Varieties of Scientific Realism

The intuitive, pre-scientific attitude contained in the main theses of scientific realism, that science learns about the world that exists independently of human cognitive acts, turned out to be philosophically problematic. Theses about the truth of scientific theories and the reality of unobservable theoretical objects have been questioned on many levels for various reasons. The discussion between scientific realism and anti-realism leads to a gradual weakening of the position of scientific realism as a result of the difficulties attributed to it. (...) In this context, questions arise about the nature of these difficulties, whether they are related to the main theses of this position or rather to the image of science that constitutes the background of the dispute and the understanding of the concepts in which it is expressed? These issues will be addressed in the context of questions and objections raised against scientific realism and the answers provided by realists. The article presents typical formulations of scientific realism and the main arguments of this position and its counter-arguments. The main realist responses to these problems are also briefly presented. Next, the difficulties arising for realism from the model-theoretic concept of scientific theories were identified and analysed, including the problem of representing real systems in theory models and the problem of idealization common in science. Then, R. Giere’s perspectival realism was briefly discussed as one of realism’s possible responses to these difficulties. The aim of the article was not to present another proposal to solve the difficulties, but to try to understand their nature and source. It seems that they are of a conceptual and interpretive nature and lie mainly in the way of understanding the concept of “truth” in relation to scientific theories. As the analysis shows, the “truthfulness” of a theory is understood as its compliance with reality in the sense of being an exact copy of it, and not in the sense of its ability to provide information about specific aspects of reality. The conclusion includes a suggestion that the understanding of the concept of “truth” in relation to scientific theories should take into account the fact that they are not copies of reality, they do not replace it in knowledge, but are only a tool for learning about some of its aspects. Omitting this fact leads to a discrepancy between the unrealistic expectation of a full reflection of reality in the scientific theory, which is formulated by philosophers, and the knowledge about certain aspects of reality obtained using models or theories, which is accepted by scientists. (shrink)

Recent work in philosophy of science has shown how the challenges posed by extremely complex systems require that scientists employ a range of modelling strategies, leading to partial perspectives that make apparently conflicting claims about the target (Mitchell 2009b, Longino 2013). The brain is of course extremely complex, and the same arguments apply here. In this paper I present a variety of perspectivism called _haptic realism_. This account foregrounds the process by which the instrumental goals of neuroscience shape the way (...) that objects of investigation are probed experimentally and conceptualised through modelling. Because such models do not aim to represent their targets exactly as they are, but in ways that are most useful for the investigators, the models should not be interpreted as literal descriptions of neural systems. Scientific realism traditionally involves a semantic commitment to interpreting theories and models as literal descriptions of human-independent nature. Haptic realism makes a significant departure from this tradition. Haptic realism also calls us to reassess the ontological commitments and knowledge claims of neuroscientific models and theories. (shrink)

Los desacuerdos acerca de la ontología científica han sido frecuentemente reconstruidos como el resultado de una disputa entre stances epistémicas rivales. En el presente trabajo, (i) caracterizamos algunos de estos desacuerdos como desacuerdos profundos. Además, (ii) mostramos que los desacuerdos profundos sobre ontología científica pueden surgir no solo de la adopción de diferentes stances epistémicas, sino entre posiciones que se encuadran dentro de una misma stance. El desarrollo de ese punto nos permite, a su vez, establecer una distinción entre tipos (...) de desacuerdos profundos y explorar la posibilidad de que existan diferencias de grado entre ellos. (shrink)

In his chapter in this volume, Christopher Pincock develops an argument for scientific realism based on scientific understanding, and he argues that Giere’s (2006) and my (2017, 2020) commitment to the context-dependence of scientific understanding or knowledge renders our views unable to account for an essential step in how scientists come to know. Meanwhile, in my chapter in this volume, I motivate a view that I call "causal pattern realism." In this response to Pincock's chapter, I will sketch a revised (...) version of Pincock’s argument for realism that is consistent with causal pattern realism. Then I will respond to Pincock’s concern that the context-dependence of understanding on my view would interfere with the scientific community’s ability to extrapolate from specific experimental and observational contexts as needed to develop knowledge. My goal is not to convince anyone to be a causal pattern realist but rather to create the space for such a view, taking into account the concerns motivating Pincock. (shrink)

