has offered a lovely example to motivate the intuition that a successful prediction has a kind of confirmatory significance that an accommodation lacks. This paper scrutinizes Maher's example. It argues that once the example is tweaked, the intuitive difference there between prediction and accommodation disappears. This suggests that the apparent superiority of prediction to accommodation is actually a side effect of an important difference between the hypotheses that tend to arise in each case.

According to the thesis of Strong Predictionism, we typically have stronger evidence for a theory if it was used to predict certain data, than if it was deliberately constructed to accommodate those same data, even if we fully grasp the theory and all the evidence on which it was based. This thesis faces powerful objections and the existing arguments in support of it are seriously flawed. I offer a new defence of Strong Predictionism which overcomes the objections and provides a (...) deeper understanding of the epistemic importance of prediction. I conclude by applying this account to strategies for defending scientific realism. (shrink)

Many philosophers have argued that a hypothesis is better confirmed by some data if the hypothesis was not specifically designed to fit the data. ‘Prediction’, they argue, is superior to ‘accommodation’. Others deny that there is any epistemic advantage to prediction, and conclude that prediction and accommodation are epistemically on a par. This paper argues that there is a respect in which accommodation is superior to prediction. Specifically, the information that the data was (...) accommodated rather than predicted suggests that the data is less likely to have been manipulated or fabricated, which in turn increases the likelihood that the hypothesis is correct in light of the data. In some cases, this epistemic advantage of accommodation may even outweigh whatever epistemic advantage there might be to prediction, making accommodation epistemically superior to prediction all things considered. (shrink)

According to one view of linguistic information, a speaker can convey contextually new information in one of two ways: by asserting the content as new information; or by presupposing the content as given information which would then have to be accommodated. This distinction predicts that it is conversationally more appropriate to assert implausible information rather than presuppose it. A second view rejects the assumption that presuppositions are accommodated; instead, presuppositions are assimilated into asserted content and both are correspondingly open to (...) challenge. Under this view, we should not expect to find a difference in conversational appropriateness between asserting implausible information and presupposing it. To distinguish between these two views of linguistic information, we performed two self-paced reading experiments with an on-line stops-making-sense judgment. The results of the two experiments—using the presupposition triggers the and too—show that accommodation is inappropriate relative to non-presuppositional controls when the presupposed information is implausible but not when it is plausible. These results provide support for the first view of linguistic information: the contrast in implausible contexts can only be explained if there is a presupposition-assertion distinction and accommodation is a mechanism dedicated to reasoning about presuppositions. (shrink)

It has recently become popular to suggest that cognition can be explained as a process of Bayesian prediction error minimization. Some advocates of this view propose that attention should be understood as the optimization of expected precisions in the prediction-error signal (Clark, 2013, 2016; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012, 2013). This proposal successfully accounts for several attention-related phenomena. We claim that it cannot account for all of them, since there are certain forms of voluntary attention that it (...) cannot accommodate. We therefore suggest that, although the theory of Bayesian prediction error minimization introduces some powerful tools for the explanation of mental phenomena, its advocates have been wrong to claim that Bayesian prediction error minimization is ‘all the brain ever does’. (shrink)

This study investigates the epistemic role and value of prediction in science: do predictions, and what kind of predictions, justify belief in scientific theories? In the philosophy of science, the epistemic role of prediction has been understood mainly in terms of novel prediction. Scientific theories are considered to gain special epistemic support if they predict novel empirical results that were not used in their construction. This view has played a central role in two debates in the field: (...) prediction vs. accommodation and scientific realism vs. anti-realism. In the former debate, predictivists seek to explain why novel predictions confirm the theory more strongly than accommodations, i.e. empirical results that were used in the construction of the theory. In the latter debate, predictivists argue that novel prediction is one of the most important criteria of empirical success that justifies realist commitment to scientific theories. -/- . (shrink)

