Claims of progress in our ethical or moral beliefs and practices—as well as claims to ethical or moral regression—are commonplace in American social and political conversation. Often, such commentary involves a lamenting of the decline of “traditional” values in contemporary society or alternatively a rejoicing in the ways that we appear to have overcome prior prejudicial values. In this dissertation, I am concerned with the notions of progress and improvement that underlie such commonsense judgments. At a minimum, (...) class='Hi'>ethical progress requires the idea that some values or practices are better than others and hence that replacing some beliefs or practices with others can be a genuine improvement. Taking inspiration from the ethical works of John Dewey, I sketch an account of evaluative progress that conceives of this sort of improvement in ethical beliefs or practices in terms of problem-resolving. On my view, resolving a problem involves both offering an adequate conception of the problem and finding a problem-solution which lives up to the world and to the values we reflectively endorse. On my account, resolving problems is not simply a matter of finding the best means to a fixed end; rather, I conceive of problem-resolving as a dynamic process in which ends themselves are typically in flux. The sort of “dynamic deliberation” I have in mind, then, goes beyond mere instrumental reasoning, by not only allowing us to recognize conflicts between ends or means to ends, but in also providing a way to rationally revise or reject ends. Finally, in order for this sort of problem-resolving to make good on the idea of genuine improvement or progress, the process of solving problems must involve some sense of objectivity. I offer a procedural account of objectivity that emphasizes the role of the world in constraining our inquiry, involves a naturalization of ethical epistemology, and allows for objective inquiry to be undertaken by an individual or a community. (shrink)

John Dewey attempted a pragmatic aufhebung of the disparate methodological aims of social science-explanation, understanding, and critique- in his 1938 Logic: the theory of Inquiry. There, in his penultimate chapter ‘Social Inquiry’, Dewey performed a trademark implementation of his deflation of absolutistic and universalistic pretensions in intellectual and theoretical discourse, in this case with respect to any one approach to social science. This deflation--as elsewhere in his analogous treatments of epistemology, ethics, and the theory of action-- involved the (...) reconstruction of the claims of the naturalist, interpretivist, and critical schools of social science into one overall pattern of social inquiry. This recasts the different and seemingly irreconcilable aims of these schools into a series of steps in a practice. That these claims, then, simultaneously stand independently but in varying degrees of tension with, and support of, each other is a hallmark of pragmatism’s embrace of pluralism in intelligent problem solving. Dewey’s discussion of interpretation needs supplementation from his broader philosophical commitments in order to see the full sense of both the compatibility and the incompatibility of his theory with philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Is There a Problem about Ethical Criticism? The Sensible Representation of the Moral The Theory of Disinterestedness Coda: The Beautiful as that which is Complete in itself.

It is said that the social conflicts and disputes can be resolved by dialogue between opposing groups. Karl popper argues that if social conflicts are resolved with the authoritarian attitude that our arguments are conclusive then this attitude imposes its opinion and hence it cannot provide the ground for reasonable dialogue. Karl Popper rejects authoritarian attitude on the basis of his critique of absolute knowledge. He believes in fallibility of knowledge. He thinks that if disagreementsare resolved with an attitude that (...) our arguments are rational but are not conclusive then this attitude is ready to be convinced by other. Hence it can provide the ground for reasonable dialogue. Popper is of the view that an attitude is moral as it believes in equality of men. Hacohen and O’Hear critically examine Popper’s fallibilism. They identify a problem that fallibilism ultimately leads Popper to anti-foundationalism which makes ethics purely individualistic. In this paper I focus on this problem and workout how Popper’s moral individualism is inadequate for possibility of reasonable dialogue. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to lay out the major aspects of a procedural, pragmatist account of objectivity in ethics. This account is “procedural” insofar as it holds that the objectivity of inquiry depends not on what the results of that inquiry are, but rather whether the proper procedure of inquiry was followed to generate the results. The account is “pragmatic” insofar as it coheres with a broader approach to ethics that conceives of ethical inquiry (...) and progress in terms of resolving problems (Roth 2010a, 2012). Why should we want this sort of account of ethical objectivity? In addition to its contribution to a larger pragmatist conception of ethical inquiry, this account has two desirable features. First .. (shrink)

This is the third and final volume of A System of Pragmatic Idealism, a series that will synthesize the life's work of the philosopher Nicholas Rescher. Rescher's numerous books and articles, which address almost every major philosophical topic, reflect a unified approach: the combination of pragmatism and idealism characteristic of his thinking throughout his career. The three related but independently readable books of the series present Rescher's system as a whole. In combining leading ideas of European continental idealism and American (...) pragmatism in a new way, Rescher has created an integrated philosophical position in which the central concepts of these two traditions become a coherent totality. The initial volume in the series was dedicated to epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of nature, while the second dealt with issues of value theory, ethics, and practical philosophy. In Volume III Rescher examines the nature of philosophical inquiry itself, seeking to affirm the classical conception of philosophy as a significant problem-solving enterprise that draws on the whole range of human experience to attempt to resolve the "big questions." Originally published in 1994. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Education in ethics among practising professionals should provide a systematic procedure for resolving moral problems. A method for such decision-making is outlined using the two classical orientations in moral philosophy, teleology and deontology. Teleological views such as utilitarianism resolve moral dilemmas by calculating the excess of good over harm expected to be produced by each feasible alternative for action. The deontological view focuses on rights, duties, and principles of justice. Both methods are used to resolve the 1971 Johns Hopkins (...) case of a baby born with Down's syndrome and duodenal atresia. (shrink)

In the postwar years Jean-Paul Sartre set himself the task of writing a book on ethics. His concern was to take up issues raised by his existentialist ontology and to resolve problems in his bleak account of the human situation in Being and Nothingness. "I am searching," he said, "for an ethics for the present time." For several years he prepared background notes, but then put the material aside as too abstract and idealistic, leaving it for publication after his death. (...) Years later he returned to ethics, this time in the hope of developing an account related to the Critique of Dialectical Reason. But once again he left the inquiry incomplete. There was yet a third attempt towards the end of his life when Sartre was blind and weak, a poignant witness to his abiding interest in ethics. This took the form of interviews with Benny Lèvy, which appeared in a controversial publication just before his death. Sartre in Search of an Ethics is a study of each of these stages in his ethical quest, with a focus on the major themes of his existentialist and dialectical ethics in the context of some of his main philosophical and literary writings. (shrink)

This paper takes up the question of the role of philosophical moral theory in our attempts to resolve the ethical problems that arise in health care, with particular reference to the contention that we need theory to be determinative of our choice of actions. Moral theorizing is distinguished from moral theories and the prospects for determinacy from the latter are examined through a consideration of the most promising candidates: utilitarianism, deontology and the procedures involved in reflective equilibrium. It is (...) argued that the current lack of any generally accepted method of solving moral problems, together with the extreme improbability of philosophy achieving a plausibly determinate theory, should encourage us to approach the problems in a spirit of agnosticism regarding the way in which theoretical material might be of relevance. The practical test for both moral theorizing and moral theories is thus not determinacy but the degree to which they increase our understanding of moral problems by serving, as they do in philosophy, as a means of inquiry into their nature. (shrink)

Omitting experimental data is often considered a violation of scientific integrity. If we consider experimental inquiry as a questioning process, omitting data is seen to be merely an example of tentatively rejecting (‘bracketing’) some of nature’s answers. Such bracketing is not only occasionally permissible; sometimes it is mandated by optimal interrogative strategies. When to omit data is therefore a strategic rather than ethical question. These points are illustrated by reference to Millikan’s oil drop experiment.

