A concise study in Thomistic theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, aiming primarily to mediate the controversy, within the Thomist camp, between Maritain and his opponents over "the Science-Philosophy problem": is science a field of knowledge distinct from philosophy, and if so wherein? Against both Maritain and his opponents the author argues for a more basic distinction between metaphysics and philosophy of nature; but in favor of Maritain he supports the separation of certain empiriological sciences, along (...) with mathematics, from philosophy of nature. -- L. K. B. (shrink)

It is an unfortunate fact of academic life that there is a sharp divide between science and philosophy, with scientists often being openly dismissive of philosophy, and philosophers being equally contemptuous of the naivete ́ of scientists when it comes to the philosophical underpinnings of their own discipline. In this paper I explore the possibility of reducing the distance between the two sides by introducing science students to some interesting philosophical aspects of research in evolutionary biology, using biological (...) theories of the origin of religion as an example. I show that philosophy is both a discipline in its own right as well as one that has interesting implications for the understanding and practice of science. While the goal is certainly not to turn science students into philoso- phers, the idea is that both disciplines cannot but benefit from a mutual dialogue that starts as soon as possible, in the classroom. (shrink)

Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline with the aim of studying the cognitive basis of religious belief. Despite the great variation in theories a number of common features can be distilled and most theories can be situated in the cognitivist and modular paradigm. In this paper, I investigate how cognitive science of religion (CSR) can be made better by insights from John Dewey. I chose Dewey because he offered important insights in cognition long (...) before there was cognitive science and because his ideas are influential in the recent enactivist movement. The relevance of Dewey’s thought for CSR will be discussed under three headers: embodiedness, embeddedness and anti-modularity. I focus on these points because embodiedness and embeddedness are important features of Dewey’s view on cognition and because his ideas are useful for criticizing modularity. I will first give a brief overview of the most influential theories in CSR. Then I will discuss how existing theories in CSR can be improved on the first two points and criticized on the third. (shrink)

With contributions from founders of the field, including Justin Barrett, E. Thomas Lawson, Robert N. McCauley, Paschal Boyer, Armin Geertz and Harvey Whitehouse, as well as from younger scholars from successive stages in the field's development, this is an important survey of the first twenty-five years of the cognitive science of religion. Each chapter provides the author's views on the contributions the cognitive science of religion has made to the academic study of religion, as well (...) as any shortcomings in the field and challenges for the future. Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-five Years calls attention to the field whilst providing an accessible and diverse survey of approaches from key voices, as well as offering suggestions for further research within the field. This book is essential reading for anyone in religious studies, anthropology, and the scientific study of religion. (shrink)

Preview: This is the second volume of the double issue of Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture devoted to the relationship between science and religion. The contributions across these two volumes have mostly been concerned with, and argued for, various aspects of a non-reductive view of this relationship, according to which reality is not limited to what the natural sciences can tell us about it. That is the view that science and religion are not in (...) conflict, or that the advances made by the natural sciences do not undermine religion as an adequate means of addressing the big questions humanity faces. This is not only a very welcome but also exciting result confirming that after many decades of an almost complete monopoly of scientific naturalism in English language philosophy the field is beginning to open up to a more diverse range of views. This development has made it possible for philosophers in the analytic tradition to engage with topics of deep human importance in a serious and systematic way. (shrink)

PeterKevern believes that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) provides a justification for the idea of spiritual care in the health services. In this paper, I suggest that he is mistaken on two counts. First,CSRdoes not entail the conclusionsKevern wants to draw. His treatment of it consists largely of nonsequiturs. I show this by presenting an account ofCSR, and then explaining whyKevern's reasons for thinking it rescues ‘spirituality’ discourse do not work. Second, the debate about spirituality‐in‐health is about (...) classification: what shall count as a ‘spiritual need’ and what shall count as ‘spiritual care’. It is about the politics of meaning, an exercise in persuasive definition. The function of ‘spirituality’ talk in health care is to change the denotation of ‘spiritual’, and attach its indelibly religious connotations to as many health‐related concepts and practices as possible.CSR, however plausible it may be as a theory of the origins and pervasiveness of religious belief, is irrelevant to this debate. (shrink)

