In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2 054.wpd 272 Reviews 1 See Brian J.yL. Berry and Donald C. Dahmen, “Paul Wheatley, 1921–1999”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91 (2001): 734–47. THE LIVES OF THOSE WHO WOULD BE IMMORTAL Richard Henry Schmitt U. of Chicago Chicago, il 60637, usa [email protected] David Leavitt. The Indian Clerk: a Novel. London: Bloomsbury, 2008; New York: Bloomsbury, 2007. Pp. 485. isbn 1-59691-040-2. (...) £16.99; us$24.95 (hb). From the start, this novel interested me for two reasons. First, it attempts to tell us the personal stories of two individuals who were working at the highest level in a very abstract Weld, namely G.yH. Hardy (1877–1947) and Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887–1920) during their collaboration on pure mathematics between spring 1914 and spring 1919. Obviously the same problems would arise in trying to tell the personal story of Bertrand Russell’s supervision of Ludwig Wittgenstein in mathematical logic, which occurred at Cambridge University in the years just before the start of the Great War. It is a great challenge to try to tie personal dynamics and abstract thought into a single coherent narrative. There are implications for the philosophy of mathematics and the history and sociology of science. So, of course, we have to ask: how does author David Leavitt rise to this challenge? Second, a more personal reason: Paul Wheatley1 told me shortly before his death that he thought this period at Cambridge represented the highest accom- March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2 054.wpd Reviews 273 2 G.yH. Hardy, Ramanujan: Twelve Lectures on Subjects Suggested by His Life and Work (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1940). Two lectures were presented at Harvard in 1936; the Wrst, a more personal recollection, was printed unchanged. The quote is from p. 2. The second lecture was expanded into the remaining published lectures, all considering speciWc mathematical topics. plishment possible for an academic institution: its fellows and masters had managed to attract and then recognize the genius of Ramanujan and Wittgenstein and to admit them to advanced studies without any real academic credentials. Wheatley had been the chair of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago; so, he knew something about such matters, as he did about many things involving humans, human settlements, and their arrangement in the world. Incidentally, Wheatley himself appeared as a character, Battle, in Ravenstein, Saul Bellow’s roman à clef about Allan Bloom. So, to the extent that Cambridge University just before and during the Great War plays a role here, we want to learn as much as we can about the atmosphere of the place. The Indian Clerk is a historical novelz—zin this case naming actual names, elaborating what we know about real people and occasionally adding Wctional charactersz—zall centered on the extraordinary mathematical genius Ramanujan and his equally extraordinary importation from India to Cambridge. The story is told largely in the third person, by an omniscient narrator, but repeatedly we also have the inner voice of G.yH. Hardy: there are a number of chapters with the indication “New Lecture Hall, Harvard University”, dated 1936, in which Hardy speaks in the Wrst person. In these passages David Leavitt uses parts of the published lectures, along with G.yH. Hardy’s private thoughtsz—zas imagined by Leavittz—zabout this “one romantic incident in my life” and about other matters that still haunt him.2 The novel is thus in some sense more about G.yH. Hardy and his inner life than it is about Srinivasa Ramanujan. The triumph of the novel is its ability to reconstruct and convey in a lively manner the circumstances of the time, the look and smell of the place, the crosscurrents, dynamics, and dislocations of people during these years. Leavitt has woven together a great deal, from many diTerent realms: pre-war meetings of the Apostles, the high table, the pre-war mathematics tripos, the method of collaboration between Hardy and J.yE. Littlewood, Cambridge as military training grounds and as hospital for the wounded, vegetarian cookery, feminism, Hindu... (shrink)

There were individuals in the vegetarian movement in Britain who believed that to refrain from eating flesh, fowl, and fish while continuing to partake of dairy products and eggs was not going far enough. Between 1909 and 1912, The Vegetarian Society's journal published a vigorous correspondence on this subject. In 1910, a publisher brought out a cookery book entitled, No Animal Food. After World War I, the debate continued within the Vegetarian Society about the acceptability of (...) animal by-products. It centered on issues of cruelty and health as well as on consistency versus expediency. The Society saw its function as one of persuading as many people as possible to give up slaughterhouse products and also refused journal space to those who abjured dairy products. The year 1944 saw the word "vergan" coined and the breakaway Vegan Society formed. (shrink)

