Freedom and Limits is a defense of the value of freedom in the context of human finitude. Working out of the American pragmatist tradition, the book aims to reclaim the role of philosophy as a guide to life.

Many despair at trying to understand something’s meaning and express dissatisfaction with language wholesale. What if some things simply are not understandable? Thich Nhat Hanh coined interbeing to name the fundamental principle of interdependence defining Buddhist ontologies, and uses interbeing to dislodge despair resulting from rigid expectations of how things must be. Thich also criticized a standard view of language as generating those rigid expectations. Drawing upon classical humanist traditions, Hans-Georg Gadamer promoted a hermeneutics whereby interpreters overcome existential alienation. In (...) his theory of understanding meaning, Gadamer rehabilitated language as having its being in revealing aspects of truth. By situating Gadamer’s hermeneutics within Thich’s interbeing, I develop limits of understanding that facilitate freedom from despair about meaning and language. Thich and Gadamer both taught that the quest for stability within change is misguided. This requires rigorous attention to the limits of understanding. Attention to these limits serves to liberate people from clinging to the illusion that all things are understandable and despair accompanying the incapacity to understand some things. (shrink)

It is patently clear that theoretical difficulties in the understanding of human freedom exist, the roots of which can be found in classic psychological proposals. The western crisis may require reconsideration of freedom and responsibility as expressed in each person. One such proposal of this type begs clarification of the approaches that led to the loss of freedom in the existential horizon and thus of social dynamics. The purpose of this paper is to explain its roots in (...) the psychoanalytic context. Specifically there seems to be three theses that give way to this analysis: the role of the past in shaping the personality; the influence of the psychological workings as related to the handling of conflict as well as the understanding of psychoanalysis as hermeneutics. The three are united in the consideration of freedom as “liberation”, and the temporal dynamics implicit in this concept. We conclude that this is the origin of the limitation of the concept of freedom within psychoanalysis. (shrink)

In "Nondomination and the Limits of Relational Autonomy," Danielle Wenner aims to achieve the political goals of relational theorists through a more effective means. This is a worthy aspiration. She believes the neorepublican conception of freedom as nondomination "can best promote the aims embodied in the political project of feminist theorists", including reducing conditions of oppression, and do it in a way that avoids the conceptual problems inherent in relational autonomy. While I appreciate the pragmatism and clarity of her (...) argument, in this commentary I raise a challenge to the freedom as nondomination approach, specifically Wenner's claim that it can avoid making substantive value judgments. I... (shrink)

In the paper we discuss the problem of limitations of freedom in mathematics and search for criteria which would differentiate the new concepts stemming from the historical ones from the new concepts that have opened unexpected ways of thinking and reasoning. We also investigate the emergence of category theory and its origins. In particular we explore the origins of the term functor and present the strong evidence that Eilenberg and Carnap could have learned the term from Kotarbiński and Tarski.

This article elaborates the interactional freedom of friendship and its limits. It shows that friendship is marked by a normative freedom that makes it relatively resistant to reification, especially when compared to erotic love. It argues further, however, that due to friendship’s embeddedness in the contemporary gender order, this freedom is limited. Having first outlined the freedom hypothesis, the article goes on to argue that friendship’s normative freedom is made possible by its weak ‘institutional (...) connectivity’. To clarify that point, the article illustrates friendship’s resistance to the reifying tendencies of therapy culture and then draws the gendered boundary of friendship’s freedom with reference to the position of heterosexual cross-sex friendship in the heteronormative social imaginary. The article concludes by way of argument for a differentiated approach to friendship and suggests that the analysis of its freedom provides significant clues concerning the work that remains to be done towards equal gender relations. (shrink)

Ecological sustainability is essential in order to ensure human flourishing and human freedom.1 There is a scientific consensus regarding the anthropogenic origin of the activities leading to diffe...