A cognitive scientific approach to religion reveals the moral role of religion in human evolutionary history and provides insight into the continuing influence of religion in human affairs. While morality can be understood and justified apart from any religious foundation, religion cannot be separated from its moral function. After setting out the evolved cognitive bases of religious beliefs and behaviors, a model for the nexus between religion and morality is developed. From this it follows that (...) religions constitute moral worldviews that emerge from and tap into deep moral and emotional instincts. This makes religion, and moral worldviews more generally, profoundly important, but also makes them dangerously problematic. A case study of the intersection of religion, race, and politics in contemporary American presidential politics will be used to explicate these ideas. Keywords: religion, morality, cognitive science, evolution, worldviews. (shrink)

This volume examines the diversity of new scientific theories of religion, by outlining the logical and causal relationships between these enterprises.

In ancient Greece and Rome magical and religious healing continued to be practised at the same time as a burgeoning of research and learning in the natural sciences was promoting a seemingly more rational and scientific approach to medicine. Was there, then, a dichotomy in medical treatment or was the situation more complex? This paper draws on historical textual sources as well as archaeological research in examining the question in more detail. Some early texts, such as the Egyptian papyri from (...) about 2,600 bc and the Hippocratic Corpus from the third and fourth centuries bc, contain an intriguing mixture of scientific and religious material. Archaeological evidence from, for example, sites of healing sanctuaries from ancient times, show medical prescriptions used as part of votive offerings and religious inscriptions on surgical instruments, while physicians were prominent among donators to shrines. Other archaeological finds such as the contents of rubbish tips, buried hoards, sepulchral deposits and stray artefacts from occupation levels, have also added to the archive of medical material available for discussion. The paper concludes that such intertwinings of religion and science were not only common in Roman medicine but, in fact, continue into the present time. (shrink)

Excerpt from Science Et Religion dans la Philosophie Contemporaine Avant d'aborder l'etude des rapports de la science et de la religion, tels qu'ils se presentent dans la societe actuelle, il y a interet a faire une revue rapide de l'histoire de ces rapports dans les civilisations dont la notre est l'heritiere. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important (...) historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In Consecrating Science, Lisa Sideris argues that an anthropocentric and science‐based cosmology encourages human arrogance and diminishes a sense of wonder in human experience immersed in the natural world, as found in diverse cultural and religious traditions. I agree with her that science elevated to a commanding worldview, scientism, is a common and contemporary mistake, to be deplored, a lame science. But I further argue that science has introduced us to the marvels of deep nature (...) and vastly increased our human appreciation of nature as a wonderland at levels great and small. Sideris is right to fear consecrating science. She—and the humanists, sages, and saviors—need also to fear blindness to what science has to teach us about cosmogenesis and wonderland Earth. (shrink)

The "New Atheist" movement of recent years has put the science-versus-religion controversy back on the popular cultural agenda. Anti-religious polemicists are convinced that the application of the new sciences of the mind to religious belief gives them the final weapons in their battle against irrationality and superstition. What used to be a trickle of research papers scattered in specialized scientific journals has now become a torrent of books, articles, and commentary in the popular media pressing the case that (...) the cognitive science of religion can finally fulfill the enlightenment dream of shrinking religion into insignificance, if not eliminating it altogether. James W. Jones argues that these claims are demonstrably false. He notes that cognitive science research is religiously neutral; it can be deployed in many different ways in relation to the actual belief in and practice of religion: to undermine it, to simply study it, and to support it. These different approaches, Jones suggests, reflect the background assumptions and viewpoints brought to the interpretation of the data. The goal of this book is not to defend either a general religious outlook or a particular religious tradition, but to make the case that while there is much to learn from the cognitive scientific study of religion, attempts to use it to "explain" religion are exaggerated and misguided. Drawing on scientific research and logical argument Can Science Explain Religion? directly confronts the claims of these debunkers of religion, providing an accessibly written, persuasive account of why they are not convincing. (shrink)

