My aim in the present paper is to show the significance of Heidegger's phenomenology of religion as an important step on his way to his magnum opus . First, I wish to exhibit traits characteristic of Heidegger's path of thinking in terms of his confrontation with phenomenology, historicism, hermeneutics, and Lebensphilosophie . I will then argue, in a second step, that it was with an eye to, and drawing upon, his previous understanding of religion and religious life, as well (...) as of the relation between faith and theology, that Heidegger was to conceive of philosophy and its relation to human existence in Being and Time . Both theology and philosophy offer a conceptual elaboration of something previously enacted or lived and, in doing so, are at the same time meant to refer back to and reinforce what they grow out of—faith or factical life. (shrink)

이 글은 초기 하이데거 철학에서 현사실성과 현사실성의 해석학 사이의 관계 문제를 다룬다. 현사실성의 해석학에 관한 논자들의 해석은 현사실성에 대한 철학의 참여 혹은 개입을 어떻게 볼 것인가와 관련하여 입장을 달리한다. 현사실성은 그 자체로 몰락에로의 경향성을 가지며 철학의 개입을 통해서만 현존재의 본래적 삶으로의 전환 가능성이 성립하는가? 아니면, 현존재의 현 사실성은 몰락에의 경향과 동시에 몰락하는 삶의 경향에 대한 반대운동을 그 자체에 포함하며, 그렇기에 현사실성의 해석학은 각자의 현존재가 자신의 실존 가능성을 수행하는 바를 명시적으로 보여주는 작업으로 한정되어야 하는가? 필자는 후자의 입장에 서서, 현사실성의 해석학을 비본래적 (...) 삶을 본래적 삶으로 전환하는 것으로, 나아가 현존재의 본래적 실존 가능성과 방식을 형성하는 것으로 간주하는 전자류의 기존 해석이 갖는 부당성을 밝히고자 했다. 그리고 본 연구는 초기 하이데거에게 현사실성의 해석학은 각자성과 각자의 현존재가 갖는 실존 수행의 면모를 은폐시키지 않고 그 자체로 드러내는 것과 관련된다는 점에서, 기존의 학문 이론으로서의 해석학과 방법적이고 형식적 측면에서 차이를 갖는다는 점을 드러내고자 했다. 이 연구는 『존재와 시간』을 중심으로 논의 되어 온 본래성과 비본래성의 문제를 초기 하이데거의 연구에 기초해 발생적 관점에서 보여준다는 점에서 연구의 의의를 갖는다. (shrink)

Na preleção de verão de 1923, intitulada “Ontologia: hermenêutica da facticidade”, Martin Heidegger estabelece seu programa filosófico em termos de uma investigação fundamental, nomeada por ele como hermenêutica fenomenológica da facticidade. De acordo com esta, a interpretação da vida fática não se realiza sem que se tome o ser e o falar como fenômenos privilegiados, ou seja, sem que se recupere o vínculo essencial em que nós, seres humanos existentes, já nos descobrimos sendo no mundo como seres capazes de fala. (...) Tendo em vista que é a partir do constructo ser-no-mundo que o filósofo alemão consegue dar um passo atrás no esquema sujeito-objeto, não é por acaso então que ele busca encontrar, desde muito cedo, modos de dizer o ser que não mais o entifiquem, com o intuito de pensá-lo para além do registro da referência e, portanto, da objetivação. É com base nessa situação que se torna premente que sua análise tenha início a partir do horizonte do ente privilegiado, uma vez que é para este que o sentido do ser se torna um problema. Assim, este artigo parte da hipótese de que a hermenêutica da facticidade se constitui por conta da tentativa de Heidegger de ater-se ao problema do ser que compreende ser, tendo como premissa uma ampla problematização em torno da significação da palavra vida. Palavras-chave: Heidegger; hermenêutica; facticidade.: In the summer lecture of 1923, entitled Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Martin Heidegger established his philosophical program in terms of a fundamental research, named by him as phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. According to this, the interpretation of the factical life is not achieved without taking the being and the speaking as privileged phenomena, i.e., without recovering the essential bond in which we, existent human beings, have already discovered ourselves being in the world as being capable of speaking. Given the fact that it is from the construct being-in-the-world that the German philosopher is able to step back on subject-object scheme, it is not by accident that he tries to find, since the beginning, ways of expressing being that no longer turn it into an entity, with the intention of thinking it beyond the scheme and, therefore, any objectualization registry. It is based on this situation that it is pressing that his analysis starts from the horizon of a privileged entity, since it is for this the sense of being becomes a problem. In fact, this paper starts from the hypothesis that hermeneutics of facticity is constituted due to Heidegger’s attempt on holding to the problem of being that understands being, with the premise of a wide problematization regarding the significance of the word life. Keywords: Heidegger; hermeneutics; facticity. (shrink)

The past decade has witnessed a notable turn in philosophical orientation in the Nordic countries. For the first time, the North has a generation of philosophers who are oriented to phenomenology. This means a vital rediscovery of the phenomenological tradition as a partly hidden conceptual and methodological resource for taking on contemporary philosophical problems. The essays collected in the present volume introduce the reader to the phenomenological work done in the Nordic countries today. The material is organized under three general (...) headings: metaphysics, facticity, and interpretation. The first part, "Metaphysics", asks if phenomenology is, or could be taken as, a metaphysical inquiry. It studies this possibility in a systematic as well as in a historical perspective. The second part, "Facticity", focuses on the double character of the philosophizing subject, on the one hand, as a worldly being bound by a cultural and historical situation, and on the other hand, as the one who thinks this condition and gives it an interpretation. It studies four aspects of facticity in particular: language, dwelling, alterity, and generation. The third part, "Interpretation", clarifies the different notions of interpretation central to phenomenology, understood as hermeneutics. (shrink)

This dissertation is an investigation of the questions of time, history, and facticity in Dilthey and Heidegger. It is an exploration of the contextual character of experience and the scope and limits of understanding and interpretation. In particular, this work considers their historical and temporal character and relation to facticity. Facticity is that which escapes and resists interpretation, narration, and understanding. In Heidegger's language, facticity indicates the "thrownness" and "uncanniness" of existence which throws the "subject" and (...) its construction of meaning into question. As such, facticity is a positive characteristic of the finitude of human existence. I offer a reconstruction of the question of history in the works of Dilthey and Heidegger through an analysis of "historicality" . The discussion of Dilthey attempts to clarify his project of a "critique of historical reason" and his grounding of the human sciences. The interpretation of Heidegger is based on Heidegger's "hermeneutics of factical life" as developed in his lecture courses of the early 1920's and his thinking of the "event"-character of being in his works of the 1930's. (shrink)

