At the end of the twentieth century, the Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī Library acquired a fourteenth-century manuscript of munshaʾāt previously held in a private collection. This composite multitext manuscript contains about two hundred letters sent by or to officials of the Rūm Saljūq sultanate in the thirteenth century. The letters include official and private correspondence as well as decrees of nomination. They are all in Persian. This article is a first study of the codicological features, structure, and contents of this manuscript. (...) It suggests a production process that unfolded in several stages over a period of seventy years, from the reign of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw II to the second decade of the fourteenth century. The Marʿashī manuscript expands considerably the volume of documents available on Saljūq Anatolia during the beginning of Mongol period. It is poised to become a major source on the political history of the period and will also help to understand the integration of Anatolia into the Persianate sphere. (shrink)

The petitions received and the letters sent by the Papal Chancery between the 12th–14th century attest the recognition of invalidity by the Papacy. They acknowledge the existence of a physical or mental infirmity and allow the supplicant to adapt his or her missions of cleric or Christian according to his or her abilities. These documents lie at the boundary between the institutional word and practical sources. Supplicant’s solicitations bring about an intense and complex epistolary production, whose main actors are (...) the disabled individuals and the curial and ecclesiastical personnel. They reveal the specific legislation of the institution and lead to a definition of infirmity by the Papal Chancery, one that categorizes invalid bodies according to their physical or mental condition. Curia’s replies to solicitations, based on a case law system, constitute further evidence of the recognition of the disabled person’s condition. The supplications and letters thus constitute an excellent laboratory of analysis to study medieval disability in its relation to the Papacy as an institution. (shrink)

Mamlūk chanceries followed elaborated specifications in writing official documents. Chancery manuals define these specifications, but it is often difficult to correlate their data to preserved original documents. Even an extensive works as al-Qalqashandī’s Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā lacks a consistent typology of chancery products that corresponds to preserved examples. This paper analyses all edited Mamlūk official documents – decrees, letters, reports, treaties, etc. – and tries to arrange them in a typology based on hierarchical relation between the document’s issuer and (...) its recipient. For types, a model for their formularies and information on its paper’s measurements and layout are given. Despite the apparent uniformity of Mamlūk documents, we can show continuous developments in chancery practice, until the scribes established at the end of the 14th century fixed formularies that stayed in use until the Ottoman conquest. (shrink)

McCarthy thinks truth more important than I do. Specifically, he thinks that “ ‘truth’ … functions as an ‘idea of reason’ with respect to which we can criticize not only particular claims within our language but the very standards of truth we have inherited” . By contrast, I think that what enables us to make such criticism is concrete alternative suggestions—suggestions about how to redescribe what we are talking about. Some examples are Galileo’s suggestions about how to redescribe the Aristotelian (...) universe, Marx’s suggestions about how to redescribe the nineteenth century, Heidegger’s suggestions about how to redescribe the West as a whole, Dickens’s suggestions about how to redescribe chancery law, Rabelais’s suggestions about how to redescriibe monasteries, and Virginia Woolf’s suggestions about how to redescribe women writing.Such fresh descriptions, such new suggestions of things to say, sentences to consider, vocabularies to employ, are what do the work. All that the idea of truth does is to say, “Bethink yourself that you might be mistaken; remember that your beliefs may be justified by your other belies in the area, but that the whole kit and caboodle might be misguided, and in particular that you might be using the wrong words for your purpose.” But this admonition is empty and powerless without some concrete suggestion of an alternative set of beliefs, or of words. Moreover, if you have such a suggestion, you do not need the admonition. The only cash value of this regulative idea is to commend fallibilism, to remind us that lots of people have been as certain of, and as justified in believing, things that turned out to be false as we are certain of, and justified in holding, our present views. It is not, as McCarthy says, a “moment of unconditionality that opens us up