This article reflects on the assumption underlying the argument of Little et al. that "contested understandings" in the clinic are susceptible to reconciliation within a liberal framework described as "pragmatic pluralism". It is argued that no such reconciliation is possible or desirable because it is of the nature of the clinic that it provides a forum for multiple voices, ethical and cultural perspectives, and conceptual frameworks, and this is the source of its fecundity and creativity. Medicine itself cannot be (...) represented by a single discourse, precisely because it is itself an unruly collection of practices that, despite their heterogeneity, are able to engage in productive dialogues with each other. The heteroglossia of the clinic, therefore, is not a problem to be overcome. Rather, it is a rich resource to be mobilized in accordance with its multiple inherent purposes. (shrink)

The release of the Final Report of the Lyons Inquiry into Local Government in England, entitled Place-shaping: A shared ambition for the future of local government (Lyons Inquiry into Local Government) was a significant milestone in the debate on local government reform. Place-shaping is a sophisticated piece of rhetoric and policy making and can be seen to have relevance far beyond its own jurisdiction. This paper traces its theoretical antecedents alongside developments in the debate on local government in (...) England. Despite its broad appeal, we argue that problems familiar to local government such as rent-seeking and cost shifting will be heightened rather than resolved with any take-up of the place-shaping agenda. (shrink)

Most forms of virtue ethics are characterized by two attractive features. The first is that proponents of virtue ethics acknowledge the need to describe how moral agents acquire or develop the traits and abilities necessary to become morally able agents. The second attractive feature of most forms of virtue ethics is that they are forms of moral realism. The two features come together in the attempt to describe virtue as a personal ability to distinguish morally good reasons for action. It (...) follows from the general picture of virtue ethics presented here that we cannot evaluate ethical judgment independently of the viewpoint of the ideal of a virtuous person. We will examine how this ideal unfolds in the realistic form of virtue ethics advanced by John McDowell. McDowell offers a compelling description of virtue as a natural ability grounded in human nature, while at the same time insisting that we cannot understand the judgment resulting from virtue without drawing on that very perspective. However, McDowell’s focus on the passive taking in of reasons in ethical experience and his idea of the silencing of wrong reasons lead us to three related problems. The first is that he cannot account for certain features of the phenomenology of such experience; the second is that he cannot provide any relevant epistemological criteria for correct moral judgment; and the third is that he gives a morally objectionable characterization of the ideal of being a virtuous person. All of these problems arise because McDowell does not take into account the particular nature of ethical experience. If we try to resolve this problem by dropping McDowell’s idea of silencing, we then have to offer another substantial description of our ideal of a virtuous person that includes active and interpersonal ways of evaluating concrete judgments. Proponents of virtue ethics still have to lift this task and develop a position that does not limit ethical experience to the passive intake of reasons. (shrink)

Background Ethical conflicts generate difficulties in daily clinical activity. Which methods of ethical advice are most frequently used to resolve them among Spanish doctors has not been studied. The objective of this study is to describe what methods hospital internal medicine physicians in Spain use to resolve their ethical doubts and which they consider most useful. Design A cross-sectional observational study was conducted through a voluntary and anonymous survey and distributed through an ad hoc platform of the (...) Spanish Society of Internal Medicine. Measures We measured methods by which to resolve doubts, types of tools sought, frequency of consulting the Clinical Ethics Committees, and satisfaction with resolution of ethical issues. Results Of 261 internists surveyed, 86 per cent resolve their ethical doubts with assistance, the most frequently used method being consultation with colleagues (58.6 per cent), followed by using specific protocols or guides (11.8 per cent) and consultation with experts in bioethics (9.6 per cent). The most preferred tools are the creation of protocols (30.3 per cent) and the establishment of a consultant/expert in bioethics (27.8 per cent). Conclusions Internists in Spain usually seek assistance to resolve their ethical doubts. Consulting colleagues is the most frequently adopted method. The majority regard tools to resolve ethical conflicts as necessary, seeking above all protocols and consultants/experts in bioethics. (shrink)

This essay is a critical engagement with recent assessments of comparative religious ethics by John Kelsay and Jung Lee. Contra Kelsay's proposal to return to a neo-Weberian sociology of religious norm elaboration and justification, the authors argue that comparative religious ethics is and should be practiced as a field of study in active conversation with other fields that consider human flourishing, employing a variety of methods that have their roots in multiple disciplines. Cross-pollination from a variety of disciplines is a (...) strength of comparative ethics, which has enlivened recent and ongoing research on ethics, not a problem to be resolved by convergence on a single, distinctively comparative project. The authors also argue in response to Lee and Kelsay that while individual comparative studies of virtue and personal formation can be flawed in various ways, this line of research has been productive and at times very compelling. Moreover, attention to comparative virtue ethics shows how scholarship on some ethical topics necessitates drawing on a variety of perspectives and disciplinary backgrounds, a conclusion relevant to all work in religious ethics today. (shrink)

This book provides the foundation for understanding ethical language as well as probing the tensions in problem solving and ethical decision-making.

