The purpose of this paper is to argue that neither mathematics nor logic can be applied ‘directly’ to reality, but to our rational representations (or reconstructions) of it, and this is extended to scientific theories in general. The difference to other approaches (e.g., Nancy Cartwright’s, Bueno & Colyvan’s or Hughes’) is that I call attention to something more than what is involved in such a process, namely, metamathematics. A general schema of ‘elaboration’ of theories, which I suppose cope with (...) most of them, is presented and discussed. A case study is outlined, the quantum case, whose anchored description, in my opinion, demands a different metamathematics and a different logic. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the principal difference between Einstein's special relativity and its contemporary rival Lorentz-type theories was that while the Lorentz-type theories were also capable of “explaining away” the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment and other experimental findings by means of the distortions of moving measuring-rods and moving clocks, special relativity revealed more fundamental new facts about the geometry of space-time behind these phenomena. I shall argue that special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of (...) space-time, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions; it simply calls something else "space-time", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about space-time and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects. (shrink)

This paper is an attack on the Dummett-Prawitz view that the principle of bivalence has a crucial double significance, metaphysical and meaning theoretical. On the one hand it is said that holding bivalence valid is what characterizes a realistic view, i.e. a view in metaphysics, and on the other hand it is said that there are meaning theoretical arguments against its acceptability. I argue that these two aspects are incompatible. If the failure of validity of bivalence depends on properties of (...) linguistic meaning, then there are no metaphysical consequences to be drawn. The case for this view is straightforward as long as we are discussing a language different from our own. But it seems that the distinction between failure because of meaning and failure because of reality cannot be applied to our own language, simply because our own language is just what we use to represent reality. I argue that this impression is illusory. In order to draw a conclusion about reality, meaning must be connected with truth in a non-trivial way, and precisely this cannot be done in the language for which the meaning theory itself is correct. (shrink)

In the classical ideal, a physical theory provides understandable dynamic explanations and yields novel predictions of phenomena. Relativistic Physics (RP), namely the special and general theories of relativity and relativistic cosmology, does not meet the classical ideal. This discrepancy has been addressed by transforming the classical ideal into a ‘relativistic methodology’, where it is accepted that nature is not fully understandable, predictions are prioritized over dynamic explanations, new phenomena may be accommodated in an orderly fashion with the aid of (...) additional hypotheses, and anomalous data may be disregarded. Relativistic methodology and the enduring confidence in RP stem from tradition, where physicists who have learned to conceptualize reality through RP see it as the only alternative. The greatest 20th-century philosophers of science —Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend— have taught us that to fully understand a theory’s weaknesses, it must be juxtaposed with an alternate theory, and that its replacement requires a superior theory. Here, RP is confronted with Tuomo Suntola’s Dynamic Universe (DU). Suntola claims that DU matches or surpasses RP’s predictive accuracy for several central phenomena from the terrestrial to the largest cosmological scales, while adhering to the classical ideal and cohering with quantum mechanics. If this claim withstands scrutiny, DU deserves further attention from physicists, philosophers and funding institutions. (shrink)

Context: In the literature concerning the theory of social systems, interest in epistemological and ontological questions has increased in recent years. The controversies regarding a realist vs. constructivist interpretation of Luhmann’s theory, as well as the concept of many realities that correspond to many ontologies, deserve attention. Problem: The paper discusses interrelated ontological and epistemological problems in Luhmann’s systems theory, such as ontology and de-ontologization, realism vs. constructivism, contingency and its limits and one vs. many realities. Method: (...) The paper proposes an interpretation, according to which systems theory is based on an epistemology - radical operative constructivism. Results: Luhmann is not a realist. The last word belongs to radical operative constructivism, and naïve realism with reference to social systems has only a preliminary, methodological significance. However, taking a position in the dispute between realism and constructivism inevitably involves an ontological “vocabulary,” that is, usage of the reality/construction distinction. Furthermore, operative constructivism formulates the necessary conditions of the possibility of cognition, which limit the contingency of the theory and constitute one reality that is a construction of systems theory. Luhmann rejects ontology, but he does not renounce epistemology, and consequently the project of de-ontologization remains incomplete. Implications: The paper offers a new, coherent interpretation of ontological and epistemological questions in Luhmann’s theory, and also throws light on some problems of radical constructivism in general, such as the ontological implications of epistemology or the constructivist self-reference of theories. Key words: Radical operative constructivism, social systems, Luhmann, ontology, reality, contingency. (shrink)

The article analyses and interprets the critique of the special dharmic theory of the early Buddhist school of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. Special attention is paid to the critique of the theory of the existence of dharmas, elementary psycho-physical data, in all three time periods. At the beginning, a general Buddhist theory of two truths is presented, which tries to legitimize the so-called philosophy of abhidharma as a “higher teaching” regarding reality (dharma (...) class='Hi'>theory) which is only rudimentarily present in the Buddha’s discourses. Then we turn to a concise presentation and analysis of the key ontological concepts of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika, and then to the critique of the same undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. It is concluded that sautrāntika, with its critique, “returned” Buddhist philosophy on the path of pure phenomenology after the sarvāstivada-vaibhāṣika’s attempt to interpret the Buddha’s teaching in line with a realistic reductive ontology. (shrink)

In this article I try to investigate the possible insights one may reach by considering the development on the level of socio-philosophical theories as a symptom of the development taking place on the level of social practice.