The paper presents a further articulation and defence of the view on prediction and accommodation that I have proposed earlier. It operates by analysing two accounts of the issue-by Patrick Maher and by Marc Lange-that, at least at first sight, appear to be rivals to my own. Maher claims that the time-order of theory and evidence may be important in terms of degree of confirmation, while that claim is explicitly denied in my account. I argue, however, that when (...) his account is analysed, Maher reveals no scientifically significant way in which the time-order counts, and that indeed his view is in the end best regarded as a less than optimally formulated version of my own. Lange has also responded to Maher by arguing that the apparent relevance of temporal considerations is merely apparent: what is really involved, according to Lange, is whether or not a hypothesis constitutes an "arbitrary conjunction." I argue that Lange's suggestion fails: the correct analysis of his and Maher's examples is that provided by my account. (shrink)

Scientific theories are developed in response to a certain set of phenomena and subsequently evaluated, at least partially, in terms of the quality of fit between those same theories and appropriately distinctive phenomena. To differentiate between these two stages it is popular to describe the former as involving the accommodation of data and the latter as involving the prediction of data. Predictivism is the view that, ceteris paribus, correctly predicting data confers greater confirmation than successfully accommodating data. In (...) this paper, I take issue with a variety of predictivist theses, argue that their role for issues of confirmation is extremely limited, and attempt to account for the appeal that predictivism has enjoyed. Introduction Temporal Predictivism Heuristic Predictivism Weak Predictivism 4.1 Inference to better theories 4.2 Inference to better methods Arguments for Strong Heuristic Predictivism 5.1 Best explanations argument 5.2 Conditional support 5.3 Unique explanations Increased Explanatory Unification 6.1 Explaining what other theories can't 6.2 Contrived hypotheses 6.2 Strength and simplicity Conclusions CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Scientific hypotheses may either predict particular unknown facts or accommodate previously-known data. Although affirmed predictions are intuitively more rewarding than accommodations of established facts, opinions divide whether predictive hypotheses are also epistemically superior to accommodation hypotheses. This paper examines the contribution of predictive hypotheses to discoveries of several bio-molecular systems. Having all the necessary elements of the system known beforehand, an abstract predictive hypothesis of semiconservative mode of DNA replication was successfully affirmed. However, in defining the genetic code whose (...) biochemical basis was unclear, hypotheses were only partially effective and supplementary experimentation was required for its conclusive definition. Markedly, hypotheses were entirely inept in predicting workings of complex systems that included unknown elements. Thus, hypotheses did not predict the existence and function of mRNA, the multiple unidentified components of the protein biosynthesis machinery, or the manifold unknown constituents of the ubiquitin–proteasome system of protein breakdown. Consequently, because of their inability to envision unknown entities, predictive hypotheses did not contribute to the elucidation of cation theories remained the sole instrument to explain complex bio-molecular systems, the philosophical question of alleged advantage of predictive over accommodative hypotheses became inconsequential. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for an embodied, embedded approach to predictive processing and thus align the framework with situated cognition. The recent popularity of theories conceiving of the brain as a predictive organ has given rise to two broad camps in the literature that I callfree energy enactivismandcognitivist predictive processing. The two approaches vary in scope and methodology. The scope ofcognitivist predictive processingis narrow and restricts cognition to brain processes and structures; it does not consider the body-beyond-brain and the (...) environment as constituents of cognitive processes.Free energy enactivism, on the other hand, includes all self-organizing systems that minimize free energy (including non-living systems) and thus does not offer any unique explanations for more complex cognitive phenomena that are unique to human cognition. Furthermore, because of its strong commitment to the mind-life continuity thesis, it does not provide an explanation of what distinguishes more sophisticated cognitive systems from simple systems. The account that I develop in this paper rejects both of these radical extremes. Instead, I propose a compromise that highlights the necessary components of predictive processing by making use of a mechanistic methodology of explanation. The starting point of the argument in this paper is that despite the interchangeable use of the terms, prediction error minimization and the free energy principle are not identical. But this distinction does not need to disrupt thestatus quoof the literature if we consider an alternative approach: Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing (EEPP). EEPP accommodates the free energy principle, as argued for by free energy enactivism, but it also allows for mental representations in its explanation of cognition. Furthermore, EEPP explains how prediction error minimization is realized but, unlike cognitivist PP, it allocates a constitutive role to the body in cognition. Despite highlighting concerns regarding cognitivist PP, I do not wish to discredit the role of the neural domain or representations as free energy enactivism does. Neural structures and processes undeniably contribute to the minimization of prediction error but the role of the body is equally important. On my account, prediction error minimization and free energy minimization are deeply dependent on the body of an agent, such that the body-beyond-brain plays aconstitutiverole in cognitive processing. I suggest that the body plays three constitutive roles in prediction error minimization: The bodyregulatescognitive activity, ensuring that cognition and action are intricately linked. The body acts asdistributorin the sense that it carries some of the cognitive load by fulfilling the function of minimizing prediction error. Finally, the body serves toconstrainthe information that is processed by an agent. In fulfilling these three roles, the agent and environment enter into a bidirectional relation through influencing and modeling the structure of the other. This connects EEPP to the free energy principle because the whole embodied agent minimizes free energy in virtue of being a model of its econiche. This grants the body a constitutive role as part of the collection of mechanisms that minimize prediction error and free energy. The body can only fulfill its role when embedded in an environment, of which it is a model. In this sense, EEPP offers the most promising alternative to cognitivist predictive processing and free energy enactivism. (shrink)

