This article inspects Peirce’s resonances on Deleuze’s semiotic. Whereas most of the literature agrees that Deleuze adapts Peirce’s semiotic to serve his Bergsonian-based theory of sign, this article claims that the relationship of Deleuze with Peirce’s writings is more foliated than it may appear at first. The development of this hypothesis invites to trace back Deleuze’s works before his very acquaintance with Peirce in the 1980s. Therefore, one of Peirce’s classical issues – the role that relations and habits play (...) for the triadic conception of sign – is considered with Deleuze’s early studies, in which he developed this same issue as to approach Hume and Proust. This background echoes years later in Deleuze’s incursion to Peirce’s semiotic in the 1980s ninety-two classes and two books on cinema. In fact, Deleuze’s own triadic conception of sign and his acknowledged pragmatist inclination prove to be closer to Peirce’s pragmatism than the scholarly literature tends to think or argue. The aim of this article is not, however, to build an overwhelming philosophical identity between Deleuze and Peirce, it sets up instead a steadier basis from where to understand their differences. Deleuze’s ignored five-year long lectures on cinema shows to be exegetically revealing with respect to his debts towards Peirce. (shrink)

To Aristotle, spoken words are symbols, not of objects in the world, but of our mental experiences related to these objects. Presently there are two major strands of interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign. First, there is the structuralist account offered by Coseriu (Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie. Von den Anfängen bis Rousseau, 2003 [1969], pp. 65–108) whose interpretation is reminiscent of the Saussurean sign concept. A second interpretation, offered by Lieb (in: Geckeler (Ed.) Logos Semantikos: Studia Linguistica (...) in Honorem Eugenio Coseriu 1921–1981, 1981) and Weidemann (in: Schmitter (Ed.) Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 2. Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike, 1991), says that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is similar to the one presented in Ogden and Richard’s (The meaning of meaning: A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism, 1970 [1923]) semiotic triangle. This paper starts off with an introductory outline of the so-called phýsei-thései discussion which started during presocratic times and culminated in Plato’s Cratylus. Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is to be regarded as a solution to the stalemate position reached in the Cratylus. Next, a discussion is offered of both Coseriu’s and Lieb’s analysis. We submit that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign shows features of both Saussure’s and Ogden and Richards’s sign concept but that it does not exclusively predict one of the two. We argue that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is based on three different relations which together evince his teleological as well empiricist point of view: one internal (symbolic) relation and two external relations, i.e. a likeness relation and a relation katà synthéken. (shrink)

This paper tries to link Ethology to Biosemiotics by analysing the similarities between some triadic relationships like biosemiotics’ Object—Representamen—Interpretant and the one established in Ethology between Sign-stimuli— Innate Releasing Mechanism—Modal Action Pattern, or the one potentially established in communication networks comprising Sender—Receiver—Eavesdropper. I argue here that a collaborative relationship is supported by the fact that the observational method used by Ethology is based on the triadic relationship Sender—Receiver—Eavesdropper. This method, by introducing the human observer at the Interpreter/Eavesdropper (...) place, is not only applicable to the direct study of animal communication, but also to the interpretation of all other animal behaviour by assuming that behaviour is a sign/signal system on its own, for us to interpret and decode. (shrink)