Aldo Leopold's holistic land ethic principle, ‘‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community … wrong when it tends otherwise,’’ has seemed to many philosophers indefensible in light of any of the traditional normative theories of character and conduct that have been central to Western moral theory since the early modern period. J. Baird Callicott has long disputed this assessment, arguing that in fact, Leopold's land ethic is best understood and (...) defended as the conclusion from the application of an essentially Humean moral outlook to the human exploitation of nature. Callicot'ts defense of Leopold's land ethic has been criticized for being grounded in an interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy that the texts do not support. But while the criticisms pose a serious obstacle to acceptance of Callicott's own strategy for constructing a Humean defense of Leopold's position, they leave open the possibility that other strategies might prove more successful. There are at least two ways that a more successful defense could be constructed. The attitude toward nature encapsulated in Leopold's land ethic principle could either be defended as an inborn, natural virtue or, alternately, as a novel species of artificial virtue inculcated for its personal and social utility. If this correct, Callicott's suggestion that we look to Hume for a defense of Leopold's position merits serious consideration, both for the light it may shed on the particular question of the defensibility of Leopold's land ethic principle and on more general questions about whether Hume's virtue theory can be a useful resource for ethical and social policy debates about the environment. (shrink)

In this book, the author presents a series of essays that demonstrate the power and versatility of connective, contrastive, and contextual analysis, a novel and original approach to philosophical inquiry. Drawing on themes from his acclaimed tetralogy on human nature, the author shows how to solve, resolve, and dissolve philosophical problems by connecting, contrasting, and contextualizing different concepts, perspectives, and arguments. The book covers a wide range of topics, from the nature of consciousness and experience, to the place of (...) value in a world of facts, to the problem of evil and the death of the soul. The book also includes a new essay on dreaming, as well as a comprehensive overview of the methodology of connective, contrastive, and contextual analysis. The book is written in an accessible and engaging style, with minimal technical jargon and no formal symbolism. It is suitable for anyone who is interested in philosophy and wants to learn how to think more clearly, creatively, and critically about philosophical problems. (shrink)

Conflict resolution is a core component of healthcare ethics consultation (HEC) and proficiency in this skill set is recognized by the national bioethics organization and its HEC certification process. Difficult interpersonal interactions between the clinical team and patients or their families are often inexorably connected to the normative disputes that are the catalyst for the consult. Ethics consultants are often required to navigate challenging dynamics that have become entrenched and work with patient-provider or family-provider relationships that have already broken down. (...) The first step in conflict resolution is diagnosing the source of the conflict. Because so many interpersonal and normative conflicts rest on misunderstanding and mischaracterization, the diagnosis of the problem requires untangling the actual positions and perspectives of the conflicting parties from the fallacious assumptions made about the parties’ respective positions and views. Developed in management science, the Ladder of Inference (LOI) is a diagnostic tool for assisting stakeholders in re-examining the process they used to form beliefs about others involved in the conflict. The LOI is a device that detects errors in reasoning, including implicit racial bias, that lead to false judgments and counterproductive responses to those judgments. The LOI is an instrument that can be used by ethics consultants to help resolve contentious bedside conflicts, but the LOI can also be employed as a teaching tool used by healthcare ethics consultants in training the clinical staff in how to avoid such conflicts in the first place. (shrink)

Religious ethics was founded on a commitment to inclusion, welcoming projects from and about different religious and philosophical traditions. This paper argues that the increasing welcome of feminist ethics in the JRE also reveals a tension in the field between inclusion and critique: where feminist ethics is included as another tradition of ethical inquiry, its critical claims can be escaped by appeal to difference from the traditions it seeks to engage. The response to feminist critique should not be (...) to applaud its inclusion without responding to its claims. Where this occurs, religious ethicists must renegotiate the terms of inclusion and the borders of difference. Feminist critique thus requires a return to founding questions of this journal, and the field, about the terms on which different traditions can be discussed and engaged in a common, critical conversation of religious ethics. (shrink)

This study is a conceptual dialogue aimed at attaining insight into reading and developing postintentional phenomenology as intercultural philosophical inquiry. This conversation commences with the problem of Eurocentric phenomenology and introduces several examples of intercultural phenomenological attempts which fail to move beyond the validation of non-European philosophy using a Eurocentric viewpoint. The first section of this study introduces possible conditions and approaches for intercultural phenomenology, drawing mainly on Kwok-Ying Lau’s (2016) work on phenomenology and intercultural understanding, with a (...) view to extending the scope of phenomenological research beyond the limitations of a Eurocentric attitude largely influenced by and inherited from Husserl. The second section considers ways in which the understanding and approach of post-intentional phenomenology could be widened and deepened by the intercultural dimension, and vice versa. Building on these discussions, the paper concludes with a brief consideration of the implications for phenomenological research and of how an intercultural understanding and approach inform research design. Following “lines of flight” in these discussions, post-intentional phenomenology is proposed as an ethical and transformative inquiry. (shrink)

Ethical decision-making in school administration has received considerable attention in educational leadership literature. However, most research has focused on principals working in secondary school settings while studies that explore ethical reasoning processes of academic deans have been significantly few. This qualitative study aims to describe the ethical decision-making processes employed by a select group of Filipino college deans in solving ethical dilemmas using the ethical paradigms proposed in the works of Starratt (Educ Adm Q 27:185–202, (...) 1991) and Shapiro and Stefkovich (Ethical leadership and decision-making in education: applying theoretical perspectives to complex dilemmas, 2005) as frameworks for the analysis. Data was gathered using semi-structured interviews and field text was analyzed using deductive thematic analysis. Findings of this study show that majority of the deans chose to share ethical dilemmas involving students and teachers. The findings also show the ethical frameworks of care, justice, and profession as the dominant paradigms utilized by Filipino deans and their preference for adopting multiple ethical frameworks when making their decisions. Most of the ethical dilemmas which the deans narrated relate to their tasks of academic administration such as monitoring student performance, faculty evaluation and maintaining school discipline. Interestingly, only a few dilemmas involving university administrators were expressed, and dilemmas that refer to broader societal issues usually associated with school administrators’ utilization of the ethic of critique were also significantly left out in the narratives of this study. This paper intends to contribute to current literature by expanding research to administrators working in the context of higher education in the Philippine setting. The findings of this study could serve as knowledge base in designing ethics courses to enhance educational leaders’ ethical decision-making skills. The study also provides useful insights of ethical decisions and reasoning processes employed by academic administrators in resolving real life ethical dilemmas that could be useful at the practical level for aspiring and practicing deans. (shrink)

The fields of environmental ethics and of religion and ecology have been shaped by Lynn White Jr.'s thesis that the roots of ecological crisis lie in religious cosmology. Independent critical movements in both fields, however, now question this methodological legacy and argue for alternative ways of inquiry. For religious ethics, the twin controversies cast doubt on prevailing ways of connecting environmental problems to religious deliberations because the criticisms raise questions about what counts as an environmental problem, how religious (...) traditions change, and whether ethicists should approach problems and traditions with reformist commitments. This article examines the critiques of White's legacy and presents a pluralist alternative that focuses religious ethics on the contextual strategies produced by moral communities as they confront environmental problems. (shrink)

As one component of a broader social and normative response to the problem of suicide, scientism served to minimize sociopolitical and religious conflict around the issue. As such, it embodied, and continues to embody, a number of interests and values, as well as serving important social functions. It is thus comparable with other normative frameworks and can be appraised, from an ethical perspective, in light of these values, interests, and functions. This work examines the key values, interests, and (...) functions of scientism in suicidology and argues that although scientism has had some social benefit, it primarily serves to maintain political and professional interests and has damaging implications for suicide research and prevention. (shrink)