1施莱尔玛赫 contribution to the development施莱尔玛赫for hermeneutics in the development of Historically hermeneutics In order to make a decisive turn when he made ​​the future "general hermeneutics" , hermeneutics will be applied to all text interpretation. When the traditional hermeneutics contains In order to understand, description and application,施莱尔玛赫the attention is hermeneutics as "the art of understanding." 施莱尔玛赫also introduced the interpretation of psychology, can penetrate the text by means of its author's individuality and flexibility soul. He (...) wanted to become a systematic hermeneutics, and criticism of previous hermeneutics is "the rules of the merger," and the lack of coherence. Wu Ning speaking, they deal with different issues is a combination of methods. 施莱尔玛赫hermeneutics points to avoid misunderstanding of the text. This part is up to the final discussion of施莱尔玛赫criticism of the United States. 2. Dilthey contribution to the philosophical hermeneutics of Dilthey on施莱尔玛赫In order to write the thesis, including In order to Protestant hermeneutics history, from the Reformation to the future as a second reference books. He was a learned scholar and has been on many topics regardless above. For our purposes, Dilthey is a philosopher with a passion for life, he was placed In order to humanities and social sciences and natural sciences in an established full equality of points, by the foundation on the hermeneutics In order to develop a basic methodology. But in the science competition, he was seeking "Allgemeingultigkeit", a universal validity, to do so In order to give him too much towards the foundation to the scientific methods of thought. He is still a major development of the character of philosophical hermeneutics. 3 Heidegger before and on philosophical hermeneutics, "and there is time" contribution to the development of philosophical hermeneutics is the decisive shift in Heidegger, born with the future, there are original philosopher The early works. He Freiburg Hu plugs Seoul assistant, and in the phenomenological Hu stopper Seoul In order to create a useful set up beyond the traditional methods of philosophy, but he is still too dependent on science Hu stopper Marco effectiveness. Part I: description of the evolution of the early Heidegger: "ontology - the fact of hermeneutics," the book published after the death of Heidegger was published in 1999, English translation, Heidegger in this series by the fact that the ontology of hermeneutics In order to give us a hermeneutic understanding of his meaning. In order to avoid the traditional hermeneutics of his meaning, In order to return to the ancient hope臘hermeneueinc and hermeneia idiom. He attempts to go beyond the limits of contemporary objects, through the period of return to the ancient hope臘general language idioms. Hermeneutic encounter with the interpretation of Homer's description of the mouth, publish, translate and interpret. His description of historical hermeneutics in the pull-down maps and sub ​​Lane Park after a groundbreaking Aristotle hope臘idioms in the loss of richness and decline. But the hermeneutics of Heidegger speaking the method is close to something, such as early speech hermeneutics In order to approach closer to the truth of it is understandable the former interpretation of this domain as there face life. For this last hermeneutics as the method of self-understanding, but in a letter to his students Engelbert Kerbs letter, Heidegger also emphasizes the history In order to recognize the character. Us from our understanding of historical context, our understanding of the structure is formed by shaping the concept of history and even our language. In Dilthey's hermeneutics, he also stressed that understanding the historical basis. From Dilthey to Heidegger this view. Heidegger in his speech defines hermeneutics as "the fact of participation, close, and descriptions of the same interrogation methods." Hermeneutics is the interpretation of not only understanding knowledge as a negative process, but active participation, interrogation and close. Fact of itself is interpreted, it is through understanding the questions and answers something. Heidegger back to the necessary conditions for our understanding of factors, understanding of "the former structure." He describes some part of the former, is awareness and understanding of nature, we understand something "to" something, and we understand it in a specific historical context. Further more, we expect to understand it in the presence of a sight, not a determining sexual arousal by the sight, by the basic problems of the future horizon, it is "the possibility of there," the sight, for there is a special special possible time horizon. These early works of Heidegger has been found there the possibility of meaning. We all都leadership to a new concept of the humanities. In addition, as a rational animal, as Aristotle said sub-Lane, who is of a future there may not be included, including the timing of there. People are looking to understand their own there. Instructions to Heidegger, hermeneutics offers a new concept for the person's point of view. Part II: there and time hermeneutics is first mentioned in the "there and the time," Section VII, Heidegger phenomenology has been interpreted as if it is. In order that he found "the meaning of phenomenological description as a way to rely on hermeneutics, phenomenology of this and some of the logos have hermeneuein the characteristics of this phenomenology is to use some basic meaning of the word hermeneutics, it indicates the work In order to interpret . "In the second sense, Heidegger found in hermeneutics裡are there for the meaning of this method of exposing the shield. The third meaning is the interpretation of this promising continuous manner so that its future is possible, it's future there. Section 31 of hermeneutics is important, because there is some understanding that is. Understanding the process is the center of human existence, in Section 32 entitled "interpretation and understanding," understanding the interpretation built on. Visit the world around it and understand things as this or that, always never as pure consciousness. As Heidegger said, "always had to watch as the ability to understand and interpret", in other words, there is no precedence in the interpretation of pure consciousness, there is always ask questions and interpretation of the visual field. Section 44, regardless Heidegger also true about management, in its modern form as a true statement, is always carried a deeper understanding and interpretation of the export process. But the really right is defined as the management there has been an associate of knot, so it access to basic ontology of sight. It is obvious that there's open, this hole is to guide him toward the police point of view of the artistic part of the next lecture will be discussed. This lecture primarily presents the two early works of Heidegger in which hermeneutics plays a definitive role. As background, the contributions of Schleiermacher and Dilthey are presented briefly before going into Heidegger's contribution. Ⅰ. Schleiermacher's Contribution to the Development of a Philosophical Hermeneutics Schleiermacher made a decisive turn in the history of hermeneutics when he proposed a "Universal Hermeneutics," a hermeneutics that would apply to all kinds of text interpretation. While traditional hermeneutics included moments of understanding, explication and application, Schleiermacher focused on hermeneutics as the "art of understanding . "Schleiermacher also introduced psychological interpretation whereby one tried to penetrate the individuality and soul of the author of a text. He wanted hermeneutics to be systematic, and he criticized previous hermeneutics for being only an" amalgam of rules "and lacking systematic coherence. Rather , they were methods for dealing with an array of different kinds of problems. Schleiermacher's hermeneutics was directed at avoiding misunderstanding of the text. At the end of this section Gadamer's criticisms of Schleiermacher will be discussed. Ⅱ. Dilthey's Contribution to Philosophical Hermeneutics Dilthey wrote his dissertation on Schleiermacher and included a history of Protestant hermeneutics since the Reformation as a second companion volume. He was a broadly educated professor and wrote on many topics. For our purposes, Dilthey was a life-philosopher with a passion for placing the Humanities and Social Sciences on an equal footing with the Natural Sciences by developing a basic methodology for them based on hermeneutics. But in competing with the sciences, he sought an "Allgemeingultigkeit," a universal validity, and in doing so he tended to give too much ground to the way of thinking in the sciences. Still, he is a major figure in the development of philosophical hermeneutics. Ⅲ. The Contribution of Martin Heidegger to Philosophical Hermeneutics before and in Being and Time The decisive turn in the development of a philosophical hermeneutics came in the early writings of Martin Heidegger, a radical and original philosopher. He was in Freiburg an assistant to Husserl and found in Husserl's phenomenology a useful way of overcoming traditional philosophy, but he still found Husserl too preoccupied with scientific validity. Part Ⅰ: Heidegger's Early Lectures: Ontology-the Hermeneutics of Facticity A posthumously published and translated set of Heidegger's lectures on ontology in terms of a hermeneutics of facticity gives us a sense of his understanding of hermeneutics. He bypassed the traditional sense of hermeneutics and went back to the Greek usage of hermeneuein and hermeneia. He attempted to overcome the limitations of modern objectivity by returning to the usages current in ordinary language in ancient Greece. There hermeneutics meant orally interpreting Homer, announcing, translating, and explaining. His account of the history of hermeneutics after Plato and Aristotle is a history of decline and loss of the richness found in Greek usage. But hermeneutics for Heidegger meant a means of access to something, and in these early lectures hermeneutics became an interpretive means of access to facticity, to the realm of pre-interpretive understanding as Dasein faces life. Ultimately hermeneutics became a means for the self-understanding for Dasein. But in a letter to his student, Engelbert Krebs, Heidegger also emphasizes the historical character of cognition. We understand from our situation in history, and our understanding is structured by historically shaped concepts and even our language. Dilthey, too, emphasized the historical matrix for understanding in his hermeneutics, and Heidegger took this up from Dilthey. Heidegger defined hermeneutics in the opening lines of the lectures as "the unified manner of the engaging, approaching, accessing, interrogating, and explication of facticity." Hermeneutics as interpretation is not just understanding as a passive process of cognition but an active engaging, interrogating, and accessing. Facticity itself is interpretive in that it sees what something is through question and answer. Heidegger is stepping back into the factors that precondition our understanding, the "forestructure" of understanding. This forehaving, he says, belongs to the very nature of knowing and understanding. We see something "as "something, and we see it in a specific historical situation. Furthermore, we see it in an existential horizon of expectation, a horizon haunted by uncertainty, by the" fundamental questionability of the future, that is of "possible being," of what is possible for this particular being at this particular time and place. Already in these early works Heidegger finds in the sense of what is possible being, a sense of "ontic questionability, care, restlessness, anxiety, temporality." All of this leads to a new conception of humanity. Instead of being an animal endowed with reason, as in Aristotle, a human being is a being with a possible future, a being with temporality. Humans are beings seeking to know themselves. Hermeneutics, Heidegger says, offers the standpoint for a new conception of the human being. Part Ⅱ: Being and Time The first mention of hermeneutics is in section 7 of Being and Time, where Heidegger is already interpreting phenomenology as letting what is show itself. He finds that " the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of hermēneúein. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the original signification of the word, where it designates the work of interpreting. "In a second sense, Heidegger finds in hermeneutics a means of uncovering the meaning of being for Dasein. And the third sense is the interpretation Dasein as continually making its future possibilities, its future being. Section 31 is important to hermeneutics because there the being of Dasein is said to be understanding. Understanding is the central process of an existing human being. In section 32, titled "Understanding and Interpretation," interpretation builds on understanding. It looks around at the surrounding world and sees things as this or that, always already , never as pure perception. As Heidegger puts it, "The seeing of this sight is always already understanding and interpreting." In other words, there is no pure perception prior to interpretation; there is always the horizon of questioning and interpreting. In section 44, Heidegger argues that truth, too, in its modern forms as statements which are true, is derivative from the deeper processes of understanding and interpreting that are always already going on. But when truth is rightfully defined in connection with being, then it moves into the horizon of fundamental ontology. It is the disclosure of being. This insight is part of what leads him to his view of art, which we will discuss in the next lectur. (shrink)