Theories in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) are sometimes seen as debunking religious or supernatural beliefs (SBs). To date, arguments have been produced by proponents on both sides, with some claiming that debunking would result and others claiming that it would not. In this paper, I depart from the approach taken by others and offer an approach based in broadly Bayesian methods of updating subjective probability assignments, including classical Bayesian formulas as well as comparative ratios and Jeffrey (...) conditionalization. I argue that debunking may take place, but only if specified conditions are met. One way to show that debunking takes place would be to show that the probability of some CSR theory naturalistically explaining SBs diminishes when it is postulated that SBs have epistemic warrant. Another alternative would be to show that CSR theories are less likely to succeed in explaining the origin of SBs if SBs have warrant than if they lack warrant. It can also be helpful to consider the role played by uncertain and even ineffable judgments. Either way, debunking SBs does not follow simply from CSR but must be considered in light of prior epistemic commitments and the role they play in evaluating probabilities. (shrink)

I review the book “Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-Five Years.” I discuss all the papers in the book and highlight some recurrent issues.

This is the outline: 1. Introduction – Quelques remarques sur Dieu 2. Science et religion vont-elles se rencontrer ? 3. Le conflit va-t-il tout emporter ? 4. Au coeur du problème : une version sclérosée du dogmatisme 5. Quelle posture pour la rencontre entre science et religion ? 6. Y a-t-il une synthèse à l’horizon ? À quelles conditions ?

Abstract.In this essay I examine the new sciences of religion, spanning the traditional fields such as the psychology, sociology, and anthropology of religion to new fields such as the economics, neurosciences, epidemiology, and evolutionary psychology of religion. The purpose is to welcome these approaches but also delineate some of their philosophical and theological limitations. I argue for pluralistic methodologies in the scientific study of religious and spiritual phenomena. I argue that religious persons and institutions should welcome these (...) investigations, because science affects only interpretative strategies and does not present a fundamental challenge to core religious commitments. Indeed, the new sciences of religion can help religions in becoming more effective and wholesome. I am critical of confusing the scientific study of religion with scientism and trace this ideological project back to August Comte. In the end I deconstruct the metaphoric boundary that places religion on the inside as the object and science as the subject on the outside looking in. (shrink)

JOHN WORRALL (ABOUT TO APPEAR –W ITH REPLY BY DEL RATZCH – IN PETERSON AND VANARRAGON (EDS) CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. BLACKWELL) We get the ages of rock, and they get the rock of ages; we work out how the heavens go and they work out how to get to heaven.

What are the epistemological implications of the cognitive science of religion (CSR)? The lion’s share of discussion fixates on whether CSR undermines (or debunks or explains away) theistic belief. But could the field offer positive support for theism? If so, how? That is our question. Our answer takes the form of an evidential argument for theism from standard models and research in the field. According to CSR, we are naturally disposed to believe in supernatural agents and these beliefs (...) are constrained in certain ways. The three main theories of this supernatural disposition are byproduct theories, adaptationist theories, and hybrid theories. We argue that our supernatural disposition—as understood by any of the main theories—is more surprising and improbable given naturalism than theism and thus serves as evidence for theism over naturalism. (shrink)

