This article addresses conceal and carry laws on higher education campuses as ethical and social dilemmas. The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a Free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” (U. S. Const. amend. II 1791 ). Proponents for conceal and carry laws on college and university campuses often interpret the Second Amendment as an overarching right to have weapons, regardless of location. Opponents (...) of such legislation argue that allowing guns on campuses would be a mistake and student safety can be addressed in other ways. Throughout the 2010–2011 legislative sessions Arizona and Texas have been on the cusp of passing pro conceal and carry laws which would allow higher education students to carry weapons on campus. Over two decades states have increased access to weapons, while most in the U.S. have sentiments against their neighbors carrying arms (Kranz 2006 ). While the Second Amendment provides the right for individual to carry arms, higher education campuses are regarded as a subset of the population, a space for maturing adults and not a place for concealed weapons. (shrink)

Concealed questions are determiner phrases that are naturally paraphrased as embedded questions (e.g., John knows the capital of Italy ≈ John knows what the capital of Italy is). This paper offers a novel account of the interpretation of concealed questions, which assumes that an entity-denoting expression α may be type-shifted into an expression ?z.P(α), where P is a contextually determined property, and z ranges over a contextually determined domain of individual concepts. Different resolutions of P and the domain of z (...) yield a wide range of concealed question interpretations, some of which were not noted previously. On the other hand, principled constraints on the resolution process prevent overgeneration. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with Noun Phrases (NPs, henceforth) occurring in two constructions: concealed question NPs and NP subjects of specificational sentences. The first type of NP is illustrated in (1). The underlined NPs in (1) have been called ‘concealed questions’ because sentences that embed them typically have the same truth-conditional meaning as the corresponding versions with a full-fledged embedded interrogative clause, as illustrated in (2) (Heim 1979).

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, great new trends of Jewish thought emerged whose widely varied representatives--Kabbalists, philosophers, and astrologers--each claimed that their particular understanding revealed the actual secret of the Torah. They presented their own readings in a coded fashion that has come to be regarded by many as the very essence of esotericism. Concealment and Revelation takes us on a fascinating journey to the depths of the esoteric imagination. Carefully tracing the rise of esotericism and its function (...) in medieval Jewish thought, Moshe Halbertal's richly detailed historical and cultural analysis gradually builds conceptual-philosophical force to culminate in a masterful phenomenological taxonomy of esotericism and its paradoxes. Among the questions addressed: What are the internal justifications that esoteric traditions provide for their own existence, especially in the Jewish world, in which the spread of knowledge was of great importance? How do esoteric teachings coexist with the revealed tradition, and what is the relationship between the various esoteric teachings that compete with that revealed tradition? Halbertal concludes that, through the medium of the concealed, Jewish thinkers integrated into the heart of the Jewish tradition diverse cultural influences such as Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, and Hermeticisims. And the creation of an added concealed layer, unregulated and open-ended, became the source of the most daring and radical interpretations of the tradition. (shrink)

This book presents a novel analysis of concealed-question constructions, reports of a mental attitude in which part of a sentence looks like a nominal complement, but is interpreted as an indirect question. Such constructions are puzzling in that they raise the question of how their meaning derives from their constituent parts. In particular, how a nominal complement, normally used to refer to an entity ends up with a question-like meaning. In this book, Ilaria Frana adopts a theory according to which (...) noun phrases with concealed question meanings are analysed as individual concepts. The traditional individual concept theory is modified and applied to the phenomena discussed in the recent literature and some new problematic data. The end result is a fully compositional account of a wide range of concealed-question constructions. The exploration of concealed questions offered in the book provides insights into both issues in semantic theory, such as the nature of quantification in natural languages and the use of type shifter in the grammar, and issues surrounding the syntax-semantics interface, such as the interpretation of copy traces and the effects on semantic interpretation of different syntactic analyses of relative clauses. The book will interest scholars and graduate students in linguistics, especially those interested in semantics and the syntax-semantics interface, as well as philosophers of language working on the topic of intensionality. (shrink)

Concealment -- Part of eloquence is to hide eloquence -- The concealed ornament -- Art or nature? -- In the garden -- Iki -- Those who cannot dissimulate cannot rule either -- True eloquence mocks eloquence -- Ready-mades.