In previous research on the evaluation of food images, we found that appetitive food images were rated higher following a positive prediction than following a negative prediction, and vice versa for aversive food images. The findings suggested an active confirmation bias. Here, we examine whether this influence from prediction depends on the evaluative polarization of the food images. Specifically, we divided the set of food images into "strong" and "mild" images by how polarized (i.e., extreme) their average (...) ratings were across all conditions. With respect to the influence from prediction, we raise two alternative hypotheses. According to a predictive dissonance hypothesis, the larger the discrepancy between prediction and outcome, the stronger the active inference toward accommodating the outcome with the prediction; thus, the confirmation bias should obtain particularly with strong images. Conversely, according to a nudging-in-volatility hypothesis, the active confirmation bias operates only on images within a dynamic range, where the values of images are volatile, and not on the evaluation of images that are too obviously appetitive or aversive; accordingly, the effects from prediction should occur predominately with mild images. Across the data from two experiments, we found that the evaluation of mild images tended to exhibit the confirmation bias, with ratings that followed the direction given by the prediction. For strong images, there was no confirmation bias. Our findings corroborate the nudging-in-volatility hypothesis, suggesting that predictive cues may be able to tip the balance of evaluation particularly for food images that do not have a strongly polarized value. (shrink)

The argument is put forward that genetic mutations are viable then only, when the changed pattern of growth and/or metabolism is accommodated by the taxon-specific biochemistry of the organisms, i.e. by adaptive, somatic/physiological plasticity. The range of somatic plasticity under changing environmental conditions, therefore, has a certain predictive value for the kind of mutations that are likely to be viable.

A major difficulty for currently existing theories of inductive inference involves the question of what to do when novel, unknown, or previously unsuspected phenomena occur. In this paper one particular instance of this difficulty is considered, the so-called sampling of species problem.The classical probabilistic theories of inductive inference due to Laplace, Johnson, de Finetti, and Carnap adopt a model of simple enumerative induction in which there are a prespecified number of types or species which may be observed. But, realistically, this (...) is often not the case. In 1838 the English mathematician Augustus De Morgan proposed a modification of the Laplacian model to accommodate situations where the possible types or species to be observed are not assumed to be known in advance; but he did not advance a justification for his solution. (shrink)