What does Martin Heidegger say about sex or gender? According to most accounts, including Derrida’s influential essay “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference,” Heidegger makes a marginal reference to sex in a 1928 Marburg lecture later translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26). However, an earlier allusion to sexual difference appears in a 1923 Freiburg lecture, translated as Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity (GA 63) where he explains why he uses the term “Dasein” instead of “man” in his (...) existential analytic. “Man” carries his own historical baggage, representing a living being endowed with reason, as well as a pregiven understanding of what it means to be a person. This latter definition has its roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition where “man” is created in the image of God as the first born of many “brethren.” In a perplexing move, Heidegger then cites biblical passages to highlight the sexed emergence of man in Genesis as he poses the question, “Problem: What is woman?” (GA 63, 22/18). This chapter untangles what it means for Heidegger to ask such a question, particularly as he leaves it unanswered and seemingly negligible in his pursuit of a hermeneutics of facticity. Heidegger states, “Hermeneutics is itself not a philosophy. It wishes only to place an object which has hitherto fallen into forgetfulness before today’s philosophers for their ‘well-disposed consideration’” (GA 63, 20/16). I place the object of sex/gender facticity before today’s philosophers, situating the “Problem: What is woman?” within the context of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, namely to rediscover the question of being. Captured in the eponymous title Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity is the insight that the study of being (ontology) can only be carried out as an interpretive non-objectifying process (hermeneutics) of our existence at a particular time in history (facticity). What does it mean to exist as a certain sex or gender during a particular time? How are sex and gender related to the question of being and the ontological difference? How are we defining sex and gender and to which term does Heidegger refer? Throughout this chapter, I will examine a few instances where Heidegger reckons with the sex/gender question. By posing the inquiry, “Problem: What is Woman?” within the parameters of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, I suggest that sex and gender must be fluid categories insofar as such properties describe the “whatness” of our existence rather than the “how” of our world-forming. That is, Dasein is neutral with respect to these categories as such attributes only show up after a time reckoning with an original position of care-lessness. I also suggest that Heidegger privileges sex/gender facticity in undergirding such neutrality as he contests Christian origin stories of the flesh (GA 63) and evolutionary theories associated with the Lebensphilosophie of his time (GA 26). Finally, I conclude by demonstrating how Heidegger’s distinction between Körper and Leib further upholds sex and gender fluidity. (shrink)

