Researchers misunderstand their role in creating ethical problems when they allow dogmas to purportedly divorce scientists and scientific practices from the values that they embody. Cortina, Edwards, and Powell help us clarify and further develop our position by responding to our critique of, and alternatives to, this misleading separation. In this rebuttal, we explore how the desire to achieve the separation of facts and values is unscientific on the very terms endorsed by its advocates—this separation is refuted by empirical observation. (...) We show that positivists like Cortina and Edwards offer no rigorous theoretical or empirical justifications to substantiate their claims, let alone critique ours. Following Powell, we point to how classical pragmatism understands ‘purpose’ in scientific pursuits while also providing an alternative to the dogmas of positivism and related philosophical positions. In place of dogmatic, unscientific cries about an abstract and therefore always-unobservable ‘reality,’ we invite all organizational scholars to join us in shifting the discussion about quantitative research towards empirically grounded scientific inquiry. This makes the ethics of actual people and their practices central to quantitative research, including the thoughts, discourses, and behaviors of researchers who are always in particular places doing particular things. We propose that quantitative researchers can thus start to think about their research practices as a kind of work, rather than having the status of a kind of dogma. We conclude with some implications that this has for future research and education, including the relevance of research and research methods. (shrink)

Researchers in developmental psychology have concluded that no significant differences exist between children raised by lesbians and gay men and those raised by heterosexuals. Although these scientific studies have attracted criticism, scrutiny has shown that they are actually epistemologically sounder than the body of knowledge that the critics themselves have developed in order to mount their case against lesbian and gay parenting. Nevertheless, to the extent that they are limited by a number of problematic assumptions structuring the paradigm within which (...) they have been conducted, the parenting studies are not a body of maximally objective knowledge. The same assumptions have also tended to inform legal discourse on lesbian and gay parenting. A paradigm shift away from questions about the goodness or badness of lesbian and gay parenting is overdue, both in sexuality-focused psychological research on child development and in the law’s approach to nonheterosexual parenting. (shrink)

New nursing researchers are faced with a smorgasbord of competing methodologies. Sometimes, they are encouraged to adopt the research paradigms beloved of their senior colleagues. This is a problem if those paradigms are no longer of contemporary methodological relevance. The aim of this paper was to provide clarity about current research paradigms. It seeks to interrogate the continuing viability of positivism as a guiding paradigm for nursing research. It does this by critically analysing the methodological literature. Five major paradigms are (...) addressed: the positivist; the interpretivist/constructivist; the transformative; the realist; and the postpositivist. Acceptance of interpretivist, transformative or realist approaches necessarily entails wholesale rejection of positivism, while acceptance of postpositivism involves its partial rejection. Postpositivism has superseded positivism as the guiding paradigm of the scientific method. The incorporation in randomized controlled trials of postpositivist assumptions indicates that even on the methodological territory that it once claimed as its own, positivism has been rendered redundant as an appropriate paradigm for contemporary nursing research. (shrink)

Nursing has historically relied heavily on scientific knowledge. It is not surprising that the cardiovascular health literature has been highly influenced by the post‐positivist philosophy. The nursing discipline, as well as the cardiovascular nursing speciality, continues to benefit from research grounded within this philosophical tradition. At the same time, there are limitations associated with post‐positivism. Therefore, it is beneficial for researchers and clinicians to examine the potential contributions various philosophical traditions can have for their research and practice. This paper (...) is an exploration of the compatibilities of feminist and post‐positivist philosophies in the study of cardiovascular nursing research. The ensuing discussion entails an examination of my clinical and research interests, the grounding of my research within the post‐positivist perspective and the significant contribution feminist philosophy can make to my research. (shrink)

It is argued that the debate over the positivist theory of historical explanation has made only a limited contribution to our understanding of how historians should defend the explanations they propose importantly because both positivists and their critics tacitly accepted two assumptions. The first assumption is that if the positivist analysis of historical explanation is correct, then historians ought to attempt to defend covering laws for each of the explanations they propose. The second is that unless a historian (...) can justify an explanation that he proposes, then his preference for that explanation is not rationally defensible. It is argued that the first assumption is false and that if in order to justify an explanation, one must justify a covering law for it, then the second assumption is also false. A program for investigating how historians should defend their explanations is suggested. (shrink)

For decades, psychological research has heavily favored quantitative over qualitative methods. One reason for this imbalance is the perception that quantitative methods follow from a post-positivist paradigm, which guides mainstream psychology, whereas qualitative methods follow from a constructivist paradigm. However, methods and paradigms are independent, and embracing qualitative methods within mainstream psychology is one way of addressing the generalizability crisis.

