INTRODUCTION Reopening a Discussion The empiricist-derived epistemology that has directed most social and natural scientific inquiry for the last three ...

본 논문의 목표는 소크라테스적 방법의 전형에 따라 넬손과 헥크만에 의해 계승 발전 된 새로운 소크라테스 대화 의 규칙을 소개하고 이를 검토하는 것이다. 이 규칙은 소크라 테스 대화 의 본질을 규정하는 구성적 규칙과 대화의 원활한 진행을 위하여 유용한 수단을 규정하는 규제적 규칙으로 구분된다. 따라서 넬손과 헥크만의 전통으로부터 나온 소크라 테스 대화 는 이러한 규칙을 전체적으로 검토함으로써 개괄될 수 있다. 이와 함께 나는 헥 크만이 제시하는 대화 지도자를 위한 교육적 방책도 살펴볼 것이다. 소크라테스 대화 의 실천에서 일반적으로 대화 지도자는 대화의 목적 달성을 (...) 위해 중요한 위치를 차지하는데, 여기서 그의 임무와 역할을 1) 사회자로서, 2) 조력자로서, 3) 촉진자로서, 4) 조종자로서 규정할 수 있다. 그리고 이를 통해 철학적 산파술이 넬손-헥크만 전통의 소크라테스 대 화 에서 어떻게 이해되어 활용되는지 알 수 있다. (shrink)

본 논문의 목표는 라우파흐-스트레이가 넬손과 헥크만의 전통에 따라 계승·발전된 ‘소크라테스 대화’의 이론적 근거로 제시한 ‘소크라테스적 전형’을 플라톤에 의해 전승된 ‘소크라테스 철학’으로부터 어떻게 이론적으로 정당화될 수 있는지를 비판적으로 고찰하 는 것이다. 이를 위해 필자는 ‘소크라테스 대화’와 관련해서 ‘소크라테스적 전형’이 제시 된 이유를 우선 살펴보고, 9가지 요소들로 구성된 ‘소크라테스적 전형’을 하나씩 소개한 후, 이를 ‘플라톤의 소크라테스’를 통해 정당화할 것이다. ‘소크라테스적 전형’의 9가지 요소들은 다음과 같다. (1) 철학함의 장소로서 아고라: 소크라테스 대화의 개방성과 공공 성, (2) 경험에 근거를 둠: 소크라테스 대화의 방법론적 원리, (3) (...) 반독단주의: 가르침에 대한 포기, (4) 이성의 자기 신뢰: 로고스-원칙, (5) 산파술: 소크라테스 대화의 절차, (6) 정당화 계획: 역행적 추상과 상기설, (7) 진리 합의의 대화 목적: 인간적 지혜와 오류가능 성주의, (8) 대화 공동체: 진리 탐구와 진리 합의의 주체, (9) 인간상: 수평적 인간관계. (shrink)

The Socratic method has a long history in teaching philosophy and mathematics, marked by such names as Karl Weierstra, Leonard Nelson and Gustav Heckmann. Its basic idea is to encourage the participants of a learning group (of pupils, students, or practitioners) to work on a conceptual, ethical or psychological problem by their own collective intellectual effort, without a textual basis and without substantial help from the teacher whose part it is mainly to enforce the rigid procedural rules designed (...) to ensure a fruitful, diversified, open and consensus-oriented thought process. Several features of the Socratic procedure, especially in the canonical form given to it by Heckmann, are highly attractive for the teaching of medical ethics in small groups: the strategy of starting from relevant singular individual experiences, interpreting and cautiously generalizing them in a process of inter-subjective confrontation and confirmation, the duty of non-directivity on the part of the teacher in regard to the contents of the discussion, the necessity, on the part of the participants, to make explicit both their own thinking and the way they understand the thought of others, the strict separation of content level and meta level discussion and, not least, the wise use made of the emotional and motivational resources developing in the group process. Experience shows, however, that the canonical form of the Socratic group suffers from a number of drawbacks which may be overcome by loosening the rigidity of some of the rules. These concern mainly the injunction against substantial interventions on the part of the teacher and the insistence on consensus formation rooted in Leonard Nelson's Neo-Kantian Apriorism. (shrink)

