This paper considers a guardianship model for the legal representation of future generations. According to this model, national and international courts should be given the competence to appoint guardians for future generations, if agents who care about the welfare of posterity apply for the creation of a guardianship in relation to a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law. This reform would grant guardians of future people legal standing or locus standi before courts, that is, the right (...) to bring an action before a court of law for adjudication. Although the guardianship model faces several difficult theoretical and practical problems pertaining to the representation of different near and distant future generations, it is argued that this model – and certain other legal norms intended to protect future basic needs – can be justified on the basis of the principle of liberty. (shrink)

Human rights were analyzed and described in many writings from older times. If we consider their fame and historical value, most important ones are: Great Charter of Freedoms of 1215, the Law on Rights of 1689, the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. In Chapter 1 of Magna Carta was described the freedom of religion – it established the freedom of the English church from state interference. Today, (...) implementation of this principle, challenges the communities to examine the part they might play in the development of a liberal democracy and to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem in internal and international relations. The restitution of the expropriated congregational properties – concretely of the Islamic Community of Macedonia remains open and can reflect the level of respect of human rights in general and religious and property rights in particular. The aim of this paper is to bring some facts on actual situation regarding the implementation of religious and related rights and discuss the way this principle has found its implementation in Macedonian legislations. Also this paper will seek to identify the problems that occur regarding these rights. (shrink)

One of the still unsolved problems in liberal anarchism is a definition of social constituency in positive terms. Partially, this had been solved by the advancements of liberal discourse ethics. These approaches, built on praxeology as a universal framework for social formation, are detached from the need of any previous or external authority or rule for the discursive partners. However, the relationship between action, personal identity, and liberty within the process of a community becoming solely generated from the praxeological (...) a priori remains largely disputed. In order to develop a testable constitutional model, this study revises how the “ontological turn” was introduced into liberal theories and redefines the concept of liberty. Liberty is usually understood as a moral goal or measurement for just actions, as the generative principle of all social existence - individual and interpersonal. For this purpose, the function of performative contradiction within the mechanism of interpersonal “encounter”, as part of the co-generative process of the individual becoming and social formation was explored through the production of a game-based narrative historiography grounded on 19th century life writings. This narrative historiography was developed in the context of Swiss history, with a “design-based” research approach, and resulted in a prototype for networked storytelling through which the transformative learning process could be visible and the negotiation of competing individual visions of the future could be re-enacted. (shrink)

Mill is neither an act-utilitarian nor a rule-utilitarian. Although he professes to regard “utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions”, he in fact makes no appeal to it in determining in Utilitarianism what actions are “of more absolute obligation than any others”. Nor does he appeal to it in his arguments for the two main conclusions of his essay, On Liberty.

Political liberalism has increasingly come under fire from both the right and the left, in politics as well as in philosophy. In this new study, G.B. Madison offers a systematic rebuttal to these contemporary critics, attempting to demonstrate that the basic principles of classical liberal philosophy are not only internally valid and coherent but also directly relevant to the problems faced by society in the post-industrial age. Building on the theory of Frank H. Knight and other liberal tinkers, Madison outlines (...) the postmodern theory of reason that is presupposed within classical liberal theory and makes the case that as a political philosophy liberalism can be justified entirely within its own terms, without reference to arbitrary or absolute values. (shrink)

Although the need of freedom is definite, the concept of individual freedom, while being interpreted with legal terms, causes not only theoretical, but also practical problems. The observed two extremes of freedom are defined as any human self-expression as well as the license, where the state power is generally attributed to disregard personal freedom. In this article the freedom of expression and state enforcement jurisdiction dichotomy are addressed by discussing positive and negative conceptions of freedom and the relationship between the (...) interpretations of political liberalism and Kant and Hegel‘s philosophies. This paper aims to prove that the positive liberty is the assumption of the negative liberty. The paper based on Hegel‘s philosophy shows that freedom is the characteristic of human nature to seek identity. It is also argued that human identity can take many forms and, therefore, a person has a number of inherent rights and liberties. It is human psycho-physical identity that provides the right to life and health care; human creative identity, providing the right to privacy and freedom of occupation; human moral identity, which provides the right of dignity, and the moral autonomy of person’s social and political identity, providing the political and social rights and freedoms. This article concludes that while a person uses the given rights with integrity and the state is limiting people’s arbitrariness, there is no conflict between the freedom and state violation. (shrink)

