Combining genetic algorithms that produce complex, fluid, biomorphic shapes with probabilistic systems that incorporate randomness, the designers attempt to mimic adaptive systems in natural evolution in order to arrive at intelligent design solutions. The design processes are said to be interactive and sensitive to varying conditions, behaving like an exceptionally perceptive and adaptive organism during an evolutionary process (Somol 2004: 8687); this process can be compared to the recent attempt by the architectural avant-garde to move beyond the (...) semiotic interests of deconstructionism and tap into the authority of the natural sciences. In some sense, an analogy can be drawn to natural evolution. In the natural world, adaptation and change result from an iterative progress, from one generation to the next, driven by mutation, recombination, and the survival of the fittest in the sense of selection. Following the model of nature in architecture, as proposed by some proponents of parametricism, should not be expected to make buildings more precisely adapted to particular circumstances and optimally functional. Evolutionary theory is used in contemporary architecture as a form of legitimization. It can also cast light on ethical issues, not reducing the human mind's creative intelligence to some sort of genetic determinism, developing in the free market of social choice. Therefore, searching for better ways of managing resources should be at the core of an adaptive concept of architecture. (shrink)

Ligation is a form of chemical self-assembly that involves dynamic formation of strong covalent bonds in the presence of weak associative forces. We study an extremely simple form of ligation by means of a dissipative particle dynamics (DPD) model extended to include the dynamic making and breaking of strong bonds, which we term dynamically bonding dissipative particle dynamics (DDPD). Then we use a chemical genetic algorithm (CGA) to optimize the model’s parameters to achieve a limited form of ligation of trimers—a (...) proof of principle for the evolutionary design of self-assembling chemical systems. (shrink)

In this article, I first interpret and evaluate the main argument of E. V. R. Kojonen's book, The Compatibility of Evolution and Design. I then address a challenge against this argument (as well as against design arguments in general), namely, the problem of seemingly malevolent and bad designs in nature. Evolutionary theodicists commonly deal with this problem by assuming that the evolutionary process is not fully under God's control. This solution, however, is deeply problematic from the (...) perspective of classical theism. I therefore suggest another approach to the problem, inspired by the thought of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

(1999). Evolutionary systems design: A soft technology for hard challenges. World Futures: Vol. 54, Challenges of Evolution at Pat I: The Human Factor in Evolution, pp. 313-335.

For Bering, appreciating that people are objects is a developmental accomplishment. Baldwin and Piaget agree. However, for Piaget, an immanent conception of the divine is more developed than a separate transcendent God. Culture also matters. In Plato's Phaedo, Socrates' belief in immortality was a reasoned conclusion – not “built in” – for reasons similar to those still held by modern scientists.

In the first half of the twentieth century there was a remarkable convergence of art and design in De Stijl, Constructivism and the Bauhaus. But in the second half of the twentieth century fine art relinquished its liaison with design due to the influence of Dada and Surrealism's postromantic antagonism to practical-functionalism. Dada and Surrealism and postmodern fine art are characterized by a critique of the dominant social discourse of functionalism and the demand for a sublime poetics to (...) be brought into everyday life. This article argues that the apparent antipathy between postmodern fine art and design can be ameliorated if we critically analyse interpretations of evolutionary theory by postromantic philosophers such as Nietzsche, Bergson, and Deleuze and Guattari. When Bergson notes that practical-functional reasoning was created by evolution he reveals a flaw in the pursuit of an aesthetics that is totally opposed to commonsense and practical-functionalism. And when we turn to Deleuze and Guattari we find another valuable concept in the form of their notion of the machinic, which assists further in reconciling the postromantic emphasis on the sublime with the practicality of mechanism. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the machinic is informed by chaos theory, which allows further elaboration in terms of complexity theory. Complexity theory can be understood as a process philosophy that has no need to figure the sublime in terms of a mysterious force of nature because the mystery is located within complex interactions among a manifold of components, what one might refer to as a cosmic, machinic, combinatoire that arises out of what Christopher Langton has called the edge of chaos. This makes it possible to replace the emphasis on desire as the fundamental force of nature evident in Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari with a complexity-theoretical concept of a cosmicmachinic combinatoire. It is then possible to formulate a machinic, evolutionary aesthetics that can reconcile the postromantic demand for sublimity with the demand for practical-functionalism that lies at the heart of the discipline of design. In place of the modernist machine aesthetic that informed De Stijl, Constructivism and the Bauhaus we would have a postmodernist machinic aesthetic. (shrink)

The Evolutionary Guidance System (EGS) is a holistic and inclusive model for designing self-organizing social systems. Such a model must be driven by evolutionary values articulated by the members of the system. The small community is an ideal context for the "growing" of an Evolutionary Guidance System. This paper describes the creation of an EGS in a community organization. The rational for the activity is to bring harmony and build community among the members of the organization and, (...) at the same time, to reach out and include the larger community. This organization can provide a model for other organizations in the town, and the ultimate goal is to install an EGS as a nongovernmental design system for the town. (shrink)