Puzzle solving in normal science involves a process of accommodation—auxiliary assumptions are changed, and parameter values are adjusted so as to eliminate the known discrepancies with the data. Accommodation is often contrasted with prediction. Predictions happen when one achieves a good fit with novel data without accommodation. So, what exactly is the distinction, and why is it important? The distinction, as I understand it, is relative to a model M and a data set D, where M (...) is a set of equations with adjustable parameters (i. e., M is a family of equations with no free parameters). Definition: Model M predicts data D if and only if either (a) all members of M fit D well, or (b) a particular predictive hypothesis is selected from M by fitting M to other data, and the fitted model fits D well. M merely accommodates D if and only if (i) M does not predict D, and (ii) the predictive hypothesis selected from M using other data does not fit D well. There will be cases in which a model M neither predicts nor accommodates D. These are the cases in which we are willing to say that data falsifies the model. So, the distinction between prediction and accommodation applies only when there is no falsification. (shrink)

an observation to formulate a theory, it is no surprise that the resulting theory accurately captures that observation. However, when the theory makes a novel prediction—when it predicts an observation that was not used in its formulation—this seems to provide more substantial confirmation of the theory. This paper presents a new approach to the vexed problem of understanding the epistemic difference between prediction and accommodation. In fact, there are several problems that need to be disentangled; in all (...) of them, the key is the concept of overfitting. We float the hypothesis that accommodation is a defective methodology only when the methods used to accommodate the data fail to guard against the risk of overfitting. We connect our analysis with the proposals that other philosophers have made. We also discuss its bearing on the conflict between instrumentalism and scientific realism. Introduction Predictivisms—a taxonomy Observations Formulating the problem What might Annie be doing wrong? Solutions Observations explained Mayo on severe tests The miracle argument and scientific realism Concluding comments. (shrink)

This article sets out a formal procedure for determining the probability that God would do a specified action, using our moral knowledge and understanding God as a perfect being. To motivate developing the procedure I show how natural theology – design arguments, the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, and the treatment of miracles and religious experiences as evidence for claims about God – routinely appeals to judgments involving these probabilities. To set out the procedure, I describe a decision-theoretic model (...) for practical reasoning which is deontological so as to appeal to theists, but is designed not to presuppose any substantive moral commitments, and to accommodate normative and non-normative uncertainty. Then I explain how judgments about what we probably ought to do can be transformed into judgments about what God would probably do. Then I show the usefulness of the procedure by describing how it can help structure discussions in natural theology and a-theology, and how it offers an attractive alternative to ‘skeptical theism’. (shrink)

To become a unifying theory of brain function, predictive processing must accommodate its rich representational diversity. Gilead et al. claim such diversity requires a multi-process theory, and thus is out of reach for PP, which postulates a universal canonical computation. We contend this argument and instead propose that PP fails to account for the experiential level of representations.

The accommodation of evidence has been argued to be associated with several methodological problems that should prompt evaluators to lower their confidence in the accommodative theory. Accommodators may overfit their model to data (Hitchcock and Sober, Br J Philos Sci 55(1):1–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.1.1), hunt for (spurious) associations between variables (Mayo, Error and the growth of experimental knowledge. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, pp 294–318), or ‘fudge’ their theory in the effort to accommodate a particular datum (Lipton, Inference to (...) the best explanation. Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 164–183). The converse of accommodation, novel prediction, has been offered as a solution. If theorists novelly predict empirical results rather than accommodate those results, the potential risks of accommodation are avoided, and the theory warrants greater confidence. This paper evaluates if the problems of accommodation justify a preference for novel prediction over accommodation for evaluators of a scientific theory. I argue that there is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that the problems of accommodation result in a predictivist advantage in theory confirmation. Taking into consideration the disadvantages of novel prediction and the advantages of accommodation, the impact of further evidential factors, and recent scientific evidence about the consequences of novel prediction and accommodation, novel prediction and accommodation appear roughly on a par, or accommodation is even superior in the current context. (shrink)

This paper examines the famous doctrine that independent prediction garners more support than accommodation. The standard arguments for the doctrine are found to be invalid, and a more realistic position is put forward, that whether evidence supports or not a hypothesis depends on the prior probability of the hypothesis, and is independent of whether it was proposed before or after the evidence. This position is implicit in the subjective Bayesian theory of confirmation, and the paper ends with a (...) brief account of this theory, and answer to the principal objections to it. (shrink)