Although J. S. Mill′s essay On Liberty was intended by its author to be read as a self-contained work, 1 and even though a careful reading would justify seeing it in this way, it has far too often been denied this right even by its defenders. There is a crucial distinction to be made between eliciting some point of substance from a particular work by an author and then turning to the rest of his work to throw further light (...) on it, and employing other texts from the corpus of his writings to put the construction on certain things said in it which the work by itself cannot sustain, thus treating the former as essentially a fragment, albeit a most important fragment, of a whole. 2 I would suggest that recourse to the latter course is justified only when the possibilities of treating it autarchically have already been explored. In this paper I propose to treat a celebrated text in the former way only because I believe that the results will show such an approach to be uniquely worthwhile, or at least fruitful enough to justify a paper conceived in this way. And, with a view to putting what I want to say about it in maximum focus I shall with one or two exceptions eschew giving supporting evidence from Mill′s other writings, even when this is permitted by the distinction I have made in this opening paragraph. (shrink)

From Descartes to Spinoza, Western philosophers have attempted to propose an axiomatic systemization of ethics. However, without consensus on the contents and objects of ethics, the system remains incomplete. This four-volume set presents a model that highlights a Chinese philosopher's insights on ethics after a 22 year study. Three essential components of ethics are examined: metaethics, normative ethics, and virtue ethics. This volume is the second part of the discussion on normative ethics. The author analyzes humanity, liberty, justice, happiness, (...) and systems of moral rules. He puts forward 26 value standards that construct a system of measuring state instruction; reveals the relationship between humanity, liberty and justice; puts forward three objective laws of happiness; and discusses the goodness of important moral rules, such as honesty, self-respect and courage. This set is an essential read for students and scholars of ethics and philosophy in general. (shrink)

Is j s mill's concept of liberty basically utilitarian? the 'utilitarian' justifies action if it promotes the ends of happiness or pleasure. But for mill liberty is neither defined nor justified by reference to any felicific calculus. Rather, His concept of liberty seems to be based on (1) natural rights theory and (2) a consideration of its social benefits.

The most famous contemporary work advancing the principles of classical liberalism and libertarianism is Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, published in 1974. Twenty-five years later on the opposite bank of the Charles River, Boston University law professor Randy E. Barnett now hopes to pick up the libertarian mantle with his first published book, The Structure of Liberty. Advancing what he simply calls “liberalism”, he offers fresh arguments for theories that many might have considered to have already received their (...) preeminent expression in Nozick’s earlier work. (shrink)

Forms of contemporary life attest to the dissolution of the concept of the ‘people’ and the renewed importance of the idea of the ‘multitude’. Though they took center stage in the seventeenth century debate that spawned much of our ethico-political lexicon, these two notions are polar opposites. The ‘people’ is by its very nature centripetal. Converging towards a general will, it acts as an interface between citizens and the State. The ‘multitude’ is plural. Fleeing all political unity, it shuns negotiations (...) with the sovereign and refuses to delegate its rights to that power; it is a recalcitrant and disobedient entity with a taste for certain forms of non-representative democracy. For example, Hobbes claims that citizens in rebellion against the State represent “the multitude against the people.” But while Hobbes spotted the greatest hindrance to the workings of the State within this multitude, Spinoza found in it the roots of liberty. The political existence of ‘multiples’ as such has been stricken from the horizon of modernity: not only by Absolute State theorists, but also by Rousseau, the liberal tradition, and the socialist movement itself. (shrink)

The purpose of our article is to contemplate, from an aesthetic-artistic vision, the principles of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by UNESCO in 2005. As a result of a restful, attentive and calm look (contemplation), we believe that the development of a line of thought capable of proposing answers to the great questions posed by the current existential and historical paradigm shift requires an effort of transdisciplinary dialogue. On the one hand, reason, as a specific and (...) differential faculty of the human being, must overcome the limits of its reduction to mere empirical scientism and redefine itself as a reason with an open horizon. On the other hand, the creation of works of art and the aesthetic experience constitutes a way of understanding the complexity and multiplicity of reality. Based on two classic works of art: "The kidnapping of the Sabinas" (Da Cortona) and "Liberty leading the people" (Delacroix) we propose a bio-aesthetic experience on the two fundamental axes on which the principles of the Declaration of UNESCO navigate, which are the centrality of the person and of society. Knowing and deepening such principles, through bio-aesthetic contemplation, is shown as a valid educational instrument, which entails the art of stimulating the capacity to reverberate the beauty existing in the world when good is manifested in human behavior and recognizing the transforming power of art, which facilitates a pedagogical and comprehensive assimilation of the principles of the UNESCO Declaration. (shrink)