In the classical ideal, a physical theory provides understandable dynamic explanations and yields novel predictions of phenomena. Relativistic Physics (RP), namely the special and general theories of relativity and relativistic cosmology, does not meet this ideal. This discrepancy has been addressed by transforming the classical ideal into a ‘relativistic methodology’, where it is accepted that nature is not fully understandable, predictions are prioritized over dynamic explanations, new phenomena may be accommodated in an orderly fashion with the aid of additional (...) hypotheses, and anomalous data may be disregarded. Relativistic methodology and the enduring confidence in RP stem from tradition, where physicists who have learned to conceptualize reality through RP see it as the only alternative. Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend have taught us that to fully understand a theory’s weaknesses, it must be juxtaposed with an alternate theory, and that its replacement requires a superior theory. Here, RP is confronted with Tuomo Suntola’s Dynamic Universe (DU). Suntola claims that DU matches or surpasses RP’s predictive accuracy for several central phenomena from the terrestrial to the largest cosmological scales, while adhering to the classical ideal and cohering with quantum mechanics. If this claim withstands scrutiny, DU deserves further attention from physicists, philosophers and funding institutions. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to demonstrate how the historical debate between materialism and idealism, in the field of Philosophy, extends, in new clothes, to the field of Quantum Physics characterized by realism and anti-realism. For this, we opted for a debate, also historical, between the realism of Albert Einstein, for whom reality exists regardless of the existence of the knowing subject, and Niels Bohr, for whom we do not have access to the ultimate reality of the (...) matter, unless conditioning it to the existence of an observer endowed with rationality, position adopted in the Interpretation of Complementarity – posture that was expanded in 1935 when Bohr assumed a “relationalist” conception, according to which the quantum state is defined by the relationship between the quantum object and the entire measuring device. This is an extremely important debate, as it further consolidates the results of nascent Quantum Mechanics, guaranteeing Bohr the leadership of the orthodoxy based on the interpretation of complementarity. Here, when dealing with Quantum Theory, we will not make any distinction between the terms Quantum Physics, Quantum Theory or Quantum Mechanics. The entire discussion will be held under the name “Quantum Theory”. Theory that tries to analyze and describe the behavior of physical systems of reduced dimensions, close to the sizes of molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. We hope that the reader will appreciate the genius of these two titans in this field of Physics when they magnificently formulate the arguments that support the object of their defenses. (shrink)

People construe reality by using words as basic units of meaningful categorization. The present theory-driven study applied the method of a free association task to explore how people express the concepts of the world and the self in words. The respondents were asked to recall any five words relating with the word world. Afterwards they were asked to recall any five words relating with the word self. The method of free association provided the respondents with absolute freedom to (...) choose any words they wanted. Such free recall task is suggested as being a relatively direct approach to the respondents’ self- and world-related conceptual categories, without enormous rational processing. The results provide us, first, with associative ranges for constructs of the world and the self, where some associative dimensions are defined by semantic polarities in the meanings of peripheral categories (e.g., Nature vs. Culture). Second, our analysis showed that some groups of verbal categories that were associated with the words world and self are central, while others are peripheral with respect to the central position. Third, the analysis of category networks revealed that some categories play the role of a transmitter, mediating the pathway between other categories in the network. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to find out whether Gadamer is entitled to hold together his finitist commitment to the heteronomy of art and thought, and his advocacy of an "endless conversation with itself" of humankind. We focus on three texts: Gadamer’s dismis­sal of Carl Schmitt’s outside-in account of the heteronomy implied by the "irrup­tion of reality" in the play Hamlet and, as Archimedean point, Shakespeare’s "excision of reality" according to Stephen Greenblatt, and its inside-out heteronomic consequences. (...) The results: Schmitt’s approach restricts Gadamer’s argument on the "endless dialogue", Gadamer’s rejoinder aggravates his own argumentative fragility, and Greenblatt’s perspectivation discloses a non-sequitur. The inspection of these texts attests that heteronomy per se does not entail any openness to "creative" interpretations, that a universalized logos endiéthetos is a chimera, and that there cannot be any "infinite conversation" which would sustain the Gadamerian interplay of question and answer. (shrink)