Explanatory elucidation occurs when a theory has one or more of its assumptions explained by another independently successful theory. Because explanatory elucidation springs from independently supported theories, it improves the credibility of the assumptions it casts light on, hence its relevance for realists. But cases can be pointed to where explanatory elucidation has badly failed to identify truthful components. One way to address this challenge is by trying to find additional epistemic support for seemingly meritorious theory-parts. Resource in this regard, (...) I suggest, include some specific lines of probing that regularly turn up against theories in mature scientific disciplines. Together with explanatory elucidation, those lines single out, in diachronic fashion, theory components worthy of realist commitment, or so I argue. (shrink)

This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when at stake is the need to harmonize philosophical hermeneutics with a kind of realist philosophy of science. The author takes issue with established position in the realism-antirealism controversy. Interventionism is criticized for a residual Cartesian dualism. Cognitive relativism is debated by developing a concept of situated transcendence in the constitution of objects of inquiry. Non-behaviorist arguments against scheme-content dualism are advanced that appeal to context- sensitive theory of meaning. (...) Social constructivism is rejected for the hypostatization of epistemic positions. The article suggests a model of the constitution of meaning. It undertakes an attempt at demonstrating how the integration of this model in a hermeneutic philosophy of science leads to realism without epistemological representationalism, foundationalism, and cognitive essentialism. The article is oriented toward a new dialogue between hermeneutic phenomenology and a holistic epistemology. (shrink)

Le réalisme scientifique occupe une place centrale dans le système philosophique de Mario Bunge. Au cœur de cette thèse, on trouve l’affirmation selon laquelle nous pouvons connaître le monde partiellement. Il s’ensuit que les théories scientifiques ne sont pas totalement vraies ou totalement fausses, mais plutôt partiellement vraies et partiellement fausses. Ces énoncés sur la connaissance scientifique, à première vue plausible pour quiconque est familier avec la pratique scientifique, demandent néanmoins à être clarifiés, précisés et, ultimement, à être inclus dans (...) un cadre théorique plus large et rigoureux. Depuis ses toutes premières publications sur ces questions et jusqu’à récemment, Mario Bunge n’a cessé d’interpeller les philosophes afin qu’ils développent une théorie, au sens propre du terme, de la vérité partielle afin de clarifier les enjeux épistémologiques liés au réalisme scientifique. Bunge a lui-même proposé plusieurs parties de cette théorie au fil des années, mais aucune de ces propositions ne l’a satisfait pleinement et la construction de cette théorie demeure un problème entier. Dans ce texte, nous passerons rapidement en revue certaines des approches proposées par Bunge dans ses publications et nous esquisserons certaines pistes qui devraient servir à tout le moins de desiderata pour la construction d’une théorie de la vérité partielle. (shrink)

Many philosophers regard scientific practice as the final arbiter in ontology. In this short paper, I argue that the very philosophers who profess to derive their ontological commitments from scientific practice impose certain views on the theories established by that practice that the practice itself does not support. This is not consistent with their view that science tells us what there is.

Chapter I describes diachronic realism and shows why it is a version of what is called 'metaphysical realism'. Consequently, I argue that recent claims that 'metaphysical realism' is incoherent are unfounded. Chapter II argues that certain anti-realist positions involve an insufficient treatment of 'meaning' and 'reference' for theoretical terms. I review much of the current work on theories of reference and show that these incommensurability positions are bankrupt given either of the two most promising theories of reference. Chapter III argues (...) that certain methodological factors are the main considerations in historical cases of theory choice, and can warrant rational belief in a theory if it has achieved a sufficient level of virtues. Chapter IV defends the intuition that a realist interpretation of scientific theories explains their success by expanding the concepts of 'truth' and 'approximate truth'. I introduce the notions of truthlikeness and being on the right track to distinguish theories that were at least partially theoretically correct, from theories that were only successful in that they correctly organized experimental data. I use these notions with my diachronic approach to analyze two important historical examples. (shrink)