Although the relationship between prejudice and predictive coding has attracted more attention recently, many important issues remain to be investigated, such as why prejudice is so persistent and how to accommodate seemingly conflicting studies. In this paper, we offer an integrated framework to explain the functional-computational mechanism of prejudice. We argue that this framework better explains (i) why prejudice is somewhat immune to revision, (ii) how inconsistent processing (e.g. one’s moral belief and biased emotional reaction) may occur, (iii) the dispute (...) over the content of ‘alief’ (unconscious belief), and (iv) conflicting data reported in disinformation studies. Finally, we briefly review the main intervention strategies and offer recommendations. (shrink)

Should we insist on prediction, i.e. on correctly forecasting the future? Or can we rest content with accommodation, i.e. empirical success only with respect to the past? I apply general considerations about this issue to the case of economics. In particular, I examine various ways in which mere accommodation can be sufficient, in order to see whether those ways apply to economics. Two conclusions result. First, an entanglement thesis: the need for prediction is entangled with the (...) methodological role of orthodox economic theory. Second, a conditional predictivism: if we are not committed to orthodox economic theory, then we should demand prediction rather than accommodation – against most current practice. (shrink)

In psychology, measurement instruments are constructed from scales, which are obtained on the grounds of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Looking at the literature, one can find various recommendations regarding how these techniques should be used during the scale construction process. Some authors suggest to use exploratory factor analysis on the entire data set while others advice to perform an internal cross-validation by randomly splitting the data set in two and then either perform exploratory factor analysis on both parts or (...) exploratory factor analysis on the first part and confirmatory factor analysis on the other. In spite of all these divergent recommendations, there is no consensus on which method yields the best result. In this paper, we analyze this issue in light of the prediction versus accommodation debate and argue that the answer to this question depends on one’s conception of the criteria that should be used to achieve the goals of the scientific enterprise. (shrink)

The paper attempts to show that Predictive Processing (PP), despite recent attempts by its proponents to ward off accusations that lead to skepticism (Clark, A. (2016). _Surfing uncertainty: prediction, action and the embodied mind_. Oxford University Press, Clark, A. (2019). Replies to critics: In search of the embodied, extended, enactive predictive (EEE-P) mind. In M. Colombo, E. Irvine, & M. Stapleton (Eds.), _Andy Clark and his critics_ (pp. 266–302). Oxford University Press), is susceptible to undesirable skeptical consequences of a (...) Kantian (rather than Cartesian) character. Specifically, I shall argue that Clark’s version of PP is susceptible to a particularly Kantian version of skepticism in which the external world directly revealed by PP generative models is a _phenomenal_ one in the Kantian sense: A world perceived and conceived _as_ external, but at the same time essentially ‘internal’ in its categorial form, where this ‘internality’ only diverges from Kant in that it is a consequence of evolution. It will be suggested that these skeptical consequences can be avoided by articulating a more nuanced notion of the boundary between mind and world in PP, namely, one that differentiates an _ontological_ from an _epistemological_ understanding of the boundary between mind (generative model) and world. Moreover, it will be argued that in order to avoid Kantian skepticism, we must construe the very distinction between the phenomenal world and the world as it is in itself in non-metaphysical, pragmatic terms, as a framework condition for epistemically coordinating empirical inquiry within an ever-changing and unpredictable world. As a bonus, this view seems capable of accommodating the insights of autopoietic enactivism without buying into the latter’s controversial ‘transcendental idealist’ organism-relative ontology. (shrink)

Ketelaar and Ellis have provided a remarkably clear and succinct statement of Lakatosian philosophy of science and have also argued compellingly that the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution fills the Lakatosian criteria of progressivity. We find ourselves in agreement with much of what Ketelaar and Ellis say about Lakatosian philosophy of science, but have some questions about (1) the place of evolutionary psychology in a Lakatosian framework, and (2) the extent to which evolutionary psychology truly predicts new findings.

