"The importance of questions is beyond doubt. But the degree of attention paid to them in logic and linguistics is still less than they deserve." What is a question? How to represent questions in formal languages? How to model reasoning in which questions are involved? Can we prove anything by means of pure questioning? How to model goal-directed problem solving? These are the main issues of Andrzej Wi niewski's "Questions, Inferences, and Scenarios." This book offers a state-of-the-art exposition of (...) Inferential Erotetic Logic, that is, an approach to the logic of questions focused on inferences which lead to questions as conclusions. Wi niewski characterizes semantic relations which determine validity of these inferences within the framework of Minimal Erotetic Semantics, applicable to a wide range of formal languages. He elaborates in detail the concept of erotetic search scenario, a tool for modelling problem solving. Moreover, the author presents some applications of Inferential Erotetic Logic in proof theory. Andrzej Wi niewski is one of the most prominent contemporary researchers in the logic of questions. Currently, he is a full professor at the Department of Logic and Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Adam Mickiewicz University in Pozna, Poland. (shrink)

We continue investigations of reasonable ultrafilters on uncountable cardinals defined in previous work by Shelah. We introduce stronger properties of ultrafilters and we show that those properties may be handled in λ-support iterations of reasonably bounding forcing notions. We use this to show that consistently there are reasonable ultrafilters on an inaccessible cardinal λ with generating systems of size less than $2^\lambda$ . We also show how ultrafilters generated by small systems can be killed by forcing notions which have enough (...) reasonable completeness to be iterated with λ-supports. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the appearance of many English-language hand books of logic and numerous monographs on topical discoveries in the foundations of mathematics. These publications on the foundations of mathematics as a whole are rather difficult for the beginners or refer the reader to other handbooks and various piecemeal contribu tions and also sometimes to largely conceived "mathematical fol klore" of unpublished results. As distinct from these, the present book is as easy as possible systematic exposition of the now (...) classical results in the foundations of mathematics. Hence the book may be useful especially for those readers who want to have all the proofs carried out in full and all the concepts explained in detail. In this sense the book is self-contained. The reader's ability to guess is not assumed, and the author's ambition was to reduce the use of such words as evident and obvious in proofs to a minimum. This is why the book, it is believed, may be helpful in teaching or learning the foundation of mathematics in those situations in which the student cannot refer to a parallel lecture on the subject. This is also the reason that I do not insert in the book the last results and the most modem and fashionable approaches to the subject, which does not enrich the essential knowledge in founda tions but can discourage the beginner by their abstract form. A. G. (shrink)

This article continues Rosłanowski and Shelah (Int J Math Math Sci 28:63–82, 2001; Quaderni di Matematica 17:195–239, 2006; Israel J Math 159:109–174, 2007; 2011; Notre Dame J Formal Logic 52:113–147, 2011) and we introduce here a new property of (<λ)-strategically complete forcing notions which implies that their λ-support iterations do not collapse λ + (for a strongly inaccessible cardinal λ).

The aim of this article is to point out the basic areas of judgment made by employees considering the ethical or unethical behaviour of employers in the workplace. The authors analyse this subject from three perspectives: The first one is labour legislation in Poland; the second is the perspective of employers, especially codes of ethical standards created by contemporary organizations, and the third perspective is the point of view of employees. The conclusions in this area have been made on the (...) basis of research in two Polish insurance companies. The authors attempted to create a ranking of ethical elements significant for employees. Such knowledge could be very useful for creating proper personnel policy in any organisation. (shrink)

We continue developing the general theory of forcing notions built with the use of norms on possibilities, this time concentrating on ccc forcing notions and classifying them.

W artykule proponuje się aksjomatyzację fragmentu klasycznej logiki zdań, który zostaje nazwany logiką niesymplifikacyjną. Nazwa pochodzi stąd, że unika się w nim, jak przypuszcza pewna ilość badaczy – wskazanych w tekście – paradoksalnych własności klasycznej implikacji i równoważności. Twierdzenie o niewyprowadzalności tez paradoksalnych nie jest jeszcze definitywnie udowodnione. Ale cały bieg myśli wydaje się interesujący z filozoficznego punktu widzenia ze względu na możliwość odróżnienia kilku rodzajów implikacji i równoważności.