L’attitude réaliste constitue de prime abord la posture du sens commun vis-à-vis de la science. Elle consiste à attribuer à la science l’objectif de décrire littéralement la réalité tout en lui reconnaissant la capacité, en vertu de ses méthodes, d’atteindre ce but. Si le réalisme scientifique apparait comme représentant le sens commun, il a dû, au courant du siècle dernier, s’ériger en véritable posture philosophique argumentée devant l’influence grandissante des différentes formes d’antiréalismes. Dans la mesure où la posture qu’un philosophe (...) adopte concernant la prétention des théories scientifiques à décrire le réel a un impact sur son traitement d’à peu près toutes les questions pertinentes de son champ de recherche, on peut dire que l’examen de la question du réalisme scientifique est recommandable à quiconque souhaite mener une réflexion philosophique à propos de l’entreprise scientifique. Cet article débute sur la présentation des thèses fondamentales du réalisme scientifique pour ensuite le distinguer des autres postures réalistes et antiréalistes qui s’y sont opposées. Une fois les contours de la notion de réalisme scientifique précisés, il sera question des principales considérations qui ont été mises de l’avant en sa faveur et en sa défaveur. Le principal argument positif pour le réalisme scientifique est l’argument dit de l’absence de miracle. Au-delà de cet argument, tous les arguments du réalisme scientifique sont issus de répliques aux différents défis antiréalistes qui lui ont été lancés depuis la seconde moitié du 20e siècle. Il s’agira donc, par la suite, de présenter ces différents défis en identifiant les postures qui s’en réclament ainsi que les principales stratégies employées par les réalistes pour tenter de les relever. À la lumière de ce qui aura été présenté, l’article se conclut en interrogeant la distance qui sépare véritablement le réalisme scientifique de l’antiréalisme dans leurs formes contemporaines. (shrink)

I investigate a new understanding of realism in science, referred to as ‘interactive realism’, and I suggest the ‘evolutionary progressiveness’ of a theory as novel criterion for this kind of realism. My basic claim is that we cannot be realists about anything except the progress affected by myriad science-reality interactions that are constantly moving on a continuum of increased ‘fitness’ determined according to empirical constraints. Moreover to reflect this movement accurately, there is a corresponding continuum of verdicts about the status (...) of the knowledge conveyed by theories – ranging from stark instrumentalism to full-blown realism. This view may sound like a pessimistic inductivist's dream, but actually this is so only if one evaluates it from within a traditional context where the ‘truth’ of a single theory is the exclusive criterion for realism. I, on the other hand, want to redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that the units of assessment of realism are sequences of theories evaluated according to their ‘evolutionary progressiveness’. I unpack ‘interactive realism’ by defining my notion of ‘evolutionary progressiveness’, the notion of ‘truth-as-historied reference’ underpinning it, and the continuum of interaction between theories and aspects of reality it affects. I conclude that, although interactive realism is a radically non-standard kind of realism, it is at least more realistic about science as a fractured complex multi-faceted enterprise than most other kinds of realism on the block, because it shows coherence amidst fragmentation. (shrink)

In practice theoretical terms are open-ended in not being attached to anything completely specific. This raises a problem for scientific realism: If there is no one completely specific kind of thing that might be in the extension of “atom”, what is it to claim that atoms exist? A realist’s solution is to say that in theoretical contexts of mature atom-theories there are things that play the role of atoms as characterized in that theory-context. The paper closes with a laundry list (...) of problems that this more careful statement of scientific realism still faces. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to reflect on the intellectual rationale underlying the origin of life scientific research efforts by reconsidering some of its conceptual premises and difficulties.

In this paper I argue for the idea that, throughout the history of science, there are some cases of theory change that would show how science develops with no referential continuity. For this purpose, I analyze Psillos’ proposal of a theory of reference used to account for referential continuity in conceptual transitions. This kind of continuity is requested by Psillos —as by other philosophers— in his defense of scientific realism. By means of a historical case, the theory of germplasm of (...) August Weismann, I intend to demonstrate that Psillos’ demand for reference continuity can be found to be inadequate. (shrink)

This article indicates some ways in which the fantasy of the brain in the vat has been used in thought experiments to discuss important philosophical problems. The first has to do with scepticism about the external world. The second has to do with Hilary Putnam’s arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and his rejection of metaphysical realism. The third issue to which the brain in the vat is relevant has to do with the difference between broad and narrow content of (...) beliefs and Putnam’s challenging assertion that reference is not ‘in the head’. Though there are brief suggestions for dealing with these problems and saving metaphysical realism, the main purpose is to indicate the relevance of the fantasy of the brain in the vat to discussion of these issues. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to argue against Karl Rogers's attacks on realism in physics. Rogers argues that electrons do not exist independently of the relevant socio-technological process, but I show that such an assumption would make our best scientific theories incomprehensible. While the paper supports Rogers's attempts to refute positivism, it demonstrates that his own position is positivistic, and it corrects his overemphasis on the roles of technology and the experimenter. Rogers assumes that the founders of modern (...) science were simply mechanists, but I show how they were actually Platonic realists. Contrary to Rogers, realist faith in the fundamental unifying power of the laws of physics is shown to be reasonable, and any denial of this belief would imply that science is impossible. (shrink)