Feminists have long argued that women who offend are judged by who they are, not what they do, with idealised images of femininity and motherhood used as measures of culpability. The ability to meet the expectations of motherhood and femininity are particularly difficult for women who experience a crisis pregnancy, as evident in cases where women have been convicted of concealment of birth. The offence prohibits the secret disposal of the dead body of a child, to conceal knowledge of (...) its birth. Traditionally used to prosecute women suspected of killing their newborn children, analysis of court transcripts suggests the offence is also used to punish women who fail to meet expectations of motherhood. This paper analyses three contemporary cases in light of the historical origins of the offence, illustrating the legacy of prejudice against ‘deviant’ mothers. Finally, it questions the continued existence of this archaic offence. (shrink)

In their first stasimon, the chorus of Euripides’Iphigenia at Aulis(=IA) praises ‘concealed Kypris’ as a marker of virtue for women (568–72):μέγα τι θηρεύειν ἀρετάν,γυναιξὶ μὲν κατὰ Κύ-πριν κρυπτάν, ἐν ἀνδράσι δ᾿ αὖκόσμος ἐνὼν ὁ μυριοπλη-θὴς μείζω πόλιν αὔξει.It is something great to hunt for excellence. For women, it is according to concealed Kypris, and among men in turn manifold order being within makes the city grow greater.

This paper presents a novel treatment of quantified concealed questions , examining different types of NP predicates and deriving the truth conditions for pair-list and set readings. A generalization is proposed regarding the distribution of the two readings, namely that pair-list readings arise from CQs with relational head nouns, whereas set readings arise from CQs whose head nouns are not relational. It is shown that set readings cannot be derived under the ‘individual concept’ approach, one of the most influential analyses (...) of CQs on the market. The paper offers a solution to this problem. It shows that once we adopt an independently motivated view of traces—according to which traces are copies with descriptive content —nothing else needs to be postulated to derive set readings within an individual-concept-based analysis. Thus, what seemed to be a challenge for this type of analysis turns out to be an argument in its favor. (shrink)

Nursing homes' ethics committees play a role in designing policies to assure ethical care. The administrative structure of nursing homes is not as large as that of hospitals. Nursing home staff and administration can respond to medical accidents in a way that treats family unethically and does serious harm to the facility. This paper describes incidents in which nursing homes attempted to conceal accidental deaths. It describes how such incidents are discovered, and the consequences of such efforts, and suggests ways (...) to prevent such incidents.This paper presents a retrospective review of a convenience sample of eight cases in which it was discovered that a nursing home attempted to conceal an accidental death. The effort to conceal an accidental death requires a coordinated effort to: [1] limit dissemination of information about the accident by staff and records, [2] decrease suspicion about the death, and [3] decrease the likelihood that an inquiry, if launched, will succeed. This effort begins as a reflexive, emotional and defensive response to the accident and consolidates as an institutional strategy to conceal both the accident and the concealment. The effort is coordinated by administrators who coerce cooperation from front line staff, alter medical records, and fail to follow reporting procedures. The attempt to conceal a lethal accident adversely affects the facility and the healthcare system. Ethics committees should work with professional organizations and administrator to assure proper management and disclosure of harmful accidents. (shrink)

Bioethical debate in Europe is partly a reaction to political endeavors and events. In line with the political goal of a united Europe, a European regulation is being sought for medical research and medical ethics ('Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine'). A certain degree of ambivalence has come to the fore: whilst it does seem possible to reach a consensus (albeit a merely 'diplomatic' consensus) about complicated bioethical issues at an international level when certain controversial matters are excluded or a (...) certain vagueness maintained, new principles are also required at a national level, for example when the medical profession of one state feels obliged to assume a 'local' stance, such as in the sensitive issue of termination of treatment. The individual contributions to this publication, together with various other current fields of bioethical conflict in Europe - especially Germany - are introduced below against a common background, namely that the original dividing line between the concealed and the revealed has shifted. (shrink)