How should we shape the practice of pastoral care, especially in the context of bioethical counseling? Martin Luther grounded it in a mutual dialogue of brethren. Friedrich Schleiermacher transformed this Protestant understanding according to the modern ideals of freedom and responsibility for oneself. In response to the other basic question of pastoral care: What is the human soul?, Sigmund Freud overcame the Platonic model undergirding Schleiermacher's account. Whoever seeks to care for his own soul and the soul of the (...) other should learn from Freud. One of the most fruitful consequences of such study lies in the formation of a mature religiosity. Another such consequence concerns the pastor's aspiring to an attitude of self-control in counseling. Building one's own competence on the experience and the knowledge of Freud can help one counteract the temptation to transfer one's own (unconscious) wishes onto the conversation partner and conversely to ward off transference from the other onto oneself. On the level of ideals and ultimate principles, however, Christian pastors, unlike Freud, will not see fate and the anonymous forces of Eros and Thanatos, as the ultimate last horizons of human self-understanding. Instead, the good news of sinful man's justification by God transcends even the limits of human existence imposed by fate. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Hick and Swinburne Moral Evil and the Free‐Will Defense Natural Disasters and other Terrible Things, and the Free‐Will Defense Suggested Reading.

This article presents the results of a journey into the work of French philosopher Simone Weil, Oppression and liberty and The Need for roots, in order to identify the conditions and limits to the implementation of freedom of expression. This research project aims at identifying the ethical foundations of freedom of expression in a contemporary context where globalization, the media and social networks facilitate a fast dissemination of numerous individual and collective expressions, while the law cannot discern when (...) to privilege freedom of expression over other human rights. The result of our analysis of Weil notions of “need of the soul” and “obligations towards human being” enable to understand why freedom of expression is individual and not collective and under which conditions it should be protected: as an essential need of our intelligence, rooted in every human being, that must be respected absolutely at an individual level. This principle also makes it possible to legitimize the limitation of certain collective expressions conveyed by organizations, in their external and internal communication, and the authorization of the individual voice of certain stakeholders when they speak out in favor of justice and truth. (shrink)

The article examines the practice of the applicability of the Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter—ICCPR) and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter—ECHR). Through the case—law of the European Court on Human Rights (hereinafter—ECtHR) and insights of the Human Rights Committee the author is investigating the content and limits of the freedom of religion. The article examines in detail the limiting clauses to the freedom of (...) belief (national security, public order, public health, public morals) and the possibility to apply derogation clause. The author comes to the conclusion that due to the complexity of this right it is difficult to forecast the future developments of this right. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is numerous as well as the decisions of the Court are often accompanied by dissenting opinions. Moreover, some potential cases related to the freedom of religion are not considered by the ECtHR as the admissibility criteria are not met. Therefore the author looks forward to the forthcoming jurisprudence of both—regional and universal human rights bodies. (shrink)

Unlike versions of open theism that appeal to the alethic openness of the future, defenders of limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT) affirm that some propositions concerning future contingents are presently true. Thus, there exist truths that are unknown to God, so God is not omniscient simpliciter. LFOT requires modal definitions of divine omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable. Defenders of LFOT have yet to provide an adequate response to Richard Purtill’s argument that fatalism (...) logically follows from the omnitemporality of truth. Hasker believes a distinction between hard and soft facts prevents fatalism, but I argue that his defense fails in light of arguments involving divine necessity. Additionally, I point out that Hasker’s philosophy of language concerning divine names faces problems that cannot be overcome, given the versions of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge that motivate LFOT. Thus, contra Hasker, Swinburne, and van Inwagen, open theism necessitates the alethic openness of the future. (shrink)