L’article présente les propositions principales de la métaphysique du réalisme axiologique de Tadeusz Czeżowski, l’un des représentants éminents de l’École de Lvov-Varsovie. La thèse soutenue par Czeżowski est que les valeurs ne sont pas des propriétés de n’importe quel genre, mais qu’elles constituent des notions transcendentales au sens de Duns Scot (et pas au sens de Thomas d’Aquin). Une des conséquences de cette position est que le réalisme de Czeżowski a la forme d’un non-naturalisme. La position prise par Czeżowski n’est (...) pas tout à fait claire ni élaborée en détails ; pour des raisons discutées dans le présent texte, il est possible de considérer les valeurs comme des sortes d’états de choses non-naturels, qui sont les correspondants des phrases axiolo-giques pertinentes. (shrink)

Our best sciences are frequently held to be one way, perhaps the optimal way, to learn about the world’s higher-level ontology and structure. I first argue that which scientific theory is “best” depends in part on our goals or purposes. As a result, it is theoretically possible to have two scientific theories of the same domain, where each theory is best for some goal, but where the two theories posit incompatible ontologies. That is, it is possible for us to have (...) goal-dependent pluralism in our scientific ontologies. This ontological pluralism arises simply from our inability to directly know the world’s objects, rather than any particular claims about our cognitive limits, values, or social structures. I then present two case studies in which this possibility actually occurs—one based on simulations and theoretical analyses of constructed causal systems, and one from actual scientific investigations into the proper ontology for ocean regions. (shrink)

_Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science_ is a fascinating study of the bounds between science and language: in what sense, and of what, does science provide knowledge? Is science an instrument only distantly related to what's real? Can the language of science be used to adequately describe the truth? In this book, Jodi Azziouni investigates the technology of science - the actual forging and exploiting of causal links, between ourselves and what we endeavor to know and understand.

This paper looks at the current realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science as a dispute between two objectivist interpretations of modern empirical success: Scientific realism and scientific antirealism. The paper traces the debate to a split in responses to the historicist relativism that gained force in the 1960s; it concentrates on the discussions that led to selectivism, a promising realist strategy that focuses on theory-parts rather than whole theories. The paper examines the merits and difficulties of selectivism and argues for (...) a naturalist approach to its present deficiencies, particularly regarding the need for a more precise identification of theory—parts worthy of realist interpretation. (shrink)

According to retail realism, we ought to abandon wholesale arguments, which purport to demonstrate realism or anti-realism about theoretical entities in general, and embrace retail arguments, which purport to demonstrate realism or anti-realism about specific kinds of theoretical entities. My aim is to argue that there is a further wholesale element that retail realism must avoid in order to qualify as a viable position. In order to do so, I distinguish between what I call wholesale and retail treatments of theoretical (...) entities. Wholesale treatments individuate theoretical entities in such a way that the same entity can appear in distinct theories. In that case, realism about a given entity implies realism about that entity as it appears in a number of distinct theories. Retail treatments, on the other hand, individuate theoretical entities more finely, so that distinct theories actually involve distinct entities. In that case, realism about one entity needn't imply realism about a similar, but distinct, entity. I argue that retail realists ought to reject wholesale treatments in favor of retail treatments, and I do so by examining a case from the history of chemistry involving the hypothetical constituent of hydrochloric acid known as the muriatic radical. I argue that there are distinct muriatic radicals in distinct theories, and that we ought to be realists about some, but not others. Hence, in this case, a retail treatment is preferable to a wholesale one, and I conclude by discussing why the combination of retail realism and retail treatments constitutes an attractive position within the scientific realism debate more generally. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is to produce true or approximately true theories about nature. It is a view which not only is shared by many philosophers but also by scientists themselves. Regarding Kuhn’s rejection of scientific progress, Steven Weinberg once declared: “All this is wormwood to scientists like myself, who think the task of science is to bring us closer and closer to objective truth.” But such a realist view on scientific theories is not (...) without problems. The paper discusses some arguments for and against the ontological commitments that scientific theories may entail. The upshot is that scientific realism according to which the semantic content of theories should be understood literally is not sustainable. Instead, it is argued that only realism with respect to entities can be reasonably and practically maintained. Finally, the paper discusses structural realism which presents itself as a modern alternative to scientific realism which may meet both the optimistic no-miracle argument and the pessimistic meta-induction argument. My conclusion is that such a position is neither attractive nor defendable. (shrink)