Ethics commissions provide expert advice to governments on what policies to implement regarding pressing ethical issues, most often in bioethics. These commissions distinguish themselves by having members from the professions we are most likely to think of as moral experts, if we believe that these exist. The relationship between moral experts and the composition of ethics commissions is worthy of further exploration, especially because of the highly controversial nature of whether moral expertise exists and, if so, how, and whether, (...) we can identify moral experts. Moreover, it has been argued that the emergence of ethics commissions and how they have been composed have led to a “thinner” debate. In the first part of the article, the problem regarding checks for identifying moral experts is discussed. I argue that one way to handle this difficulty is through the application of Rawls’ concept of comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines have inherent standards that function similarly to independent checks, making it possible to identify moral experts from within such different doctrines. Using this approach makes it manageable to appoint moral experts to ethics commissions. In the second part, I consider the implications of seeing moral expertise through the prism of comprehensive doctrines for the composition of ethics commissions. One natural conclusion is that we should select moral experts representing different reasonable comprehensive doctrines to serve as members of ethics commissions. I consider six challenges to my proposal and demonstrate why these lack merit, and I point out some practical concerns that need further inquiry. (shrink)

Narrative based real world case examples are powerful tools by which to help learners more empathetically engage the complexity of ethical conflicts and interactions, enabling clearer analysis of ecological ethical issues and overcoming apathy toward real-world responses. In this paper, I develop ecological ethical inquiry as a means by which to use narrative-based case studies to help ethicists connect to and empathize with other morally relevant individuals. I argue that ecological issues not only benefit from but (...) also require a narrative approach because of ethical and epistemic complexity. I first describe the problem of apathy toward motivation given the ethical and epistemic complexity in ecological ethics contexts; then, I offer a case study in ecological ethics that draws out this complexity; and finally, I point out several caveats concerning the conclusions I have drawn. (shrink)

Spinoza searched for a language that could help him to create a monistic system of ethics. Latin was in the 17th century a fairly malleable medium of communication. In its philosophical use it was largely a creation of Descartes. Spinoza wanted to use it in a way that would resemble Euclid's treatment of geometry. He needed a language that would clearly and precisely describe the process by which a man could liberate himself from the power of affection that hamper naturaly (...) propensity for social peace and mental equaenimity. He decided to begin by describing nature, which was responsible for man's proclivities and abilities. Consequently he needed a new conception of substance which on the one hand could be definied by some initial axioms, and on the other hand would sufficiently flexible to include various aspects of human thought. It is interesting that when Spinoza had to make a choice between flexibility and content, he resolved to adopt a strict method of reasoning at the cost of the received understanding of substance. It is possible that these linguistic considerations led him to adopt the view that substance is identical with God and as such encompasses all principles of operations of the human mind and premises for the deriving of all fundamental notions popular in his times. (shrink)

Because wicked problems are beyond the scope of normal, industrial-age engineering science, sustainability problems will require reform of current engineering science and technology practices. We assert that, while pluralism concerning use of the term sustainability is likely to persist, universities should continue to cultivate research and education programs specifically devoted to sustainable engineering science, an enterprise that is formally demarcated from business-as-usual and systems optimization approaches. Advancing sustainable engineering science requires a shift in orientation away from reductionism and intellectual specialization (...) towards integrative approaches to science, education, and technology that: draw upon an ethical awareness that extends beyond the usual bounds of professional ethics or responsible conduct of research to include macroethics, adopt anticipatory and adaptive approaches to unintended consequences resulting from technological innovation that result in more resilient systems, and cultivate interactional expertise to facilitate cross-disciplinary exchange. Unfortunately, existing education and research training programs are ill-equipped to prepare scientists and engineers to operate effectively in a wicked problems milieu. Therefore, it is essential to create new programs of graduate education that will train scientists and engineers to become sustainable engineering science experts equipped to recognize and grapple with the macro-ethical, adaptive, and cross-disciplinary challenges embedded in their technical research and development programs. Content Type Journal Article Category Articles Pages 1-18 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9342-2 Authors Thomas Seager, School of Sustainability and The Built Environment, Arizona State University, Phoenix Metropolitan Area, AZ, USA Evan Selinger, Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, Henrietta, NY, USA Arnim Wiek, School of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Phoenix Metropolitan Area, AZ, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863. (shrink)

The paper gives an analysis of the theoretical-methodological principles of the philosophy of J. Pato?ka not only as a historian of philosophy, but also as a historian of science, especially of its revolutionary periods. The aim of the paper is to show that following the general context of his works here also Pato?ka consistently deals with the central issue of his philosophy, namely the life-world . In Pato?ka's view it was already the rise of ancient philosophy, and especially of the (...) mathematical natural science that destroyed the original uniform picture of the universe, splitting man's world into the natural world on one hand and the world construed by the mathematical natural science on the other hand. Further, the paper shows Pato?ka's view of phenomenology, which he has seen as a means, with the help of which this dichotomy could be resolved, as well as Pato?ka's criticism of the original Husserlian concept of phenomenology, which failed to avoid its subjectivist and solipsist tendencies. The problem of lifeworld led Pato?ka not only to the principles of non-subjective phenomenolog, but it also became the basis of his philosophy of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This article begins with three problems of “dual loyalties” in medicine, the supposed fact that military physicians are, as medical officers, sometimes required to do what violates ordinary medical ethics—for example, ignore medical need in order to treat their own wounded before civilians or wounded enemy, help make chemical or biological weapons more deadly, or assist at a rough interrogation. These problems are analyzed as special cases of a problem that could arise in any profession, a problem easily (...) resolved using a theory of professional ethics absent from medical ethics until now though common outside. Employing a physician—rather than an ordinary officer, some other kind of healer, or scientist—is to enter a sort of “Ulysses contract” requiring the physician’s professional standards to preempt obligations otherwise applying to an employee. In this way, the article also illustrates the benefits that might accrue to medical ethics from drawing on other fields of practical ethics. (shrink)

