It is widely believed that the Divine Command Theory is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This article first examines the Platonic dialogue of that name, and shows that Socrates’s reasoning is faulty. Second, the dilemma in the form in which many contemporary philosophers accept it is examined in detail, and this reasoning is also shown to be deficient. This is not to say, however, that the Divine Command Theory is true—merely that one popular argument for rejecting it is unsound. (...) Finally, some brief thoughts are presented concerning where the real problems lie for the theory. (shrink)

A. E. Taylor states the widely held view that Plato’s Euthyphro posed a question which figured prominently in later ethical controversies: “It amounts to asking whether acts of piety, or more generally virtuous acts, derive their character of being right from the mere fact of being commanded or are commanded because they are antecedently intrinsically right.” I argue against this characterization of the Euthyphro. The argument Socrates deploys against Euthyphro’s third and most serious definition of holiness or piety (to hosion) (...) is not the opening round in the debate over divine command theory nor is a discussion of the nature of holiness ipso facto an exercise in ethical theory. (shrink)

Critics of theological accounts of the nature of morality have argued that such accounts must be rejected, even by theists, because such accounts (i) have the unacceptable implication that nothing is morally wrong in possible worlds in which atheism is true, (ii) render the substantive content of morality arbitrary, and (iii) make it impossible or redundant to attribute moral properties to God or God’s actions. I argue that none of these criticisms constitute good reason for theists to abandon theological accounts (...) of the nature of morality. (shrink)

Expressivism is supposed to have an advantage over moral realism, in that it can explain why it is a conceptual truth that the moral supervenes on the natural, even though the natural does not entail the moral. I develop an analogy between expressivism and a version of theistic moral realism, and argue that this version of theistic moral realism shares any advantage that expressivism might have. It may be that the alleged advantage that expressivism has over moral realism (...) is overstated. Nevertheless, possible analogies between expressivism and theistic moral realism have received very little attention in the past, and are worth considering for their own sake. (shrink)

Scholars have often considered evolutionary social theories a product of Positivist scientism and the naturalization of ethics. Yet the theistic foundations of many evolutionary theories proposed between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries bolstered the belief that following natural laws was morally desirable, if not vital, to guaranteeing social and moral progress. In the early twentieth century, American paleontologist and leading evolutionist Henry Fairfield Osborn represented one of the most authoritative advocates of this interpretation of natural normativity. Particularly (...) during the last years of his career, Osborn used theological arguments to reinforce his advocacy of evolutionary ethics and social control policies, which led him to challenge his “old master” Thomas Huxley regarding the separation between evolution and moral conduct. This article examines the development of Osborn’s evolutionary ethics, with particular regard to its bearing on the American debate on euthenics. I argue that theistic topics played a major rhetorical role in the attempt to justify normative conclusions drawn from ostensible laws of evolution. (shrink)

One of the central tasks of meta-ethical inquiry is to accommodate the common-sense assumptions deeply embedded in our moral discourse. A comparison of the potential of secular and theistic ethics shows that, in the end, theists have a greater facility in achieving this accommodation task; it is easier to appreciate the action-guiding authority and binding nature of morality in a theistic rather than in a secular context. Theistic ethics has a further advantage in being able (...) to accommodate not only this essential conceptual feature of morality, but also the existence of moral requirements and their source of normativity. (shrink)

Recent Christian reflection on the relation of religion and ethics has focused a great deal on establishing a conception of ethics in which God plays a central role. The numerous attempts to respond to Plato's "Euthyphro Dilemma" and the various defenses of the divine command theory provide two examples of this phenomenon. But much of this ethical reflection has gone on in a way that is largely “defensive.” That is, those engaged in such discussions typically describe an ethical (...) theory which provides God with a central role, and then seek to deflect potentially fatal objections. While there is surely a place for this sort of defensive reflection, these discussions fail to address a deeper and perhaps more pressing question, namely: what positive reasons are there for preferring a religiously grounded ethical theory to the non-religious competitors. Are there argument or considerations, we might wonder, that can explain just why grounding an ethical theory in theism is superior to grounding it non-theistically? And if there are, what would such arguments or considerations look like? (shrink)