In the era of “big data,” science is increasingly information driven, and the potential for computers to store, manage, and integrate massive amounts of data has given rise to such new disciplinary fields as biomedical informatics. Applied ontology offers a strategy for the organization of scientific information in computer-tractable form, drawing on concepts not only from computer and information science but also from linguistics, logic, and philosophy. This book provides an introduction to the field of applied ontology that is of (...) particular relevance to biomedicine, covering theoretical components of ontologies, best practices for ontology design, and examples of biomedical ontologies in use. After defining an ontology as a representation of the types of entities in a given domain, the book distinguishes between different kinds of ontologies and taxonomies, and shows how applied ontology draws on more traditional ideas from metaphysics. It presents the core features of the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), now used by over one hundred ontology projects around the world, and offers examples of domain ontologies that utilize BFO. The book also describes Web Ontology Language (OWL), a common framework for Semantic Web technologies. Throughout, the book provides concrete recommendations for the design and construction of domain ontologies. (shrink)

In this paper, we reconsider the context of Barbara Carper'salternative ways of knowing,a prominent discourse in modern nursing theory in North America. We explore this relative to the concepts ofrealism, non‐realismandnominalism, and investigate the philosophical divisions behind the original typology, particularly in relationship to modern scientific enquiry. We examine forms of knowledge relative to realist and nominalist positions and make an argument ad absurdum against relativistic interpretations of knowledge using the example of Borge's Chinese Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge. We propose (...) a contentious postpositivist practical classification for nursing knowledge that demonstrates and supports the idea that knowledge has both individual and subjective components. This classification supports the practical application of nursing knowledge within the paradigm of realist postpositivist science. (shrink)

First published in 1970, this book provides an introduction to literary realism. After considering what realism is and its philosophical roots, it goes on to examine the emergence of the idea of realism in nineteenth-century France and its gradual spread across the wider republic of letters. This work will be of interest to those studying nineteenth-century European literature.

No detailed description available for "Form and realism in six novels of Anthony Trollope".

Structural exegesis is a major recent development in biblical studies and is related to simultaneous currents in other fields of academic study. Here, at last, is an introduction to structuralism and structuralist methods that does not presuppose advance knowledge of linguistics or anthropology. Traditional exegetical methods follow a historical paradigm; structuralism follows a linguistic paradigm. Thus, these two approaches involve significantly different attitudes toward the biblical text. Through clear analytic explanations illustrated by application to specific texts, Daniel Patte shows how (...) structuralism and traditional scholarship must go hand in hand so that together they can carry the exegetical task to its end--opening the possibility for fresh insights based on clear understandings. (shrink)

The germs of the ideas in this book became implanted in me during my experience as a resident in clinical pathology at Boston University Medical Center. At the time, I had inklings that the test results churned out by our laboratories were more than scientific facts. As a philosophically unsophisticated young physician, however, I had no language or framework to analyze what I saw as a deep philosophical problem, a problem largely unrecognized by most physicians. The test results provided by (...) our laboratories were accurate and of great practical importance for patient care. However, most of the physicians who relied on our test results to diagnose and treat their patients either did not have the time or interest to consider the philosophical issues inherent in diagnosis, or, like me, had inadequate means to further analyze them. It was more than ten years later that I began doctoral studies in philosophy, and I was fortunate to find a faculty that was supportive of my efforts to address the problem. This book began as my doctoral dissertation in the Department of Philosophy at Georgetown University. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my mentor, Robert Veatch, Ph. D. Our conversations during my Georgetown years led me in new and often fascinating directions. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Kenneth Schaffner, M. D., Ph. D. (shrink)