Modern sociology and anthropology proposed from their very beginnings a scientific study of religion. This paper discusses attempts to understand religion in this ‘scientific’ way. I start with a classical canon of anthropology and sociology of religion, in the works of E. B. Tylor, Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Science aims to be a discourse that transcends local identities; it is deeply cosmopolitan. To offer a local metaphysics as its basis would produce a discourse that was (...) not recognizable as a contribution to the cosmopolitan conversation of the sciences. So, a science of religion cannot appeal to the entities invoked in any particular religion; hence the methodological atheism of these three founding fathers. This cosmopolitan ideal, the calling of the scientist, on the one hand, and the concern to understand the ideas of other cultures, on the other, can pull in different directions. Understanding requires us to appeal to our own concepts but not to our own truths. In the explanations, though, truth – the universal shared reality – has to matter, because the scientific story of religion has to work for people of all faiths and none, precisely because it is cosmopolitan. Not everything we call a religion will have historical Christianity's laser-like focus on ontological truth-claims. But as long as there are people making truth-claims in the name of religion, there will be the possibility of a tension between the very idea of a science of religion and some of the multifarious collections of beliefs, practices and institutions that make up what we now call ‘religions’. (shrink)

Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has inspired a number of debunking arguments against god-belief. They aim to show that the belief-forming processes that underlie belief in god(s) are unreliable. The debate surrounding these arguments gives the impression that CSR offers new scientific evidence that threatens the rationality of religious belief. This impression, however, is partly misleading. A close look at a few widely discussed debunking arguments shows, first, that CSR theories as such are far from providing sufficient empirical (...) evidence that the belief-forming processes behind god-belief are unreliable. Thus, appealing solely to CSR theories makes a debunking argument weak. Second, there are strong arguments that also invoke CSR, but these gain their strength primarily from more familiar claims about evolutionary epistemology and religious diversity. What CSR actually does in these arguments is providing an explanation of why people might believe in gods even if gods did not exist. But explaining is not debunking. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science (...) of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs. (shrink)

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan was a prominent South Asian reformer of Islam who focused on the reconciliation of science and Islam in his most influential texts. This article aims to analyze the implications of science becoming the dominant discourse in nineteenth-century South Asia for the conception of Islam and religion in general. Sayyid Ahmad is an intriguing example because he actively participated in religious as well as scientific discourses since as early as the 1830s. After a concise (...) outline of his early writings, his stances toward science and reason shall be compared with his later writings, primarily those written after 1870, to uncover the impact of the increasing influence of science in South Asia during the latter half of the nineteenth century. In his later writings, Sayyid Ahmad accomplishes a complex effort of translation, claiming mutual compatibility of science and Islam. The question of how this influences his conception of Islam and religion will be addressed, exploring whether this process should be described as a mere adoption of foreign discourse? Or does it trigger transformative effects? (shrink)

Hume was a cognitive scientist of religion avant la lettre. His Natural History of Religion (1757 [2007]) locates the origins of religion in human nature. This paper explores similarities between some of his ideas and the cognitive science of religion, the multidisciplinary study of the psychological origins of religious beliefs. It also considers Hume’s distinction between two questions about religion: its foundation in reason (the domain of natural theology and philosophy of religion) and (...) its origin in human nature (the domain of cognitive science of religion). (shrink)

This article discusses the use of evolutionary theory in the cognitive science of religion (CSR), with special attention to critical issues and new developments. In the first part of the article, I will discuss the definition of evolution and describe the Modern Synthesis (or neo-Darwinian theory). In the next part, I will consider various evolutionary perspectives in CSR, including evolutionary psychology, sexual selection, gene-culture co-evolution, and cultural evolution. In the final part, I will turn to the problems with (...) the Modern Synthesis and present a new approach based on network theory, with potential applications to the study of biological and cultural systems. Keywords: cognitive science of religion, evolution, modern synthesis, cultural evolution, gene regulatory networks, evo-devo, deep learning. (shrink)

