The reflection on the preconditions and evolution of science has played a decisive role in the development of Ernst Cassirer's philosophy, contributing to its functional and thus inherently pluralistic and holistic view of knowledge. To present Cassirer's conception of physics as an open symbolic formation enables us to reveal and study the radical features of his epistemological model: (1) the fundamental process of generating sense-units and meaning in its constitutive character for each attempt of objectification, (2) its driving and (...) structuring dynamics that touches and transforms all elements of knowledge, the a priori included, (3) the strategies of justification that allow maintaining the claim of truthfulness in spite the fact that Cassirer's open model integrates contingency and transitoriness as an inherent part of knowledge. It thus becomes clear that Cassirer's term 'symbol' cannot be reduced to its habitual representational acceptation, for its key theoretical function is to overcome the inconsistencies of dualistic epistemological models. It is this re-orientation, a kind of 'second Copernican revolution', that allows Cassirer to go beyond traditional dichotomies and to propose a larger frame in which to appreciate the diversity of human understanding. (shrink)

radicalization of Kant 's critical project inverts or opposes traditional readings of Kant 's critical program. Nietzsche aligns both Kant and Schopenhauer with what he named the effectively, efficiently pathological optimism of the rationalist drive to knowledge, patterned on the Cyclopean eye of Socrates in The Birth of Tragedy. For the rest of Nietzsche's writerly life, the name of Socrates would serve both as a signifier for the historical personage marking the end of the "tragic age" of the Greeks as (...) well as a signifier for the philosophical tradition of the idealization of reason, knowledge, and truth: Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Schopenhauer. (shrink)

The debates now in progress about the interactions of science and art compel one involuntarily to recall that such discussions have been held more than once and were, a long time ago, perhaps no less heated. It suffices to cite virtually at random certain statements of Pisarev, for example , for us to see, as in a cloudy mirror, both today's advocates of scientism and the romantics of art. Does this mean that all we need is to bear in (...) mind the wise words of the past in order to advance, as is believed by Iu. I. Kagarlitskii ? Obviously, that is not the case. The problem of the interactions of science and art is a philosophical one, not one of natural science; and the results achieved in debates of the past do not eliminate the questions of world view that constantly arise anew. Philosophy has no axioms such as exist in mathematics. It is therefore difficult to imagine that subsequent history has added nothing whatever to the understanding of past debates. Yet reference to these debates would appear to be essential today to clarify at least one of the factors of the problem we have posed. It might appear that this factor has been pointed to, but it has constantly been beclouded by the explanations of how science influences artists, and how art influences scientists who are at the same time artists, by references to the unity of the creative character of science and art, and so forth. In my opinion, it is essential, however, to emphasize that the very problematics of the interactions between science and art depend on the social and cultural environment within which they exist and are discussed. Turning to the past, we can see that science and art are not realms of activity handed down to humankind "since the creation of the world." They develop in the "body," if one may put it thus, of a specific socium, a specific culture. It would, of course, be absurd to conceive of any direct contact between science and art without the mediation of human beings, of society, of culture. Moreover, the debates themselves are determined by the level at which science and art are found within a given sociocultural space, by virtue of which analysis of these debates may provide data to the researcher for an understanding of the direction of social development. The RST influences all spheres of human activity, including the esthetic. Today, however, particularly in the West, there is a tendency to elevate the significance of the RST to an absolute, to explain many processes by its direct influence on social consciousness independently of the social conditions in which it occurs. Therefore, it would seem to be methodologically important for today's debates to demonstrate, on the basis of some concrete historical material, the connection between those shifts in social consciousness that sometimes explain the direct influence of progress in science and technology, on the one hand, and certain sociocultural conditions, on the other. (shrink)

Richard Harvey Brown's pioneering explorations in the philosophy of social science and the theory of rhetoric reach a culmination in Social Science as Civic Discourse. In his earlier works, he argued for a logic of discovery and explanation in social science by showing that science and art both depend on metaphoric thinking, and he has applied that logic to society as a narrative text in which significant action by moral agents is possible. This new work is (...) at once a philosophical critique of social theory and a social-theoretical critique of politics. Brown proposes to redirect the language and the mission of the social sciences toward a new discourse for a humane civic practice. (shrink)