This essay proposes that while a "Christian" democracy may be too idealistic, liberal democracy presupposes transcendent moral and spiritual norms, in particular a Judeo-Christian foundation for human dignity and human rights. A Biblical understanding of human nature as fallible and imperfect susceptible to worldly temptations, emphasizes free choice and personal responsibility, and the imperative to limit the temporal exercise of power by any man or institution. Maritain's concept of integral or Christian humanism is founded on personalism, the unique value and (...) dignity of each human being created in the image of God, and the need for community. The major challenge for literal democracy is how to reconcile individual freedom with socio-economic-political-legal institutions and processes which require the constraint of man-made laws and the exercise of authority and power The essay condudes that perhaps the major legacy of the American founding is the notion of the priority of liberty which offers the best prospects for conjoining reason and faith, the secular and the sacred, Athens and Jerusalem, The priority of liberty also animates Maritain's vision of a "Christianly-inspired" personalistic society capable of advancing both individual human flourishing and the common good. (shrink)

(1997). The paradigm of expressive freedom: Its limits and paradoxes. The European Legacy: Vol. 2, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, pp. 515-522.

In recent years, the notion of relational autonomy has transformed the old debate about the freedom of the individual in society. For Spinoza, individual humans are embedded in natural, social and political circumstances from which they derive their power and freedom. I take this to mean that Spinoza’s is best described as a constitutive theory of relational autonomy. I will show how by defining freedom in terms of power, Spinoza understands individual freedom as irreducibly relational. I (...) propose that Spinoza develops his theory of power to understand how individual power or freedom is limited and enhanced by the power of those around one. For Spinoza, the power of an individual is a function of that individual’s emotions, imaginative conceptions of itself and the world and its appetites. In this paper (1) I will argue that Spinoza reformulates a concept of freedom in terms of power. (2) His mature theory of freedom as power proposes that individual power is determined through social interaction, and is thus best understood as a relational theory of freedom. (3) I will show that as a consequence of Spinoza’s theory, individual power and empowerment relies on those around the individual, and thus, to achieve individual liberation we must pursue collective empowerment. (shrink)

The problem of human freedom have been addressed by al-Mutakallimūn (Islamic theologians) in the context of human acts and discussed from the point of view its relation with the will and other elements. At this point, whether the human has will and power in his own act, the limits of his will and power, the role of human in the act and his responsibilities have prompted to different debates. The theory of tawlīd put forward by Mu‘tazila is very crucial (...) in terms of determining the scope and limits of the freedom of human in acts. Mu‘tazila’s tawlīd theory defenses based on two important reasons. The first is to present the nature and limits of the acts that man did them outside himself. The other is to explain the relationship of human with such acts with regards to moral responsibility. Because both issues are very important in the principle of justice of Mu‘tazila. The effort to put the cause-effect relationship of human with his acts in terms of tawhīd and justice on the rational and moral ground is the reason for emergence of the theory. In this respect, the purpose of this theory which enables establishing a causality relationship between the human act and nature is aimed at the justification of freedom and responsibility between agent (fā‘il) and act.In this study, firstly, the definition of the concept of tawlīd and its meaning area have been presented and tackled the discussions about the agent of indirect acts. And then it has been discoursed upon the criticisms of Ahl al-Sunna about the subject of tawlīd. The subject has been outlined in the context of the intellectual discussion between Ahl al-Sunna and Mu‘tazila which constitute the dominant part of theological dispute tradition. In this respect, the main purpose of the study is to reveal how the limits of indirect actions belonging to human by force of freedom and moral responsibility are drawn and understood.Although they did not have a uniform thought about the topic, Mu‘tazila theologians who accepted semi-determinism in the theory of tawlīd acknowledged the existence of natures in the substances. Those who admitted the reason as a means of the act did not approve this. By accepting the continuity of the accidents in the acts, they twisted together the voluntary acts and the natural acts, and accepted that directly acts were realized through the human will and the other according to the principle of necessity. According to Mu‘tazila, causes are only means. Hence, the act emerging as a result of the means is the act of the agent who used this means to reach the result, not the means. Therefore, man is the agent of engendered acts and responsible for all kinds of acts that arise as a reflection of the will and their consequences. While Ahl al-Sunna has directly associated the action of man and all its consequences with the power of Allah, Mu‘tazila has based these actions on the power of man, which Allah has created in man and has been the source of the acts. Contrary to Mu‘tazila, the continuance of power which are not a constant accident is not possible for a second act from the point of Ahl al-Sunna since they have accepted the idea that the accidents will not be continuous. In this respect, according to Ahl al-Sunna, there is no compulsory relationship between the agent that caused the formation of the acts and the result supervening from them. They did not accept the idea of tawlīd, which its meaning is that accident gives birth to accident, because it would oblige the relationship between cause and effect. Because this relationship, which Mu‘tazila gives the name of tawlīd in human acts, is made up for that Allah has created His laws right after the orientation of human to the cause. In this respect, Ahl al-Sunna thinkers rejected tawlīd because it would mean attributing an act to an inanimate being and require a mandatory relationship between cause and effect in the functioning of the universe. Although the result does not occur with his own act when the person applies to the cause, he is responsible for his act because it is related to the person who did it. Māturīdī tradition did not accept the acts that emerged as a result of tawlīd as the production of man, but they tried to establish a balance by holding the person responsible because he is the reason for the outcome that emerged. As for the Ash‘arites, they avoided giving a real effect of the will and power to the causes by considering that created will and power is only a locus in the emergence of the act. The person has no effect on his act except for directing his will to that act and his behavior which will make the person responsible is based on this will. (shrink)

