I attempt in this paper to argue a thesis that is the opposite of the standard reading of Plato’s Symposium. I maintain that it is not the persuasive speech of thecomic or tragic poets that is criticized and undermined in the dialogue, but Socratic dialectic and dialogical argumentation. This is to say, it is not Aristophanes’ and Agathon’s speeches that are the object of Plato’s critique, but Socrates’ minimalist and rather unpoetic elenchos. My anaysis leads to the conclusion (...) that Diotima’s speech is meant to be recognized as Plato’s own invention in order to highlight the abstraction and utter unmusicality of Socratic dialectic. (shrink)

In the final scene of the Euthydemus, Socrates argues that because the art of speechwriting merely partakes of the two good arts philosophy and politics, it places third in the contest for wisdom. I argue that this curious speech is a reverse eikos argument, directed at the speechwriters own eikos argument for the preeminence of their art. A careful analysis of the partaking relation reveals that it is rather Socratic dialectic which occupies this intermediate position between philosophy and (...) politics. This result entails that Socrates’ peculiar art is only a part of philosophy, and its practitioner only partially wise. (shrink)

The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato’s conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a (...) value-neutral method directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well. -/- The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers. (shrink)

The object of my dissertation is to demonstrate that the conceptual thrust of Nietzsche's philosophical activity is a sustained endeavor to negate the Socratic basis of Western ontology through the re-implementation of the Aeschylean tragic paideia. Nietzsche's most consequential objection against Socrates is the latter's neutralizing of Hellenic mythos with the "cold edge" of reason and the "naive optimism" of science. Accordingly, we may most properly understand Nietzsche's effort as a movement against aesthetic Socratism, since it is with its (...) "supreme law," "To be beautiful everything must be intelligible," that Socrates--from behind his "Euripidean mask"--quelled the Dionysian spirit in Attic aesthetics, ipso fact put into operation an impulse-taming didacticism, and thus made ready the social climate for the institutionalization of the Judeo-Christian moral system. ;Nor, as I urge, is this a mere intellectual position, a philosophical exercise for Nietzsche. Just as the Platonic Socrates saw the need for a new moral and aesthetic direction, so does Nietzsche regard the culturo-political reformulation of Western society as a practical goal. Two interrelated themes of his appear to speak in favor of this observation: his regard of the composer Richard Wagner as the new Aeschylus who would reanimate the Dionysian spirit within German culture, and his persistent call for the somato-intellectual overcoming of humankind as we know it. That is, Wagner's musical dramas would at once transform Western/Socratic aesthetics and prepare the socio-cultural mentality for the rise and establishment of the Ubermensch as a new and profoundly "superior" "species" of human beings. That the younger Nietzsche did indeed regard Wagner as useful toward the achievement of such an artistic and cultural inversion may be noticed from the fact that he terminated their friendship virtually immediately after the composer signalled that he was turning to a more traditional and acceptable subject--Christianity. ;Despite this loss, Nietzsche ineluctably presses on his vision of the future "masters" of the earth. Indeed, in The Will to Power he implicitly offers at least two dissimilar "blueprints" whereby that goal could be realized. Only one of these plans of action, however, could ultimately prove useful in the establishment of the Ubermensch, while the other could at best permit only isolated communities of Ubermenschen to exist for a relatively short time, before succumbing to the rabble's socio-cultural levelling tendency. Only after the rabble's lifestyle would have become intolerable even to themselves, such that they would collectively rise up to transcend their mass-identity in all its manifestations, could the emergence and future of the Ubermensch as a phenomenal being be assured. (shrink)

플라톤 『고르기아스』편 전체를 아우르는 연구는 아직까지 부족한 상황이고, 더 나아가 본 작품 전체의 통일성을 구하는 일 역시 여전히 문제꺼리로 남아 있다. 이런 상황에서 필 자는 “소크라테스적 대화”, 곧 소크라테스가 자신의 대화 상대자들과 벌이는 첨예한 문답 의 과정을 이해할 서로 다른 세 가지 길을 제시하고 이 길들 가운데 하나를 옹호하는 것이 본 대화편 전체를 관통하는 주요 관심사 중 하나라고 주장한다. 부연하자면, 본 대화편에 대한 필자의 분석에 따를 때 “소크라테스적 대화”를 승자가 모든 유익을 독식하는 일종의 전투 과정이나 소크라테스가 일방적으로 상대방에게 시혜를 베풀기 (...) 위해 분투로서의 전투 로 이해하는 두 길이 본 작품을 통해 소개된다. 하지만 소크라테스가 대화를 통해 지향하 는 바는 대화 상대자 모두가 이 대화를 통해 유덕해지는 것이고, 대화 참여자 모두가 유익 을 누린다는 바로 이 점에서 본 대화편이 제시하는 이상적인 “소크라테스적 대화”는 일종 의 축제에 비유될 수 있다고 필자는 주장한다. (shrink)

Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance—is in (...) fact a benefit. Socrates’ attitude toward his own pending death sentence, his claim that the virtues are unified around wisdom, and his opposition to vengeance or retaliation as a moral motive, all underscore how dialectical engagement is a paradigm instance of just Socratic punishment. (shrink)

Incorporating Gadamer and other thinkers from the continental tradition, this essay is a close and detailed hermeneutic, phenomenological, and ontological study of the dialectic practice of Plato’s Socrates—it radicalizes and refutes the Socrates-as-teacher model that educators from scholar academic ideology embrace.

The aim of this paper is to understand some meaningful aspects of the Socratic use of Iliad x 224 in Plato’s Protagoras and Symposium. In these dialogues the Homeric reference appears in different contexts, but Plato’s Socrates applies it in the same way and seems to indicate it as a relevant step for the implementation of the dialectic method. Socrates is not only provoking his interlocutor, but rather making a comparison between the dialogue’s scene and the context involving (...) Diomedes and Odysseus’ in Iliad x. Ultimately, the use of this reference shows that a dialogical interplay to achieve a common purpose is a precondition for the Socratic dialectic. This previous cooperation between Homeric characters is emphasized by Plato’s Socrates and is derived from a specific soul’s manifestation. (shrink)

The paper proposes (1.) a non-standard interpretation of the proverbial expression “deuteros plous” by giving a fresh look to Phaedo, 99c9-d1. Then (2.) it proceeds to the philosophical problem raised in this passage according to this interpretation, that is, the problem of the “hypothesis” or the “unproved principle”. It indicates finally (3.) the kernel of truth contained in the standard Interpretation and it concludes with some remarks on the “weakness of the logoi”.

I emphasize four points: Socratic dialectic challenges the interlocutor not only to acquire the correct moral opinions, but to question and think for oneself and to develop one's own moral rationality; it involves anticipatory acts of several types of virtue: courage, moderation, and justice and concern for the common good as opposed to competition and jealousy; what is at stake is not only the topic of the particular exchange, but the opportunity for membership in a rational/educational community; and (...) the fact that Socrates' interlocutors typically reject the opportunity for moral insight and personal growth he makes available to them explains why he cannot be said to possess a techne of moral education, and why he insists that virtue cannot be taught. The process of education through the elenchus is not a matter of correct instruction, but of rational elicitation, which must be responded to by personal choice. Thus Socrates' principles may represent not only beliefs he has tested over many years of dialogue, but also values he has come to through participation in elenctic inquiry, the idealized extension of norms required by and created in the practice of dialectic. Socratic education involves the interlocutor in the confrontation with a self whose irrational attachments of appetite and ego are exposed and must be overcome for the interlocutor to experience catharsis. (shrink)

This paper describes the first phase of an ongoing education and research project guided by three main intentions: (1) to create opportunities for phronesis in the classroom; (2) to develop new understandings about phronesis as it relates to nursing care generally and to caring for specific groups, like formerly incarcerated adults; and (3) to provide an opportunity for formerly incarcerated adults and graduate nursing students to participate in a dialectical conversation about ethical knowing. Gadamer's writings on practical philosophy, phronesis, and (...) the Socratic dialectic provide the philosophical foundation and framework for the project. The first phase in the project was a 4‐h class within a graduate‐level health promotion course during which 30 nursing students and three formerly incarcerated panelists engaged in a dialectic conversation about what it means to care for formerly incarcerated adults in a meaningful way. After the class, two focus groups were conducted, one with the students and one with the formerly incarcerated panelists. Findings articulated participants' prejudices and assumptions prior to the class, expanded sense of phronesis, and ability to consider nursing practice within a larger ethical framework. Panelists and students left the class with a deeper understanding of one another and expressed an openness towards continued dialectic conversations together. Use of the Socratic dialectic within nursing curricula reflects a current and critical trend in nursing education to bring non‐epistemologic forms of knowledge into the classroom. (shrink)

