This article examines the recent introduction of forced ultrasound-beforeabortion measures in select U.S. states as an intervention of gendered biopower. These measures are drafted based on model legislation entitled the Woman’s Right to Know Act. Such legislation exploits a discourse of women’s health, but invests in fetal “life” by regulating the behavior of pregnant women so as to promote the carrying of pregnancies to term; the legislation also represents childbirth and motherhood as in the interest of women’s health. Ultimately, I (...) contend that Right to Know measures give the state permission to override the choices, rights, and interests of the population of pregnant women as a whole in an attempt to “protect” and optimize a supposedly vulnerable fetal population. (shrink)

A woman's right to say no to a proposal of marriage, in defiance of her family and friends, was an essential feature of Victorian middle- and upper-class ideology, as it is represented in novels of the time. This right was based on the assumptions that falling in love is to some degree fortuitous, but that it is a permanent ontological change of selfhood. A good woman is justified in saying no even to an advantageous marriage proposal if she does (...) not love her suitor. Anthony Trollope's novels offer varied dramatizations of these assumptions, while Henry James's novels recount their incipient breakdown. (shrink)

This article considers the objection to abortion that a woman who voluntarily engages in sexual activity is responsible for her fetus and so cannot have an abortion. The conclusion argued for is that the conceptions of responsibility that can ground the objection that are considered do not necessitate a requirement on the part of a pregnant woman to carry her pregnancy to term. Thus, the iterations of the responsibility objection presented cannot be used to curtail reproductive choice.

This paper proposes that in developing jurisprudence on women’s rights, the African Commission will need to ask the woman question, particularly the African woman question. The woman question requires a judicial or quasi-judicial body to always put woman at the centre of any decision with a view to addressing the historically disadvantaged position of women in society. Asking the African woman question means examining how the peculiar experiences of African women have been ignored by laws rooted in patriarchy across (...) the region. Although the Commission has handled few cases directly dealing with women’s rights, the paper suggests that the Commission can draw inspiration from decisions of other regional and international human rights bodies such as the European Court on Human Rights and the Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on how to ask the woman question. The paper recommends that in line with feminist reasoning, there is a need for the African Commission to develop a consistent gender-sensitive approach in dealing with cases that may have implications for women. In essence, the African Commission must ask the African woman question when dealing with cases on the enjoyment of women’s fundamental rights. (shrink)

Patricia Williams in her book, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, describes being denied entrance in the middle of the afternoon by a “saleschild.” Utilizing the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this article explores their interaction phenomenologically. This small interaction of seemingly simple misunderstanding represents a limit condition in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis. His phenomenological framework does not explain the chasm between the “saleschild” and Williams, that in a sense they do not participate in the same world. This interaction between the “saleschild” (...) and Williams represents a moment when the two contest exactly what is reason in our society. To the extent that society discerns one’s actions as reasonable and the other’s actions as unreasonable, our society participates in determining that which constitutes reason. Williams’s work speaks precisely to this chasm as evident in her text’s subtitle, Memoirs of a Mad Woman. This decision relegates one subject to “judiciousness” and relegates the other to “madness.”. (shrink)