The article deals with semiosis and its dimensions as a theoretical construct to show some elementary differences between spheres of semiotic activity. In essence, one sign will be dissected into four categories of existence to show it may have different relations depending on the dimension it happens to be in. The general framework is that of human consciousness and its two distinct states: awake cognition and asleep dreaming with emphasis on the latter. From our point of view, the concepts (...) of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ have two layers: the manifest form and the latent function, the seen and the unseen. These are used as parallels to support the central thesis of this article that human cognition has dreaming as its countepart.The main theoretical frame is drawn from the work of Greimas and Courtes with emphasis on the semiotic square. The concept of the sign is taken from Peirce, whereas ‘sign-ness’ is adopted from Pyatigorskij. By projecting the triadic sign onto the semiotic square and excluding the concept ‘sign system’ along with the syntactic aspect, the basic fourfold dimension of the sign as such will be brought to view based on the distinct sign-relations in each given dimension. In order to double the square, semiosis will be endowed with features of ‘being-able’, thus affording the initial expression of dominant modalities serving as basis for the structure(s) of the elementary function and mechanism in each of the four dimensions. This will also enable bringing into view some elementary restrictions on semiosis in each dimension. Lastly, some new terms are suggested in accordance with what has been presented.В статье рассматривается семиозис и его измерения как теоретическая конструкция, чтобы показать некоторые элементарные различия между сферами семиотического действия. По сути знак будет разделен на четыре категории существования, чтобы показать, что он может иметь разные отношения в зависимости от того, в каком измерении он находится. Основной рамкой, вместе с тем, является человеческое сознание в его двух состояниях: в состоянии бодрствования и сна со сновидениями, с акцентом на последнее. Несмотря на широкое использование универсальных понятий ‘природа’ и ‘культура’, статья не сосредоточивается на семиотических особенностях этих доменов. С нашей точки зрения ‘природа’ и ‘культура’ имеют два уровня, т.е. проявленную форму и скрытую функцию, видимое и невидимое. Они используются параллельно, поддерживая центральный тезис этой статьи о том, что человеческое познание имеет соответствие в виде сновидения.Теоретическая рамка взята из работы Греймаса и Курте с акцентом на семиотический квадрат. Понятие знака трактуется в духе Пирса, тогда как понятие ≪знаковости≫ дается по Пятигорскому. При проекции триадического знака на семиотический квадрат и исключении понятия ≪знаковой системы≫ вместе с синтаксическим аспектом, обнаруживается основное четырехкратное измерение знака, опирающаяся на определенные знаковые отношения в каждом данном измерении. Чтобы удвоить квадрат, семиозис будет наделен функцией ≪быть способным≫, таким образом обеспечивая начальное выражение доминирующих модальностей, служащих в каждом из четырых измерений основой для структуры (структур) элементарной функции и механизма. Это также даст возможность рассмотреть некоторые элементарные ограничения семиозиса в каждом из измерений. Наконец, предлагаются некоторые новые термины в соответствии с тем, что было представлено.Artikkel tegeleb semioosi ja selle mootmetega kui teoreetilise konstruktsiooniga, et demonstreerida moningaid elementaarseid erinevusi semiootilise tegevuse sfaarides. Sisuliselt lahatakse uks mark neljaks eksistentsikategooriaks, naitamaks, et sel voivad olla erinevad suhted olenevalt mootmest, milles see olema juhtub. Uldiseks raamiks on inimteadvus ja selle kaks eristuvat olekut: arkvelolek ja uni, rohuasetusega viimasel. Vaatamata universaalsete terminite nagu ‘loodus’ ja ‘kultuur’ ohtrale kasutamisele, ei tegele kaesolev artikkel nende valdkondade semiootiliste eriparadega. Meie seisukohast on ‘loodusel’ ja ‘kultuuril’ kaks kihti – manifestne vorm ja latentne funktsioon, nahtav ja nahtamatu. Neid vaadeldakse paralleelselt, et toetada kaesoleva artikli keskset teesi, et inimkognitsiooni vasteks on unenagemine.Peamine teoreetiline raam tuleneb Greimase ja Courtes’ toodest, rohuasetusega semiootilisele ruudule. Margi moiste voetakse Peirce’ilt ning “margilisus” Pjatigorskilt. Projitseerides triaadilist marki semiootilisele ruudule ning valistades ‘margisusteemi’ moiste koos suntaktilise aspektiga, tuuakse nahtavale margi neljakordne alusdimensioon, mis tugineb kindlatele margisuhetele igas antud mootmes. Et ruutu kahekordistada, antakse semioosile ‘suutlikkuse’ jooned, lubades domineerivate modaalsuste algset valjendumist, mis igas neljast dimensioonist toimivad elementaarse funktsiooni struktuuri(de) ja mehhanismi alusena. See voimaldab vaatluse alla tuua ka moned elementaarsed piirangud semioosile iga dimensioonis. Viimaks pakutakse valja moned uued terminid. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine some important features of Peirce's and Wittgenstein's accounts of the nature of signs. The analysis shows that there are at least four points, regarding the nature of signs, on which Peirce and Wittgenstein agree. These are: the triadic nature of signs, the presence of degenerate signs in our discourses, the role of rules in the constitution of meaning, and the indispensable role of a community in creating and maintaining the network of (...) signs. Discovering these similarities does not mean that Peirce's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of semiotics are identical, as their authors make different assumptions about e.g. the aims of semiosis, but they nevertheless reach very similar conclusions. (shrink)

Compared to existing classical approaches to semiotics which are dyadic (signifier/signified, F. de Saussure) and triadic (symbol/concept/object, Ch. S. Peirce), this theory can be characterized as tetradic ([sign/semion]//[object/noema]) and is the result of either doubling the dyadic approach along the semiotic/ordinary dimension or splitting the ‘concept’ of the triadic one into two (semiotic/ordinary). Other important features of this approach are (a) the distinction made between concepts (only functional pairs of extent and intent) and categories (as representations of (...) expressions) and (b) the indication of the need for providing the mathematical passage from the duality between two sets (where one is a singleton) within systems of sets to category-theoretical monoids within systems of categories while waiting for the solution of this problem in the field of logic. Last but not least, human language expressions are the most representative physical instances of semiotic objects. Moreover, as computational experiments which are possible with linguistic objects present a high degree of systematicity (of oppositions), in general, it is relatively easy to elucidate their dependence on the concepts underlying signs. This new semiotic theory or rather this new research program emerged as the fruit of experimentation and reflection on the application of data science tools elaborated within the frameworks of Rough Set Theory (RST), Formal Context Analysis (FCA) and, though only theoretically, Distributed Information Logic (DIL). The semiotic objects (s-objects) of this theory can be described in tabular datasets. Nevertheless, at this stage of formalisation of the theory, lattices (not trees) can be used as working representation structures for characterizing the components of concept systems and graphs for categories of each layer. (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists of diverse orientations have suggested that the pragmatics of semiosis is germane to a dynamic account of meaning as process. Semiosis, the central focus of C. S. Peirce's pragmatic philosophy, may hold a key to perennial problems regarding meaning. Indeed, Peirce's thought should be deemed seminal when placed within the cognitive sciences, especially with respect to his concept of the sign. According to Peirce's pragmatic model, semiosis is a triadic, time-bound, context-sensitive, interpreter-dependent, materially extended (...) dynamic process. Semiosis involves inter-relatedness and inter-action between signs, their objects, acts and events in the world, and the semiotic agents who are in the process of making and taking them. (shrink)

