Relationships and Marriage

Accusations of sexual creepiness are on the rise, but are such accusations morally problematic? Legal scholar Heidi Matthews thinks so, arguing that sexual creepiness as a category is in tension with liberal and progressive moral commitments. Principled liberals and progressives can reject creepiness as a category, but the costs of abandoning sexual creepiness may be high. Empirical findings about who gets accused of being creepy suggest that the creepiness norm is being repurposed to control male sexual advances in two ways: (...) first, by discouraging substandard male suitors from approaching young women unlikely to be interested in them (“prefiltration”), and second, by deflecting eligible older men away from young women and towards older women (“redirection”). If something like this hypothesis is correct, the ethical question liberals and progressives must wrestle with is whether these benefits justify maintenance of a norm that is (inter alia) lookist, ageist, sexist, sex-negative, and neuronormative. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the 4B movement, which originates in Korea, as a feminist movement. In particular, I conceptualize it as a labor strike, considered against the backdrop of recent empirical research on comparative rates of unpaid labor, happiness, and well-being between men and women in heterosexual relationships. In doing so, I situate it within a historical context of the successes and failures of second-wave and recent "Girl Boss" feminist movements, particularly as regards their intersections with capitalism.

The 1960s and 1970s in Britain was a time of revolution in attitudes towards sex, especially in the public education system. The campaign to see sex education established as a subject in primary and secondary schools was gaining traction despite fierce opponents like Mary Whitehouse. This article focuses on the story of a traditionalist Catholic couple named Mr Derrick Taylor and Mrs Irene Taylor who set up a campaign to defend their children against what they saw as the encroachment of (...) immorality, promiscuity and pornography. Mrs Taylor worked to spread the message that sex education was wrong by building a network of mothers who shared her views while Mr Taylor defended in court his decision to remove his children from school altogether. This article gives an account of the lengths Mr and Mrs Taylor went to in order to try to stop sex education and describes the impacts this campaign had on their children. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to shed some light on the nature and value of this neglected but important virtue of trustfulness. First, I briefly introduce the nature of trust and trust relationships and explain why they are essentially risky. Second, I examine the nature of trustfulness mainly by comparing it with other traits such as distrustfulness, gullibility, and prudent reliance. I then argue that its attitudinal element of respecting the trustee as a person—that is, respecting her as an agent (...) capable of free choice—is what distinguishes trustfulness from other traits. I also show why trustfulness is not only intrinsically admirable but also necessary for building a harmonious community. Then I add some further remarks on trustfulness that might help better understand this virtue. Finally, I conclude this paper after addressing some possible objections. (shrink)

This article reconstructs a Received View of the right to marry in the European Convention on Human Rights and provides its philosophical interpretation. According to the Received View, the right to marry is a right to a legal institution of marriage. Recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights is analysed, with a focus on the protection and recognition of personal relationships under the law. According to the Fedotova case, the rights pertaining to the protection of conjugal relationships (...) stem from the right to family life. The problem of non-distinctiveness of the right to marry is being discussed. If substantial rights protecting conjugal couples stem from the right to family life, then the right to marry does not offer any additional protection for the couple. The Received View addresses this issue. However, it is politically and morally unjust. (shrink)

The 14th-century Dominican theologian and philosopher Durand of Saint-Pourçain was among the intellectuals who took part in the medieval debate on virginity, especially on the relationship between virginity and marriage. This paper discusses a question of his Sentences Commentary (Super Sent., II, d. 20, q. 2), in which Durand poses the question of “whether or not there would have been a loss of virginity in marriage” (utrum in actu matrimoniali fuisset amissio virginitatis) both in statu innocentiae and in statu post (...) peccatum. This paper shows how Durand’s solution to the problem is in opposition to Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’s views, based on formal and material aspects of virginity. (shrink)