The conclusion locates the diverse concerns of German Idealism and phenomenology in their historical contexts. German Idealism can be interpreted as a reaction to the Scientific Revolution, resisting the temptation to reduce the thinking subject to one more material object, and instead carving out the unique features of consciousness. Its accounts of freedom and intersubjectivity also should be understood in the political context of liberal revolutions and European imperialism. By contrast, phenomenology grapples with a world marked by world (...) war, economic upheaval, and a sense of cultural decline. Its adherents generally emphasize various forms of human finitude—including the limits of reason and freedom. Finally, the conclusion describes how the shared commitments of German Idealism and phenomenology continue to resonate in the contemporary world. (shrink)

The article is an attempt at a philosophical interpretation of the literary text. Its task is to identify the principles of the human self, which are presented in classical literature, in Homer’s “Iliad” and “Odyssey” and Dante’s “Divine Comedy”. The study provides an analysis of the archetypal narrative structure to which the model of human development with three components is applied. The correspondence of the heroes to this typology, which is not the final measure of the human, but resembles the (...) “ideal types” according to Max Weber, has been traced in the research. The dynamics of the development of the inner world of a human being, which corresponds to the plot of the journey, is analyzed. That is not a journey only in physical space, but an inner path too that a person overcomes in a gradual process of self-awareness. It has been found that the works of Homer and Dante can be interpreted as not implying a developed and independent personality. On the other hand, the characters demonstrate the key factors of change that occur within the one who forms the traits of self-sufficiency. The study succeeds in constructing a psychological map that allows outlining not a stable type, but rather different personality horizons. There are certain human aspirations of the man to be the creator of the self. However, such motivations involve not only a number of arbitrary manifestations of human beings but also the establishment of a measure for themselves. Initially, these intentions are carried out without self-absorption, reflection, and self-assessment. After all, unrestrained and unbalanced human temperament for a long time remains subject to higher forces and is significantly limited by this supreme power. Nevertheless, a human eventually comes to the need for self-knowledge and establishes a balance between rational and unconscious manifestations. People succeed in getting out of the circle of self-forgetfulness by overcoming various forms of alienation, loneliness, narcissism, self-contradiction, negligence, arrogance. Self-control is achieved by truth about oneself, overcoming fear, recognizing the effects of temptation and passion. The human attitude to the Other becomes possible due to freedom and love as cardinal manifestations of the active component of the self. (shrink)