1 Introduction1 In the 1980s, hermeneutics was often incorporated into deconstructionism and literary theory. Rather than focus on authorial intentions, the nature of writing itself including codes used to construct meaning, socio-economic contexts and inequalities of power,2 Gadamer introduced a different perspective; the interplay between effects of history on a reader’s understanding and the tradition(s) handed down in writing. This interplay in which a reader’s prejudices are called into question and modified by the text in a fusion of understanding (...) and topic revitalized the study of the printed word. Gadamer’s turn to language for understanding the meaning of Being also appealed to the post-modern antipathy toward modernity and metaphysics.3 If the truth and validity of interpretations are limited to communities of language, then our mode of being in history cannot but be historical. This point of view rendered Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics vulnerable to the critique of moral and epistemological relativism. However, Gadamer’s theory of interpretation also stems from re-examination of the beginning of knowledge in the Pre-Socratics and Plato, and on this basis, is receptive to another dimension of inquiry than that which was trending in North America. -/- At the East-West Center, University of Hawai’i at Manoa in 1982, Chung-ying Cheng for the first time introduced onto-hermeneutics to an audience of esteemed philosophers including Li Zehou, Ren Jiyu, Feng Youlan, and Zhang Liwen.4 In contrast to schools of deconstruction and literary theory that had disengaged the interpreter from trans-historical sources of meaning and truth, Cheng explained that interpreters exist within a cosmological order inextricable from responsibility to harmonize Heaven and Earth in creative acts of interpretation. By integrating Chinese cosmology into hermeneutics through ontology, he tacitly challenged philosophers in the West to re-examine assumptions about humanity’s place in nature and by implication, Gadamer’s recovery of the beginnings of knowledge in Western philosophy. -/- Cheng’s Neo-Confucianism is inspired by the method and goals of Thomé H. Fang. The following words by Fang seem to prefigure, although in an indistinct and bundled way, aspects of Cheng’s philosophy including a Mencian theory of human nature, comprehensive observation, and creativity: “In the very process of living in concord with creative Nature, Man is charged with an ideal to be fully realized in the light of the principle of comprehensive harmony.”5 Like Fang, Cheng reinvigorates Chinese culture and language, but not solely in order to vindicate the insights of Neo-Confucianism. He has studied Western thought, from pragmatism and the analytic school to German idealism and phenomenology, to unlock and clarify philosophical concepts within the Yijing tradition and thereby render them intelligible to Anglophones. The result has been an awakening of Western scholars to the moral and cultural consequences of decoupling their thought from metaphysical foundations that are neither dogmatic nor doctrinal. -/- Not unlike the dialectic of Gadamer’s dialogue form, onto-generative hermeneutics integrates contrary positions on the same topic in order to blend both sides into a world philosophy, or as Cheng says, a “totalizing or integrative theory,”6 not to be confused with a theoretical rewording of a theory. On the contrary, the universal scope and relevance of hermeneutics stems from personal experience. Just as Gadamer, in response to faction and strife, immersed himself in Plato during the war years, and developed a method with which to harmonize opposites, so too, according to On-cho Ng, was Cheng moved by faction, strife and political persecution to develop a path toward unity.7 Gadamer taught at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, and Cheng at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa among other institutions in North America. They facilitated trans-continental educational and cultural ties. Similar experiences yield similar insights irrespective of differences of time and place. Hence, authors in this issue who reside in Europe, China and North America, delineate the differences between Gadamer and Cheng, yet also, in light of Cheng’s onto-generative method and cosmology, develop integrative theories. Due to the page-budget restriction of the publisher, certain articles of this special theme will be subsequently published in the next issue. -/- 2 Integrative Theory This special issue of The Journal of Chinese Philosophy confirms a dimension of hermeneutics that Cheng has both motivated and inspired. The contributors do not abide by the conviction that since thought is mediated by language, interpretations cannot transcend culture. On the contrary, their research exemplifies the fruits of trans-historical onto-dialogical hermeneutics within limits defined by their field inquiry, organized into Parts I and II, around three themes: language, the philosophy of history and ethics. -/- Andrew Fuyarchuk introduces the theme of ontology in relation to Gadamer’s turn to language. Fuyarchuk argues that Chung-ying Cheng’s criticism of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is informed by Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and thereby overlooks how Gadamer’s Platonic-Pythagorean problem of the division between the One and Many is harmonized in the event of language, which in turn positions Gadamer in proximity to the presupposed grounds of receptivity in Cheng’s onto-generative hermeneutics. Lauren Pfister’s contributing article addresses the year 2000 meeting between Cheng and Gadamer in Heidelberg and expands the transhistorical grounds of meaning in Gadamer to matters of theology. Pfister’s summary of the written Chinese record of their conversation indicates that Cheng does not address the role of Christian philosophy and hence, the role of the inner word in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This is important not only for detecting changes in Cheng’s philosophical development, but also for modifying his hermeneutics along the lines of a living conversation, possibilities explored by Pfister in a sequel to the article submitted to this issue. Nevertheless, by raising the issue of how Gadamer’s turn to language for understanding the meaning of Being extends possibilities in Cheng’s thought, Pfister anticipates the article by Katarina Gajdosova. She returns to the roots of Chinese thought during the Warring States period and broadens the meaning of names in recently excavated texts. Contrary to the conventions about how to understand terms, she appeals to both Heidegger’s ontology and Cheng’s notion of receptivity and creativity to reinterpret naming in relation to cosmology. Along the same lines, insofar as the event of Being is lingual, Jay Goulding captures its emergent structure in an evolving community of scholars and scholarship. He recalls his philosophical journey toward Cheng’s philosophy that begins in conversations with Gadamer at McMaster University in Hamilton, leads to Heidegger and Asian thought, expands into turning points with teachers and colleagues from various backgrounds that by increments contributed to Goulding’s formulation of “Daoist phenomenology.” -/- Although differing traditions guide their inquiries and research, Cheng and Gadamer recall the wisdom of the past to ameliorate the fragmentation in contemporary life. This leads them to re-examine the origins of philosophy; historical roots and thus sources of creative re-interpretations East and West whose affinities are developed in contributions by Hyun Höchsmann and Friederike Assandri. Höchsmann assesses convergences and divergences in the origins of Chinese and Western philosophy (Confucius and Socrates, the Yijing and Pre-Socratics) that culminates in pairing Gadamer’s understanding of paideia in the context of Plato’s political cosmology in the Timaeus with moral and social cultivation in The Western Inscription. She delineates the limits of this comparison which in turn justifies introducing Vattimo’s notion of locality. Assandri’s comparative analysis moves between India and China, Buddhism and Tang Daoism. Based on Gadamer’s argument that writing detaches concepts from their cultural moorings, she defines and applies three levels of understanding in onto-generative hermeneutics to Buddhist terms that were assimilated into the Benji Jing and in so doing clarifies essential dimensions of Daoism. -/- Contributions by Stephen Palmquist and Nicholas Brasovan position Cheng in relation to Kant and Gadamer by way of Aristotle’s ethics respectively. On the one hand, Palmquist plots Cheng’s evolving criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy and draws on crucial dimensions of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to reposition that criticism in a constructive relation to Kant’s emphasis on the philosophical conditions of morality while also indicating how religious dimensions of his thought answer Cheng’s concerns for lived moral action. For Palmquist, Gadamer enables a constructive criticism of Cheng. On the other hand, Brasovan compares Cheng’s Yijing-based account of moral deliberation with Gadamer’s Aristotelian-based ethics and reasons that in contrast to Cheng, Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness is disengaged from practical knowledge. For Brasovan, Cheng is a constructive critic of Gadamer. Palmquist and Brasovan’s divergent angles on Gadamer and Cheng map onto a dialectic of contrast and complementarity that constitutes the inner logic of Cheng’s philosophy. In other words, Gadamer and Cheng ought to be read alongside one another for the sake of removing discrepancies and contradictions, which constitutes the organic structure of their thinking. -/- 3 Our Mode of Being in History Is Not Historical The conversations between Cheng and Gadamer in this issue of The Journal of Chinese Philosophy pivot on language, philosophy of history and ethics within a comparative framework of analysis, but also explore the grounds that make the comparisons possible. Those grounds are informed by Chinese cosmology, and function to wrest Gadamer from the shadow of Heideggerian facticity and reposition him within the range of Cheng’s ideas about our place in nature that is embedded in his question about how mind emerges from inorganic matter.8 -/- For Gadamer scholars of Heidegger, human finitude, our ownmost individuating death ensures that hermeneutics is always open to the other as other, always on the way toward understanding the meaning of Being. To arrest the process in a concept of “the Absolute” cannot but represent someone’s point of view, and thereby render hermeneutics indistinguishable from ideology. However, insofar as finitude is defined by them in terms of an onto-theological concept of immorality, finitude is a metaphysical concept consistent with epistemologies and confuse beings with the meaning of Being. As a result, the celebrated political value of hermeneutics to always be on the way toward an understanding of the meaning of Being admits subtle variations on the same worldview that are insufficiently self-critical. -/- Gadamer scholars of Heidegger are right. A transformation in ethos and opening to the meaning of Being depends on awareness of finitude. Yet this awareness does not yield openness to more of the same, i.e., discourse structurally incapable of coming to unity but instead, for both Gadamer and Cheng, openness to a distinctly different ontological dimension of reality. As Sandra Wawrytko and So-Seong Park indicate,9 this ontological dimension is prefigured in the experience of being-as-a-whole or the totality of all possible relations in both Chinese totemic shamanistic rituals,10 and Greek Dionysian festivals.11 Through these religious experiences human ethos and therefore consciousness is expanded and elevated from being centered on one’s ownmost concerns toward an affinity with all sentient beings from insects and plants to animals. The channel for this affinity is an auditory disposition and hence, the emotions, compassion, and feeling response. -/- The capacity for an auditory disposition, or as Gadamer calls it, listening consciousness to respond to the inter-relationality and therefore inherent balance of nature is developed through music, song and dance of the religious rituals and festivals. They facilitate the unity of mind with nature. This use of music, that transforms ordinary consciousness, explains Cheng’s emphasis on the receptivity of feeling response in comprehensive observation, and Gadamer’s emphasis on openness to the other in attunement. However, an auditory disposition characteristic of pre-literate oral cultures that reveals the “All” need not rely on religion. As theorists about the evolution of language have explained,12 modern languages preserve their pre-historical past in music or prosody. That is to say, the song and dance that revealed the totality of inter-related beings to an ethos of comprehensive observation and attunement toward beings in classical civilizations is retained in the back-and-forth movement or rhythm of the dialogue form. Our mode of being in history is a mode of being in nature – through the music of language. -/- While alerting the reader to the limits of a nominalist interpretation, Gadamer expresses the inner law of the nature as follows: “in perishing there is always becoming, and in becoming there is always perishing.”13 Considered in process, opposites generate and blend into each other. This law of nature applies to everything.14 Hence, in a manner comparable to Pfister’s concluding insights, onto-dialogical hermeneutics is not only open to discrete events of otherness but moreover, to the moving structure of reality expressed, as Gajdosova suggests, in the existential moment of naming. Considered as interplay of tension and resolution with a life of its own, the dialectic of a dialogue is self-similar to the way in which an organism grows (by instinct). There is, therefore, a sense in which the art of interpretation extends the human mind into the eternal cycles of nature such that we participate in the articulation of the inner telos/homeostasis toward which all beings strive and importantly for Gadamer scholars of Heidegger, within the material limits of energy to which our embodied minds are self-evidently subject. In mortality there is always immortality. (shrink)

Hermeneutics is widely celebrated as a call for “conversation”—that is, a manner of inquiry characterized by humility and openness to the other that eschews the pretenses of calculative rationality and resists all finality of conclusions. In this, conversation takes shape in efforts to understand and interpret that always unfold in the transmission of meaning historically in language. Yet, the celebration of hermeneutics for humility and openness appears, at least, to risk embarrassment in light of claims found in Heidegger (...) and Gadamer that conversation is always contingent on “prior accord.” Critics of hermeneutics have, for some decades, interpreted this claim of prior accord to refer to a common tradition, so that the understanding achieved in conversation is restricted to those who belong to the same heritage. In this essay, the author argues that although Heidegger and Gadamer often suggest this prior accord is a matter of common tradition, crucial threads of Gadamer’s thought, in particular, recommend a different view. Gadamer, in these threads, offers that “prior accord” concerns not a common tradition, but, on the contrary, the call to participate in hermeneutic transmission as such, even—and no doubt especially—when those in conversation are not familiar with the tradition or language of the other. With this, we are called to converse not first by _what_ the other says, but by the fact _that_ we do not yet understand, that we have already misunderstood, and that we perhaps cannot understand. (shrink)

Book Review. Jesús Conill-Sancho. Ética hermenéutica. Crítica desde la facticidad. [Hermeneutic Ethics. The Critique of Facticity]. Madrid: Tecnos, 2006.