Robert Rosen’s relational biology and biosemiotics share the claim that life cannot be explained by the laws that apply to the inanimate world alone. In this paper, an integrated account of Rosen’s relational biology and Peirce’s semiosis is proposed. The ultimate goal is to contribute to the construction of a unified framework for the definition and study of life. The relational concepts of component and mapping, and the semiotic concepts of sign and triadic relation are discussed and compared, (...) and a representation of semiotic relations with mappings is proposed. The role of the final cause in two theories that account for what differentiates living beings, natural selection and relational biology, is analyzed. Then the presence of the final cause in Peirce’s semiosis is discussed and, with it, the similarities and differences between the theories of Rosen and Peirce are deepened. Then, a definition of a semiotic relation in an organism is proposed, and Short’s definition of interpretation is applied. Finally, a method to identify and analyze semiotic actions in an organism is proposed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Periodic Table for Peirce's Sixty-Six Classes of SignsVinicius RomaniniI. IntroductionOne hundred and ten years after his death, the most important task left by Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) to future generations of semioticians remains incomplete: a taxonomy of sign classes, with detailed descriptions and examples to justify its claim as a general logic (Houser 502). In his final years, Peirce made several attempts to present what would be (...) a rationale for deriving, from his three categories and a detailed analysis of the aspects of the sign, the sixty-six classes of signs that would be the elements of a grammar serving as the foundation for both critical semiotics (an expanded logic to encompass all mental states) and a universal theory of communication (where semiosis, or the action of the sign, can be thought of as the most fundamental layer of reality).Drafts and sketches of diagrams found in Peirce's notebooks and letters to Lady Welby and William James depict frenetic activity, even a struggle against time, to leave as a legacy a semiotics fused with his strand of pragmatism. For Peirce (CP 5.3881), pragmatism is primarily a method for clarifying concepts, and concepts are symbols that act in tandem with indices (to denote the subject of an assertion) and icons (to embody the information to be expressed in the assertion). Without a complete and well-articulated typology in a consistent grammar, the promise of pragmatism to be the method of scientific inquiry would never be fulfilled.Many scholars have proposed solutions to the puzzle, such as Burks and Weiss; Sanders; Savan; Jappy ("Peirce's Sixty-Six"; Peirce's Twenty-Eight); Farias and Queiroz ("On Diagrams"; "On Peirce's Diagrammatic Models"); and Romanini (Semiótica minuta; "Prolegomena"). Others, after careful analysis, believe that the project to assemble the bits and pieces left by Peirce into a coherent system is hopeless. Nothing justifies, for example, adopting the [End Page 1] latest classificatory exercises found in Peirce's notebooks as his final word, since he himself sometimes expresses that versions produced many months earlier were better.II. Categories and Their DegenerationsOur starting point is Peirce's categoriology and the table of ten sign classes that he presented in a syllabus brochure (Peirce, "Syllabus") accompanying one of his 1903 public lectures in Lowell, Massachusetts. We know the categories are three: Firstness (quality, possibility); Secondness (reaction, brute force); Thirdness (mediation, generality). A book is an object of many qualities, and I can sufficiently determine it by listing the comprehension we have of these qualities. If we find a book on the ground, there is a shocking reaction to the event. But if we gift Mary with a book, there is a telos involved in my action that prevents its reduction, for example, to the pure action of placing the book in Mary's hands and her taking it for herself. So predicates can be monadic, dyadic, or triadic, according to the categories.In this same period (as we can find in Peirce's Harvard lectures delivered a few months before in 1903), Peirce held the opinion that categories can exhibit degenerations (EP 2:160; CP 5.68–70). While Firstness does not degenerate, Secondness can degenerate into Firstness of Secondness (an imperfect reference destined to dissolve into Firstness), and Thirdness can undergo two degrees of degeneration: Firstness of Thirdness (an unstable pattern that dissipates into possibility) and Secondness of Thirdness (the instantiation of a law in a replica). To simplify, let's use the numbers 1, 2, and 3 for the non-degenerate categories. In our notation, a single prime symbol (') signifies one degree of degeneration, and a double prime symbol (') signifies two degrees of degeneration. We then have the triangular figure below (see Fig. 1) Click for larger view View full resolutionFig 1.A triangle with six blocks can represent the categories, their degeneration, and the relations among them: Firstness (1) is involved in all others, and Thirdness (3) involves all others. Secondness (2) is an instantiation of Thirdness (3), which subsumes it.[End Page 2] that organizes the categories and their degenerations (in grey, the genuine categories at the vertices of the... (shrink)

The central thesis of this essay is that the relation imagined to hold between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit corresponds quite closely with the triadic relationship that holds between object, sign, and interpretant, respectively, within C. S. Peirce’s conception of semiosis. Section 1 introduces Peirce’s conception of semiosis. Section 2 supports the main thesis through examination of descriptions of the Trinitarian relations in two classic Christian texts: The New Testament and The Catechism of the Catholic (...) Church. Section 3 reviews two alternative explanations of this surprising correlation: Andrew Robinson’s vestigia Trinitatis explanation and a naturalistic alternative. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Peirce's Concept of Sign".