to criticism from other points of view” . It is the particular attractions of those other points of view.Richard Rorty is University Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia. His most recent book is Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Since the dawn of capitalism, corporations have been regarded by the law as separate legal “persons.” Corporate “personhood” has nonetheless remained controversial, and our understanding of corporate personhood often influences our thinking about the social responsibilities of corporations. This essay, written in honor of Prof. Thomas Donaldson, explores the tension in recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Delaware Chancery Court about what corporations are, whose interests they serve, and who gets to make decisions about what they (...) do. These decisions suggest that the law does not unequivocally support Donaldson’s vision of corporations as “moral” persons. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.2 (2002) 185-206 [Access article in PDF] Machiavelli's Sketches of Francesco Valori and the Reconstruction of Florentine History Mark Jurdjevic... As for the lies of these citizens of Carpi, I can surpass them all, because it has been a long time since I became a doctor of that art... for some time now I have never said what I believed and never believed (...) what I said; and if indeed I do sometimes tell the truth, I hide it behind so many lies that it is hard to find.... Niccolò Machiavelli to Francesco Guicciardini, Carpi, 17 May 1521. 1Is Machiavelli a reliable source for Florentine history? This article addresses that question by focusing on a remarkable discrepancy in Machiavelli's writing: the Florentine secretary's contradictory interpretations of Francesco di Filippo Valori, a major figure in the post-Medicean republican regime and one of the leaders of the Savonarolan movement. In the Discourses, Machiavelli described Valori as an ambitious politician whose quasi-princely power engendered dangerous factional violence. Several years later, in The Natures of Florentine Men, one of the few texts from Machiavelli's literary corpus that has yet to receive any sustained analysis, Machiavelli described Valori as a republican patriot who consistently sought the common good and upheld the republic's laws. Both assessments were written over a decade after Valori's murder (1498). [End Page 185]What caused Machiavelli to alter his initial interpretation? Were both accounts part of a larger single interpretation of the Florentine statesman? If not, which portrait more faithfully conveyed the nature of Francesco Valori's career and its effect upon Florentine political life and what did Machiavelli hope to achieve by the other portrait? Finally, why did Machiavelli praise a man so directly associated with Savonarola and the political party that had excluded Machiavelli from office before 1498? Machiavelli's reputation as an opponent of Savonarola was the cause of his rejection for an office in the Second Chancery in February 1497, during Valori's term as Gonfaloniere di giustizia. It was also a likely cause of his more spectacular success in April 1498, immediately following the downfall of Savonarola and Valori. 2This article examines the political circumstances surrounding the composition of The Natures of Florentine Men, Machiavelli's ties to the Valori family, and contemporary accounts of Valori's personality and career. It argues that The Natures are the preliminary sketches of the unwritten ninth book of the Florentine Histories and that Machiavelli, writing in a Florence of renewed Medici power, rewrote Valori's role in recent history to obscure his own ties to the principal statesmen of the Soderini regime. In particular, arguing from a different set of sources, it confirms Felix Gilbert's cautious and often-forgotten reminder about the impact of politics and political survival on the pioneering historical literature of early sixteenth-century Florence: that Machiavelli and Guicciardini "frequently had political purposes when discussing historical events and thus consciously constructed a historical myth." 3The Valori family played a prominent role in the political and cultural life of Quattrocento Florence. The family had been allied with the Medici since Cosimo de' Medici's political ascent in 1434 and Bartolomeo Valori, as a generous patron of neo-Platonic philosophy, became a close friend of Lorenzo de' Medici and Marsilio Ficino. Francesco, however, dramatically realigned the family's political identity and loyalties along strong anti-Medicean lines. He began his political career as a successful participant in the Medici party, receiving numerous offices and distinctions, including election as Gonfaloniere di giustizia three times (1484, 1489, 1493). When the political tide turned against Piero de' Medici in 1494, however, Valori was among the first ottimati to capitalize on Medici weakness. He participated in the popular revolt against Piero de' Medici and became one of the constitutional founders of the new Republic. His power and ambition became famous, even notorious, after he emerged as one of the most important and powerful political allies (1495-98) of the prophetic friar... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government a.d. 284–324T. D. BarnesSimon Corcoran. The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government a.d. 284–324. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. xv 1 406 pp. Cloth, $85. (Oxford Classical Monographs)The four decades between the accession of Diocletian on 20 November 284 and the abdication of Licinius on 19 September 324 witnessed profound changes in the government and administrative structure of (...) the Roman world. These changes are naturally reflected in the legislation of the period, which survives in relative abundance—indeed, a larger proportion of the emperors’ legal decisions and enactments probably survives from these four decades than from any previous period of forty years in the history of the Roman Empire. The high rate of survival is due in part to the activity of the commissioners who compiled the Theodosian Code in the 430s and the Codex Justinianus in the sixth century: the former set out to collect general laws and edicts of the Christian Roman Empire since the conversion of Constantine, while the latter included in their compilation a large part of two Diocletianic collections of imperial rescripts, the Codex Gregorianus and the Codex Hermogenianus. But the legislation of Diocletian and his imperial colleagues and successors is also known from a wide variety of other sources—papyri, inscriptions, nonofficial collections of laws, Lactantius’ account of the decade of Christian persecution from 303 to 313 in his On the Deaths of the Persecutors, and Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History. Moreover, Eusebius’ Life of Constantine quotes important documents from the last months of 324.Simon Corcoran includes all this varied and historically significant material in his purview, and he provides a reliable guide to it. His monograph is a revised version of an Oxford doctoral thesis which he began in 1987 under the supervision of Fergus Millar and completed in 1992 under that of John Matthews, and he has also taken advice from Tony Honoré. His work is technically proficient. I have not noticed any careless errors of any consequence, and Corcoran has used my work on the period of Diocletian and Constantine in the spirit in [End Page 145] which I intended it to be used: he has understood the underlying principles upon which it rests, then applied them critically, sometimes to reach conclusions which not only differ from my own but are superior to them.Corcoran begins with two introductory chapters which succinctly survey the subject and the evidence available. On interpolation in legal texts, he is cautious and sensible. He proceeds on the assumption that though “the transmitted texts are seldom identical with what the imperial chancery originally issued,” they have seldom undergone drastic alteration: “abbreviation is the most common fate of constitutions in the legal sources” (19). Yet he provides a salutary reminder and example of what can happen (16–18): whereas a rescript in the Fragmenta Vaticana denies that the temporary gift of estates subject to tax is valid (Frag. Vat. 283, si stipendariorum proprietatem dono de-disti,... donatio inrita est), the same rescript in the Codex Justinianus directly contradicts and asserts that such a gift is valid (CJ 8.54.2, si praediorum proprietatem dono dedisti,... donatio valet). On a priori grounds alone, it seems highly probable that something similar has happened to some texts which are known only through the Codex Justinianus—and where the alteration may not be at all obvious.What of the date and contents of the two Diocletianic codes? Corcoran confronts the problems of dating and attribution squarely and honestly. Most of his conclusions may not be new, but his discussion has been able to proceed from the fact that an Aurelius Hermogenianus, who can hardly be anyone other than the jurist, is now securely attested as praetorian prefect between 293 and 305 with Julius Asclepiodotus as his colleague (AE 1987, 456). Corcoran argues that Gregorius published the Codex Gregorianus in 291/2 or ca. 292, after serving as magister libellorum with Diocletian from 285 to 290: he accounts for the ascription of some later constitutions to this code by postulating a second edition compiled ca. 306, possibly at the court of Maximinus or... (shrink)

On May 4, 1380, Cecily Chaumpaigne brought a deed of release into the Chancery of Richard II and had it enrolled on the close rolls . In this deed Chaumpaigne released the poet Geoffrey Chaucer from “all manner of actions such as they relate to my rape or any other thing or cause” . The deed had been witnessed three days earlier by several prominent members of the court of Richard II.

