Após uma breve retomada da tese bergsoniana da inadequabilidade da linguagem para exprimir o real, a qual está presente ao longo de toda sua obra, este trabalho procura mostrar de que modo Matéria e Memória contempla uma reflexão mais profunda sobre esta temática ao apresentar a noção de “aparelho motor”, que permite vislumbrar o fundamento corporal dos hábitos da prática e aponta para o problema de transpô-los sem crítica ao âmbito do pensamento especulativo. Em linhas gerais, procuramos entender de que (...) modo a concepção de linguagem de Bergson – com base na definição da palavra como entidade de ordem motora ou mais explicitamente como aparelho motor – anuncia um acesso extralingüístico ao real. (shrink)

The moral pedagogy in the fairy tales is simple but powerful. It is concentrated in the lesson –according to the message of Aristotle– about the finalism sense of action: it makes the child understand that the human answer is an action with sense. Everything in the fairy tale leads to this perspective. Moreover, it exemplifies MacIntyre’s opinion which says that current people tend to be proto-aristotelian and to understand their own life and the other’s in narrative terms.

The moral pedagogy in the fairy tales is simple but powerful. It is concentrated in the lesson -according to the message of Aristotle- about the finalism sense of action: it makes the child understand that the human answer is an action with sense. Everything in the fairy tale leads to this perspective. Moreover, it exemplifies MacIntyre's opinion which says that current people tend to be proto-aristotelian and to understand their own life and the other's in narrative terms.

A temporal counterpart to Bell nonlocality would intuitively refer to the presence of non-classical correlations between timelike-separated events. The hypothesis of temporal nonlocality has received recent support in the literature, and its existence would likely influence the future development of physical theories. This paper shows how Adlam's principle of temporal locality can be violated within a protocol involving indefinite causal orders. While the derivations of Leggett-Garg inequalities or the temporal CHSH inequality are said to involve problematic assumptions preventing a targeted (...) probing of a well-defined notion of temporal nonlocality, the present test is free from such worries. However, it is shown that the test, in its current formulation, fails to be fully model-independent. We provide several considerations regarding the physicality of ICOs that could help alleviate this drawback. In the present work, a specific physical interpretation of ICOs in terms of retrocausal influences would explain the presence of temporally nonlocal correlations. It is argued that, as the physical underpinnings of temporal nonlocality might also account for standard Bell nonlocality, focusing on the former as a consequence of ICOs might support under-explored strategies to make sense of the latter. (shrink)

Temporal non-dynamists hold that there is no temporal passage, but concede that many of us judge that it seems as though time passes. Phenomenal Illusionists suppose that things do seem this way, even though things are not this way. They attempt to explain how it is that we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. More recently, Cognitive Error Theorists have argued that our experiences do not seem that way; rather, we are subject to an error that leads us mistakenly (...) to believe that our experiences seem that way. Cognitive Error Theory is a relatively new view and little has been said to explain why we make such an error, or where, in the cognitive architecture, such an error might creep in. In this paper we remedy this by offering a number of hypotheses about the source of error. In so doing we aim to show that Cognitive Error Theory is a plausible competitor to Phenomenal Illusion Theory. (shrink)

This volume constitutes the proceedings of the First International Conference on Temporal Logic (ICTL '94), held at Bonn, Germany in July 1994. Since its conception as a discipline thirty years ago, temporal logic is studied by many researchers of numerous backgrounds; presently it is in a stage of accelerated dynamic growth. This book, as the proceedings of the first international conference particularly dedicated to temporal logic, gives a thorough state-of-the-art report on all aspects of temporal logic research relevant for computer (...) science and AI. It contains 27 technical contributions carefully selected for presentation at ICTL '94 as well as three surveys and position papers. (shrink)

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective “sense of agency”. However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause-effect sequence. (...) In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, have been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people’s causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding. (shrink)

Within the framework of 'Temporalities and the Urban Fabric: Co-Producing Liminal Spaces in Transitional Epochs,' this rigorous examination unravels the multilayered nuances of temporality and its intimate relationship with urban spaces in times of transition. The research delineates the intricate interplay between public exhibitions, urban realms, and socio-political paradigms, particularly within the dynamic settings of the metropolitan entities of Houston and Amsterdam. These cities, as epitomes of temporal urban flux, become fertile grounds for exploring the ephemeral essence of liminal (...) spaces and their transformative manifestations. By weaving together diverse academic domains – from Design Computation and Fabrication to Urban Communities and Spatial Justice – this study underscores the symbiotic fusion of Augmented Reality (AR) and Gamification within the broader canvas of urban temporalities. Crucially, the research accentuates the transformative potential of Extended Reality (XR) in augmenting the theoretical and methodological contours of urban studies within these transitional epochs. (shrink)