The self-concealing of being is a primary preoccupation of Heidegger's later thought, but neither Heidegger nor his interpreters have made clear precisely what it is. In this paper, I identify the self-concealing of being as the concealing of the worlding of the world, which is essential to and simultaneous with that worlding. In order to establish this, I sketch a taxonomy of the various phenomena of concealing and concealment in Heidegger's work by building on Mark Wrathall's four ‘planks’ of (...) unconcealing and concealment. Importantly, I distinguish the procedurally prior concealment that all unconcealing presupposes from the simultaneous concealing that Heidegger frequently confuses it with. This distinction not only allows us to get clear on what it means to say that being conceals itself but also reveals various confusions and obscurities in Heidegger's own thought as well as in that of his readers. (shrink)

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, great new trends of Jewish thought emerged whose widely varied representatives--Kabbalists, philosophers, and astrologers--each claimed that their particular understanding revealed the actual secret of the Torah. They presented their own readings in a coded fashion that has come to be regarded by many as the very essence of esotericism. Concealment and Revelation takes us on a fascinating journey to the depths of the esoteric imagination. Carefully tracing the rise of esotericism and its function (...) in medieval Jewish thought, Moshe Halbertal's richly detailed historical and cultural analysis gradually builds conceptual-philosophical force to culminate in a masterful phenomenological taxonomy of esotericism and its paradoxes. Among the questions addressed: What are the internal justifications that esoteric traditions provide for their own existence, especially in the Jewish world, in which the spread of knowledge was of great importance? How do esoteric teachings coexist with the revealed tradition, and what is the relationship between the various esoteric teachings that compete with that revealed tradition? Halbertal concludes that, through the medium of the concealed, Jewish thinkers integrated into the heart of the Jewish tradition diverse cultural influences such as Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, and Hermeticisims. And the creation of an added concealed layer, unregulated and open-ended, became the source of the most daring and radical interpretations of the tradition. (shrink)

This book investigates silence as a normal, ubiquitous and indispensable element of political thinking, theory, and language. It explores the diverse dimensions in which silences mould the different core features of the political-by summoning-up finality, by contributing to rendering support for communities or withholding it, by processing consent or dissent, by the manner in which it secures continuities or generates ruptures, and by its role in shaping national time, public memory and collective identity. Not least, silence is a highly flexible (...) power resource, both enabling and constraining major social practices, traditions, and currents. The emphasis of this study is primarily on the concealed, unintentional, and unrecognized ways through which silence pervades socio-political life, departing from the typical focus on intentional silencing and the dominance of logos. Instead, silence adopts the guises of the unspeakable, the ineffable, the inarticulable, and the unconceptualizable. En route, silence is juxtaposed with stillness, absence contrasted with lack, agency set against undetected conventions, and the veiled paired with the wondrous. Drawing extensively from historical, philosophical, anthropological, psychoanalytical, theological, linguistic, and literary viewpoints, the book demonstrates the common threads that connect silences to those different disciplines, alongside the features that pull them asunder. In extracting and decoding their political implications, it explores both academic literature and colloquial, everyday discourse. Selected case-studies elaborating the overall analysis include topics such as Buddhist nondualism, Locke's tacit consent, the submerging of historical narratives, state neutrality, Pinter's miscommunications and menace, and the separate ways ideologies integrate silence into their beliefs. (shrink)

Hidden in the cave : the Upaniṣadic self -- Dangerous truths : the Buddha on silence, secrecy and snakes -- A cloak of clever words : the deconstruction of deceit in the Mahābhārata -- Words that burn : why did the Buddha say what he did? -- Words that break : can an Upaniṣad state the truth? -- The imperfect reality of persons -- Self as performance.