Freedom as an authentic and willed process, characteristic of man as a human rational being, enables the individual to act in accordance with the principles of morality, since the individual can choose between good and evil, and in this way to get out of the sphere of the given to which the rest of the living world is limited. We should recall the forgotten Marx and his famous text on the essential difference between the animal world and humanity (...) as a genus: "The animal is immediately united with its vital activity. It does not differ from it. It is vital activity. Man makes his own vital activity the subject of his will and consciousness. He has conscious vital activity. This is not a determination with which he merges immediately. Conscious vital activity distinguishes man directly from animal vital activity. It is exactly in this way alone that he is a generic being. Or a conscious being, i.e. his own life is a subject for him precisely because he is a generic being. It is only for this reason that his activity is free activity...". In other words, while animals live just the life of their species and cannot choose anything else, since the choice has been made by the fact of their belonging to a species, man can choose the world in which to live, overcoming in this way the natural givens. Here lies the core of the anthropological explanation of the principle of morality, inconceivable without man's ability to be an authentic free being. Sloboda kao autenticni voljni proces, svojstven coveku kao ljudskom umnom bicu, omogucuje individui da postupa u skladu sa nacelima moralnosti, buduci da individua moze da bira izmedju dobra i zla i da na taj nacin izadje iz sfere datosti na koju je ogranicen ostali zivi svet. Podsetimo se zaboravljenog Marxa i cuvenog teksta o sustinskoj razlici izmedju sveta zivotinjskih vrsta i coveka kao roda:?zivotinja je neposredno jedinstvena sa svojom zivotnom delatnoscu. Ona se od nje ne razlikuje. Ona je zivotna datost. Covek cini samu svoju zivotnu delatnost predmetom svoga htenja i svoje svesti. On ima svesnu zivotnu delatnost. To nije odredjenost s kojom se on neposredno stapa. Svesna zivotna delatnost razlikuje coveka neposredno od zivotinjske zivotne delatnosti. On je upravo samo na taj nacin genericko bice. Ilije samo svesno bice, tj. njegov vlastiti zivot mu je predmet upravo zato sto je genericko bice. Samo zato je njegova delatnost slobodna delatnost...". Drugim recima, dok zivotinjski svet zivi samo zivotom svoje vrste i ne moze da izabere nista drugo, on je srastao sa vrstom kojoj pripada, covek moze da bira svet u kojem ce ziveti prevazilazeci na taj nacin prirodnu datost. Ovde je sadrzana bit antropoloskog objasnjenja principa moralnosti, koji se bez sposobnosti coveka da bude autenticno slobodno bice ne bi mogao pojmiti.. (shrink)

Abstract:Western business philosophy is rooted in the concepts of free enterprise, free markets, free choice. Yet freedom has its limits. Nature itself imposes constraints. In the state of nature each business must try to accomplish everything autonomously and ward off the attacks of rivals. These activities cost the business a great deal of freedom. The social contract emerges from such anarchy to increase the freedom available to all members of society. It does so by setting limits on (...) individual freedom which actually increase the overall amount of freedom available within the system. The Social Equation presents a relational model of this contract to show how overall freedom is increased in a state of society. In so doing, the obligations which society places on businesses to produce beneficial goods and services is developed. Next, the complex relationship between socially enforced constraints and social moral constraints is examined, showing that social moral constraints increase freedom more than do enforced constraints. This work concludes with proposed uses of the Social Equation as a heuristic for business ethics. (shrink)

From the perspective of Christian theology, divine freedom is the paradigm of human freedom, but it is also completely unlike ours in its infinity. This is the paradox of the analogy of being: in its infinity, the Archetype of our being is also completely other. In contrast, likeness between contingent beings is limited in that each being is individuated yet similar to those of like species. No matter how alike beings are, “unlikeness” increases with generic distance. At (...) the asymptotic limit, the Archetype is infinitely unlike us, but remains the ultimate blueprint for each being. If as Archetype, God’s infinite freedom is qualitative of infinite being, then all finite beings must possess freedom to some finite degree. Herein lies the problem treated in this paper: how can bothanimate and inanimate being possess freedom? To answer this question, the author draws upon the first volume of part two of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s sixteen volume trilogy, Theo-logic: The Truth of the World. (shrink)