The given work analyses several aspects of the concept te’cnh in Plato´s philosophy. At the same time, it deals with his attempt of finding a type of behaviour which counts on the same features as arts and science, in other words, a behaviour based on rational principles that will enable us to act accurately and according to our principles. He followed the path of Socrates in the process of the search for such behaviour. The sophists were proud of teaching (...) a certain political science that, to Plato, is an exclusive property of the philosopher who is acquainted with the intelligible forms and makes use of the right calculation and measure. According to him, these two would be the undeniable components of what we may define as the good and happy life of an individual.El presente estudio analiza algunos aspectos del concepto de te’cnh en la filosofía de Platón, así como el intento, siguiendo los pasos de su maestro, de encon- trar un tipo de conducta que posea las mismas características que las artes y ciencias, es decir, basado en principios racionales capaces de proporcionar fiabilidad y precisión a nuestras acciones. Los sofistas se preciaban de enseñar una ciencia política que, en opinión de Platón, es propiedad exclusiva del filósofo que conoce las Formas inteligibles y se sirve del cálculo y la medida, componentes indispensables de toda vida buena y feliz. (shrink)

In this chapter, the author considers a line of thought in Arthur Danto in that regard about the bearing of cognitive science on our construal of changes in art. For Danto, a key to the issue of how to understand change in art forms and artistic identities is found in his fundamental notion that both the meaning and the style of a work of art are historically indexed; that is, they depend on historical conditions. Danto's skepticism about facile changes (...) in world views is born out of his theory that the history of such changes has certain logic, defined over basic or fundamental forms of action and thought; a view that applies as much to science as it does to art. The author's claim has been that recent research shows that, logical deductions aside, advances in cognitive science suggest that the language of art criticism will have to change. (shrink)

We humans are a curious species. Of all the life forms that inhabit the earth, we alone strive to make sense of the world in which we find ourselves. For thousands of years we understood the world through stories. Our ancestors told stories of how the world began, how our people originated and came to be at this place, and how those people across the river or beyond the mountains came to be where they are. Some stories were of animals (...) and plants in our neighborhood, and their powers to help us, feed us, or cure our ailments. But in the last few centuries, starting in Europe and spreading throughout the world, a new way of understanding began competing with storytelling as a means of comprehending our world. Science supplanted storytelling largely because it empowered us to transform the world in ways that were unimaginable to our ancestors. We understand the world scientifically by describing the world instead of by telling stories about it. The stories our ancestors told no longer explain the world, but are data within the world, part of the world that science describes. Our stories have become myths, cultural artifacts that may be interesting and a subject of study, but cannot possibly be true. Yet even in societies that have thoroughly embraced science as a means of understanding the world, myths remain a powerful force. Myth and science exist side by side, often creating confusion and conflict. (shrink)

My object in these lectures is to show that Science is a form of Art, though not of fine art; in other words, that it is one example of a process of which fine art is the most obvious example, the process of making out of certain materials a result into which the mind itself enters. Clearly enough the material of the artist, whatever it be, marble or paints or tones or words, is moulded by the artist into a (...) shape which it would not possess unless something in the artist’s mind found expression in it. Science also is a product of the mind’s interference and is artificial. But it differs from fine art, I shall try to show, in this respect: in fine art the material is controlled from the mind, or at least it is principally controlled from the mind. In science the material is the facts of nature ; but while science would not be except for the mind of the scientist, the work is controlled from the side of the material itself, and his mind is instrumental to the product rather than in some sense intrinsic to it as in fine art. (shrink)

Like a number of other writers, [Gunther S.] Stent contends that in essential ways science and art are comparable. As he puts it: "Both the arts and the sciences are activities that endeavor to discover and communicate truths about the world" . Although one cannot but sympathize with the desire to bring the so-called Two Cultures together, a viable and enduring union will not be achieved by ignoring or glossing over important differences. Using the behavior of scientists, artists, and (...) laymen as empirical evidence, the first part of this essay will argue that Stent's union is a shotgun marriage, not one made in heaven, and that his attempt to wed different disciplinary species results not in fecund insight but barren misconception. In the second part, I will suggest that this misunderstanding arises because, like many scientists Stent fails even to recognize the existence of the humanist - that is, the theorist and critic of the arts. Yet the humanities must be included, and areas of inquiry within them differentiated, if diverse disciplines are to be related to one another in a coherent and consistent way. Leonard B. Meyer's most recent book is Explaining Music: Essays and Explanations. He is also the author of Emotion and Meaning in Music, The Rhythmic Structure of Music , and Music, The Arts, and Ideas, awarded the Laing Prize in 1969. See also: "Against Literary Darwinism" by Jonathan Kramnick in Vol. 38, No. 2. (shrink)