Depending on historical periods and individual perspectives, fencing has been defined in various ways. Indeed, fencing has been regarded as an art, and/or a science, and/or a sport, and/or a game. This paper shows that those various attempts to define fencing throughout history are strategies aiming to conceal the founding violence of fencing (although these strategies do not prevent the emergence of further forms of violence). The study demonstrates that these strategies pertain to semantics, to regulation and codification of fencing, (...) and to more recent phenomena which are linked to the deterritorialization of the practice of fencing. (shrink)

Cissexist perception involves a prejudicial judgment and an unmediated affective response, such as that of disgust, directed at the gendered aspects of another person. In this paper, I advance a view of how cissexist perception harms disabled people. On this view, there at least two morally problematic aspects of cissexist perception: that it has painful effects, and that it restricts bodily agency. I defend this claim through an analysis of a double bind faced by people subjected to cissexist perception: on (...) the one hand, such individuals are pressured into avoiding certain environments to dodge dangerous predicaments that can arise on behalf of looking different from others; this constitutes unfair exclusion from an environment and under some conditions causes pain. On the other hand, to avoid dangerous predicaments, targets of cissexist perception are pressured into concealing their gender non-conformity to fit into certain environments; concealing frustrates their bodily agency. I conclude with remarks about how trans-affirming artwork may have the capacity to interrupt cissexist perception. (shrink)

Crosslinguistically, causative constructions conform to the following generalization: If the causal relation is syntactically concealed, then it is semantically direct. Concealed causatives span a wide syntactic spectrum, ranging from resultative complements in English to causative subjects in Miskitu. A unified type-driven theory is proposed which attributes the understood causal relation—and other elements of constructional meaning—to type lifting operations predictably licensed by type mismatch at LF. The proposal has far-reaching theoretical implications not only for the theory of compositionality and causation, but (...) also for the underlying theory of events, space, and time, in natural language discourse. (shrink)

What is Heidegger talking about when he says that being conceals itself? This is the first study to systematically address that question. Katherine Withy analyses texts from across Heidegger's philosophical career and sorts the various phenomena of concealing and concealment that Heideggerdiscusses into a highly-structured taxonomy. The taxonomy clarifies the relationships and differences between such phenomena as lethe, the nothing, earth, excess, the backgrounding of the world, and un-truth, as well as speaking falsely, talking idly, secrets, mysteries, seeming, andinauthentic (...) discovering. But in relating and differentiating these phenomena, the taxonomy shows that none of them is the self-concealing of being.Having established what the self-concealing of being is not, Withy establishes what it is. She argues that being conceals itself in that it shows up to us as lacking the sorts of contrast cases that render entities determinate and intelligible. This novel and powerful interpretation of theself-concealing of being explains why the secondary literature to date has discussed it in vague and metaphorical terms, as well as why Heidegger tends to collapse being's self-concealing into the concealment of lethe. Withy's interpretation is both a clarification of and a corrective to Heidegger'snotoriously difficult and sometimes misleading discussions of being as self-concealing. (shrink)

Our evaluation of questions and knowledge attributions may vary relative to the way in which the relevant objects are identified. In the first part, the article proposes a theory that represents different methods of trans-world identification and is able to account for their impact on interpretation. In the second part, the same theory is used to account for the meaning of concealed questions. On the proposed account, the interpretation of a concealed question results from the application of a type-shifting operation (...) mapping an individual denoting expression into an identity question interpreted relative to a contextually selected identification method. (shrink)

Everyone knows that something has gone wrong, in the United States, with the conventions of privacy. Along with a vastly increased tolerance for variation in sexual life we have seen a sharp increase in prurient and censorious attention to the sexual lives of public figures and famous persons, past and present. The culture seems to be growing more tolerant and more intolerant at the same time, though perhaps different parts of it are involved in the two movements.

Informed consent, as Alfano (2015) recognizes, has been routinely idealized within philosophical debate: Philosophers typically present a psychologically sanitized formulation of the temporal seque...