By exercising their (imperfect) capacity to discriminate, people try to recognize and to understand some important differences between things that make them prefer some things to other. In this article I will use my ability to discriminate between people and societies according to a principle which plays the role of attractor, both at individual and societal levels, namely the principle of peaceable conduct. This principle allows us to discriminate at the civic level between the people who have (...) a civilized conduct and those who manifest an aggressive conduct. The category of civilized people includes individuals who (a) respect the life and bodily integrity of their fellows, (b) practice self-control, not control over others and (c) do not claim, through coercive means, the goods that their fellows have obtained by making free and peaceful use of their own faculties and capabilities. The category of aggressive people reunites (a) murderers (those who endanger the lives of their fellow), (b) tyrants (those who beslave their fellows by taking control of some of their faculties) and (c) thieves (those who claim the goods of their fellows without their consent). The civilized conduct requires high standards of action of the people who embrace it and, implicitly, considerable physical and psychical costs. The primary impulses originating in our lower Self blatantly contradict the respect for life, liberty and property of our fellows, so that it seems impossible for them to be controlled only by personal effort. Therefore, it is vital that the energy allotted to peaceable conduct by our higher Self be superior to the energy which it spontaneously mobilizes in support of the primary impulses of our lower Self. This can be achieved by feeding the people with the social energy of certain social emotions in the process of internalizing the norms of peaceable conduct. Among these emotions, contempt and shame, respectively anger and guilt stand out through the predominance of the moral dimension and force of shaping human conduct. They underlie two different moral systems – “shame morality”, and “guilt morality” respectively – that support our peaceable conduct and, ipso facto, our civilized life. (shrink)

The providential state.--The collectivist movement.--The reconstruction of liberalism.--The testament of liberty.

The challenge of pursuing sustainability in agriculture is often viewed as mainly or wholly technical in nature, requiring the reform of farming methods and the development and adoption of alternative technologies. Likewise, the purpose of sustainability is frequently cast in utilitarian terms, as a means of protecting a valuable resource (i.e., soil) and of satisfying market demands for healthy, tasty food. Paul B. Thompson has argued that the embrace of these views by many in the consumer/environmental movement enables easy co-optation (...) by agribusiness. It also reflects a critical weakness in this movement: a lack of commitment to philosophical principles that depart from the utilitarian premises of the industrial model of agriculture. This paper draws on the writings of Thomas Berry and Liberty Hyde Bailey to identify the philosophical principles of what we call planetary agrarianism. From the perspective of planetary agrarianism, the pursuit of sustainability is a broad and challenging moral, educational, and political task. Berry helps us see that it is fundamentally a project of worldview transition, which requires a new cultural narrative that must rival, in form and appeal, the mythic power of the utilitarian industrial vision. Liberty Hyde Bailey, author of The Holy Earth (1915) and a leader in the land-grant education and nature-study movements, took up the project of worldview transition in his life work. While in some ways dated and flawed, Bailey’s writings are a valuable source of guidance for developing and pursuing a viable philosophy of agriculture for the 21st century. (shrink)

What is liberty, and can it be measured? In this paper I argue that the only way to have a liberty metric is to adopt an account of liberty with specific and controversial features. In particular, I argue that we can make sense of the idea of a quantity of liberty only if we are willing to count certain purely agential constraints, such as ignorance and physical incompetence, as obstacles to liberty in general. This spells (...) trouble for traditional ‘negative’ accounts, against which I argue directly. My aim is to establish the following somewhat surprising claim: that if a political theory is to contain a principle regarding the protection, maximisation, or equalisation of some liberty, it must concern itself--on pain of conceptual incoherence--with the positive preconditions (in addition to the negative preconditions) of that liberty’s effective exercise. (shrink)

