In The Conditions for Ethical Chemical Restraint, Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) propose ethical standards for the use of chemical restraints, which they consider normatively distinct from physica...

In this paper I argue that metalinguistic negotiations are not as common as David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell assume. They make two related controversial claims: the claim that speakers don’t know what they say and the claim that they directly communicate metalinguistic contents. These two claims generate two challenges that the metalinguistic-negotiation view should meet. Firstly, it should clarify why speakers are oblivious to what they are saying and communicating, and secondly, it should explain the mechanism that transforms what seems (...) like a typical object-language disagreement into a metalinguistic dispute. I argue that the way in which Plunkett and Sundell meet these challenges is unsatisfactory. Regarding their answer to the first challenge, I’ll argue that the theoretical cost of postulating massive semantic and pragmatic blindness in otherwise competent speakers is too high. Regarding what they say in relation to the second challenge, I’ll claim that metalinguistic contents can only be conveyed when speakers uttering apparently contradicting claims know that they are using terms with different meanings. If my arguments are correct, then metalinguistic negotiations are certainly not ubiquitous. (shrink)

One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. This special issue of Philosophy and Technology investigates whether and to what extent machines, of various designs and configurations, can or should be considered moral subjects, defined here as either a moral agent, a moral patient, or both. The articles that comprise the issue were competitively selected from papers initially prepared for and presented at a symposium on this subject matter convened during (...) the AISB/IACAP 2012 World Congress, held in at the University of Birmingham in Birmingham, UK. (shrink)

Globalization is a cultural phenomenon. The authors present the thematically multi-dimensional and theoretically complex contribution of Polish research on globalization. They do not approach globalization as an abstract process, instead exploring it through the lens of clearly defined factors.

In my paper I argue that a successful theory of vagueness should be able to account for faultless disagreement concerning borderline cases.Firstly, I claim that out of the traditional conceptions of vagueness the best equipped to account for faultless disagreement areparaconsistent solutions. One worry concerning dialetheism is that it seems to allow not only for faultless disagreements between different speakers, but also for such ‘disagreements’ between the given speaker and himself. Another worry, at least for some people, is that subvaluationism (...) and dialetheism account for faultless disagreements by allowing contradictions. Next, I go on to argue that contextual conceptions, which are free from this latter worry, are equally well able to account for such disagreements. To this aim I offer a new account of the usage of personal taste predicates and suggest that we model the usage of all vague predicates on them. The idea is that in clear cases “a is F” means “a is F simpliciter”, whereas in borderline cases it means “a is F-to-me”. Since the boundary between borderline and nonborderline cases depends on context, my solution weds content-contextualism with truth-contextualism. (shrink)

Background: The law and literature about children’s consent generally assume that patients aged under-18 cannot consent until around 12 years, and cannot refuse recommended surgery. Children deemed pre-competent do not have automatic rights to information or to protection from unwanted interventions. However, the observed practitioners tend to inform young children s, respect their consent or refusal, and help them to “want” to have the surgery. Refusal of heart transplantation by 6-year-olds is accepted. Research question: What are possible reasons to explain (...) the differences between theories and practices about the ages when children begin to be informed about elective heart surgery, and when their consent or refusal begins to be respected? Research design, participants and context: Research methods included reviews of related healthcare, law and ethics literature; observations and conversations with staff and families in two London hospitals; audio-recorded semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample of 45 healthcare professionals and related experts; interviews and a survey with parents and children aged 6- to 15-years having elective surgery (not reported in this paper); meetings with an interdisciplinary advisory group; thematic analysis of qualitative data and co-authorship of papers with participants. Ethical considerations: Approval was granted by four research ethics committees/authorities. All interviewees gave their informed written consent. Findings: Interviewees explained their views and experiences about children’s ages of competence to understand and consent or refuse, analysed by their differing emphases on informed, signified or voluntary consent. Discussion: Differing views about children’s competence to understand and consent are associated with emphases on consent as an intellectual, practical and/or emotional process. Conclusion: Greater respect for children’s practical signified, emotional voluntary and intellectual informed consent can increase respectful understanding of children’s consent. Nurses play a vital part in children's practitioner-patient relationships and physical care and therefore in all three elements of consent. (shrink)

część 1. Józef Władysław Bychowiec, Anna z Zamoyskich Sapieżyna, Jan Śniadecki, Franciszek Wigura -- część 4. Konkurs na Katedrę Filozofii w Uniwersytecie Wileńskim w 1820 roku -- część 5. Józefa Władysława Bychowca przekład "Sporu fakultetów" Immanuela Kanta.