Sur la base des travaux théologiques publiés par Ernst Troeltsch entre 1900 et 1913, rassemblés dans le volume 111 de ses Oeuvres , nous cherchons à montrer comment s'est précisée sa pensée sur la théologie durant cette période. Dans le but de l'intégrer à la culture scientifique, il lui assigne pour méthode et site l'histoire de la religion en général, et pour tâche propre l'exploration des connaissances normatives qui se dégagent de la finalité de cette histoire. La tâche spécifique (...) de la théolo­gie chrétienne est de situer la prédication de Jésus et celle de l'Église dans l'histoire universelle de la religion et de subvenir aux besoins spirituels de la communauté ; il lui trace, dans cette perspective, un programme de « dogmatique » inspiré de Schleiermacher.L'intérêt actuel de la pensée de Troeltsch est de souligner les condi­tionnements historiques du christianisme auxquels doit se soumettre la théologie. Cependant, ni son épistémologie ni sa conception téléologi­que de l'histoire ne peuvent fonder la méthode d'une théologie pour aujourd'hui. Trop préoccupé du déploiement de Hélée religieuse, il ne permet pas de penser la révélation de l'Absolu dans la contingence de l'événement et de la chair du Christ. Mais son souci du divorce entre la pensée chrétienne et la culture occidentale moderne nous encourage à frayer les voies du « libre christianisme » auquel il aspirait.On the basis of the theological works published by Ernst Troeltsch between 1900 and 1913, brought together in volume III of his Works , we would like to show how his thinking on theology during this period became more precise. In order to integrate it into scientific culture, he uses a method and background in the history of religion in general, and more particularly the exploration of normative knowl­edge that comes out of the finality of this history. The specific task of Christian theology is to situate the preaching of Jesus and that of the Church in the universal history of religion and to provide for the spiritual needs of the community. In this perspective he traces a program of “dogmatics" inspired by Schleiermacher.Today's interest in the thought of Troeltsch is to point out the historical conditions of a Christianity that ought to defer to theology. Nevertheless, neither his epistemol­ogy nor his theological conception of history are capable of laying the ground for a theological method today. Too preoccupied about the use of the religious Idea, he does not allow for reflection on revelation of the Absolute in the contingency of the event and theflesh of Christ. But his concern about the divorce between Christian thought and modern occidental culture encourages us to trace the paths of a 'free Chris­tianity " to which he aspires. (shrink)

Naturalistic explanations for religious beliefs, in the form of the cognitive science of religion, have become increasingly popular in the contemporary sphere of philosophy and theology. Some...

The cognitive science of religion seeks to find genuine causal explanations for the origin and transmission of religious ideas. In the cognitive approach to religion, so-called intuitive and counter-intuitive concepts figure importantly. In this article it is argued that cognitive scientists of religion should clarify their views about the explanatory and semantic role they give to counter-intuitive concepts and beliefs in their theory. Since the cognitive science of religion is a naturalistic research programme, it (...) is doubtful that its proponents can remain neutral on important ontological questions. (shrink)

_The Science of Religion: A Defence_ offers a brilliant overview of Donald Wiebe’s contributions on methodology in the academic study of religion, of the development of his thinking over time, and of his intellectual commitment to 'a science of religion'.

This article discusses “explaining away” arguments in the cognitive science of religion. I distinguish two rather different ways of explaining away religion, one where religion is shown to be incompatible with scientific findings and one where supernatural entities are rendered superfluous by scientific explanations. After discussing possible objections to both varieties, I argue that the latter way offers better prospects for successfully explaining away religion but that some caveats must be made. In a second step, (...) I spell out how CSR can be used to spell out an argument of the second kind. One argument renders religion superfluous by claiming that it results from a cognitive bias and one does the same by claiming religion was a useful evolutionary adaptation. I discuss some strengths and weaknesses of both arguments. (shrink)

The last 15 years or so has seen the development of a fascinating new area of cognitive science: the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Scientists in this field aim to explain religious beliefs and various other religious human activities by appeal to basic cognitive structures that all humans possess. The CSR scientific theories raise an interesting philosophical question: do they somehow show that religious belief, more specifically belief in a god of some kind, is irrational? In this (...) paper I investigate this question and argue that CSR does not show that belief in god is irrational. (shrink)