Principle 2 of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act (MCA) requires that decision-making capacity should be assumed, unless there is conclusive evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to the contrary (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005). In his article “The Paradox of the Assessment of Capacity Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005,” Ajit Shah (2011) raises the concern that the new Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS), introduced through the Mental Health Act (Department of Health 2007), conflict with this principle (...) (henceforth, the principle of presumed capacity) because, in practice, they will encourage the routine assessment of capacity even in the absence of any positive evidence of diminished capacity .. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of whether all that unites the main parts of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty—the liberty principle, the defense of free discussion, the promotion of individuality, and the claims concerning individual competence about one’s own good—is a general concern with individual liberty, or whether we can say something more concrete about how they are related. I attempt to show that the arguments of On Liberty exemplify Mill’s institutional design approach set out (...) in Considerations of Representative Government and related works. Mill’s approach reflects both his debt to Bentham and his own progressive development of the utilitarian tradition. The paper proceeds by setting out the elements of Mill’s institutional designs and then showing that On Liberty neatly applies them, thereby clarifying the structure of the arguments of On Liberty. (shrink)

I consider whether Mill intends for us to see the arguments that constitute his defense of the “Liberty of Thought and Discussion” in chapter 2 ofOn Libertyas a part of his larger case for the “harm” or “liberty” principle (LP). Several commentators depict this chapter as a digression that interrupts the flow between his introduction of this principle in the first chapter and his exposition and defense of it in the final three. I will argue instead (...) for a reading ofOn Libertyon which chapter 2 is well integrated with the rest of the essay and is in fact where Mill starts constructing his case for LP. (shrink)

This essay explores the impact of the ancient principle of the freedom of the Church—identified by the Second Vatican Council as “the fundamental principle” governing “the relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order”—on both Western civilization and the development of modern Catholic social thought. Arguing that this principle requires the articulation and institutionalization of a new understanding of society and government, it contends this principle revolutionized the structure of Western political life and (...) helped lay the groundwork for Western liberty. At the same time, it maintains that the development in contemporary Catholic social teaching that crystallizes in Dignitatis Humanae must be seen in the context of the ongoing effort of Catholic thought to understand the nature and role of the state towards which the idea of the freedom of the Church points. (shrink)

The consequences of restricting or not restricting the right to freedom of assembly are potentially magnified in transitional societies. Yet determining whether such consequences are indeed ‘harmful’, and whether their cost should be borne despite the harms caused, requires the elaboration of criteria which define what are valid and relevant harms. While a human rights framework can perform this task, open-textured rights standards prescribe neither the threshold of legal intervention nor the goals of transition. By extension, the rule of law—underpinned (...) by this rights discourse—is silent about whether liberal or communitarian ideals should inform the reconstruction of public space in conflicted or nascent democracies. Illustrated by analysis of legal interventions in parade disputes in Northern Ireland, this article argues that the rule of law is necessarily orientated by ethical consensus about its scope. Furthermore, this consensus operates as a restraint upon the degree of normative discontinuity permitted during transitional compromises. The article frames the ethical options in terms of three liberty-limiting principles—the argument from democracy, the argument for toleration, and the argument for recognition. Each suggests different parameters for the transitional project and for the role of law within it. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to argue that the principle of “publicity” constitutes a fundamental idea in Kant’s political thought. Publicity provides a central insight that binds together various strands of Kant’s political writings (on issues as diverse as the question of Enlightenment, the right of revolution, historical teleology, reflective judgment, cosmopolitan citizenship, democratic peace, and republican government), and moreover, it offers a much-needed cornerstone for a systematic exposition of his nonexistent political philosophy. Apart from some eminent examples, (...) publicity has been a rather neglected topic in the ever-expanding literature on Kant’s political ideas. Revisiting this notion will make us more attentive to his evocation of the “spirit of republicanism” over and above the letter of the law, and might prompt us to reconsider Kant’s reputation as a classical representative of liberal political thought. Indeed, it should inspire us to situate Kant’s appeal for the “public use of reason” in the vicinity of the republican ideal of political liberty. (shrink)