The aim of research is to determine moral Realism and religious Beliefs. Regardless of whether moral truths correspond to moral facts or characterise moral qualities, Peripatetics and moral constructivists, on the other hand, believe that moral truths are discovered via an analysis of the circumstances of practical reasoning and human interests. Moral constructivism's perspective on the existence of moral characteristics is similar to Mullā Ṣadrā's on the Platonic Form of the Good. Because he believed that universal conceptions should be reflected (...) in the intellectual domain, Mullā Ṣadrā recognised the reality of the Platonic Forms. The research also determines the analysis of the foundations of ethical normativity in theistic traditions. However, the researcher did not think an appeal to the Forms could be utilised to overcome epistemological concerns concerning natural sorts. Similarly, constructivists and peripatetics might acknowledge a basic account of realism for moral facts and attributes while rejecting the idea that moral knowledge can be obtained by appealing to direct intuitions. Understanding human nature and using common sense are the foundations of moral knowledge that is not dependent on revelation. (shrink)

I contend that Kant’s moral argument that postulates God and an afterlife in order to justify moral rationality counts strongly in favor of theistic ethics even though it cannot on its own justify that God exists. In moving toward this conclusion, I assess Kant’s moral argument and note how both Kant and the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick, in their own ways, recognize that morality cannot reasonably be seen as completely overriding if God and an afterlife are rejected. I then (...) critique a theistic moral rationality argument offered by C. Stephen Layman, as a flaw in this argument helps to reveal why arguments centering upon moral rationality likely cannot reach an ontological conclusion concerning theism; nevertheless, I contend that moral rationality arguments like Kant’s have apologetic significance for theism. They reveal a dilemma for secular ethics: either appeal to the possibility of theism in order to justify moral rationality or else accept that morality is not fully rational. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas has provided the philosophical basis for psychologies commensurate with the ethical basis of human existence; however, introducing psychologists to his work is frustrated by a number offactors. One of these factors is his use of theistic language in his philosophical writings. Two problems are discussed regarding this language. First, contemporary psychology, including the area ofpsychology of religion, rejects any theistic language as incompatible with an empirical science. Second, it is suggested that many persons, including psychologists, are (...) not in the cognitive developmental stage at which they can understand Levinas’s writings about God. Further, it is also suggested that psychology’s history warns against creating a psychological school or division based in Levinas’s thought. The article concludes with general discussion regarding how psychology can apply Levinas’s thought while leaving God and Levinas behind. (shrink)

In decrying the evils of supernaturalism, African philosopher Kwasi Wiredu proposes humanism, by making concern for human well-being the basis for morality. However, the presentation of humanism as a simple replacement of supernaturalism is objectionable. Wiredu’s notion of supernaturalism is too narrow, since it is only a variant of supernaturalism. His reference to humanism is too broad, since humanism is an umbrella of very conflicting worldviews, such as that between secular and theistic humanism. Although Wiredu does not specify which (...) variant of humanism he means, and although he acknowledges that the Akan believe in a Supreme Being, his general ontology shows that he is closer to the secular than the theistic variant. This article explores the ideological extensions of the two and argues that theistic humanism provides the compatibility needed for being religious and at the same time basing morality on humanistic/naturalistic concerns. In doing so, it distinguishes supernaturalism per se from its ethical and cosmological variants. As a corrective to Wiredu, this article blames these two variants of supernaturalism, rather than supernaturalism per se, for the evils that Wiredu adduces. The conclusion is that in theistic humanism, humanism escapes the dangers of ethical and cosmological supernaturalism without necessarily adopting the antisupernaturalist connotations currently popular with modern secular humanism. (shrink)

Part I: The 'explanatory gap'. 1. Why take morality to be objective? -- 2. The gap opens: evolution and our capacity for moral knowledge -- Part II: Secular responses. 3. Alternatives to realism: Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard -- 4. Procedures and reasons: Tim Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard -- 5. Natural goodness: Philippa Foot's moral objectivism -- 6. Natural goodness and 'second nature': John McDowell and David Wiggin -- Part III: Theism. 7. From goodness to God: closing the explanatory gap (...) -- 8. Purpose without theism? Axiarchism and Neoplatonism. (shrink)

Erik J. Wielenberg draws on recent work in analytic philosophy and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism, according to which there are objective ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. He goes on to develop an empirically-grounded account of human moral knowledge.

