Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy

In this work, I will begin by briefly describing the codices that belonged to Petrarch’s library and contain his glosses to the Enarrationes in Psalmos of Augustine: Paris, BnF, Latin 1994 and Paris, BnF, Latin 19891 - 19892. I will then describe the type of marginal markings found in it, and I will lastly offer a complete edition of the glosses.

Este artigo examina criticamente cinco erros teóricos fundamentais na filosofia de Tomás de Aquino, especialmente em suas quinque viae (cinco vias) da Summa Theologiae. A análise começa com uma discussão sobre problemas de tradução nos termos tomasianos, destacando a distinção entre esse (ser) e existência. Os erros identificados incluem: (1) a confusão entre esse e essentia em Deus, resultando em uma noção incoerente da natureza divina; (2) a contradição ao tratar a essência como distinta do ser, o que implicaria que (...) a essência é "nada"; (3) a suposição de uma dimensão além do ser de Deus, o que comprometeria Sua posição de condição última; (4) a identificação equivocada de Deus com o maxime ens (ente supremo) nas quinque viae, em vez de com o ipsum esse subsistens (o próprio ser subsistente); e (5) a falha das cinco vias em demonstrar verdadeiramente o "Ser de Deus", limitando-se a postular um ente supremo. O estudo também critica o uso que Tomás faz dos conceitos de actus purus (ato puro) e causalidade, argumentando que essas categorias restringem indevidamente o conceito de Deus. Conclui-se que Tomás, apesar de parcialmente alcançar uma compreensão do Ser, permanece preso a esquemas escolásticos ultrapassados, levando a inconsistências conceituais e metodológicas. (shrink)

This paper critically examines five key theoretical errors in Thomas Aquinas' philosophy, particularly in his quinque viae (five ways) from the Summa Theologiae. The analysis begins with a discussion on translation issues regarding Aquinas' terminology, emphasizing the distinction between esse (being) and existence. The identified errors include: (1) the conflation of esse and essentia in God, leading to an incoherent notion of divine nature; (2) the contradiction arising from treating essence as distinct from being, rendering essence as "nothing"; (3) the (...) presupposition of a dimension beyond God's being, undermining His ultimate condition; (4) the misidentification of God with the supreme being (maxime ens) in the quinque viae, rather than as ipsum esse subsistens; and (5) the failure of the five ways to truly demonstrate the "Being of God" rather than a mere supreme entity. The study also critiques Aquinas’ use of actus purus (pure act) and causality, suggesting that these categories improperly constrain the concept of God. Ultimately, it argues that Aquinas partially reaches an understanding of Being but remains entangled in outdated Scholastic frameworks, leading to conceptual and methodological inconsistencies. (shrink)

The study aims at the systematic presentation of basic systems of scholastic epistemic logic (regardless of its original distribution into different contexts and genres). Scholastic epistemic logic can be (re)interpreted as a conservative extension of a certain non-modal base, which can be viewed as the model of epistemic agents. Its fundamental principles are: [O] if φ implies ψ and an agent knows that φ, then the agent knows that ψ; [T] if an agent knows that φ, then φ; [K] if (...) an agent knows that φ implies ψ and that φ, then the agent knows that ψ; [4] an agent who knows φ knows to know φ; [5] an agent who fails to know φ knows to fail to know φ; (or their modifications). From this point of view, scholastic epistemic logic can be construed as a confrontation of logical systems with unequal strength, ranging between that of John Wyclif, Peter of Mantua and Paul of Venice, William Heytesbury, and finally (a different theory of) Paul of Venice. These systems represent the hierarchy of epistemic agents by extending the set of their basic properties, including veridicality, inferential extendability, and introspectibility of knowledge. (shrink)