Sociology is becoming fragmented. With specialised fields spinning off beyond the capacity of a unifying theoretical frame to embrace them, the prospect exists that sociology's vital centre may not hold. Proceeding from a social constructionist perspective, this work examines the existence and probes the origins of the specialised sociological fields of social problems and social movements. Conceptual ambiguities that currently plague both specialisations are noted, as are their effective theoretical isolation from general sociological theory. Each field is traced to (...) its roots in sociology's formative period in the nineteenth century. Two modes of doing sociology are found to have evolved, respectively, in the United Stales and in Continental Europe, each conditioned by distinctive historical experiences and resonating with the prevailing social and political concerns on the two continents. American sociology emerged in response to social perceptions that progress is inhibited by a proliferation of 'social problems'. Continental European sociology arose in reaction to Enlightenment principles failing to be institutionalised, inviting the perceived social threat of either revolution or anarchy. Both sociologies are thus seen as ideologically contaminated, and their respective dominant perspectives, through the 1950s, are contrasted as the 'social problem orientation' and the 'social movement orientation'. Comparative analysis of these orientatations probes such issues as ahistorical vs. historical treatments: methodological individualism vs. collectivism: differential conceptions of class; the discipline's need to inhibit ideological contagion through a sociological reconstruction of prevailing social constructions of reality; the vital distinction between structural and processual conceptualisations. The study concludes that temporality serves as a crucial but much-neglected dimension in much of American sociology. So-called social problems and social movements are found to be grounded in essentially similar empirical social circumstances, with their alternate conceptualisations attributable to differential time-frames through which such circumstances are sociologically apprehended. This points to the potential theoretical integration of these two fields. Scientific, ideological. and social policy implications of alternative constructions of reality are also explored. (shrink)

In this lesson, I explore three areas of intersection between ethics and metaphysics: accounts of the self, the reality of value, and basic distinctions in ethical theory. I compare the account of the self as a chariot from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Deontology), early Buddhism from Questions of King Milinda (Consequentialism), and Plato's Phaedrus (Virtue Ethics). In each case, the metaphysical model is continuous with the moral theory of the same perspective and adopted to accommodate the moral (...) class='Hi'>theory. I also compare debates across traditions on controversies such as: Naturalism vs. Nonnaturalism, ethics vs. action (dharma vs. karma), and the perennial question of Moral Realism. The relationship between metaphysics and ethics is not peculiar to a specific philosophical tradition. It has to do with central questions of moral philosophy. A common point that these issues converge on is the question of moral standing: what kinds of things count, and what are their properties. (shrink)

These are the proceedings of Physics and Reality 2024, International Conference on Philosophy of Physics, held at University of Helsinki, Finland, 4-6 June 2024. -/- The conference was organised by the research project Appearance and Reality in Physics and Beyond that started in June 2023. The project is located in the Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies, University of Helsinki. -/- The conference explored central themes in philosophy of physics, including interpretations of quantum theory, geometric vs. (...) dynamic approaches to relativistic phenomena, the project of unifying quantum theory and general relativity, and extending quantum theory to new domains. The conference provided a platform for representing well-informed novel ideas, which are needed as the theoretical foundations of physics are not ready. Moreover, it is to be noted that the greatest 20th century philosophers of science —Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend— reminded us that rival theories are needed to fully understand the weaknesses of a paradigmatic theory. -/- Altogether 18 articles are included in the proceedings. Their authors and titles, the members of the organizing and program committees, and the peer reviewers are listed below. -/- Helsinki, January 17, 2025 Avril Styrman, Paavo Pylkkänen and Saara Wuokko Editors -/- Cosmology and Relativistic Phenomena -/- Martín López-Corredoira. Alternative cosmologies Karen Crowther. On the Motivations for Seeking a Theory of Quantum Gravity Tuomo Suntola. The Dynamic Universe Avril Styrman. Evaluation of Theories and Methodologies: Relativistic Physics vs. the Dynamic Universe — With Remarks from Physics and Reality 2024 and Cosmology on Small Scales 2024 Conferences Tarja Kallio-Tamminen. Beyond wave-particle dualism: How Suntola's mass-wave concept unites physics and metaphysics Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila. A Neo-Aristotelian Approach to a Unified Theory of Physics Michal Křížek. Infrared measurements of the JWST suggest that our dynamic universe is spatially closed Álvaro Mozota Frauca. Quantum Cosmology and the Age of the Universe William Mark Stuckey and Michael Silberstein. Unifying Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics via Adynamical Global Constraints Michal Křížek and Václav Vavryčuk. Twin paradox in accelerated systems and the Equivalence Principle Enrico Maresca. Noncommutative Geometry and Spacetime: A Historical Reconstruction -/- Quantum Perspectives, Scientific Metaphysics, and Free Will -/- Vikram Athalye. Unifying Perspectives: All-encompassing Reality vs. All-inclusive Physics Paavo Pylkkänen. Was David Bohm a Wave Function Realist? Cristi Stoica. Structural Realism and the underdetermination of the physical meaning Maria Luisa Chiofalo. Quantum Toolbox for Neurobiology Sensory Systems Hans Liljenström. Can physics and neuroscience allow for free will? Alessandra Pulga. A Framework for Free Will within a Quantum Universe Kiran Pala and S Shalu. A Quantum Paradigm in Conscious Experience and Cognitive Process -/- Organizing committee -/- Paavo Pylkkänen, University of Helsinki (chair) Avril Styrman, University of Helsinki (vice-chair) Saara Wuokko, University of Helsinki (conference manager) -/- Program committee -/- Chris Fuchs, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA Albert Solé, University of Barcelona, ES Marilu Chiofalo, University of Pisa, IT Bert Kappen, Radboud University, NL Paavo Pylkkänen, University of Helsinki, FI (chair) Avril Styrman, University of Helsinki, FI Saara Wuokko, University of Helsinki, FI -/- Peer reviewers -/- Vikram Athalye, Cummins College Pune, IN Jerome Busemeyer, Indiana University, USA Marilu Chiofalo, University of Pisa, IT Karen Crowther, University of Oslo, NO Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, University of Helsinki, FI Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Aalto University, FI Tarja Kallio-Tamminen, Physics Foundations Society, FI Michal Křı́žek, Czech Academy of Sciences, CZ Petri Lievonen, Screen io, FI Martı́n López-Corredoira, Instituto de Astrofı́sica de Canarias, ES Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, University of California, US Prakash Mondal, Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad, IN Ilkka Pättiniemi, Helsinki Circle, FI Paavo Pylkkänen, University of Helsinki, FI Heikki Sipilä, Physics Foundations Society, FI Avril Styrman, University of Helsinki, FI Tuomo Suntola, Physics Foundations Society, FI Václav Vavryčuk, Czech Academy of Sciences, CZ. (shrink)