Recently a child’s right to a father was invoked to justify the prevention of single women from obtaining access to IVF. This article explores the conceptual and normative issues about the nature of the right and its conflict with a woman’s right to procreative autonomy. The discussion relates the conceptual issues to those raised in the context of ‘wrongful life’ tort cases. It concludes that the right to be born with a father, although conceptually sound, does not justify the restriction (...) on the procreative right of single women. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Daniel Callahan died on July 16, 2019, just short of his 89th birthday. In the years since, we have seen the overturning of abortion rights, a concern central to his scholarship and musings about the place of religion in American civic life. Callahan’s journey from lay Catholic journalist and commentator at Commonweal to a co-founder of the Hastings Center, during his decade of doubt, is especially relevant today as America revisits established precedent governing a woman’s right to choose. His (...) life-long struggle with faith and the secularization of bioethics is a story worth telling, as it may foster dialogue across a divide between religious and laical thinkers that has fractured our political discourse. We recall Callahan’s misgivings about the marginalization of religious perspectives in public life; he sought not the denial of complexity nor of difference in views, but rather the importance of free and honest debate around deeply held beliefs, contextualized in the realities of the contemporary world. Callahan’s ambivalence about his faith remains a part of the fabric of American life, a story that Callahan chronicled to our collective benefit for over a half-century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fetal Sentience and Women’s RightsBonnie Steinbock (bio)A growing number of states have banned abortion after twenty weeks on the grounds that the fetus at that stage experiences pain. Such laws run contrary to current abortion law, and so are almost certain to be challenged in court. In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court said that the constitutional right to abortion extends until the fetus is viable, between twenty-four and (...) twenty-eight weeks. After viability, states may ban abortion entirely except where continuing the pregnancy would threaten the woman’s life or health. The viability threshold was upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.Why viability? The Roe court said that this is “the ‘compelling’ point... because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” Some commentators point out that this is no justification; the capacity for independent life does not explain the significance of viability. It merely gives the meaning.Another problem with viability is that it seems to depend on medical technology. What if fetuses under twenty-three weeks could be placed in an artificial uterus and brought to development there? Would we then say that even a first-trimester fetus was viable? This focuses on one aspect of viability only—namely, the capacity for independent existence. Another aspect is development. The justification for viability is that a fetus of twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks is so substantially developed, so similar to a newborn, that it has a claim to societal protection—so long as this does not threaten the pregnant woman’s life or health. Any attempt to ban abortions much earlier in pregnancy—as in a bill passed by the Ohio state legislature in June that would ban abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detectable, which can occur as early as six weeks—would be so restrictive as to vitiate the right to abortion altogether.It could be argued that sentience is a more rational threshold than viability because of the connection between sentience and moral considerability. If, as many experts believe, sentience and viability occur around the same time, then from a practical standpoint, it does not matter whether sentience or viability is chosen. But if sentience is the standard, and if it occurs earlier than viability, then abortion rights are restricted. Thus, much of the debate has turned on when fetal sentience occurs. Some are adamant that fetal sentience prior to twenty-four weeks is impossible, but other researchers do not rule it out. The development of neural networks necessary for the experience of pain might be present as early as seventeen weeks.Opposition to these laws should not be based on when sentience occurs, since this might change with more evidence. All we can say now is that the fetus almost certainly cannot feel pain during the first trimester and almost certainly can during the third. The exact onset of sentience in the second trimester is not just unknown; it may even be unknowable. It depends on the development of neural connections, which is a process, not an event. Drawing any exact line within a process is likely to be arbitrary.The choice between sentience and viability to justify the prohibition of late abortions is not the real issue. What really matters—and what pro-choice advocates should stress—is that late abortions are not denied to women who need them to preserve their own lives or health. Roe makes this clear, and subsequent cases have affirmed it.That is what is so upsetting about the story of Danielle Deaver. Deaver was at twenty-two weeks in a wanted pregnancy when her water broke, and the amniotic fluid did not rebuild. Her doctors said that fetal development had stopped and that the fetus stood only a remote chance of being born alive. Deaver also faced a risk of serious infection. She and her husband opted for inducing labor. But because inducing labor, if not done to save the life of the fetus, is legally defined as abortion, and Nebraska law prohibits abortion after twenty weeks, doctors and hospital lawyers concluded that the procedure would be illegal.After ten days, Deaver went into labor... (shrink)

Historically attempts to use the courts as a means of challenging decisions to refuse NHS resources have met with little success. However two recent developments, that of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the development of European Union law through the application of Article 49 of the EC Treaty have provided the prospect for a challenge to this position. This article examines the impact of a recent case that of Watts v Bedford PCT in which a woman sought to (...) by-pass NHS waiting lists by seeking treatment in France and then claimed reimbursement of the cost of the operation and the possible impact of this case in the context of patients’s rights and resource allocation. (shrink)

The article discusses the problems of development of women’s political rights in Lithuania in the legal historical aspect starting from the 16th century, when some property and individual rights were enshrined in the first codifications of the laws of the Great Duchy of Lithuania. The aim of the article is to show that women’s struggle for political equality and suffrage at the end of the 19th and at the turn of the 20th century correlates with the movement for (...) re-establishment of the independent State of Lithuania. As a result in Lithuania equal suffrage and political rights were ensured from the very beginning of independence. In 1905 the Great Seimas of Vilnius recognized the principles of equality of women and men and declared the principles of equal general election to the Seimas (parliament); women’s suffrage, as one of the elements of legal equality, became constitutionally entrenched already in the first temporary Constitution of the State of Lithuania in 1918. At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century women’s rights have been further developed, moreover, the first woman was elected as President of the Republic in the national elections in May 2009. (shrink)

entertainment and interest of Liberty’s readers, I intend to express in this article some conservative thoughts on the so called Woman Question. This I will do, not so much because of my desire to present my own views, but because it appears to me a good way of eliciting elaborate statement and clear explanation from those with whom I shall take the issue. The discussion (if such it may be called) of the Woman Question has so far been confined to (...) platitudes and trivial points, while it has been deemed one of the absolute requisites of an advanced, progressive, and liberal thinker to believe in equality of the sexes and to indulge in cheap talk about economic emancipation, equal rights, etc., of the “weaker sex.” Declining to repeat this talk in a parrot like fashion, I ask to be offered some solid arguments in support of the position which I now, with all my willingness, cannot consider well grounded. (shrink)

