Universal Grammar (UG) can be interpreted as a constraint on the form of possible grammars (hypothesis space) or as a constraint on acquisition strategies (selection procedures). In this response to Herschensohn we reiterate the position outlined in Epstein et al. (1996a, r), that in the evaluation of L2 acquisition as a UG- constrained process the former (possible grammars/ knowledge states) is critical, not the latter. Selection procedures, on the other hand, are important in that they may have a (...) bearing on development in language acquisition. We raise the possibility that differences in first and second language acquisition pertaining to both attainment of the end-state and course of development may derive from differences in selection procedures. We further suggest that for these reasons age effects in the attainment of nativelike proficiency must necessarily be separated from UG effects. (shrink)

Christiansen & Chater (C&C) suggest that language is an organism, like us, and that our brains were not selected for Universal Grammar (UG) capacity; rather, languages were selected for learnability with minimal trial-and-error experience by our brains. This explanation is circular: Where did our brain's selective capacity to learn all and only UG-compliant languages come from?

Universal Grammar (UG) is a theory about the innate linguistic knowledge that child language learners bring to the task of language acquisition. This chapter examines the findings of experimental research on children's knowledge of one principle of UG, called Principle C. It presents the defining properties of Principle C. The chapter reviews empirical evidence showing that children apply Principle C to a range of disparate‐looking phenomena. It also presents empirical findings that document children's assignment of hierarchical structure to (...) strings of words. The empirical evidence supports a conclusion – that child language learners access a level of linguistic representation in addition to the constituent structure that is formed using Merge. This additional component of the language apparatus is called Logical Form. The chapter looks at a string of words where Principle C applies at the level of Logical Form. Cleft sentences are one such case. (shrink)

A central concern of generative grammar is the relationship between hierarchy and word order, traditionally understood as two dimensions of a single syntactic representation. A related concern is directionality in the grammar. Traditional approaches posit process-neutral grammars, embodying knowledge of language, put to use with infinite facility both for production and comprehension. This has crystallized in the view of Merge as the central property of syntax, perhaps its only novel feature. A growing number of approaches explore grammars with (...) different directionalities, often with more direct connections to performance mechanisms. This paper describes a novel model of universal grammar as a one-directional, universal parser. Mismatch between word order and interpretation order is pervasive in comprehension; in the present model, word order is language-particular and interpretation order (i.e., hierarchy) is universal. These orders are not two dimensions of a unified abstract object (e.g., precedence and dominance in a single tree); rather, both are temporal sequences, and UG is an invariant real-time procedure (based on Knuth's stack-sorting algorithm) transforming word order into hierarchical order. This shift in perspective has several desirable consequences. It collapses linearization, displacement, and composition into a single performance process. The architecture provides a novel source of brackets (labeled unambiguously and without search), which are understood not as part-whole constituency relations, but as storage and retrieval routines in parsing. It also explains why neutral word order within single syntactic cycles avoids 213-like permutations. The model identifies cycles as extended projections of lexical heads, grounding the notion of phase. This is achieved with a universal processor, dispensing with parameters. The empirical focus is word order in noun phrases. This domain provides some of the clearest evidence for 213-avoidance as a cross-linguistic word order generalization. Importantly, recursive phrase structure “bottoms out” in noun phrases, which are typically a single cycle (though further cycles may be embedded, e.g., relative clauses). By contrast, a simple transitive clause plausibly involves two cycles (vP and CP), embedding further nominal cycles. In the present theory, recursion is fundamentally distinct from structure-building within a single cycle, and different word order restrictions might emerge in larger domains like clauses. (shrink)

The target article advanced the null, unified and widely misinterpreted generative hypothesis regarding second language (L2) acquisition. Postulating that UG (Universal Grammar) constrains L2 knowledge growth does not entail identical developmental trajectories for L2 and first language (LI) acquisition; nor does it preclude a role for the L1. In embracing this hypothesis, we maintain a distinction between competence and performance. Those who conflate the two repeat fundamental and by no means unprecedented misconstruals of the generative enterprise, and more (...) specifically, of the empirical content of the null hypothesis regarding L2 linguistic knowledge growth. We hope to have identified certain common goals, the adoption of which might constitute a firm foundation for continued productive interdisciplinary development of contemporary theoretical and experimental L2 acquisition research. (shrink)

Differences of opinion between Epstein, Flynn & Martohardjono (1996) and some commentators can be traced to different interpretations of Universal Grammar (UG) form or strategy. Potential full access to the form of linguistic universals in second language acquisition may be distinguished from access to UG strategy, but Epstein et al.'s dismissal of the Critical Age Hypothesis clouds their central argument.