In the literature, the distinction between positivism and interpretivism based on ontological assumptions is somehow clear. Problems in dividing them based on epistemological assumptions continue to exist and appear in several works; for instance, Bhattacherjee’s book (2012) introduced the concept of research design and categorization of methods of data collection based on positivist and interpretivist epistemological assumptions. While acknowledging Bhattacherjee's contribution, nonetheless, the paper argues that since both the quantitative and qualitative research approaches share a few epistemological assumptions, strictly (...) categorizing them into positivism and interpretivism raises some confusion. Consequently, impacting communication among researchers and the implementation of the research projects. Therefore, the paper describes Bhattacherjee's contributions and limitations in understanding the dichotomy existing between positivist and interpretivist methods of data collection. The paper's suggestions aim to resolve such confusion and restore research approaches and their methods of data collection to their original philosophical positions. Thus minimizing the existing confusion on research methodology in the current literature. (shrink)

In this paper, the sociopolitical status of nurses in the Philippines is examined. The importance of nursing research in identifying the many elements that contribute to inequality among nurses is critical in the face of these problems. The positivist and interpretivist perspectives, however, have limitations that could potentially perpetuate the many forms of inequality that already exist. The idea of political competency is introduced in this tension. A critical grasp of the elements that contribute to structural inequalities and a (...) commitment to bringing about positive social changes make political competency a potential supplement to the limitations of critical theory. (shrink)

Researchers distinguish two approaches that are paradigmatic for the cluster of social theories: positivist and interpretivist. We have outlined the problematic core that contains the main differences between positivist and interpretivist sociology. In our opinion, the opposition between positivist and interpretive sociology is indicative of social theory, and we have shown the dual nature of social reality. We refuted the classification of social theories into nominalist and realist, showing that such a division does not reveal the dual (...) nature of social reality. The difference between interpretivism and positivism is that positivist sociology focuses on the study of social systems as an independent reality, while interpretive social theory thematises social reality as a socio-cultural universe, and from this perspective raises the question of social institutions. (shrink)

The article discusses the allegedly decontextualized and ahistorical traits in positivist educational research and curriculum by examining its emergence in early twentieth-century empirical education. Edward Lee Thorndike’s educational psychology is analyzed as a case in point. It will be shown that Thorndike’s positivist educational psychology stressed the need to account for the reality of schooling and to produce knowledge of the actual contexts of education. Furthermore, a historical analysis informed by Michel Foucault’s history of the human sciences reveals (...) that there are multiple historical temporalities involved in Thorndike’s educational psychology. This allows a new critical angle to be taken on positivist educational research. The question concerning the contexts of empirical education turns to examining the way the conditions of possibility for scientific knowledge in education involve practices of contextualization as well as paradoxical and self-defeating elements. (shrink)

Islamic education encompasses not only worship but included in it is the aspect of using reason to understand God's creation and how the universe works. Science continues to develop and requires humans to be able to adapt to developments over time. Comte's positivist thinking can be linked to the context of Islamic education in giving rise to efforts to strengthen Islamic education. This research explores Auguste Comte's positivist thinking, compares it with Islamic values, and examines the potential of (...) positivism for Islamic education. This research explores Auguste Comte’s positivism, contrasting it with Islamic values, and examines the potential of positivism for Islamic education. This research uses a qualitative approach, utilizing literature reviews from various relevant books and journals. This research ultimately produced findings that Comte’s positivism elevates the scientific method while sidelining metaphysical discussions, including religion. Key characteristics of positivism are value-free perspectives, phenomenalism, reductionism, naturalism, and mechanism. Comte proposed a “law of three stages” outlining human development from theological to metaphysical and finally to positivistic stages. While he did not advocate abandoning religion, he sought to separate science and religion. Comte's view of trying to separate science from religion is contrary to Islam's emphasis on religious values. Islamic education can adopt aspects of positivism by enhancing empirical and interdisciplinary studies. Also, prioritizing scientific and empirical inquiry in understanding phenomena to foster critical thinking and innovation within an Islamic education framework. Thus, integrating empirical, interdisciplinary, and scientific studies within Islamic education can enrich itself while maintaining its foundational values. (shrink)

On 15 October 1959, Rudolf Carnap, a leading member of the recently founded Vienna Circle, came to lecture at the Bauhaus in Dessau, southwest of Berlin. Carnap had just finished his magnum opus, The Logical Construction of the World, a book that immediately became the bible of the new antiphilosophy announced by the logical positivists. From a small group in Vienna, the movement soon expanded to include an international following, and in the sixty years since has exerted a powerful sway (...) over the conduct of the philosophy of science as well as over wide branches of philosophy, economics, psychology, and physics. The site of Carnap’s lecture that day, the Dessau Bauhaus, was a stunning building designed by Walter Gropius and dedicated just three years earlier. Protected by its flat roof and glass walls, the artists, architects, weavers, and furniture designers had made the school a citadel of high modernism. It was here that Carnap addressed an enthusiastic audience on “Science and Life.” “I work in science,” he began, “and you in visible forms; the two are only different sides of a single life.”1 In this paper I will explore this “single life” of which the new philosophy and the new art were to be different facets; in the process, I hope to cast light on the shared modernist impulses that drove both disciplines in the interwar years. 1. Rudolf Carnap, lecture notes for his Bauhaus lecture, “Wissenschaft und Leben,” prepared 1 Oct. 1929 and delivered 15 Oct. 1929, transcription from shorthand by Gerald Heverly, Carnap Papers in the Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Libraries, University of Pittsburgh , document RC 110-07-49. Quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved. Translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Peter Galison is associate professor in the departments of philosophy and physics at Stanford University, where he co-chairs the program in the history of science. His primary interest is in the history and philosophy of experimentation, the subject of his How Experiments End and Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research, edited with Bruce Hevly . His current project is entitled Image and Logic: The Material Culture of Modern Physics. (shrink)