Current attempts by historians of science to revise the narrative of the Scientific Revolution by using the concept of the Baroque have important implications for art history. Correspondences between baroque art and baroque science gain new complexity when the rational, epistemologically optimistic image of the New Science is put in doubt. Rather than a method of objective observation, early seventeenth‐century science and art share an acceptance of the constructed nature of reality, of human epistemological limitations and (...) of the role of passions in the observation of the world. While Caravaggio has revolutionised art precisely through his interest in questions of knowledge and sensorial perception and by his subversive transformation of Renaissance epistemological values and ideals, this article concentrates on the work of Jusepe de Ribera, who made the senses and their shortcomings a major theme of his pictorial research. Ribera's epistemology is examined in the context of contemporary Neapolitan philosophy and science. Through the confrontation of some of the Spagnoletto's paintings with the work of figures such as Giovanni Battista della Porta, Federico Cesi and particularly Colantonio Stigliola, it becomes clear that early modern Neapolitan faith in rational knowledge was more ambiguous than is sometimes assumed. (shrink)

This article provides a brief systemic analysis of the key concepts of the so-called new science of art developed by the Austrian art historian Hans Sedlmayr. The result of Seldmayr’s pursuits are reflected in creation of his own philosophy of art and culture based on a particular worldview. The cognition of the whole, along with individual and unique, underlies this science. Understanding is the goal of scientific knowledge for Sedlmayr. It suggests not only abstract knowledge, but peculiar existential (...) experience as well. Sedlmayr interprets the understanding of artwork as its contemplation, which in turn, is identical to its actualization or presence. In Seldlmayr’s art of science, epistemologies and ontologies merge into each other. He interprets artworks simultaneously as the event and as the social organism, which overcomes the linearity of time and fragmentation of plurality. This artificial complex system, built on the paradoxical identity of the single and plenty, is both finite and infinite. Sedlmayr’s views encompass classical and nonclassical approach towards cognition of the whole. He relies on the principles of monism, seeking to reduce all concepts to a single basis, single point of singularity that designates the synthesis of all the moments of the whole and can be expressed by a single category. The main category, which resembles the center of the opposites, is the “midpoint”. The aforementioned ideas are consistent and logical only in such scientific worldview that identifies ontology and epistemology, which implies the unity of contemplation and phenomenon of the artwork. Therefore, in Sedlmayr's constructions, actualization or revival of the artwork is identical with its comprehension. The systemic approach towards the artwork reflected in the theoretical works of Sedlmayr extends the boundaries of art science and converges with philosophy. (shrink)

This article critically examines the usual characterisation of aesthetics as a fragmented, marginal or secondary field within phenomenology. The author argues in particular that phenomenological aesthetics was consciously and systematically articulated as an explicit programme in at least two distinct contexts of early phenomenology: the international project to establish a general science of art known as the Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, and the Soviet State Academy of Art Studies (GAChN). The article explores the impact of these institutions on the development of (...) early phenomenological aesthetics, highlighting how that development was conditional on the idea of a general science of art. It suggests, in conclusion, that these two attempts to mobilise phenomenology as a science of art, while abortive, cast important light not only on early phenomenological aesthetics, but on phenomenology’s fundamental relation with aesthetics. (shrink)

Cognitive advancement is not always a matter of acquiring new information. It often consists in reconfiguration--in reorganizing a domain so that hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and resources come to light. Several modes of reconfiguration prominent in the arts--metaphor, fiction, exemplification, and perspective--play important roles in science as well. They do not perform the same roles as literal, descriptive, perspectiveless scientific truths. But to understand how science advances understanding, we need to appreciate the ineliminable cognitive contributions (...) of non-literal, non-descriptive symbols. (shrink)

Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) has become famous, and perhaps infamous, for many reasons. Presently, he is probably most widely-known for his paintings of plants and animals in his very popular book, Art Forms in Nature, originally collected and published in 1904. However, in addition to Haeckel’s art, he is also well-known for his advocacy of Darwinism and Social Darwinism, for first coining the term ‘ecology,’ for having his work utilized by Nazi pseudo-scientists (Dombrowksi in Tech Commun Q 12:303–319, 2003), and for (...) famously (perhaps fraudulently) producing drawings of animal and human embryos so as to confirm his biogenetic law (Gould in Nat Hist 109:44–45, 2000). Something Haeckel is not as well-known for today is the fact that he seemed to be both a strenuous critic of the metaphysical and moral philosophies of Immanuel Kant and yet also something of an adherent to Kant’s aesthetic views. In terms of metaphysics and morality, Haeckel sought to exorcise Kant’s ideas as much as possible from twentieth century views on science, humanity, and nature; however, in terms of aesthetic theory, Haeckel seemed to embrace a distinctly Kantian approach to art and artworks. This essay proposes to: (1) carefully examine Haeckel’s refutations of some of Kant’s central metaphysical concepts, (2) explore some of the, arguably Kantian, assumptions underlying Haeckel’s approach to aesthetics and his artistic practice, and (3) combine these two lines of inquiry into a portrait of Haeckel’s mind as one that is conflicted about the role Kantian philosophy, and more specifically Kantian noumena, should play in twentieth century science and art. This unresolved tension in Haeckel’s mind regarding Kant’s noumenal realm is what I propose to call his ‘Kant Problem’. (shrink)

Due to its considerable length, this article has been published in two parts. Part 1, which appeared in the previous issue of the journal, discussed the intriguing relationship between John Dewey and Albert Barnes, as well as the circumstances behind the creation of the Barnes Foundation and its art education programs. Following this, it established both areas of convergence and divergence in Barnes’s and Dewey’s understandings of aesthetic formalism, organic unity, and form and content in the arts. Part 2 now (...) builds on these findings to explore important differences in their respective treatments of the significant sociocultural context of art. After returning briefly to the question of aesthetic formalism in... (shrink)

We planned this meeting a long time ago, and are very happy that the editors of Voprosy literatury are displaying such good, I would say consistent, initiative in strengthening friendship, joint efforts, and collaboration with social scientists and representatives of other sciences, particularly with philosophers and the journal Voprosy filosofii.

With the findings of microbiome studies, many artists have begun to focus on environments where microbe-human interactions take place. Beyond the sharp boundaries that separate human and microbe as distinct entities, they give an artistic expression to the complex symbiotic modes between them. Güneş-Helen Isitan’s work _Hybridities_: _Almost Other_ creates images of human-microbe symbiosis by mobilizing certain scientific tools and discourses and the possibilities of photographic medium. A “microbe-image” emerges as a result of multi-species interaction and is produced by traversing (...) multi-sites. Its apparatus contains its own production process as a problematic knot to be posed. This requires approaching the work with a certain ethnographic sensibility. As a result, manufacturing life through microbe-images becomes inseparable from technical, scientific, social, methodological, and philosophical issues that are weaved in _Hybridities_: _Almost Other_’s “biophotographic” apparatus. (shrink)

This volume explores the roles and uses of abstraction in scientific and artistic practice. Conceived as an interdisciplinary dialogue between experts across histories and philosophies of art and science, this collection of essays draws on the shared premise that abstraction is a rich and generative process, not reducible to the mere omission of details in a representation. When scientists attempt to make sense of complex natural phenomena, they often produce highly abstract models of them. In the history and philosophy (...) of art, there is a long tradition of debate on the function of abstraction, and - more recently - its relation with theories of depiction. Adopting a process-oriented perspective, the chapters in this volume explore the epistemic potential of a diversity of practices of abstracting. The systematic analysis of a wide range of historical cases, from early twentieth-century abstractionist painting to contemporary abstract photography, and from nineteenth-century physics to recent research in biology and neurosciences, invites the reader to reflect on the material lives of abstraction through concrete artefacts, experimental practices and theoretical and aesthetic achievements. Abstraction in Science and Art: Philosophical Perspectives will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in aesthetics, philosophy of science, and epistemology, as well as to historians of science and art, and to practicing artists and scientists interested in exploring foundational questions at the heart of the creative practice of abstracting. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the forgotten friendship between Georges Bataille and the Russian émigré poet and philosopher Boris Poplavsky. Comparing their solar metaphysics, I focus on conceptions of friendship, sacrifice and depersonalisation. First, I retrace Bataille’s relationship to early Surrealis and Russian circles in interwar Paris, with a focus on his friendship with Irina Odoevtseva. I then offer a novel reading of Poplavsky’s poetry through the lens of Bataille’s philosophy, analysing a recurring motif that I call ‘dark solarity’. Uncovering a hidden (...) intertextual dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I argue for Poplavsky’s lasting impact on Bataille’s anti-Icarian sun cult. Finally, my paper demonstrates how Poplavsky’s writings on solar sacrifice, excess and friendship left marks on Bataille’s vision of a solar community, embodied in the secret society Acéphale. The dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I finally suggest, is a missing piece in the entangled history of Russian and French philosophy, as well as an original contribution to discourses on friendship in twentieth-century continental thought. (shrink)