Different forms of mindfulness meditation are increasingly integrated in the clinical practice in the last three decades. Previous studies have identified changes in the neurophysiology and neurochemistry of the brain resulting from different mindfulness meditation practices in the general population. However, research on neural correlates of different types of meditation, particularly on the clinical outcomes, is still very sparse. Therefore, the aim of this article is to review the neural impact of mindfulness meditation interventions on different mental disorders via the (...) classification of main components of mindfulness meditation. The clearer classification of mindfulness meditation may inform future clinical practice and research directions. (shrink)

In this paper I criticise some aspects of the view that Ernie Lepore and Mathew Stone propose in their book Imagination and Convention. I concentrate on their analysis of indirect speech acts and contrast it with the view held by Searle. I point out some problems that arise for Lepore and Stone’s ambiguity view and argue that admitting conventions of usage that are not meaning conventions allows one to avoid postulating global ambiguity, which in my opinion threatens the view proposed (...) in Imagination and Convention. In addition, if one admits that there might be such conventions of usage, one is in a position to provide an adequate analysis of sub-sentential speech acts and semantic underdetermination as well as indirect speech acts. (shrink)

In the paper Evans’s argument concerning indeterminate identity statements is presented and discussed. Evans’s paper in which he formulated his argument is one of the most frequently discussed papers concerning identity. There are serious doubts concerning what Evans wanted to prove by his argument. Theorists have proposed two competing and incompatible interpretations. According to some, Evans purposefully constructed an invalid argument in order to demonstrate that the vague objects view cannot diagnose the fallacy and is therefore untenable. According to others, (...) Evans wanted to formulate a (valid) argument to the effect that there cannot be vague identity statements whose vagueness is due solely to the existence of vague objects. As it has been argued, if it is the former interpretation which is correct, than the argument really is invalid, but it is doubtful whether it achieves its aim. It might be claimed that “the vague objects view” it refutes is not the view that most vague objects theorists hold. The main part of the paper is devoted to the second interpretation and the discussions concerning the validity of the argument on this interpretation. It appears that the vague objects theorist is in a position to object to the validity of every single step of the proof. (shrink)

Przekład na podstawie: „Which Naturalism?”, New Blackfriars 2022: 1–16, DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.1111/nbfr.12765. Przekład za zgodą Autora. Program „naturalizacji” bywa we współczesnej laickiej filozofii przedstawiany w opozycji do tradycyjnego teizmu. Biorąc jednak pod uwagę historię terminów „natura” i „naturalny”, widać brak ciągłości między tym, jak owe terminy są rozumiane obecnie, a jak rozumiano je w przeszłości. Nowożytny „naturalista”, który domaga się, by wszystkie zjawiska umieścić w dziedzinie tego, co naturalne, stawia tezę, którą wielu klasycznych, średniowiecznych i wczesnonowożytnych filozofów i teologów uznałoby (...) za dość samooczywistą. Zmiana, która tu zaszła, nie polega na decyzji, by do dziedziny naturalnej włączyć to, co poprzednio było z niej wykluczone, lecz na zupełnie innym rozumieniu tejże dziedziny. W artykule argumentuję, że filozoficznie ciekawe jest nie tyle pytanie, czy powinniśmy być naturalistami, ile pytanie, który z dwóch naturalizmów należy przyjąć: świecki naturalizm, z jego neutralistyczną koncepcją natury w ogóle i ludzkiej natury w szczególności, czy teistyczny naturalizm, wedle którego świat naturalny i nasza własna natura noszą znamię boskości. Okazuje się, że ujęcie sekularystyczne musi zmierzyć się z poważnymi wyzwaniami epistemicznymi i moralnymi. (shrink)