Recent work in the cognitive sciences has argued that beliefs sometimes acquire signaling functions in virtue of their ability to reveal information that manipulates “mindreaders.” This paper sketches some of the evolutionary and design considerations that could take agents from solipsistic goal pursuit to beliefs that serve as social signals. Such beliefs will be governed by norms besides just the traditional norms of epistemology. As agents become better at detecting the agency of others, either through evolutionary history (...) or individual learning, the candidate pool for signaling expands. This logic holds for natural and artificial agents that find themselves in recurring social situations that reward the sharing of one’s thoughts. (shrink)

In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore 's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the ‘scale-relativity’ considerations built into Binmore 's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and extend Binmore (...) 's theory in a number of respects, integrating it with Kim Sterelny's and Don Ross's recent work on the evolution of people as cultural entities. The account also yields a novel basis for choosing between socialism and what Binmore calls ‘whiggery’ as normative political programs. Key Words: theory of justice • bargaining theory • evolutionary game theory • human evolution • Ken Binmore • Herbert Gintis • Kim Sterelny. (shrink)

(1993). Evolutionary competence in the postmodern family: An idealized design approach. World Futures: Vol. 36, Evolutionary Consciousness, pp. 81-105.

This article shows how Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of science can bring resolution to a recent controversy: the controversy that arises from Intelligent Design theorists' and proponents of neo-Darwinian evolution. Intelligent Design theories argue that the complex structures of living organisms cannot be adequately explained by neo-Darwinian theories, especially by its postulate of random variations. Hence, an "intelligent designer" must be postulated in order to fill out scientific explanations. This article finds fault with the Intelligent Design arguments, but (...) proposes a different form of design argument–one that accepts neo-Darwinian evolution (or something very much like it). It shows how Lonergan's analysis of scientific methods grounds his account of evolution, and how much this can overcome the most basic Intelligent Design objections. It then shows how Lonergan's philosophy of God also can offer a design argument based, not in the complexity of this or that organism, but in the "design" of evolution itself. /// O presente artigo mostra até que ponto a filosofia da ciência de Bernard Lonergan pode trazer resolução à recente controvérsia suscitada pelos defensores da Teoria do Desígnio Inteligente, teoria essa fortemente atacada pelos defensores neo-darwinistas da teoria da evolução. As teorias do Desígnio Inteligente defendem que as estruturas complexas dos organismos vivos não podem ser adequadamente explicadas pelas teorias neo-darwinistas, especialmente pelo seu postulado relativo às variações de acaso. Nesse sentido, um agente Inteligente teria de ser postulado em ordem a prover as necessárias explicações científicas. O autor do presente artigo, porém, considera que a argumentação dos defensores do Desígnio Inteligente é defeituosa, pelo queavança um novo argumento de desígnio, um efectivamente que aceita a teoria da evolução neo-darwiniana (ou algo muito semelhante a ela). Em suma, o artigo mostra até que ponto a análise lonerganiana dos métodos científicos subjaz à sua própria teoria da evolução, mostrando-se assim também de que forma esta doutrina ultrapassa as objecções mais elementares dos defensores da Teoria do Desígnio Inteligente. Por fim, mostra-se ainda de que modo a filosofia de Lonergan sobre Deus pode oferecer um argumento de desígnio baseado, não na complexidade deste ou daquele organismo, mas no "desígnio" da evolução em si mesma. (shrink)

The Narrow Evolutionary Psychology Movement represents itself as a major reorientation of the social/behavioral sciences, a group of sciences previously dominated by something called the ‘Standard Social Science Model’. Narrow Evolutionary Psychology alleges that the SSSM treated the mind, and particularly those aspects of the mind that exhibit cultural variation, as devoid of any marks of its evolutionary history. Adherents of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology often suggest that the SSSM owed more to ideology than to evidence. It (...) was the child of the 1960s, representing a politically motivated insistence on the possibility of changing social arrangements such as gender roles: " ‘Not so long ago jealousy was considered a pointless, archaic institution in need of reform. But like other denials of human nature from the 1960s, this bromide has not aged well.’ ) " This view of history does not ring true to those, like the authors, who have worked in traditions of evolutionary theorizing about the mind that have a continuous history through the 1960s and beyond: traditions such as evolutionary epistemology and psychoevolutionary research into emotion (Griffiths. (shrink)

This article begins by describing the impact of systems science on the field of marriage and family therapy, discussing that systems concepts are broadly disseminated but have become diluted. The author describes the educational program at a marriage and family therapy graduate institute where students utilize social systems design in their research projects as well as their work with clients. The article outlines the specifications of the Idealized Systems Design (ISD) teaching system, its relationship with the larger institution, (...) as well as its purposes and systemic functions. Application of ISD to the field of marriage and family therapy is emphasized, demonstrating its use in helping facilitate individual, family, and community health as a research tool as well as a set of intervention tools for the practicing therapist. (shrink)

The effectiveness of evolutionary algorithms is one of the issues discussed in The Compatibility of Evolution and Design, where it is argued that such algorithms are only effective when stringent preconditions are met. This article considers this issue from the perspective of computer science. It explores the properties of problems that can be effectively solved by evolutionary algorithms, and the extent to which such algorithms need to be carefully adjusted. Although there are important differences between the study (...) of evolutionary algorithms in computer science and the study of biological evolution, it is argued that the experience of computer science can help to strengthen the claim that evolutionary mechanisms generally require a considerable degree of fine-tuning. (shrink)

(1993). A “user“‐designed mediation approach, fostering evolutionary consciousness and competence. World Futures: Vol. 36, Evolutionary Consciousness, pp. 155-164.