In this article I critically engage with Robert Craig’s constitutive metamodel of communication theory from the vantage point of an integrational semiology, as developed by Oxford Professor Roy Harris in his book Signs, Language and Communication (1996). I argue that Harris’ dichotomy of a ‘segregational’ vs. an ‘integrational’ tradition of theorizing language and communication makes the metamodel redundant on the grounds that Craig’s communicational perspective on social reality is replaced by two semiologies sponsoring mutually exclusive ontologies and epistemologies.

Many cognitive and evolutionary theories of religion argue that supernatural explanations are byproducts of our cognitive adaptations. An influential argument states that our supernatural explanations result from a tendency to generate anthropomorphic explanations, and that this tendency is a byproduct of an error management strategy because agents tend to be associated with especially high fitness costs. We propose instead that anthropomorphic and other supernatural explanations result as features of a broader toolkit of well-designed cognitive adaptations, which are designed for explaining (...) the abstract and causal structure of complex, unobservable, and uncertain phenomena that have substantial impacts on fitness. Specifically, we argue that (1) mental representations about the abstract vs. the supernatural are largely overlapping, if not identical, and (2) when the data-generating processes for scarce and ambiguous observations are complex and opaque, a naive observer can improve a bias-variance trade-off by starting with a simple, underspecified explanation that Western observers readily interpret as “supernatural.” We then argue that (3) in many cases, knowledge specialists across cultures offer pragmatic services that involve apparently supernatural explanations, and their clients are frequently willing to pay them in a market for useful and effective services. We propose that at least some ethnographic descriptions of religion might actually reflect ordinary and adaptive responses to novel problems such as illnesses and natural disasters, where knowledge specialists possess and apply the best available explanations about phenomena that would otherwise be completely mysterious and unpredictable. (shrink)

There are four main theories concerning the ultimate constitution of matter: atomism version 1, atomism version 2, the theory of gunk, and the theory of extended simples. These four theories are usually seen as diametrically opposed. Here I take a stab at ecumenism, and argue that atomism version 1 and the theory of extended simples can be reconciled and rendered compatible by reference to the reality of dispositions.

The following remarks are intended to show that some of Freudenthal's recent criticisms of Bunge'sFoundations of Physics are wide of the mark. Freudenthal sets his criticisms of detail in a framework of some general considerations of the role played by axiomatic theories in the foundations of physics. In particular, he considers the notion of the objects of an axiomatic theory, the relation of an axiomatic theory to reality, and the notion of the transformation group of a (...) class='Hi'>theory. These topics are considered below. (shrink)

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is (...) the chief concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided. (shrink)

