The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were they to remember alone is a phenomenon known as collaborative inhibition. The article offers a phenomenological account of this highly counterintuitive effect of group remembering. It argues that the mutual failure to live up to one’s potential does not warrant the standard, strongly negative views about the role of others in recall. Rather, the phenomenon may imply that sharedness itself becomes (...) constitutive of the process in the sense that interaction partners co-determine what and how to remember. Drawing on phenomenological approaches to remembering and second-person engagement, the article argues that individuals participating in shared remembering co-construct their memories by reciprocally and dynamically incorporating each other’s perspectives, attitudes, and emotions about their shared past. (shrink)

In everyday parlance, "inhibition" suggests repression, tight control, the opposite of freedom. In medicine and psychotherapy the term is commonplace, its definition understood. Relating how inhibition—the word and the concept—became a bridge between society at large and the natural sciences of mind and brain, Smith constructs an engagingly original history of our view of ourselves. Not until the late nineteenth century did the term "inhibition" become common in English, connoting the dependency of reason and of civilization itself (...) on the repression of "the beast within." This usage followed a century of Enlightenment thought about human nature and the nature of the human mind. Smith traces theories of inhibitory control from the moralistic psychologies of the early nineteenth century to the famous twentieth-century schools of Sherrington, Pavlov, and Freud. He finds that the meanings of "inhibition" cross disciplinary boundaries and outline the growth of our belief in the self-regulated person. (shrink)

The crux of the dispute on the mutual relations between attention and consciousness, and to which I have referred in this paper, lies in the question of what can be attended in spatial attention that obviously resonates with the phenomenological issue of intentionality. The discussion has been initiated by Christopher Mole. He began by calling for a commonsense psychology, according to which one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all (...) the things that one is conscious of. In other words, attention is supposed to be a condition which is sufficient but not necessary for consciousness, i.e., consciousness is a necessary concomitant of attention, but attention is not a necessary concomitant of consciousness. Mole seeks to validate his stance with data from psychology labs. His view is, however, partly confronted, for instance, by Robert Kentridge, Lee de-Wit and Charles Heywood, who used their experimental research on a neurological condition called blindsight as evidence of a dissociation between attention and consciousness, i.e., that visual attention is not a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. In this meta-theoretical state of affairs, I would like to focus on the cognitive phenomenon most often referred to as Inhibition of Return and suggest that, following its micro dynamics from the perspective of micro-phenomenology, it can be used to actually showcase all of the options on both sides of the argument. One of my leading goals would be also to follow Mole’s attempt to link attention with agency but where we differ is that I wish to heuristically articulate the matter in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of embodied pre-reflective intentionality. (shrink)

Inhibition, associated with self-efficacy, enables people to control thought and action and inhibit disturbing stimulus and impulsion and has certain evolutionary significance. This study analyzed the neural correlates of inhibition modulated by self-efficacy. Self-efficacy was assessed by using the survey adapted from the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire. Fifty college students divided into low and high self-efficacy groups participated in the experiments. Their ability to conduct inhibitory control was studied through Go/No-Go tasks. During the tasks, we recorded students’ (...) brain activity, focusing on N2 and P3 components in the event-related potential. Larger No-Go N2 amplitudes for the high self-efficacy group were found compared with the low self-efficacy group. Conflict detection as represented by N2 was modulated by self-efficacy, whereas conflict inhibition as represented by P3 was not modulated by self-efficacy. The highly self-efficacious students were more capable of detecting conflicts but not necessarily more capable of inhibiting action given that conflict was detected. Taken together, these findings offer neurophysiological evidence of the important regulatory role of self-efficacy in inhibitory control ability development. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe history of psychology, like other human science subjects, should attend to the meaning of words understood as relationships of reference and value within discourse. It should seek to identify and defend a history centered on representations of knowledge. The history of the word “inhibition” in nineteenth-century Europe illustrates the potential of such an approach. This word was significant in mediating between physiological and psychological knowledge and between technical and everyday understanding. Further, this word indicated the presence (...) of a common discourse structuring ways of thought about order, whether in technology, moral activity, or experimental psycho-physiology. Writing history as the history of discourse suggests several difficulties; these are considered briefly. Nevertheless attention to language and meaning makes it possible to integrate the history of psychology with intellectual history and thereby to broaden its potential audience. (shrink)

This study focuses on latent inhibition, a mechanism behind selective attention, as the biological basis of creativity in schoolchildren. The main objective of this study is to know if low levels of attention positively affect the levels of creativity manifested in students between the ages of nine and 12. The design of this study is non-experimental with an explanatory-correlational cross-sectional quantitative approach. In order to achieve the objective suggested, several education centers located in Murcia were selected, in which 476 (...) students took part in a creativity test, an attention test, and another test about intelligence depending on the educational level. The results obtained showed that selective attention was negatively correlated with graphic creativity, understanding that behind it lies the latent inhibition, and that when certain levels of intelligence are present, this negative correlation increases. In this way, the simultaneous existence of creative and inattentive subjects is demonstrated. (shrink)