A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted (...) rather a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality. The main statement is formulated as follows: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to some mathematical structure in a way constructive. Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. The sketch of the proof is organized in five steps: a generalization of epoché; involving transfinite induction in the transition between Peano arithmetic and set theory; discussing the finiteness of Peano arithmetic; applying transfinite induction to Peano arithmetic; discussing an arithmetical model of reality. Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom. The present paper follows a pathway grounded on Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve the generalized arithmetic necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics: reality is included within mathematics. That latter mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic. The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the problem which mathematics refers to our being; and vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons would confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. The Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics is involved to illustrate that ontology. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being is discussed again in a new way A few directions for future work can be: a rigorous formal proof of the principle as an independent axiom; the further development of information ontology consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much more natural for Hilbert mathematics; the development of the information interpretation of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics; the description of consciousness in terms of information ontology. (shrink)

Huxley, the visionary, was a key figure in creating modern science education. He was also an employee and bureaucrat of the Science and Art Department most of his working life. The Department was established to organize scientific education for the working class, and many of Huxley's activities on its behalf marked him as a friend of the artisan. It will be argued here that Huxley's vision of working-class scientific education was not in the least radical but reflected the (...) middle-class views of his contemporaries in the Department. Their views, by as late as the 1890s, were little different from those of the late 1840s. Huxley's attitudes were narrowly meritocratic and in no way egalitarian. By the time the movement for technical instruction gathered momentum in the 1880s, Huxley's ideas were distinctly old-fashioned. (shrink)

Art as Capital addresses the role of art and creative practices in contemporary society.

According to the nineteenth-century polymath William Stanley Jevons, natural phenomena were a series of combinations and permutations. The similarity between Jevons’s account and other instances of ars combinatoria has already been noticed, although this topic has never been extensively addressed in the literature. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of Jevons’s logic and philosophy of science as an art of combinations. Jevons’s position shall be compared with other theorizers in the ars combinatoria tradition. This study will show (...) that Jevons’s art of combinations differed from some of the examples here investigated because he did not believe that language could refer to the primal constituents of reality. Rather, his art of combinations relied on the order of combinations, displaying a syntactical nature. Consequently, I will argue that Jevons’s logic presents some relevant similarities to Leibniz’s characteristica. Moreover, this analysis offers a contribution to the study of Jevons’s logic, highlighting the ontological implications embedded in his logical thought. (shrink)

Debate over the status of medicine as an Art or Science continues. The aim of this paper is to discuss the meaning of Art and Science in terms of medicine, and to find out to what extent they have their roots in the field of medical practice. What is analysed is whether medicine is an "art based on science"; or, the "art of medicine" has lost its sheen (what with the rapid advancements of science in course (...) of time, which has made present day medicine more sophisticated). What is also analysed is whether the "science of medicine" is a pure one, or merely applied science; or the element of science in it is full of uncertainty, simply because what is accepted as "scientific" today is discarded by medical practitioners tomorrow in the light of newer evidence. The paper also briefly touches upon how, in the field of present medical education, the introduction of medical humanities or humanistic education has the potential to swing the pendulum of medicine more towards the lost "art of medicine". The paper concludes by saying that the art and science of medicine are complementary. For successful practice, a doctor has to be an artist armed with basic scientific knowledge in medicine. (shrink)

Photographs deployed in scientific investigation also are circulated and consumed in popular culture. Examination of the work of an early-twentieth-century consulting U.S. scientist in commercial print advertising illuminates a still mostly unwritten history concerning scientific realism, photography, and American advertising’s middle-class audiences. The work of American scientific photographer Philip O. Gravelle with American national advertising campaigns during the early decades of the twentieth century draws attention to the myriad creative uses of scientific photography during the first decades of the twentieth (...) century. It also sheds new light on a pivotal era in the evolution of illustration-based American print advertising. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis article compares the corresponding effects in science and art of a change in the intuition of time at the beginning of this century. McTaggart's distinction between linear time and tense time is applied to the question of whether linear perspective requires a notion of time as succession. It is argued that the problem of self-representation is a basic problem for this kind of uniform space-time because of the contradiction between this model's need for a privileged point of (...) view and its simultaneous denial of such a possibility. (shrink)