Introduction. The article analyzes the problem of substantiating morality in revolutionary activity using the example of L. D. Trotsky’s articles. The relevance of the article is connected with its consideration of ethical ideas, which are largely common to Marxist and generally left-radical philosophy. In addition, the works of L. D. Trotsky that we are considering, for political reasons, entered into free scientific circulation relatively recently, and to date have not received a sufficient amount of versatile academic commentary, primarily (...) philosophical. The purpose of the study is to analyze the position of L. D. Trotsky regarding the use of violence as a means of achieving political goals, to identify the main arguments and principles underlying his approach to this problem, and also to assess its influence on political thought and practice. As a result of the analysis, the authors strive to provide readers with a deeper understanding of the problematic ethical aspects of using violence in politics through the prism of the ideas and views of Leo Trotsky. Methods. The authors use historical and hermeneutic methods. The first allows us to explore the context of the time in which the ethical views of L. D. Trotsky developed, and the second allows us to identify in his texts the basic principles and ideas characteristic of revolutionary radicalism. In addition, general scientific methods were used: analysis, synthesis, comparison and generalization, which made it possible to organize the material, identify patterns and draw conclusions based on a comparison of the ethical views of L. D. Trotsky with various ethical systems, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses in these views. Scientific novelty of the research. The authors focus on the problematic substantiation of morality in the articles of L. D. Trotsky, primarily such as “Terrorism and Communism” (1920) and “Their Morality and Ours” (1938, written in exile). At the same time, Western research on this topic is analyzed, as well as the controversy that unfolded between Trotsky and Bertrand Russell. It is noted that based on the statements of F.M. Dostoevsky that building a just society is impossible with the help of immoral means, since the goal can be transformed depending on the methods of achieving it. The problematic nature of the concept of conscience and possible options for its inadequate interpretation are revealed: (1) when it replaces the moral and metaphysical ideal (I. Kant, L. Tolstoy), or (2) it is completely declared a “chimera”, identified with selfish aspirations, the need to capture and retain power, hiding behind some ideals. It is indicated that the second position is characteristic of L. Trotsky, who tried to “morally” justify total revolutionary violence. Results. The authors come to the conclusion that Trotsky’s position is essentially an extremely utilitarian and revolutionary version of Machiavellianism, when, for the sake of an allegedly good goal, it becomes possible to carry out mass repressions, to sacrifice not only people, but also entire nations. It turned out that sworn political opponents, Stalin and Trotsky, assessed the role of violence in politics in a similar way. At the same time, the launched flywheel of violence cannot be stopped so easily; it destroyed Trotsky himself. Nevertheless, the fact that Trotsky addressed this item speaks to the importance of resolving the moral problems associated with revolutionary practice. (shrink)

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic introduced new challenges to provide care and educate junior doctors (resident physicians). We sought to understand the positive and negative experiences of first-year resident physicians and describe potential ethical issues from their stories.MethodWe used narrative inquiry (NI) methodology and applied a semistructured interview guide with questions pertaining to ethical principles and both positive and negative aspects of the pandemic. Sampling was purposive. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Three members of the research team coded (...) transcripts in duplicate to elicit themes. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion to attain consensus. A composite story with threads was constructed.Results11 residents participated across several programmes. Three main themes emerged from the participants’ stories: (1) complexities in navigating intersecting healthcare and medical education systems, (2) balancing public health and the public good versus the individual and (3) fair health systems planning/healthcare delivery. Within these themes, participants’ journeys through the first wave were elicited through the threads of (1) engage us, (2) because we see the need for the duty to treat and (3) we are all in this together.DiscussionCases of the ethical issues that took place during the COVID-19 pandemic may serve as a foundation on which ethics teaching and future pandemic planning can take place. Principles of clinical ethics and their limitations, when applied to public health issues, could help in contrasting clinical ethics with public health ethics.ConclusionEfforts to understand how resident physicians can navigate public health emergencies along with the ethical issues that arise could benefit both residency education and healthcare systems. (shrink)

Litigation and mediation offer substantive and important approaches toward resolving environmental disputes. Yet as currently practiced both approaches have shortcomings. For example, litigation often promotes divisive, adversarial relationships. Mediation often yields untenable ground given the seriousness of many environmental problems. This paper offers a reconception of both approaches. It is argued that both litigation and mediation need to be embedded within a more ethically comprehensive context, one of ‘courting ethical community’. Discussion focuses on what it means in this (...) sense to court, on what defines and bounds the ethical, and how courting depends on understanding not only differences but commonalities in people's environmental views and values. (shrink)

...It is clear that there exists in the history of ethics the problem that naturalist systems of ethics frequently fall prey to the entailment of behavioral determinism. If this occurs, it robs the ethic of doing any real work. Instead of proscribing correct and incorrect action, or allowing those considering the situation and activity to meaningfully assign praise or blame, the naive naturalist ethic functions only as a psychological thesis: that one will behave according to whatever psychological or mechanical (...) program one is informed by.The question of this paper was whether Aristotle's system falls prey to such a difficulty given his reliance on the individual's established character as one of the bases upon which ethical decisions are made. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do (...) so, we will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

In the management and business ethics literatures, stakeholder engagement has been demonstrated to lead to more ethical management practices. However, there may be limits on the extent to which stakeholder engagement can, as currently conceptualized, resolve some of the more difficult ethical challenges faced by managers. In this paper we argue that stakeholder engagement, when seen as a way of reducing five types of knowledge problems—risk, ambiguity, complexity, equivocality, and a priori irreducible uncertainty—can aid managers in resolving (...) such ethical challenges. Using a practical illustration of the ethical challenges surrounding the development and application of genetic modification technologies, we demonstrate how stakeholder engagement enables managers to better address these knowledge problems, thereby to manage more ethically. In this way, we suggest that stakeholder engagement has an even more crucial role to play in business ethics research and practice. (shrink)

Train crashes cause, on average, a handful of deaths each year in the UK. Technologies exist that would save the lives of some of those who die. Yet these technical innovations would cost hundreds of millions of pounds. Should we spend the money? How can we decide how to trade off life against financial cost? Such dilemmas make public policy is a battlefield of values, yet all too often we let technical experts decide the issues for us. Can philosophy help (...) us make better decisions? Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry is the first book to subject important and controversial areas of public policy to philosophical scrutiny. Jonathan Wolff, a renowned philosopher and veteran of many public committees, such as the Gambling Review Body, introduces and assesses core problems and controversies in public policy from a philosophical standpoint. Each chapter is centred on an important area of public policy where there is considerable moral and political disagreement. Topics discussed include: Can we defend inflicting suffering on animals in scientific experiments for human benefit? What limits to gambling can be achieved through legislation? What assumptions underlie drug policy? Can we justify punishing those who engage in actions that harm only themselves? What is so bad about crime? What is the point of punishment? Other chapters discuss health care, disability, safety and the free market. Throughout the book, fundamental questions for both philosopher and policy maker recur: what are the best methods for connecting philosophy and public policy? Should thinking about public policy be guided by an ‘an ideal world’ or the world we live in now? If there are ‘knock down’ arguments in philosophy why are there none in public policy? Each chapter concludes with ‘Lessons for Philosophy’ making this book not only an ideal introduction for those coming to philosophy, ethics or public policy for the first time, but also a vital resource for anyone grappling with the moral complexity underlying policy debates. (shrink)