O ponto central deste artigo é explicar como as emoções desempenham um papel fundamental no comportamento moral dos mamíferos sociais. Entendida como um fenômeno natural, a moralidade é caracterizada como um sistema de exigências recíprocas, em que os lobos estão envolvidos desde o nascimento, e o vínculo emocional entre os membros da matilha desempenha um papel fundamental. O argumento é empiricamente informado para apresentar uma possível relação entre emoções e instintos sociais com relação à aptidão dos lobos para comportamentos sociais (...) moralmente qualificados, com base na existência de um sistema social complexo dentro da alcateia. O artigo relaciona pesquisas cognitivas sobre emoções e sistemas psicobiológicos a estudos contemporâneos em etologia de lobos para apoiar, empiricamente, a tese filosófica de que emoções surgem em resposta a uma série de eventos socialmente significativos. Assim, o objetivo é elucidar a natureza das demandas emocionais inerentes à moralidade, bem como sua relação com as características naturais que permitiram aos lobos desenvolver uma vida social complexa. Nesse sentido, o artigo pretende apresentar os elementos necessários para o surgimento de um fenômeno moral inerente aos mamíferos com vida social complexa, o que parece ser um forte argumento a favor de uma teoria que explique a moralidade em bases evolutivas. Palavras-chave: Moral. Emoções. Lobos. Emotivismo. Etologia. (shrink)

A care deficit is clearly evident in global cities such as London and is attributable to an ageing population, the increased employment of native-born women, prevalent gender ideologies that continue to exempt men from much reproductive work, as well as the failure of the state to provide viable alternatives. However, while it is now acknowledged that migrant women, and to a lesser extent, migrant men, step in to provide care in cities such as London, there is less research on how (...) this shapes the nature, politics and ethics of care. Drawing upon empirical research with low-paid migrant workers employed as domiciliary care providers in London, this paper explores the emergence of a distinct migrant ethic of care that is critically shaped by the caring work that migrant women and men perform. (shrink)

The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the (...) theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human- or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to. (shrink)

Each year thousands of individuals enrol in clinical trials as healthy volunteers to earn money. Some of them pursue research participation as a full-time or at least a part-time job. They call themselves professional or semiprofessional guinea pigs. The practice of paying healthy volunteers raises numerous ethical concerns. Different payment models have been discussed in literature. Dickert and Grady argue for a wage-payment model. This model gives research subjects a standardised hourly wage, and it is based on an assumption that (...) research participation is morally indistinguishable from other forms of unskilled labour. In this paper, I will challenge this assumption. I will argue that human guinea pigging has particular characteristics which taken together make it significantly different from other forms of labour. Participation in research is skill-independent. Healthy volunteers are valuable not because they are skilful persons, but because they are human bodies. The role of research volunteers is mainly passive. They are not asked to produce goods or deliver services. They are paid for enduring unpleasant, painful and risky interventions performed by investigators. Research volunteering involves inherent risks and uncertainties, and subjects have little or no control over their minimisation and materialisation. I conclude that participation in clinical research is a specific kind of activity. It is more like renting out one’s body to strangers, than working. Thus, research participation should not be treated on par with other forms of employment. (shrink)

Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We (...) conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect. (shrink)

How leaders and managers respond to not knowing is highly relevant given the complex, ambiguous, and chaotic business environment of the twenty-first century. Drawing on the literature from a variety of disciplines, the paper explores the dominant, unfavorable conceptualization of not knowing. The authors present some potential ethical implications of a negative view of not knowing and suggest how organizations would benefit from identifying any unhelpful aspects of the culture that may encourage unethical, undesirable, and/or hasty actions in situations of (...) not knowing. The paper specifically illustrates how patience, courage, honesty, integrity, and humility are integral to negative capability in the contexts of not knowing. Finally, the paper calls for deeper inquiry into the role of virtue ethics in preparing managers and leaders for not knowing and urges organizations to embrace negative capability in not knowing rather than engaging in damaging delusion. (shrink)