Epstein et al. take as given that, (1) a hypothetical Universal Grammar (UG) exists that allows children effortlessly to acquire their first language; they then argue (2) that critical or sensitive periods do not block the UG from second language acquisition. Therefore, why can't we all effortlessly “acquire” Tibetan in six months or so? Data concerning the neural bases of language are also noted.

This commentary aims to highlight what exactly is controversial about the traditional Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis and what is not. There is widespread agreement that we are not born that language universals exist, that grammar exists, and that adults have domain-specific representations of language. The point of contention is whether we should assume that there exist unlearned syntactic universals that are arbitrary and specific to Language.

A key motivation for Universal Grammar (UG) is developmental: UG can help children acquire the linguistic knowledge that they do as quickly as they do from the data that's available to them. Some of the most fruitful recent work in language acquisition has combined ideas about different hypothesis space building blocks with domain‐general statistical learning. Statistical learning can then provide a way to help navigate the hypothesis space in order to converge on the correct hypothesis. Reinforcement learning is (...) a principled way to update the probability of a categorical option that's in competition with other categorical options. There are two prominent options for linking theory theoretical representations: the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) and the relativized form of that theory, relativized UTAH. The learning strategy of Pearl and Sprouse shares the intuition with subjacency that there's a local structural anomaly when syntactic islands occur. (shrink)

This handbook provides a critical guide to the most central proposition in modern linguistics: the notion, generally known as Universal Grammar, that a universal set of structural principles underlies the grammatical diversity of the world's languages. Part I considers the implications of Universal Grammar for philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, and examines the history of the theory. Part II focuses on linguistic theory, looking at topics such as explanatory adequacy and how phonology (...) and semantics fit into Universal Grammar. Parts III and IV look respectively at the insights derived from UG-inspired research on language acquisition, and at comparative syntax and language typology, while part V considers the evidence for Universal Grammar in phenomena such as creoles, language pathology, and sign language. The book will be a vital reference for linguists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists. (shrink)

Issues concerning UG access for L2 acquisition as formulated by Epstein et al. are misleading as well as poorly discussed. UG accessibility can only be fully evaluated with respect to the steady state gram mar reached by the learner. The steady state for LI learners is self evidently the adult grammar in the speech community. For L2 learners, however, the steady state is not obvious. Yet, without its clear characterization, debates concerning stages of L2 acquisition and direct and indirect (...) UG accessibility cannot be resolved. (shrink)

The current conception of the relation between UG and the grammar of a language rules out the no-access hypothesis, but does not distinguish between the full-access and partial-access hypotheses. The former raises the issue of why language acquisition in child and adult should be so different. The evidence presented in Epstein et al.'s target article seems inconclusive regarding a choice between hypotheses.

Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono trivialize the question of access to universal grammar in second language acquisition by arguing against a straw-man version of the no-access position and by begging the question of how second language (L2) knowledge is represented in the mind/brain of an adult L2 learner. They compound their errors by employing a research methodology that fails to provide any relevant evidence.