Este artículo introduce y elabora el concepto de compromiso temporal discrecional, que se define como la asignación no forzada de un cierto número de minutos, horas, días o cualquier otra unidad de tiempo que una persona consagra, o querría consagrar, a realizar una actividad. El compromiso temporal discrecional encuentra su expresión en el ocio y en las facetas agradables del trabajo (que, en la práctica, se experimentan como ocio). Los tipos de compromisos temporales que realizan las personas les ayudan a (...) dar forma a sus estilos de vida laborales y de ocio, constituyendo así parte del modelado de estos estilos de vida. En el ocio, la naturaleza de estos compromisos varía sustancialmente en función de sus tres formas: ocio serio, casual o basado en proyectos. En el ámbito de los Estudios de Ocio se usa generalmente el “uso del tiempo” como una idea objetiva. Al contrario que la expresión “compromiso temporal discrecional”, aquella no connota habitualmente ningún sentido subjetivo de iniciativa o intencionalidad personales (asignar tiempo, reservar tiempo, etc.). (shrink)

The process of revising the beliefs of the actors involved in receiving new information in the form of a representation‐occurrence, i.e. new and contradictory to their current beliefs, can lead to a radical transformation of the latter. This chapter describes two cases such as weak transformation of beliefs and the radical transformation of beliefs. The possible worlds semantics sets out several principles, two of which are of particular interest to us: the rational actor follows a principle of minimal change and (...) seeks to preserve his most “rooted” beliefs. On the contrary, actors who would perform a level 3 Batesonian learning would ipso facto interpret given events in a different way than before, so that they would now interpret the same one in a context that has become different. Such learning would introduce a temporal disruption in individual actors' flow of thoughts, and consequently in the evolution of their network. (shrink)

The paper first introduces the concept of implicit and explicit temporality, referring to time as pre-reflectively lived vs. consciously experienced. Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the dimensions of present, past and future. It is further shown that temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are (...) closely connected: While implicit temporality is characterised by tacit bodily functioning and by synchronisation with others, explicit temporality arises with states of desynchronisation, that is, of a retardation or acceleration of inner time in relation to external or social processes. These states often bring the body to awareness as an obstacle as well. On this basis, schizophrenia and melancholic depression are investigated as paradigm cases for a psychopathology of temporality. Major symptoms of schizophrenia such as thought disorder, thought insertion, hallucinations or passivity experiences may be regarded as manifesting a disturbance of the constitutive synthesis of time consciousness, closely connected with a weakening of the underlying pre-reflective self-awareness or ipseity. This results in a fragmentation of the intentional arc, a loss of self-coherence and the appearance of major self-disturbances. Depression, on the other hand, is mostly triggered by a desynchronisation from the social environment and further develops into an inhibition of the conative–affective dynamics of life. As will be shown, both mental illnesses bear witness of the close connection of temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Within legal contexts, a claim to knowledge requires that the evidence appealed to fulfills conditions established by legal norms that belong to the so-called Evidence Law. In addition, the epistemic justification presupposed by this kind of knowledge is temporally affected by the changing character of the evidence and the judicial discretion usually exercised in the applications of the Evidence Law. As such, these two scenarios involve three modalities: temporal, epistemic, and deontic. The present paper philosophically discusses the links between these (...) modal dimensions in the above legal context. Based on the discussion, a formal tense-epistemic-deontic logic is developed. That is, the paper characterizes a formal language formally representing the three dimensions through specific logical operators, constructs a formal semantics for the language, and specifies a formal logical system. Finally, the soundness and completeness of the system with respect to the semantics is proved. (shrink)

This paper describes Stein’s process for establishing the relationship between finite and temporal beings and infinite and eternal beings. Although she contextualized her research in the fields of phenomenology and ontology, Stein surpasses these domains. Following Aquinas, Stein uses the analogy to trace the ascension towards the sense of Being. However, this process ends up being closest to the position of St. Augustine. In fact, the author first draws up a temporal analogy and then a personal analogy starting from two (...) pieces of evidence: the certainty of “I am”, from Augustine, Descartes, and Husserl, and the divine “I am”, according to the name that God reveals of himself: “I am who I am”. Through personal analogy, the author goes beyond phenomenology and ontology, while the category “person” includes both being and an attributed fullness. (shrink)

Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.

Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case (...) that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception. (shrink)

This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A- theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. I close with some remarks on the relation between veridicalism (...) and a deflationary view of the A versus B debate. I suggest that the deflationary view can provide further support for veridicalism. (shrink)

It is taken as obvious that there is a conflict between objective temporal passage and relativistic physics. The traditional formulation of temporal passage is the movement of a universe-wide set of simultaneous events known as the NOW; the Special Theory of Relativity implies that there is no NOW and therefore no temporal passage. The vast majority of those who accept the B-theory blockworld—the metaphysics of time most friendly to relativistic physics—deny that time passes. I argue that this denial is a (...) mistake. Contrary to overwhelmingly popular opinion, temporal passage does not need a NOW. To show this, I defend a relational understanding of temporal becoming, that I call B-coming, in which an event y B-comes with respect to x iff R xy. Temporal passage is then the difference in what has B-come at one point in a thing’s history with respect to what has B-come at an earlier point in that thing’s history. Appealing to this kind of relation is a strategy that is well-known but has been widely dismissed. This dismissal is premature; I show that the essential elements of temporal passage do not necessarily require a NOW. There can be passage without presentness. (shrink)

Common wisdom, philosophical analysis and psychological research share the view that memory is subjectively positioned toward the past: Specifically, memory enables one to become re-acquainted with the objects and events of his or her past. In this paper I call this assumption into question. As I hope to show, memory has been designed by natural selection not to relive the past, but rather to anticipate and plan for future contingencies -- a decidedly future-oriented mode of subjective temporality. This is (...) not to say memory makes no reference to the past. But, I argue, past-oriented subjectivity is a by-product of a system designed by natural selection to help us face and respond to the "now and the next". I discuss the implications of the proposed temporal realignment for research agendas as well as the potential limitations of measures designed to explore memory by focusing on its retentive capabilities. (shrink)

Abstract Temporal Externalism is the view that future events can contribute to determining the present content of our thoughts and utterances. Two objections to Temporal Externalism are discussed and rejected. The first is that Temporal Externalism has implausible consequences for the epistemology of biology and other taxonomic sciences (Brown, 2000). The second is that it is committed to implausible claims about dispositions.

Temporal experience and its radical alteration in schizophrenia have been one of the central objects of investigation in phenomenological psychopathology. Various phenomenologically oriented researchers have argued that the change in the mode of temporal experience present in schizophrenia can foreground its psychotic symptoms of delusion. This paper aims to further the development of such a phenomenological investigation by highlighting a much-neglected aspect of schizophrenic temporal experience, i.e., its non-emotional affective characteristic. In this paper, it denotes the type of an experience (...) wherein an afflicted individual experiences a pervasive pull or attraction coming from the past, present, and future. By employing Husserl’s account of affection, I argue that such an affectively prominent temporal experience is not yet another abnormality that happens to be present in schizophrenia. Instead, it is indicative of the core disturbance that underpins the schizophrenic temporal mode of experience. I identify such a disturbance as ‘affective modification dysfunction’ and employ it as a core concept with which I synthesize and organise heterogeneous components of schizophrenic temporal experience in their conceptual unity. For the sake of clear description, I organise those components into the following categories: 1.) Time Stop 2.) Ante-festum 3.) Déjà vu/vécu and 4.) Time Fragmentation. I conclude by demonstrating how approaching schizophrenic temporal experience from its affective dimension can further help us better understand its pre-psychotic phase known to precipitate schizophrenic primary delusion, i.e., delusional mood. (shrink)