Rastreamos doctrinas unamunianas del Otro en el Edipo, rey de Sólbeles y en el Sofista platónico, edípico hacia el «padre» Parménides al filosofar sobre lo otro (té `ttapov). Examinamos el platonismo del Otro en Del setííimie,zío trágico, en las acotaciones de Unamuno a la tragedia de Sófocles y en su propio drama El Otro.

I present a problem for a prominent kind of conservatism, viz., the combination of traditional moral & religious values, patriotic nationalism, and libertarian capitalism. The problem is that these elements sometimes conflict. In particular, I show how libertarian capitalism and patriotic nationalism conflict via a scenario in which the thing that libertarian capitalists love – unregulated market activity – threatens what American patriots love – a strong, independent America. Unrestricted libertarian rights to buy and sell land would permit the sale (...) of all American territory by private individuals to foreign powers. Patriotic nationalists regard this as outrageous, but libertarian capitalists cannot refuse it. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell famously disparaged Thomas Aquinas as having ‘little of the true philosophic spirit’, because ‘he does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead.’ Like many of Russell's pronouncements, this is breathtakingly supercilious and unfair. Still, even an enthusiastic admirer of Aquinas may worry that there is something in it, that there is something wrong with religious ‘commitments’ in philosophy. I examine Russell's objection by comparing standards of permissibility in epistemology with standards of (...) permissibility in ethics, where these issues are better understood. I conclude that the epistemic standard behind Russell's criticism is no less contentious in epistemology than, say, direct utilitarianism is in ethics. (shrink)

The Greek Tradition in Republic Thought completely rewrites the standard history of republican political theory. It excavates an identifiably Greek strain of republican thought which attaches little importance to freedom as non-dependence and sees no intrinsic value in political participation. This tradition's central preoccupations are not honour and glory, but happiness and justice - defined, in Plato's terms, as the rule of the best men. This set of commitments yields as startling readiness to advocate the corrective redistribution of wealth, and (...) even the outright abolition of private property. The Greek tradition was revived in England during the early sixteenth century and was broadly influential throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its exponents included Sir Thomas More, James Harrington, Montesquieu and Thomas Jefferson, and it contributed significantly to the ideological underpinnings of the American Founding as well as the English Civil Wars. (shrink)

Over the past two decades the growth of the organic sector has been accompanied by a shift away from first party, or peer review, systems of certification and towards third party certification, in which a disinterested party is responsible for the development of organic standards and the verification of producer compliance. This paper explores some of the limitations of the third party certification model and presents the case of Mexico as an example of how an alternative form of participatory certification (...) has emerged. The paper suggests that participatory guarantee systems (PGS) are reflective of the growing “beyond organic” movement, which focuses on reconstructing the local and re-embedding food systems into their socio-ecological contexts. It argues that PGS offers a number of benefits for producers and consumers, particularly in the South, but that it faces a number of challenges as well, such as a lack of formal recognition, social conflicts and dependence on donated resources. (shrink)

Introduction: conceptual analysis of teaching, by B. P. Komisar and T. W. Nelson.--A concept of teaching, by B. O. Smith.--The concept of teaching, by I. Sheffler.--A topology of the teaching concept, by T. F. Green.--Teaching: act and enterprise, by B. P. Komisar.--Must an education have an aim? By R. S. Peters.--Curriculum as a field of study, by D. Heubner.--Can and should means-ends reasoning be used in teaching? By C. J. B. Macmillan and J. E. McClellan.