Reigning regulatory frameworks for biomedical research impose on researchers and research ethics committees an obligation to protect research participants from risks that are unnecessary, disproportionate to potential research benefits, and non-minimized. Where the research has no potential to produce results of direct benefit to the subjects and the subjects are unable to give consent, these requirements are strengthened by an additional condition, that risks should not exceed a certain minimal threshold. In this article, I address the question of whether there (...) should be limits of permissible risks in non-therapeutic research involving competent and healthy subjects. Some commentators argue that competent and informed individuals should have a right to participate even in extremely risky research and that research ethics committees should never reject studies because they are too dangerous. To use David Shaw's expression, competent volunteers should have ‘a right to participate in high-risk research’. I argue that this idea is ill-founded, as it does not take into account the social mission and complex collaborative nature of research practice as well as the inequity of power between researchers and subjects. Imposition of limits on permissible risks for healthy volunteers is justified by the need to protect research enterprise and the need to protect the weaker party, namely the subjects. Also, I suggest that the best way to set boundaries on research risks is to leave the judgment of risk acceptability to research ethics committees. (shrink)

Joanna Demers argues that Houellebecqs apocalypse can be understood as a system analogous to Hegels, and interrogates the ethics of such a system.

Etyka troski rozwija teorię uogólnionej troski poprzez wyjście od naturalnych praktyk opiekuńczych. Jednak ze względu na jej uwikłanie w naturalizm efektem często jest zarówno wąska definicja kobiecości, jak i wąskie rozumienie troski – może ona dotyczyć tylko ludzi. Przyjęcie opieki nad dzieckiem jako paradygmatu sprawia też, że etyka troski powiela reprodukcyjny futuryzm – fantazmatyczne ujęcie polityczności jako jednolitej wspólnoty ucieleśnianej przez postać Dziecka. By pokazać, że etyka troski nie musi być naturalistyczna, konfrontuję ją z postulatem Donny Haraway, by ograniczyć reprodukcję (...) w imię dbałości o inne niż ludzie istoty, oraz z pojawiającym się w powieściach Octavii Butler motywem opieki nad dzieckiem, które nie jest ludzkie – „potwornego macierzyństwa” – by zarysować nieantropocentryczną etykę troski. (shrink)

According to the paradigm view in linguistics and philosophical semantics, it is lexical semantics plus the principle of compositionality that allows us to compute the meaning of an arbitrary sentence. The job of LS is to assign meaning to individual expressions, whereas PC says how to combine these individual meanings into larger ones. In this paper I argue that the pair LS + PC fails to account for the discourse-relevant meaning of normative ‘ought’. If my hypothesis is tenable, then the (...) failure of LS + CS extends to normative language in general. The reason I offer that this is so is that semantics for normative language is, in an important respect, a substantive semantics. The ‘substantive’ in question means that the meaning of normative vocabulary in use is driven by metanormative views associated with a particular normative concept. SS rejects the model LS + CS and replaces it with a discourse-relevant semantics built around an interactional principle that ascribes to a particular surface syntactical form of ‘ought’ sentences a logical form that represents its discourse-salient normative content. In the paper I shall sketch how SS works and why it is worth serious consideration. (shrink)

This paper targets an orphan topic in research ethics, namely the so called principle of the primacy of the human being, which states that the interests of the human subject should always take precedence over the interests of science and society. Although the principle occupies the central position in the majority of international ethical and legal standards for biomedical research, it has been commented in the literature mainly in passing. With a few notable exceptions, there is little in-depth discussion about (...) the meaning and role of the principle. Several authors note that the principle is vogue, ambiguous and apparently conflicting with the accepted practice of conducting non-beneficial research on individuals unable to give consent. There are opinions that it is just “a vacuous figure of speech” and should be abandoned. This paper argues that the primacy principle is far from being “a vacuous figure of speech”, rather it should be seen as a threefold concept: a fundamental interpretative rule, a procedural rule, and a substantive rule aimed at protecting research subjects from instrumental treatment and unacceptable risks. This interpretation tracks back to the principle regulatory and normative origins in the Declaration of Helsinki of 1975, but also acknowledges changes in research ethics and practice, which took place at the turn on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Thus, the proposed reading of the principle is not only original, but also historically grounded and normatively fruitful. It provides a fresh and ethically rich perspective on extensively debated, but still controversial problem of an upper limit of permissible risks in non-beneficial studies. (shrink)