Socrates believes that living well is primarily an intellectual undertaking: we live well if we think correctly. To intellectualists, one might think, the body and activities related to it are of little interest. Yet Socrates has much to say about food, eating, and cookery. This paper examines Socrates’ criticism of ‘feeding on opson’ (opsophagia) in Xenophon’s Memorabilia and of opson cookery (opsopoiia) in Plato’s Gorgias. I argue that if we consider the specific cultural meaning of eating opson, we (...) can see that Socrates takes a nuanced stance on food and cookery: he recommends careful consumption and skillful production, not austerity or abstinence. This nuance in Socrates’ discussion of food changes our interpretation of Socrates’ criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias: in comparing rhetoricians to opson chefs—not to pastry chefs, as many have assumed—Socrates evokes the dangers of indulging in speeches while acknowledging their necessity for Athenian public life. (shrink)

Between people who unabashedly support eating meat and those who adopt moral vegetarianism, lie a number of people who are uncomfortably carnivorous and vaguely wish they could be vegetarians. Opposing animal suffering in principle, they can ignore it in practice, relying on the visual disconnect between supermarket meat and slaughterhouse practices not to trigger their moral emotions. But what if we could have the best of both worlds in reality—eat meat and not harm animals? The nascent biotechnology of tissue culture, (...) originally researched for medical applications, holds out just such a promise. Meat could be grown in vitro without killing animals. In fact, this technology may not just be an intriguing option, but might be our moral obligation to develop. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the just society is vegetarian. However, I do so in a way not commonly attempted by contemporary animal rights theorists, insofar as I appeal to Plato to make my case. Although there are certainly other ways to argue for this position, appealing to Plato is a significant and interesting way to lend historical credibility to this argument, and as such, the argument offered in this article provides an important contribution to existing analyses that (...) attempt to establish that humans ought to be vegetarians. (shrink)

Abstractabstract There are estimated to be five million vegetarians in the United Kingdom and another four million in the United States. There are numerous vegetarians elsewhere in the world: around fifteen million, for instance, in India. Some of these vegetarians are parents. And some of the vegetarian parents will bring up their children to be vegetarian, too. Is this a permissible course of action? Or should vegetarian parents raise omnivorous offspring? In this article, I consider three arguments (...) that aim to show that a parent should not raise a child on a vegetarian diet. None of these arguments are convincing and I know of no better ones — so I conclude that it is permissible for a parent to raise her child as a vegetarian. (shrink)

I analyze Quine’s later writings on analyticity from a linguistic point of view. In Word and Object Quine made room for a “strictly vegetarian” notion of analyticity. In later years, he developed this notion into two more precise notions, which I have coined “stimulus analyticity” and “behaviorist analyticity.” The latter characterization is in many respects similar to Carnap’s characterization of analyticity based on semantic rules and can be seamlessly incorporated in a Carnapian project of explication. I explain why Quine (...) failed to see the importance of analyticity thus defined. I argue that Quine’s views on language are deeply rooted in the American structuralist tradition in linguistics and that the resulting strict descriptivism and the strong emphasis on language change bring down the usefulness of analyticity. (shrink)

Vegetarians are often charged with inconsistency. They are told that, if they refrain from meat consumption, they should also refrain from the consumption of all animal products. The central question this paper addresses is whether the requirement of consistency means that vegetarians should become vegans. It is argued that if a vegetarian is motivated by arguments that focus on animals, she is indeed inconsistent and should become a vegan.