This article discusses language universality and language variation, and suggests that there is no feature variation in initial syntax, featural variation arising by metamorphosis under transfer from syntax to PF-morphology. In particular, it explores the Zero Hypothesis, stating that Universal Grammar, UG, only provides two building elements, Root Zero and Edge Feature Zero, zero, as they are purely structural/formal elements with no semantic content in UG. Their potential content is provided by the Concept Mine, a mind-internal but language-external (...) department. UG and narrow syntax has access to the Concept Mine, and this Syntax-Concept Access is unique to humans, a prerequisite for the evolution of language (Section 1). A related idea (also inSection 1) is coined the Generalized Edge Feature Approach, GEFA. It states that Merge always involves at least one edge feature, which precludes symmetric structures and enables Simplest Merge (no Pair-Merge, no Hilbert epsilon operator). The article advocates that there is no syntactic feature selection (Section 2), all syntactic features being universally accessible in the Concept Mine, via Root Zero and Edge Feature Zero. In contrast, there is feature selection in PF (including morphology), yielding variation (Section 3), Gender being a clear example (Section 4). However, there is a widely neglected syntax-to-PF-morphology metamorphosis (Section 5), such that morphological features like [past] are distinct from albeit related to syntactic features like Speech Time. Parameters operate on selected PF features, and not on purely syntactic features, so parameter setting is plausibly closely tied to the syntax-to-PF-morphology metamorphosis (the concludingSection 6). It is suggested that parameters are on the externalization side of language, part of or related to the sensory-motor system, facilitating motoric learning in language acquisition. (shrink)

In this chapter we consider unsupervised learning from two perspectives. First, we briefly look at its advantages and disadvantages as an engineering technique applied to large corpora in natural language processing. While supervised learning generally achieves greater accuracy with less data, unsupervised learning offers significant savings in the intensive labour required for annotating text. Second, we discuss the possible relevance of unsupervised learning to debates on the cognitive basis of human language acquisition. In this context we explore the implications of (...) recent work on grammar induction for poverty of stimulus arguments that purport to motivate a strong bias model of language learning, commonly formulated as a theory of Universal Grammar (UG). We examine the second issue both as a problem in computational learning theory, and with reference to empirical work on unsupervised Machine Learning (ML) of syntactic structure. We compare two models of learning theory and the place of unsupervised learning within each of them. Looking at recent work on part of speech tagging and the recognition of syntactic structure, we see how far unsupervised ML methods have come in acquiring different kinds of grammatical knowledge from raw text. (shrink)

I identify a number of problematic aspects of Christiansen & Chater's (C&C's) contribution. These include their suggestion that subjacency and binding reflect non-domain-specific mechanisms; that proto-language is a ; and that non-adaptationism requires overly rich innate structures, and is incompatible with acceptable evolutionary processes. It shows that a fully UG (Universal Grammar)-free version of the authors' neo-adaptationism would be incoherent.

It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is frequently suggested to derive from a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary, principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution. Specifically, as the processes (...) of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which language genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the original motivation for UG arises because language has been shaped to fit the human brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent which evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases deriving from the structure of thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatics. (shrink)

To what extent, if any, does Universal Grammar (UG) constrain second language (L2) acquisition? This is not only an empirical question, but one which is currently investigable. In this context, L2 acquisition is emerging as an important new domain of psycholinguistic research. Three logical possibilities have been articulated regarding the role of UG in L2 acquisition: The first is the hypothesis that claims that no aspect of UG is available to the L2 learner. The second is the hypothesis (...) that claims that only LI instantiated principles and LI instantiated parameter-values of UG are available to the learner. The third, called the hypothesis, asserts that UG in its entirety constrains L2 acquisition. (shrink)

Is the ability to speak a language an acquired skill? Leading proponents of the generative approach to human language—notably Chomsky (2000) and Pinker (2003)—have argued that the thesis that language capacities are skills is hopelessly confused and at odds with a range of empirical evidence, which suggests that human language capacities are grounded in a biologically inherited set of language instincts or a Universal Grammar (UG). In this paper, we argue that resistance to the claim that human language (...) capacities are skills has been fostered by naïve and implausible conceptions of the nature of skilled action. Correcting these misconceptions about the nature of skilled action breathes new life into the old idea that human language competences are particular kinds of skills and does so in a way that is fully consistent with appeals to the central importance of UG, broadly construed. More generally, we argue that by taking human language capacities to be skills, we capture what is right about the generative program while at the same time avoiding its most serious pitfalls. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky's ideas and work on the human language faculty and how language is acquired opened new territory on which a whole new framework in non‐native language acquisition was established: generative second language acquisition, or GenSLA. Investigating Chomsky's principles and parameters within the GenSLA framework has brought additional and convincing evidence for the essential validity of Chomsky's original insights. This chapter highlights Chomsky's lasting legacy embodied in the GenSLA framework. In addition to interpretation, poverty of the stimulus situations provide an (...) opportunity to test Universal Grammar (UG)‐based knowledge of graded distinctions beyond simple acceptability. The Subjacency Condition was probably the most studied principle of UG in the 1980s and 1990s. Structure dependence is directly demonstrated in languages with auxiliary verb movement to form questions. The Feature Reassembly Hypothesis brought grammatical features reflected in functional categories to the front of GenSLA research. (shrink)