The installation in a society of ad hoc and contradictory legal policies over a foundation of equal liberty and justice under the rule of law results in social disorder. When these policies reflect economic interests, A feudal-Like form of economic determinism begins to close in. This in turn breeds inequalities, Frustrated expectations, Political favoritism and authoritarianism. Further, The 'success' of such policies in terms of visible changes in the social order cannot in principle be known. The paper demonstrates (...) these social disorders in terms of a current american mandate called 'reverse discrimination' which coerces industries and universities to favor and promote the economic and educational interests of some persons over others. (shrink)

I argue along the following lines: For Wollstonecraft, liberty is independence in two different spheres, one presupposing the other. On the one hand, liberty is independence in relation to others, in the sense of not being vulnerable to their whim or arbitrary will. Call this social, or political, liberty. For liberty understood in this way, infringements do not require individual instances of interfering. Liberty is lost in unequal relationships, through dependence on the goodwill of a (...) master. In addition, liberty is independence of mind, a state I am in when I trust my own reasoned judgement above any other authority. Call this moral liberty. Moral liberty needs social liberty. In other words, to the extent I am subject to the whim of others, I am not in a position to be guided by my own judgement. Moral liberty is one of two aspects of virtue: a disposition to independent deliberation according to reason. As such, virtue is a habit of mind. The second aspect of virtue is universal benevolence as its action guiding principle. This is how liberty, equality, and virtue fit together. Social liberty, understood as independence in relation to others, necessarily coexist with equality, and is necessary for moral liberty, the habit of mind that makes up one aspect of virtue, as well as for universal benevolence as virtue’s action guiding principle. This triad explains her views on property, on sex equality, and also on legitimate government. My second line of argument is that according to Wollstonecraft, we have a duty to be virtuous. Virtue is the main object of human life. But since virtue, in both its aspects, needs social liberty and since liberty is the birthright of man, the duty is conditioned on the right. The foundation for the triad of liberty, equality, and virtue is a theory of rights. The basis for the discussion of virtue is the right to the conditions necessary for its realization. The duty is conditioned on the right to liberty. (shrink)

With a new foreword by Paul Kelly 'I regard Hayek's work as a new opening of the most fundamental debate in the field of political philosophy' - Sir Karl Popper 'This promises to be the crowning work of a scholar who has devoted a lifetime to thinking about society and its values. The entire work must surely amount to an immense contribution to social and legal philosophy' - Philosophical Studies Law, Legislation and Liberty is Hayek's major statement of political (...) philosophy and one of the most ambitious yet subtle defences of a free market society ever written. A robust defence of individual liberty, it is also crucial for understanding Hayek's influential views concerning the role of the state: far from being an innocent bystander, he argues that the state has an important role to play in defending the norms and practices of an ordered and free society. His arguments had a profound influence on the policies of Thatcher in the 1980s and resonate today in visions of the 'Big Society'. First published in three separate volumes, this Routledge Classics edition makes one of his most important books available in a single volume. Essential reading for understanding the background to the recent world economic turmoil and financial crisis, it also foreshadows the subsequent heated debate about regulation and political governance if such disasters are to be avoided in the future. (shrink)

The distinction drawn by Rawls between the ideas of property-owning democracy and welfare state capitalism parallels his distinction between justice-based ‘liberalisms of freedom’ (including his own conception of justice as fairness) and utilitarian- based ‘liberalisms of happiness’. In this paper I argue that Rawls’s failure to attach the same level of significance to essential socio-economic rights and liberties as he attached to the traditional liberal civil and political rights and liberties gives justice as fairness a quasi-utilitarian character, which is incompatible (...) with the fundamental objective of protecting the highest.-order interests of citizens conceived as free and equal. I argue that in order fully to protect these interests, rights to access to non-human capital and productive resources should be assigned the same level of significance as that assigned to the civil and political rights and liberties, and prioritized over the lower-order rights and benefits regulated by Rawls’s second principle of justice. (shrink)

This paper discusses the impact of the so-called war on terrorism on civil liberties. The United States government in Madison’s plan was to be distrusted and hemmed in to protect citizens against it. The terrorist attacks of 2001 have seemingly licensed the US government to violate its Madisonian principles. While the current government asks for citizen trust, its actions justify distrust. The courts, which normally are the chief defenders of civil liberties, typically acquiesce in administration policies during emergencies, and it (...) has been during wartimes that the worst infringements of civil liberties have occurred. (shrink)