The model of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) defended in the ASBH Core Competencies report has gained significant traction among scholars and healthcare providers. On this model, the aim of CEC is to facilitate deliberative reflection and thereby resolve conflicts and clarify value uncertainty by invoking and pursuing a process of consensus building. It is central to the model that the facilitated consensus falls within a range of allowable options, defined by societal values: prevailing legal requirements, widely endorsed organizational policies, and (...) professional standards of practice and codes of conduct. Moreover, the model stipulates that ethics consultants must refrain from giving substantive recommendations regarding how parties to a moral disagreement in the clinic should evaluate their options. We argue that this model of CEC is incomplete, because it wrongly assumes that what counts as the proper set of allowable options among which the parties are to deliberate will itself always be clearly discernible. We illustrate this problem with a recent case on which one of us consulted—a neonate born with trisomy 18 (T18). We try to show that law, policy, and standards of practice reveal no clear answer to the question posed by the case: namely, whether forgoing gastrostomy tube feedings for a baby with T18 is allowable. We suggest there may be other kinds of cases in which it may simply be unsettled whether a given choice falls within the set of allowable options within which consensus is to be facilitated. What should an ethicist do when confronting such unsettled cases? We agree with the facilitation model that an ethicist should remain neutral among the allowable options, when it is clear what the allowable options are. But, in unsettled cases, the role of a consultant should be expanded to include a process of moral inquiry into what the allowable options should be. We end by raising the issue of whether this means an ethicist should share his or her own conclusions or views about the allowability of a given clinical option. (shrink)

BackgroundAdolescents living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) experience challenges, including lack of involvement in their care as well nondisclosure of HIV status, which leads to poor adherence to antiretroviral therapy (ART). Parents have authority over their children, but during adolescence there is an increasing desire for independence. The aim of the study was to explore adolescents’ experience of challenges identified by adolescents ages 10–19 years attending HIV care and treatment at Temeke Regional Referral Hospital in Tanzania. MethodsAn exploratory descriptive qualitative (...) design was employed in the HIV Care and Treatment Centre (CTC) in the Out-Patient Department at the Temeke Regional Referral Hospital in Tanzania with adolescents living with HIV who were 10–19 years of age. A total of 22 adolescents participated in semi-structured face-to-face interviews after parental consent and adolescent assent were obtained. Participants were interviewed about their participation in decisions to be tested for HIV and enrolled in the CTC, concerns surrounding disclosure of their HIV status to the adolescent or to others, stigma and discrimination, and the effect of these challenges on their adherence to medication. All interviews were audio-taped, transcribed verbatim in Swahili, and back-translated to English. Data analysis included both inductive and deductive thematic analysis.ResultsQualitative themes identified included lack of participation in decisions about HIV testing, challenges to enrollment in care and treatment; issues around disclosure of HIV status, such as delays in disclosure to the adolescent and disclosure to other persons and benefits and harms of such disclosures; and factors supporting and interfering with adherence to ART, such as parental support, organizational (clinic) support and problems, and self-stigmatization and shame.ConclusionLack of adolescents’ involvement in their care decision making and delayed disclosure of HIV status to the adolescent were identified concerns, leading to poor adherence to ART among adolescents. Disclosure to others, especially teachers, helped adolescents at school to take their medication properly. Disclosure to others led to stigma and discrimination for some adolescents. More research is needed to better understand the role of disclosure and its benefits and challenges for HIV-positive adolescents in Tanzania. (shrink)

Many environmental problems are longitudinal collective action problems. They arise from the cumulative unintended effects of a vast amount of seemingly insignificant decisions and actions by individuals who are unknown to each other and distant from each other. Such problems are likely to be effectively addressed only by an enormous number of individuals each making a nearly insignificant contribution to resolving them. However, when a person’s making such a contribution appears to require sacrifice or costs, the problem of (...) inconsequentialism arises: given that a person’s contribution, although needed (albeit not necessary), is nearly inconsequential to addressing the problem and may require some cost from the standpoint of the person’s own life, why should the person make the effort, particularly when it is uncertain (or even unlikely) whether others will do so? In this article I argue that justifications for making the effort to respond to longitudinal collective action environmental problems are, on the whole, particularly well supported by virtue-oriented normative theories, on which character traits are evaluated as virtues and vices consequentially or teleologically and actions are evaluated in terms of virtues and vices. If ethical theories are to be assessed on their theoretical and practical adequacy, and if providing a compelling response to the problem of inconsequentialism is an instance of such adequacy, then this is a reason for preferring virtue-oriented ethical theory over non-virtue-oriented ethical theories, such as Kantian, act utilitarian, and global utilitarian theories. (shrink)

Since the 1960s, it has been recognized that “medical ethics,” the area of inquiry about the obligations of practitioners of medicine, is inadequate for capturing and addressing the complexities associated with modern medicine, human health, and wellbeing. Subsequently, a new specialty emerged which involved scholars and professionals from a variety of disciplines who had an interest in healthcare ethics. The name adopted is variously biomedical ethics or bioethics. The practice of bioethics in clinical settings is clinical ethics and its (...) primary aim is to resolve patient care issues and conflicts. Nurses are among these clinical ethicists. They are drawn to the study and practice of bioethics and its applications as way to address the problems encountered in practice. A significant number are among the ranks of clinical ethicists. However, in the role of bio- or clinical ethicist, some retained the title of their original profession, calling themselves nurse ethicists, and some did not. In this article, we explore under which conditions it is permissible or preferable that one retains one’s prior profession’s nomenclature as a prefix to “ethicist,” under which conditions it is not, and why. We emphasize the need for transparency of purpose related to titles and their possible influence on individual and social good. (shrink)