As his editor John L. Stanley points out, Georges Sorel was "that fascinating polymath." This volume, the third in his selected works in the English language published by Transaction, emphasizes Sorel's extraordinary writings in the philosophy of science, religion, culture, and art. For those who know Sorel only as author of Reflections on Violence, the present volume will come as a forceful reminder of the range and depth of Sorelian efforts to construct a world view. Sorel is throughout concerned with (...) the moral development of human beings. In this sense, his writings on politics are of a piece with his writings on religion, "facticity" of human history and society. Sorel's earliest writings were on religion, and key portions of that period are reflected in selections here. And he went on from there to study the sociology of science, the ways in which science fits into the cultural history of civilization and present day social relationships of industrial society. Stanley provides a profound framework based on two decades of close study and translation of Sorel's texts. He helps to explain how the partial theories of Sorel lead to holistic intellectual consequences, how the psychological method does not foreclose political activism, and how historical limits can be transformed against a background of aesthetics or considerations of taste. He shows that Sorel comes as a close as Manheim and Simmel and Durkheim to the creation of a modern social science--albeit he lacks the overall philosophical theorems of people like Marx and Weber. In Sorel we have a first-class mind at work. And in Stanley, we have a first-class analyst at work. Together, the volume adds up to something special for the political scientist, sociologist, art historian, theologian--in short for those to whom the ideal of a human science endures. John L. Stanley is professor of political science at the University of California at Riverside. He is the author of The Sociology of Virtue: The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel. He has written many articles and reviews on the history of European political theory. With his wife, Charlotte Stanley, he has been long engaged in the translation of the works of Georges Sorel. (shrink)

I argue that Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic phenomenology accounts for the social dimension of factical life. In my view, Gadamer is able to do so through an appropriation of Martin Heidegger’s early phenomenological developments. My argument is centered on Heidegger’s early formal indicative method, especially as it emerges in his 1923 “hermeneutics of facticity” lecture course. Gadamer’s 1924 publication “On the Idea of a System in Philosophy” provides evidence that Gadamer follows Heidegger in many ways but not down a (...) path of methodological destruction by way of formal indications. Instead, for Gadamer, understanding occurs through conversation and always with reference to the self, other, and tradition. My article clarifies the role of formal indication in hermeneutic phenomenology and contributes to scholarship concerned with the relationship between Heidegger and Gadamer. (shrink)

IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to outline the program of a hermeneutic theory of the way in which reality becomes disclosed and meaningfully articulated in practices of scientific inquiry.Text and MethodsI describe the profile of hermeneutic realism by addressing the issue of how objectified factuality is produced within the facticity of inquiry. Hermeneutic realism is characterized as a position that discards foundational epistemology and cognitive essentialism. I argue that the meaningful articulation of domains disclosed in scientific inquiry is (...) an ontologically self-sufficient process. This claim is the kernel of interpretive internalism. At stake in my analysis is the interplay of interrelated scientific practices and the possibilities for doing research, granted that the practices’ interrelatedness is projected upon the horizon of possibilities. Three kinds of hermeneutic circularity in this interplay are distinguished. They refer accordingly to the selection of data, the construction of data-models, and the saving of phenomena whereby theoretical objects become contextually envisioned. The main emphasis is placed on the reading of theoretical objects in the articulation of scientific domains.ConclusionThus, the kind of philosophy of science pertinent to hermeneutic realism and interpretive internalism aims at revealing reality within the facticity of inquiry. (shrink)

Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is important to phenomenology for a number of reasons. One chief reason is that Gadamer describes his philosophical hermeneutics as an attempt to advance beyond the early Heidegger’s introduction of a “hermeneutics of facticity” that would break from the transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology. This chapter argues that Gadamer attempts to clarify his advance beyond Heidegger’s hermeneutical turn in phenomenology, at least in part, in reference to Hegel’s philosophy. While Gadamer remains critical of (...) German Idealism generally and Hegel’s notion of “absolute” spirit in particular, Gadamer nevertheless embraces Hegel’s approach to “objective” spirit in order to elucidate historical and linguistic conditions of facticity that the early Heidegger appears to discount. (shrink)

One may indeed wonder why it is that after so many years arguing about the role of textuality, metaphor, and discourse in the transmission of meaning and truth from one tradition to the next, thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur, Jürgen Habermas, and Jacques Derrida are currently preoccupied with such vexed issues as the nature of European identity, the role of forgiveness in the contemporary milieu, and the refugee crisis currently bedevilling so many states today. I think the answer is quite (...) simple: all of these thinkers are hermeneuts to a greater or lesser degree, in that each one is committed to the belief that we are, from the beginning, embedded in socio-linguistic frameworks, that we are, in other words, factically situated in a web of beliefs and practices not of our own making. As such, they consider interpretation as possessing a pivotal status in questions of identity and meaning. To understand oneself, that is, is not a matter of suspending or circumventing cultural and linguistic features of experience, but of wrestling with them in an effort to see how we can, from the point of view of our particular sociocultural provenance, build solidarity with those of differing perspectives and varying linguistic or interpretative backgrounds. The nature and function of “communication” is thus what most interests Ricoeur, Habermas, Gadamer, and Derrida. (shrink)

Proceedings of the First Conference of the International Society for Hermeneutics and Science.

Gadamer's discussion of play occurs as part of his effort to develop a philosophical hermeneutics, or a theory of interpretation, that attempts to reconcile two apparently opposed concepts, namely, universality and historicity. Heidegger's “hermeneutic of facticity”, or the existential structure of understanding, as developed in Being and Time, has an important influence on Gadamer's efforts to develop an historical and universal account of interpretation. It leads Gadamer to criticize traditional views of “aesthetic” and “historical” consciousness because of their (...) failure to adequately account for the “unique, originary experiences” of human beings, such as play, which are basic both to our inherence in the world and our self‐experience. Gadamer holds that the universality of the hermeneutical experience can be approached from any starting point. Play, human action in general, speech and writing, language use, etc., are intentional phenomena and have intentional properties. (shrink)

Like Aristotle’s texts, the present volume consists of logoi, lecture notes Heidegger left behind which later in his life he considered for possible inclusion in his Gesamtausgabe. Omissions in the manuscript amounting to about eleven pages were made good by referring to two transcripts of what was heard, respectively, by Walter Bröcker and Helene Weiss, two of Heidegger’s students at Freiburg University in the summer of 1923, when the course was given. Here and there in the manuscript, Heidegger provided headings (...) for sections of the text and for a number of inserts and supplements added later. The detailed section and subsection headings, which are an outline of the course, were added by the German editor, Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. According to the translator, by Heidegger’s own admission, the text comprises “the first notes for Being and Time”, and therein lies one element of our interest in these logoi, the other being the possibility that “Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity” was “the original form of Heidegger’s ‘original ethics’”. (shrink)