This paper points to a lost and ignored strand of argument in the writings of liberalism's earliest defenders. These “classical” liberals recognized that market liberty was not always compatible with individual liberty. In particular, they argued that labor markets required intervention and regulation if workers were not to be wholly subjugated to the power of their employers. Functioning capitalist labor markets (along with functioning credit markets) are not “natural” outgrowths of exchange, but achievements hard won in the battle against feudalism. (...) Further, and crucially, the existence of such markets required closing off other market choices. Footnotesa I would like to thank the other contributors to this volume, and its editors, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. (shrink)

This book explains why we should stop thinking of freedom as limited to a right to be left alone, and explores how Kantian philosophy and Jewish thought instead give rise to a concept of positive freedom. At heart, positive freedom must be understood as inextricably linked to the obligation to respect the autonomy and dignity of others.

Discussions about freedom of speech and academic freedom today are about the limits to those freedoms. However, these discussions take place mostly in the higher education trade press and do not receive any serious attention from academics and educationalists. In this paper several key arguments for limiting academic freedom are identified, examined and placed in an historical context. That contextualisation shows that with the disappearance of social and political struggles to extend freedom in society there has (...) come a narrowing of academic life and a new and impoverished concept of 'academic freedom' for a diminished idea of the human subject, of humanity and of human potential. (shrink)

This paper analyzes ethical aspects of the new paradigm of Ambient Intelligence, which is a combination of Ubiquitous Computing and Intelligent User Interfaces (IUI’s). After an introduction to the approach, two key ethical dimensions will be analyzed: freedom and privacy. It is argued that Ambient Intelligence, though often designed to enhance freedom and control, has the potential to limit freedom and autonomy as well. Ambient Intelligence also harbors great privacy risks, and these are explored as well.

There were 180 applications from prospective contestants of the StawellGift in 1978. The race limit, imposed in the interests of safety, is just 60 runners. Of the 60 acceptances Richard Roe was the hotfavourite, but healong with six others fell victim to the great oyster poisoning, and had towithdraw on the day of the race, along with five of the others; the sixth died of the poisoning just as the race was run. In the event the winner was John Doe, (...) the second favourite according to the bookmakers. (shrink)

The issue of whether science is, or can be, value-free has been debated for more than a century. The idea of value-free science is of course as old as science itself, and so are the arguments against this idea. Plato defended it..

Tolerance cannot not be concerned with the law, once it takes up in its concept the relationship between truth and justice. And there are several reasons for this. To begin with, the word right enters into many definitions of tolerance: the right to difference, to liberty, to those fundamental public freedoms that constitute human rights. Moreover, law, as opposed to morality, is the public instance where obligation is coupled with legitimate coercion. Finally, juridical institutions offer an excellent vantage point from (...) which to observe the transformations of the idea of tolerance and scan the history of the struggles carried out in its name. (shrink)

Few have given much thought to how a state of freedom and justice should be organized. This book is the result of the author s 35-year odyssey in search of an answer. He has taken a multi-disciplinary approach, reading widely over many years in the realms of Politics and Economics, Sociology and Philosophy, History and Law. This approach has led to some fresh insights which do not fit into the current left wing/right wing political analysis straitjacket. Comparing the consensus (...) theory of the origin of the state, popularized by Rousseau, with the less well-known conflict theory as expounded by Franz Oppenheimer, the author argues that most states have arisen from the conquest of one class over another, or one tribe over another. Thus the modern state is characterized by a ruling class exercising the coercive power of the state, denying freedom and justice to the rest in varying degrees. Thus the state can be our greatest enemy the 20th century provides plenty of evidence for that. To counter the abuse of power, the author follows the work of Frederic Bastiat in describing a minimal state, limited to the defence of the territory and to maintaining law and order.". (shrink)