Easy to understand philosophy papers in all areas. Table of contents: Three Short Philosophy Papers on Human Freedom The Paradox of Religions Institutions Different Perspectives on Religious Belief: O’Reilly v. Dawkins. v. James v. Clifford Schopenhauer on Suicide Schopenhauer’s Fractal Conception of Reality Theodore Roszak’s Views on Bicameral Consciousness Philosophy Exam Questions and Answers Locke, Aristotle and Kant on Virtue Logic Lecture for Erika Kant’s Ethics Van Cleve on Epistemic Circularity Plato’s Theory of Forms Can we trust our (...) senses? Yes we can Descartes on What He Believes Himself to Be The Role of Values in Science Modern Science Kant’s Moral Philosophy Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy Schopenhauer on Human Suffering Bertrand Russell on the Value of Philosophy The Philosophical Value of Uncertainty Logic Homework: Theorems and Models Searle vs. Turing on the Imitation Game Hume, Frankfurt, and Holbach on Personal Freedom Manifesto of the University of Wisconsin, Madison Secular Society Michael’s Analysis of the Limits of Civil Protections Bentham and Mill on Different Types of Pleasure Set Theory Homework Aristotle on Virtue Nagel On the Hard Problem Wittgenstein on Language and Thought Camus and Schopenhauer on the Meaning of Life Camus’ Hero as Rebel without a Cause My Little Finger: Camus’ Absurdism Illustrated Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? Does Mathematics Assume the Truth of Platonism? The Self-defeating Nature of Utilitarianism and Consequentialism Generally What is The Good Life? Bentham and Mill regarding types of pleasures Kant’s Moral Philosophy Five Short Papers on Mind-body Dualism Tracy Latimer’s Father had the Right to Kill Her: Towards a doctrine of generalized self-defense Arguments Concerning God and Morality Goldman, Rousseau and von Hayek on the Ideal State J.S Mill on Liberty and Personal Freedom A Kantian Analysis of a Borderline Date-rape Situation Living Well as Flourishing: Aristotle’s Conception of the Good Life Three Essays on Medical Ethics: Answers to Exam Questions on Elective Amputation, Vaccination, and Informed Consent Hobbes, Marx, Rousseau, Nietzsche: Their Central Themes De Tocqueville on Egoism Mill vs. Hobbes on Liberty Exam-Essays on the Moral Systems of Mill, Bentham, and Kant Kant’s Moral System Aristotle on Virtue Plato’s Cave Allegory An Ethical Quandary Superorganisms The Tuskegee Experiment A Rawlsian Analysis Why Moore’s Proof of an External World Fails A Defense of Nagel’s Argument Against Materialism A Utilitarian Analysis of a Case of Theft The Paradox of the Self-aware Wretch: An Analysis of Pascal’s Moral Philosophy Jean-Paul Sartre: Decline and Fall of a Marxist Sell-out A One Page Proof of Plato’s Theory of Forms Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy The problem of the one and the many Four Short Essays on Truth and Knowledge What is ‘the Good Life?’ The Ontological Argument Different Political Philosophies: Plato, Locke, Madison, Rousseau, Hayek, and Mill on the State What do I know with certainty? Skepticism about skepticism Neuroscience and Freewill Operant Conditioning What makes us special? Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? No Two Papers on Epistemology: Gettier and Bostrom Examination Nietzsche on Punishment God’s Foreknowledge and Moral Responsibility . (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge the distinction between “epistemic” and “ontic” states propounded by Harrigan and Spekkens (Found Phys 40:125–157, 2010) by pointing out that because knowledge is factive, any state that represents someone’s knowledge about a physical system thereby also represents something about the physical system itself, so there is no such thing as “mere knowledge”. This criticism leads to the reformulation of the main question of the debate: instead of asking whether a given state is ontic or epistemic, (...) we should instead ask whether a given change of a state is ontic or epistemic. In particular, in the context of quantum mechanics, one can ask whether the collapse of the quantum state could be understood as an epistemically successful change of the observer’s beliefs about the complete state of the system that is not associated with any change in the physical reality. I argue that the answer to this question should be in the negative because it is possible that, in a series of measurements, the collapse rule tells us to update a certain state to a different one and then back to the same state; if both of these updates are merely changes of our beliefs, then they could not both be epistemically successful. (shrink)

Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots (...) of McDowell’s views and providing Kantian and Husserlian correctives where needed. (shrink)

Study represents an application of the neutrosophic method, for solving the contradiction between communication and information. In addition, it recourse to an appropriate method of approaching the contradictions: Extensics, as the method and the science of solving the contradictions. The research core is the reality that the scientific research of communication-information relationship has reached a dead end. The bivalent relationship communicationinformation, information-communication has come to be contradictory, and the two concepts to block each other. After the critical examination of (...) conflicting positions expressed by many experts in the field, the extensic and inclusive hypothesis is issued that information is a form of communication. The object of communication is the sending of a message. The message may consist of thoughts, ideas, opinions, feelings, beliefs, facts, information, intelligence or other significational elements. When the message content is primarily informational, communication will become information or intelligence. The arguments of supporting the hypothesis are: a) linguistic (the most important being that there is "communication of information" but not "information of communication"; also, it is clarified and reinforced the over situated referent, that of the communication as a process), b) systemic-procedural (in the communication system is developing an information system; the informing actant is a type of communicator, the information process is a communication process), c) practical (the delimitation eliminates the efforts of disparate and inconsistent understanding of the two concepts), d) epistemological arguments (the possibility of intersubjective thinking of reality is created), linguistic arguments, e) logical and realistic arguments (it is noted the situation that allows to think coherently in a system of concepts - derivative series or integrative groups) f) and arguments from historical experience (the concept of communication has temporal priority, it appears 13 times in Julius Caesar’s writings ). In an axiomatic conclusion, the main arguments are summarized in four axioms: three are based on the pertinent observations of specialists, and the fourth is a relevant application of Florentin Smarandache’s neutrosophic theory. (shrink)

Aesthetic theory distinguishes different approaches to understanding the sensory and logical. The author agrees with I. Kant’s theory that sensory perception is subjective and the imagination is given the opportunity to invent fictional characters that do not exist in real life. Digital technologies make it possible to revive and introduce such characters into an artistic performance. This process becomes possible with the help of computer algorithms that are used to create art practices. There are many contradictory publications where (...) there is no understanding of the technological process of the task at hand, for example, that it is possible to write a program that will “teach machine aesthetics” using pictures. Therefore, the author turns to three technological solutions (virtual reality, augmented reality and artificial intelligence or neural networks) and examines, using the example of existing programs and applications, how the process of interacting computer algorithms of artistic creativity with the imagination and skill of stage work directors (play, opera, choreography). The author solves this issue within the framework of algorithmic aesthetics, which considers the process of communication, but unlike media theory, considers the process of information exchange in binary code. The algorithms by which the written programs operate do not create a “code spirit”, but allow the creation of tools for artistic creativity and the development of the skills of talented people. (shrink)