In this article I explore naturalism as a joyful science by focusing on how Nietzsche and Deleuze appropriate an Epicurean legacy. In the first section I introduce some salient features of Epicurean naturalism and highlight how the study of nature is to guide ethical reflection on the art of living. In the next section I focus on Nietzsche and show the nature and extent of his Epicurean commitments in his middle period writings. In the third and final main section (...) my attention shifts to Deleuze and to showing how he fruitfully demonstrates the intersection of physics and ethics in the Epicurean method of thinking. I am interested in Epicureanism since, as both Nietzsche and Deleuze show, it holds ethics to be central to philosophical inquiry and activity: we study nature not simply as an end in itself but as a way of better understanding how we can promote a flourishing life. Our being in the world is not to be guided by myths and illusions, especially of a supernatural kind, but rather by the affirmation of the positive power of an immanent and multiple nature and by the joy that results from recognizing the diversity of its elements. (shrink)

This essay centralizes and explores Ernst Cassirer’s concept of style. Although it does not emerge as much as the concept of form or symbol in Cassirer’s corpus, style plays a major—if intrinsic—role throughout the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. I shall examine how Cassirer’s conception of style is derived from Goethe’s theory of art and why it is fundamental to Cassirer’s theory of knowledge. Style is considered the defining feature of the cultural sciences, as well as the sign of the anthropological (...) character of the natural sciences, and, more generally, as the creative principle underlying all objectivity. I argue that it is therefore justified to read style as the fundamental yet variable expression of our symbolic relation to reality. Indeed, style refers neither to an abstract principle nor to a predetermined truth: it is a formative force actualizing itself in the incessant diversification of its forms. In so doing, Cassirer’s underexamined concept of style proves highly relevant in our times of epistemic and cultural pluralism. (shrink)

Nowadays the answer to the question “what is logic?” seems very simple and obvious—“logic is a science,” and after that usually one says what is this science about. As for the expressions “logic is an art” or “the art of logic,” then they are only metaphors or some kind of “façon de parler” used in serious scientific discourse. One of my aims here is to trace the line of development of dichotomy “logic as an art—logic as a (...) class='Hi'>science” and to demonstrate that both these feat uses of logic have fundamental historical roots and play very important conceptual role in any theorizing about logic. Despite the fact that logic is undoubtedly a science, it can be interpreted as an art, moreover, the analysis of logic from this point of view expands, it seems to me, the researching possibilities in the field of the philosophy of logic at least in better understanding what is logic, what creates its unity independently from the historical period of its development, topics, and methods. (shrink)

V svojem predavanju imam »humanistiko« za skupek disciplin, katerega jedro tvorijo duhoslovne znanosti – Geisteswissenschaften. Zgodovino oziroma zgodovinopisje pa imam za paradigmatični primer humanistične znanosti, ki se razprostira med dvema poloma znanosti in umetnosti. Na enem koncu imamo postopke, povezane z ravnanjem z arhivi, na drugem pa vrsto besednih izrazov, zaradi katerih je zgodovina del literature. Vmes je dihotomija med razlago in razumevanjem, namreč obseg sredstev, s katerimi zgodovinarji skušajo odgovoriti na vprašanja kot: »Zakaj se je zgodil ta dogodek, zakaj (...) so ti ljudje naredili to in to?« Ta razlagalna sredstva s stavkom zato – lingvistično značilnostjo vseh odgovorov na vprašanje zakaj? - ravnajo na različne načine; vemo pa, kako raznolika je lahko raba stavka zato. Spoj razlage in razumevanja med poloma dokumentaristike in literature, je dober primer zmesi znanosti in umetnosti v celotnem zgodovinskem procesu.My lecture takes “Humanities” to be the collection of disciplines, the core of which is the human sciences – Geisteswissenschaften. History or historiography on the other hand provides a paradigmatic example of human sciences, which expands between two poles of science and art. On the one side, there are procedures related to archive management, and on the other a number of lexical expressions which make history part of literature. In between there is a dichotomy between interpretation and understanding, i.e. a scope of means with which historians attempt to answer the questions such as: “Why has this event taken place, why have these people done this and that? In the because sentence, these interpretative means– linguistic feature of all answers to the question why? – behave in various ways; it is well-known, however, how numerous and various the usage of the sentence because can be. The combination of interpretation and understanding between the poles of documentaries and literature provides an excellent example of the mixture of science and art in the historical process as a whole. (shrink)