Concealing information requires that adolescents manage the information that they share, which requires cognitive skills, for example, theory of mind. This study explored motivations for concealment that early adolescents endorsed concealing or disclosing to friends and parents, in relation to their theory of mind. We found that adolescents broadly endorsed disclosure to both parents and friends, even when it might mean they would face consequences, be impolite, or face negative identity-related emotions. We found that ToM ability was associated with (...) a tendency to endorse being forthcoming and sharing information with both friends and parents. These findings provide new insight into how the relation between ToM and concealment may change with age, specifically how in early adolescence it may foster open communication rather than concealment as is the case in early and middle childhood. (shrink)

Concealment, or the deliberate withholding of information from others, is of fundamental sociological interest. Yet, a general theoretical framework of concealment is missing from the sociological canon. This paper specifies a model that builds on and goes beyond existing accounts of concealment by emphasizing the desire for autonomy. I propose that the desire for autonomy, and the subjective assessment of concealment as the best route to achieve autonomy, lead individuals to attempt concealment. After specifying a (...) dyadic model based on the concealer (ego) and the target of concealment (alter), I incorporate ego-alter power differentials, network dynamics, and norms about privacy and concealment into a multilevel model of how concealment is initiated and maintained. (shrink)

The paper undertakes to investigate the Shī`ī practice of prudential concealment (taqīya) as a source of both quietism and political activism. The practice functioned as a strategy of survival for the Shī `ī minority living under hostile Sunni regimes. Although Sunni ulema criticized the practice as dissimulation and, hence, morally wrong, ironically they too adopted the strategy when encountering autocratic and oppressive Sunni regimes that suffocated the right of the people to voice their demand for just treatment. The article (...) demonstrates that the strategy created a specific sphere of existence for the Shī `ites, known as the “abode of prudential concealment,” which incrementally allowed Muslim opposition to engage in underground activity for regime change and for a political transformation of the public order that accorded with Islamic ideals. In light of Muslim political theology providing doctrinal resources for Muslim societies to work toward the common good in the public sphere, this latter space functions as a means of critical evaluation of the existing autocratic governments in the Muslim world, prompting political action, however underground. The major conclusion of the paper is that although the practice was developed by the Shī `ī minority living under intolerable political conditions, at different times under unbearable political conditions and the absence of democratic processes, it has provided Muslims a strategy to regroup and engage in political transformation. (shrink)

Thomas Nagel is widely recognized as one of the top American philosophers working today. Reflecting the diversity of his many philosophical preoccupations, this volume is a collection of his most recent critical essays and reviews.

_ Heidegger on Being Self-Concealing _, by WithyKatherine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 192.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.1 (2001) 21-37 [Access article in PDF] Conscience and the Concealments of Metaphor in Hobbes's Leviathan Karen S. Feldman Introduction Conscience is not a topic of terribly heated debate in Hobbes research. 1 Nevertheless, my claim in this article is that conscience in the Leviathan, which Hobbes poses as an example of the dangers of metaphor, is not merely an example of the dangers of metaphor, (...) but rather is the most dangerous metaphor, the metaphor that corrupts knowledge and thereby makes error and deception possible. Hobbes's brief account of conscience, which appears in the chapter of Leviathan on the ends of discourse, tells the story of the insinuation of metaphor into proper nomenclature; however, his example of the metaphorical use of the word conscience turns the story into one in which public knowledge itself is made private and thereby corrupted. Moreover, according to the story, private conscience is itself invented by means of a metaphor; it is in effect metaphorized into being. 2 With the emergence of private conscience, the potential of privatization expands from the privatization of the meaning of words to an entire private sphere of opinion. The metaphorical corruption of conscience invents a new understanding of knowledge as isolated from other witnesses, and the resultant privatization of truth lends itself to the corruption of that truth. Thus, whereas Hobbes characterizes the wrong use of names (of which metaphor is an instance) as a threat to accurate judgment and reason (L 22-23, 34, 161-62), as I will argue in the sections following, Hobbes's demand for the preservation of proper meaning in Leviathan corresponds to an anxiety regarding privacy and its peculiar potential for corrupting truth and knowledge. Hobbes's worries as to the dangers that metaphor poses to the stability of the commonwealth thereby converge with his worries about the dangers of conscience to the principle of public authority (cf. Strong 1993). [End Page 21] Hobbes's condemnations of conscience In Leviathan, conscience is condemned as a source of principles of human decision and action in a commonwealth. The problem with conscience as a principle of action is that it renders each individual inventor of his own rules and judge of his own actions. In brief, individual conscience is incommensurable with the public authority that defines a commonwealth: Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his own eyes. (L 311) In this account, conscience is not just inferior to civil law as a principle guiding action, but at odds with civil society and the good of the commonwealth. The fact that conscience is private renders it problematic for the commonwealth for several reasons: First, as privately invented, it may be erroneous. Likewise, because it is private, conscience does not possess any binding power outside the individual, private sphere. Each person may be bound by his own conscience, but insofar as consciences differ, standards of action differ, and this leads to the undermining and distraction of the commonwealth. Likewise, private consciences may be divergent from one another, and the conflicts in private judgment produce conflicting actions that disturb the peace of the commonwealth. This rule of privacy is, moreover, associated with primitive life and with the state of nature... (shrink)