Somatic or inherited mutations in the adenomatous polyposis coli (APC) gene are a frequent cause of colorectal cancer in humans. APC protein has an important tumor suppression function to reduce cellular levels of the signaling protein β‐catenin and, thereby, inhibit β‐catenin and T‐cell‐factor‐mediated gene expression. In addition, APC protein binds to microtubules in vertebrate cells and localizes to actin‐rich adherens junctions in epithelial cells of the fruit fly Drosophila (Fig. 1). Very little is known, however, about the function of these (...) cytoskeletal associations. Recently, Hamada and Bienz have described a potential role for Drosophila E‐APC in cellular adhesion,1 which offers new clues to APC function in embryonic development, and potentially colorectal adenoma formation and tumor progression in humans. BioEssays 24:771–774, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Many results concerning the equivalence between a syntactic form of formulas and a model theoretic conditions are proven directly without using any form of a continuum hypothesis. In particular, it is demonstrated that any reduced product sentence is equivalent to a Horn sentence. Moreover, in any first order language without equality one now has that a reduced product sentence is equivalent to a Horn sentence and any sentence is equivalent to a Boolean combination of Horn sentences.

volume 1. Quantifying diversity and formulating success -- volume 2. Perspectives and exemplary programs.

Chinese influence in Asia is complicated by many factors. There are those who argue that China's growing military and economic power make this influence an automatic threat, while others maintain that China's recent attempts at a mute this threat and have succeeded in creating a positive image for many of its regional neighbors. Drawing on survey data collected across 23 countries, we enter this debate by asking what individuals in and across Asia think about Chinese influence. Do they see this (...) influence as positive or negative? What factors at the individual and national levels most clearly shape their perceptions? Using multilevel statistical analysis, we find that Asian opinions of Chinese influence are on the whole quite positive and are influenced by a range of factors, including foreign policy interest, national identification, foreign contact, and recent military conflict. (shrink)

The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.

Feelings of awe can generate well-being. The typical explanation of this is that an otherwise self-absorbed individual now experiences something so vast that it forges a humble new perspective of self. Self-absorption is replaced by altruistic characteristics that result in a sense of well-being. However, the observations of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Carl Rogers provide an existential framework for understanding the human being in relation to the world and well-being within that framework. And such a framework offers a different (...) perspective on how the experience of awe produces well-being. Existentially understood, incongruence is the anti-thesis of well-being. Incongruence is developed by a hyper-focus on external conditions of worth. Rather than a remedy to self-absorption, the experience of awe offers the remedy of self-absorption, towards congruence. This article will explore key observations by each existentially principled thinker to display this framework in order to comprehend how awe produces well-being within it. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

We argue that concentration of power in religious hospitals threatens disestablishment values. When hospitals deny care for religious reasons, they dominate patients’ bodies and convictions. Health law should — and to some extent already does — constrain such religious domination.

The thesis is two-fold: to show that to be human is to have a nature disposed to inalienable conflict of interests, and to show that creativity is the best principle by which to organize interests.

Rastreamos doctrinas unamunianas del Otro en el Edipo, rey de Sólbeles y en el Sofista platónico, edípico hacia el «padre» Parménides al filosofar sobre lo otro (té `ttapov). Examinamos el platonismo del Otro en Del setííimie,zío trágico, en las acotaciones de Unamuno a la tragedia de Sófocles y en su propio drama El Otro.

Three points extend the authors' comprehensive and provocative argument: (1) The idea of “entering a community of minds” is suggested to replace theory of mind or social understanding; (2) learning words and concepts through a Wittgensteinian process often involves a period of “use without meaning”; (3) concepts based in social interaction are achieved through collaborative – neither individual nor social alone – construction.