We introduce a game model for an Algol-like programming language with primitives for parallel composition and synchronization on semaphores. The semantics is based on a simplified version of Hyland–Ong-style games and it emphasizes the intuitive connection between the concurrent nature of games and that of computation. The model is fully abstract for may-equivalence.

DARWIN’s (1859, 1871) discoveries have profound ethical implications that continue to be misrepresented and/or ignored. In contrast to socialdarwinistic misuses of his theory, Darwin was a great humanitarian who paved the way for an integrated scientific and ethical world view. As an ethical doctrine, socialdarwinism is long dead ever since its defeat by E. G. Moore although the socialdarwinistic thought is a hard-die in the biological community. The accusations of sociobiology for being socialdarwinistic are unfounded and stem from the moralistic (...) fallacy that is, a false assumption that morality is good by definition. Both social and developmental psychology demonstrate that the moral agency is a motivational device for executing reciprocity that remains at the core of any morality across all studied societies and throughout the ontogeny of moral judgment. The level of true universalizing ethical reflection (KOHLBERG’s postconvential stages or GIBBS’s existential phase) is achieved by a small minority of humans, thus showing that Homo sapiens is a moral but not an ethical animal. While the origin of reciprocity has been perfectly explained by sociobiology, the evolutionary assembly of affective and cognitive elements that make up the moral agency is being successfully studied by the social/personality/developmental psychology as extended to non-human primates. As DARWIN (1871) expected, the key innovation for the evolution of moral agency was the emergence of empathy that evolved independently at least three times: in elephants, dolphins and primates. Empathy has a motivational power of its own; it is also necessary for moral agency that requires two cognitive abilities: reflective self-consciousness and understanding of causality; the two make possible the attribution of responsibility. All these requirements are met by the chimpanzees whose moral agency operates in dyads. In contrast, the human moral agency allows for a third party intervention that opens up vast opportunities for ideologies, especially religions, to use and misuse the moral agency to enforce a reciprocation that may be harmful to both individuals and the entire group. Also, the moral agency is known to enforce enhanced intragroup cohesion and loyalty in response to conflict and war, which suggests that the two prima facie opposed human universals, morality and warfare, may have coevolved. The most important ethical consequence that follows from the increasing understanding of the primate moral agency is that every received morality is ethically flawed, none can be taken as a paragon of goodness, and each needs corrections by science-informed ethics. In fact, Darwin pioneered the integration of science and ethics, an approach that has come to be appreciated only recently under the heading of consilience. (shrink)

True Darwinian Ethics -/- Darwin’s model for the evolution of morality as presented in Descent of Man (1871) is shown to comprise three major stages that are here referred to as empathic premorality, tribal morality, and universalizing morality. Empathy, the key component of Darwin’s “social instincts” that started moral evolution, is here recognized as the principal cognitive device that conveys epistemic credibility to moral agency. The two constitutive elements of the tribal morality are conscience that Darwin conceived of as a (...) conflict between a lasting social motive and an immediate selfish impulse, and true altruism that evolved as a result of group (community) selection. Darwin’s genius recognized the uniqueness of group selection in human evolution as being dependent on mental faculties and speech that facilitated habit formation through praise and blame form other group members, with empathy as a gauge of others’ emotional reactions. Contrary to repeated claims, Darwin did not derive morality from reciprocity that he (and his contemporaries) considered to be “a low motive”, and adduced it only as a mechanism of habit formation. The universalizing morality was brought about by the increasing powers of intellect that led to respecting individual lives (rather than group interests only) and extending humane concerns beyond one’s group, ultimately to all sentient beings, which places Darwin among the spiritual fathers of modern humanitarianism. In terms of substantive ethics, Darwin’s views support moral individualism that requires to treat each subject according to his/her individual characteristics rather than any group membership. Darwin’s moral individualism and universalism have been elaborated by Peter Singer as the principle of equal consideration of interests and the expanding circle of ethics, respectively. Darwin’s model of moral evolution, which starts with intuitive but epistemically reliable moral agency and then allows for its rational improvement, provides a way out of the moral subjectivism of evolutionary ethics that reduces morality to an adaptation to social life. The primary or core morality that relies on empathy and implements reciprocity supports welfare (wellbeing) of a group and its members. Welfare (which has been defined by Darwin) is a basic “terminal” (ultimate) value that constitutes an objective, measurable fact. Since the primary morality supports welfare, it is objectively good, which justifies an ethical reasoning that such morality ought to be extended (with appropriate adjustments) to all sentient beings. Confusion over the status of morality is largely due to the lack of appreciation of its complexity: not only had its motivational apparatus (known as the moral agency) evolved by superposition of many emotional and pure cognitive mechanisms, but it has subsequently been co-opted to implement prudential, religious and possibly other norms that are accidental and sometimes contrary to its original social function. Those secondary morality norms are now enforced by the moral agency but lack moral objectivity and thus may support the perception of moral subjectivism and relativism. In short, true Darwinian ethics is based on the scientific axiology that recognizes evolutionary origins of all values, requires respecting all values that are experienced by each and every subject according to its individual characteristics, and calls for a critical assessment of each and every received morality. (shrink)