CRUICKSHANK J. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 71–82 Positioning positivism, critical realism and social constructionism in the health sciences: a philosophical orientationThis article starts by considering the differences within the positivist tradition and then it moves on to compare two of the most prominent schools of postpositivism, namely critical realism and social constructionism. Critical realists hold, with positivism, that knowledge should be positively applied, but reject the positivist method for doing this, arguing that causal explanations have to be based (...) not on empirical regularities but on references to unobservable structures. Social constructionists take a different approach to postpositivism and endorse a relativist rejection of truth and hold that the task of research is to foster a scepticism that undermines any positive truth claim made. It is argued that social constructionism is a contradictory position. (shrink)

The research subject in the present article is A. Comte’s and H. Spencer’s beliefs, who are considered the representatives of early positivism. The particular emphasis is made on the ethnicity issues. A. Comte distinguished three stages of the human consciousness elevating: theological or fictitious, metaphysic or abstract, positive or real. The scientist claimed the quality of a society as a whole is directly related to the level of the individual development. Moreover, moral ideas, which have to be free from theology (...) and metaphysics and based on the new philosophy of positive thinking, have a powerful influence on the society development. As a result, moral principles have to be guided by social solidarity and be a society’s logical controller. However, the societal progress rejected the scientist’s notion. According to H. Spencer, social morality arises from natural one whereby altruism and social equity are built on the concern of the kind preservation. The higher the society is organized, the greater the level of the equity is. The researcher provides the example illustrating an ideal society in which a well-functioning organ evolves better than others which in turn means “social equity” principle is implemented. The scientific novelty of the article is determined by the first comparative analysis of A. Comte’s and H. Spencer’s moral-ethnical concepts as well as defining the most controversial theses in their theories. There has been found out that the key difference in the philosophers’ ideas is their seeing into the real nature of morality, having its ground either in the human mind (Comte) or natural environment (Spencer). The definition of the society as an entity with its characteristics resembling a biological organism is considered to be significantly similar in their views. Secondly discovered similarity is the definition of the human history as a progressive process in which individual human mind, morality and a society as an entity are evolving simultaneously. The present paper also puts forward the conclusion that the ideas about the history as a progressive process resulted at a “positive” stage turned out to be the most debatable issues. (shrink)

A standard view would suggest that research is a neutral apolitical activity. It neutralizes external pressures by its fidelity to robust scientific methods. However, politics is an inevitable part of human knowledge. Our knowledge of the world is always mediated by human priorities. What matters is therefore a contested and political debate rather a neutral accumulation of factual data. How researchers manage this varies. Research paradigms are one way in which research engages with knowledge. They frame knowledge within epistemological and (...) ontological philosophies. In this paper, I will explore this view in relation to neo‐positivism, qualitative research, Foucault and critical realism. I will argue that if nursing knowledge is to be effective it needs to acknowledge the political, particularly in the context of neoliberalism. Healthcare systems are having to cope with a social world increasingly dominated by market fundamentalism, extreme levels of inequality and a rise in xenophobia. These forces are undermining the provision of ethically sound health care, misdirecting research practice and contributing to a discourse of dehumanization. These forces need to be challenged politically and I will argue that epistemologically diverse approaches, alongside a realist ontology can provide a way forward for nursing research. (shrink)

In the present article, I compare Ernst Mach’s and Heinrich Gomperz’s contributions to the German-speaking positivist tradition by showing how, in trying to refound epistemology on the basis of one definite category of experiential element, namely, sensation and feeling, respectively, they each epitomized one major trend of Immanenzpositivismus. I demonstrate that, besides Mach’s “sensualist” conception of positivism – in light of which historians have tended thus far to interpret all German-speaking positivist research of that period – there also (...) existed an “affectivist” conception of positivism, which originated in Avenarius’s empiriocriticism and culminated in Gomperz’s pathempiricism. Here I aim to provide a new perspective on the history of positivism by highlighting the role played in it by psychological concerns. First, I revisit the notion of Immanenzpositivismus, the form of positivism that prevailed in both Germany and Austria between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: in addition to addressing the definition of this philosophical school of thought, I discuss the issue of “pure experience”, from which the positivists tried to reinterpret the foundations of knowledge. Second, I deal with Mach’s sensation-based approach to Immanenzpositivismus by commenting on his ontological and typological analysis of the constitutive elements of experience and emphasizing the fact that his concept of Empfindung is a relatively ill-defined notion in light of contemporary psychological standards. Moreover, I show that, despite his pretense of confining his epistemological developments to the analysis of sensations, Mach did not deny the involvement of feelings in epistemology, as clearly evidenced by some passages of Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Third, I analyze Gomperz’s feeling-based conception of Immanenzpositivismus, that is, pathempiricism, by highlighting how he strove to radically refound epistemology on the basis of the most recent advances of affective psychology. Focusing on the question of language sciences, I also discuss how he considered the role of feelings in the various forms of theoretical knowledge, the only field of investigation that he revisited in detail in his unfinished book, the Weltanschauungslehre. Fourth and last, I contrast Gomperz’s with Mach’s positivist model and argue that the former is more coherent and has a higher explanatory power than the latter. In conclusion, I insist on the importance of revisiting pathempiricism within the broader framework of affective epistemology. (shrink)