In this essay I try, first, to show that Lockean passages in Book I can be given a Berkeleian interpretation. I take two passages that have, in particular, been cited as allowing only a Lockean interpretation and show how they can be more coherently construed as Berkeleian in their intended meaning. In the process of this demonstration I show that only a Berkeleian interpretation is tenable for Book I. Second, I defend the Berkeleian interpretation against several charges; for instance, a (...) charge of textual inconsistency. I do, however, acknowledge in the process that in the Enquiry and subsequently Hume abandons Berkeley for Locke. I then offer an explanation of why he did and lastly I try to show that though Hume is thereby committed to an inconsistency he provides a way for justifying his (and our) conversational commitment to that inconsistency. (shrink)

I defend the view that a person's identity is injured when a powerful social group views the members of her own, less powerful group as unworthy of full moral respect, and in consequence unjustly prevents her from occupying valuable social roles or entering into desirable relationships that are themselves identity constituting. We may call this harm deprivation of opportunity. Further, a person's identity is injured when she endorses, as a portion of her self-concept, a dominant group's dismissive or exploitative understanding (...) of her group, and in consequence loses or fails to acquire a sense of herself as worthy of full moral respect. We may call this harm infiltrated consciousness. Either injury to the identity constricts the person's ability to exercise her moral agency. ;I argue that because identities are narratively constituted and narratively injured, they can be narratively repaired. The morally pernicious stories that construct the identity according to the requirements of an abusive power system can be at least partially dislodged and replaced by identity-constituting counterstories that portray group members as fully developed moral agents. I develop the concept of the counterstory: it is a purposive act of moral definition, developed on one's own behalf or on behalf of others. It sets out to resist, to one degree or another, the stories that identify certain groups of people as targets for ill treatment. Its aim is to reidentify such people as competent members of the moral community and so to free their moral agency. (shrink)

Mary Anne Warren's claim that there is room for only one person with full and equal rights inside a single human skin ([1], p. 63) calls attention to the vast range of moral conflict engendered by assigning full basic moral rights to fetuses. Thereby, it serves as a goad to thinking about conflicts between pregnant women and their fetuses in a way that emphasizes relationships rather than rights. I sketch out what a care orientation might suggest about resolving gestational conflicts. (...) I also argue that the care orientation, with its commitment to the significance of the partial and the particular, cannot be absorbed within standard, impartialist moral theory. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers often claim that the giving and criticizing of deductive arguments is the main or only business of philosophy. I argue that this is mistaken and show analytic philosophers also use formal schemas, distinctions, examples, and analogies so as to make some aspect of reality manifest. That is, some analytic philosophers sometimes simply try to ‘tell it like it is’. This ‘method of descriptive manifestation’ is less commonly recognized than it should be given its divergence from the self-image of (...) analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Several conclusions depend on a version of signal detection theory that assumes performance is based on underlying equal-variance normal distributions of trace strength. Such conclusions are questionable without empirical justification for that assumption. A thought experiment is presented to show how the assumption is probably invalid, and empirical evidence is cited for the assumption's invalidity in research on human memory.

Mary Ann Meeker’s article admirably reminds readers that family members are involved in—or “responsively manage”—the care of relatives with severe illness in ways that run considerably beyond the stereotypes at play in many bioethical discussions of advance directives. Her observations thus make thinking about the role of families in healthcare provision more adequate to the facts, and this is an important contribution. There’s reason to be worried, however, that one explicit aim of the article—to ease the standing anxieties that many (...) clinicians and ethicists have about the reliability of family members as proxy decision makers—will be frustrated by its very success. Those already inclined to suspicion may tend to think that the more intricate and pervasive the ways in which families influence the healthcare decision making of their sick, the more chances they have for altering the connection between patients’ interests and the actions of professional providers.To determine whether and when such alterations are something to be concerned about, we’ll need to supplement a better grasp of the pertinent facts with a deeper sense of how human agency works and why we value it. We may also need some reminders about the defensibility of diverse moral understandings. Although both professionals and family members may profess an ethic that sets patients’ interests above those of non-patients—as Meeker’s own results suggest—any strict allegiance to such a framework may be more notional than normative—as her findings also hint. The actual working norms (among professionals, as well as within families) will likely be more complex, but not necessarily any the less defensible for that. (shrink)

Bloom's domain general theory remains strictly cognitive and individualistic. By ignoring the contribution of social interaction and collective construction of concepts, he fails to solve the word learning problem.