This article traces the career path and personality of a chancery official or secretary in the service of the Gonzaga, the ruling dynasty of Mantua, in the middle years of the fifteenth century. It relates Giovanni Arrivabene to the contemporary social, political and cultural context of this secondary northern Italian power or signoria but touches the wider Italian world at many points, particularly the papal court, whether in Rome or other locations, where Giovanni’s talented younger brother served first as (...) the secretary of Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga and later as an apostolic secretary. The comparison between the two brothers and their interdependence as property owners is a recurring theme. Giovanni emerges with evident limitations which hampered the succession to his father’s superior role in the chancery, where other privileged families also tended to prevail. Humanist educated and efficient, he seems to have been a bureaucrat of routine abilities, not quite astute enough to outpace certain departmental rivals or to avoid being tainted by association with some possibly corrupt practice which caused loss of favour. His later rehabilitation, first as a provincial magistrate concerned with criminal jurisdiction and later as an estate management official, illustrates that private relationships within the narrow world of a civic quasi despotic government were all important. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of EquityDennis R. KlinckI. Introduction"There is nothing more in our Mouths than Conscience," wrote John Sharp in the 1680s, echoing a sentiment that had been expressed before in the seventeenth century.1 Indeed, one modern writer has observed, uncontroversially, that that century "can justly be called the Age of Conscience."2 Among the foci of this preoccupation one can identify such topics as moral and religious (...) casuistry and "liberty of conscience." My focus in this paper is somewhat different: conscience as a criterion of judgment in the Court of Chancery—the court of equity—and particularly its meaning for Heneage Finch, Lord Nottingham, successively Lord Keeper and Lord Chancellor from 1673 to 1682, a seminal figure in the history of English equity.The intimate connection of conscience with the equitable jurisdiction [End Page 123] is a commonplace,3 and certain aspects of it have been quite thoroughly studied.4 A central problem that has been identified with resort to conscience as a criterion of legal judgment is its subjective and hence ostensibly arbitrary nature. This concern goes back a long way. Thomas Audley, in 1526, argued that conscience was an uncertain ground of law because "it depended upon the 'arbitrament' of one man, the chancellor alone."5 The author of The Replication of a Serjeant at the Laws of England similarly raised the complaint of "divers men, divers conscience."6 No doubt the most remembered comment of this sort is John Selden's that the spaciousness of chancellors' consciences might vary as much as the length of their respective feet, so that equitable adjudication on the basis of conscience was "a roguish thing."7 Nottingham himself balked at the idea that justice might be dispensed according to the kind of conscience that amounted only to "the pleasure of a Court which took upon itself to be purely arbitrary."8Indeed, as the father of systematic equity,9 Nottingham apparently devoted himself to the project, undertaken in some measure by certain of his predecessors,10 of making the jurisdiction regular. He repeatedly makes this [End Page 124] point. In the case just cited, he observes that "equity itself would cease to be Justice if the rules and measures of it were not certain and known" and that "conscience" has to be "dispensed by the rules of science" (639). "Rules," "measures," and "science" are by-words of his preoccupation. Elsewhere, he asserts that "if equity be tied to no rule... everything becomes arbitrary."11At the same time, he did not abandon conscience as a kind of touchstone of equity. He refers to it repeatedly, and often speaks of Chancery as a "court of conscience,"12 as if this was a perfectly natural way of describing it. So the question becomes: how did he reconcile the tendency towards arbitrariness thought to be implicit in "conscience" with the ruled, measured, scientific system that he sought to develop? Or putting the question slightly differently: how did he understand or limit the notion of "conscience" so as to make it compatible with the "regular equity" to which he aspired?What appears to have been a crucial distinction for Nottingham in this regard was that between private conscience and public, or perhaps civic, conscience. In the Prolegomena, he says that "there is a twofold conscience, viz. conscientia politica et civilis, et conscientia naturalis et interna" and that "[m]any things are against inward and natural conscience, which cannot be reformed by the regular and political administration of equity" (194). He makes the point again in "the great case" of Cook v. Fountain: "With such a conscience which is only naturalis et interna this Court hath nothing to do; the conscience by which I am to proceed is merely civilis et politica, and tied to certain measures...."13 As Yale points out, this distinction was not new with Nottingham. The distinction between the forum internum and the forum externum was venerable;14 an anonymous Elizabethan case distinguishes between matters of conscience in which equity will intervene and those that must be left to the party's own moral judgment;15 Francis Bacon recognized, at least as alternatives, a party... (shrink)

The Parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Oświęcim can boast a long and rich history. Although the exact date of its establishment is unknown, it can be assumed that its beginnings and the first parish church date back to the turn of the 12th century. The first written mention of the church dates back to 1304. The next source to mention the Oświęcim church was a papal tithe register from 1326. The town had already played an (...) important role as an administrative center: the capital of the Duchy of Oświęcim and the deanery of the Krakow Diocese. The parish included almost thirty villages, apart from the town and the castle. Among the many important events in the history of one of the oldest pastoral centers in the area, a dispute over the right of patronage and gifts to the provost office in Oświęcim occupies an important place. The conflict flared up in 1533 after the death of the provost Jan Rajski. In the literature to date, this problem has not received a separate study. It is worth looking into, especially since there are unique sources containing data on its genesis, course and further consequences. The purpose of this paper is to present this dispute, as well as to signal the legal repercussions of the law of patronage until the first half of the 20th century. Source materials provide the basis for the analyses contained. The resources used were mainly the archives of the Metropolitan Curia in Krakow, including the records of the administrators of the diocese of Krakow, the consistory in Krakow, the court chancery, the visitation protocols from 1598, and the parish records of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Oświęcim. Manuscript No. 5935, held at the Jagiellonian Library in Krakow, also provided first-rate information. Manuscript documents were supplemented with data from printed sources and the literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.1 (2001) 59-79 [Access article in PDF] Money and Sovereignty in Early Modern France Jotham Parsons [The mint official] must above all seek integrity in the moneys, on which our features are imprinted and on which the general good depends. For what would be safe if our image were offended, and if that which a subject ought to venerate in his heart were (...) immediately violated by a sacrilegious hand? 1Early modern French commentators on money and monetary policy were fond of quoting this very late antique chancery formula; 2 it even appears in the epigraph to one unpublished commonplace book on the subject from the early seventeenth century. 3 Its popularity was no doubt due partly to the fact that classical literature contained few other theoretical statements on the practicalities of issuing money. 4 It also showed how deeply classical humanism had shaped economic thought, as it had done to all of French political culture. This was apparent as early as 1514 in Guillaume Budé's scholarly classic, De Asse et partibus ejus. 5 By 1600 these influences had ensconced themselves so firmly that economic writers found it nearly impossible to talk about money without a [End Page 59] full panoply of classical erudition. 6 In France the second half of the sixteenth century saw the rise of a specialized, expert, and increasingly systematic tradition of monetary thought. Despite its classical vocabulary, this economic literature was in many ways "modern" in its methods, ambitions, and subject. While developing an account which aspired to a scientific explanation of commercial society and of how government and money interacted, the French commentators came to a partial realization of how radically their own society differed from those which had gone before. In this respect the prevailing climate of thought about money influenced even a writer as non-technical as Michel de Montaigne.Traditionally, scholarly treatment of early modern French economic texts has focused on a relatively small range of issues and authors. One such issue, the origins of the "quantity theory of money" (with Jean Bodin as its hero), is notable for its sterility, since that concept was not and could not have been meaningful to contemporaries. 7 The origin and development of "mercantilism" or, more broadly, of "political economy" in general, has proven a more fruitful subject of inquiry. 8 Undeniably, the changing relationships among governments, merchants, and the economy were a major public issue and, in the seventeenth century, a major site of theoretical reflection on the nature of political power generally. Even so, an excessive concentration on mercantilism is dangerous, for however one defines it, it was not the first, and for a long time not the most significant, economic discourse in France. Rather, from the 1560s well into the seventeenth century, French discussions of economic issues centered on very concrete problems brought about by the government's obligation to issue and maintain a stable currency. 