To appear in Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory XVI. Ithaca, NY: CLC.

This article offers a reading of Eriugena’s thought that is inspired by Heidegger’s claim according to which being is constituted in a dialectical interplay of revelation and concealment. Beginning with an analysis of how “causality as concealing revelation” works on the level of God’s inner-Trinitarian life, the piece moves on to a consideration of the way in which the human soul reveals itself in successive stages of exteriorization that culminate in the creation of the body, its “image.” The body, (...) however, conceals as much as it reveals true human nature. Moreover, it is shown that for Eriugena all of reality, as theophany, possesses this character of concealing its fundamental truth. These insights lead Eriugena to a recognition of radical human finitude, as genuine wisdom requires an acknowledgement of our fundamental ignorance. (shrink)

It is known that the Schrödinger equation may be derived from a hydrodynamic model in which the Lagrangian position coordinates of a continuum of particles represent the quantum state. Using Routh’s method of ignorable coordinates it is shown that the quantum potential energy of particle interaction that represents quantum effects in this model may be regarded as the kinetic energy of additional ‘concealed’ freedoms. The method brings an alternative perspective to Planck’s constant, which plays the role of a hidden variable, (...) and to the canonical quantization procedure, since what is termed ‘kinetic energy’ in quantum mechanics may be regarded literally as energy due to motion. (shrink)