This article analyses the gazes, looks, stares and glares in Laurence Anyways, and examines their affective, interpretive, and symbolic qualities, and their potential to create viewer empathy through affect. The cinematic gaze can produce sensations of shame and fear, by offering a sequence of varied “encounters” to which viewers can react, before we have been given a character onto which we can deflect them, thus bypassing the representational, narrative and even the sympathetic power of the medium to create “raw”, apparently (...) unmediated sensations. Through the point-of-view shot and direct address, the viewer is the object of the gazes it receives, and experiences their hate and rejection before actually being presented with the film's narrative object of the gaze – the film's protagonist, a transgender woman named Laurence. It examines how the viewer, after being affected, interprets and misinterprets the emotions behind the gazes, and then cognitively attaches the gazes' importance... (shrink)

Over the past decade, support for reexamining and reconsidering the U.S. model of ethics review for protocols involving research with humans has grown, particularly for studies involving participants from multiple locales and organizations. The HMO Research Network received an infrastructure-building contract in 2004 that enabled us to evaluate issues in multi-institutional IRB review, examine possible changes, and propose a new model. We conducted key informant interviews and held meetings with IRB personnel, administrators, and researchers, eventually resulting in networkwide agreement to (...) pilot an alternative model of IRB review for minimal-risk, data-only studies that only entailed use of computerized data from our network sites. This article describes the organizational and interpersonal processes that led to the successful establishment of this alternative model, to inform other research consortia considering new multisite review models. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to offer a suggestion in support of the thesis that if a given set of facts is explained by two rival explanations A and B, where A consists of a single hypothesis H1, and B consists of at least two independent hypotheses H2 and H3, then, other things being equal, A is more probable than B. That this view is true is seldom questioned, though I have never seen any reason given for it, which would (...) justify the methodological value so many philosophers attribute to it. It is not my purpose to discuss simplicity of explanation in general, but simply to point out that the Multiplicative Axiom of the calculus of probabilities justifies the above thesis. I shall call this thesis the Principle of Parsimony. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 151-153 [Access article in PDF] Allen W. Wood. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xxiv + 436. Cloth, $54.95. This book by Allen Wood in its first half gives us a state-of-the-art survey of traditional topics in the interpretation of Kant's ethics, and in the second half breaks new ground, and significantly widens the canon of works that (...) need to be taken account of in presenting Kant's ethics as a whole. Wood tells us that his main criticism of previous interpretations of Kant's ethics is that they overemphasize the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, when the most promising version is the formula of humanity. One of the major contributions of this book is the detailed argument (passim, but especially Chapter IV) that the formula of humanity is the preferable one for understanding Kant's ethics in application, and the one used most in the Metaphysics of Morals.Part I takes the reader on the familiar traversal of the text of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Chapter 1 is a discussion of the topics that come up in Chapter One of the Groundwork. Chapter 2 is a coverage of the first part of Kant's Chapter Two. Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are discussions of what are usually called the first (universal law), second (humanity), and third (autonomy and kingdom of ends) formulations of the categorical imperative. The discussion of Kant's Chapter Three is brief (basically, Wood's pages 171-182).Wood comments that the proper way to expound Kant's views on ethics would be, after (1) an introductory exposition based in the Groundwork, (i.e., his Chapters 1-5) to present (2) Kant's views on "human nature and its consequences for the application of the foundational principles" (13) (his Chapters 6-9). Only then would one be in a position to "provide (3) a systematic exposition of the Metaphysics of Morals as the definitive form of Kant's practical philosophy" (13). But such an undertaking would have been too ambitious for any single book. Hence Wood's book omits part (3), though he makes significant use of the Metaphysics of Morals throughout.Wood urges his readers not to neglect his extensive endnotes (xv), where sometimes [End Page 151] important matters are discussed that could not be accommodated within the main text. In addition, in the notes one can find some fascinating passages, e.g., (1) a significant self-criticism (345, n.12). (2) Another note finds Wood saying that Andrea Dworkin borrows her views of sexuality from Simone de Beauvoir (without acknowledgment), and that Beauvoir and Sartre's views were largely anticipated by Kant. Then he adds this zinger: "These comparisons also shed light on the cogency of the condescending explanations usually offered for Kant's views on sex. For it would not naturally occur to us to attribute the views of Beauvoir or Sartre to their sexual inexperience, to the lingering effects of their excessively religious upbringing or to the puritanical attitudes characteristic of mid-century Parisian intellectuals" (397, n.11).One of the traditional topics Wood discusses is the proper formulation of maxims for evaluation by the universal law formulation. He thinks that there are bound to be some systematic failures to achieve correct results because of inadequacies of this formulation, but he discusses fairly extensively how to minimize such erroneous outcomes by correct formulations of maxims (97-107), and his discussion makes some useful contributions to this once heavily discussed topic. One might add another, almost commonsense suggestion to his: Maxims mention ends of action, as well as proposed action-kinds; since actions are thus described within maxims as means to ends, action-descriptions would include only action characteristics that are causally relevant to the achievement of the ends of actions. This reminder enables us to eliminate many irrelevant action-descriptors.Part II of the Wood book is entitled "Anthropological Applications." In this section he pursues topics that have not been central to... (shrink)