Due to its considerable length, this article is being published in two parts. This first part briefly discusses the intriguing relationship between John Dewey and Albert Barnes, as well as the circumstances behind the creation of the Barnes Foundation and its innovative art-education programs. This is followed by examination of the prominent roles of aesthetic formalism and organic unity in Barnes's writings about the arts and their less technical, more contextual positioning in Dewey's aesthetics. To end Part 1 of the (...) article, a similar dynamic is revealed in Barnes's and Dewey's ultimately disparate understandings of the relationship between form and content in the arts.In its heyday during the first part of the... (shrink)

Micrographs obtained using different instrumental techniques are presented with the purpose of demonstrating their artistic qualities. The quality of uniformity currently dominates the aesthetic assessment in scientific practice and is discussed in relation to the classical appreciation of the interplay between symmetry and asymmetry in arts. It is argued that scientific and artistic qualities have converged and inspired each other throughout millennia. With scientific discoveries and inventions enriching the world of communication, broadening the space for artistic creativity and making artistic (...) products more accessible than ever, science inevitably influences artistic creativity. On the other hand, the importance of aesthetic principles in guiding scientific conduct has been appreciated by some of the most creative scientific minds. Science and arts can be thus considered as parallel rails of a single railroad track. Only when precisely coordinated is the passing of the train of human knowledge enabled. The presented micrographs, occupying the central part of this discourse, are displayed with the purpose of showing the rich aesthetic character of even the most ordinary scientific images. The inherent aesthetic nature of scientific imagery and the artistic nature of scientific conduct have thus been offered as the conclusion. (shrink)

This essay derives its focus on poetry from the subtitle of Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft: “la gaya scienza.” Nietzsche appropriated this phrase from the phrase “gai saber” used by the Provençal knight-poets (or troubadours) of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries — the first lyric poets of the European languages — to designate their Ars Poetica or “art of poetry.” I will begin with an exploration of Nietzsche’s treatment of poets and poetry as a subject matter, closely analyzing his six aphorisms which (...) deal explicitly with poets and poetry. Having considered The Gay Science as a text about poetry, I will then briefly explore three further ways in which The Gay Science can be thought of as itself a kind of poetry. The result of these analyses is an understanding of Nietzsche’s own understanding of philosophy (and of the best way to live) as also a form of poetry. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay argues that historians of science who seek to embody our oxymoronic self-description must confront both contradictory terms that define our common enterprise—that is, both “history” and “science.” On the history/methods side, it suggests that we embrace the heterogeneity of our institutional arrangements and repudiate the homogeneous disciplinary model sometimes advocated by Thomas Kuhn and followed by art history. This implies that rather than treating the history of science as an end in itself, we consider (...) it a means to a variety of historical ends, think of ourselves as a tool-making community, and jettison moralistic assertions of scientific exceptionalism. To do so, this essay argues—on the science/subject side—that we rebrand the subject of our historical inquiry as “episcience,” a neologism that stands in relation to “science” as the new field of epigenetics does to the old genetics. Episcience encompasses both the material activities of the relevant sciences and their “surround” (environment, milieu, Umgebung) to reframe knowledge making to include the material processes that put science “in play” and make its findings matter beyond science. The essay concludes that “the history of science” is an oxymoron that makes sense to the extent that its practitioners acknowledge that the history of science is important not just because science is important, but because its history is. (shrink)

International relations (IR) is both a science and an art, i.e. the unity of object and subject. Traditional international relations theories (IRT) have probed the laws of IR, in an attempt to become the universal science. IRT have developed into a class doctrine that defends the legitimacy of the western international system as a result of proceeding from the reality of IR, while neglecting its evolving process, and overlooking the meaning of art and the presence of multi-international systems. (...) In other words, IRT have turned into what Karl Marx might have deemed as the vulgar international relations theories (VIRT). For this reason, we declare the end of international relations theories. This phenomenon can only be negated by the so-called Chinese School, which will set the sustainable and harmonious relations among nations, between state and non-state actors, and within states and non-state actors (in one word ) in five life-forces of economy, politics, military, culture, and religion. Consequently, this will bring about a real regression of nationality and compatible development of various international systems. (shrink)