Formal indication is one of the central concepts of Heidegger’s hermeneutics. Formal means that something is to be fulfilled. Indication indicates the direction of fulfilling. Heidegger developed the so-called by him, „formal indication”, respectively „formally indicative concepts” as a methodological justification of the philosophical terminology. The term „formal indication” aroses in the context of the phenomenology of life, where Heidegger introduces his „hermeneutics of facticity”, which is also referred to as „formally indicative hermeneutics“. This is about (...) something crucial for Heidegger’s thinking. The epistemological and transcendental tradition of viewing finds here a turn into the existential and historical. The indication always remains at the distance of pointing, that is, someone to whom something is shown, must see for himself. Formal indication indicates the direction for seeing. What can be seen, one must learn to say, to say in the own words. The old problem of the concretization and the conceptualization, which runs through German idealism, gets here a new expression. (shrink)

Both the early hermeneutics of facticity and the mature question of being have their starting point in the investigation of everyday life. Underlining Being and Time, we discuss two dimensions of the everyday life phenomenon, namely its «content» and «modal» sense. The relationship between both of them shows up as a dynamic tendency and an internal reference. On the basis of the distinction of the two-dimensional everyday life we deal with the problem of modal indifference, which is apparently (...) closely connected with the «content» sense of everyday life, in order to find out whether it could be a third way to execute existence besides authenticity and inauthenticity. We reject the plain correspondence between everyday life with modal indifference and inauthenticity, taking into account the thesis in Being and Timeabout the possibility of authentic liberating solicitude in the facticity of being together, whose analysis remains within the limits of everyday life. (shrink)

From the hermeneutics of facticity to phenomenological destruction, Heidegger’s constant effort has been to achieve a non-metaphysical, pre-theoretical methodology of philosophy. His ideas finally lead to the development of the method of formal indication. In this essay, I will consider first the methodological function of historical things, in order to illustrate the method of destruction. Then, I will explain the definition of philosophy from the point of view of formal indication, thereby showing how different this method is from (...) traditional philosophical methods. Finally, I will analyse the importance of this transformation of methodology, in order to reveal in which sense a concrete universality is possible and how it contributes to the foundation of the ontology of life. (shrink)

This paper deals with the methodological role played by the term «motivation» in young Heidegger’s early hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology. To that effect, I shall start analyzing the concept of motivation in Husserl’s phenomenology so as to better understand its hermeneutical variation in young Heidegger’s philosophy. Subsequently, I will pay special attention to the relevance exhibited by motivation in the emergence of the most important methodological notions of hermeneutical phenomenology as «destruction», «formal indication» and «preconception». To conclude, I shall explore (...) the possibility of reshaping the phenomenological problem of the motivation to reduction in hermeneutical terms. That is to say: a motivation to reduction in factical life experience is always needed to access to the primordial sphere of meaning. Accordingly, I will finally suggest that the philosophical basic experience of radical questioning can be read as a hermeneutical epoche, which is, however, directly linked to the concern for one’s own existence. (shrink)

On se propose ici de tenter de rapprocher la critique wittgensteinienne des propositions métaphysiques du projet heideggérien de « destruction phénoménologique de l’histoire de l’ontologie ». Il s’agit donc d’abord de rappeler que dans le Tractatus Wittgenstein établit une différence « transcendantale » entre ce qui peut se dire et ce qui ne fait que « se montrer » et qu’il faut plutôt taire. Mais chez Wittgenstein la mise en évidence de cette différence conduit au refus du métalangage, et à (...) l’interdiction d’une interrogation sur sa propre démarche de philosophe, c’est-à-dire à ce que l’on pourrait nommer un « transcendantalisme paradoxal ». Chez Heidegger en revanche la mise en évidence de la différence ontologique, laquelle ne permet ni de faire de l’être un prédicat réel ni d’énoncer l’être sous la forme de propositions prédicatives conduit à interroger le fondement antéprédicatif du langage énonciatif, qui n’est autre que la transcendance du Dasein. Il répond ainsi à la paradoxie du Tractatus en montrant qu’il n’y a d’apophansis que sur la base d’une hermeneia plus originaire. Une mise en parallèle de l’« herméneutique de la facticité » heideggérienne et de l’analyse wittgensteinienne des jeux de langage en tant que formes de vie peut alors être tentée, dans la mesure où la dimension herméneutique du comprendre n’est pas entièrement absente chez le second Wittgenstein, en dépit de sa conception instrumentale du langage.The object of this paper is to try a comparison between Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysical statements and Heidegger’s project of a « phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology ». It is at first necessary to recall that in Tractatus Wittgenstein establishes a transcendental difference between what can be said and what can only show itself and has to be passed over in silence. But this leads Wittgenstein to refuse metalanguage and to prohibit all questioning of his own position as a philosopher, that is to say to what could be named a « paradoxical transcendentalism ». On the contrary, Heidegger, in bringing to light the ontological difference, which does not allow to define Being as a real predicate or to enunciate Being in the form of predicative statements, is led to question the antepredicative foundation of the propositional language or logos apophantikos, which is nothing else than the transcendence of Dasein. He thus gives an answer to Wittgenstein’s parodoxy by showing that there is apophansis only on the basis of a more originary hermeneia. A comparison between Heidegger’s « hermeneutics of facticity » and Wittgenstein’s analysis of language games as life forms can then be performed, in so far as the hermeneutic dimension of understanding is not completely absent in Wittgenstein’s Investigations, in spite of his instrumental conception of language. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 14.1 (2000) 79-81 [Access article in PDF] Books Received July 1999 through December 1999Asmuth, Christoph. 1999. Das Begriefen des Unbegreiflich. Abt. II, Band 41 of Spekulation and Erfahrung. Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog. 411 pp.Badiou, Alain. 1999. Manifesto for Philosophy. Trans. and ed. Norman Madarasz. Albany: SUNY Press. 181 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4219-5, $14.95 pbk. 0-7914-4220-9.Barwise, Jon, and John Perry. 1999. Situations and Attitudes. New York: Cambridge UP. (...) lxxxviii + 352 pp. $22.95 pbk. 1-57586-193-3.Benson, Bruce L. 1998. To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice. New York: New York UP. xxviii + 372 pp. $37.50 h.c. 1-8147-1327-0.Bonsdorff, Pauline von, and Arto Haapala, eds. 1999. Aesthetics in the Human Environment. Lahti, Finland: International Institute of Applied Aesthetics. 204 pp. h.c. 952-5069-07-09.Bratman, Michael E. 1999. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. vi + 200 pp. $22.95 pbk. 1-57586-192-5.Brencick, Janice M., and Glenn A. Webster. 2000. Philosophy of Nursing: A New Vision for Health Care. Albany: SUNY Press. ix + 247 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4379-5, $19.95 pbk. 0-7914-4380-9.Clendenning, John. 1999. The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce. 2d ed. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt UP. xvii + 446 pp. $49.95 h.c. 0-8265-1312-3, $24.95 pbk. 0-8265-1322-0.Curtis, Kimberley. 1999. Our Sense of the Real: Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. xv + 197 pp. $39.95 h.c. 0-8014-3577-3, $16.95 pbk. 0-8014-8640-8.Frederick, Robert E., ed. 1999. A Companion to Business Ethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. xvi + 464 pp. $99.95 h.c. 0-631-20130-0.Gallois, André. 1996. The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP. xii + 213 pp. h.c. 0-521-56093-4.Gracia, Jorge J. E. 1999. Metaphysics and its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge. Albany: SUNY Press. xix + 247 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4213-6, $17.95 pbk. 0-7914-4214-4.Grosz, Elizabeth, ed. 1999. Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. vi + 250 pp. $45.00 h.c. 0-8014-3632-X, $18.95 pbk. 0-8014-8590-8.Heidegger, Martin. 1999. Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity. Trans. John van Buren. Bloomington: Indiana UP. xii + 138 pp. $24.95 h.c. 0-253-33507-8.Heyde, Ludwig. 1999. The Weight of Finitude: On the Philosophical Question of God. Trans. Alexander Harmsen and William Desmond. Albany: SUNY Press. xviii + 177 pp. h.c. 0-7914-4265-9, $17.95 pbk. 0-7914-4266-7.Lang, Berel. 1999. The Future of the Holocaust: Between History and Memory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. xiv + 198 pp. $45.00 h.c. 0-8014-3588-9, $17.95 pbk. 0-8014-8569-X.Levinas, Emmanuel. 1999. Alterity and Transcendence. Trans. Michael B. Smith. New York: Columbia UP. xxiv + 195 pp. $29.50 h.c. 0-231-11650-0.Lorraine, Tamsin. 1999. Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. xiv + 272 pp. h.c. 0-8014-3623-0, $19.95 pbk. 0-8014-8586-X.Margolis, Eric, and Stephen Laurence, eds. 1999. Concepts: Core Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. x + 652 pp. h.c. 0-262-13353-9, $37.50 pbk. 0-262-63193-8.McCumber, John. 1999. Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana UP. xiv + 338 pp. $49.95 h.c. 0-253-33473-X, $24.95 pbk. 0-253-21316-9.McWhorter, Ladelle. 1999. Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization. Bloomington: Indiana UP. xx + 260 pp. $39.95 h.c. 0-253-33558-2, $18.95 pbk. 0-253-21325-8.Raposa, Michael L. 1999. Boredom and the Religious Imagination. Charlottesville, VA: UP of Virginia. xiii + 199 pp. $40.00 h.c. 0-8139-1898-7, $13.95 pbk. 0-8139-1925-8.Redding, Paul. 1999. The Logic of Affect. Ithaca, NY: Cornell... (shrink)