The idea that love changes who we are is widely shared, and has been mostly explored from a stance in the middle stage of love (i.e., when people already love each other). But how do we get there? And what happens when love ends? In this chapter, I explore how self-understanding may be shaped in different ways at different stages of love through the notions of narrative and existential feeling. As I will argue, love gains narrative momentum at the beginning, (...) which is maintained during the middle, and ultimately extinguished at the end. This momentum is triggered and later sustained by the existential feeling that ‘things make sense’, which keeps the lovers oriented towards each other. (shrink)

“I am only what I make myself to be”, Fichte tells us. In this paper, I outline Fichte’s views on sex, marriage and gender, with two aims. Firstly, to elucidate an aspect of his moral theory which has received little attention, and secondly to argue that Fichte’s distinctive stance on selfhood, freedom, and normativity lead to a revisionary account of gender expression and identity, where people can freely carve out their own identity, irrespective of “nature”. In this paper, I therefore (...) outline Fichte’s own views, highlighting what I see as a tension in the texts between essentialism and antiessentialism about gender, before reconstructing a neo-Fichtean view which foregrounds the anti-essentialist aspect. (shrink)

The paper discusses Beauvoir's interpretation of the Marxist and Freudian contributions to our understanding of the feminine condition. Several epistemological assumptions derived from Sartre's philosophy are pointed out. Beauvoir's reading of Marx, Engels, and Freud is discussed, claiming that her reading is biased by humanistic and historicist assumptions. This is an unpublished English version of Sergio Cremaschi, “Marxismo e psicanalisi in Il secondo sesso di Simone de Beauvoir”, Vita e Pensiero, 67 (1975), 3-4, pp. 510-525; reprint in E. De Marchi (...) (ed.), In nome della donna, Editrice Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 1976, pp. 510-525. (shrink)

The paper discusses how some Cartesian dualism, inherited from Sartre, is an obstacle to Beauvoir's project of a new comprehension of the feminine ‘situation', aimed at rescuing women from an 'inauthentic' self-definition. Suggestions coming from the phenomenological approach of a positive value of the bodily dimension as such, and hence of the feminine bodily dimension, are never fully spelt out, and Beauvoir falls back into the trap of grounding claims of equality between men and women on the assumption that bodily (...) differences are of limited relevance. The eventual reason for a such step back is the distorting Cartesian mirror into which Beauvoir still looks in the vain hope of discovering a disembodied self as the (Cartesian) subject of an impossible kind of liberation. This is an unpublished English version of Sergio Cremaschi, “Il concetto di eros in Le deuxième sexe di Simone de Beauvoir”, in V. Melchiorre (ed.), Amore e matrimonio nel pensiero filosofico e teologico moderno, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1976, pp. 296-318. (shrink)

What would the institution of the family look like, if it were reformed according to republican desiderata? Would it even survive such re-shaping?

A response to James S. Spiegel's article in THINK 43 in which he argues that same-sex marriage is unjust.

The main goal of this paper is to present the philosophical explanation of the marital relationship according to the Polish philosopher Karol Wojtyła. In our research, our attention was focused mainly on his book Love and Responsibility; the early philosophical work of a young, 37 year old Professor of Philosophy at the Catholic University in Lublin, Poland. In his writings, Karol Wojtyła—the future Pope John Paul II—presents marriage as a monogamous, indissoluble relationship between a man and a woman, which grows (...) out of mutual love for the purpose of procreation. Such a relationship is ruled by the „personalistic norm" which says that a person can never, under any circumstances, be a mere object of enjoyment for another person, but can only be the object of love. Love is a self-giving for the good of one's counterpart, so Marriage as a personalistic unity persists as long as these persons are alive. Because love is fecund from its very essence, so it is fruitful from its nature. Thus, procreation belongs to the principle ends of marriage. Such an attitude—as K. Wojtyła proves—is opposed to the utilitarian point of view of man and Marriage. According to the utilitarian conception, a person can be used as a means for achieving the highest good, i.e., pleasure. (shrink)

Develops a model of marriage as the chosen institutionalization of love. Builds on a phenomenological account of love to make sense of marital promises and to identify the kinds of promises it makes sense for marriage partners to make.