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped (...) throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or “adaptivism” concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution. (shrink)

La réception tardive de l'oeuvre de Ernst Troeltsch en France nous a privés d'une analyse du christianisme originale et féconde. Elle nuance et enrichit ce que nous savons, au travers de la réflexion wébérienne notamment, des relations de la religion chrétienne à la modernité. Contre les interprétations usuelles qui datent l'émergence de cette dernière de la Renaissance et de la Réforme, Troeltsch insiste sur la centralité des Lumières comme marquant la fin de la civilisation ecclésiastique ; c'es l'évanouissement de (...) la référence structurante à l'ordre divin qui inau­gure selon lui l'entrée dans le monde moderne. Sur la base de ce constat, il s'agit pour Troeltsch de trouver une définition du christianisme qui soit en adéquation avec les conditions de l'existence moderne. Dans son ouvrage datant de 1912, « Les doctrines sociales des Églises et groupes chrétiens », il examine les types « Église », « secte » et « mystique » pré­sents depuis les origines évangéliques, circonscrivant trois modes socio­logiques et éthiques qu'il confronte à la modernité. Aucun n'est seul adéquat. Pour durer, le christianisme devra, selon Troeltsch, renoncer à la réalisation d'un programme éthique d'essence religieuse au sein du monde et accepter le cantonnement de la foi dans l'intimité des cons­ciences, tout en s'articulant à des réalités socio-culturelles à l'échelle de tous dont les formes et les transformations internes sont toujours à repenser.The delayed reception of the work of Ernst Troeltsch in France deprived us of an analysis of an original and fertile Christianity. It nuances and enriches what we know, especially through a Weberian reflection, about the relations of the Christian religion and modernity. Against the customary interpretations that date the emergence of the latter from the Renaissance and the Reformation, Troeltsch insists on the centrality of the Enlightenment as marking the end of an ecclesiastical civilization. It is the disappearance of the structuring reference to the divine order that inaugurated, according to him, the entrance to the modern world. On the basis of this observation, Troeltsch is interested in finding a definition of Christianity that would be in harmony with the conditions of modern existence. In his work dating from 1912, "The social doctrines of the Churches and Christian groups ", he examines the categories "Church", "sect", and "mystic" that were present evangelical times, circumscribing three sociological and ethical modes, which he confronts with modernity. No single one is adequate. In order to endure, Christian­ity should, according to Troeltsch, renounce the attempt to set up an ethical program of a religious essence in the heart of the world and accept the establishment of a faith in the intimacy of consciences, all the while adapting its« to socia-cultural realities applicable to everyone, of which the forms and internal transformations are always to be re-thought. (shrink)

What are the epistemological implications of the cognitive science of religion? The lion’s share of discussion fixates on whether CSR undermines theistic belief. But could the field offer positive support for theismtheism? If so, how? That is our question. Our answer takes the form of an evidential argument for theism from standard models and research in the field. According to CSR, we are naturally disposed to believe in supernatural agents and these beliefs are constrained in certain ways. The (...) three main theories of this supernatural disposition are byproduct theories, adaptationist theories, and hybrid theories. We argue that our supernatural disposition—as understood by any of the main theories—is more surprising and improbable given naturalism than theism and thus serves as evidence for theism over naturalism. (shrink)

