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Summary Physicalism about the mind is the metaphysical view that all mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena, or necessitated by physical phenomena. There are various mental-physical relations proposed by physicalists to account for their claim. One relation is identity. Identity based physicalism about the mind takes two forms: token physicalism (which asserts that all token mental states are identical to a physical or neural state), and type physicalism (according to which all types of mental states are identical to types of physical or neural states). Another proposed relation is supervenience. Supervenience based physicalism about the mind is a form of type physicalism and it takes two main forms: a priori physicalism (the view that mental truths are a priori deducible from the totality of physical truths) and a posteriori physicalism (the view that mental truths are a posteriori or empirically necessitated by the totality of physical truths).
Key works Identity based physicalism was first proposed by Place 1956, Feigl 1958, and Smart 1959. Token identity based physicalism is taken to originate with Davidson 1963. Explicitly type identity based physicalist approaches are to be found in Lewis 1966 and in Armstrong 1968. An account of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori supervenience based physicalism is given in Chalmers 1996 and in Stoljar 2000. Particular a priori physicalist approaches are to be found in Dennett 1991Dretske 1995Lewis 1990Rey 1995. Particular a posteriroi physicalist approaches appear in Loar 1990Papineau 1993Tye 1995Hill 1997Balog 1999Block & Stalnaker 1999Balog 2011.
Introductions Stoljar 2015
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  1. Grounding Physicalism and the Metaphysical Exclusion Problem.Will Moorfoot - forthcoming - Ratio.
    Ground physicalism is the view that higher-level properties, such as phenomenal and normative properties, are fully grounded in the fundamental physical properties. Like other non-identity physicalists, ground physicalists face the causal exclusion problem. In this paper, I introduce a new worry for the ground physicalist: the metaphysical exclusion problem. According to the metaphysical exclusion problem, there is something deeply problematic about certain properties having more than one full ground. Furthermore, the causal and metaphysical exclusion problems are shown to work together (...)
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  2. Conscious Thought under Sensory Deprivation: Avicenna's Flying Man and 'I'.Mahrad Almotahari - forthcoming - The Monist.
    This paper offers a new take on Avicenna's Flying Man, one that explains why it's better than its Cartesian counterpart.
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  3. Life is strongly emergent.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2024 - Ratio 37 (4):297-312.
    In this article, I argue that life is a strongly emergent phenomenon. For the project of drawing a real distinction between living and non-living beings cannot but appeal to strongly emergent powers. First, I introduce some features whose possession is typically taken to be sufficient for possessing life, i.e., Life-Sufficient Features (or LS-Features). I also clarify what I mean by “strongly emergent powers”. And I fully develop and illustrate my argument. Subsequently, I examine no less than 17 possible reactions to (...)
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  4. OS DUALISMOS DE DESCARTES E LEIBNIZ REVISTOS EM METAFÍSICA CONTEMPORÂNEA.Sâmara Costa - 2024 - Inconfidentia 8 (15):51-65.
    Resumo: Este trabalho é centrado em mostrar parte da propagação da Metafísica Contemporânea feita por Peter van Inwagen. Demonstraremos alguns argumentos do autor e suas respectivas análises sobre a validação do argumento dualista, dentre eles a comparação entre dois importantes e diferentes dualismos, especialmente o de Descartes e Leibniz. Van Inwagen aponta problemas nos dois argumentos. Por fim esclarece-nos muito sobre o problema da representação de fenómenos mentais versus representações físicas, o que explica um importante aspecto que contribui para o (...)
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  5. Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce (eds.): Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 96 (1).
  6. Are algorithms always arbitrary? Three types of arbitrariness and ways to overcome the computationalist’s trilemma.C. Percy - manuscript
    Implementing an algorithm on part of our causally-interconnected physical environment requires three choices that are typically considered arbitrary, i.e. no single option is innately privileged without invoking an external observer perspective. First, how to delineate one set of local causal relationships from the environment. Second, within this delineation, which inputs and outputs to designate for attention. Third, what meaning to assign to particular states of the designated inputs and outputs. Having explained these types of arbitrariness, we assess their relevance for (...)
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  7. The hope and horror of physicalism: an existential treatise.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2024 - New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
    This book assesses the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism. It argues that accepting physicalism is the healthiest stance we can take in the face of an account of the self and world which offers no metaphysical assurances. Why should we care about physicalism? On one hand, the view seems to be inconsistent with things that many people find valuable, such as the existence of free will, God, the immortal soul, ultimate purpose, and natural laws like karma. On the other hand, (...)