Bad philosophy is responsible for the climate and nature crises, and other global problems too that threaten our future. That sounds mad, but it is true. A philosophy of science, or of theatre or life is a view about what are, or ought to be, the aims and methods of science, theatre or life. It is in this entirely legitimate sense of “philosophy” that bad philosophy is responsible for the crises we face. First, and in a blatantly obvious way, those (...) institutions, organizations, corporations, businesses, endeavours, and activities of humanity that cause the crises and global problems we face, do so because of the aims they pursue (profit perhaps, or power, or heat and light for homes), and the methods adopted in pursuit of those aims – the philosophy in other words, built into the institution, organization, business, human activities, or whatever it may be. It is the philosophy of these institutions, organizations and activities that we need to change to put a stop to, or at least lessen the severity of, the crises we face, the global problems that confront us, above all the climate and nature crises. One institution has an especially crucial role in this respect: our universities. They are dominated in a multitude of ways by a particularly disastrous philosophy, a philosophy of inquiry which may be called knowledge-inquiry. This holds that the basic aim of the university is to acquire and apply knowledge. First, knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help solve social problems. But this philosophy of knowledge-inquiry is an intellectual disaster. As a result, universities are, in devastating and almost entirely unrecognized ways, humanitarian disasters too. Judged from the standpoint of helping to promote human welfare, the university shaped by the philosophy of knowledge-inquiry violates THREE of the four most elementary rules of rational problem solving conceivable in a wholesale, structural fashion, and it is this gross, wholesale, structural irrationality of the university, unnoticed by all but a few scientists and scholars, that is in part responsible for the creation of our grave global problems, and our current incapacity to learn how to solve them. The pursuit of knowledge, conducted in universities, within the framework of knowledge-inquiry over the decades and centuries, has produced much of great benefit to humanity. It has made the modern world possible. It has led to modern power production, modern industry and armaments, modern agriculture, modern hygiene and medicine, modern travel and communications, and the internet. But these very successes have also created many of our most serious current global problems: the climate crisis; the destruction of natural habitats, the catastrophic loss of wild life, and impending mass extinction of species (the nature crisis); the lethal character of modern war; the impact on the natural world of the rapid growth of the human population; the menace posed by nuclear weapons; pollution of earth, sea and air; threats to democracy caused in part by the internet and social media. All these grave global problems have been made possible by modern science and technology, pursued largely in universities within the framework of knowledge-inquiry. Nevertheless, it is not science and technology as such that are the problem, but science pursued in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental task of the university to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, so that progress may be made to a better world. Science and technology, pursued within the framework of knowledge-inquiry, create for some of us the power to act, but not the power to act wisely – not the power to learn how to resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways. For that, we need our institutions of learning, above all our universities, to take as their primary task to help humanity learn how to do it. In order to do that, the philosophy of inquiry put into practice by universities needs to be dramatically transformed. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry – a revolution in the philosophy of the university, all around the world, wherever possible, so that the basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom, construed to be the capacity, active endeavour, and perhaps desire, to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom in this sense including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides, methods being dramatically modified too so as to help achieve the new academic aim. The basic task of the university would be, not to solve problems of knowledge, but rather to help people in the social world beyond the university to resolve conflicts and problems of living so that what is of value in life may be realized by everyone, insofar as that is possible. The pursuit of knowledge would be vital, but not intellectually fundamental. The intellectual and institutional revolution we so urgently need in our universities would affect every discipline and aspect of the university; it would dramatically affect both research and education, and the whole way the university is related to the rest of the social world. The revolution, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry would dramatically enhance the intellectual integrity and rationality of natural science, social inquiry, the humanities and technology, the character of these disciplines and the relationships they have with one another. University education throughout the university would be dramatically improved. And academic inquiry as a whole would do what, on the whole, it fails to do at present: it would help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational and, as a result, increasingly successful ways, progress at last being made to a genuinely good, civilized world – a world in which there is peace, justice, liberal democracy, individual freedom, education, reasonable equality, sustainable prosperity and worthwhile opportunities in life, all of these for everyone, insofar as this is possible. Why, it may be asked, has academic philosophy not noticed that we urgently need to transform the current bad philosophy of inquiry of knowledge-inquiry into the far more intellectually rigorous and humanly valuable philosophy of wisdom-inquiry, so that we can begin to do what so far we have failed to do so lamentably: learn how to avoid impending disasters, and even make progress to a better world, something that seems at present almost unthinkable given the horrors of war, poverty, political enslavement of the 20th century, and the horrors of this century so far too? The answer is that academic philosophy is in a particularly pitiful state, as philosophers themselves, are just beginning to realize and lament. That is why academic philosophers are blind to the intellectual and humanitarian disaster of the bad philosophy that dominates universities today, and inconceivable to them to them that they might have, as a disciplinary task, to ensure academic inquiry implements a good philosophy of inquiry, and advocate and argue for change if it does not. Once upon a time, in Europe at least, philosophy was an intellectual power in the world. In the 17th century it created modern science which massively increased and improved our knowledge and understanding of the world, which in turn led to the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, and the modern world. Philosophy was once so intellectually powerful and influential that it changed the course of history. But philosophy also made in the past three disastrous intellectual blunders: the post-Cartesian blunder, the post-Newtonian blunder, and the Enlightenment blunder. Never acknowledged and corrected by subsequent philosophy right down to the present, these unrecognized intellectual blunders rendered academic philosophy the esoteric, pathetic, and powerless discipline it is today, so that throughout the last century and, so far, throughout this one, academic philosophy has remained blind to the intellectual disaster of knowledge-inquiry, and thus failed entirely to take up its proper disciplinary task of warning fellow academics of the structural irrationality of the philosophy that prevails in the university, and of proposing what steps need to be taken to put things right. Instead of performing such an urgently needed philosophical task, so-called analytic philosophy was reduced to analysing the meaning of words. Since then, there has been hardly any discernible improvement, even if analysis of concepts no longer dominates the scene. Bad academic philosophy is indeed responsible for intellectual and humanitarian failures of the university. What the three past intellectual blunders of philosophy are, why their persistence so dramatically reduces academic philosophy to a triviality, and why, furthermore, this results in the failure of scientists and scholars to see what is so blatantly bad about the philosophy prevailing in universities around the world – the failure to see what so urgently needs to be done to put right what has been wrong for so long: all this is made clear in this book. A new kind of philosophy emerges during the course of the argument, critical fundamentalism, which has as its task to keep alive imaginative and critical – that is rational – thinking about our fundamental problem: How can our human world, the world we experience and live in – the world of living things, people, consciousness, free will, meaning and value – how can all of this exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe? That problem encompasses all others of life, science and thought. Critical fundamentalism tries to improve answers to aspects of this problem; but it also seeks to encourage everyone to think about the problem, from time to time, and think about how it interacts, in both directions, with more urgent particular and specialized problems of life and thought. Critical fundamentalism sets out to help improve bad philosophy wherever it is to be found: in social, political, commercial, legal, financial, and international life; and especially in academia, in institutions of learning, so that they become devoted to enhancing the capacity of people to learn how to achieve what is of genuine value in this brief life of a few decades if we are fortunate. Critical fundamentalism does everything it can to bring about the revolution in our universities we so urgently need. If taken up by mainstream philosophy, it might really have an impact, and begin to transform universities for the better, in both intellectual and humanitarian terms, and thus, enable humanity to learn how, after the grim failures and horrors of the last century and this one, to make progress to a better world. -/- . (shrink)