Jay L. Garfield defends two exegetical theses regarding Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. The first is that Book II is the theoretical foundation of the Treatise. Second, Garfield argues that we cannot understand Hume's project without an appreciation of his own understanding of custom, and in particular, without an appreciation of the grounding of his thought about custom in the legal theory and debates of his time.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume’s “Treatise” from the Inside Out by Jay L. GarfieldJohn Christian LaursenJay L. Garfield. The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume’s “Treatise” from the Inside Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. 302. Hardback. ISBN: 978-0-19-093340-1, $82. This book has at least two original and great merits. One is that it is one of the first in the Hume literature to be truly global. (...) The other is that it gives custom and habit the place they deserve in Hume’s philosophy. Concerning the first of these, I think it would be widely admitted that most of the study of Western philosophy is done in blissful ignorance of non-Western philosophy. We follow what our thinkers are doing, and pay little or no attention to the rest of the world. In contrast, this book peppers the footnotes, and even some of the text, with comparisons to Buddhist schools and figures such as Madhyamaka, Candrakirti, Nagarjuna, and the like. We are not used to the idea that Western philosophers may have drawn some of their ideas from non-Western philosophy, although we have long known that Pyrrho traveled to India and may have taken ideas from the gymnosophists, and that later philosophers like Bayle and Leibniz were very interested in Chinese ideas. In Hume’s case, it is possible that there was some influence through Pyrrho and his followers, or that these were simply parallel developments. The latter are still of philosophical interest because they show how similar philosophies can develop from different roots. Of course, one of the reasons that most of us cannot compare a figure like Hume to Indian or Chinese philosophy is that we do not know the languages and have not been trained in those areas. In this case, Jay Garfield is the author of many works on Indian philosophy, including Engaging Buddhism: Why it Matters to Philosophy (2015), so he has authority in the matter. A work like this, drawing attention to many similarities and parallels in philosophy, could be followed up by some methodological work on how to compare philosophies from such different intellectual traditions. What do the parallels mean? Are there any deeper or wider conclusions that we can make about parallels that appear in very different philosophical traditions? Is convergence of ideas a confidence builder in their solidity and truth, or rather a reminder of common human tendencies to fallacy? If philosophy is ever going to join the ranks of truly global human enterprises, it will have to ask and answer these questions about far-flung philosophical traditions. The main argument of this book is that Hume is best understood as a Pyrrhonian philosopher who maintains that the foundations of our knowledge, ethics, and political practices may be found only in custom and habit. Book 2 of Hume’s Treatise is the key, providing a social account of the passions and our constructions of ourselves. “Custom is essential to the story,” the author writes (82). Nature makes [End Page 179] us develop customs together that start from passions and sympathy, and are drawn together by the imagination. On the basis of these social constructions of most elements of our lives, by the end of the book, Garfield is talking about Hume’s place in the “communitarian tradition” (279–80). If Book 2 is read before Book 1, one will realize that what Hume says about reason and ontology in Book 1 is rooted in his theory of the passions in Book 2, and thus always social. What Hume is doing is more like philosophical psychology (or the psychology of philosophy?) than epistemology, metaphysics, or moral philosophy, according to Garfield. Hume is asking why we believe what we believe in epistemology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, not proving that any of these beliefs are true. Taking the title of Hume’s Treatise seriously, it is a book about human nature, not about Hume’s understanding of those philosophical subfields. Hume’s work is more descriptive than prescriptive. We can learn from it how we live, not how we should live, which is a matter for the development of customs over time... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Heidegger on Being Self-Concealing by Katherine WithyMorganna LambethKatherine Withy. Heidegger on Being Self-Concealing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 192. Hardback, $80.00.Heidegger’s claim that Being conceals itself is significant for several reasons. It tells us something about Heidegger’s main area of inquiry, Being—that is, our standards for what makes a being count as a being, our “sense of what kinds of entities there can be” (8). Further, it (...) explains why Heidegger’s inquiry is challenging: he inquires into something that conceals itself. This claim also elucidates other Heideggerian claims, explaining why we tend to overlook Being in our everyday lives, and why philosophers have failed to investigate Being. Because making sense of this claim is important for making sense of Heidegger, Katherine Withy’s book is a welcome addition to the literature.The claim that Being conceals itself is difficult to interpret, since, as Withy underscores, Heidegger discusses multiple types of concealment throughout his corpus. In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses the withdrawal of tools when we use them: we attend not to the tool at hand but to what we produce with it (47). In the “Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger claims that earth, the materiality from which artworks are made, “denies... penetration” (34). He claims, variously, that language “cover[s] things up” (72), that we are concealed from ourselves (95), and that the world of equipment “recedes” into “the background” (48). Which of these, if any, counts as the self-concealing of Being?Withy’s book pinpoints what counts as the self-concealing of Being, and what does not. She develops this account with rigor and clarity, owing not least to the innovative structure of her investigation—organized into sections, which are grouped according to four “planks of unconcealment,” which she borrows from Mark Wrathall (Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010]). “Unconcealment” is Heidegger’s rendering of the Greek word alētheia (usually: truth), which highlights that truth (propositional, ontological, etc.) reveals something previously “forgotten or concealed” (10). On Withy’s construal, these planks differentiate progressively deeper levels of unconcealment. At the most superficial level, language unconceals some entity; this is made possible by the second plank, where entities are unconcealed, or discovered; the third plank is the unconcealment, or disclosure, of Being, which makes discovery possible; finally, the fourth plank is the unconcealment of the clearing, which makes the disclosure of Being possible.Although Withy eventually rejects Wrathall’s fourth plank, adopting this plank structure nevertheless allows her to organize the forms of concealment that correspond to the first three planks of unconcealment. While taxonomizing multiple kinds of concealment—such as lēthē (in classical Greek, “forgetfulness”), the initial concealment that unconcealment “overcome[s]” (10)—Withy pays special attention to the self-concealing of unconcealment itself, which she calls kruptesthai (in classical Greek, “to hide, to conceal oneself”). The kruptesthai that occurs at the third plank (where Being is disclosed) is the self-concealing of Being. Withy also draws attention, at each plank, to the ways in which Heidegger’s philosophy combats kruptesthai, so unconcealment becomes apparent to us.Withy begins with the second plank, where we discover some entity. The withdrawal of tools and the hiddenness of earth are concealings that belong to this level (accompanying, respectively, the unconcealing of tools and artwork). However, these are not forms of self-concealing. Here, unconcealing conceals something else (the tool, the earth), rather than itself. Withy calls this kind of concealing kruptein (in classical Greek, “to hide, to conceal”). By contrast, kruptesthai occurs when discovery conceals itself—when we overlook that we are uncovering something (ourselves doing, making, contributing to an experience) when we encounter an entity. Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses, however, bring into view our unconcealing of entities.Withy then proceeds to consider the first plank, where language unconceals some entity. Heidegger suggests that we also fail to appreciate that language unconceals—linguistic unconcealing conceals itself. An utterance draws our attention to the phenomenon that it describes rather than to what language is doing to unconceal that phenomenon. However, [End Page 673] Heidegger’s analyses of... (shrink)