God’s gesture. Nature and the origin of the sign in Spinoza. The Author provides the textual and conceptual elements to outline a thought of event in Spinoza’s philosophy. On the one hand necessitas and contingentia are known to exclude one another while, on the other, necessitas and contingere are not opposite. They are the same when seen in relation to the conception of libera necessitas and to the doctrine of the unity of intellect and will. Also, the unity (...) of a thought of concept and a thought of event appears in the definition of revelation, where the problem of the sign becomes crucial in separating philosophy from theology. A comparative study of the texts confirms the influence of Stoicism on the triadic model of the sign, showing that all interpreters give a pragmatic orientation to the sense of signs. The impossibility for any sign to be signum sui is not due to a defect in its nature. The idea of God, in fact, does not itself need any sign to be known, but it is also true that there is no lack of a sign for its linguistic communication. (shrink)

W. H. Greenleaf has been widely acknowledged as a significant contributor to the gradual development of a more historically sensitive attitude to the study of political thought. J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, two of the leading figures in the present methodological debate raging in the history of political thought, while disagreeing with some of Greenleaf’s ideas, pay tribute to his effort to change the character of the discipline. Pocock, for example, suggests that “Greenleaf’s important contribution is that he (...) compels us to regard English political thought in terms of the styles of legitimation and explanation currently available” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Critics of Pocock and Skinner have maintained that Greenleaf’s historical perspective may prove to be the most fruitful for organizing the study of the history of political thought, and J. G. Gunnell asserts that much of what Skinner says echoes comments that Greenleaf had made as early as 1964. However, when Greenleaf is mentioned in methodological discussions he is given very little consideration. I know of only one article that devotes more than one or two paragraphs to outlining his ideas, and even its characterization proves to be inadequate because the views presented and criticized there draw only upon Greenleaf’s Order, Empiricism and Politics and neglect the subsequent development of his theoretical position. The essence of Lockyer’s criticism of Greenleaf’s articulation of the traditions of order and empiricism is that they “are static and ossified abstractions, and therefore of little use in explaining the development of ideas.” Lockyer suggests that in order to exhibit traditions as having a more fluid and dynamic content, the thoughts of Collingwood and Hegel can usefully be invoked. The irony of the criticism is that Greenleaf, after 1964, drew on a whole range of idealist thinkers, including Collingwood and Hegel, in order to present a view of traditions which captured the diversity of their content, while attempting to exhibit their unity through change. (shrink)

In biosemiotics, life and living phenomena are described by means of originally anthropomorphic semiotic concepts. This can be justified if we can show that living systems as self-maintaining far from equilibrium systems create and update some kind of representation about the conditions of their self-maintenance. The point of view is the one of semiotic realism where signs and representations are considered as real and objective natural phenomena without any reference to the specifically human interpreter. It is argued that the most (...) basic concept of representation must be forward looking and that both C. Peirce’s and J. v. Uexküll’s concepts of sign assume an unnecessarily complex semiotic agent. The simplest representative systems do not have phenomenal objects or Umwelten at all. Instead, the minimal concept of representation and the source of normativity that is needed in its interpretation can be based on M. Bickhard’s interactivism. The initial normativity or natural self-interest is based on the ‘utility-concept’ of function: anything that contributes to the maintenance of a far from equilibrium system is functional to that system — every self-maintaining far from equilibrium system has a minimal natural self-interest to serve that function, it is its existential precondition. Minimal interactive representation emerges when such systems become able to switch appropriately between two or more means ofmaintaining themselves. At the level of such representations, a potentiality to detect an error may develop although no objects of representation for the system are provided. Phenomenal objects emerge in systems that are more complex. If a system creates a set of ongoingly updated ’situation images’ and can detect temporal invariances in the updating process, these invariances constitute objects for the system itself. Within them, a representative system gets an Umwelt and becomes capable of experiencing triadic signs. The relation between representation and its object is either iconic or indexical at this level. Correspondingly as in Peirce’s semeiotic, symbolic signs appear as more developed — for the symbolic signs, a more complex system is needed. (shrink)

This book has two objectives: to provide a comprehensive and consistent account of Peirce’s theory of signification; and to situate that theory at the center of a general semiotics. The author’s strategy is to identify Peirce’s three conditions for signification and to devote a chapter to the analysis of each. Greenlee accepts Peirce’s view that anything is potentially a sign and that an analysis of signification cannot be just "dynamic," i.e., causal, but he departs from Peirce on other matters. (...) Whereas Peirce argues for the division of signs into three kinds, Greenlee maintains that these are factors of signs rather than exclusive categories, so all signs can be viewed as symbols. Further, whereas the elements of the triad of signification are different in kind for Peirce, Greenlee treats them all as signs. In this manner the sign, the object, and the interpretant is each a kind of sign rather than a distinct kind of thing, and signs become explicable in terms of their relations to other signs. The triad then becomes polyadic and interpretation becomes a continuous process. One may question whether or not Peirce could accept all that this entails. (shrink)

We propose a new relational direction in higher education that acknowledges external and internal images as integrated in thinking and learning. We expand educational theory and practice that commonly rely on discrete conceptual developments that exclude images. Our argument epistemologically relies on certain semiotic views that consider the role of iconic signs and iconicity (meaning making by the virtue of similarity) as significant in relation to knowledge and learning. The analogical and imaginative work required to discover similarity between external pictures (...) and any educational concept is a form of iconic mind work that opens a space for transformational thinking and creative solutions. The novelty of our argument lies in the schematic philosophy of mind by C.S. Peirce, and specifically, an adaptation of Peirce’s triadic sign diagram for learning, exemplified via an ‘inquiry graphic’ sign and reflective method. This outlook seeks connections in diversity, arguing for an education that acknowledges and teaches intrinsic human relatedness to other humans, beings and things in the environment, thus challenging any notions of anthropocentrism and superiority. It calls for a reaction in international higher education to acknowledge the iconicity of concepts and thinking and embrace integrated image-concept signs for deep and critical teaching-learning, towards a modest educational contribution to counteracting social and environmental crises. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 221 Seiten: 105-121.