This article reconsiders contemporary conservatism’s “libertarian” claim to economic and political liberty and related claims. It re‐examines the relation of conservatism and its supposed “libertarianism” to the principle or ideal of liberty in society and economy, respectively. The paper argues and demonstrates that since its inception out of medieval traditionalism, conservatism has continued to consistently oppose the ideal and practice of liberty defining liberalism, and to that extent modern liberal‐democratic society as a reality or project premised (...) on that ideal. The argument and inference is that conservative “libertarianism” is effectively the antithesis to the ideal of liberty, couched in and rationalized as antagonism toward liberalism identified as its original and continual antagonist. (shrink)

Early modern political thought transformed toleration from a prudential consideration into a moral obligation. Three questions need to be answered by any explanation of this transition: Did religious toleration really become an obligation of the state in this period? If this was the case, how could tolerating heresy and idolatry possibly become a moral duty to Christians? How could Europeans both condemn practices as idolatrous and immoral, and yet insist that these practices ought to be tolerated? To answer these questions, (...) the article shows how the early policy of toleration in British India was constituted by a Protestant theological framework. Toleration turned into a moral obligation, it is argued, because the Reformation had identified liberty in the religious realm as God's will for humanity. This gave rise to a dynamic in which Christian states and churches were continuously challenged for their violations of religious liberty. The principle of toleration developed as a part of this dynamic. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Liberty and Coercion Liberty‐Limiting Principles The Harm Principle The Offense Principle Legal Paternalism Legal Moralism Justice Need Conclusion Bibliography.

The prevalent views of animal liberty among animal advocates suggest that liberty is merely instrumentally valuable and invasive paternalism is justified. In contrast to this popular view, I argue that liberty is intrinsically good for animals. I suggest that animal well-being is best accommodated by an Objective List Theory and that liberty is an irreducible component of animal well-being. As such, I argue that it is good for animals to possess liberty even if possessing (...) class='Hi'>liberty does not contribute towards their subjective well-being, and even in some cases where it has a negative effect upon their subjective well-being. To establish this view I argue that if animals are agents, as I assume they are, then like humans they must be able to determine the course of their own lives (to some extent). Further, having the opportunity to self-determine one’s life just is the very same thing as liberty, and having the opportunity to determine the course of one’s life is intrinsically good. Thus liberty has intrinsic value for humans and animals. So, in addition to the instrumental harms of having one’s liberty restricted, I claim that restricting animals’ liberty in principle harms them because it undermines their capacity for self-determination and fails to acknowledge their authority as agents to make their own choices. (shrink)

This article discusses the self-respect argument for basic liberties, which is that self-respect is an important good, best supported by basic liberties, and that this yields a reason for the traditional liberty principle. I concentrate on versions of it that contend that self-respect is best supported by basic liberties for reasons related to the recognition that such liberties convey. I first discuss the two standard approaches loosely associated with John Rawls and Axel Honneth. Here self-respect pertains to traits (...) and conduct (Rawls) or to one’s personhood (Honneth). It is argued that these approaches fail to show why self-respect is better supported by the liberty principle than certain alternatives worth taking seriously – unless (in the case of personhood self-respect) self-respect is construed in such a narrow way that it is not a condition for autonomy or welfare in any plausible sense. I then identify a self-attitude that I call “a sense of competence”, which at least shows that the liberty principle is more important to autonomy than what we might otherwise have reasons to believe. (shrink)

The idea that healthcare should become more person-centred is extremely influential. By using recent English policy developments as a case study, this article aims to critically analyse an important element of person-centred care, namely, the belief that to treat patients as persons is to think that care should be ‘co-produced’ by formal healthcare providers and patients together with unpaid carers and voluntary organizations. I draw on insights from political philosophy to highlight overlooked tensions between co-production and values like equality and (...) liberty. Regarding equality, I argue that co-production compounds both problems of gender inequality in the distribution of care labour and the challenges associated with securing equal access to care. Turning to liberty, I identify important commonalities between co-production and republicanism in political philosophy, given their shared insistence on common citizens’ civic virtue. Then, I use against co-production some liberal arguments against republicanism, to highlight a problem of over-demandingness. In bringing my argument to a close, however, I wish to caution against hastily rejecting co-production as a policy programme. (shrink)