This paper provides a brief critique of Jaegwon Kim’s evaluation of the achievements of materialist physicalism and then goes on to examine the case for panpsychism and the main objection that has been raised against it, i.e., the composition problem. The object of this examination is to lay bare the fundamental assumptions underlying both the main argument in support of the theory and the objection against it. Whitehead’s panexperientialism has a fair claim to be regarded as the most elaborate (...) version of the theory ever produced. Once the logical structure of the composition problem has been clarified, however, it becomes possible to see that—contrary to what has been argued by David Ray Griffin in his important book, Unsnarling the World-Knot—even Whitehead’sversion of the doctrine fails to provide a satisfactory solution. The paper is brought to an end with a general reflection on the shortcomings of current critiques of panpsychism. Whitehead’s panexperientialism cannot be accepted as it stands and panpsychism as a general philosophical position is not supported by a conclusive proof; nevertheless, the notion that experience is a pervasive feature of reality has the unquestionable merit of being a wholly adequate response to a real philosophical perplexity. (shrink)

Brentano’s empiricism displays striking similarities with Mach’s phenomenalism. Both authors hold physical reality to be a “fiction” and reject the traditional view of truth and existence. In this paper, the author seeks to clarify some aspects of the Mach-Brentano debate, with a special focus on the theory of intentionality. First, he links this debate to an earlier one, namely to the debate about the mind-body relation. Secondly, he discusses some of Brentano’s objections and construes his intentionalism as an (...) alternative to the psychophysical identity thesis. (shrink)

The article focuses on one important aspect of this debate between Realists and Nominalists in the Late Middle Ages, namely the controversy between William Ockham and Walter Burley about the nature and status of relations and relatives, for the category of ad aliquid is the most intriguing category after substance, and in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages many authors attempted to develop new formulations of the Aristotelian theory of relatives. Burley believed that when two substances are related one (...) to the other, five distinct elements can be singled out: the relation itself (for instance, the form of paternity); the ultimate substrate of that relation (namely, the substance that denominatively receives the name of the relation - the animal which is called ‘father’ because it begot another similar to itself); the fundamentum of the relation (namely the categorial item in virtue of which the relation inheres in its substrate - in our example, the generative power); the antecedent term of the relation (namely the aggregate formed by the substrate in which the relation inheres and the relation itself - in our example, the father); and the consequent term of the relation (namely, the aggregate formed by the substance with which the subiectum is somehow connected and the relation correlated to the first one - in our example, the son). In fact, according to Burley, any relation has its own converse. The foundation is the main component, since it joins the relation to the underlying substances, permits the relation to link the antecedent term to the consequent term, and transmits some of its properties to the relation. Ockham, on the contrary, believed that terms such as ‘relativum’, ‘relatio’, and ‘ad aliquid’ are terms of second intention, since they signify other (vocal, written, mental) terms, when taken in personal supposition. In Ockham’s opinion, Socrates qua father cannot be regarded as a relative; it is the name ‘father’ (and the corresponding intentio) that is a relative. This implies that the abstract terms of the category, namely those terms that in Burley’s view signify relations such as ‘paternitas’, and the concrete terms, namely those terms that in Burley’s view signify relatives such as ‘pater’, are synonymous according to Ockham. He thinks that any abstract term belonging to the category of ad aliquid is semantically equivalent to the definition (in a broad sense) of the correlated concrete term, so that, for instance, ‘paternity’ in a sentence like ‘a father is a father because of paternity’means: a father is a father because he has begotten a son. Such differences between them in their divergent interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of ad aliquid consist in the opposing roles that reality plays in their explanations of human knowledge, and Ockham’s rejection, in favour of a principle of ontological parsimony, of the principle of a close isomorphism between (mental) language and the world. For Burley, extra-mental reality was the model that our knowledge has to adequate and reproduce, whilst Ockham conceived of reality as a simple object of our knowledge, which does concern reality, but is articulated according to inner principles. Burley’s thought was dominated by the object-label scheme, as the basic semantic relation, and by hypostatization, regarded as the practice of replacing logical and epistemological rules by ontological standards and references, as the main device for explaining the semantic function of language. On the contrary, for Ockham reality must consist of as few as possible kinds of being. (shrink)

In our research about Fuzzy Time and modeling time, "Unexpected Hanging Paradox" plays a major role. Here, we compare this paradox to the Zeno Paradox and the relations of them with our standard models of continuum and Fuzzy numbers. To do this, we review the project "Fuzzy Time and Possible Impacts of It on Science" and introduce a new way in order to approach the solutions for these paradoxes. Additionally, we have a more general discussion about paradoxes, as Philosophical back (...) ground of the subject and in this way, we introduce the concepts of General View, the first picture, BBF-General View. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the alleged incompatibility between presentism and specious present theories of temporal experience. According to presentism, the present time is instantaneous (or, near-instantaneous), while according to specious present theories, the specious present is temporally extended—therefore, it seems that there is no room in reality for the whole of a specious present, if presentism is true. It seems then that one of the two claims—presentism or the specious present theory—has to go. I shall argue that (...) this kind of worries is mislead. Once we understand properly how our phenomenal experience as of passage and as of change, such as it is understood by specious present theorists, comes into being, the apparent phenomenologico-metaphysical conflict will disappear. In short, the mistake here is to presuppose that there is a link between phenomenology and metaphysics stronger than it actually is. Presentism is a metaphysical theory about what exists. Specious presentism is a phenomenological theory about how things appear to us in experience. As we will see, the two claims are not in conflict, and are in fact entirely orthogonal. (shrink)