9 While one would search this literature in vain for the specific doctrines of modern economics, I argue that it did represent a real achievement in the early modern understanding of commerce and the state. Though they have not received their due from scholars, the writers who took part in these debates formed a large and influential school with close ties to the actual institutions of government. 10 The French monetary theorists did an enormous amount [End Page 60] to set the stage for the mercantilist era. They developed a detailed notion of monetary economics as a specialized discipline, and above all they placed money and economic policy in the context of a multi-national system of commercial states. In so doing, they sought to comprehend and control not just money but the modern state itself.Early modern money was perched uncomfortably between commodity and fiat. Bewildering varieties of coins circulated, composed of all sorts of alloys. The government assigned a face value for each coin which it authorized to circulate in the abstract accounting unit called the "money of account." 11 This value was almost always greater than... (shrink)

The Gelasian letter, Famuli uestrae pietatis, addressed to Emperor Anastasius I (491-518), is famous for the so-called theory of two powers that has enjoyedconsiderable fortune and has received continual attention in the history and thought of the Latin West in view of its arguments about the relationshipbetween the Church and secular power. Scholars have been primarily interested in the Wirkungsgeschichte of the letter. Less frequently studied is the letter's specific religious context, characterized by the Acacian schism (484- 519), the dispute (...) between the episcopal sees of Rome and Constantinople. This article seeks to situate this document from the late fifth-century Roman pontifical chancery in its specific historical and ecclesial context, and to provide a commentary on the entire letter. A brief, final chapter offers a synthetic excursus on the immediate reception of the text in the Early Middle Ages before the Gregorian Reform. (shrink)

Delaware’s famous corporate law and its highly respected specialized Court of Chancery attract entrepreneurs from all over the world, who choose the small state as their locus of incorporation and litigation forum, and global investors who choose Delaware law as the law governing their corporate investments and mergers and acquisitions. Other jurisdictions vie with Delaware in regard to these choices. This interjurisdictional competition makes Delaware a significant global norm exporter in the field of corporate law because jurisdictions emulate some (...) of its corporate law. Israel leads the global pack. For two decades, it has been approximating its corporate law to Delaware’s and emulating its principal institutions, including by establishing a specialized Chancery-like court whose judges seek guidance in Delaware’s case law in deciding open corporate law questions. This Article employs qualitative methods—interviews with M&A practitioners from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel. We use the interviews to assess whether the project of approximating Delaware corporate law has succeeded in shifting incorporation decision preferences away from Delaware to Israel and watering down the natural reluctance of global investors to accepting an unfamiliar corporate law when engaging in cross-border corporate M&A transactions involving an Israeli party. Our findings indicate that the approximation project has countervailing effects, opinions about its success being polarized and nuanced; that approximation increases the familiarity of domestic practitioners with the foreign law being emulated, making the emulated law easier to implement; and that approximation creates more room for other aspects of interjurisdictional competition to influence private choices. (shrink)

The present article offers a description and an analysis of the Liber Graecus, a manuscript register from Venice State Archive containing copies and translations of the documents sent from the Ottoman sultans to Venice between 1479 and 1504. Almost all the documents are in Greek, which until Bayazid II’s reign was the language used by the Ottomans in diplomatic communications with Western powers. Thanks to Liber Graecus not only we have a detailed account of Venetian-Ottoman relationships at the turn of (...) the 16th century, but also we learn more about the activity of the Venetian chancery and the role played by Greek scribes working there. (shrink)