The first look at the philosophy behind Stephenie Meyer's bestselling Twilight series Bella and Edward, and their family and friends, have faced countless dangers and philosophical dilemmas in Stephenie Meyer's Twilight novels. This book is the first to explore them, drawing on the wisdom of philosophical heavyweights to answer essential questions such as: What do the struggles of "vegetarian" vampires who control their biological urge for human blood say about free will? Are vampires morally absolved if they kill only (...) animals and not people? From a feminist perspective, is Edward a romantic hero or is he just a stalker? Is Jacob "better" for Bella than Edward? As absorbing as the Meyer novels themselves, Twilight and Philosophy: Gives you a new perspective on Twilight characters, storylines, and themes Helps you gain fresh insights into the Twilight novels and movies Features an irresistible combination of vampires, romance, and philosophy Twilight and Philosophy is a must-have companion for every Twilight fan, whether you're new to the series or have followed it since the beginning. (shrink)

I critique the oppressive society in which Michael A. Fox’s Deep Vegetarianism was written and which Fox too attempts to criticize and change. Fox proves himself to be among a handful of Western philosophers open-minded enough to acknowledge and attempt to learn from North American indigenous values and world views. For this reason, he should be commended. In defending his thesis that a vegetarian life style is morally preferable, he draws upon indigenous thought, feminist philosophy, and antidomination theories, arguing (...) that speciesism, racism, and sexism can all be traced back to the same mind-set of oppression, domination and exploitation. Unfortunately, identifying the oppressive mind-set is not ipso facto escaping it. I show that Fox in his explication and use of indigenous thought actually perpetuates the very oppression and exploitation he argues against. (shrink)

This article addresses the question whether Whiteheadians should be vegetarians in two ways. First, I question whether Whitehead should have been a vegetarian to be consistent, arguing that his omnivorous diet was inconsistent with his own philosophy. Second, I evaluate the works of three distinguished Whiteheadian philosophers on the ethics of vegetarianism. I argue that Charles Birch, John Cobb, and Jay McDaniel have prioritized animals justifiably over other organisms, yet that Birch and Cobb fail to do justice to the (...) lives of other animals, and that the account provided by McDaniel fails to provide a convincing argument for minimal moral vegetarianism. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have found inspiration in the writings of Alfred Whitehead to develop their ideas on environmental and animal ethics. I explore the writings of Charles Hartshorne and Daniel Dombrowski to address the question of whether Whiteheadians should be vegetarians. I conclude that there is a morally relevant distinction between plants and animals, based on the Whiteheadian view that animals have higher grades of experience, and that this distinction grounds a moral duty to adopt minimal moral veganism.

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

Contemporary defenders of philosophical vegetarianism are too often unaware of their historical predecessors. In this paper, I contribute to the rectification of this neglect by focusing on the case of Rousseau. In part one, I identify and articulate an argument against meat eating that is implicitly present in Rousseau’s writings, although it is never explicitly developed. In part two, I consider and respond to two objections that might be made to the claim that this argument should be attributed to Rousseau. (...) In part three, I consider how Rousseau’s argument might fit into a general typology of recent discussions of vegetarianism, and argue that the eclectic nature that is revealed in doing so shows that the argument is worthy of further consideration. (shrink)

David DeGrazia (2009) and Stuart Rachels (2011), among others, offer moral arguments in favor of adopting a vegetarian diet that have, they claim, broad appeal. Rather than relying on an account of animal rights or a particular ethical theory, these arguments rely on the moral principle that an extensive amount of pain requires moral justification. Since people do not need to eat meat in order to survive, the arguments conclude that the pain that animals experience in factory farming is (...) unjustified. I argue that these very same arguments support a more radical conclusion, namely, vegetarians morally should avoid eating vegetables from industrialized farming. Thus, if vegetarians are convinced by the moral arguments for vegetarianism offered by DeGrazia and Rachels, then they should be convinced, by analogous reasoning, that they should not eat vegetables from industrialized farming. (shrink)

The food we choose to eat tells a good deal about who we are and how we stand in relation to nonhuman animals and nature as a whole. Though most people are concerned about the state of the world and about their own health, they tend not to reflect very much, if at all, on what results from their dietary choices, and therefore see nothing wrong in eating meat. I question this attitude. Specifically, I argue that, for the same reasons (...) we should care about pain, suffering, well-being, and death in humans, so should we care about the fate of animals we traditionally designate as sources of meat. Caring is supplemented in my argument by considerations of justice, and I contend that for reasons of caring and justice, we should be vegetarians, consistent with the aim of minimizing the harm we cause by our lifestyle choices. Finally, I examine what it means to take responsibility for our diets and challenge meat eaters to come to terms with the wrongdoing that is inherent in the livestock industry today. (shrink)