In this article I examine the importance of self-respect in the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice. First, I present two elements that are part of the contemporary debate on self-respect as a form of self-worth—namely, moral status and merit. Second, I specify the bases that support self-respect within A Theory of Justice. Finally, I discuss at length the function of self-respect in justifying the principles of justice. This inquiry implies an analysis of the relationship between self-respect and the component (...) parts of the two principles of justice: basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle. I also explore the connection between self-respect and the sense of justice in light of the stability argument, and how the relationship between the two is important for achieving social stability. (shrink)

RESUMEN El suicidio o el interfictium spinoziano es a simple vista una categoría marginal en el pensamiento de Spinoza. La vasta producción filosófica en torno a quien ha sido considerado como el filósofo de la "anomalía salvaje" o al mismo tiempo el pensador de los "afectos alegres" ignora, o en el mejor de los casos trata oblicuamente, las nociones de muerte y suicidio. La paradoja es total porque el rechazo hacia el pensamiento de la muerte contrasta con la profusa interpelación (...) a dicha categoría en su Ética. El propósito de este artículo es mostrar que la expresión negativa del suicidio, como pura imposibilidad y servidumbre respecto a causas externas es, sin embargo, menos literal y clara, cuando en su análisis se incorporan aquellos elementos centrales de su obra más emblemática. Libertad, Necesidad y Sustancia, entre otros, son conceptos que, desde el suicidio se tensionan mostrando los propios límites del orden geométrico esbozado por Spinoza. ABSTRACT Suicide or spinozian interfictium is at first sight a marginal category in Spinoza's thought. The vast philosophical production on who has been considered the philosopher of the "savage anomaly" or at the same time the "cheerful affects" thinker, ignores or, in the best-case scenario, obliquely addresses the notions of death and suicide. The paradox is complete because the rejection towards the thought of death contrasts with the profuse questioning of the aforesaid category in its Ethics. The goal of this article is to show that the negative expression of suicide, as pure impossibility and servitude with respect to external causes is however, less literal and clear when some central elements of its most emblematic work are incorporated in its analysis. Liberty, Need, and Substance, among others, are concepts that from suicide get tensioned showing the own limits of the geometric order insinuated by Spinoza. (shrink)

Lord Sumption, a former Justice of the Supreme Court, has been a prominent critic of coronavirus restrictions regulations in the UK. Since the start of the pandemic, he has consistently questioned both the policy aims and the regulatory methods of the Westminster government. He has also challenged rationales that hold that all lives are of equal value. In this paper, I explore and question Lord Sumption’s views on morality, politics and law, querying the coherence of his broad philosophy and his (...) arguments regarding coronavirus regulations with his judicial decision in the assisted-dying case of R v Ministry of Justice. In Nicklinson, Lord Sumption argued for restrictions on liberty given the priority of the sanctity of life principle and the protection of others who may be vulnerable, as well as for deference to policy-making institutions in instances of values-based disagreement. The apparent inconsistencies in his positions, I argue, are not clearly reconcilable, and invite critical analysis of his impacts on health law and policy. (shrink)

Whilst security seems central to many moral and political problems, sustained examination of the concept by contemporary philosophers is rare. In this chapter I seek to re-ignite philosophical interest in security by uncovering some of the ways in which the concept has been both understood and misunderstood. I begin by exploring the scarce historical understandings of security within the Western philosophical canon, from the Epicureans through Hobbes and on to contemporary political philosophy, identifying the key themes which arise within the (...) literature. I then provide an account of the structure of the concept of security, which lays bare its relationship to contemporary debates on the distinction between “natural” and “social” threats, on the political significance of fear, and on the nature of rights. Finally, I identify four key problems in moral and political philosophy – the balance between state and individual security, between liberty and security, the status of moral principles during emergencies and the trade-off between privacy and public safety – where a finer grained understanding of security can benefit normative theorising. (shrink)

This essay examines arguments offered in support of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) by Leibniz and his followers as well as Hume's critique of the PSR. It is shown that Leibniz has a defensible argument for the PSR, whereas the arguments of his self-proclaimed followers are weak. Thus, Hume's challenge is met by Leibniz, by Wolff and Baumgarten not so much.