This article praises the development of second order cybernetics by von Foerster, Maturana, and Varela as an important step in deepening our understanding of the bio-psychological foundation of the dynamics of information, cognition, and communication. Luhmann's development of the theory into the realm of social communication is seen as a necessary and important move. The triple autopoietic differentiation between biological, psychological, and social-communicative autopoiesis and the introduction of a technical concept of meaning is central. Finally, the paper shows that second (...) order cybernetics lacks explicit and ontological concepts of emotion, meaning, and a concept of signs. C. S. Peirce's theory is introduced for this purpose. It is then shown, through Varela's development of Spencer Brown's ‘Laws of Form’ from a dual to a dynamic triadic categorical structure, that both theories are triadic and second order, and therefore can be fruitfully fused to a Cybersemiotics. (shrink)

This article examines the contention that the central concepts of C. S. Peirce’s semeiotic are inherently communicational. It is argued that the Peircean approach avoids the pitfalls of objectivism and constructivism, rendering the sign-user neither a passive recipient nor an omnipotent creator of meaning. Consequently, semeiotic may serve as a useful general framework for studies of learning processes.

After defining the concept of error as it applies to Roentgen semiotics, we present a typology of the sources of semiotic error in clinical practice. It is a typology based on clinical observation, with the Peircean Categories and the triadic structure of Roentgen signs as organizing principles. This is followed by a review of a general psychological typology of the sources of human error. We conclude with the demonstration of a Category preserving correspondence between psychologic and semiotic sources of (...) error. Thus, independently derived and empirically based typologies of psychologic and semiotic error are shown to have the same categorical structure. (shrink)

The notion of “semiotic scaffolding”, introduced into the semiotic discussions by Jesper Hoffmeyer in December of 2000, is proving to be one of the single most important concepts for the development of semiotics as we seek to understand the full extent of semiosis and the dependence of evolution, particularly in the living world, thereon. I say “particularly in the living world”, because there has been from the first a stubborn resistance among semioticians to seeing how a semiosis prior to and/or (...) independent of living beings is possible. Yet the universe began in a state not only lifeless but incapable of supporting life, and somehow “moved” from there in the direction of being able to sustain life and finally of actually doing so. Wherever dyadic interactions result indirectly in a new condition that either moves the universe closer to being able to sustain life, or moves life itself in the direction not merely of sustaining itself but opening the way to new forms of life, we encounter a “thirdness” in nature of exactly the sort that semiosic triadicity alone can explain. This is the process, both within and without the living world, that requires scaffolding. This essay argues that a fuller understanding of this concept shows why “semiosis” says clearly what “evolution” says obscurely. (shrink)

We examine the possibility of shifting the concept of choice to the centre of the semiotic theory of learning. Thus, we define sign process (meaning-making) through the concept of choice: semiosis is the process of making choices between simultaneously provided options. We define semiotic learning as leaving traces by choices, while these traces influence further choices. We term such traces of choices memory. Further modification of these traces (constraints) will be called habituation. Organic needs are homeostatic mechanisms coupled with (...) choice-making. Needs and habits result in motivatedness. Semiosis as choice-making can be seen as a complementary description of the Peircean triadic model of semiosis; however, this can fit also the models of meaning-making worked out in other shools of semiotics. We also provide a sketch for a joint typology of semiosis and learning. (shrink)

The changes from the original version are relatively minor, but enough to make it necessary to treat the present version as a distinct text for purposes of exact reference. Since there is no normal pagination on a web page, I assign in lieu of that paragraph numbers, included in brackets and placed flush right, just above the paragraph, for purposes of scholarly reference.

The main aim of this article is to describe central elements of, and the relationships among, three interrelated domains of inquiry. The first domain is Charles Peirce's semiotic theory which offers five concepts of special relevance to the other two domains: primary components of the triadic sign, including the object, representamen, and interpretant; the unceasing process of semiosis, or continuous growth of the developing sign; the three forms of inference, of which Peirce's notion of abduction is of (...) special interest; the element of surprise in experience, and the universal categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness that ground Peirce's overarching theory. The second domain incorporates the discipline of psychosemiotics, which is defined as the study of how we learn, understand, and use the signs of culture. The article outlines the nature and scope of psychosemiotics and emphasizes its grounding in Peircean semiotics, meaning‐making, and the five concepts listed above. The claim will be made that signs, semiosis, and meaning act through the seven signways outlined in the article and thereby bind the individual into the surrounding physical and cultural environments. The third domain is formal education, for which implications are presented as derived from Peircean theory and viewed through the psychosemiotic lens. In this perspective, all forms of education are semiotic processes grounded in signs and meaning‐making. Further, formal education consists of learning a wide variety of culturally‐valued signs by way of the seven signways and through processes that often differ from a technocratic, standards‐driven, accountability‐oriented approach to learning and instruction. (shrink)