Background Positivism is sometimes rejected for the wrong reasons. Influential textbooks on nursing research and in other disciplines tend to reinforce the misconceptions underlying these rejections. This is problematic, since it provides students of these disciplines with a poor basis for making epistemological and methodological decisions. It is particularly common for positivist views on reality and causation to be obscured. Objectives and design The first part of this discussion paper identifies and explains the misconceptions about positivism as they appear (...) in two influential textbooks. The second part pinpoints five mistakes these misconceptions easily result in when the researcher adopts an epistemological and methodological standpoint. What is already known about the topic? There are several impeccable descriptions of positivism in nursing research literature; but a relatively large number of inaccurate or confused views of positivism appear in the nursing research literature as well. Mistakes of the kind identified in this paper have been noted before—for instance, in Shadish. What this paper adds: This paper provides a detailed analysis of two particularly common and influential misconceptions about positivism. It traces the historical roots of these misconceptions and characterizes them more carefully than many earlier attempts have done. The paper shows how and why these misconceptions affect epistemological and methodological decisions negatively, regardless of one’s interest in positivism. (shrink)

In this paper I put forward some arguments in defence of inclusive legal positivism . The general thesis that I defend is that inclusive positivism represents a more fruitful and interesting research program than that proposed by exclusive positivism . I introduce two arguments connected with legal interpretation in favour of my thesis. However, my opinion is that inclusive positivism does not sufficiently succeed in estranging itself from the more traditional legal positivist conceptions. This is the case, for instance, (...) with regard to the value-freedom principle, which is commonly accepted by inclusive positivist scholars. In contrast with this approach, I try to show, in the concluding section, how a constructivistic version of inclusive positivism could legitimately acknowledge the presence of value-judgments in the cognitive activities of jurists and legal theorists. (shrink)

Under the influence of a narrowly understood scientific legal positivism, jurisprudence has neglected interdisciplinary research for a long time. However, today there are strong practical and scholarly reasons for an interdisciplinary analysis of law triggered, e.g., by bioethics, life sciences, economics and ecology. And yet the very subject matter of law shimmering between normativity and descriptivity seems to resist all attempts to be taken in by common enterprises across disciplines: How then is the necessary interdisciplinary research in jurisprudence possible without (...) abandoning its core, legal dogmatics? This question was discussed at a special working group during the IVR-World Congress in Cracow. The papers have been polished and updated for publication. The volume falls into two parts: One is directed at the basic conceptual and institutional questions of interdisciplinary research in jurisprudence; the other one concentrates on one fruitful and highly important field of interdisciplinary research, constitutionalism. The volume brings together a truly international and in itself interdisciplinary group of experts in the field, from Finland to Brazil and from Spain to Greece. (shrink)

This research brought approaches regarding habermasian democratic thought, taking into account the social critical theory aligned with the post-positivist current of interpretation and application of Law. Thus, from a dialectical perspective, the essay made brief digressions on language and communication present in the discourse of communicative action. A debate had been held on the impact of the discourse principle and its evaluative dimension in the busy and dynamic public sphere of communicative action. From the passage of the discourse principle (...) to the democratic one, comments were made on the axiological burden of society, in its plural exegesis and detached from the normative construct of law as a unitary source to subsidize it. Theoretical distinctions were also made between legal positivism and post-positivism, especially regarding the autonomy of the latter. Afterwards, a correlation was made between the democratic principle, as a necessary discursive theory, and legal post-positivism and its implications for the construction and application of Law in accordance with the diversity and social expectations of communicative subjects. (shrink)

This article establishes an analysis of the first contributions and the importance of the Critical and Positivist theories of accounting in Latin America over the years, through the study of scientific articles by recognized accounting experts from different countries on the theories.. Also, carry out a bibliographic examination of criticism and positivism applied to accounting, resulting in the correlation of concepts focused on accounting in Latin America. The type of research is descriptive with a qualitative approach with the purpose (...) of developing a discussion of the Critical and Positivist theories of accounting in Latin America. Obtaining a greater scope to understand that this social science is immersed in two currents that are based on the fact that knowledge is obtained through practice and can be verified through scientific methods, establishing the importance of understanding the contributions that the critical and positivist theory in the field of accounting science. (shrink)