The causal explanation of human action has received increasing attention in social studies since the latter half of the twentieth century. A key question in this context is whether Aristotle’s framework of the four causes originally applied to natural phenomena, can also be extended to human actions. Concerning a compatible perspective between free will and causality, we contend that the Scholastic contributions offer a significant advancement in addressing this question. They demonstrate that the four causes, as interpreted by Scholastic thinkers, (...) provide a robust explanatory tool for analyzing human affairs and their dynamics. Moreover, we argue that their contributions go beyond theoretical analysis, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding how causal principles can be applied to various aspects of human experience. (shrink)

This article examines Francisco Suárez’s views on consent and the social contract, challenging the interpretation that portrays him as a precursor to modern theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. While Suárez’s political thought incorporates elements that may seem similar to contractarian principles, it fundamentally diverges from the modern social contract tradition. Rather than basing political legitimacy on individual consent, Suárez grounds it in the divine origin of power. He sees the community’s consent, expressed through a “virtual pact,” as a necessary (...) condition for transferring power to a sovereign, but not as the foundation of political obligation or authority. For him, the duty to obey laws rests on humanity’s nature and God’s will. The article argues that Suárez rejects key premises of modern social contract theory, notably the ideas that political communities are artificial constructs and that political obligation stems from a contract. (shrink)

Aquinas claims against Avicenna’s causal determinism that even a sufficient cause can be impeded. I analyze Aquinas’s claim in the context of his reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (VI 3) and argue that it ultimately rests on the idea that no cause has the per se effect of disposing matter to form. A cause can thus be impeded by the indisposition of matter while being sufficient for the production of form. By contrast, Avicenna understands that the per se effect of natural (...) causes is precisely to dispose matter, thus accounting for the removal of impediments, and this is why, I argue, there is no sense in which a sufficient cause can be impeded on Avicenna’s view. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Siger of Brabant’s anti-deterministic argument as developed in De necessitate et contingentia causarum. First, I offer an in-depth reconstruction of how Siger justifi es the contingency of effects in nature: the contingent status of an effect depends only on (the contingent status of) its proximate cause, and not on the First Cause. According to Siger, the First Cause, which is understood as a necessary cause, only determines the necessity of its immediate effect. I, then show (...) that such an account runs into an impasse: it is, in fact, impossible to justify how there can be contingent (i.e., impedible) secondary causes in the chain of causes, once it has been assumed that the First Cause is a necessary (i.e., nonimpedible) cause which immediately produces a necessary effect. (shrink)

The article analyzes the occurrences and meaning of the expression ratio practica in the works of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. A lexicographical survey shows that ratio practica appears in the philosophical vocabulary of Latin medieval philosophy starting from the second quarter of the thirteenth century. In particular, it occurs with some frequency in the early works of Albertus Magnus (before 1250), who uses ratio practica in connection with Augustine of Hippo’s theory of the double reason (ratio superior and ratio (...) inferior). Albertus seems to abandon the use of ratio practica when he begins to engage with the exegesis of Aristotle. Notably, he uses it negligibly in the two commentaries on the complete version of the Nicomachean Ethics, of which, before 1250, he only knew the fi rst three books (Ethica nova and vetus). In contrast, Thomas Aquinas frequently uses the expression ratio practica, but only in contexts related to the psychological process preceding action, which Aristotle had primarily described in the Nicomachean Ethics. In short, thanks to Thomas, ratio practica is characterized as an Aristotelian notion, while Albertus’s merit lies in introducing it into the philosophical vocabulary. (shrink)

Walter Chatton’s Reportatio has been dated to 1322-23, possibly at London, and his Lectura either as a revision of bachelor lectures given earlier at Oxford, or given after 1323. Stephen Brown has shown that material in Chatton’s Lectura dates to 1323-1324 when Chatton and Ockham were disputing in the same place, presumably London, before Ockham left England forever. The present article shows how arguments dating to one place and time can be used in a later work, and should not be (...) used to date that work. (shrink)