Temporal regularities in speech, such as interdependencies in the timing of speech events, are thought to scaffold early acquisition of the building blocks in speech. By providing on-line clues to the location and duration of upcoming syllables, temporal structure may aid segmentation and clustering of continuous speech into separable units. This hypothesis tacitly assumes that learners exploit predictability in the temporal structure of speech. Existing measures of speech timing tend to focus on first-order regularities among adjacent units, and are overly (...) sensitive to idiosyncrasies in the data they describe. Here, we compare several statistical methods on a sample of 18 languages, testing whether syllable occurrence is predictable over time. Rather than looking for differences between languages, we aim to find across languages (using clearly defined acoustic, rather than orthographic, measures), temporal predictability in the speech signal which could be exploited by a language learner. First, we analyse distributional regularities using two novel techniques: a Bayesian ideal learner analysis, and a simple distributional measure. Second, we model higher-order temporal structure—regularities arising in an ordered series of syllable timings—testing the hypothesis that non-adjacent temporal structures may explain the gap between subjectively-perceived temporal regularities, and the absence of universally-accepted lower-order objective measures. Together, our analyses provide limited evidence for predictability at different time scales, though higher-order predictability is difficult to reliably infer. We conclude that temporal predictability in speech may well arise from a combination of individually weak perceptual cues at multiple structural levels, but is challenging to pinpoint. (shrink)

In humans, at least some of our ability to coordinate our actions with the timing of events in our world is due to our capacities for temporal cognition. However, controversy arises when we turn our attention to the animal world. In this paper, we will argue that apes, especially Taï Chimpanzees, are capable of genuine temporal cognition. That is, they are able to mentally represent and reason about time in cognition. We do this by developing a novel analysis of the (...) mental representation of time. (shrink)

Temporal binding occurs when people observe two events that they believe to be causally connected: They underestimate the length of the interval between those two events, when compared with their estimates of the length of intervals between events they believe to be causally unrelated. I discuss temporal binding in the context of Dennett and Kinsbourne’s (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15(2), 183–201, 1992) influential argument levelled at what they call ‘Cartesian Materialism’. In particular, I argue that Dennett and Kinsbourne’s argument trades (...) on a representational conception of perceptual experience, which blurs the boundary between perception and judgement, and that temporal binding can serve as a case study for developing an alternative, relational, conception of perceptual experience and of its relation to judgement. Based on research on the mechanisms underlying temporal binding, I provide an explanation of the phenomenon in which perception and judgement play clearly distinct roles. (shrink)

Habits and habitudes are peculiar in that they are both a condition of human agency, as well as one of its most significant hurdles. They open up the world by providing us with ways of being within it (e.g., how we perceive, move about, and generally orient ourselves in space). However, they also confine our worldly behavior given their repetitive and often predictable nature. This tension between spontaneity and repetition arises out of the two-fold temporal structure of habits – i.e., (...) the habitual body simultaneously directs us toward the future and the past. An understanding of this tension is generally important for thinking about how individuals can do things differently. More urgently, this work has applications in the treatment of addictions and other compulsive behaviors where the difficulties of disrupting habitual repetition are much more pronounced. (shrink)

Recent influential accounts of temporal representation—the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of inter-temporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and inter-temporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter-temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores (...) potential upshots of this result for theorizing about rationality and representation. (shrink)

This study consists of two parts. The first is an examination of the hermeneutical presuppositions underlying the theory of models that Moshe Idel has applied to the study of Jewish mysticism. Idel has opted for a typological approach based on multiple explanatory models, a methodology that purportedly proffers a polychromatic as opposed to a monochromatic orientation associated with Scholem and the so-called school based on his teachings. The three major models delineated by Idel are the theosophical-theurgical, the ecstatic, and the (...) magical or talismanic. Idel’s hermeneutic rests on the assumption that the phenomenon of Jewish mysticism (as the phenomenon of religion more generally) cannot be essentialized, and therefore no one methodological approach should be privileged as the exclusive means to ascertain it. In the second part of this study, I raise the possibility that affirming set patterns of thought and a unified system of symbols that link together kabbalists from different historical periods might not inevitably implicate the scholar in a methodological reductionism. Moving beyond a binary logic, which is still operative in the postmodern dichotomy of truth and dissimulation, I surmise that the polysemic nature of the text that may be elicited from kabbalistic sources is not dependent on the rejection of laying claim to an inherent and original intent that is recoverable through proper philological attunement. Multivocality and essentialism are not mutually exclusive. Kabbalah, I submit, is a cultural-literary phenomenon that illustrates an open system in which each moment is a mix of newness and repetition, each event a renewed singularity. The hermeneutical praxis appropriate to this system displays a temporality linked to the conception of time in its most rudimentary form as an instant of diremptive reiteration, the repetition of the same as different in the renewal of the different as same. The tendency to generalize, therefore, should not be misconstrued as viewing the variegated history of Jewish mystical doctrines and practices monolithically. (shrink)