The current Evolutionary Psychology Movement argues that the mind/brain cannot be understood except by conceiving of it as the product of design by natural selection. Cognitive science should proceed by reconstructing the adaptive pressures that shaped the mind and then looking for mental structure predicted by this these reconstructions. It is argued that this is not a practical solution, because our ability to reconstruct the evolutionary pressures that shaped the mind is exactly proportional to our preexisting understanding (...) of mental structure. EPM's criticisms of contemporary cognitive science are strikingly similar to the criticisms of behavioristic psychology made by the founders of ethology, Lorenz and Tinbergen, fifty years ago. But the ethologists drew the conclusion that psychology should investigate the mind's performance on ecologically valid tasks. This is shown to be a more tractable proposal for injecting an evolutionary perspective into cognitive science. In the second part of the paper it is argued that the concept of 'design' central to EPM is not fully naturalistic, in the sense that it envisages a process more like intelligent design than like a realistic model of evolution by natural selection. An enriched model of evolutionary psychology is outlined, modeled on recent 'evolutionary developmental biology' approaches to morphological evolution, and which we call 'evolutionary developmental psychology'. Like 'evo-devo' more generally, EDP recognizes that selection builds systems that develop in an environment, not phenotypes that are transmitted. The nature of evolutionary dynamics is a function of the nature of development. It is argued that EDP allows a more productive integration of the role of the environment in psychological development into evolutionary psychology than has so far been achieved by EPM. (shrink)

The prevalence of optimality models in the literature of evolutionary biology is testimony to their popularity and importance. Evolutionary biologist R. C. Lewontin, whose criticisms of optimality models are considered here, reflects that "optimality arguments have become extremely popular in the last fifteen years, and at present represent the dominant mode of thought." Although optimality models have received little attention in the philosophical literature, these models are very interesting from a philosophical point of view. As will be argued, (...) optimality models are central to evolutionary thought, yet they are not readily accomodated by the traditional view of scientific theories. According to the traditional view, we would expect optimality models to employ general, empirical laws of nature, but they do not. Fortunately, the semantic view of scientific theories, a recent alternative to the traditional view, more readily accomodates optimality models. As we would expect on the semantic view, optimality models can be construed as specifications of ideal systems. These specifications may be used to describe empirical systems--that is, the specifications may have empirical instances. But the specifications are not empirical claims, much less general, empirical laws. Although philosophers have yet to discuss the general features and uses of optimality models, these topics have stimulated much recent discussion among evolutionary biologists. Their discussions raise a number of precautions concerning the proper use of optimality models. Moreover, many of their caveats can be interpreted as general reminders that 1) optimality models specify ideal systems whose empirical instantiations may be quite restricted, and that 2) optimality models should not be construed as general, empirical laws. As G. F. Oster and E. O. Wilson caution, "the prudent course is to regard optimality models as provisional guides to further empirical research and not necessarily as the key to deeper laws of nature." It seems, then, that the semantic view of theories is more sensitive to the nature and limitations of optimality models than is the more traditional view of theories. (shrink)

I argue that Evolutionary Psychologists’ notion of adaptationism is closest to what Peter Godfrey-Smith (2001) calls explanatory adaptationism and as a result, is not a good organizing principle for research in the biology of human behavior. I also argue that adopting an alternate notion of adaptationism presents much more explanatory resources to the biology of human behavior. I proceed by introducing Evolutionary Psychology and giving some examples of alternative approaches to the biological explanation of human behavior. Next I (...) characterize adaptation and explain the range of biological phenomena that can count as adaptations. I go onto introduce the range of adaptationist views that have been distinguished by philosophers of biology and lay out explanatory adaptationism in detail. (shrink)

What is the experience of creating a synergistic approach to arts and sciences practice in a learning community focused on the notion of sustainable development? In this article, I answer this question through an evolutionary approach to societal transformation. My social research inquiry integrates the arts and sciences, a learning and design community, sustainable development, and Internet networking. Codesigners created the conditions to explore in multimodal dialogue and engage, guide, and design the emergence of what I call (...) evolutionary artscience through portfolios and a new systems design space-the ArtSciLAB (an online artscience laboratory). Eighteen individuals working in nine countries participated in the Evolutionary Learning Community Network. Our learning and design experience, guided by Evolutionary Systems Design inquiry supports General Evolution Theory. We guided the Evolutionary Learning Community Network and designed the ArtSciLAB to incubate localized knowledge for development in learning regions worldwide. (shrink)

