The Parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Oświęcim can boast a long and rich history. Although the exact date of its establishment is unknown, it can be assumed that its beginnings and the first parish church date back to the turn of the 12th century. The first written mention of the church dates back to 1304. The next source to mention the Oświęcim church was a papal tithe register from 1326. The town had already played an (...) important role as an administrative center: the capital of the Duchy of Oświęcim and the deanery of the Krakow Diocese. The parish included almost thirty villages, apart from the town and the castle. Among the many important events in the history of one of the oldest pastoral centers in the area, a dispute over the right of patronage and gifts to the provost office in Oświęcim occupies an important place. The conflict flared up in 1533 after the death of the provost Jan Rajski. In the literature to date, this problem has not received a separate study. It is worth looking into, especially since there are unique sources containing data on its genesis, course and further consequences. The purpose of this paper is to present this dispute, as well as to signal the legal repercussions of the law of patronage until the first half of the 20th century. Source materials provide the basis for the analyses contained. The resources used were mainly the archives of the Metropolitan Curia in Krakow, including the records of the administrators of the diocese of Krakow, the consistory in Krakow, the court chancery, the visitation protocols from 1598, and the parish records of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Oświęcim. Manuscript No. 5935, held at the Jagiellonian Library in Krakow, also provided first-rate information. Manuscript documents were supplemented with data from printed sources and the literature. (shrink)

[This editorial is part of the 50th celebration issue that explored ‘what comes after postmodernism in educational theory. The special issue is being published as a monograph and this is our group...

The paper concerns the problem of the legal responsibility of autonomous machines. In our opinion it boils down to the question of whether such machines can be seen as real agents through the prism of folk-psychology. We argue that autonomous machines cannot be granted the status of legal agents. Although this is quite possible from purely technical point of view, since the law is a conventional tool of regulating social interactions and as such can accommodate various legislative constructs, including legal (...) responsibility of autonomous artificial agents, we believe that it would remain a mere ‘law in books’, never materializing as ‘law in action’. It is not impossible to imagine that the evolution of our conceptual apparatus will reach a stage, when autonomous robots become full-blooded moral and legal agents. However, today at least, we seem to be far from this point. (shrink)

For the given logical calculus we investigate the proportion of the number of true formulas of a certain length n to the number of all formulas of such length. We are especially interested in asymptotic behavior of this fraction when n tends to infinity. If the limit exists it is represented by a real number between 0 and 1 which we may call the density of truth for the investigated logic. In this paper we apply this approach to the intuitionistic (...) logic of one variable with implication and negation. The result is obtained by reducing the problem to the same one of Dummett's intermediate linear logic of one variable (see [2]). Actually, this paper shows the exact density of intuitionistic logic and demonstrates that it covers a substantial part (more than 93%) of classical prepositional calculus. Despite using strictly mathematical means to solve all discussed problems, this paper in fact, may have a philosophical impact on understanding how much the phenomenon of truth is sporadic or frequent in random mathematics sentences. (shrink)