Universal Grammar (UG) is indeed evolutionarily implausible. But if languages are just to a large primate brain, it is hard to see why other primates do not have complex languages. The answer is that humans have evolved a specialized and uniquely human cognitive architecture, whose main function is to compute mappings between arbitrary signals and communicative intentions. This underlies the development of language in the human species.

According to a “selective” (as opposed to “instructive”) model of human language capacity, people come to know more than they experience. The discrepancy between experience and eventual capacity (the “poverty of the stimulus”) is bridged by genetically provided information. Hence any hypothesis about the linguistic genotype (or “Universal Grammar,” UG) has consequences for what experience is needed and what form people's mature capacities (or “grammars”) will take. This BBS target article discusses the “trigger experience,” that is, the experience (...) that actually affects a child's linguistic development. It is argued that this must be a subset of a child's total linguistic experience and hence that much of what a child hears has no consequence for the form of the eventual grammar. UG filters experience and provides an upper bound on what constitutes the triggering experience. This filtering effect can often be seen in the way linguistic capacity can change between generations. Children only need access to robust structures of minimal (“degree-0”) complexity. Everything can be learned from simple, unembedded “domains” (a grammatical concept involved in defining an expression's logical form). Children do not need access to more complex structures. (shrink)

Alan Barnard's Language in Prehistory attempts to find an accommodation between linguistic and evolutionary theory and apply insights from archeology and anthropology to the origins and purposes of language. Rudolph Botha's Language Evolution: The Windows Approach is a critique of employing evidence from other fields. Botha also critiques conclusions drawn from pidgins and creoles, homesign, motherese, grammaticalization, language acquisition, protolanguage, and comparative animal behavior. This review attempts in turn to bring into question the appropriateness of applying the framework of generative (...) linguistics, and its style of argumentation, to prehistory. (shrink)

The mass/count distinction attracts a lot of attention among cognitive scientists, possibly because it involves in fundamental ways the relation between language (i.e. grammar), thought (i.e. extralinguistic conceptual systems) and reality (i.e. the physical world). In the present paper, I explore the view that the mass/count distinction is a matter of vagueness. While every noun/concept may in a sense be vague, mass nouns/concepts are vague in a way that systematically impairs their use in counting. This idea has never been (...) systematically pursued, to the best of my knowledge. I make it precise relying on supervaluations (more specifically, ‘data semantics’) to model it. I identify a number of universals pertaining to how the mass/count contrast is encoded in the languages of the world, along with some of the major dimensions along which languages may vary on this score. I argue that the vagueness based model developed here provides a useful perspective on both. The outcome (besides shedding light on semantic variation) seems to suggest that vagueness is not just an interface phenomenon that arises in the interaction of Universal Grammar (UG) with the Conceptual/Intentional System (to adopt Chomsky’s terminology), but it is actually part of the architecture of UG. (shrink)

In philosophical circles, but not only there, Chomsky's views on natural language regularly fall a prey to misrepresentation. Very often the confusion involves the creative aspect of language use, an aspect of linguistic performance, which tends to be confounded with the notion recursivity, a property of the grammatical competence system. The present article clears away the most deep-seated confusions and proves that criticism of generative grammar based upon them cannot be upheld. In particular, it shows that the existence of (...) metaphors, and deviations from rules more generally, reinforces rather than refutes Chomsky's theory so long as the crucial distinction between knowledge of language (competence) and language use (performance) is taken heed of. It is argued that theories which deny this distinction and view human language as a set of dispositions or as an ability are misguided. The final section illustrates some properties of Universal Grammar (UG) by means of data from the domain of negative polarity and subject-object asymmetries. Though these phenomena are far from being fully understood, the present level of our insight warrants the conclusion that they lend considerable support to the Chomskyan conception of UG as a highly complex and richly articulated linguistic genotype. (shrink)