This article presents the genesis of Evolutionary Systems Design (ESD) as a praxis that draws on General Evolution Theory and Social Systems Design methodology, in addition to Critical Systems Theory, to engage in lifelong learning and human development in partnership with the Earth. The contributions of Bela H. Banathy to the creation of ESD are portrayed as bridging evolutionary consciousness and evolutionary action. Following a brief description of the inspiration and mentorship provided by Bela in (...) this regard, the roots of ESD are traced back to General Evolution Theory. It is described how notions of evolutionary stewardship grew out of encounters with Bela and his work at the International Systems Institute, and were given operational viability through the methodology of Social Systems Design he developed. The fundamental tenets of ESD are presented and discussed by way of a four-stage evolutionary learning framework. Finally, the vehicle of Evolutionary Learning Community through which ESD operates is shown to embody the potential for individuals and groups to think, live, and act in harmony with the dynamics of which they are a part as a means to guide the conscious creation of sustainability. (shrink)

Design thinking in general, and optimality modeling in particular, have traditionally been associated with adaptationism—a research agenda that gives pride of place to natural selection in shaping biological characters. Our goal is to evaluate the role of design thinking in non-evolutionary analyses. Specifically, we focus on research into abstract design principles that underpin the functional organization of extant organisms. Drawing on case studies from engineering-inspired approaches in biology we show how optimality analysis, and other design-related (...) methods, play a specific methodological role that is tangential to the study of adaptation. To account for the role of these reasoning strategies in contemporary biology, we therefore suggest a reevaluation of the connection between design thinking and adaptationism. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology and intelligent‐design theory both need to be able to account for the empirical world, or the world as it is. This essay is an attempt to clarify the challenges these theories need to meet, if the relevant empirical findings are replicable. There is evidence of change in the biological world and of modularity of mind, and there is a growing body of work that finds evolutionary theory a convincing and fruitful account of the “design” (...) of the mind. Three major empirical findings within evolutionary psychology are presented and discussed. The author claims that Cartesian dualism, as it is usually meant within psychology—a split between body and mind—is false, but that Descartes' original division between body and soul has not been challenged and is not challenged by the evidence that the mind is also a biological entity. The article concludes that the convergence of theology and science is to be found in the onus to discover the truth about the world as it really is, and this calls for an ability on both parts to account for the empirical world. (shrink)

The evolutionary challenge for technology in the third millennium is one of designing the vehicles for sustainable human and societal development in partnership with earth. The challenge calls for the conscious creation of evolutionary systems-not through the "hard technologies" that shape and mold the physical infrastructure of our planet, but through "soft technologies" that augment creative and constructive processes of human interaction. Through them, humanity has the opportunity to create the conditions for the emergence of a true learning (...) society at both regional and global levels. The meaning of key terms such as evolution, technology, and development must be explored if we are to create a shared understanding of the contemporary survival challenges faced by humanity. This paper explores both the promise and the threat faced by a techno-civilization such as is emerging on our planet in the early twenty-first century. (shrink)

Abstract. This paper examines the impact of two formalizations of evolutionary biology on the antiselectionist critiques of the Intelligent Design (ID) movement. It looks first at attempts to apply the syntactic framework of the physical sciences to biology in the twentieth century, and to their effect upon the ID movement. It then examines the more heuristic account of biological-theory structure, namely, the semantic model. Finally, it concludes by advocating the semantic conception and emphasizing the problems that the semantic (...) model creates for ID's negative and positive theses. (shrink)

The design argument for the existence of God took a probabilistic turn in the 17 th and 18 th centuries. Earlier versions, such as Thomas Aquinas' 5 th way, usually embraced the premise that goal-directed systems (things that "act for an end" or have a function) must have been created by an intelligent designer. This idea – which we might express by the slogan "no design without a designer" – survived into the 17 th and 18 th centuries, (...) 1 and it is with us still in the writings of many creationists. The new version of the argument, inspired by the emerging mathematical theory of probability, removed the premise of necessity. It begins with the thought that goal-directed systems might have arisen by intelligent design or by chance; the problem is to discern which hypothesis is more plausible. With the epistemic concept of plausibility characterized in terms of the mathematical concept of probability, the design argument was given a new direction. The new probabilistic perspective did not extinguish the older idea of "no design without a designer." The two conflicting approaches coexisted, often with less than perfect clarity about their fundamental difference. At the same time, the details of how the probabilistic perspective ought to be articulated were slow in emerging. These characteristics of uneven development are exemplified in a debate that took place in the 18 th century among three probabilists – John Arbuthnot, Nicholas Bernoulli, and Abraham DeMoivre – on the proper explanation of human sex ratio. Arbuthnot proposed a probabilistic version of the design argument, claiming that it is intelligent design, not chance, that provides the better explanation of why slightly more boys than girls are born each year. Bernoulli rejected Arbuthnot's argument. DeMoivre defended Arbuthnot against Bernoulli's criticisms. The problem of explaining sex ratio, both in human populations and in the rest of nature, experienced another transformation after 1859 --it became a problem for the theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin (1871) addressed the question in the first edition of The Descent of Man but withdrew his suggestion in the second (Darwin 1874). Carl Düsing (1884) provided a mathematical model that moved beyond the explanation Darwin offered. Fisher (1930) added the new idea of parental expenditure. Williams (1966) argued that the sex ratios found in nature provide the opportunity to test hypotheses of group selection against hypotheses of individual selection. Hamilton (1967) constructed a model that generalizes Fisher's approach and represents the effects of both group and individual selection. The theory of natural selection gradually developed the ability to predict sex ratios, not just explain them post hoc. (shrink)