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  8. Property dualists shouldn't be nominalists about properties.Daniel Giberman & David Mark Kovacs - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Property nominalism is the view that there are neither repeatable nor non-repeatable fundamentally predicable entities (i.e. neither universals nor tropes) and that things being a certain way or being related in a certain way must ultimately be accounted for in (...)
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  9. The Many-Subjects Argument against Physicalism.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz, The Importance of Being Conscious. Oxford University Press.
    The gist of the many-subjects argument is that, given physicalism, it’s hard to avoid the absurd result that there are many conscious subjects in your vicinity with more-or-less the same experiences as you. The most promising ways of avoiding this result have a consequence almost as bad: that there are many things in your vicinity that are in a state only trivially different from being conscious, a state with similar normative significance. This paper clarifies and defends three versions of the (...)
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  10. Why the phenomenal concept strategy cannot save physicalism.Martina Fürst - 2008 - In Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb, Reduction and elimination in philosophy and the sciences : papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 106-109.
  11. Phänomenale Begriffe.Martina Fürst - 2023 - In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb, Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler. pp. 1-11..
    Viele unserer Bewusstseinszustände sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass es irgendwie für uns ist (Nagel 1974), in diesen Zuständen zu sein. In der Philosophie des Geistes werden derartige Zustände als ‚phänomenale Zustände‘ bezeichnet. ‚Phänomenale Begriffe‘ sind nun spezielle Begriffe, mittels derer wir uns auf phänomenale Zustände beziehen. Paradigmatische Beispiele für phänomenale Zustände, von denen wir einen phänomenalen Begriff besitzen können, sind das bewusste Erlebnis, die Farbe Blau zu sehen, den Klang einer Violine zu hören oder Schmerz zu fühlen. Zentral ist, dass sich (...)
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  12. On a body-switching argument in defence of the immateriality of human nature.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):17-29.
    In an earlier paper in Theoria, I discussed an argument based on the idea of “soul-switching” that attempted to undermine the immaterialist account of human beings. The present paper deals with a parity argument against that argument in which the idea of “body-switching” plays a pivotal role. I call these two arguments, that have been reported by Razi (d. 1210), respectively “the soul-switching argument” and “the body-switching argument”. After some introductory remarks, section 2 of the paper describes the structure of (...)
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  13. Grounding Physicalism and "Moorean" Connections.Alex Moran - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
  14. Plotinus' Self-Reflexivity Argument against Materialism.Zain Raza - 2025 - Ancient Philosophy Today 7 (1):60-97.
    Plotinus argues that materialism cannot explain reflexive cognition. He argues that mere bodies cannot engage in the self-reflexive activity of both cognizing some content and being cognitively aware of cognizing this content. Short of outright denying the cognitive unity underlying this phenomenon of self-awareness, materialism is in trouble. However, Plotinus bases his argument on the condition that material bodies are capable of a spatial unity at most, and while this condition has purchase on ancient materialists, it would be rejected today. (...)
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  15. Review of Tye's Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (2):338-343.
  16. The Duchess of Disunity: Margaret Cavendish on the Materiality of the Mind.Colin Chamberlain - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1):1-18.
    Sometimes we love and hate the same thing at the same time. Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673)—the maverick early modern materialist—appeals to this type of passionate conflict to argue that the mind is a material thing. When our passions conflict, the mind or reason conflicts with itself. From this Cavendish infers that the mind has parts and, therefore, is material. Cavendish says this argument is among the best proofs of the mind’s materiality. And yet, the existing scholarship on Cavendish lacks the kind (...)
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  17. A Speculation About Consciousness.Edward A. Francisco - manuscript
    This is a sketch of the basis and role of consciousness and the minimally required elements and constraints of any setting that may produce consciousness. It proposes that consciousness (as we know it) is a biologically-mediated product of evolved recursive and hierarchically nested representational systems that obey information theoretic principles and Bayesian (probabilistic) feedback and feedforward predictive modeling processes.
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  18. Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem.Jane Anderson - 2022 - Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand “the mind-body problem”. The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as “what it is like” to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of “what-it-is-like” as “the hard problem” of consciousness and claims that this problem is so “hard” that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally (...)