The present contribution focuses on Harclay’s Parisian Commentary on the Sentences and is divided into two sections. The fi rst section (§1) is devoted to the attribution to Harclay of a Commentary on the second book of the Sentences, a controversial issue among scholars for decades. In this fi rst section, after having reconstructed in more detail the status quaestionis about the attribution of the Commentary contained in the ms. BAV, Borgh. 346, I will present new evidence in support of (...) its attribution to Henry of Harclay. The second section (§2) is devoted to an analysis of the manuscript tradition of Harclay’s Commentary, shedding light in particular on its indirect tradition, which is indispensable – as we shall see – for any editorial project. This section also contains an editorial Appendix with the text of Harclay’s Sent. II d. 12 q. 1, in which the Author provides his point of view on the topic of prime matter. This appendix is preceded by a brief analysis of the philosophical contents of the question. (shrink)

This article deals with the lectio ultima, the last lecture on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, written by theologians from the University of Cracow in the fi fteenth century. Previous studies concerning the last question from Cracow did not recognize it as a specifi c literary genre or acknowledge its characteristics. This article will attempt to disclose these. There is a strong relationship between the lectiones ultimae and the principia on the Sentences, which, thus far, has not been described in the literature. (...) This article characterizes the hallmarks of the lectiones ultimae which are understood as a separate literary genre and gives a catalogue of examples of this genre from the University of Cracow. (shrink)

From Hippocrates and Galen, meteorological medicine studied the impact of environmental factors and weather phenomena on mental and bodily health. This theory has been largely diffused by medical works and encyclopaedias, such as those of Vincentius de Beauvais and Bartholomeus Anglicus. However, its reception within mediaeval meteorology still remains to be fully inquired, partly because it was not a traditional topic to be discussed in the question commentaries on the Meteorologica of Aristotle. This article aims to focus on three Parisian (...) quaestiones on the Meteorologica in which Radulphus Brito and Themo Iudaei de Monasterio utilised concepts of meteorological medicine as a tool to explain meteorological principles. The medical theory is used to clarify how antiperistasis works within animals’ bellies and its impacts on their general health; and in the second one, to describe the harmful impacts water has on human and animal bodies; and then thirdly, to explain the process of generating rain. (shrink)

In 1972, Kurt Flasch broke new ground with his contentious thesis that Dietrich von Freiberg, as early as 1300, had formulated a theory of productive subjectivity. Flasch argues that Dietrich recognized the object-constituting function of the mind conceived in transcendental terms, much in the same vein as Immanuel Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution. Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding this thesis, Kant has been noticeably neglected in the relevant scholarly discussion. The following paper will address this oversight through a comparative analysis of (...) Dietrich’s and Kant’s theories on mental constitution and intellect. While there are general similarities between the two philosophers, closer inspection reveals critical discrepancies in their core theoretical constructs. Additionally, their respective methodologies are fundamentally incompatible. Dietrich’s approach does offer a reorientation in medieval thinking, yet its underpinnings of metaphysics and theocentricism clash with the experimental nature of Kant’s transcendental refl ections. (shrink)

This reexamination of documents purporting to show that Henry of Ghent served on a commission of 16 theologians that compiled the 219 articles condemned in 1277 produces a different picture. It shows that Henry did not serve on a special commission appointed by bishop Tempier but was present at a meeting of all masters, who condemned the articles. It also shows that Tempier did not bypass masters in the faculty of theology, but had them vote on the articles.

Recent scholarship has focused on the notion of ‘rationality’ and the consequences of different conceptions to the characterization of the human-animal divide. In this article, I attempt to further muddle the waters by considering examples of stricter requirements being imposed on what counts to be rational. I argue that whereas many medieval authors were willing to identify similarities in the way humans and non-human animals behave and process information, they also tended to emphasize the differences in those processes: human processes (...) are inherently rational (or rational-oriented), while those of other animals may resemble rational processes but are not rational. I further claim that this evidence should lead scholars to be less generous in their attribution of rationality to non-human animals to avoid trivializing that notion. (shrink)

In 2024, five centuries will have passed since the first course taught by Vitoria in Spain after his arrival in his native country. This monographic issue of Scio gathers the signatures of several experts on Vitoria's thought and the School of Salamanca.