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic (...) ventures. I suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

Michael Levine's book is the first comprehensive study of pantheism as a philosophical position. Spinoza's Ethics, finished in 1675, has long been seen as the most complete attempt at explaining and defending pantheism. Historically, however, pantheism has numerous forms and Spinoza's version is best considered as one among many variations on pantheistic themes. Levine manages to disentangle the concept from Spinoza; this book is a broad philosophical and historical survey of pantheism itself. There is much confusion about what pantheism, (...) this "form of... non-theistic monotheism," actually is. The early part of the book deals with definitions of pantheism and examines critical distinctions between them. Chapter 2 is an analysis, both historical and contemporary, of the concept of pantheism. What is "unity" in pantheism's "all-inclusive divine unity"? Pantheism is compared to theism in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 an account is presented of how some philosophical problems usually associated with theism are to be recast in pantheism and how, if at all, they might be resolved. The later chapters discuss the relationship between belief and practice. What are the religious implications of pantheism in terms of practice? Are there grounds - both philosophical and religious - for believing that pantheism presents the genuine alternative to theism that many contemporary non-theists think it does? (shrink)

An inquiry into the ontology of critical gender consciousness in Africa Philosophy is long overdue. Hitherto discourses on gender problems lost focus because of the tendency to leave out the gaps in culture created by colonial experience, modernity’s assaults and unAfricaness in ontology and essence. It is argued here that the fulcrum for a legitimate feminist doctrine is Theistic Humanism, the philosophy of African philosophy that exposes the epistemological and metaphysical basis of the rightful and ethical place of women (...) in the society. (shrink)

Aristotle discovered the principle of the golden mean. He saw that the moral good is one but the bad is two. Individuals deviate from the goal not in a single direction but in two opposite ones. The principle holds not only in ethics but in many other spheres. Concerning “proofs for the existence of God” there are two extremes which seem equally mistaken: the proofs, and even the search for proofs, are vain; the proofs are completely satisfactory and coercive. (...) The first extreme is now fashionable; the second was the fashion in the Middle Ages. I shall propose a view intermediate between the two. (shrink)

This book covers the theory of our moral behavior that seems to meander throughout the history of ideas and that led eventually to scientific explanation of human moral behavior with various interpretations of the natural moral law.

This article attempts to articulate a grounding of animal rights based on inherent worth as the most fitting way to draw attention to the moral status of animals. The primary objective is to identify the proper grounds of those rights. To that end, two influential philosophical accounts of animal rights are first surveyed: Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Tom Regan’s deontological argument. These are followed by two theistic accounts of rights put forth by Andrew Linzey and Nicholas Wolterstorff. It (...) is argued that the latter two complementary accounts based on inherent worth bestowed by God develop a stronger grounding than versions grounded on intrinsic capacities. (shrink)

0.0. Theistic Ethics as a Challenge and a Diagnostic Tool. Naturalistic conceptions in metaethics come in many varieties. Many philosophers who have sought to situate moral reasoning in a naturalistic metaphysical conception have thought it necessary to adopt non-cognitivist, prescriptivist, projectivist, relativist, or otherwise deflationary conceptions. Recently there has been a revival of interest in non-deflationary moral realist approaches to ethical naturalism. Many non-deflationary approaches have exploited the resources of non-empiricist “causal” or “naturalistic” conceptions of reference and of (...) kind definitions in service of the “naturalistic” metaphilosophical conception that substantive moral questions, and questions about the metaphysics of morals, are broadly a posteriori questions, somewhat analogous to scientific questions, and are not amenable to a priori resolution by “conceptual analysis.”. (shrink)