The Narrow Evolutionary Psychology Movement represents itself as a major reorientation of the social/behavioral sciences, a group of sciences previously dominated by something called the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ (SSSM; Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow, 1992). Narrow Evolutionary Psychology alleges that the SSSM treated the mind, and particularly those aspects of the mind that exhibit cultural variation, as devoid of any marks of its evolutionary history. Adherents of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology often suggest that the SSSM owed more (...) to ideology than to evidence. It was the child of the 1960s, representing a politically motivated insistence on the possibility of changing social arrangements such as gender roles: ‘Not so long ago jealousy was considered a pointless, archaic institution in need of reform. But like other denials of human nature from the 1960s, this bromide has not aged well.’ (Stephen Pinker, endorsement for Buss, 2000)) This view of history does not ring true to those, like the authors, who have worked in traditions of evolutionary theorizing about the mind that have a continuous history through the 1960s and beyond: traditions such as evolutionary epistemology (Stotz, 1996; Callebaut and Stotz, 1998) and psychoevolutionary research into emotion (Griffiths. (shrink)

Evolutionary Psychology links the methodology for cognitive science associated with the late David Marr to evolutionary theory. The mind is conceived as a bundle of modules which can be described at three theoretical levels. Each module represents an adaptation to some specific ecological problem. Evolutionary psychologists try to derive the highest level of description using a heuristic method called 'adaptive thinking'. This paper questions the value of the official EP methodology and reasserts the value of the earlier (...) methodology associated with classical ethology, in which the structural and comparative analysis of the products of evolution precedes the investigation of their origin by natural selection. The adaptive heuristic is shown to be unhelpful. It tends to restrict psychology to work designed to confirm our preconceptions. It is argued that evolutionary psychology must be retrodictive and explanatory, rather than predictive, and that a powerful method for testing postulated claims about the adaptive origin of traits is available in modern versions of the comparative method. Some arguments for the inapplicability of the comparative method to human psychoevolution are examined and shown to be specious. These various points are exemplified in evolutionary work on emotions. (shrink)

This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study and asks what it tells us about the human mind. Wolfram Hinzen lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. He introduces Chomsky's program of a 'minimalist' syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. He explains how the Minimalist Program originated in work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. (...) He considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are ahistorical and internalist in character. Linguistic meaning, he suggests, arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this he substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. Clearly written in nontechnical language and assuming a limited knowledge of the fields it examines and links, Minimal Mind Design will appeal to a wide range of scholars in linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science. It also provides an exceptionally clear insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program. (shrink)

This paper discusses how the theory of evolutionary Asiacentrism and the Peking Man findings at the Zhoukoudian site stimulated Chinese intellectuals to construct Sinocentric ethno-nationalism during the period from the late 1920s to the early 1940s. It shows that the theory was first popularized by foreign scientists in Beijing, and the Peking man discoveries further provided strong evidence for the idea that Central Asia, or to be more specific, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia, was the original cradle of humans. Chinese (...) scholars in the late 1930s and 1940s appropriated the findings to construct the monogenesis theory of the Chinese, which designated that all the diverse ethnic groups within the territory of China shared a common ancestor back to antiquity. (shrink)

Evolutionary ideas and modern biological knowledge have important roles to play in the understanding of human behaviour. Nevertheless, it is deeply misleading to regard humans as robots in the grip of their genes. A well designed brain should respond to the consequences of behaviour; if an understanding of the likely consequences can be achieved without actually performing the act, then a person who knows that they will be rewarded or punished for certain acts is bound to be influenced by (...) that knowledge. A brain designed in that way facilitates the evolution of societies with explicit social approval of certain activities and explicit disapproval of others. The evolutionary approach to psychology does not imply that individuals do not make free choices. Individuals clearly do make a big difference to what happens in their lives through their decisions. They may be surprised by the consequences of their own actions. A well designed brain should be able to anticipate the consequences of various courses of action and choose between them on the basis of their likely costs and benefits. Planning before doing is clearly of great advantage. People do make well considered decisions and they benefit from doing so. (shrink)

Much discussion on the singularity is based on the assumption that the design ability of a human can be transferred into an AI system, then rendered autonomous and self-improving. I argue here that this cannot be foreseen from the current state of the art of automatic or evolutionary design. Assuming that this will happen 'some day' is a doubtful step andmay be in the class of 'searching for the Philosopher's Stone'.

Intelligent design advocate William Dembski has introduced a measure of information called “complex specified information”, or CSI. He claims that CSI is a reliable marker of design by intelligent agents. He puts forth a “Law of Conservation of Information” which states that chance and natural laws are incapable of generating CSI. In particular, CSI cannot be generated by evolutionary computation. Dembski asserts that CSI is present in intelligent causes and in the flagellum of Escherichia coli, and concludes (...) that neither have natural explanations. In this paper, we examine Dembski’s claims, point out significant errors in his reasoning, and conclude that there is no reason to accept his assertions. (shrink)