Psychological research has shown that cognitive illusions, of which visual illusions are just a special case, are systematic and pervasive, raising epistemological questions about how error in all forms of research can be identified and eliminated. The quantitative sciences make use of statistical techniques for this purpose, but it is not clear what the qualitative equivalent is, particularly in view of widespread scepticism about validity and objectivity. I argue that, in the light of cognitive psychology, the ‘error question’ cannot be (...) dismissed as a positivist obsession, and that the concepts of truth and objectivity are unavoidable. However, they constitute only a ‘minimal realism’, which does not necessarily bring a commitment to ‘absolute’ truth, certainty, correspondence, causation, reductionism, or universal laws in its wake. The assumption that it does reflects a misreading of positivism and, ironically, precipitates a ‘crisis of legitimation and representation’, as described by constructivist authors. (shrink)

Recent research has brought to light numerous facts that go against received views of the development of philosophy of science. One encounters several concepts, claims, or projects much earlier than is generally acknowledged. Auguste Comte was careful to distinguish each major science with respect to method and object, speaking of mathematical philosophy, biological philosophy, sociological philosophy, and so forth. He thereby in a sense anticipated the regionalist turn: philosophical analysis should be carried out with respect to a specific body of (...) knowledge. He also adopted a general perspective, a scientific philosophy. In the light of new discoveries, later thinkers such as Pierre Duhem, Gaston Milhaud, and Abel Rey endeavored to reformulate Comte’s doctrine as a neopositivism, a logical positivism, or an absolute positivism. The aim of this article is to examine the constitutive concepts mentioned and the controversies that hinge on them, in an effort to reach a precise understanding of the aim, scope, and import of philosophy of science in the context of nineteenth-century France. (shrink)

The disavowal of positivist science by many educational researchers has resulted in a deepening polarization of research agendas and an epistemological divide that appears increasingly difficult to span. Despite a turning away from science altogether by some, and thus toward various forms of poststructuralist inquiry, this has not held back the renewed entrenchment of more narrow definitions by policy elites of what constitutes scientific educational research. The new sciences of complexity signal the emergence of a new scientific paradigm that (...) challenges some of the core assumptions of positivism, while offering the potential to develop a new kind of social science that demands both rigour and imagination in coming to understand the emergence and behaviours of social systems and the subsystems that comprise them. The language, concepts and principles of complexity are central to the development of a new science of qualities to complement the science of quantities that has shaped our understanding of the physical and social worlds. Accomplishing this task promises to 1) open up new investigations that have thus far been beyond the purview of scientific study, 2) allow the study of social phenomena as fully embodied, or at least as more robust models than those represented in the abstracted empiricism upon which the sciences of quantities are predicated, and 3) allow for more coarse‐grained explanations and predictions of social phenomena to be legitimated as scientific. Both educational research and educational practice stand to gain from this expansion of the scientific repertoire to include rigorous and imaginative investigations of phenomena characterized by change and transformation. (shrink)

This paper aims at presenting the critique of both the quantitative and the qualitative research methodologies for social sciences in general and organizational sciences in particular. Quantitative and qualitative research models have been dominant over the second half of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, it has become a growing concern that a dichotomy between them should be overcome by combining them into a methodological pluralism. Positivism is the epistemological ground of quantitative methodology whereas phenomenology is the same with qualitative. It will (...) be argued that for methodological pluralism, neither positivism nor phenomenology can suffice alone. This paper presents a comparison and analysis of both positivism and phenomenology with the intention of working out their fundamental presuppositions. The purpose of this investigation is to look for the possibility of outlining a theoretic paradigm for the practice of methodological pluralism. (shrink)

There are grave issues with how the U.K. government approaches the issue of wellbeing. Specifically, policy interventions that might improve the material conditions of citizens are being down-played, and at times out-rightly dismissed. Instead, an individualist, instrumental message is being promoted, namely, that the best way to improve wellbeing is by improving individual happiness and mental health. I argue that this instrumental message – which in practice blames the victims for their lack of happiness and removes state responsibility – can (...) be made to sound feasible because of a reliance on positivist-based research, whether obtained objectively or subjectively. In this paper, I therefore detail the failings of mainstream wellbeing research and its policy conclusions, and argue that critical realism offers solutions. (shrink)

Research design is fundamentally central to all scientific endeavors, at all levels and in all institutional settings. This book is a practical, short, simple, and authoritative examination of the concepts and issues in interpretive research design, looking across this approach's methods of generating and analyzing data. It is meant to set the stage for the more "how-to" volumes that will come later in the Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods, which will look at specific methods and the designs that they require. (...) It will, however, engage some very practical issues, such as ethical considerations and the structure of research proposals. Interpretive research design requires a high degree of flexibility, where the researcher is more likely to think of "hunches" to follow than formal hypotheses to test. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea address what research design is and why it is important, what interpretive research is and how it differs from quantitative and qualitative research in the positivist traditions, how to design interpretive research, and the sections of a research proposal and report. (shrink)

This paper offers a realist critique of socialresearch on health inequalities. A conspectus of thefield of health inequalities research identifies twomain research approaches: the positivist quantitativesurvey and the interpretivist qualitative `casestudy'. We argue that both approaches suffer fromserious philosophical limitations. We suggest that aturn to realism offers a productive `third way' bothfor the development of health inequality research inparticular and for the social scientific understandingof the complexities of the social world in general.