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  19. The first-personal argument against physicalism.Christian List - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a seemingly straightforward argument against physicalism which, despite being implicit in much of the philosophical debate about consciousness, has not received the attention it deserves (compared to other, better-known “epistemic”, “modal”, and “conceivability” arguments). This is the argument from the non-supervenience of the first-personal (and indexical) facts on the third-personal (and non-indexical) ones. This non-supervenience, together with the assumption that the physical facts (as conventionally understood) are third-personal, entails that some facts – (...)
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  20. Mental Causation, Exclusive Argument, and Non-reductive Physicalism.Xiaoyang Wang & Yuchen Wang - 2020 - Journal of Human Cognition 4 (2):53-67.
    Jeagwon Kim's exclusion argument is a well-known argument against non-reductive physicalism in the contemporary debate on mental causation. In this essay, we will first discuss two versions of the exclusion argument: the simple version and the sophisticated version. Secondly, we will take a conservative strategy to defend the kind of non-reductive physicalism initiated by Donald Davidson: the Token Identity Theory. Namely, we will explain where Kim failed to appropriately understand Davidson's work and argue that the simple version and the sophisticated (...)
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  21. Epiphenomenal Minds and Philosophers’ Zombies: Where do mental properties originate?George Aulisio - 2022 - National Taiwan University Philosophical Review 64 (Special Issue on Self and Other):267-312.
    Property dualism [PD], when adopted by physicalists, is the view that mental properties are irreducible and joined to the physical. Many property dualists who subscribe to physicalism hold epiphenomenalism—the view that the mind does not have a causal role in affecting physical events (e.g., bodily movements).1 In this paper, I examine two possible origins of mental properties and the entailments of those origins if one is committed to physicalism. First, mental properties have a generative origin (e.g., emergence, neurophysiological, etc.). Second, (...)
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  22. Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality: Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits.Christian Coseru (ed.) - 2023 - Springer.
    Best known for his groundbreaking and influential work in Buddhist philosophy, Mark Siderits is the pioneer of “fusion” or “confluence philosophy", a boldly systematic approach to doing philosophy premised on the idea that rational reconstruction of positions in one tradition in light of another can sometimes help address perennial problems and often lead to new and valuable insights. -/- Exemplifying the many virtues of the confluence approach, this collection of essays covers all core areas of Buddhist philosophy, as well as (...)
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  23. Modal Arguments against Physicalism in View of Scientific Findings Concerning Pain.Maja Malec - 2016 - Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 14 (4):360-368.
    I analyse Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-brain identity theories. Specifically, he argues against the identity between pain and C-fibres simulation by pointing out the difference between this identity claim and the theoretical identifications, such as ‘Water is H2O’ and ‘Lightning is a motion of electric charges’. Kripke’s argument relies on the assumption that the experience of pains is a simple and homogenous phenomenon, but scientific research shows that it is in fact a quite complex one. We can distinguish at (...)
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  24. What's Wrong With Nonreductive Physicalism? The Exclusion Problem Reconsidered.Kevin Morris - 2023 - ProtoSociology 39:19-34.
    Jaegwon Kim argued that nonreductive physicalism faces the “exclusion problem” for higher-level causation, mental causation in particular. Roughly, the charge is that given the presumptive ubiquity of physical causation, there cannot be irreducible mental causes for physical effects. Since there are mental causes, Kim concluded that nonreductive physicalism should be rejected in favor of a more reductionist alternative according to which mental causes are just physical causes differently described. But why should mental causes be “excluded” in this way? Unfortunately, Kim (...)
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  25. Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism.Rosa Cao - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-31.
    Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam ( 1967 ) supposed it to be “overwhelmingly probable” that there exist psychological properties with different physical realizations in different creatures. But because function constrains possible physical realizers, this empirical bet is far less favorable than it might initially have seemed, especially when we take on board the richer picture of neural and brain function that neuroscience has been uncovering (...)
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  26. (2 other versions)What is it like to be boring and myopic?Kathleen Akins - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg, Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.
  27. Conceptual reductions, truthmaker reductive explanations, and ontological reductions.Savvas Ioannou - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-26.
    According to conceptual reductive accounts, if properties of one domain can be conceptually reduced to properties of another domain, then the former properties are ontologically reduced to the latter properties. I will argue that conceptual reductive accounts face problems: either they do not recognise that many higher-level properties are correlated with multiple physical properties, or they do not clarify how we can discover new truthmakers of sentences about a higher-level property. Still, there is another way to motivate ontological reduction, the (...)