After a brief discussion of altruism, supererogation, and the duty to rescue in American and Jewish Law, this paper turns to an examination of the challenge to altruism presented by the developing field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology is the investigation of animal behavior from the perspective of natural selection. The fundamental issue, as E.O. Wilson says, is the question, "How can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?" According to a seminal article (...) in the field, "Models that attempt to explain altruistic behavior in terms of natural selection are models designed to take the altruism out of altruism." The challenge of evolutionary psychology is that it provides a "genealogy of morals" that many have found to be disturbing. From the evolutionary perspective what crucially matters is the reproductive success of the individual animal, the transmission of its genes to later generations, and this provides the measure of its individual fitness. The evolutionary psychologist's argument proceeds by the introduction of three basic concepts: kin selection , reciprocal altruism, and indirect reciprocity. Each of these concepts is critically analyzed. It is concluded that the current status of altruism and cooperation is not affected by evolutionary history. They do have a genetic basis, but then so does everything about human beings, nastiness as well as cooperation; it does not follow that motives for cooperation are always self-serving. Nach einer kurzen Erörterung von Altruismus, Supererogation und der Hilfeleistungspflicht im amerikanischen und jüdischen Recht wendet sich der Artikel einer Untersuchung der Anforderungen zu, die die Evolutionspsychologie an den Altruismus stellt. Evolutionspsychologie ist die Erforschung tierischen Verhaltens aus der Perspektive der natürlichen Auslese. Das grundlegende Problem ist, wie E.O. Wilson sagt, die Frage: "Wie kann sich Altruismus, der per definitionem die eigenen Fähigkeiten vermindert, durch natürliche Auslese entwickeln?" Nach einem bahnbrechenden Artikel sind "Modelle, die versuchen, altruistisches Verhalten in Begriffen der natürlichen Auslese zu erklären, darauf angelegt, dem Altruismus das Altruistische zu nehmen". Die Herausforderung der Evolutionspsychologie ist die von ihr bereitgestellte "Genealogie der Sitten", die von vielen als eine Beeinträchtigung empfunden wird. Vom Standpunkt der Evolution kommt es entscheidend auf den Reproduktionserfolg des einzelnen Wesens an, auf die Übertragung seiner Gene auf spätere Generationen, und das liefert den Maßstab für seine eigenen Fähigkeiten. Die Argumentation der Evolutionspsychologen fährt mit der Einführung von drei grundlegenden Begriffen fort: "kin selection" , reziproker Altruismus und indirekte Reziprozität. Jeder dieser Begriffe wird kritisch analysiert. Daraus folgt, daß der gegenwärtige Stand von Altruismus und Kooperation von der Evolutionsgeschichte nicht beeinflußt ist. Altruismus und Kooperation haben eine genetische Basis. Aber das haben alle menschlichen Eigenschaften, Bosheit genauso wie Kooperation. Daraus folgt nicht, daß die Motive für Kooperation stets dem Handelnden dienen. (shrink)

Summary It is usually supposed that biological design arguments are made obsolete by Darwinian evolutionary theory. However, philosopher Alvin Plantinga and others have defended the continued possibility of a rational “design discourse”, in which biological order is taken as a sign of God’s purposeful action. In this article, I consider two objections to design discourse: a theological objection to biological design based on the problem of natural evil, and the evolutionary objection, according to which (...) evolutionary theory removes the justification for any biological design perception. Whereas Plantinga’s own response utilizes the arguments of the Intelligent Design movement, I argue in favor of utilizing “design discourse” as part of a theistic evolutionist view. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present a model of well-being based on current research in neurobiology and psychology, integrated in an evolutionary perspective of the human mind. Briefly, the primary purpose of nervous systems is to direct an animal toward behavior should be conducive to survival and procreation, and as a rule of thumb this implies either approach or avoidance. While behavior originally was based on reflexes, in humans the brain contains a system of negative and positive (...) affect. Although an array of functions has evolved that employ emotions in order to handle various pursuits, recent studies suggest that they converge on shared neural circuits involved in mood, that is, they converge on circuits designed to generate reward and punishment. Happiness can be construed as the net output of these brain modules. Neural circuits tend to gain in strength and influence upon frequent activation, which suggests a strategy for improving happiness and mental health: to avoid excessive stimulation of negative modules, to use cognitive interference to enhance the "turn off" function of these modules, and to exercise modules involved in positive feelings. (shrink)

In 2002, Evolution and Human Behavior published a study purporting to show that the differences in toy preferences commonly attributed to girls and boys can also be found in male and female vervet monkeys, tracing the origin of these differing preferences back to a common ancestor. Despite some flaws in its design and the prima facie implausibility of some of its central claims, this research received considerable attention in both scientific circles and the popular media. In what follows, I (...) survey some of the problems with this study that seem to be characteristic of research into sex differences in a particular research program in evolutionary psychology. I suggest that an epistemology of ignorance is at work that suppresses the methods and insights of an earlier research program, which emphasized the complexity and contingency that ultimately grounds the variety of human behaviors, in favor of one that has been widely criticized as empirically flawed and politically pernicious. I conclude with some speculative remarks on the persistence of this problematic research program in evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