Resumo O curso proferido por Heidegger, no semestre de verão de 1923, e publicado posteriormente, sob o título de Ontologia: a hermenêutica da facticidade, é um dos importantes loci nos quais Heidegger deixa entrever tanto a influência e importância de Kierkegaard quanto algumas de suas avaliações acerca do pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês. Uma delas, em especial, não obstante formule um interessante juízo sobre a relação entre Kierkegaard e Hegel - a partir da figura de F. A. Trendelenburg -, um dos (...) temas mais revisitados da literatura interpretativa sobre Kierkegaard, não tem sido objeto frequente de avaliação por aqueles intérpretes. Assim, o objetivo deste artigo é expor, analisar e avaliar as teses de Heidegger sobre a relação Kierkegaard-Hegel, a fim de sopesá-las em sua correção. Por fim, o artigo apresenta algumas reflexões metafilosóficas, avaliando o juízo de Heidegger sobre Kierkegaard, quanto a não ter se “desprendido de Hegel”.The course delivered by Heidegger during the Summer semester of 1923, and published later under the title of Ontology - The hermeneutics of facticity, is one of the most important loci in which we can have a glimpse of Kierkegaard’s influence on and importance to Heidegger, as well as of some of his interpretations about the thought of the Dane philosopher. One of them, notwithstanding puts forward a very interesting assessment of the relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel - through F. A. Trendelenburg -, one of hottest topics in the Kierkegaardian scholarship, is not usually analyzed by that scholarship. Hence, this paper aims to show and analyze Heidegger’s theses on the relation between Kierkegaard-Hegel in that work in order to evaluate their correctness. As final remarks, this paper presents some metaphilosophical reflections on the very notions of relation and dependence between philosophers. (shrink)

Divers ouvrages sur saint Augustin conduisent à reposer la question du temps et celle du sujet qui ont alors été réunies pour la première fois comme un unique problème : memoria, conscience et conscience de soi, sont pensées selon le temps comme un sentir primordial. Celui-ci suppose un lieu, le ciel des ciels, qui est le lieu temporel de l'homme auprès de Dieu. L'intériorité augustinienne a des antécédents dans la pensée antique ; elle a influencé la philosophie récente ; Heidegger (...) interprète l'ego de Descartes d'une façon augustinienne dans son herméneutique de la facticité. Les questions suscitées par ces ouvrages viennent du manque actuel d'une histoire spéculative de l'ego, en même temps que d'une résurgence évidente de celui-ci dans le champ de la philosophie contemporaine. Several books about Augustine lead to question once more the topic of time and of the subject which then were united for the first time as a single problem : memoria, conscionsness and self conscionsness are thought according to time as a prime feeling. The latter supposes a place, heaven in heaven, which is the temporal seat of man next to God. Augustinian interiority has its antecedents within classical thought. It influenced recent philosophy. Heidegger interprets Descartes' ego in an Augustinian way within his hermeneutics of facticity. The topics at stake from these books surge from the present lack of a speculative history of the ego, together with an obvious resurgence of the latter within the field of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

When Heidegger takes the decision at the end of the 1920’s to « risk again the step into an authentic metaphysics », a very strong solidarity is already established between his philosophical project and that of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This solidarity is testified in the recuperation Heidegger does of the idea – proper to Kant and Baumgarten – of a metaphysica naturalis. The « Metaphysics of Dasein » constitutes the last attempt – after the hermeneutics of (...) class='Hi'>facticity and the fundamental ontology – to define philosophy starting from « human nature ». After this « step into metaphysics », Heidegger’s thought will dedicate its efforts to the well-known « Overtaking of metaphysics ». (shrink)

Aron Vinegar’s essay explores art history and visual culture’s dependence on a phenomenological conception of world, which is based on a hermeneutics of facticity, intentionality, and ontological difference. He argues that the ‘basic concept’ of world has structured the field of art history and visual culture in implicit and explicit ways, thus dictating many of its commitments and concerns. One of the primary limitations of this commitment to world, is that it has resulted in art history and visual (...) culture’s tendency to concern itself with a very small portion of existence, usually human existence, in its emphasis on hermeneutics and facticity, thus foreclosing on a more generous and speculative ontology, ethics, and politics. The concept of “world” suggests an overarching totality, an interconnected field of meaning and sense, often indicated by a tacit and resonate tonality. But there is no overarching “world” or “world-view” that can provide us with an overview of or container for the myriad worlds of things. An art history that is willing to consider that the world does not exist would acknowledge and embrace the fact that there is no overall focus, which can encompass things and events in all their spatio-temporal complexity. It would entail a practice attentive to a “supple and inflected bathmology” (Vinegar prefers this phrase to “flat ontology”) in its refusal to emphasize “privileged ontological scenes” predicated on hierarchies of ontological difference, and subsuming things and experience within the structures of phenomenological intentionality. To initiate such a practice, Vinegar suggests an embrace of what he terms “ontological indifference,” a robust notion of habit, and a temporal logic that would be fully attentive to a pluriverse of multiple existences and eruptions of substance, which extend well beyond ‘our’ realms of significance and meaning, cares and concerns, laughter and joy, losses and mournings. (shrink)

The supple and ever-present search for the possibilities offered by the narrative form in fictional writing corresponds to the use of the narrative as a mode of understanding and explaining our being-in-the-world in philosophy. The intimate liaison between the realm of fictional imagination and that of human everydayness inspires writers to seek ways to tackle issues of temporality, the conflicting character of human drives, and the ultimately unresolvable tension between finitude and infinitude. As a literary and philosophical category, the narrative (...) remains an inexhaustible space for the exploration of the way we understand our lives. I propose a hermeneutic investigation of the interactions between the art of narration and the categories of space, presence/absence, and (be)longingness as evoked in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway. This article engages Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, and, more specifically, his notions of homelessness and homecoming, to shed light on the inimitable character of Woolf’s artistic representations of the spatial dimension of human existence, reality viewed as both tremulous and solid, as well as of human embodiment and the disparity/closeness between the corporeal and the spiritual. (shrink)