The history of the diffusion and confirmation of Mendeleev’s periodic table of elements has proven to be a challenging testbed for contemporary philosophical debates on the role of predictions in science. More than ten years of fruitful literature came after Scerri and Worrall :407–452, 2001) versus Maher and Lipton ; nevertheless, such a long-lasting debate left quite a few open questions. The aim of this contribution is to go through the various cases that emerged during the debate, in an effort (...) to explain them coherently in a weak predictivist perspective. Maher’s early account—according to which the astounding success of the major predictions alone was enough to explain the confirmation of the periodic table—can now be replaced by a more balanced and thorough picture, where both predictions and accommodations do weight. (shrink)

A widely endorsed thesis in the philosophy of science holds that if evidence for a hypothesis was not known when the hypothesis was proposed, then that evidence confirms the hypothesis more strongly than would otherwise be the case. The thesis has been thought to be inconsistent with Bayesian confirmation theory, but the arguments offered for that view are fallacious. This paper shows how the special value of prediction can in fact be given Bayesian explanation. The explanation involves consideration of (...) the reliability of the method by which the hypothesis was discovered, and thus reveals an intimate connection between the 'logic of discovery' and confirmation theory. (shrink)

A not unpopular thesis, when it comes to the confirmation of scientific theories, is that data which were used in the construction of a theory afford poorer support for that theory than data that played no role. Some compelling thought experiments have been offered in favour of this view, not as proof but rather to add some intuitive plausibility. In this paper I consider such thought experiments and argue that they do not support the thesis; the perceived importance of (...) class='Hi'>prediction over accommodation, at least in these cases, is illusory. Introduction Background assumptions Strong thesis Weak thesis Conclusions. (shrink)

Although Freud's merits may be readily acknowledged in the year of his 150th birthday, recent findings on repression-related phenomena cannot be accommodated by his classic conception, on which Erdelyi's theory is built. This point is illustrated by discussing the role of inhibitory processes. The unified theory of repression should be elaborated to generate falsifiable predictions on the reported phenomena.

Acquiring perceptual expertise is slow and effortful. However, untrained novices can accurately make difficult classification decisions by reformulating the task as similarity judgment. Given a query image and a set of reference images, individuals are asked to select the best matching reference. When references are suitably chosen, the procedure yields an implicit classification of the query image. To optimize reference selection, we develop and evaluate a predictive model of similarity-based choice. The model builds on existing psychological literature and accommodates stochastic, (...) dynamic shifts of attention among visual feature dimensions. We perform a series of human experiments with two stimulus types and nine classification tasks to validate the model and to demonstrate the model's potential to boost performance. Our system achieves high accuracy for participants who are naive as to the classification task, even when the classification task switches from trial to trial. (shrink)

Prior research has shown that various types of conventional multiword chunks are processed faster than matched novel strings, but it is unclear whether this processing advantage extends to variant multiword chunks that are less formulaic. To determine whether the processing advantage of multiword chunks accommodates variations in the canonical phrasal template, we examined the robustness of the processing advantage (i.e., predictability) of binomial phrases with non‐canonical conjunctions (e.g.,salt and also pepper; salt as well as pepper). Results from the cloze study (...) (Experiment 1) showed that there was a high tendency of producing the canonical conjunct (pepper), even in the binomials that contained non‐formulaic conjunctions. Consistent with these findings, results from two eye tracking studies (Experiments 2a and 2b) showed that canonical conjuncts were read faster than novel conjuncts that were matched on word length (e.g.,paprika), even in the binomials with variant conjunctions. This robust online processing advantage was replicated in a self‐paced reading study that compared all three conjunction types (Experiment 3). Taken together, these findings show that binomials with variant function words also receive facilitated processing relative to matched novel strings, even though both types of strings are neither conventional nor relatively frequent. Exploratory analyses revealed that this processing speed advantage was driven by the lexical–semantic association between the canonical conjuncts (salt–pepper), rather than lexical and phrasal frequency. Overall, these results highlight flexibility in the processing of multiword chunks that current models of multiword storage and processing must take into account. (shrink)

For Calvin, if we are to relate to God then he must accommodate himself to us, to our space-bound and time-bound condition. Such divine accommodation is fundamental to Calvin's idea of revelation, to the way in which God discloses his purposes in different eras, and deals with his people individually. This Chapter therefore examines Calvin's use of language about God, particularly in connection with divine change and divine-human dialogue.