Everyone knows what is feels like to be in pain. Scraped knees, toothaches, migraines, giving birth, cancer, heart attacks, and heartaches: pain permeates our entire lives. We also witness other people - loved ones - suffering, and we 'feel with' them. It is easy to assume this is the end of the story: 'pain-is-pain-is-pain', and that is all there is to say. But it is not. In fact, the way in which people respond to what they describe as 'painful' has (...) changed considerably over time. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, people believed that pain served a specific (and positive) function - it was a message from God or Nature; it would perfect the spirit. 'Suffer in this life and you wouldn't suffer in the next one'. Submission to pain was required. Nothing could be more removed from twentieth and twenty-first century understandings, where pain is regarded as an unremitting evil to be 'fought'. Focusing on the English-speaking world, this book tells the story of pain since the eighteenth century, addressing fundamental questions about the experience and nature of suffering over the last three centuries. How have those in pain interpreted their suffering - and how have these interpretations changed over time? How have people learnt to conduct themselves when suffering? How do friends and family react? And what about medical professionals: should they immerse themselves in the suffering person or is the best response a kind of professional detachment? (shrink)

A blueprint for social change showing how we can reverse the destructive attitudes that threaten our world.

This paper broadens out existing challenges to the divisions between the human and the animal that keep humans distinct, and apart, from other animals. Much attention to date has focused on how the Euro-American individuation of the human subject intensifies the asymmetries inculcated by these divisions. This paper rehearses some of this literature but goes on to attend to how these divisions undercut understandings of sociality and limit social organization to interaction between persons. Drawing together debates around the human/animal relation, (...) the paper juxtaposes different perspectives of nature-cultures to bring ‘worlds’ of relations into view. Specifically, I distinguish here between the state of ‘being alongside’ and the process of ‘being-with’. Ranging from approaches that try to settle ideas of difference through appeals to ‘ethical health’, through to work on identity that ‘unconceals’ a wealth of connection, this distinction will help to keep apart those situated moments of relations, where the constituent parts are left more provisional and contingent, from more sought-out relationships, where a sense of togetherness purposefully dominates the conjoining of activities. Contrasting hybridity as a totalizing form of ‘being-with’, with alongsideness, as a form of intermittent and partial connection, the analysis eschews the obfuscation of difference entrenched in contemporary emphasis on connectivity. Proposing instead the importance of creatures as ‘division preserving', the paper theorizes ways to sustain regard for division as well as connection as key to understanding the arts of dwelling amidst different kinds. (shrink)

Studies show that rejection increases negative affect and aggression and decreases helping behavior toward the excluder. Less is known about emotions and behavior after rejection by a friend for someone else. In two experimental studies (N = 101 and N = 169), we tested the predictions that rejection would feel worse in a close relationship but would result in less aggression and more reconnecting behavior, especially when the reasons for rejection were unknown. The results of study 1 showed that, as (...) expected, among acquaintances, more aggression was noted only after comparative rejection, but among strangers, aggression was also observed after rejection with no stated reason. Negative feelings toward a new acquaintance were only marginally stronger than those toward a stranger in study 1, but study 2 confirmed that rejection by a best friend, and especially comparative rejection by a friend, felt worse than other conditions. Study 2 also showed that reconnecting behavior was more likely to dominate over aggressive behavior between people in close relationships than between strangers. The results are discussed mostly in light of the multimotive model of rejection. (shrink)

Saunkeah et al. analyze the aptness of extending the Belmont Principles of Respect for Persons, Beneficence and Justice to AI/AN tribal communities as a whole. They argue that to protect AI/...