Is divorce reasonable, given that marital promises are often apparently unqualified? I explain a variety of ways in which one can take promises seriously and recognize the value of genuinely unqualified love in marriage while recognizing that it may be reasonable in particular cases to treat marital promises as non-binding.

Men, Women, and the Mystery of Love es el libro escrito por Edward Sri, profesor del Augustine Institute de Denver, Colorado, publicado en el 2015 por la editorial Servant, en el cual toma las enseñanzas de la obra del papa Juan Pablo II titulada Amor y responsabilidad pre-sentándolas como una guía práctica, sin ser un manual seco sobre ética sexual o un tratado abstracto sobre el amor, que ayuda a los lectores a comprender la visión de Juan Pablo II sobre (...) las relaciones entre el hombre y la mujer, y las puedan aplicar en sus propias vidas. (shrink)

In Pythagorean Women, classical scholar Sarah B. Pomeroy discusses the groundbreaking principles that Pythagoras established for family life in Archaic Greece, such as constituting a single standard of sexual conduct for women and men. Among the Pythagoreans, women played an important role and participated actively in the philosophical life. While Pythagoras encouraged women to be submissive to men, his reasoning was based on the desire to preserve harmony in the home. -/- Pythagorean Women provides English translations of all the earliest (...) extant examples of literary Greek prose by Neopythagorean women, shedding light on their attitudes about marriage, the home, music, and the cosmos. Pomeroy sets the Pythagorean and Neopythagorean women vividly in their historical, ecological, and intellectual contexts, illustrated with original photographs of sites and artifacts known to these women. (shrink)

Parties to a temporary marriage agree in advance that their marriage will only last for a fixed period of time unless renewed: that it will automatically expire after two years, for instance, or five, or twenty. This paper defends the claim that temporary marriages deserve state recognition. The main argument for this is an application of a principle of marriage equality. Some other arguments for are also canvassed, including an argument from religious freedom, and a number of arguments against recognition (...) are also discussed. The paper also discusses the question of whether such “temporary marriages” are in fact a kind of marriage, and defends the claim that they are, or would be, genuinely marriages. (shrink)

People who experience love often experience break-ups as well. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an (...) insight on the nature of break-ups, but also make a specific claim about the nature of love. I argue that the object that is universally lost in all break-ups is a person with certain intrinsic qualities, who is in a relationship characterised by certain shared activities and recognized as romantic. That means that, at least in romantic terminations, the beloved and the relationship are not independent objects of grief. So, plausibly, they may not independent objects of value in love. Hence, those who state otherwise should face up to this objection coming from the study of break-ups. (shrink)

What defines family law? Is it an area of law with clean boundaries and unified distinguishing characteristics, or an untidy grouping of disparate rules and doctrines? What values or principles should guide it – and how could it be improved? Indeed, even the scope of family law is contested. Whilst some law schools and textbooks separate family law from children’s law, this is invariably effected without asking what might be gained or lost from treating them together or separately. Should family (...) law and children’s law be distinguished or treated together? One would expect disagreement on these questions in any context. In bringing together theorists from multiple jurisdictions and at least two primary disciplines, we should not be surprised to find deep differences in approach reflecting different methodologies and foundational questions. The tension between them, we hope, can illuminate and enrich discussion on all sides. (shrink)

In What is Marriage? One Man and One Woman: A Defense, Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson and Robert George defend the ‘conjugal marriage’ while claiming to make no moral judgments about homosexuality. My contention in this article is that the argument of What is Marriage is not sufficiently different from the arguments of classical new natural law theorists, and, therefore, What is Marriage does not remain neutral on the question of whether homosexuality is moral. First, I give an overview of some (...) classical NNLT arguments on the nature of marriage and their sexual ethic. Next, I present What is Marriage's account of conjugal marriage as a comprehensive union of two people, focusing on what makes a genuinely bodily union. I then move to the central contention of this article. By drawing on its understanding of genuinely bodily union and its account of the harm of same-sex marriage, I argue that What is Marriage is committed to the view that same-sex sexual unions cannot be good, since on its account of things there can be no shared sexual goods in a same-sex sexual ‘union’. (shrink)