How does science work? Does it tell us what the world is "really" like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality , Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses these questions by taking the reader on a grand tour of one hundred years of debate about science. The result is a completely accessible introduction to the main themes of the philosophy of science. Intended for undergraduates and general readers with no prior background in philosophy, (...) Theory and Reality covers logical positivism the problems of induction and confirmation Karl Popper's theory of science Thomas Kuhn and "scientific revolutions" the views of Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and Paul Feyerabend and challenges to the field from sociology of science, feminism, and science studies. The book then looks in more detail at some specific problems and theories, including scientific realism, the theory-ladeness of observation, scientific explanation, and Bayesianism. Finally, Godfrey-Smith defends a form of philosophical naturalism as the best way to solve the main problems in the field. Throughout the text he points out connections between philosophical debates and wider discussions about science in recent decades, such as the infamous "science wars." Examples and asides engage the beginning student a glossary of terms explains key concepts and suggestions for further reading are included at the end of each chapter. However, this is a textbook that doesn't feel like a textbook because it captures the historical drama of changes in how science has been conceived over the last one hundred years. Like no other text in this field, Theory and Reality combines a survey of recent history of the philosophy of science with current key debates in language that any beginning scholar or critical reader can follow. (shrink)

?Disclosing New Worlds? represents an extraordinarily fruitful response to the radically changed social and intellectual conditions of the late twentieth century. Its focus on skillful practice yields a social theory thicker than most. Yet in remaining aloof of material reality it retains an ambiguity that contemporary culture prevailingly resolves into a style of life largely devoid of skill and excellence. Consideration of material reality, however, discloses hopeful if inconspicuous practices as well, practices that are at the center (...) of the good life and constitute the wellspring of solidarity. University teaching can be a vigorous introduction to that sort of life. (shrink)

The compatibility of scientific realism and evolutionary epistemology is a controversial issue in contemporary philosophy of science. Scientific realism is the view that scientific theories aim to describe the true nature of reality, while evolutionary epistemology is the view that scientific knowledge is the product of natural selection and adaptation. Some philosophers argue that evolutionary epistemology undermines the epistemic status of scientific theories and thus poses a serious challenge to scientific realism. This paper examines this problem and explores whether (...) scientific realism can be reconciled with evolutionary epistemology. The paper argues that critical rationalism (CR), a philosophical approach that rejects justificationism and emphasizes the role of criticism, rationality, and objectivity in science, can provide a viable framework for integrating scientific realism and evolutionary epistemology. The paper shows that by adopting a non-justificationist fallibilist stance toward scientific theories, CR can reconcile the realist and the evolutionary views on scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This paper proposes to assess the naturalist project in epistemology with an eye towards exposing the project as deficient for serving as a robust epistemological project. Epistemologists treasure a certain family of questions and burden themselves with a number of specific concerns the most important of which, I think, cannot be answered by the epistemological naturalist. Ignoring these questions, I will argue, essentially amounts to a dismissal of the principle tension that primarily motivates and properly guides epistemological theorizing. This tension (...) is the familiar appearance vs. reality distinction and characterizes what I am calling the classical landmark or boundary-stone for epistemological theorizing. I will defend the claim that a full replacement of the traditional/classical epistemological project by a naturalized epistemology closes epistemology off from making important claims needed in a theory of human knowledge and, for that reason, a full replacement should be resisted. These claims that an epistemology should be expected to make issue from what I call the classical landmark for epistemological inquiry. Naturalist's effectively ignore this landmark and I caution them in the spirit of the proverb to not "remove the ancient landmark which your fathers have set. (shrink)