"The ontology of the 1899 paper may then be summed up as follows," says Mr. Hochberg. "There are two kinds of entities, existents and non-existents.... All existent entities are made up ultimately of simple concepts which are non-existent. Also, all other non-existent entities are likewise reducible to simple concepts. The category of existent entities includes simple objects, like yellow1, and complex objects, like Paul, as well as existential propositions. In addition to simple concepts, the category of nonexistent entities includes non-existential (...) propositions, and complex concepts like the concept of Paul." By "simple object," Hochberg means any complex of concepts in which a single adjectival concept, like red or yellow, is tied together by some ontological relation, R, involving containment, with the concepts existence and now. Any such composite, denoted by the words, e.g., R2, R2, etc. or by the words "red1," "yellow1," etc., is a particular, since it has temporal existence. Every complex composed of simple objects and only such complexes are likewise particulars, in contrast to simple or complex concepts, which are universals. Thus, as Hochberg interprets him, Moore in "The Nature of Judgment" denies existence to universals, while maintaining that particulars, and only particulars, exist. (shrink)

The generation of asymmetric cell shapes is a recurring theme in biology. In budding yeast, one form of cell asymmetry occurs for division and is generated by anisotropic growth of the mother cell to form a daughter cell bud. Previous genetic studies uncovered key roles for the small GTPase Cdc42 in organizing the actin cytoskeleton and vesicle delivery to the site of bud growth,1,2 but a recent paper has also raised questions about how control of Cdc42 activity is integrated into (...) a proposed hierarchical regulatory pathway that specifies a unique site of bud formation.3 BioEssays 25:833–836, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In Mental Acts Professor Peter Geach asserts that “‘The same’ is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean ‘the same X’, where ‘X’ represents a general term … ” In Reference and Generality Geach interjects the following note: “I maintain that it makes no sense to judge whether x and y are ‘the same’, or whether x remains ‘the same’, unless we add or understand some general term ‘the same F’.” Here, as in Mental Acts, (...) he goes on to say that not any general term will serve to complete ‘the same’ constructions; only substantival terms will suffice for this purpose. Finally, in his article, “ldentity,” Geach asserts that “When one says ‘x is identical with y’, this … is an incomplete expression; it is short for ‘x is the same A as y’, where ‘A’ represents some count noun understood from the context of utterance—or else, it is just a vague expression of a half-formed thought.” (We should not, incidently, conclude from this last remark that Geach thinks all and only count nouns are substantival terms. (shrink)