This article explores the cognitive science of religion to discover the challenges and implications for theology by providing a critical evaluation through the lenses of philosophy, evolutionary biology and neuroscience. Four positive implications of the cognitive science of religion are identified. Firstly, the cognitive science of religion can function as a strong hermeneutics of suspicion through which theologians can criticise dogmatic and authoritative religions and theologies. Secondly, the cognitive science of religion invites (...) scholars of religion and theology to consider the evolutionary view of survival. Thirdly, the discipline's counter-intuitive concept of God could provide the basic material for theology. Finally, the folk psychology this field depends on can be harmonised with theological emphasis on the weak. Despite these positive comments, it is nevertheless clear that a constructive encounter between the cognitive science of religion and theology should follow a careful critique of the former. Thus, I criticise that the cognitive science of religion is excessively dependent on evolutionary psychology and overemphasises a reductionist explanation of religion as merely a by-product of evolutionary adaptation whilst this study almost precludes any non-reductionistic model of mind such as 'connectionism' and 'enactionism' as well as any holistic interpretation of religion and theology. Finally, I conclude that theology of nature is a proper method for establishing a relationship between the cognitive science of religion and theology.CONTRIBUTION: The article explores a critical accommodation of and response to the cognitive science of religion which has challenged religion and theology. It can not only expand transdisciplinarity of theological discourse, but also enrich the discourse of science and religion. (shrink)

Ideas from Wittgenstein are developed to provide suggestions about how both the nature and acquisition of normative cognition in the cognitive science of religion might be understood. As part of this there is some consideration of more general issues about the nature and status of claims in the cognitive science of religion and of appropriate methodologies for the cognitive study of religion. The gaining, production, distribution and implementation of social concepts and norms involves the possession (...) of certain cognitive skills and the ability to use symbols, concepts and norms as normative cognitive tools. Normative cognition is connected to social facts which are construed in Searle’s sense as being any facts involving collective intentionality. For example, socially shared belief systems which are concerned with the ideological bases for the distribution and exercise of power are large systems of social facts whose functions involve the generation of norms. Social facts can be included in Wittgenstein’s account of meaning being socially constructed by a community of language users. Such inclusion enables his ideas, especially those from On Certainty about world pictures, to be usefully employed to clarify the ontological and epistemological status of social facts in a way which does not involve reification along with articulating their significance for normative cognition. World pictures include social facts with socially shared belief systems being a significant constitutive element. (shrink)

This volume introduces readers to emergence theory, outlines the major arguments in its defence, and summarizes the most powerful objections against it. It provides the clearest explication yet of this exciting new theory of science, which challenges the reductionist approach by proposing the continuous emergence of novel phenomena.

Nineteenth-century Harvard faculty and students looked to philosophical ideas about the proper and effective study of nature as the model of rationality to which their religion must conform. As these ideas changed, notions of rationality changed and so did Harvard religion.

Science and religious faith are two of the most important and influential forces in human life, yet there is widespread confusion about how, or indeed whether, they link together. This book describes this combination from the perspective of one who finds that they link together productively and creatively.

This volume argues that theistic philosophy should be seen not as an “armchair” enterprise but rather as a critical endeavor to bring philosophy of religion into close contact with emerging sciences of religion. This text engages with the rationality of religious belief by investigating central problems and arguments in philosophy of religion from the perspective of new naturalistic research. A central question the book analyzes is whether findings in cognitive science of religion falsify or undermine (...) religious ideas and beliefs. With regard to CSR, this volume offers a sustained and critical investigation of the neutrality and positive-relevance view, before offering a re-appraisal of the conflict view. The text argues that when scrutinizing these views, much more attention must be paid to specific normative premises that allow empirical findings to have epistemic relevance. A novel feature is the theoretical application of analytical epistemology in virtue-epistemology to the central question of whether CSR undermines, supports, or is neutral with respect to religious belief. This book appeals to upper-level students and researchers in the field. (shrink)

This article examines the notions of “intuitive” and “counterintuitive” beliefs and concepts in cognitive science of religion. “Intuitive” states are contrasted with those that are products of explicit, conscious reasoning. In many cases the intuitions are grounded in the implicit rules of mental models, frames, or schemas. I argue that the pathway from intuitive to high theological concepts and beliefs may be distinct from that from intuitions to “folk religion,” and discuss how Christian theology might best interpret (...) the results of studies in cognitive psychology of religion. (shrink)