Values are relational properties that can be defined only in relation to a goal-directed system. Biological values originated with living systems and subjective values originated with the origin of vertebrate (and possibly others’) mind through a conversion (subjectivization) of biological values. While this conversion is understandable in adaptive (functional) terms, the evolutionary mechanism whereby positive and negative meanings in the mind were assigned to molecular and/or neuronal configurations in the brain, so far defies our comprehension. Whatever their origin, the primary (...) subjective values are experienced by most if not all vertebrates, and the hominid conceptual values are all ultimately derived from experiential values. (shrink)

Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that the World’s order (as ultimately based on divine laws) is good and thus every gain of knowledge will have good consequences. Scientific process was assumed to entail moral progress. In fact some moral progress did occur in the Western civilization and science contributed to it, but it is widely incommensurate with the progress of science. The Enlightenment’s concept of a concerted scientific and moral progress proved largely wrong for several reasons. (1) Public morality and science (...) evolve largely independently and may either enhance or inhibit each other. (2) There are no objective values to be read in the World’s order and simply followed. Instead, our real, subjective values and the moral systems they fuel have all been generated and shaped by evolution rather than designed to be universally good, and thus ought to be managed rather than simply followed. (3) Our evolved morality is flawed, deficient, prone to doctrinal manipulation and refractory to progress. (4) The majority of people show metaethical incompetence in failing to take a reasoned critical stand toward the principles and assumptions of received morals. This makes moral progress largely dependent on those who reach metaethical competence by transcending the conventional stages of moral development. (shrink)

Aside from the local (mostly Western) efforts to subject animal experimentation to public scrutiny, the extent of animal experimentation, the acceptance of alternative methods and the fate of animals in laboratories depend on experimenters’ morality (as defined by social psychology), whose shaping is of crucial importance for the future of animal use in science. Meanwhile, sociological and ethnographic research in laboratories demonstrates that in the matter of animal use the experimenters are unreflective, ethically incompetent, and incapable of taking a critical (...) view of the received morality. This appears to result largely from their higher education which is known to cause a regression in moral development, inculcate a routine exploitation and/or objectification of animals, and ignore both the scientific premises and moral consequences of animal subjectivity. From all we know, it is researchers’ morality rather than pressing needs and expectations of humanity that interferes with a major restriction of invasive animal research in general and a wide, proactive acceptance of alternative methods in particular. (shrink)