John Rawls based his theory of justice, in the work of that name, on a ‘Kantian interpretation’ of the status of human beings as ‘free and equal’ persons. In his subsequent, ‘political rather than metaphysical’ expositions of his theory, the conception of citizens of democracies as ‘free and equal’ persons retained its foundational role. But Rawls appealed only to Kant’s moral philosophy, never to Kant’s own political philosophy as expounded in his 1797 Doctrine of Right in theMetaphysics of Morals. I (...) argue here that the structure of Kant’s political philosophy, with its categories of the innate right to freedom, private acquired right and public right, can clarify the relationship between Rawls’s two principles of justice and his scheme of basic liberties and primary goods. (shrink)

First published in 1982. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The project of “public reason” claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of “public reason,” in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available to (...) pick out from the multitude of particularized accounts of what constitutes “civic order,” no “public reason” so derived could adequately capture - and thus be able to secure in a practical sense - any single determinate civic order, much less one that would be consistent with all citizens' conceptions of public order. Part I of this Article raises a number of issues for consideration relating to the epistemology of law and focuses especially on the concept of public reason and its critique. Part II addresses alternative approaches to legal reasoning suggested by classical accounts of practical reasoning and virtue theory and considers the operation of such legal analysis outside the area of substantive due process; Part III analyzes post-Lawrence case law confirming the dilemma created by the Supreme Court's ambiguous approaches to substantive due process and concludes that only one interpretation - that articulated fully in Washington v. Glucksberg and given lip service in Lawrence v. Texas - provides a method for resolving novel substantive due process challenges that is philosophically sound as well as historically coherent. Rather than perpetuating a fiction that denies the propriety of lawmaking unless based on principles that all citizens can rationally agree upon, an appropriate model of substantive due process analysis recognizes that law must inevitably be based upon principles that cannot be agreed upon by all citizens in virtue of rationality alone. -/- Abstract Footnotes (291) Beta -/- Revise My Submission -/- -/- One-Click Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase -/- Facebook | Twitter | Digg | Del.icio.us | CiteULike | Permalink Using the URL or DOI link below will ensure access to this page indefinitely -/- Based on your IP address, your paper is being delivered by: New York, USA Processing request. [Processing request.] Illinois, USA Processing request. [Processing request.] Brussels, Belgium Processing request. [Processing request.] Seoul, Korea Processing request. [Processing request.] California, USA Processing request. [Processing request.] -/- If you have any problems downloading this paper, please click on another Download Location above, or view our FAQ File name: SSRN-id1004757. ; Size: 424K -/- Sample Cover You will receive a black and white printed and perfect bound version of this document in 8 1/2 x 11 inch format, with glossy color front and back covers. Currently shipping to the US addresses only. Your order will be shipped within three business days. Quantity: Total Price = $0.50 plus shipping (U.S. Only) -/- If you have any problems with this purchase, please email [email protected] or call 1-585-442-8170. Reason's Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty -/- Edward C. Lyons University of Notre Dame Law School -/- Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 157, 2007 -/- Abstract: The project of "public reason" claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of "public reason," in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available to pick out from the multitude of particularized accounts of what constitutes "civic order," no "public reason" so derived could adequately capture - and thus be able to secure in a practical sense - any single determinate civic order, much less one that would be consistent with all citizens' conceptions of public order. -/- Part I of this Article raises a number of issues for consideration relating to the epistemology of law and focuses especially on the concept of public reason and its critique. Part II addresses alternative approaches to legal reasoning suggested by classical accounts of practical reasoning and virtue theory and considers the operation of such legal analysis outside the area of substantive due process; Part III analyzes post-Lawrence case law confirming the dilemma created by the Supreme Court's ambiguous approaches to substantive due process and concludes that only one interpretation - that articulated fully in Washington v. Glucksberg and given lip service in Lawrence v. Texas - provides a method for resolving novel substantive due process challenges that is philosophically sound as well as historically coherent. -/- Rather than perpetuating a fiction that denies the propriety of lawmaking unless based on principles that all citizens can rationally agree upon, an appropriate model of substantive due process analysis recognizes that law must inevitably be based upon principles that cannot be agreed upon by all citizens in virtue of rationality alone. -/- Keywords: substantive due process, practical reason, public reason, Rawls, Casey, Lawrence, Glucksberg, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, dialectic, autonomy, freedom -/- . (shrink)