A fundamental theme in Gilbert Meilaender’s work on bioethical issues is the relationship between the ethical claims of finitude and of freedom. This article identifies two ways in which Meilaender articulates this relationship and proposes a third way which avoids the limitations of the first two ways while serving Meilaender’s purpose, which is to redress what he sees as an imbalance in favor of the claims of freedom over those of finitude in contemporary biomedicine and bioethics. The article (...) ends by suggesting that Meilaender’s purpose would be best served by avoiding tensions between finitude and freedom as the third way does. (shrink)

By defining freedom in terms of power, Spinoza understands individual freedom as irreducibly relational. I propose that Spinoza develops his theory of power to understand how individual power or freedom is limited and enhanced by the power of those around one. For Spinoza, the power of an individual is a function of that individual’s emotions, imaginative conceptions of itself and the world and its appetites. In this paper (1) I will argue that Spinoza reformulates a concept (...) of freedom in terms of power. (2) His mature theory of freedom as power proposes that individual power is determined through social interaction, and is thus best understood as a relational theory of freedom. (3) I will show that as a consequence of Spinoza’s theory, individual power and empowerment relies on those around the individual and, thus, to achieve individual liberation we must pursue collective empowerment. (shrink)

In the _Republic, _the paradigmatic character of Plato’s best city appears incompatible with the use of deception in the procreative practices of the Auxiliaries and Guardians. I argue that this incongruity, as well as the exact provisions of Plato’s reproduction festival, are explained by three facts: his commitment to eugenics, his insistence on the abolition of the typical Greek household and his belief that there are serious limitations to the type of knowledge that Auxiliaries can achieve.

In various debates about science, appeal is made to the freedom of scientific research. A rationale in favor of this freedom is rarely offered. In this paper, two major arguments are reconstructed that promise to lend support to a principle of scientific freedom. According to the epistemological argument, freedom of research is required in order to organize the collective cognitive effort we call science efficiently. According to the political argument, scientific knowledge needs to be generated in (...) ways that are independent of the major political powers because of the important role it plays for the citizens and their capacity to form well-informed political preferences. Both arguments are examined critically in order to identify their strengths and limitations. I argue that the scientific freedom established by both rests on a number of critical preconditions, and that the arguments’ force must be weighed against competing societal interests and values in each case of their application. Appeal to a principle of scientific freedom should therefore never mark the end, but rather the beginning of a public debate about the ends and means of science. (shrink)

Unable to reconcile freedom of choice and the inexorable limitations of nature, common sense successively affirms a false unlimited and unsituated freedom, and a false determination of man by nature which reduces him to an object. On the ...

The primary purpose of this article is to explore the limits that an agent, such as the government or the American Psychological Association, may place on one's right to pursue a program of research or to share the findings of a research project. The primary argument that evolves here is that researchers' rights to pursue an interesting hypothesis, and their freedom of expression, are conditional. The author examines the potential pragmatic and epistemological barriers to a program of research and (...) the responsibilities that researchers bear to address epistemological and nonepistemological matters while reviewing the implications of their work. (shrink)

The recent debates about the nature of social freedom, understood in a broadly negative way, have generated three main views of the topic: these represent freedom respectively as non-limitation, non-interference and non-domination. The participants in these debates often go different ways, however, because they address different topics under common names, not because they hold different intuitions on common topics. Social freedom is sometimes understood as option-freedom, sometimes as agency-freedom and the different directions taken by the (...) theories can often be explained by their addressing freedom in one sense, then in another. The non-limitation approach focuses primarily on option-freedom, the non-domination approach on agencyfreedom, whereas the representation of freedom as non-interference seems to spring from a failure to resolve the focus decisively on one target or another. (shrink)