이 글은 시론적 성격을 갖는 것으로서, 기술의 급속한 발달을 배경으로 새롭게 일어나고 있는 여성주의운동을 #미투 운동을 중심으로 살펴보고, #미투 운동이 나타내보이고 있는 여성주의 이론적 실천적 변화의 철학적 함축을 기술과학과 연관된 측면에서 다룬다. 최근 일어난 #미투 운동의 참여자들이 사건 폭로로 인해 주변으로부터 겪게 될 고통을 감수하면서 성평등한 사회를 만드는 이상 추구에 동참하게 되는 과정과 이유들을 되짚어봄으로써, 여성주의 인식에 어떤 변화가 나타나고 있는지 고찰한다. 또한 초연결사회의 도래로 인한 인간주체와 환경의 변화가 여성주의에 어떤 도전과 가능성을 제공하게 될 것인지, 초연결성의 여성주의적 함축에 대하여 생각해 (...) 본다. (shrink)

In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty tells us of how the phenomenon unfolds and its unfolding is never complete: there is no total view of being to be had. Being as phenomenon is, because of this, non-objective: it is disclosed, as Heidegger would put it, in proportion to its being concealed. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty suggest, in their different ways, that this obscure counterpart to the disclosed world, forgotten in objective thought and instrumental rationality, is nonetheless shown, made visible, in art. (...) That is to say, paraphrasing Heidegger, that art shows the concealed as concealed. Conceptual art and its 'dematerialisation of the art object' that the art critic Lucy Lippard described during its early days, have not been readily associated with phenomenology, in part because conceptual art practices tended to be, as Lippard noted, 'non-visual'. Nonetheless, if one overlooks the apparent visual bias of Merleau-Ponty's treatment of art, then it becomes clear, as this paper set out to show, that Conceptual art's 'immaterial' or non-objective ontology is peculiarly congruent with the late Merleau-Ponty's account of the intertwining of the visible and the invisible. In particular this paper argued that the relevance to ecophenomonology of conceptual practices such as Richard Long's that consist in walking as medium and method, is not primarily in their thematising of nature or the body, but rather in their own ontological structure as open-ended and non-objective projects as opposed to their being directly perceptible objects. (shrink)

The present study investigates and thematizes the interrelation between face masking, concealment, and deceit. It starts from the premise that the significance of disguise and deceit in the history of ideas should be reversed as these methods of the management of human appearance are not only regarded as coercive methods to manipulate and exert power over others but also as tactics skillfully used by the weak in order to outmaneuver those who are in a position of power. The study (...) traces the matrix of simulation and dissimulation as forming the structure of deceit, it reviews some of the main theories of disguise within the field of semiotics, and it singles out two main dimensions of disguise, one geared upon dynamism and the other based on the static features of the face. This study suggests that classifications of masks elaborated in semiotic theory hitherto are useful but insufficient to encompass the full scope of such phenomenon. For this reason, the study provides a new typology of masks. (shrink)