It is now some thirty years since the researches of John H. Fisher and Malcolm Richardson highlighted the importance of the records of the central government in the process of English-language “vernacularization” in early-fifteenth-century England. Their publication of the Anthology of Chancery English provided irrefutable evidence of a linguistic transition that overtook some key types of government records, which began to be drafted in English where previously they had been written in Anglo-Norman French and, to a lesser extent, Latin. (...) But while the existence of these early examples of “official” written English cannot be doubted, the forces that underlay this linguistic shift are less clear. From the very outset, doubts were expressed about the hypothesis advanced by Fisher and Richardson, that the spread of English in the records of the central government could be directly attributed to a “language policy” put into place by the Lancastrian regime and, in particular, to the personal initiative of Henry V, who made the momentous decision—from a linguistic point of view—to have his signet letters written in English rather than French in July 1417. But it is only more recently that a more detailed and robust criticism has been directed toward these ideas. In an article published in 2004, Michael Benskin rightly pointed out that the very term “Chancery English,” or “Chancery Standard,” as applied in the work of Fisher and Richardson is a misnomer, since only a minority of the documents contained within the Anthology were actually produced within the Chancery itself. He also questioned the extent to which the Chancery could be credited with an enlightened attitude toward written English, given that some of its most prestigious records—the close, patent, and statute rolls—continued to be written in Latin or French throughout the fifteenth century. (shrink)

This article examines and contextualizes a health wish formula found at the opening of eight Roman official letters inscribed in Greek, one of Caesar and seven of Octavian. In each letter the sender mentions that he is well ‘with the army’ (μετὰ τοῦ στρατεύματος), hence the term ‘military’ health wish. The health wish was borrowed from Latin letters into Roman letters written in Greek by means of phraseological imitation. The formulation employs appropriate Koine Greek. It was optional during the Republic (...) for the wish to be used in letters either from or to a Roman holding imperium and commanding an army. Because Caesar and Octavian were in such positions, their use of the wish is conventional. The use of this health wish demonstrates that epistolographers working for Caesar and Octavian not only drafted letters that met the conventions of Hellenistic chanceries but also were proficient enough in the medium to incorporate Roman elements with effectiveness. Attestations of the military health wish declined during the Imperial period. The requirement that the sender or the recipient hold imperium would have restricted usage during the Republic but even more so under the Empire through administrative changes to the command of armies and the increasing centrality of the princeps. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper offers a re-interpretation of the development of practical mathematics in Elizabethan England, placing artisanal know-how and the materials of the discipline at the heart of analysis, and bringing attention to Tudor economic policy by way of historical context. A major new source for the early instrument trade is presented: a manuscript volume of Chancery Court documents c.1565–c.1603, containing details of a patent granting a monopoly on making and selling mathematical instruments, circa 1575, to an unnamed individual, identified (...) here as the instrument maker Humphrey Cole. Drawing on economic and legal history, the paper argues that practical mathematics needs to be understood as one ‘project’ among many, at a time when monopoly patents were used to advance industry, lower unemployment, secure the realm and reward invention. Drawing on the history and sociology of technology, it argues that the management and control of materials – mathematical instruments themselves, and the local socio-legal context within which they could be made – needs to be understood as prior to and separate from the rhetoric of mathematical authors, which is of interest in its own right but which may not have a direct relationship to mathematical practice. (shrink)

This study examines the apparently well-established rule that the equitable doctrine of conversion operates on a contract to grant an interest only so long as it is specifically enforceable. It observes that in principle and in practice there is good reason to believe this not to be the case. It looks at the original culture of conversion, in terms of the historical relationship of property and contract from which it emerged, but suggests that the specific enforceability rule first arose out (...) of the narrowness of the original availability of common injunctions. But when, in the late nineteenth century, common injunctions began to lie more expansively and the rule could have been discarded, it was in fact preserved, and indeed insisted upon. It is suggested that this was because adherence to the old narrow view on common injunctions and to its concomitant, the specific enforceability rule in estate contracts, served the purposes of the Chancery lawyers who were contemporaneously adopting a restrictive attitude to the effects of the Judicature Acts 1873–5, by emphasizing the distinctiveness of equitable institutions. However, such views were not a doctrinally necessary consequence of that attitude, and, given the a priori unsuitability of the specific performance rule, there seems no reason why it should not nowadays be regarded as obsolete. But the lessons which equity had thus had to learn by experience can usefully be extrapolated into conclusions of more general applicability for legal development. (shrink)