Real-world policy decisions involve trade-offs. Sometimes the trade-offs involve both the efficacy and morality of potential policies. In this chapter, the morality and likely efficacy of hiring one more spy to help anti-terrorist intelligence gathering efforts is compared to the morality and likely efficacy of implementing a prediction market on terrorism. Prediction markets on terrorism allow registered traders to buy and sell shares in predictions about terrorism-related real-world events. The comparison at the heart of this chapter is based (...) on the assumption that it would cost about $5 million to bankroll the prediction market project, or to establish another spy, including equipment and head office support, for 15 years. The comparison reveals that implementing a prediction market on terrorism is likely to be more efficacious and less morally problematic than hiring one more spy. (shrink)

A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind is (...) that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it. (shrink)

In this paper I elaborate on previous criticisms of the influential Stalnakerian account of presuppositions, pointing out that the well-known practice of informative presupposition puts heavy strain on Stalnaker’s pragmatic characterization of the phenomenon of presupposition, in particular of the triggering of presuppositions. Stalnaker has replied to previous criticisms by relying on the well-taken point that we should take into account the time at which presupposition-requirements are to be computed. In defense of a different, ‘semantic’ account of the phenomenon of (...) presupposition, I argue that that point does not suffice to rescue the Stalnakerian proposal, and I portray Lewisian ‘accommodation’ as one way in which speakers adjust themselves to one another in the course of conversation. (shrink)

This fictional case study examines a person’s right to privacy, including the protection of their name, voice, and image, in the event that they decide to work at the same establishment where they and/or their relatives receive mental health-related therapeutic care.

The predictive coding (PC) theory of attention identifies attention with the optimization of the precision weighting of prediction error. Here we provide some challenges for this identification. On the one hand, the precision weighting of prediction error is too broad a phenomenon to be identified with attention because such weighting plays a central role in multimodal integration. Cases of crossmodal illusions such as the rubber hand illusion and the McGurk effect involve the differential precision weighting of prediction (...) error, yet attention does not shift as one would predict. On the other hand, the precision weighting of prediction error is too narrow a phenomenon to be identified with attention, because it cannot accommodate the full range of attentional phenomena. We review criticisms that PC cannot account for volitional attention and affect-biased attention, and we propose that it may not be able to account for feature-based and intellectual attention. (shrink)

Introduction : law, religion and the challenge of accommodation -- Muslim communities in a multicultural context -- Contextualishing Shari ̀ah : Shari ̀ah in the Common Law world -- Muslims, family relationships and the Common Law -- Muslims, crime and the Common Law -- Muslims, business transactions and the Common Law -- Conclusion.

Social scientists increasingly use social media data to illuminate long-standing substantive questions in social science research. However, a key challenge of analyzing such data is their lower level of individual detail compared to highly detailed survey data. This limits the scope of substantive questions that can be addressed with these data. In this study, we provide a method to upgrade individual detail in terms of ethnicity in data gathered from social media via the use of register data. Our research aim (...) is twofold: first, we predict the most likely value of ethnicity, given one's first name, and second, we show how one can test hypotheses with the predicted values for ethnicity as an independent variable while simultaneously accounting for the uncertainty in these predictions. We apply our method to social network data collected from Facebook. We illustrate our approach and provide an example of hypothesis testing using our procedure, i.e., estimating the relation between predicted network ethnic homogeneity on Facebook and trust in institutions. In a comparison of our method with two other methods, we find that our method provides the most conservative tests of hypotheses. We discuss the promise of our approach and pinpoint future research directions. (shrink)

We welcome the proposal to use forward models to understand predictive processes in language processing. However, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) miss the opportunity to provide a strong framework for future work. Forward models need to be pursued in the context of learning. This naturally leads to questions about what prediction error these models aim to minimize.