For deliberations on the ethical and meta-ethical implications of Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy, here are abstracts and papers from the Ethics Section of the 6th International Whitehead Conference held at the University of Salzburg in Salzburg, Austria in July 2006. In accordance with the conference schedule, there are three subsections. The subsection on "Metaphysics of Morals and Moral Theory" includes contributions from Franklin I. Gamwell (Does Morality Presuppose God?), John W. Lango (abstract only), Duane Voskuil ("Ethics' Dipolar (...) Necessities and Theistic Implications), and Theodore Walker Jr. ("Neoclassical Cosmology and Matthew 22:36-40). The subsection on "Evaluating Moral Practices" includes contributions from Frederick Ferrè (abstract only), Seung Gap Lee (Hope for the Earth: A Process Eschatological Eco-ethics for South Korea), Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore (Compassion, Creativity, and Form: The Ethics of Institutions), and George W. Shields (Ruse, Altruism, and Process Philosophy). The subsection on "Ethics and Aesthetic Values" includes contributions from Stephen T. Franklin (abstract only), Brian G. Henning (Is There an Ethics of Creativity?), Mihàly Tòth (Art of Life and the Ethics of Life Forming), and Guorong Yang (Problems and Perspectives in the Emerging of Global Society). (shrink)

An inquiry into the ontology of critical gender consciousness in Africa Philosophy is long over due. “Hitherto a discourse on Gender problems has lost focus because of the tendency to leave out the gaps in culture created by colonial experience, modernity’s assaults and unAfricaness in ontology and essence. It is argued that the fulcrum for a legitimate feminist doctrine is Theistic Humanism, the philosophy of African philosophy that exposes the epistemological and metaphysical basis of the rightful and ethical place (...) of women in the society without injury, injustice and abuse on womanhood. Theistic Humanism as an ontology and cosmology abhors class struggle between husbands and wives, sons and daughters etc. Class struggle between men and women degenerated from the oneness of being ontology and Gender community where husbands and wives were happily married with different complementary social roles for the preservation of society. (shrink)

The failure of theistic morality -- Ethical inquiry -- The common moral decencies -- Excelsior : the ethics of excellence -- Responsibilities -- Education for character and cognition -- Human rights -- Privacy -- The tree of life.

This essay defends an account of Fichte’s philosophy according to which The Vocation of Man’s theological commitments, along with some related metaphysical claims, prove to be not only consistent with, but even strongly supported by, the transcendental idealism of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre. The key to this account is its focus on Fichte’s longstanding commitment to a strong notion of non-epistemic justification, which derives from his post-Kantian conception of the practical dimension of pure reason. On this view, one can have rationally (...) unimpeachable grounds for assent to descriptive propositions pertaining to issues that, given transcendental idealism, are epistemically intractable. Chief among such rationally-mandated assents is belief in the supra-subjective reality of God, qua unconditioned, autonomously purposive rational activity, sustaining what truly is and ordaining what ultimately ought to be. This essay shows, in addition, that the content of that conception of divinity is intimately interwoven with the first principles of Fichte’s system. (shrink)

This paper considers whether John McDowell’s cognitivist account of affectively toned ethical experience can be extended to the case of theistic experience. It makes particular use of McDowell’s claim that there is no simple correlation between value-free qualities in the world and kinds of value experience. The paper draws on the work of William Alston and John Henry Newman, and argues that at various points, McDowell’s work can help to strengthen their defence of the epistemic significance of religious experience.

This book aims to reinvigorate discussions of moral arguments for God's existence.