Taking as its starting-point Eva Illouz's sociological study Why Love Hurts, this paper develops a philosophical framework for understanding love and marriage, particularly in their contemporary manifestations. To begin with, premodern practices in love and marriage during the ancient Greek and Byzantine eras are outlined and contrasted with modern forms of love, whose overriding features are suffering and disappointment. To cast some light upon this great transformation in the fortunes of love the discussion takes an axiological and metaphysical turn by (...) placing the transformation within the context of the kind of relational morality and metaphysics proposed by many idealist philosophers. (shrink)

Let the marriage bond be the set of extralegal obligations to one another that individuals acquire in getting married. And let a conception of the marriage bond be an account of the nature and content of these. Here, I argue that the conception of this bond dominant among us is uncongenial to romantic love among individuals of a certain psychological type. Then, after articulating a conception more congenial to romantic love among such individuals, I argue that if we wish to (...) make marriage safer for love, we should make room in our thinking and practice for this conception, embracing a form of marital pluralism. (shrink)

A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applicable the ideal of higher friendship is (...) to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited. (shrink)

One current line of argument against the legalization of same-sex marriage, advocated primarily by the New Natural Lawyers, is that marriage is a pre-political institution that has, as an essential element, a bodily union requirement. They argue that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union in their sexual activities and thus cannot meet the structural requirements of marriage. Accordingly, they argue that the same-sex marriage debate must be framed as a debate about what marriage is, and not, as it was in (...) the anti-miscegenation precedents, about who can get married. I argue that their position, which promulgates a set of pernicious stereotypes about same-sex couples, is, first of all, internally inconsistent. According to their own metaphysical principles about bodily union, they provide no rational basis for the claim that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union and thus that same-sex couples cannot be married. Second, I argue for a deflationary account of the significance of bodily union. While same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, can realize bodily union, this sort of union has no moral significance and thus cannot be the factor that distinguishes marriages from other sorts of relationships. Finally, I suggest that they have no basis for their claims about the inferiority of same-sex relationships. (shrink)

New natural lawyers--notably Grisez, Finnis, and George--have written much on civil marriage's moral boundaries and grounds, but with slight influence. The peripheral place of the new natural law theory (NNLT) results from the marital grounds they suggest and the exclusionary moral conclusions they draw from them. However, I argue a more authentic and attractive NNLT account of marriage is recoverable through overlooked resources within the theory itself: friendship and moral self-constitution. This reconstructed account allows us to identify the relation between (...) marriage and human flourishing and the morality of same-sex marriage without making marriage infinitely plastic. (shrink)

Argues that same-sex “marriage” is a logical and practical impossibility and has serious implications for both other aspects of family law and the respect for human life and children in our culture. Asserts that the movement for same-sex “marriage” is a logical outgrowth of our culture’s separation of sex and procreation. Argues that the basis for opposition to this movement may be the residual reservoir of traditional understanding about marriage in the American public.

This article considers the arguments made in Baker v. Vermont, wherein the Vermont Supreme Court held that same-sex couples must be granted all thelegal rights and privileges that are granted to married couples. The article concludes by questioning if abolishing the legal institution of marriage would be the best way to protect the natural institution of marriage.

Fisher, Anthony The campaign to redefine marriage has recently gained such momentum- with now three and soon four Bills before the Commonwealth Parliament-that many think it is inevitable; this can leave those with misgivings feeling that they are already losers in a done deal. Some think it's the inexorable progress of liberty and equality-which leaves the doubters 'on the wrong side of history'. In this context supporters of classical marriage are presumed to have no real arguments to offer. So in (...) this paper I want to offer some reasons-not decrees from on high or from the past, not expressions of hatred or prejudice-but reasons I hope anyone can understand. I also hope you find these reasons persuasive and helpful in proclaiming and witnessing to true marriage among your families, friends and colleagues. But even if you disagree with me on this matter, I at least hope to help you understand why Australian law has always held, and many people still hold, that marriage is for people of opposite sex. (shrink)