In a crucial passage in the Parmenides, Parmenides states that the power of conversation (ten tou dialegesthai dynamin) depends on forms (135b-c) and indicates that this power is a prerequisite for philosophy. In chapter xx Kristian Larsen raises the question what implications this passage has for Plato’s conception of dialectic and argues that the discussion of the thesis that knowledge is perception in the Theaetetus, and in particular the conclusion to this discussion found at 184b3-186e12, provides an explanation of (...) Parmenides’ claims about the power of conversation. The chapter provides a detailed interpretation of the final refutation of Theaetetus’ thesis that knowledge is perception that highlights the way the dramatic features of the Theaetetus accentuate the argument Socrates develops in order to refute the thesis. Larsen argues that a central feature of the drama of the dialogue is Socrates’ attempt at redirecting Theaetetus from mathematics toward dialectic and philosophy. In particular, Socrates aims to make Theaetetus realize that being and the good or the beneficial are things that are what they are, themselves by themselves, that they are on a par, ontologically speaking, and that reaching for them, and attempting to come to grips with them, in thought, is a requirement for knowledge in general and for dialectic in particular. (shrink)

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to (...) learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned. (shrink)

This essay argues for a rereading of "Meno" and attempts two specific goals: 1) reviving Plato's indictment of sophistry as an important and timely way to investigate what it means to achieve a deeper sensibility of teaching and learning; and 2) demonstrating that the Socrates/slave-boy "dialectic" is actually a display of sophistry, for sophists, to demonstrate the flaws of sophistry. By offering such an interpretation as 2) an argument is made against sophistry and for authentic dialectic (vs. (...) class='Hi'>Socratic dialectic) in contemporary schools. To have authentic dialectic in American schools, teacher-education programs should engage teachers and prospective teachers in the kind of dialectic for which this essay argues. (shrink)

This article addresses and rebuts the claim that the purpose of the Socratic method is to humiliate, shame, and perplex participants. It clarifies pedagogical and exegetical confusions surrounding the Socratic method, what the Socratic method is, what its epistemological ambitions are, and how the historical Socrates likely viewed it. First, this article explains the Socratic method; second, it clarifies a misunderstanding regarding Socrates' role in intentionally perplexing his interlocutors; third, it discusses two different types of perplexity (...) and relates these to philosophical inquiry and dialectical pedagogy; finally, it refutes the claim that those who use the Socratic method intentionally attempt to shame and humiliate students. (shrink)

While refutation is usually related to Plato's early, Socratic, dialogues, this paper is aimed at exploring the link between refutation and dialectic in some of his middle and late dialogues. First, it argues that refutation assumes a constructive role in the Phaedo, where the best logos is the least refutable, and also in the Republic, where the philosopher is invited to fight his way through all elenchoi. Then, it tries to show that the gymnasia of Prm. 130a ff. (...) is aimed at training young Socrates to come to the aid of the theory he embraces preventing it from being refuted. He should travel and explore all the paths, by assuming a hypothesis as well as the opposite one. This methodology paves the way on which Plato advances in the Sophist, where the antinomic structure of the gymnasia gives way to a “constructive” dialectic in which the aporia is solved and a thesis is established by refutation. The last section of this paper is devoted to analysing Sph. 251c-252e, where the positive and constructive function of the elenchus is especially clear. Plato argues for the symploke eidon by exploring all the hypotheses that are open to the search and refuting those that ultimately represent obstacles to his position. The symploke is the truth which remains when all the hypotheses that contradict it have been refuted. The conclusion is that the elenchus does not disappear but is put at the service of the truth, as an essential part of the method for attaining a positive doctrine. (shrink)

In Plato's dialogues, we find many references to Corybantic rites-rites of initiation performed in honor of the goddess Rhea. But in the dialogue titled Euthydemus, there is more than a mere reference to the rites to be found. Within the context of Socratic dialectic, the ancient rites of the Corybantes are acted out-although veiled and distorted. This is what Carl Levenson argues in his book. Since the Corybantic rites are of the Dionysian/Eleusinian type, Plato gives us a glimpse (...) of the reality of Dionysiac ecstacy. This interesting knowledge of these rites has usually been lost in the academic assertion that the Euthydemus was just a satire on philosophic arguing (in which it is), and hence it has been consigned to a marginal place in Plato's canon. But here Plato is rejecting his abstract theories in favor of intimacy with the reality of the world, of matter and being rather than form. Levenson states that complete immersion in the material substrate of the world is what Plato discovered at the heart of Dionysian ecstacy, and the aim of ecstacy, as Plato said, is to purify the soul of ancient guilt. (shrink)