In "Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief" Robert Merrihew Adams defends a theistic argument from the nature of morality according to which the existence of God is entailed by the divine-command theory, which Adams believes is our best account of morality. In reply I examine the four arguments for the modified divine-command theory that Adams develops in this and later papers, and I show that three of the arguments are much too weak to enable him to make a case (...) for theism in this way and that the fourth itself depends on the assumption that there is a God and so would render that case circular. (shrink)

Nigeria is a country blessed with abundant human and material resources. Pre-independent Nigeria had agriculture as the major foreign exchange and revenue earner. Other alternative revenue earners such as agricultural and mineral resources were explored and their proceeds used to support and foot the bill of government expenditures. Immediately the first oil field was discovered in 1956 at Olobiri in the Niger Delta, other alternative sources of revenue for Nigeria were abandoned and crude oil became the determinant of Nigeria’s mono-economic (...) status and the sole basis of all socio-economic transaction within and outside the country. The issue of appropriate pricing of petroleum products and the removal of government’s subsidy on petroleum price became a thorny controversial public policy issue. Successive governments, including the current President, have grappled with this problem of whether to remove the subsidy or not, without coming to a publicly endorsed solution to the debate. The last fuel subsidy removal on 1st January, 2012 sparked an uprising that almost led to a revolution. The thrust of the study is to examine the causes of the fuel subsidy removal, to identify the benefits of fuel subsidy removal, to describe the effects of the subsidy removal, and the socio-religious implications of the removal of fuel subsidy to the citizens of Nigeria. It is in the context of these socio-religious that one discovers the relevance of Professor Dukor theistic humanism and its implied need for African values to be applied to governance in the 21st century. The debate surrounding the subsidy removal and the subsidy scam running into trillions of Naira of stolen funds by independent marketers of petroleum products revolve around corruption and a bad commentary about how ethical African vales have been removed from public governance and the management of public resources. After pointing out these socio-religious implications for the Nigerian ethical and value re-orientation, the paper went ahead to recommend some ways of managing the subsidy money for the development of the country. (shrink)

Gene patenting was enabled by strained interpretations of legal precedent and with very little consideration of its ultimate ethical implications. The sciences of justice, ethics, and morals remain in their dark ages, with their practitioners all ascribing to differing values and modes of inquiry, besieged in their various camps of deontological, or consequentialist, or emotive or theistic dogmas. Ownership and property rights in moveables are good candidates for grounded relations as opposed to intellectual property. The groundedness of a (...) valid possession rests on the intentional state of the possessor and other external and objective facts of the possession. The ontology of the social and legal institution of ownership reveals that it is grounded in certain states of affairs, such as brute‐worldly facts and intentional states, as well as social acts revealing intentions of the parties. (shrink)

Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.

Uncovering the historical roots of naturalistic, secular contemporary ethics, in this volume Michael Gill shows how the British moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries completed a Copernican revolution in moral philosophy. They effected a shift from thinking of morality as independent of human nature to thinking of it as part of human nature itself. He also shows how the British Moralists - sometimes inadvertently, sometimes by design - disengaged ethical thinking, first from distinctly Christian ideas and then from (...) theistic commitments altogether. Examining in detail the arguments of Whichcote, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson against Calvinist conceptions of original sin and egoistic conceptions of human motivation, Gill also demonstrates how Hume combined the ideas of earlier British moralists with his own insights to produce an account of morality and human nature that undermined some of his predecessors' most deeply held philosophical goals. (shrink)

In this book, Maduabuchi Dukor presents a comprehensive interpretation of African Philosophy that is informed by the idea that everything in the universe includes a 'spiritual' dimension, what he calls theistic humanism. Imperceptible agents such as God, lesser divinities, and ancestors, as well as forces such as witchcraft and magic, play prominent roles in Dukor's accounts of not just metaphysics, but also ethics, aesthetic, and epistemics. By highlighting the diversity in intellectual world currents philosophy stimulates intercultural dialogue, African (...) Philosophy in the Global Village. Theistic Panpsychic Rationality, Axiology and Science is a response to major contemporary socio-cultural challenges in the global village. (shrink)