Fifty years ago, on 12 September, 1963, the association agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey was signed in Ankara. However, in contrast to many other countries who applied later on, Turkey has not yet become a member of the EU. Nevertheless, Turkey’s candidacy to join the EU is still one of the most considerable and controversial topics within the European political arena. Within the accession negotiations, apart from human rights and the Kurdish and the Cypriot issues, one (...) of the greatest challenges to Turkey’s successful candidacy is the issue of respect for and protection of minorities. It might indeed represent an unsolvable problem, which will ultimately block Turkey joining the EU. Neither the EU nor Turkey has really come to terms or dealt with what the EU sees as an “unsatisfactory” protection of minorities in Turkey. What lies at the root of this disagreement is what the term “minority” actually means. Due to Turkey’s own nation state concept as being a united and undivided country and to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which defined Turkey as a nation, the country only recognises non-Muslim minorities. Moreover, contrary to the wording of the minority protection clauses in the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey restricts its recognition of non-Muslim minorities only to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish religious populations. Although being a non-Muslim group as well, the Assyrians are excluded from the Turkish concept of minorities and, therefore, also from minority protection. In contrast to that, the EU’s concept of minority includes ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, which means that according to the EU’s concept of minorities, also ethnic minorities like the Kurds, linguistic minorities like the Laz and religious minorities like the Alevis are included in the term “minority” and, therefore, these minorities should benefit from specific minority protection rights. To find a common basis for discussing the unsatisfactory issue of minority rights in Turkey, the concept of “ethnic groups” is introduced by the author as the most promising approach to deal with this unreconciled conceptual difference. According to this concept, ethnic groups could form a sub-identity of Turkishness and help build a legal basis to the treatment of minority groups founded on human rights, which would be compatible with both Turkish and EU Law. (shrink)

To Aristotle, spoken words are symbols, not of objects in the world, but of our mental experiences related to these objects. Presently there are two major strands of interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign. First, there is the structuralist account offered by Coseriu (Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie. Von den Anfängen bis Rousseau, 2003 [1969], pp. 65–108) whose interpretation is reminiscent of the Saussurean sign concept. A second interpretation, offered by Lieb (in: Geckeler (Ed.) Logos Semantikos: Studia Linguistica (...) in Honorem Eugenio Coseriu 1921–1981, 1981) and Weidemann (in: Schmitter (Ed.) Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 2. Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike, 1991), says that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is similar to the one presented in Ogden and Richard’s (The meaning of meaning: A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism, 1970 [1923]) semiotic triangle. This paper starts off with an introductory outline of the so-called phýsei-thései discussion which started during presocratic times and culminated in Plato’s Cratylus. Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is to be regarded as a solution to the stalemate position reached in the Cratylus. Next, a discussion is offered of both Coseriu’s and Lieb’s analysis. We submit that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign shows features of both Saussure’s and Ogden and Richards’s sign concept but that it does not exclusively predict one of the two. We argue that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is based on three different relations which together evince his teleological as well empiricist point of view: one internal (symbolic) relation and two external relations, i.e. a likeness relation and a relation katà synthéken. (shrink)

Mind has played the starring role in the West's arts, humanities, and sciences, while an embodied notion of oneself, others, and the physical world has been customarily pushed under the rug. In view of radical new theories, methods and techniques that have emerged during the past century and a half, the notion of complementary, sympathetic co-participation, and its accompanying re-enchantment, merits attention. C. S. Peirce is at the crossroads between modernism, enchantment, and misplaced concreteness, on the one hand, and postmodernism (...) and its attendant poststructuralism, on the other. His categories of feeling, sensation, and thought, and his triadic, all-encompassing concept of the sign, can help bring all facets of human creativity, concrete living, and understanding into a proper balance. Three coined terms — homogeny, hierogeny, and heterogeny — serve to elucidate how Peirce's triadic vision can offer a middle path, a way of mediating between antagonistic modes of sensing, living, and thinking. This middle path follows traditional tenets of logic and reason — identity, non-contradiction, and excluded-middle — while at its fringes, it allows deviation — by way of process, inconsistency, and incompleteness — from the rigidity that lies therein. Studies of feminist postures and various cultural processes in Latin America bear out the premise that a dose of conformity accompanying a tendency toward resistance can synethnically help keep broad cultural processes on an even keel, balancing mind and body, conflicting theories and methods and modes of living, and styles of reason and unreason in equilibrium. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School ed. by Fernando ZalameaGianluca CaterinaFernando Zalamea (Ed.) Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2022. 212 pp. (incl. index).The volume Advances in Peircean Mathematics is an important, very much needed contribution towards a deeper understanding of the impact of Peirce's work especially in the fields of mathematics, logic, and semiotic. It fills a gap in the current (...) literature by recasting some of [End Page 373] Peirce's profound mathematical insights into a formal framework. This is a finely edited editorial project, which summarizes the work of more than two decades done by a group of scholars—the Colombian School—lead by Fernando Zalamea, a pioneer of Peirce studies, and pragmatism in general, in Latin America.The structure of the volume unfolds in three dense chapters, each corresponding to a specific mathematical context connected to various aspects of Peirce's work. Broadly speaking, in the first chapter, Gustavo Arengas proposes the theory of higher category theory as a natural framework to represent the main traits of Peirce's semiotic; in the second chapter, Francisco Vargas develops a thorough set-theoretical model of Peirce's continuum; in the third chapter, Arnold Oostra, in a truly Peircean spirit, formalizes the notion of Intuitionistic Existential Graphs, emphasizing the idea that intuitionistic logic is the most natural context to represent and understand Peirce's diagrammatic logic. The fourth and last chapter, penned by Zalamea, provides the reader with a solid summary of the main results presented in the volume along with a robust road map to navigate through the technical details of the text.Mathematics, as implied by the title of the volume, is at the core of this project, and the authors do not shy away from the complexity, details, and depth of it in order to shed light on some of the most fundamental and groundbreaking nature of Peirce's ideas. That level of rigor and formal soundness is certainly one of the strengths of the volume, although readers who may not be acquainted with at least some basic notions of category theory or with the mathematics of Peirce's work, may find some of the text a bit terse—this is not a casual reading and it does require a certain level of commitment in order to appreciate the depth of the provided insights. On the other hand, all the background material is clearly laid out, making the volume a self-contained work which can be thoroughly enjoyed by a general audience.The real upshot of recasting some of Peirce's intuitions within the fabric of formal mathematics is not only that of providing the instruments to clarify those ideas, but also that of highlighting the role that Peirce's work has been playing in the development of modern mathematics in many relevant aspects, from the very genesis of category theory—which today is widely regarded as a necessary and unifying language in several fields of the mathematical and physical sciences—to the development of non-standard analysis, just to mention a few of them.An elegant instance of such perspective is offered by Gustavo Arengas in the first chapter, where it is argued that ∞-categories can be used to model the natural order of hierarchies implicit in Peirce's conception of the basic triadic relation between sign, object, and interpreter. What, at first glance, may seem just a simple analogy, unfolds onto a methodical and enlightening analysis of Peirce's semiotic, as the author builds [End Page 374] the connections with the relevant categorical constructions in a precise manner. Most of the rest of the chapter focuses on Peirce's notions of the pragmatic and pragmaticist maxim, and the use of basic structures such as monads, limits, presheaves and sheaves as the natural environment to better convey their meaning, both from a mathematical and a philosophical perspective. The reader will find it interesting to realize that, by delving deeper into the understanding of the relational nature of category theory, a great chunk of Peirce's work can be seen as fundamentally intertwined with the apparatus and the language of modern mathematics... (shrink)