This article recounts the evolution of a global debate on the development of a common international code of journalistic ethics that would apply to East and West, Developed and Developing Countries. It sees as unlikely universal principles and prescriptions for professionals can be adopted across the divergent sociopolitical philosophies involved. Even common ground for constructive discussion on the topic is limited. Scholars, journalists, and educators are encouraged to instill an appreciation for the differences and to help create an understanding (...) of the special problems involved in media relationships among countries. (shrink)

This study explores freedom and equality as necessary constituents of a liberal democratic state. At the same time, equality and freedom conflict in various respects. It is examined how such conflicts may optimally be resolved while taking seriously the interests involved. These inquiries have far-reaching consequences for the justification of the liberal democratic state. Equal rights are generally considered to be an integral part of a liberal democratic state, but on what foundation are such rights based? Various attempts (...) have been made to provide such a foundation from a moral framework. Some important and influential positions are examined critically and an alternative perspective is offered. "Equality" is approached straightforwardly, without appealing to obscure notions while seeking an outcome that may universally be accepted. Rationality is an important feature in this respect. The question to what extent freedom should be allowed to citizens is another important issue. Granting citizens freedom is beneficial for the liberal democratic state as a whole and for citizens themselves. The limits of freedom must, however, be defined carefully. The search for a simple solution is balanced against the need to do the complexities of individual cases justice. In addition, it is not the task of a liberal democratic state to influence people’s convictions concerning equality ; only equal treatment should be guaranteed. (shrink)

This article proposes to look at the concept of freedom formulated by Nicholas Berdyaev in his early work, Philosophy of Freedom, through the prism of kenotic Christology. The kenotic nature of the Incarnation of the Son of God, as it was described in the St. Paul’s Letter to the Philippians and developed later by the Christian tradition, was connected with His renunciation of his own infinitude—adopting the “form of a servant” and embracing the limits of the human body. (...) It was an absolutely free act of the divine Person, who revealed to man his own divine model and opened up for him the possibility of its implementation, i.e., the way to becoming a person. For Berdyaev, this possibility is conditioned by the ability to engage in a free act of kenosis, involving the renunciation of the compulsions of reason that have entangled us in natural forms of necessity and that reduce us to mere cogs in the machinery of nature. According to Berdyaev, this way of human kenosis is faith. The act of faith, understood as a rejection of the tendency to seek security through compelling evidence, constitutes a person in his/her uniqueness, and performatively realizes the similarity to God potentially present in every human. (shrink)

Free speech has been a historically volatile issue in higher education. In recent years, however, there has been a surge of progressive censorship on campus. This wave of censorship has been characterized by the explosive growth of such policies as "trigger warnings" for course materials; "safe spaces" where students are protected from speech they consider harmful or distressing; "micro-aggression" policies that often strongly discourage the use of words that might offend sensitive individuals; new "bias-reporting" programs that consist of different degrees (...) of campus surveillance; the "dis-invitation" of a growing list of speakers, including many in the mainstream of American politics and values; and the prominent "shouting down" or disruption of speakers deemed inconsistent with progressive ideology. Not to be outdone, external forces on the right are now engaging in social media bullying of speakers and teachers whose views upset them. The essays in this collection, written by prominent philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, and legal scholars, examine the issues at the forefront of the crisis of free speech in higher education. The contributors address the broader historical, cultural, legal, and normative contexts of the current crisis, and take care to analyze the role of "due process" in protecting academic freedom and individuals accused of misconduct. Additionally, the volume is unique in that it advances practical remedies to campus censorship, as the editors and many of the contributors have participated in movements to remedy limitations on free speech and open inquiry. The Value and Limits of Academic Speech will educate academic professionals and informed citizens about the phenomenon of progressive censorship and its implications for higher education and the republic. (shrink)