In the context of truth-functional propositional many-valued logics, Hájek’s Basic Fuzzy Logic BL [14] plays a major rôle. The completeness theorem proved in [7] shows that BL is the logic of all continuous t -norms and their residua. This result, however, does not directly yield any meaningful interpretation of the truth values in BL per se . In an attempt to address this issue, in this paper we introduce a complete temporal semantics for BL. Specifically, we show that BL formulas (...) can be interpreted as modal formulas over a flow of time, where the logic of each instant is Łukasiewicz, with a finite or infinite number of truth values. As a main result, we obtain validity with respect to all flows of times that are non-branching to the future, and completeness with respect to all finite linear flows of time, or to an appropriate single infinite linear flow of time. It may be argued that this reduces the problem of establishing a meaningful interpretation of the truth values in BL logic to the analogous problem for Łukasiewicz logic. (shrink)

Tactile exploration often involves sequential touches interspersed with stimulus-free durations. Whereas it is obvious that texture-related perceptual variables, irrespective of the encoding strategy, must be stored in memory for comparison, it is rather unclear which of those variables are held in memory. There are two established variables—“intensity” and “frequency”, which are “temporally global” variables because of the long stimulus integration interval required to average the signal or derive spectral components, respectively; on the other hand, a recently established third contender is (...) the “temporally local” variable that codes for kinematic profiles of very short, suprathreshold events in the vibrotactile signal. Here, we present the first psychophysical evidence that temporally local variables can be stored in memory. To that end, we asked participants to detect changes in pulsatile indentation stimuli at their fingertips with and without a gap of 1 s between stimulus presentations. The stimuli either contained global variables alone, or a mix of local and global variables. We found, first, that humans are much better at detecting a change in stimuli when local variables are available rather than global ones alone—as evident by the fact that 21 compared to only 6 participants out of 25 yielded a valid psychophysical curve, respectively. Second, this observation persists even when there is a gap between the stimuli, implying local variables must be stored in memory. Third, an extensive array of relevant intensity definitions failed to explain participants’ performance in any consistent manner, which implies that perceptual decisions were less likely to be driven by intensity coding. Taken together, our results suggest that humans perform pulsatile change detection utilizing local pulse shape, and to a lesser degree global pulse rate, and that both parameters can be stored in memory. (shrink)

Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence deals with the history of temporal logic as well as the crucial systematic questions within the field. The book studies the rich contributions from ancient and medieval philosophy up to the downfall of temporal logic in the Renaissance. The modern rediscovery of the subject, which is especially due to the work of A. N. Prior, is described, leading into a thorough discussion of the use of temporal logic in computer science and the (...) understanding of natural language. Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence thus interweaves linguistic, philosophical and computational aspects into an informative and inspiring whole. (shrink)

Temporality is a fundamental determinant of human cognition. There are, however, states of mind in which people feel that temporality changes radically and perhaps even becomes irrelevant. Here I attempt a typology of the patterns of such non-ordinary temporal experiences. The discussion is based on a phenomenological study of the special state of consciousness induced by Ayahuasca, a powerful Amazonian psychoactive brew.

The traditional debate over theories of reference of natural kind terms faces a serious dilemma. On the one hand, although direct reference theory, or the causal–historical analysis of reference to natural kinds, is still highly influential in the philosophy of language, there is a notorious “qua” problem: direct reference theory cannot uniquely determine the referents of natural kind terms. On the other hand, the standard descriptivism does not accommodate our externalist intuition. We propose temporal externalist descriptivism, where relevant future theorists (...) determine references by past speakers. This position makes the externalist intuition about reference compatible with descriptivism about natural kind terms by ensuring the possibility of mistakes in the past and present practice. It also provides a defense of the controversial claim of temporal externalism based on a descriptivist analysis of reference. While causal–historical analysis focuses on inheritance through history, a reference has both a past and a future. In this sense, reference to natural kinds is essentially a provisional phenomenon. (shrink)

Why does Plato write dialogues? Why more than one? The Temporality of Human Excellence begins with a brief introductory consideration of these questions, and concludes with a suggestion about two things: the intent of his use of this form, and the manner of its concrete realization in a set of two dozen or so dialogues. Taking up each dialogue as a separate drama, the reading seeks to focus attention on how each, by its characters, their interplay and conversation, and (...) the apparent lack of positive issue to the discussion they engage in, contributes to a sketch of human excellence as a complex power developed and grown into as consummation in the maturing, over time, of a human being. (shrink)