The concept of hermeneutical experience is conceived analogously to that of aesthetic, religious or empirical experience. The unique nature of hermeneutical experience is the comprehension of the meaning of artificial signs or sign-systems, such as art, literature, laws, institutions, actions, etc. It may be questioned how far and to what extent hermeneutical experience is second-hand experience, i.e., secondary to primary experience expressed in signs, or, following a well-known formula of Boeckh, a ‘recognition of what has been recognized before’.

Examines the development iun the period between Descartes and the mid 19th century of the concept of form in semantics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: There is an abundance of scholarship on John Dewey. Dewey's writings are vast, so scholars try to find the crux that connects their many themes into a distinctive vision for philosophy and life. Many claim that the democratic way of life is the center of Dewey's philosophical vision. Others claim that Dewey's response to Darwin was the impetus for a philosophical experimentalism that could envision a better life (...) by responding to the needs in an age of modern industry. Some claim that the crux is a dynamic and non-mechanistic naturalism that Dewey develops to critically undo the dualisms of tradition, most especially the distinction between nature and culture. There has even been an effort to interpret each of these themes within Dewey's theory about the conditions for aesthetics in life, the life of art within an experience, and an experience of life as art. Arguably, no strategy is more preferable than another because each is plausible. Each plausibly selects a crux that connects the many themes across an array of writings, since Dewey's philosophy is multimodal by design and shuns reductionism for pluralism. Even amidst plurality, through many modes of activity and existence, each of these themes and all of Dewey's writings have a concern for meaning in life and how life is a process of meaning-making. And yet, meaning, for Dewey, is irreducible to verbal or written language and is made by more than propositions, but extends beyond the divide of nature and culture to potentially encompass all of life and life's processes. This expansive conception of meaning has more in common with semiotics, especially those of Charles Sanders Peirce, than any philosophy of language. And yet almost no scholar has sought to semiotically interpret Dewey's philosophy as a whole. Perhaps, though, Dewey's multimodal and pluralistic vision for philosophy and life also has a semiotic crux that intersects with the others in ways that are fundamentally important. There are scholars who have dealt with semiotic themes or insights with implications for semiotics in Dewey's writings. None have sought to semiotically interpret Dewey's philosophy as a whole, or, as a consequence, to chronologically survey Dewey's writings to determine if there is a conceivably Deweyan approach to semiotics that might contrast with or contribute to the more dominant approaches. There is a reason scholars may not have sought a Deweyan approach to semiotics. Dewey did not have an explicit theory of semiotics. There is no attempt to devise a doctrine of signs in Dewey's writings. Never did Dewey try to classify the fundamental types of sign, analyze the relations of signification by which they differ, or methodically explain how the logic of signification works. This contrasts sharply with Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce has an explicit theory of semiotics that divides the fundamental types of sign into icons, indices, and symbols by their distinct relations of signification that are at work in the logic of inference by the categories. During his second year at Johns Hopkins, Dewey was actually Peirce's student in a class on logic. This already suggests the possibility of influence. Dewey's writings around 1883 even espouse the central thesis of Peirce's semiotics. All signs, however else their significations may differ, are triadic relations for both Peirce and Dewey. Whether and how far Peirce's logic was an influence on Dewey at Johns... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion of expertise and skilled movement in sport by analysing the bodily practice of learning a new movement at a high level of skill in parkour. Based on Sennett’s theory of craftsmanship and an ethnographic field study with experienced practitioners, the analysis offers insight into the skilful, contextual and unique practice of parkour, and contributes to the renewed discussion of consciousness in sport at a high level of skill. With Sennett’s (...) concept of craftsmanship, it is possible to describe and grasp important aspects of obstacles put up, repetitions and material consciousness in developing perceptual and physical skills in parkour. The parkour craftsmen conduct a constant dialogue between concrete, material practices and thinking. It is argued in the article that Sennett’s ideas about craftsmanship are, in many ways, similar to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ concept of mastery, but are less elitist and exclusive than the theory of skill acquisition... (shrink)