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  28. Physicalism, Infinite Decomposition, and Constitution.Torin Alter, Sam Coleman & Robert J. Howell - 2022 - Erkenntnis (4):1735-1744.
    How could physicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is that physicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has produced a counterexample to that solution. We show how to modify the solution to accommodate Brown’s example: physicalism could be true of a world without fundamental physical phenomena if that (...)
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  29. The Problem "I" in Galen Strawson.Elaheh Khoshzaban & Zahra Khazaei - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 16 (38):186-213.
    One of the topics in the philosophy of mind is the discussion of "I", which philosophers have referred to in various interpretations as "The self", "personal identity", "ego", "soul" and "spirit". Philosophers' different theories about the existence and even the nature of this seemingly simple and obvious have turned it into a philosophical problem. Galen Strawson is a physicalist who has addressed this issue by interpreting “The self”. On the one hand, he believes in the existence of the "empirical self", (...)
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  30. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics.Amy Kind - 2020 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    Philosophy of Mind: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to the fundamental philosophical questions and theories about the mind. The author Amy Kind, a leading expert in the field, examines central issues concerning the nature of consciousness, thought, and emotion. The book addresses key questions such as: • What is the nature of the mind? • What is the relationship between the mind and the brain? • Can machines have minds? • How will future technology impact the mind? (...)
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  31. The ins and outs of conscious belief.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):517-548.
    What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intentionality thesis coupled with a commitment to beliefs as essentially unconscious embroils Crane in positing unconscious phenomenology, counter-argues that beliefs are essentially conscious. I examine and rebut Crane’s arguments for the essential unconsciousness of beliefs, some of (...)
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  32. Three Versions of Physical Closure.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (4):640-658.
    The Exclusion Argument has been regarded as the most powerful challenge to non-reductive physicalism. This argument presupposes a crucial thesis, Causal Closure of the Physical, which asserts that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Although this thesis is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophers say surprisingly little about what notion of physical entities should be adopted in the context. In this article, the author distinguishes between three versions of Closure that appeal to a narrow, a moderate, (...)
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  33. What to Do if You Want to Defend a Theory You Cannot Prove.Peter Achinstein - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (1):35-56.
  34. Meaning generation and self-consciousness: Neurophilosophical applications of an evolutionary scenario? (Lomonosov Moscow State University. 2015 Presentation).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    The nature of human mind has been an open question for more than 2000 years and it is still today a mystery. There has been during the last 30 years a renewed interest from science and philosophy on that subject. Among the existing research domains is neurophilosophy, an interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy looking at neuronal aspects of access consciousness, of phenomenal consciousness and at functional aspects of consciousness. We propose here to look if self-consciousness could have a place (...)
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  35. Estudio crítico de Jaegwon, Kim. "El fisicalismo no reduccionista y su problema con la causalidad mental.".Pablo Pavesi - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):292-296.
    This article is, in particular, a discussion of the article by Jaegwon, Kim: "Non-reductionist physicalism and its problem with mental causation". In general, we turn to classic texts of phenomenology to refute any (non) reductionist physical theory.
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  36. (1 other version)Mechanism and Materialism: British Natural Philosophy in the Age of Reason.P. M. Heimann - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):297-306.
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  37. Focusing On The Brain, Ignoring The Body.Alessandro Colarossi - 2013 - Philosophy Now 97:17-19.
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  38. (1 other version)The significance of emergence.Tim Crane - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer, Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible (...)
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  39. (1 other version)Sensations and grain processes.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2002 - In James H. Fetzer, Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
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Formulating Physicalism
  1. One-term physicalism.Miklós Márton - 2025 - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    In this paper I present firstly the close resemblance of two famous philosophical arguments, namely Moore’s open question argument and the so-called zombie or absent qualia argument. Then, based on their similarity, I argue for the tenability and prima facie plausibility of a theoretical position in the mind-body problem which I call one-term physicalism, and which is almost entirely missing from the relevant literature. The argumentation primarily leans on the fact that a parallel position in metaethics, namely one-term naturalism, is (...)
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  2. The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Alin C. Cucu - 2024 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 10 (4).
  3. Physicalism, Foundationalism, and Infinite Descent.Jonas Werner - 2025 - Erkenntnis 90 (2):789-794.
    This paper contributes to answering the question how physicalism can be defined for a world without fundamental physical phenomena. In a recent paper in this journal, Torin Alter, Sam Coleman, and Robert J. Howell propose a necessary condition on physicalism. They argue that physicalism is true only if there is no infinitely descending chain of mentally constituted phenomena. I argue that this alleged necessary condition faces counterexamples. An infinitely descending chain of mentally constituted phenomena is compatible with physicalism. Afterwards I (...)