Preface The status of sovereignty as a highly ambiguous concept is well established. Pointing out or deploring, the ambiguity of the idea has itself become a recurring motif in the literature on sovereignty. As the legal theorist and international lawyer Alf Ross put it, “there is hardly any domain in which the obscurity and confusion is as great as here.” 1 The concept of sovereignty is often seen as a downright obstacle to fruitful conceptual analysis, carried over from its proper (...) setting in history to “plague and befog contemporary thought.” 2 . . . So contested is the concept that, rather than pursuing the contestation, many political theorists think we should give up so protean a notion. Granting that the debate on the relevance of sovereignty frustratingly oscillates between claims that it will either continue to exist or that it is about to disappear, forgetting it altogether, and thereby escaping this seemingly endless argument, can easily appear as the most urgent task for political theory . The following argument makes a case that the “urgent task” is not the abandonment of the concept of sovereignty, but an understanding of its essential philosophical nature as an integrated and evolving expression of practical reason. Sovereignty is neither ambiguous nor obscure once its fundamental presuppositions are laid bare and its many philosophical and historical manifestations shown to be the product, in actuality, of a single, dialectally dynamic but integrated set of metaphysical elements. This is the first of three arguments describing the evolution of international law as a manifestation of practical reason through an application of philosophical method to the source , locus , and scope of the concept of sovereignty. It moves from a dialectic balance favoring utility to a balance dominated by legal right to a dialectic of duty to humanity and nature. All three arguments are meant to be a contribution to the new field of International Legal Philosophy as defined by Phillip Allott. 4 This field combines a sensitivity to legal practice with an effort to understand the underlying philosophical determinants of empirical choice and behavior. One purpose of international legal philosophy is to “remove” from the minds of those who study the law what Diderot defined as “the sophism of the ephemeral,” and what Allott calls “the disempowering idea that what xii Preface happens to exist now is inevitable and permanent.” 5 A core imperative is to “reunderstand what it is to be a thinking being” 6 and to rediscover the dialectic between the private and the public as it determines, and is redetermined by, legal practice. This requires a “revolution in the human mind” 7 so that we may transcend the current dependence on positivist methods and empirical fact as an end-in-itself, and try to understand the underlying and more constant and essential ideas and inherent dialectics that constitute the substructure or “metaphysics” of international law. I will approach this “revolution” with the use of R. G. Collingwood’s philosophical method 8 and the philosophy of David Hume, applied to international law as an expression of practical reason. The goal of philosophical method is the construction of a comprehensive policy argument (CPA) for a public policy or legal issue. In addition to the conventional use of empirical models and their logic of investigation in the study of policy and law, CPA requires that an underlying philosophical logic of concepts be deciphered to identify the ideas within the issue, and their definition, overlap, and systematic interdependence. Philosophical method is a means with which to interpret and understand competing systematic and complete conceptual logics, existing at the core of an issue and pertinent to policy change. Philosophical method is therefore not meant to be a replacement for the empirical investigation of a policy or legal issue, or the use of scientific method in social studies. Rather, it is a complimentary and prerequisite method that seeks to transcend the limitations of positivism and present a more complete understanding of the philosophical presuppositions of positivist ideas like power, interest, or strategic rationality. Philosophical method is meant to be used with the facts of the policy or legal issue to match an illuminating logic of concepts with a pertinent logic of investigation . Within the CPA, the use of philosophical method and the metaphysics of a policy or legal issue is assumed to be critical to the full understanding of the overlapping concepts, dialectics, and scale of forms that determine, and are determined by, the empirical context of the policy or legal topic. Specifically, instead of utilizing bits and pieces of various theoretical arguments to address narrowly focused empirical questions, as positivism prescribes, I will address the evolution of international law as practical reason in three phases. Each will be approached through a single integrated logic of philosophical concepts from a particular philosopher (i.e., David Hume, G. W. F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant). This philosophically holistic approach to the law is based on the assumption that only through the use of a single integrated argument in legal analysis can sovereignty, or any concept, be understood as a truly systematic and logical whole. A complete philosophical paradigm has a dialectic integrity and systematic logic that can more adequately describe the evolving essence of a concept like sovereignty. This approach also has the advantage of generating a number of distinct holistic descriptions of the law through the application of different philosophical systems, one at a time, to its factual structure. 9 Positivism does not seek Preface xiii holism, and rejects the idea that “theory” has such a characteristic. The essential or comprehensive substructure of any idea is therefore ignored in a method that recommends the observation of empirical problems through the use of whatever hodgepodge of theoretical elements is seen fit to frame its superstructure. This failure to deal with metaphysics has retarded both an essential understanding of international law as a species of legal system, and any holistic and dialectical conceptualization of its inherent concepts, like sovereignty. A second positivist convention expects modern theorists to create new theory rather than to refine and apply that of existing philosophy. This predisposition is driven by the positivist goal of discovery that ignores refinement as a possible purpose of philosophical analysis. Collingwood argues that philosophy must take that set of ideas already known and utilize existing systematic philosophical arguments to refine them so that they evolve closer to their essence as concepts. Considering this imperative, the idea of sovereignty can be assumed to have had valid usage for hundreds of years, over which time, the concept has evolved to mean different things, each a refinement of the definition that preceded it. Transcending positivism means that the scholar’s search is not for “new” material, but to decipher the metaphysical essence of a concept as it has been made manifest over time and context. These manifestations are rooted, and refined from, the known terms of that concept’s inherent idea(s). Rather than depending exclusively on positivism and its conventions, my work utilizes, in addition to Collingwood, the intact philosophical systems of Hume, Hegel, and Kant to trace the refinement of international law as a product of human practical reason. These paradigms, or integrated systems of logical concepts, will be applied to legal practice individually, so that each CPA can be deciphered separately. This provides a set of integrated and logically intact paradigms for the evolutionary stages of practical reason in international law. Because each argument is applied systematically, a deeper understanding of the source, locus, and scope in the development of law in general, and international law in particular, is possible where it is not with the application of various disconnected components of many theories. Each CPA based on Hume, Hegel, or Kant can then be used to describe a distinct context that its logic of concepts best illuminates; specifically, the (1) genesis, (2) contemporary dilemmas, and (3) future of the international legal system. By widening the perspective of international lawyers and policymakers, they can more easily perceive the dialectic of ideas that has created, and is refined by, the legal practice in which they participate. We also move toward Allott’s goal of “human self-perfecting.” 10 And, in addition, by providing a more complete knowledge of the origins of legal practice and its evolution, we illuminate the practical possibilities for what we might “choose to be” 11 in the future. To achieve this, the essential metaphysical elements of state sovereignty and its inherent evolutionary scale of forms will be deciphered and described. This will transform what appears to be a multitude of definitions and xiv Preface practical realizations of the concept of sovereignty into a set of interdependent manifestations of a single substructure, made of a single set of dialectic elements. The interpretation of international law through practical reason sorts and integrates a diverse and discordant literature and defines state sovereignty as a single concept evolving on a scale of forms that allows it to exhibit diverse character traits, all arising from different combinations of common and essential metaphysical elements. This approach, compared to positivist methods and legal realism, allows one to transcend current agreement that sovereignty is, at best, a narrowly focused set of empirical characteristics or, at worst, “organized hypocrisy.” 12 This method also encourages the scholar and practitioner to understand the predispositions and pitfalls of the concept of sovereignty, as well as its potential future paths, more effectively. The use of philosophical method to create policy paradigms out of preexisting philosophical systems and apply these to international law will be called Philosophical-Policy & Legal Design . This approach allows the use of preexisting and complete philosophical arguments that provide an adequate logic of concepts to chart the evolution of the idea of sovereignty along its scale of forms. An examination of the source of practical reason in human social convention with the employment of a philosophical-policy drawn from Hume’s logic of concepts about human nature will demonstrate this new approach. Why Hume? Because, up to now, without an adequate substructure we have arguments, like Brunne é’ s and Troope’s, 13 that may correctly identify international law as an “interactional” system, but cannot present any argument as to why it is, where this empirical reality comes from, or what its implications are for the future. Comparatively, Hume provides a logic of philosophical concepts that answers these concerns. First, he fulfills the requirements for a fuller understanding of the origin and evolution of law from social convention and the dependence of social convention on the human imperative for society. Second, he offers a more adequate delineation of the overlapping concepts of the law in terms of the ideas and institutions that deal with norms and justice (e.g., principle, process, practice, rule, power, interest). Third, he provides a fundamental understanding of the essential dialectics at the core of a conceptualization of the law with both unconscious and conscious human participation (i.e., passion. (shrink)