A critical re-examination of the history of the concepts of space (including spacetime of general relativity and relativistic quantum field theory) reveals a basic ontological elusiveness of spatial extension, while, at the same time, highlighting the fact that its epistemic primacy seems to be unavoidably imposed on us (as stated by A.Einstein “giving up the extensional continuum … is like to breathe in airless space”). On the other hand, Planck’s discovery of the atomization of action leads to the fundamental (...) recognition of an ontology of non-spatial, abstract entities (Quine) for the quantum level of reality (QT), as distinguished from the necessarily spatio-temporal, experimental revelations (measurements). The elementary quantum act (measured by Planck’s constant) has neither duration nor extension, and any genuinely quantum process literally does not belong in the Raum and time of our experience. As Heisenberg stresses: “Während also die klassische Physik ein objectives Geschehen in Raum and Zeit zum Gegenstand hat, für dessen Existenz seine Beobachtung völlig irrelevant war, behandelt die Quantentheorie Vorgänge, die sozusagen nur in den Momenten der Beobachtung als raumzeitliche Phänomene aufleuchten, und über die in der zwischenzeit anschaulische physikalische Aussagen sinloss sind”. An admittedly speculative, hazardous conjecture is then advanced concerning the relation of such quantum ontology with the role of the pre-phenomenal continuum (Husserl) in the perception of macroscopically distinguishable objects in the Raum and time of our experience. Although rather venturesome, it brings together important philosophical issues. Coherently with recent general results in works on the foundations of QT, it is assumed that the linearity of quantum dynamical evolution does not apply to the central nervous system of living beings at a certain level of the evolutionary ramification and at the pre-conscious stage of subjectivity. Accordingly, corresponding to the onset of a non-linear dynamic evolution, a ‘primary spatial’ reduction is ‘continually’ taking place, thereby constituting the neural precondition for the experience of distinguishable macroscopic objects in the continuous spatial extension. While preventing the theoretically possible quantum superpositions of macroscopic objects from being perceivable by living beings, the ‘primary reduction’ has no effect on the standard processes concerning quantum level entities involved in laboratory man-made experiments. In this connection, an experimental check which might falsify the conjecture is briefly discussed. The approach suggested here, if sound, leads to a naturalization of that part of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetics than can survive the Euclidean catastrophe. According to such naturalized transcendentalism, “space can well be transcendental without the axioms being so”, in agreement with a well-known statement by Boltzman. Finally, as far as QT is concerned, the conjecture entails that a scheme for quantum measurement of the von Neumann type cannot even ‘leave the ground’, vindicating Bohr’s viewpoint. A quantum theory of measurement, in a proper sense, turns out to be unnecessary and in fact impossible. (shrink)

Can language capture objective reality? N. J. Enfield’s Language vs. Reality: Why Language Is Good for Lawyers and Bad for Scientists probes into this question and argues how language performs poor...

Theory and Reality is about the connection between true theories and the world. A mathematical framefork for such connections is given, and it is shown how that framework can be used to infer facts about the structure of reality from facts about the structure of true theories, The book starts with an overview of various approaches to metaphysics. Beginning with Quine's programmatic "On what there is", the first chapter then discusses the perils involved in going from language (...) to metaphysics. It criticises contemporary intuition-driven metaphysics, comments on naturalistic approaches, and then presents the main proposition put forward in the thesis: we should base metaphysics on model theory. In chapters 2 to 5, mathematical treatments are given of concepts that we need: theories, metaphysics, necessitation and semantics. These are used in chapters 6 and 7 to prove that, seen from a certain informative view point, any true theory will give rise to an isomorphism between that theory and the world. This conclusion is similar to Wittgenstein's in the Tractatus, but differs in that it places the structural relationship on the level of whole theories, rather than single propositions. (shrink)

Bell's theorem is used to guide the formulation of a unified theory of reality that incorporates the basic principles of relativistic quantum theory.

Response-dependent (R-D) properties have a big epistemological advantage: when we are the responders, they give us real knowledge of what their bearers can do or cause. But accounts vary substantially with respect to the underlying metaphysics, and the epistemological advantage is easily lost. In this paper, I explain how this occurs in Pettit’s influential account. I begin by outlining the epistemological motivation for dealing with R-D properties, in particular for some, more demanding, empiricist theories of knowledge. I then explain how (...) dispositional accounts of R-D properties, like Johnston’s, invite in accounts involving judgments, like Pettit’s. In Pettit’s account, responses are effectively judgments of salient similarities between objects, and thereby second-order, so that it is not the properties, but our concepts of the properties that are “response-privileging” and thereby ultimately R-D. This account is then extended to all concepts. Pettit thus gives us a R-D genealogy of concepts, but relinquishes the epistemological asset inherent in (first-order) accounts of R-D properties as consisting in (“real”) response events. (shrink)

Moving from a cinematic reinterpretation of Borges’s Library of Babel, I attempt to provide a new answer to the old ontological question: “What kind of being is a film?”. This answer, which takes into account the coming of digital era, is developed through a comparison with Carroll’s philosophy of motion pictures. While discussing, criticizing and trying to complete his theory, I will examine the concept of a film under four different aspects: as a material object, as an ideal object, (...) as a mental object, and as a social object. Finally, our ontology of film will be applied to clarify some traditional theoretical dualisms: i.e. film vs. reality, film vs. narration, film vs. discourse, film vs. art. (shrink)

This book was digitized and reprinted from the collections of the University of California Libraries. It was produced from digital images created through the libraries' mass digitization efforts. The digital images were cleaned and prepared for printing through automated processes. Despite the cleaning process, occasional flaws may still be present that were part of the original work itself, or introduced during digitization. This book and hundreds of thousands of others can be found online in the HathiTrust Digital Library at www.hathitrust.org.

A Theory of Reality is an unchanged, high-quality reprint of the original edition of 1899. Hansebooks is editor of the literature on different topic areas such as research and science, travel and expeditions, cooking and nutrition, medicine, and other genres. As a publisher we focus on the preservation of historical literature. Many works of historical writers and scientists are available today as antiques only. Hansebooks newly publishes these books and contributes to the preservation of literature which has become (...) rare and historical knowledge for the future. (shrink)