Religion and diversified religious experiences are always held suspect and not spared from apprehensions regarding its value, its ethics, its revelatory claims and its approaches. Time immemorial religion and religious experiences have played a pivotal role in building up society for betterment and also for deterioration. Man’s intellectual activity throughout the history was on the line of religion. The sacred in religion has always empowered man in many paths of his life, say, to bring social reformation, be it environmental (...) concern or women empowerment. The sacred in religion have brought wonders in human life. (shrink)

We first argue that there are cases of “blameless non-belief.” That is, some people—through no fault of their own—fail to enter into a conscious relationship with God. But if so, then it would be unjust of God to make certain particular goods (e.g., one’s salvation, the possibility of an ethical or a meaningful life, or entrance into heaven) depend upon one having a conscious relationship with God. So, given that God is just, then despite what some theists believe, a relationship (...) with God (even assuming that God exists) cannot be a necessary condition for the attainment of these goods; there might, e.g., be atheists in heaven, even assuming that theism is true. This implies that religion is a far less important component of people’s lives than many might think. (shrink)

In this article I defend the claim that nonhuman animals can be persons. In this regard I rely on the thought of neoclassical or process theists like Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Their moderate stance regarding personhood is in contrast to the influential classical theistic view, which denies personhood status to nonhuman animals.

Does God's existence make a difference to how we explain morality? Mark C. Murphy critiques the two dominant theistic accounts of morality--natural law theory and divine command theory--and presents a novel third view. He argues that we can value natural facts about humans and their good, while keeping God at the centre of our moral explanations.

Kant’s account of the idea of God in the first Critique prefigures but does not imply a theism. It is in his ethical philosophy that this idea is given a theistic interpretation, and that the postulation (or fideic affirmation) of God’s existence, along with immortality, is practically justified as a condition of the possibility of the summum bonum. This paper argues that Kant’s reasoning from his initially austere conception of morality to the summum bonum and to immortality and God’s (...) existence lacks compelling logic. It also argues that Kant’s practical justification of faith, amounting to no more than the claim that practical reason explicates its own inherent need and satisfies this need by faith, fails to satisfy the demand of religious consciousness for an ontology of reason that includes an account of the grounding of reason in what it postulates. (shrink)

This article examines literature from cultural anthropology for insights into ethics. It particularly addresses the moral issue of justly understanding those people different from oneself. Clifford Geertz, pragmatist as well as anthropologist, draws upon the rhetorical theory of Kenneth Burke in his 1988 book Works and Lives. Just this sort of cross-disciplinary borrowing offers resources for understanding what were once religiously-based ethics in a humanistic context. The rhetorical style of various cultural anthropologists serves to inform the rhetorical forms (...) of appeal of theistic and non- theistic ethics. (shrink)

This essay presents a moral argument for the rationality of theistic belief. If all I have to go on morally are my own moral intuitions and reasoning and those of others, I am rationally led to skepticism, both about the possibility of moral knowledge and about my moral effectiveness. This skepticism is extensive, amounting to moral despair. But such despair cannot be rational. It follows that the assumption of the argument must be false and I must be able to (...) rely on more than my own human powers and those of others in attempting to live a moral life. The Christian God has such a function. Hence, if it is rational to attempt a moral life, it is rational to believe in the Christian God. (shrink)

In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defenses of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that the divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers; Godless normative robust realism can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis; and GRNR provides a better account of intrinsic value. In this paper, (...) I will argue Wielenberg’s defenses of the autonomy thesis fails. I will argue that his objection to divine command theories fails, that he fails to address two standard challenges to the autonomy thesis adequately, and, finally, that Wielenberg fails to show that GRNR better accounts for the intuition that certain things are intrinsically good than various forms of theistic alternatives. (shrink)

Adams offers a theistically-based framework for ethics, based upon the idea of a transcendent, infinite good, which is God, and its relation to the many finite examples of good in our experience. His account shows how philosophically unfashionable religious concepts can enrich ethical thought. "...one of the two most important books in moral philosophy of the last quarter century, the other being After Virtue."--Theology Today.