The development of Information and Communication Technologies has favored access to technological resources in adolescents. These tools provide access to information that can promote learning. However, they can also have a negative effect against people, as they can be used with other functionality, in which cyberbullying situations are caused during the interactions that arise when using social networks. The objective of this study was to determine the predictive value of the role of cyberbullying victims based on variables related to other (...) roles involved in cyberbullying and bullying, as well as personal characteristics, contextual characteristics and positive teamwork habits.. Information was collected from 227 students of the educational stages of Primary Education and Secondary Education, aged between 11 and 15 years, in a city with a high index of cultural diversity. The step-by-step technique was used to build the regression model. The results indicate that the model has a good goodness of fit coefficient. The role of cyberbully is the most important predictive variable of the role of the victim in cyberbullying and, to a lesser extent, the role of the witness in cyberbullying, the role of the witness in bullying, and the role of the victim of bullying. The role of the bullying aggressor and the variables sex, age, type of educational center, and teamwork habits are excluded in the predictive model. (shrink)

Current diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia place emphasis on delusions and hallucinations, whereas the classical descriptions of schizophrenia by Kraepelin and Bleuler emphasized disorganization and impoverishment of mental activity. Despite the availability of antipsychotic medication for treating delusions and hallucinations, many patients continue to experience persisting disability. Improving treatment requires a better understanding of the processes leading to persisting disability. We recently introduced the term classical schizophrenia to describe cases with disorganized and impoverished mental activity, cognitive impairment and predisposition to persisting (...) disability. Recent evidence reveals that a polygenic score indicating risk for schizophrenia predicts severity of the features of classical schizophrenia: disorganization, and to a lesser extent, impoverishment of mental activity and cognitive impairment. Current understanding of brain function attributes a cardinal role to predictive coding: the process of generating models of the world that are successively updated in light of confirmation or contradiction by subsequent sensory information. It has been proposed that abnormalities of these predictive processes account for delusions and hallucinations. Here we examine the evidence provided by electrophysiology and fMRI indicating that imprecise predictive coding is the core pathological process in classical schizophrenia, accounting for disorganization, psychomotor poverty and cognitive impairment. Functional imaging reveals aberrant brain activity at network hubs engaged during encoding of predictions. We discuss the possibility that frequent prediction errors might promote excess release of the neurotransmitter, dopamine, thereby accounting for the occurrence of episodes of florid psychotic symptoms including delusions and hallucinations in classical schizophrenia. While the predictive coding hypotheses partially accounts for the time-course of classical schizophrenia, the overall body of evidence indicates that environmental factors also contribute. We discuss the evidence that chronic inflammation is a mechanism that might link diverse genetic and environmental etiological factors, and contribute to the proposed imprecision of predictive coding. (shrink)

In this study, the focus was on the development of green energy and future prediction for the consumption of current energy sources and green energy development using an improved deep learning algorithm. In addition to the analysis of the current energy consumption used for the natural gas and oil as fuel, deep neural network algorithm is used to train the system as well as to process the data obtained previously, ranging from literature from the year 2003 until the year (...) 2019, for consumption of fuel. Also, using the proposed algorithm to predict the development of green energy consumption till 2030 is presented in terms of solar and wind generators. The resulting study also focuses on depletion of energy currently used or pollution caused because of it. The green energy controlling issue can take effect by using multiple layers of handling different features extracted from different sources and then learning the system to control it.This study aims to take advantage of carbon emissions to reduce their impact and dependence in the future on environmentally friendly renewable energies. Predicting the correct and precise amount of energy consumption and increasing the amount of environmentally friendly energy lead to a healthy ecosystem. The expected green energy consumption in the future is almost 78.25 EJ in 2030 and will be, in total energy average, 56% in 2045. The aim is to reduce dependency on costly and environmentally harmful fuels. (shrink)