i The 2005 decision by Judge John E. Jones in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District was celebrated by all red-blooded American liberals as a victory over the forces of darkness. The result was probably inevitable, in view of the reckless expression by some members of the Dover School Board of their desire to put religion into the classroom, and the clumsiness of their prescribed statement in trying to dissimulate that aim.1 But the conflicts aired in this trial—over the status (...) of evolutionary theory, the arguments for intelligent design, and the nature of science—reveal an intellectually unhealthy situation. The political urge to defend science education against the threats of religious orthodoxy, understandable though it is, has resulted in a counterorthodoxy, supported by bad arguments, and a tendency to overstate the legitimate scientific claims of evolutionary theory. Skeptics about the theory are seen as so dangerous, and so disreputably motivated, that they must be denied any shred of.. (shrink)

The explanatory filter is a proposed method to detect design in nature with the aim of refuting Darwinian evolution. The explanatory filter borrows its logical structure from the theory of statistical hypothesis testing but we argue that, when viewed within this context, the filter runs into serious trouble in any interesting biological application. Although the explanatory filter has been extensively criticized from many angles, we present the first rigorous criticism based on the theory of mathematical statistics.

This article reports the results of an experiment involving 108 college students with varying backgrounds in biology. Subjects answered questions about the evolutionary history of sets of hominid and equine taxa. Each set of taxa was presented in one of three diagrammatic formats: a noncladogenic diagram found in a contemporary biology textbook or a cladogram in either the ladder or tree format. As predicted, the textbook diagrams, which contained linear components, were more likely than the cladogram formats to yield (...) explanations of speciation as an anagenic process, a common misconception among students. In contrast, the branching cladogram formats yielded more appropriate explanations concerning levels of ancestry than did the textbook diagrams. Although students with stronger backgrounds in biology did better than those with weaker biology backgrounds, they generally showed the same effects of diagrammatic format. Implications of these results for evolution education and for diagram design more generally are discussed. (shrink)