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  4. From Materialism To Physicalism: An Opinionated Sketch.Andrew Melnyk - 2024 - In John Symons & Charles Wolfe, The History and Philosophy of Materialism. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 439-455.
    Late twentieth-century physicalism—here understood, broadly, as a comprehensive view about the nature of contingent reality, rather than, narrowly, as a view about the relation of the mental to the physical—is widely regarded as the descendant of the materialist hypotheses familiar from the history of philosophy both ancient and modern. This chapter contends that contemporary physicalism differs significantly from historical hypotheses of materialism, significantly enough that the prospects for physicalism cannot be inferred from those for materialism. The chapter brings out these (...)
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  5. Not So Weak Emergence.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2024 - Argumenta 10 (1):303-312.
    In this article, I shall examine Jessica Wilson’s schema for weak emergence in connection with two questions: why are only certain proper subsets of the powers borne by lower-level features associated with higher-level, weakly emergent features? Why is a certain proper subset of the powers borne by a given lower-level feature associated with a certain higher-level, weakly emergent feature, and vice versa? I shall consider and criticize four possible answers to these questions, including Wilson’s own view. Finally, I shall suggest (...)
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  6. The absentminded professor.Justin Tiehen - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (10):4062-4077.
    In this paper, I argue that absences pose a challenge to our understanding of physicalism that has not been properly appreciated. I do this by setting out a thought experiment involving a being in whom absence properties occupy the causal roles that functionalists take to define mental properties, in which case these absence properties realize the being’s mental properties. Such a being should be compatible with the truth of physicalism, I argue, even though its mental properties are neither themselves physical (...)
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  7. Type-R Physicalism.Will Moorfoot - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In this paper, I argue for an often-neglected solution to the conceivability argument: the reconciliatory response. Its advocates state that, even if zombies are metaphysically possible, it does not follow that all versions of physicalism are false. To make the reconciliatory response, we must construct a theory that counts as a version of physicalism (because it makes higher-level facts count as physical) but also allows for the metaphysical possibility of zombies. Call any physicalist theory that can make the reconciliatory response (...)
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  8. What Physicalism Could Be.Michael J. Raven - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    The physicalist credo is that the world is physical. But some phenomena, such as minds, morals, and mathematics, appear to be nonphysical. While an uncompromising physicalism would reject these, a conciliatory physicalism needn’t if it can account for them in terms of an underlying physical basis. Any such account must refer to the nonphysical. But won’t this unavoidable reference to the nonphysical conflict with the physicalist credo? This essay aims to clarify this problem and introduce a novel solution that relies (...)
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  9. Physical Properties.Alexander D. Carruth - 2018 - In Mihretu P. Guta, Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties. New York: Routledge. pp. 24-38.
    Physicalism can be roughly characterised as the view that everything is physical, or that everything that is fundamental is physical, or that any non-physical entity—property, substance, fact, event, kind and what have you—is both dependent upon and fully determined by physical entities. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing physicalism is to explain how conscious experience can be accounted for within the physicalist framework. Given these rough characterisations of physicalism, before setting out to address the problem posed by consciousness, there is some (...)
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  10. Causalità del mentale: dall'argomento di Kim ai qualia in una prospettiva fisicalista.Leonardo Capitaneo - 2023 - Dissertation, Università Degli Studi di Torino
    Lo scopo dell’elaborato è presentare il problema della causalità del mentale e cercare di dare una soluzione fisicalista al problema che possa includere anche i qualia, da sempre considerati come l’ultima difesa a favore dell’irriducibilità della mente al fisico. Il primo capitolo ha il compito di trovare la teoria metafisica del mentale migliore che riesca sia a rendere conto della causalità del mentale e sia a resistere all’argomento di Kim. Dopo aver esposto in dettaglio l’argomento di Kim sono affrontati i (...)
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  11. Qualia share their correlates’ locations.Neil Sinhababu - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-14.
    This paper argues that qualia share their physical correlates' locations. The first premise comes from the theory of relativity: If something shares a time with a physical event in all reference frames, it shares that physical event’s location. The second premise is that qualia share times with their correlates in all reference frames. Having qualia and correlates share locations makes relations between them easier to explain, improving both physicalist and dualist theories.
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1 — 50 / 1897