If non-human animals have high moral status, then we commit a grave moral error by eating them. Eating animals is thus morally risky, while many agree that it is morally permissible to not eat animals. According to some philosophers, then, non-animal ethicists should err on the side of caution and refrain from eating animals. I argue that this precautionary argument assumes a false dichotomy of dietary options: a diet that includes farm-raised animals or a diet that does not include animals (...) of any kind. There is a third dietary option, namely, a diet of plants and non-traditional animal protein, and there is evidence that such a diet results in the least amount of harm to animals. It follows therefore that moral uncertainty does not support the adoption of a vegetarian diet. (shrink)

For all their antagonism, deep and social ecology do share at least this much: a lack of interest in the issues of animal rights, animal welfare, and vegetarianism. I argue that this disinterest is inconsistent with deep and social ecology's practical programs and philosophical foundations. Furthermore, while they ignore the animals' case for special moral recognition, both schools nevertheless exploit our special feelings (pro and con) toward animals in order to advance their own agendas concerning nature.

Ten years ago National Geographic magazine reported that the Loma Linda Seventh-day Adventist population is one of the communities in the world that lives longer and with a higher quality of life thanks in part to the biological benefits of a vegetarian diet. Along with National Geographic, other media outlets have reported since then that the Adventist religious community considers a plant-based diet a very important factor for a healthy lifestyle. Adventists have been promoting this type of diet worldwide (...) for more than 150 years. This article is an attempt to understand from a social-scientific perspective the origin of the importance they lend to diet and see whether this helps explain why approximately 150 years after the founding of the church, diet remains crucial for Adventists around the world. The conclusion proposed is that Adventists understood the adoption of a plant-based diet as a special divine instruction in order to nourish their new identity as a special people differentiated from the rest of society. This was possible through a desecularisation of diet that placed food in the moral category of the Adventist belief system.Keywords: Seventh-day Adventist Church; vegetarian diet; religion; health; desecularisation; identity. (shrink)

Jag argumenterar för att Torbjörn Tännsjö borde anse det fel att äta kött. Därför borde han bli vegetarian. Anledningen till detta är en artikel, "Why we ought to accept the repugnant conclusion", som Tännsjö publicerade 2002 i tidskriften Utilitas.

A timely examination of the problems with meat from a Jewish perspective. Examines the historical Jewish dietary laws, and argues that vegetarianism today best fulfils the requirements of kashrut. Gives reasons for Jewish vegetarianism based on concern for human health, ethical considerations of animal welfare, environmental concerns, concern for poor people, and for the general welfare of the community.

The author compares myths about meat-eating with myths about manliness, and seeks to explore the literary, scientific, and social connections between meat-eating, male dominance, and war. Drawing on such sources as butchering texts, cookbooks, Victorian hygiene manuals, and Alice Walker, the author argues in favor of linking feminist and vegetarian theory.

Imagine a world in which as part of their basic substances tomatoes contain fish and tobacco, potatoes contain chicken, moths and other insects, and corn contains fireflies. Is this science-fiction? No, these plant-animal hybrids already exist today and may soon be on your supermarket shelves without any special labeling to warn you. Furthermore, in a few years the types of these genetically engineered "vegetables" are sure to increase and may very possibly also include human genes. If you are a (...) class='Hi'>vegetarian, do you want to be in the position of inadvertently eating vegetables that are part meat? Even if you are not a vegetarian, are you ready to become a cannibal and eat foods that are part human being? (shrink)

Kathryn Paxton George's recent publication, Animal, Vegetable, or Woman?, is the culmination of more than a decade's work and encompasses standard and original arguments against the feminist-vegetarian connection. This paper demonstrates that George's key arguments are deeply flawed, antithetical to basic feminist commitments, and beg the question against fundamental aspects of the debate. Those who do not accept the feminist-vegetarian connection should rethink their position or offer a non-question-begging defense of it.