Drawing on four years of ethnographic research with romance novel writers, we show how their affiliation with romance—a literary genre known for stories containing sexual content—prompted outsiders to sexually stigmatize them. Our work examines both the application and management of this stigma. We describe how outsiders applied the stigma in two ways: by conveying blatant disapproval through “sneering” and inviting writers to display a highly sexualized self through “leering.” Writers interpreted outsiders’ sneering as slut-shaming rhetoric and responded discursively to manage (...) the stigma; leering, however, sent a more complicated message that was harder for writers to manage. In revealing how these interactions threatened to strip writers of their sexual agency, our analysis suggests gender may be a primary mechanism by which stigma is applied and managed, which has theoretical implications for the stigmatization of women’s sexual selves. (shrink)

Czy można skrzywdzić osobę powołując ją do istnienia we wrodzonej chorobie lub niepełnosprawności? To pytanie od lat jest przedmiotem sporów w literaturze etycznej i prawniczej. Standardowa koncepcja krzywdy kontrfaktycznej nie sprawdza się bowiem na gruncie wyborów prokreacyjnych, przede wszystkim ze względu na tzw. problem nie-istnienia oraz problem nie-tożsamości. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest krytyczne przeanalizowanie alternatywnej koncepcji krzywdy wypracowanej przez Joela Feinberga – krzywdy opartej na racjonalnej preferencji. Wykazane zostanie, że koncepcja ta jest oporna na problem nie-istnienia. Rodzi jednak wiele problemów (...) interpretacyjnych i teoretycznych, w szczególności nie jest w stanie w sposób satysfakcjonujący rozwiązać problemu nie-tożsamości. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przeanalizowanie specyficznego rozumienia współczesnego ateizmu, który 1) powstał we francuskim środowisku filozoficznym w XX i XXI wieku; 2) łączy w sobie krytykę religii (mniej czy bardziej radykalną) z pozytywną propozycją zastąpienia tradycyjnej duchowości religijnej duchowością ateistyczną. Celem badań nad taką duchowością jest weryfikacja następujących hipotez badawczych: 1) „nowa duchowość” jest propozycją alternatywną dla tradycyjnych „duchowości religijnych”, adresowaną do ludzi o przekonaniach ateistycznych; 2) nowa „świecka duchowość” w wielu aspektach jest zbieżna z duchowością religijną, zasadnicza różnica pojawia się (...) w kwestiach rozumienia nieśmiertelności człowieka i sposobu przezwyciężania lęku przed śmiercią; 3) „duchowość ateistyczna”, jako uzupełnienie krytyki postaw religijnych, może przyczynić się do konwersji osób tradycyjnie religijnych i przyjęcia przez nich duchowości, która nie odwołuje się do osobowej Transcendencji. Badania zostaną przeprowadzone na podstawie krytycznej analizy tekstów czterech francuskich myślicieli: M. Onfray’a, L. Ferry’ego, M. Gaucheta i A. Comte-Sponville’a. French atheist sprituality The purpose of the article is the analysis of a specific understanding of contemporary atheism, which 1) arose in the French philosophical circles in the 20th and 21st century; 2) combines a critique of religion (more or less radical) with a positive proposal of replacing traditional religious spirituality with an atheist spirituality. The goal of this research is to verify the following hypotheses: 1) a “new spirituality” is an proposal alternative to traditional “religious spiritualities”, addressing atheits; 2) this new “secular spirituality” is in many aspects similar to religious spirituality, with its difference being the new ways of understanding immortality and the ways of overcoming the fear of death; 3) “atheist spirituality”, as a support for the criticque of religious positions, may encourage traditionally religious people to accept a spirituality that requires no relation to personalized Transcendence.Research will be conducted on the base of a critical analysis of the sources of four French thinkers: M. Onfray, L. Ferry, M. Gauchet and A. Comte-Sponville. (shrink)