The philosophical underpinnings of this article are the Peircian notion of the triadic nature of the sign as iconic, linguistic and indexical, and the use of the sign as a ‘Zeug’ or thing as a means of pointing to or deixis in the context of creative activity in the classroom. This involves Lyotard's conception of desire as the generation of a space where the pupil can be affected by what the world donates. Both deixis and desire (...) take on added value in relation to the psychoanalytic theories of Winnicott in terms of the role of transitional object use in the generation of ‘potential space’, and Nussbaum's notion of tyche or being on the lookout for what the world has to offer. In terms of education, the central section of the article looks at the way these notions can be applied to teaching and learning in the secondary art classroom. This involves the use of what I have termed transitional notation, combining all three Peircian sign modes on a surface of inscription that is ‘ready-to-hand and that operates as what the anthropologist Alfred Gell termed an ‘index of agency’. (shrink)

Lullus' conception of man is expressed in his definition of man as "animal/ens homificans". It is based on the augustinian understnding of being and is articulated in his dctrine of correlatives, determinig triadically every substance, consisting of the ability of activity, the active and the activity. Thus evry substance is understood as a substantial relation. From the definition of man as "animal/ens homificans" it results that the man creates himself throuhg activity, vhich brings him closer to the abstract essence (...) of his species, namely in his striving at moral perfection. Thus he humanizes the whole universe, aiming at the the human unity and the unity with the universe. This interpersonal aspect is embodied in a modified definition of man as "animl homificans interpersonale propter animam rationalem suam". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:What's so Important about Music Education?Leonard TanJ. Scott Goble, What's so Important about Music Education? (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010)In What's so Important about Music Education, J. Scott Goble proposes a new philosophical foundation for music education in the United States based on the theory of semiotics by American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. Following a brief summary, I will note several merits in Goble's book before sketching four (...) recommendations for future editions.In Chapter One, Goble notes how the inclusion of non-Western musics in the public schools as espoused in the 1967 Tanglewood Declaration has raised two crucial questions: "Whose music should be included in the curriculum?" and "What is the role or social importance of public school music education in the United States as a postmodern society?" Noting that music education was established in the United States during the modern era, and that the Tanglewood Declaration did not account for vast differences in beliefs about music, Goble argues that there is a need to establish a new philosophical foundation that can accommodate the varied beliefs and practices of diverse cultural groups in postmodern United States.In Chapter Two, Goble sketches and critiques five cultural anthropologists. Of the five, he singles out Clifford Geertz's conception of culture as "semiotic [End Page 201] webs" (p. 20) as the conceptual foundation that is appropriate for this study. He then links Geertz's notion of culture to the semiotic theory of C. S. Peirce which is to become the theoretical underpinning of the book. Subsequently, he unpacks many key Peircian themes: human conceptions are maintained not individually but collectively in cultural groups, provisional truth (as opposed to absolute Truth) is relative and dependent on conceptions of communities, and the scientific method is the sole mode of inquiry by which people in communities may use to satisfy their doubts to formulate beliefs. Most importantly, Goble expounds the "pragmatic maxim" that since humans live in communities united by common beliefs, "the 'clear' meaning of an idea held by a member of the community will almost inevitably stem from the beliefs—or ways of understanding—held by members of that community" (p. 30). Goble concludes the chapter by presenting the Peircian semiotic system of cognition which posits that a "sign" is conceptualized in a triadic relationship: the Sign or "Firstness," the Object or "Secondness," and the Interpretant or "Thirdness" (p. 33).In Chapter Three, Goble considers how music is a sign based on the theoretical framework laid in Chapter Two. Drawing on the work of ethnomusicologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists, and a neuroscientist, he formulates a Peircian pragmatic approach to musical practices which posits that "the musical practices of different cultural communities represent a diverse cluster of community-specific ritualized behaviors involving sound" (p. 252). Furthermore, each of the musical practices "serves those persons who meaningfully participate in it as a means of psychophysiological, psychosocial, and/or sociopolitical equilibration relative to the worldview—or ordered conception of Reality—they tacitly share" (p. 252). For Goble, this pragmatist conception of musical practices is neither ethnocentric, universalist, nor relativist, and can serve as a conceptual framework for all diverse musical practices in postmodern United States.With the Peircian pragmatic conception in mind, Goble examines historical factors that contributed to current conceptions of music in the United States in Chapter Four. He laments that as a result of European Enlightenment and three socio-political phenomena in the United States (the separation of church and state, promotion of no other worldview than democracy, and adoption of democratic capitalism), music is no longer pragmatically oriented but trivialized and pursued by self-serving musicians.In Chapter Five, Goble traces the philosophical justifications for music education throughout the history of the United States. While the sign "musical practice" was conceptualized as "worship" in colonial America, the sign "music" was conceived as "art" during the age of Enlightenment, and as "product" during the age of science and technology. Noting that Bennett Reimer's music education as aesthetic education is limited in its Western focus on music as works [End Page 202] of artistic objects, Goble aligns his Peircian conception along praxial lines—in particular, with... (shrink)