This project provides a detailed examination and critique of current philosophical, linguistic, and cognitive accounts of first language acquisition. In particular, I focus on the concept of "innate" and how it is embraced, marginally utilized, or abandoned altogether in efforts to describe the way that a child comes to be a competent user of a language. A central question that naturally falls out of this general inquiry is therefore what exactly is supposed to be "innate," according to various theories? Philosophically, (...) the theory of innate ideas put forth to explain human learning has existed for centuries and hence, this thesis as it relates to language is discussed. The revival of nativism by linguists like Chomsky is thus a central theme of the first chapter. Universal Grammar and the various arguments for it are closely scrutinized, and I close this chapter with what I take to be the commitments of linguistic nativism, how its proponents conceive of "innate," and several possible objections to the arguments they put forth. Just as the theory of innate ideas has had its contesters throughout the history of philosophy, so too have linguists and cognitive scientists rejected Universal Grammar and other forms of linguistic nativism. Thus, the second chapter presents several of these alternative explanations of language acquisition. Namely, I divide the chapter into three sections, Usage-Based Linguistics, Emergentism, and Sociolinguistic Acquisition, as it is my suggestion that most of the anti-UG attacks are levied from one of these three fields. In discussing the details of each, two distinctions become of particular concern: first, a large part of the differing conceptions of "innate" seem to hinge on what is meant by "learning" and "acquiring," and therefore second, a fine line between UBL and Emergentism can be drawn, a relationship that is otherwise conflated in the literature. Because chapter two involves a brief account of the way in which connectionist simulations are often utilized to model or represent language acquisition, particularly from an Emergentist perspective, chapter three begins by examining this feature of Emergentism in more detail. Due to its explanatory power, ability to be effectively modeled, and the evidentiary support found in neuroscience, Emergentism would appear to be the most tenable position to maintain regarding language acquisition. This possibility seems further strengthened when we take into account the neuroscientific data often used to bolster anti-nativist claims. Nevertheless, reflecting on the overarching concern of the project, regarding what is really meant by "innate," it is shown that this attack on nativism might stand on shakier ground than was originally assumed. Finally, based on these considerations, a case is made for an intermediary position, a theory of "Minimally Innate Ideas.". (shrink)

In this paper I want to look at what the evidence from Complex Predicates can tell us about the design parameters of an empirically adequate theory of Universal Grammar (UG). This is a fertile field for investigation because, according to the standard assumptions of the field, complex predicates are monoclausal with respect to some properties and multiclausal with respect to others and this tension can only be resolved by giving up some cherished beliefs. After introducing the problem in (...) Section 1, Sections 2–4 will lay out the basis of the dilemma. Sections 2 and 3 argue that Romance complex predicates have an articulated rightwardbranching phrase structure, and cannot be analyzed as some sort of verb compound or verbal complex while conversely Section 4 shows how in many respects a complex predicate does behave just like a single predicate. Hence we require a notion of monoclausality that these complex predicates satisfy despite their articulated phrase structure. (shrink)

Chomskyan linguistics recently seems to let its goals become wider, from a pure formal field to biology and cognitive sciences, aiming to a foretold convergence between the Universal Grammar Theory and neurosciences. In this paper I try to make the point on how far this linguistics biological trend is going today. First I’m going to talk about the foundations of biolinguistics. Then I’ll shortly face some critics against Chomsky about rationalism, innateness and modularity of mind; two theories alternative (...) to UG will be shown. Fifth and sixth paragraphs just talk about recent acquisitions on the biological foundations of language and about how the UG theory can be tested with new neuroscientific surveying techniques. The last paragraph contains some remarks on the future of biolinguistics. (shrink)

Selection through iterated learning explains no more than other non-functional accounts, such as Universal Grammar (UG), why language is so well designed for communicative efficiency. It does not predict several distinctive features of language, such as central embedding, large lexicons, or the lack of iconicity, which seem to serve communication purposes at the expense of learnability.