Many environmental ills derive from humanity’s unsustainable fondness for meat, a fondness that often pushes (and sometimes breaks) environmental limits and reveals unsustainable patriarchal ideologies. Han Kang’s The Vegetarian and Ang Li’s The Butcher’s Wife each, in very different ways, expose the strands of “meat and gender” enmeshments in Korea and Taiwan respectively, showing the mutual interdependence of carnivorism and patriarchal power. So deeply rooted are the entangled strands of carnivorism and sexism that contesting them (either together or apart) (...) means dismantling the very definition of human corporeality: in The Vegetarian, this means that a woman becomes a plant; in The Butcher’s Wife, it means that a man becomes the very cattle he has spent his life slaughtering; in both, questioning meat is a very dangerous challenge that comes from a woman through a narrative perspective that is clearly feminist. Both novels plainly show deep analogies and correspondences between domestic violence and violence against animals, and yet, in both, there is a taut relationship between vegetable-based histories and a more meat-based modernity. This article argues firstly that the violence of meat-eating in The Vegetarian and The Butcher’s Wife is both physical and psychological. Dreams and madness are involved. Normalcy is male, deviance female. Order is meat, chaos vegetal. And the threat of death will either be fully realized or will hang menacingly in the air. Secondly, this article argues that the novels importantly show that breaking points (psychological and environmental) are often utterly unpredictable and that once breached, the results can also be devastatingly unpredictable. (shrink)

Posthumanism reformulates the idea of human agency and its relationship with the natural world. By shunning dualisms, it blurs the man-made boundaries between the human and the animal in the natural and technological world. As a rejection of universality, posthumanist studies aim to rearrange the way we view societal values through a more intersectional approach, without completely divorcing itself from the tradition of humanism. Instead, it seeks to expand the way the human interacts with the wider world, and in the (...) case of The Vegetarian, the title character Yeong-hye’s actions may be part of a moral imperative. (shrink)

Han Kang's 2007 novel The Vegetarian, published in English translation in 2015, tells a story of one woman's refusal to eat meat. Yeong-hye's refusal comes from her desire to eschew the intersecting violence of patriarchy and carnism, which gradually reveals an underlying psychosis and drive towards self-attrition. Because of the central motifs of bodily transgression and self-abnegation in the novel, critics have compered Han Kang's Yeong-hye to Frantz Kafka's Gregor Samsa or the hunger artist. Just as the hunger artist (...) seeks seclusion from human sociality in the space of his vacuous interiority, so does Yeong-hye sequester herself from the gaze of others in her visions of... (shrink)

In this interesting book Aronson discusses lapsed vegetarians, which she dubs lapsos. She argues that lapsos struggle with the implications of eating meat, and in so doing their spirits are strengthened. She offers the book not as a polemic, but rather a peace offering to soften the debate over meat eating, trace ambiguity and nuance, and suggest that being a vegetarian should not be so easy.

Kitchen, cooking, nutrition, and eating have become omnipresent cultural topics. They stand at the center of design, gastronomy, nutrition science, and agriculture. Artists have appropriated cooking as an aesthetic practice - in turn, cooks are adapting the staging practices that go with an artistic self-image. This development is accompanied by a philosophy of cooking as a speculative cultural technique. This volume investigates the dimensions of a new #on#culinary turn#off#, combining for the very first time contributions from the theory and practice (...) of cooking. The volume is bilingual, all contributions are presented in English and in German. (shrink)

Kathryn Paxton George has recently argued that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even if Tom Regan is correct in arguing that humans and certain nonhuman animals are equally inherently valuable. She holds that Regan's liberty principle permits humans to kill and eat innocent others who have a right to life, provided that doing so prevents humans from being made worse off. George maintains that obstaining from meat and dairy products would in fact make most humans (...) worse off. I argue that Regan's liberty principle either contradicts his equal rights view or does not permit the slaughter of another for food. I show that a different view recognizing the moral rights of nonhumans but according them less value than normal adult humans, the unequal rights view, would permit such action if human survival or health depended upon it. However, it would also permit the slaughter of innocent humans in the same circumstances. Finally, I argue that current nutritional research does not support George's contention that most humans would suffer if they ceased eating other animals and their products. (shrink)