Ethical problems are common in clinical medicine, so medical volunteers who practice clinical medicine in developing countries should expect to encounter them just as they would in their practice in the developed world. However, as this article argues, medical volunteers in developing countries should not expect to encounter the same ethical problems as those that dominate Western biomedicine or to address ethical problems in the same way as they do in their practice in developed countries. For example, (...) poor health and advanced disease increase the risks and decrease the potential benefits of some interventions. Consequently, when medical volunteers intervene too readily, without considering the nutritional and general health status of patients, the results can be devastating. Medical volunteers cannot assume that the outcomes of interventions in developing countries will be comparable to the outcomes of the same interventions in developed countries. Rather, they must realistically consider the complex medical conditions of patients when determining whether or not to intervene. Similarly, medical volunteers may face the question of whether to provide a pharmaceutical or perform an intervention that is below the acceptable standard of care versus the alternative of doing nothing. This article critically explores the contextual features of medical volunteer work in developing countries that differentiate it from medical practice in developed countries, arguing that this context contributes to the creation of unique ethical problems and affects the way in which these problems should be analyzed and resolved. (shrink)

The articles by Brooks-Gum, Fisher, Hoagwood, Liss, and Scott-Jones (all this issue) present a panoply of real-world ethical issues in conducting scientific research on risky behaviors of children, adolescents, and their parents, particularly those from vulnerable populations. The universal, ethical principles of beneficence, justice, and respect for others are always applicable, but they do not resolve issues of child assent, parental consent, legal reporting requirements for illegal behaviors, and the special problems of studying risky behaviors in risky populations. (...) Taken as a group, the articles raise some of the most interesting ethical problems that arise in developmental research. My discussion elaborates some issues and fails to resolve others. I hold the view that both science and ethics can be served by thoughtfully designed and implemented research on important social issues, but that the studies themselves cannot simultaneously solve the many societal problems of participants and be scientifically credible. (shrink)

. The management of ethics within organisations typically occurs within a problem-solving frame of reference. This often results in a reactive, problem-based and externally induced approach to managing ethics. Although basing ethics management interventions on dealing with and preventing current and possible future unethical behaviour are often effective in that it ensures compliance with rules and regulations, the approach is not necessarily conducive to the creation of sustained ethical cultures. Nor does the approach afford (mainly internal) stakeholders (...) the opportunity to be co-designers of the organisations ethical future. The aim of this paper is to present Appreciative Inquiry (AI) as an alternative approach for developing a shared meaning of ethics within an organisation with a view to embrace and entrench ethics, thereby creating a foundation for the development of an ethical cul- ture over time. A descriptive case study based on an application of AI is used to illustrate the utility of AI as a way of thinking and doing to precede and complement problem-based ethics management systems and interventions. (shrink)

This text gives business students a sense that problems of business policy can be resolved, in part, by ideas from philosophy, social theory, and law. It enables students to view ethical principles as a response to an evolving set of problems related to harmonizing values in a pluralistic society.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pragmatist Ethics: A Problem-Based Approach to What Matters by James Jakób LiszkaHenrik RydenfeltJames Jakób Liszka (Ed) Pragmatist Ethics: A Problem-Based Approach to What Matters Albany: SUNY Press, 2021; 192 pp., incl. indexThere appears to be increasing interest in public discussion and debate on ethical issues in our societies motivated by concerns regarding economic growth within the limits of the environment, the development [End Page 253] (...) of "autonomous" machines and advances in artificial intelligence, and issues of justice and equality under conditions of global emergencies such as climate change. Over the past twenty years, numerous philosophers have produced important works on the ethical perspectives and social and political philosophy of the classic thinkers of the pragmatist tradition, including several volumes on John Dewey and William James, and a volume on Charles S. Peirce that James Liszka also published in 2021. However, there exist few general statements of the potential of the pragmatist approach to the topic of ethics in general. For this reason, Liszka's new book outlining pragmatist ethics is welcome. Despite its concise presentation of only about 170 pages, Liszka manages to discuss a number of pragmatist notions and views both in their historical context and in contrast and comparison with contemporary arguments, particularly ones developed in the fields of metaethics and normative ethics of the analytic tradition.As both a scholar and a philosopher, Liszka offers his own perspective on the pragmatist approach and what is unique and distinctive about it. In the introduction, the pragmatist perspective is described as beginning with an examination of actual problems to develop solutions that may reveal what would be good or better than the present, rather than aiming at the development of a concept of the good that could then be applied in particular cases. The remainder of the book can be characterised as developing this notion of ethics through the lenses of philosophical debates, both historical and contemporary, on practical reasoning, community, inquiry, and moral progress. Following the introduction, Liszka presents in the second chapter his pragmatist, problem-based ethics as a response to the "tragedy of life", in the sense of an inevitable conflict of goods and values, with the melioristic slogan "solve problems, and good will follow". In the third chapter, Liszka delves deeper into the roots of his problem-based ethics by looking at the writings of the classical pragmatists, including Peirce's maxim of pragmatism, James's account of truth as that which brings us into a satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, Peirce's notion of the community of inquiry, and Dewey's account of democracy as the setting for solving the problems of the community. James Wallace's account of practices as potential solutions for problems provides Liszka with an important stepping stone to his conclusion, drawn at the end of this chapter, that in order to solve problems, practices must aim to attain a good end in the right way.However, this formal conclusion does not provide specific guidance on how problems should be solved. Providing such guidance is the task of practical reason, the subject of chapter four. Liszka's discussion develops pragmatist perspectives on practical reasoning based on Wallace's account, Robert Brandom's distinctions between shapes of practical reasoning, as well as Peirce's account of desire. All of these are brought to [End Page 254] bear in long-standing debates in meta-ethics. In particular, to counter subjectivism and other familiar issues with the Humean desire-belief account of moral motivation (or internalism about moral motivation), Liszka—again drawing from Wallace's notion—argues that practices are not subjective but collectively approved and institutionalised.The presence of problems indicates that something is not working within the practice in question. Pragmatists typically suggest that inquiry could be deployed to solve problems. This is why in chapter five normative science is considered. Liszka's central project is to make sense of the pragmatist stance that moral inquiries and judgments can be made scientific, and that normative claims can be tested by observing the results actually attained. Liszka argues that "the norms of practical reasoning derive their... (shrink)

One merit claimed for john rawls's coherence method, Wide reflective equilibrium, Is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. The two tiered conception of philosophical method is not limited to ethics. The most detailed exposition of the conception can be found in r m chisholm's various discussions of the problem of the criterion. While chisholm's work has (...) played a major role in structuring the way epistemologists think about method, It has not similarly influenced the deliberations of moral theorists. But moral philosophers are not the only ones with myopia, For neither rawls's coherentist method nor classical moral intuitionism figure in chisholm's taxonomy. One aim is to correct the vision of both parties by expanding chisholm's taxonomy in order to make clear how intuitionism and rawls's coherentist method are related to the methods identified by chisholm. My other aim is to argue for coherentism of the sort defended by rawls against the other non-Skeptical methods I consider. (shrink)