Christiansen & Chater (C&C) argue persuasively that Universal Grammar (UG) could not have arisen through evolutionary processes. I provide additional suggestions to strengthen the argument against UG evolution. Further, I suggest that C&C's solution to the logical problem of language evolution faces several problems. Widening the focus to mechanisms of general cognition and inclusion of animal communication research might overcome these problems.

This chapter takes the familiar arguments for nativism to establish the interesting nativist thesis that “the initial state” of linguistic competence is sufficiently rich that humans can naturally learn only languages that conform to the rules specified by “Universal Grammar”. It rejects Fodor’s “only-theory-in-town” abduction for the very exciting “I-Representational Thesis”, the thesis that the UG-rules are represented in the initial state. It argues that this thesis lacks significant evidence and is implausible. The chapter also argues for some (...) tentative proposals: that the UG-rules are, largely if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought, a proposal resting on the Language-of-Thought Hypothesis ; that if LOTH is false, then the UG-rules are not, in a robust way, innate in a speaker; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. The chapter concludes the book-long argument that there is no significant evidence for the Representational Thesis and that it is implausible. (shrink)

Our results support the idea that adults have access to the principles and parameters of Universal Grammar (UG), contrary to Epstein et al.'s misrepresentation of our work as involvingpartial access toUG. For both LI and L2 acquisition, functional projections appear to develop in a gradual fashion, but in L2 acquisition there ispartial transferin that the lowest projection (VP) is transferred from the speaker's LI.

What is the meaning of the present and past tenses? The answer to this question depends on what objects these terms refer to. If the question is about the English tense morphemes present and past, we will get one answer; if it is about their Japanese or Russian counterparts, we will get another; and if it is about a semantic categories PRESENT and PAST attributed to the theory of Universal Grammar (UG), we will get still another. In this (...) article, I discuss the semantics (and the syntax) of (English) morphemes, but my theoretical treatment of this exploits temporal categories that I attribute to UG, expressed overtly in some languages and covertly in others. (shrink)

That language is shaped to fit the human brain is close to the Chomskyan position. The target article by Christiansen & Chater (C&C) assumes an entity, outside individual heads. What is the nature of this entity? Linguistic niche-construction and co-evolution of language and genes are possible, with some of what evolved being language-specific. Recent generative theory postulates much less than the old Universal Grammar (UG).

Our target article argued that a genetically specified Universal Grammar (UG), capturing arbitrary properties of languages, is not tenable on evolutionary grounds, and that the close fit between language and language learners arises because language is shaped by the brain, rather than the reverse. Few commentaries defend a genetically specified UG. Some commentators argue that we underestimate the importance of processes of cultural transmission; some propose additional cognitive and brain mechanisms that may constrain language and perhaps differentiate humans (...) from nonhuman primates; and others argue that we overstate or understate the case against co-evolution of language genes. In engaging with these issues, we suggest that a new synthesis concerning the relationship between brains, genes, and language may be emerging. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that the rules of language, as distinct from its semantic features, are the characteristics which most clearly distinguish language from the communication systems of other species. A number of linguists (e.g., Chomsky 1972, 1980; Pinker 1994) have suggested that the universal features of grammar (UG) are unique human adaptations showing no evolutionary continuities with any other species. However, recent summaries of the substantive features of UG are quite remarkable in the very general nature of (...) the features proposed. While the syntax of any given language can be quite complex, the specific rules vary so much between languages that the truly universal (i.e. innate) aspects of grammar are not complex at all. In fact, these features most closely resemble a set of general descriptions of our richly complex semantic cognition, and not a list of specific rules. General principles of the evolutionary process suggest that syntax is more properly understood as an emergent characteristic of the explosion of semantic complexity that occurred during hominid evolution. It is argued that grammatical rules used in given languages are likely to be simply conventionalized, invented features of language, and not the result of an innate, grammar-specific module. The grammatical and syntactic regularities that are found across languages occur simply because all languages attempt to communicate the same sorts of semantic information. (shrink)