In this paper, I propose a view of real definitions such that a difference of a species need not presuppose all of the differences that occur in the definition of the genus it qualifies. In such a case, two differences can be swapped in the definition of the species. Under this view, the correct diagrammatic representation of the subdivision of genera into species is a graph possibly containing cycles, rather than a tree as commonly assumed. Applying this theory, I respond (...) to Joseph Gredt’s claim that “rational animal” cannot be further specified except accidentally, as rationality does not admit further specification. I also tackle a different argument by David Oderberg to the effect that all possible rational animals, even merely possible ones, are of the same metaphysical species. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant attempts to derive the principle of causality from our observation of events’ temporal succession. His argument, however, faces difficult objections. These objections show that his argument is unable to draw the strong necessity of causation out of the weaker necessity of temporal succession. Thomists generally offer a different sort of argument from Kant. They seek to derive the principle of causality from the concept of actual contingent being. I compare the Kantian and Thomistic arguments, and I show that (...) the Thomistic argument is successful where the Kantian argument fails. I also defend the Thomistic argument from possible Kantian objections. (shrink)

The seventeenth-century Spanish Dominican Cosme de Lerma authored numerous philosophical works, some ofwhich were posthumously reorganised into a Cursus philosophicus, intended as an arts course for the Dominican studia in Italy. Lerma’s philosophical project consisted in developing the doctrines proposed a century earlier by his fellow Dominican friar Domingo de Soto. Through analysing Lerma’s Compendium and Disputationes based on Soto’s Summulae and Lerma’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Logic, this paper explores three issues: first, Lerma’s axiomatic theory of inference, including the development (...) of Soto’s project of relevance logic (relating to the analysis of the paradoxes of implication); second, the question whether there are different degrees of validity (answered negatively by Lerma); third, Lerma’s psychology of inference, which offers an interpretation of human inferential behaviour and its limitations in terms of the scholastic theories of causation and natural agency. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose and defend what I take to be the correct reading of the phrase non tantum… sed… as it is used by Duns Scotus. I identify two possible interpretations of the phrase — the Additive Interpretation and the Intensive Interpretation — and argue that the latter is correct. Then I analyse three occurrences of this construction in Scotus’s writing and show how misinterpreting it will lead and, in two of these cases, actually has (...) lead to an erroneous understanding of a crucial passage in Scotus. (shrink)

Given recent developments in Church-State relations, it is important to discuss the relationship between liberty and morality in law. We must reconcile the classical understanding of politics as a way to make citizens virtuous with a more modern understanding of law as institutional safeguards to liberty. Legal pronouncements can lead citizens to virtue or condemn their wrongdoing without engaging in forceful punishment. The law in this way can be used as an instrument of moral education. Congressional resolutions and moral curricula (...) serve as current examples of this. Political theorists and lawyers should reaffirm not only the just structures that constitute political offices but also the virtue required to uphold them. Without this proper moral education, citizens abandon their commitment to liberty. This solution allows us to recognize that liberty and virtue must coexist because the moral order is inextricably tied with the free order of society. (shrink)

This volume brings together contributions in the history of logic, philosophy of mind, and ethics, three areas dear to its dedicatee. Covering the Middle Ages and the early modern period, the papers highlight both long-term developments and systematic connections between the three domains.

In the treatise On the Change of Names (part of his magnum opus, the Allegorical Commentary), Philo of Alexandria brings his figurative exegesis of the Abraham cycle to its fruition. Taking a cue from Platonist interpreters of Homer's Odyssey, Philo reads Moses's story of Abraham as an account of the soul's progress and perfection. Responding to contemporary critics, who mocked Genesis 17 as uninspired, Philo finds instead a hidden philosophical reflection on the ineffability of the transcendent God, the transformation of (...) souls which recognize their mortal nothingness, the possibility of human faith enabled by peerless faithfulness of God, and the fruit of moral perfection: joy divine, prefigured in the birth of Isaac. (shrink)