Little is known about the world’s first sociological society, Émile Littré’s Société de Sociologie (1872—4). This article, based on prosopographic research, offers an interpretation of the foundation, political-intellectual orientation and early demise of the society. As indicated by recruitment and texts by its founding members, the Société de Sociologie was in fact conceived more as a political club than a learned society. Guided in this by Littré’s heterodox positivism and the redefinition of sociology he proposed around 1870, the Société de (...) Sociologie was intended first and foremost to accompany intellectually the political changes that Littré considered imperative in the early years of the Third Republic (1870— 1940). This expectation found little echo among the members of the society, and it seems possible that Littré himself and his closest associates were the ones to interrupt the society’s meetings. Some of its members’ general studies on the status of the social sciences and their main divisions were continued in the framework of the journal La Philosophie positive (1867—83), but the authors most committed to those studies were on the margins of the Littré network. Neither the dominant positivist republicanism, centered around Littré and Dubost, nor the general sociology of the more peripheral members of the network (Mesmer, Roberty, Vitry) represented an important intellectual contribution to the formation of academic sociology in France. Given that the Société de Sociologie did contribute to diffuse the project of a sociological science and developed forms of sociology coherent enough to be rejected by the pioneers of university sociology, the group constitutes a significant case of failure in the history of the discipline. (shrink)

One of the consequences of hyper-positivism on contemporary scholarship has been an increase in measuring academic excellence by instrumental rather than intrinsic value. Increasingly, university disciplines are required to demonstrate their relevance in the marketplace, resulting in a tendency by some arts and humanities scholars to deemphasise research and concentrate on creative practice. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between these two responses. It argues that concentrating on creative practice (techne) reduces the art academic to a trades-person and that (...) concentrating on rhetoric while ignoring arts practice alienates the artist from vital skills and techniques. It identifies scholarship as the defining feature of academic excellence and argues that this is better achieved when academics use critical thinking to balance creative expression and research based practice. (shrink)

The issue of interpersonal comparisons of utility is about the possibility (or not) of comparing the utility or welfare or the mental states in general, of different individuals. Embedded in the conceptual framework of utilitarianism, interpersonal comparisons were admissible in economics as part of the theoretical justification of welfare policies until the first decades of the twentieth century. Under the strong influence of the scientific philosophy of positivism as reflected in the works of early neoclassical economists and as epitomized by (...) Lionel Robbins, utility comparisons were subsequently rejected as a value judgement. Robbins’ methodological stance is still prevalent among mainstream economists. Despite the explicit rejection of comparability by the majority of economists, interpersonal comparisons are necessary for many key policy issues, such as progressive taxation, social welfare policies, GDP-based welfare comparisons, cost–benefit analysis, and public goods provision. In this paper, the case of interpersonal utility comparisons is discussed as an illustrative example of the usefulness of the study of the role of value judgements, and generally of the interrelationship between ethics and economics. It is argued that the current tension between theory and policy practice might be resolved through the efforts of prominent economists and philosophers to challenge positivism, and especially its problematic treatment of value judgements and of ethical assumptions in general. The discussion also provides more strength to the view that policy makers and their economic advisers cannot avoid ethical questions in their analysis of the workings of the economic system. (shrink)

Conventional, positivist science is not well suited for addressing the contemporary risk landscape. To address high-uncertainty, high-stakes risks, Funtowicz and Ravetz have called for a postnormal science. Two key characteristics of postnormal science are the involvement of an extended peer community and the deliberation of extended facts. The health research community has responded to the shortcomings of normal science with approaches to field research, known collectively as community-based participatory research. A review of case literature shows that although CBPR is (...) not inherently postnormal, it can be friendly to a postnormal approach. A postnormal CBPR practice would rely more heavily on a deliberative process, which engages a broad range of expertise, including experts in normal science, in decisions about data collection, analysis, and actions. (shrink)