Showing a very early interest in Descartes, after having first considered him as a Christian thinker in the perspective of a deconstruction of religious life, Heidegger soon regards him as the major obstacle to the phenomenological analyses he wants to develop, as part of the first ontological search he gave himself: that of a hermeneutics of facticity. Therefore, the latter immediately takes in his work the shape of a hermeneutics of the I think, therefore I am, its (...) author being blamed for having entirely ignored the sense of being in the I am, focused as he is on the thinking ego, the ins and outs of which he develops. But the criticism also applying to Husserl, it is by laying the blame on his master, that Heidegger intends to radicalize the project of his own master, hence the necessity to throw light on the origin and the foundations of what we can call the Cartesian question in Heidegger. (shrink)

With the massification of digital communication networks, a powerful and intense digital transformation of everyday life has been taking place. This transformation intensifies in the common sense of our domestic life the idea of immediacy and simultaneity: the factual possibility that "we are" contemporary and everyday together with the global passing. In this context catalyzed by a phenomenon that we will call digital hyperconnectivity, the concept of “inhabiting” acquires special interest due to the possible transformations that its supposed escalation implies (...) to an unprecedented measure. It is precisely in this review that this article seeks to approach an idea of surrounding world, based on notions found in two works by Martin Heidegger: “Being and time” and “Ontology. Hermeneutics of facticity. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Notre article traite de l’interprétation heideggerienne du Surhomme chez Nietzsche en prenant en considération tout particulièrement sa désignation comme forme dans les cours de 1939-1946 qui constituent, sous plusieurs aspects, la culmination du « différend » avec lui. En effet, si anthropomorphie et subjectivité s'appartiennent mutuellement dans la métaphysique moderne, cette coappartenance trouve son achèvement chez le Surhomme. Elle indique par ailleurs la forclusion du sujet nietzschéen dans la logique de la négation, témoignage de la tentative heideggerienne pour « (...) dialectiser » Nietzsche. C’est ainsi qu’une continuité s'établit entre sa position métaphysique et la dialectique hégélienne. Par ailleurs, nous nous efforçons de projeter cette interprétation réductrice sur la critique par Heidegger d’une des figures majeures du néohégélianisme au tournant du siècle, à savoir Oswald Spengler, telle qu’elle a lieu dans ses cours de l’herméneutique de la facticité. Notre stratégie interprétative est fidèle au principe interprétatif qui consiste à dire que le Heidegger d’avant Être et Temps, nous offre les outils nécessaires pour aborder certains motifs essentiels du développement ultérieur de sa pensée dont notamment sa confrontation avec la métaphysique. ABSTRACT This paper focuses on Heidegger's interpretation of the Ubermensch with a special emphasis on his designation as a form developped mainly in the 1939-1946 lecture courses on Nietzsche. The belonging- together of “unconditional” subjectivity and anthropomorphism reaches its completion in the “form” of the Ubermensch, while it also witnesses its forclosure in the logic of negativity. Consequently, a direct continuity is established between Nietzsche's metaphysical position and Hegel's dialectics. By taking this unexpected affinity as a starting point, we go back to Heidegger's early critique of hegelianism and especially of Spengler's project of a morphology of the cultures in his hermeneutics of facticity. This interpretative strategy unfolds according to the principle that the first steps on Heidegger's path of thinking offer us the necessary conceptual tools in order to come to terms with the later developments of his confrontation with metaphysics. (shrink)

The reissue of Ernesto Grassi’s Rhetoric as Philosophy in English by Southern Illinois University Press prompts a reconsideration of this twentiethcentury Italian intellectual’s contribution to rhetoric and philosophy. The book is a set of closely related essays around the central theme that Italian humanism compliments and enriches the hermeneutic understanding developed by Grassi’s mentor, Heidegger. Grassi wishes to retrieve and promote the neglected resources of the ancient rhetorical tradition as they were nurtured and embellished by great and lesser known humanists (...) of the Renaissance. Just as does Hans-Georg Gadamer, Grassi uses the distortions of the dominant Cartesian worldview of apodictic certainty as foil. Against this modern backdrop Grassi offers up an entire tradition of humanist scholarship which locates human understanding in the familiar rhetorical territory of probability, situatedness, and invention. Not the deadened instrumentalist technique that rhetoric was accused of becoming after Aristotle, Grassi reveals a rich treasury of conceptual resources which comport plausibly with the hermeneutics of facticity and a poetics of thinking. Perhaps the most rewarding aspect of Grassi’s effort in Rhetoric as Philosophy is that, in support of his argument on behalf of Renaissance humanism and classical Latin culture, he introduces us to an untapped treasure-house of scholarship that includes not only the familiar names of Giambattista Vico, Fabius Quintilian, Juan Luis Vives, and Leonardo Bruno, but a host of lesser known figures such as Angelo Poliziano, Coluccio Salutati, Hugo of St. Victor, Brunetto Latini, and the younger Pico, all of whom make striking contributions to what seems very like a kind of rhetorical-hermeneutic understanding of the world. (shrink)

This innovative book investigates being Jewish not as a sectarian religiosity but as a way of being-in-the-world particularly suited to understanding Heidegger's early phenomenology. At its core is an intimate engagement with sacred texts,which grounds being Jewish in a way of life constituted as a way of reading-a way of reading transmitted to succeeding generations as a passionate teaching. Allen Scult argues that Heidegger was similarly involved in a passionate attempt to introduce his students to philosophical practice through a personal (...) engagement with the words of Aristotle. Scult traces the hermeneutical affinity- even intimacy-between Judaism as a way of life, grounded in an intense interpretive relationship to the Torah; and Heidegger's view of philosophical practice, as a similarly intense interpretive relationship to the founding texts of Western philosophy. In tracing the dynamics of this relationship in Heideggerian and Jewish hermeneutics, Scult not only finds mutually enlightening points of contact between the two, but also uncovers new ways of understanding how Heidegger's fundamental ontology is grounded in the lived experience of religion. Allen Scult is National Endowment for the Humanities Professor of Philosophy and Rhetoric at Drake University. He is co-author of Rhetoric and Biblical Interpretation. Being Jewish/Reading Heidegger ponders what it means to read Heidegger on his own terms, that is, to read him from the place where one is, in Heidegger's language, in and from the facticity of one's own Being... To be Jewish, according to Scult, is to be entexted with Torah. Scult argues that this notion of binding one's being with a textual tradition underlies Heidegger's theory of Dasein. He uses Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric to illustrate how Heidegger 'reads Aristotle' and, in doing so... teach[es] the Jew how to be-Jewish-in-the-world through an engagement with a textual tradition (Torah)..Shaul Magid, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America a compelling account of how being-Jewish enacts the sort of concrete, revealing relationship to a text and a world that makes meditation on being, as Heidegger - early and late - understands it, possible. Only someone with Allen Scult's trained ear for the subtle interplay of rhetoric and hermeneutics could make us see the remarkable parallels between the Rabbis' reading of the Torah and Heidegger's reading of Aristotle..he makes a trenchant case for 'a reading of Heidegger not as prophet, but as Rabbinic sage'.--Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Boston University Being Jewish/Reading Heidegger ponders what it means to read Heidegger on his own terms to read him from the place where one is...As a Jew seriously engaged with Heidegger as both a philosopher and a thinker... Scult posits that being Jewish is not simply a consequence of birth or biology but... of binding oneTs being with a textual tradition(Torah)...This book is really about a search for b/Being Jewish using Heidegger as a guide --a guide that shows the seeker how text and person read and constructively use one other... Scult succeeds in presenting how one can be a serious disciple of Heidegger and a serious Jew and that the former, in many ways, only enriches the latterShaul Magid, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America A compelling account of how being-Jewish enacts the sort of concrete, revealing relationship to a text and a world that makes meditation on being, as Heidegger-early and late-understands it, possible. Only someone with Allen Scult's trained ear for the subtle interplay of rhetoric and hermeneutics could make us see the remarkable parallels between the Rabbis' reading of the Torah and Heidegger's reading of Aristotle.... He makes a trenchant case for a reading of Heidegger not as prophet, but as Rabbinic sage'.Daniel O. Dahlstrom. (shrink)