Opracowanie dotyczy relacji konstytucyjnego pojęcia „dobro wspólne” z art. 1 Konstytucji RP, do pozaprawnych pojęć dobra wspólnego. Bezpośredni asumpt do jego przygotowania dało zdanie odrębne sędziego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego Zbigniewa Cieślaka do wyroku TK z dnia 20 kwietnia 2011 r. w sprawie Kp 7/09, dotyczącej zmian w prawie budowlanym. Jest to w ogóle najobszerniejsza wypowiedź w całym dotychczasowym orzecznictwie TK poświęcona wprost problematyce dobra wspólnego. Sędzia Z. Cieślak wyraźnie odróżnił prawne pojęcie dobra wspólnego – jego zdaniem właściwe dla interpretacji klauzuli dobra (...) wspólnego z art. 1 Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. – od pojęć pozaprawnych, uznając te ostatnie za źródło nieporozumień w prawniczych dyskusjach na temat rozumienia wyrażenia „dobro wspólne” w prawie i jako kategorii konstytucyjnej. Argumentować będę, że zrekonstruowane przez Z. Cieślaka prawne pojęcie dobra wspólnego nie nadaje się do interpretacji klauzuli dobra wspólnego z art. 1 konstytucji z 1997 r., i że pojęcia pozaprawne powinny być postrzegane nie jako źródło nieporozumień, ale jako nieodzowna pomoc w ustalaniu treści konstytucyjnego pojęcia dobra wspólnego. Problematyka ta prowadzi do podjęcia pewnego – kluczowego dla stosowania art. 1 – zagadnienia relacji między dobrem wspólnym a prawami człowieka (wolnościami i prawami człowieka), zagadnienia, które ostro zarysowało się w orzecznictwie trybunalskim po raz pierwszy właśnie w tym zdaniu odrębnym. Chodzi mianowicie o związki zachodzące między dwoma zasadniczymi tradycjami pojmowania dobra wspólnego i odpowiadającymi tym tradycjom dwoma typami pojęć dobra wspólnego – tradycji klasycznej, znajdującej swój wyraz w Konstytucji 3 maja z 1791 r., i tradycji, w której dobro wspólne pojmowane jest przede wszystkim jako dobro państwa i która znalazła wyraz w konstytucji kwietniowej z 1935 r. Dla pierwszej tradycji charakterystyczne jest uznanie praw człowieka za zasadniczy element dobra wspólnego – i tę tezę Z. Cieślak akceptuje. Analiza jego propozycji pokazuje jednak, że należy ona do tradycji konstytucji kwietniowej, a przyjęcie pojęcia dobra wspólnego należącego do tej tradycji prowadziłoby do niespójności z niektórymi fundamentalnymi rozstrzygnięciami ustrojodawcy, dotyczącymi tak interpretacji art. 1 konstytucji i przyjętej w nim koncepcji dobra wspólnego, jak i konstytucyjnej koncepcji wolności i praw człowieka. (shrink)

We give a procedure for counting the number of different proofs of a formula in various sorts of propositional logic. This number is either an integer (that may be 0 if the formula is not provable) or infinite.

In this paper I would like to argue that Stoic logic is a kind ofrelevant logic rather than the classical logic. To realize this purpose I willtry to keep as close as possible to Stoic calculus as expressed with the helpof their arguments.

Classic epistemology is under manifold changes; its categories loose their traditional meanings and gain new ones. Civilization and cultural changes, especially in mass communication and scientific knowledge, make impossible to insist on the concept of knowledge entirely as a true and justified belief. Traditional concepts of individual and subjectivistically conceived agent as well as concept of objects (areas and domains) of human knowledge are to much restrictive and at the same time controversial. Epistemological (pure philosophical) meaning of them is constantly (...) confronted and changed by the scientific discoveries and definitions, coming especially from natural and social sciences (biology, neural sciences, psychology and social sciences). It is long-lasting and manifold process of naturalization that regards not only cognitive phenomena but epistemic categories and epistemological theories as well. The papers presents the concise model of the naturalized theory of human knowledge one can eliminate from different positions and theories. Today types of naturalized epistemology try to go beyond the strict and limited concept of naturalism (Quine’s naturalized epistemology) and go toward anti-scientific, more liberal understanding of it. Naturalizing epistemology opens, as it is argued in the paper, the new perspectives and prospects on human cognition and knowledge that are far from the classic concepts. (shrink)

This paper analyses the concept of the relation of alternativity between possible worlds, the primary concept for relational semantics. We have focused only on epistemic and doxastic logics. The paper presents two approaches to these logics: J. Hintikka’s position and R. Stalnaker’s position.

The article presents some problems of logical representation of belief change. The problem of beliefs (approached in a synchronic way) was analyzed on the ground of epistemic or intuitionist logics. In the 1980\'s works concerning logical reconstruction of belief change appeared. The basic conception here is the conception of belief change formulated by C. Alchouron, P. Gardenfors and D. Makinson (abbreviated as AGM), based on the assumption that the belief state is represented by a non-contradictory set of propositions and that (...) a belief change should be minimal (the postulate of economy). However, the AGM theory, characterized by a good formal shape, gives rise to several problems of the intuitive nature. Some of them are: the way the object of beliefs is understood, logical value of propositions that induce a change, the prepositional way of representing beliefs, putting beliefs in an order and the way this order is formally represented. (shrink)