In the evolution of the vertebrates and probably a few other animals (Metazoa), biological values have been translated (subjectivized) into affective experience that necessarily involves the consciousness of external objects/events (as different from one’s body), which is tantamount to the origins of subjectivity. Mammals, birds and other vertebrates are experiencing subjects even though their negative and positive experience greatly vary in scope. Some mammals are capable of vicarious experience and may act as empathic agents, and some of them, at least (...) the great apes, use true reflective self-consciousness and thus perceive themselves as agents, which generates attributive feelings. The balance of positive and negative experience determines the intrinsic value of (an individual) life. Every subjective life is autotelic in striving to maximize this balance. A subjective life may also have a social value that is measured in terms of the impact on intrinsic values of other lives. The social value of life is contingent upon an agency, that is, conscious intentional actions that impact intrinsic value of other lives. The difference between the social value of a subjective life and an instrumental value of an individual comes down to the difference between agent causation and event causation. The moral agency refers to a subcategory of agent causation that involves the awareness of impact on another subject’s wellbeing (interests). The moral agency is at present known only in the hominids (including the chimpanzees) which understand causality and use reflective self-consciousness, which in turn enables them to perceive themselves as agents and attribute to themselves responsibility. The moral agency originated as a motivational mechanism of reciprocity execution , and thus as an adaptation for group life, which is why it favors ingroup members and often promotes norms that harm other groups. The human moral agency is frequently used by third parties to implement group norms that are based on ideologies (religious or secular) and may actually harm both group members and the entire groups. Any received, bioculturally evolved morality is unlikely to be good in either absolute or universal sense. Therefore, the moral capacity alone does not make a human life categorically more valuable, even if human motivation were dominated by moral agency (which is true only of some people). The life of a vertebrate has, therefore, two values, intrinsic and social. Each can be negative or positive, and may vary to a large extent independently of the other, whereby a joint value of a subjective life cannot be sensibly assessed and compared without prior assessments of the intrinsic and social component separately. In the absence of objective reasons to rate the intrinsic value of a human life as categorically higher than that of other mentally advanced mammals, and in consideration of the observed range of social values of human lives, some of which approach zero and some are highly negative (lower than any thinkable negative values of non-human lives), the doctrine of extraordinary and inalienable (innate) human „dignity” is groundless and unethical, as it leads to a depreciation of the lives of non-human subjects, and often preempts the need to impart a real social value to one’s own life. (shrink)

There are many religions in the human world, and people manifest their religiousness in many different ways. The main problem this paper addresses concerns the possibility of sorting out this complex world of human religiousness by showing that it can be phenomenologically reduced to a few very basic existential attitudes. These attitudes express the main types of ways in which a human being relates to his or herself and the world, independently of the worldview or religion professed by the individual. (...) I use Kierkegaard’s theories of the stages of existence and subjective truth as a model. The theory of the stages of existence provides five basic existential attitudes on the basis of which religious attitudes can develop: spiritlessness, the aesthetic, the ethical, religiousness A, and religiousness B. The theory of subjective truth shows how the concept of truth functions in an ethical and existential sense as the personal truth of an individual engaged in building their religious identity. In turn, I discuss the problem of the relation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy to phenomenology, briefly introduce his concept of subjective truth and the stages of existence, and show how existential attitudes can be transformed into religious ones. I also consider the problem of the demonic as the inverted order of this anthropological and existential model. Finally, I argue that the model developed herein may be useful for further research into the phenomenology of religious attitudes. (shrink)

Having positive experience is, by defintion, in the interest of every subject. Whether being alive per se, in addition to having positive experiences, is in a subject's interest depends of her/his cognitive development. Only a reflectively self-conscious subject can take and thus have an interest in one's own individual existence and may not want to die regardless of the expected experience. Since most non-human subjects (except for a few mammalian and avian species) are not aware of their subjective existence they (...) cannot take and thus have interest in their lives per se. However, they do have interest in maximizing rewarding experience and minimizing suffering. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 1 Seiten: 179-203.

The evolutionary function of love is to create a strong bond between the partners with reproduction in view. In order to achieve this goal, humans use various sexual/reproductive strategies, which have evolved due to specific reproductive benefits. The use of particular strategies depends on many factors but one of the most important is early childhood experiences, on which life history theory focuses. John Lee identified 6 basic love styles: eros, ludus, storge, pragma, agape, and mania. Our goal was to check (...) whether love styles may be treated as sexual/reproductive strategies in the context of LHT - slow or fast strategy. In our study we found that people who prefer the slow reproductive strategy are inclined to show passionate, pragmatic and friendly love, and those who prefer the fast strategy, treated love as a game. A low level of environmental stress in childhood results in preferring eros, storge and agape love styles, belonging to the slow strategy, and a high one results in preferring ludus, which belongs to the fast strategy. People representing eros, storge or pragma styles have restricted sociosexual orientation so they prefer long-term relationships, whereas those with the ludus style are people with unrestricted orientation, preferring short-term relationships. Besides, storge, agape and pragma seem to determine preferring qualities connected with parental effort in one’s partner, mania - with mating effort, and eros - with both kinds of effort. No correlation was found between the love style and the number of children. (shrink)