This paper focuses on two key issues in Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs . It argues that Wolterstorff's theistic grounding of inherent rights is not successful. It also argues that Wolterstorff does not provide adequate criteria for determining what exactly these natural inherent rights are or criteria that can help us to evaluate competing and contradictory claims about these rights. However, most of Wolterstorff's book is not concerned with the theistic grounding of inherent rights. Instead, it is (...) devoted to a detailed and rigorous articulation of the meaning and defense of a theory of justice as consisting of inherent rights and with showing why this theory of justice is superior to the alternative right order theories that Wolterstorff criticizes. The paper concludes that these accomplishments are not diminished even if Wolterstorff has failed to provide us with a satisfactory theistic grounding of his theory. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Agnostic Religious Commitment Moral Permissibility and Evidence Moral Permissibility and Moral Content Moral Permissibility and Revisability God's Existence and Moral Obligation God's Existence and Moral Aid Concluding Remarks Works cited.

In the Groundwork Kant dismisses theistic principles, along with all other competitors to his Categorical Imperative, claiming that they are heteronomous. By contrast, he asserts, the fundamental moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. I argue that the best case for this Kantian conclusion conflates our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state these reasons such that they could figure in an argument. This conflation, in turn, results from a certain Kantian conception of (...) inclination, and its role in our moral psychology. These are views that we ought to reject. Having done so we will see that a theistic ethics based on desire or love for God would not face a distinctive problem of heteronomy. (shrink)

Too many parts of the world testify to the difficulties religions have in tolerating each other. It is often concluded that the only way tolerance and plurality can be protected is to keep religion out of the public sphere. Ian Markham challenges this secularist argument. In the first half of the book, he advances a careful critique of European culture which exposes the problem of plurality. His analysis of the Christendom Group is contrasted with the outlook found in the USA, (...) where a religiously informed culture may be seen to be tolerant. In the second half of the book, the author argues that plurality is better safeguarded by a theistic, rather than a secularist, foundation. He submits that too often secularists use relativist arguments, while theists want to appeal to the complexity of God's world. He concludes that in our post-modern world the religious affirmation of diversity offers genuine political possibilities for cultural enrichment. (shrink)

Most atheists are error theorists about theists; they claim that theists have genuine beliefs about the existence and nature of a divine being, but as a matter of fact no such divine being exists. Thus on their view the relevant theistic beliefs are mistaken. As error theorists, then, atheists need to arrive at some answer to the question of what practical course of action the atheist should adopt towards the theistic beliefs held by committed theists. The most natural (...) answer and the one that we see being implemented by many prominent atheists today, can be stated roughly as follows: -/- (1) Theistic Eliminativism: Atheists should marshal the best arguments at their disposal and present them to theists in the hopes that theists will come to appreciate that their religious beliefs are systemically erroneous. Furthermore, on coming to this realization, a theist should abandon not just his specific religious beliefs, but also more generally his religious practices and theistic framework for viewing the world, and adopt a secular point of view instead. -/- One of the main goals of this paper is to show that, despite its popularity, eliminativism is not the only option for the atheist to adopt. In order to do so, I draw on recent work in meta-ethics on moral error theories, work which has helped to outline a number of alterative courses of action that someone might take towards a group which is said to have widespread erroneous beliefs. (shrink)

Herman Bavinck (1854–1921), the Dutch master of dogmatic theology, wrote a systematic treatise in theological ethics. Bavinck is a theistic moral realist whose ethics is deontological and virtue centered. His realism—both ontological and epistemic—is reflected in his understanding of conscience and its relation to the objective moral law. Furthermore, this review article discusses issues in Christian anthropology, particularly the selfhood of the human person, the relation between nature and grace, creation and redemption, and philosophy and theology, and (...) the distinction between objective and subjective religion. It concludes with a brief reflection on Bavinck’s hermeneutics of renewal and reform in the continuity of the catholicity of the Reformed tradition. (shrink)