An analysis of two heuristic strategies for the development of mechanistic models, illustrated with historical examples from the life sciences. In Discovering Complexity, William Bechtel and Robert Richardson examine two heuristics that guided the development of mechanistic models in the life sciences: decomposition and localization. Drawing on historical cases from disciplines including cell biology, cognitive neuroscience, and genetics, they identify a number of "choice points" that life scientists confront in developing mechanistic explanations and show how different choices result in divergent (...) explanatory models. Describing decomposition as the attempt to differentiate functional and structural components of a system and localization as the assignment of responsibility for specific functions to specific structures, Bechtel and Richardson examine the usefulness of these heuristics as well as their fallibility—the sometimes false assumption underlying them that nature is significantly decomposable and hierarchically organized. When Discovering Complexity was originally published in 1993, few philosophers of science perceived the centrality of seeking mechanisms to explain phenomena in biology, relying instead on the model of nomological explanation advanced by the logical positivists (a model Bechtel and Richardson found to be utterly inapplicable to the examples from the life sciences in their study). Since then, mechanism and mechanistic explanation have become widely discussed. In a substantive new introduction to this MIT Press edition of their book, Bechtel and Richardson examine both philosophical and scientific developments in research on mechanistic models since 1993. (shrink)

I outline the theoretical framework of, and three research programs within American speculative philosophy of science during the period 1900-1931. One program applies verificationism to research in psychology, one investigates the methodology of research programs, and one analyses scientific explanation and other scientific concepts. The primary sources for my outline are works by Morris Raphael Cohen, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Theodore de Laguna, Edgar Arthur Singer Jr., Harold Robert Smart, and Marie Collins Swabey. I also use my outline to provide (...) a partial comparison of American speculative philosophy of science and 1930s logical positivism. My comparison suggests that logical positivism was a proposal for substantially narrowing down and winding back American philosophy of science and was based on positions that were already problematized in the American context. -/- . (shrink)

On January 1, 1958, in the journal Democratic Critique, Zhang Junmai, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan published the "Manifesto on Chinese Culture for the World: Our Common Understanding of Chinese Scholarship Research and of the Future of Chinese Culture and World Culture."1 This manifesto is commonly seen as the founding statement of the New Confucianism movement. Section 2 of the manifesto, "Three Motives, Approaches, and their Shortcomings in the Study of Chinese Culture in World Scholarship," claimed that Chinese (...) culture had not been understood by three kinds of people who had approached it, namely, Christian missionaries, sinologists, and students of present world history. For the New Confucians, the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.1 (2003) 1-21 [Access article in PDF] Did Habermas Cede Nature to the Positivists? Gordon R. Mitchell Jürgen Habermas's "colonization of the lifeworld" thesis (1987, 332-73) posits that many of society's pathologies are due to the tendency of institutions to convert social issues that ought to be sorted out by a debating citizenry into technical problems ripe for resolution by expert bureaucracies, thus pre-empting important public (...) discussion. Habermas has attempted to lay bare the pernicious effects of this colonization process in his analysis of public opinion polling, welfare policy, education, German reunification, immigration, and other social issues (see Habermas 1997, 1994, and 1970; Holub 1992). In each of these contexts, Habermas has publicly challenged the encroachment of scientistic modes of decision-making into spheres where joint communicative action by deliberating citizens would yield more appropriate and legitimate judgments. This critical impulse is also evident in Habermas's methodological reflections on the proper role of academic scholarship, where he has argued vigorously against attempts to graft "objectivating" methods of natural scientific inquiry onto research projects in the social sciences (1971, 304-17).From all of this, one might gather that Habermas's commitment to rolling back the influence of technical forms of reasoning is connected to some intrinsic quarrel he has with the natural sciences. Yet such a sweeping generalization is hard to sustain in light of the fact that Habermas does not oppose technical reasoning per se; he recognizes that the daunting complexity of social life in late capitalism requiresthat certain "steering" tasks be delegated to systems that utilize largely instrumental logics to co-ordinate action. Likewise, he acknowledges that the disciplines of the natural sciences necessarily play important supporting roles in such steering projects.One normative presupposition of Habermas's colonization thesis is that there exists some proper boundary demarcating where the sphere of technical reasoning ends and the realm of communicative rationality begins. [End Page 1] On one side of this boundary, Habermas has provided many details on what he sees as the essential qualities of a properly functioning "public sphere," where "new social movements" continuously reweave the threads of communicative fabric holding society together (1996, 359-87), and where "historico-hermeneutic" academic study reflects on public life, sluicing insight back into the capillaries of democratic deliberations (1987, 374-403).What lies on the other side of the boundary is murkier. The proper role of natural scientific investigation has received relatively scant attention in Habermas's critical theory of society, and this has led to some confusion regarding his account of the natural sciences, as well as debate over whether this account has political purchase. One would think that sympathetic commentators, such as Helen Longino (who bases much of her own coherence theory of scientific truth on Habermas), would have reassuring things to say on this point. Yet her lukewarm assessment that, "in trying to clear a space for an autonomous social and critical theory, [Habermas] has ceded nature to the positivists" (1990, 202), raises questions about the flexibility and scope of Habermas's theory of communicative action as a basis for critique of scientific practice.One way to test Habermas's account of the natural sciences on this count is to put his views in conversation with science studies commentators who share a similar commitment to the idea that dialogue and argumentation are constitutive elements of scientific practice. Such an approach recasts the "ceding to positivism" question into a moment of controversy over the role of dialogue, not only as an essential motor driving the scientific enterprise, but also as a vehicle for democratic decision-making on issues related to the purpose and direction of scientific inquiry in society.Part one of this essay locates discursive norms embedded pragmatically in the notion of scientific objectivity. By bringing a modified version of Habermas's theory of communicative action into conversation with other approaches to science studies that foreground intersubjective dialogue as the key motor driving the scientific enterprise, I develop a foundation for robust criticism of systematically distorted scientific communication. Specific strategies of... (shrink)

In line with its institutional commitments and in order to strengthen the relevance of its business education program in addressing the persistent social challenges facing the Philippines, Mission University revised its Master of Business Administration curriculum in 2012. A core change in the curriculum was the incorporation of action research training and the requirement for graduation of implementing and defending an action research project. The introduction of action research, which is based on critical realist philosophy of science, was intended to (...) enable the university’s MBA graduates to become reflexive and humanistic agents of change in their work contexts through the application of observation, critical reflection, collaborative analysis and action and scholarly skills. The implementation of the action research requirement is beginning to yield positive results based on the types of projects implemented by the students and their resulting sense of efficacy in the workplace. Challenges in implementation include the need to further hone student skills in pursuing more emancipatory projects and the need to further orient faculty in the critical realist philosophy underlying action research, as distinct from traditional positivism. (shrink)

Exploring long-term educational change, we investigate our re/construction of research methodology as we moved from a positivist framework to working with ideas drawn from Deleuze and Guattari. We reveal our becoming rhizomatic in data analysis in the metamodelling of the richness flowing horizontally through our practices. We tell of our struggles to escape hierarchical thinking and relations researching between the smooth and striated. A space of interactions, conversations and writings created relations between polyphonic voices, leading us to an (...) emergent methodology. Our struggle against hierarchies in data analysis yielded rich educational possibilities for becoming that Deleuzo-Guattarian thinking offers us. (shrink)

We all know that ships are safest in the harbor; but alas, that is not what ships are built for. They are destined to leave the harbor and to confront the challenges that are waiting beyond the harbor mole. A similar challenge confronts the practice of research. Research at work cannot play it safe and stay in whatever theoretical and methodological harbors in which it may have found shelter in the past. Still less can it examine and maintain its foundations (...) in the dry dock. Research is more like a ship that must be repaired on the open sea. Yet foundationalist ideas persist in the practice of research. Counter to what is often assumed, today’s dominating model for research--the fallibilist model of critical rationalism--has not really overcome the empirical foundationalism of earlier, positivist research practices. This paper analyses two major foundationalist traps that are currently in the upswing and work against reflective research practice. (shrink)

Different paradigms or perspectives function as the point of departure and framework for research. In this article ethical issues in the positivist and constructivist paradigms are presented. The article points out that more or less the same ethical codes are used in these paradigms, but with some nuanced interpretations. CHAT (cultural historical activity theory) is presented as a third paradigm. While conducting research, one intention within this paradigm is to change and improve practice. This means that the researcher and (...) the research participants during the research process together set the goals for the work and try to change practice en route to these goals. The relation between the researcher and the research participants is different than in the other two presented paradigms. This means that research in the CHAT paradigm also needs to be guided by different ethical codes. The purpose of this article is to show how some of the traditional ethical codes which direct research both in the positivist and constructivist paradigm change and are also inadequate in the CHAT paradigm. The article presents and discusses ethical codes that challenge the researchers’ communicative, social and knowledge competence. (shrink)

Positivist ethnographic research situates the participant observer in an objectivist position towards the field. Using poststructural perspectives to analyse the field challenges and unsettles objectivist assumptions underpinning ethnography. Neither is merging of the two approaches completely unproblematic. A crucial element in a coherent amalgam centres around resolution of potential contradictions emanating from the place of field notes in ethnographic research, and the position of the researcher (author) vis‐a‐vis such notes. Contemporary approaches to field notes maintain that such notes are (...) not an objective description of the field, unaffected by the voice of the researcher. Rather, observational records are to be regarded as text, with characteristics in common with all texts. The ethnographic record is constituted as much by the positionality of the researcher as by the research participants. The nurse researcher can be viewed as participant in the constitution of the field. In unsettling and challenging taken‐for‐granted understandings about nursing practice, I am affirming the centrality of the position of the nurse in nursing research. (shrink)

According to the commonsensical model of educating researchers, young researchers must first acquire the knowledge achieved thus far and then solve new problems by developing applications of the accepted theory. This model, which presupposes a positivist theory of science, is incapable of explaining why the major breakthroughs in science have been carried out by young researchers. On the idealizational view of science, it becomes clear that commonsensical model must be rejected and replaced with an alternative, according to which the (...) primary duty of young researchers is to revise the existing theories. It is the young researchers who are usually creative enough, ignorant enough, and exhibit a sufficient degree of nonconformism, to be capable of developing really new scientific theories. (shrink)