_The Rights of Woman as Chimera _examines Mary Wollstonecraft's intellectual relationship to Rousseau, Locke, and Aristotle. Although she learned much from each philosopher, her own thought cannot be said to be simply derivative of these thinkers. In considering "the woman question," Wollstonecraft levels important, but friendly, critiques of her male predecessors. She puts forth a conception of the nature of woman, which is informed by and consistent with her larger political philosophy, and this study endeavors to outline this conception (...) of the nature of woman. (shrink)

In recent years philosophers have done impressive work explicating the nature and moral importance of a kind of self-respect Darwall calls “recognition self-respect,” which involves valuing oneself as the moral equal of every other person, regarding oneself as having basic moral rights and a legitimate claim to respectful treatment from other people just in virtue of being a person, and being unwilling to stand for having one’s rights violated or being treated as something less than a person. It (...) is generally agreed that such self-respect is something all persons have a right to and ought to have and that it is morally objectionable for a person or a society to preclude or injure someone’s self-respect. But scant attention has been paid to another kind of self-respect, the kind that has to do not with the fact that you are a person but with the kind of person you are, that has to do not with rights but with character. I call this kind of self-respect “evaluative self-respect.” The central task of this paper is to explicate the moral value of evaluative self-respect. I do this by looking at the role it plays in the life of someone who is sincerely concerned to be a good person. This is not to deny that evaluative self-respect can go wrong, and I look at how it can go wrong. In particular, evaluative self-respect is, like everything else in human life, vulnerable to the distorting forces of oppression. But, I argue, evaluative self-respect can have moral value even when it goes wrong, and it can be a liberatory resource in the lives of the oppressed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Explode and Die!A Fat Woman’s Perspective on Prenatal Care and the Fat Panic EpidemicJennifer HansenClassifying obesity as a disease provides more ammunition for the “war on obesity.” I gather that this is supposed to be a good thing. The problem is that obesity isn’t a germ or a crime; it’s a word applied to a particular kind of body—and thus to the person inhabiting it.From a fat person’s perspective, (...) the “war on obesity” is a war on fat people. It’s a license to bully, shame, and ostracize fat people and deny us employment, medical care, and even ordinary family life because we don’t look right. Fat people, proclaimed by medical authority to be the enemy and identifiable on sight as outsiders, are made into targets for all kinds of free–floating anger. For example, I am apparently sucking away people’s tax dollars via my fat, and it’s also my fault that men expecting to fantasize about every woman they see on the street encounter my distasteful fatness instead. But no matter how many times we get told that we are wrong just for existing, we go on existing, in public even. How dare we? The answer, obviously, is to keep at us. If we would just admit that we have no right to exist, then we would all either vanish or become socially acceptably thin, and then the whole world would be unicorns and butterflies and everyone would be rich and nobody would get old. Or something like that. If obesity is a disease, then phrenology is a science.Of course, we get a lot of well–meaning flak along with the bullying; after all, concentrating on weight loss can only be good for us, because fat people are always about to explode and die. This assumption has definitely affected my relationship with the only medical practice I can reach that’s in my network. During the 20–plus years since I became visibly obese, I have gotten used to the constant drone of “You’re fat, you’re fat, you’re about to explode and die, we don’t care about what you actually came in for because it’s vitally important that we bug you yet again about your pants size,” but some things can still shock me. For example, during all three of my pregnancies, I never had a result that was even borderline for gestational diabetes (GD). And yet, some time after my last baby was born, someone wrote “HISTORY OF GESTATIONAL DIABETES” in my file. I first heard about it during my annual checkup, when the doctor referred to it when talking about my increased risk of Type 2 diabetes due to age (unavoidable), my first–ever non–whitecoat–syndrome borderline blood pressure (BP) reading (taken with a standard cuff, gee how could it possibly have been inaccurate), and GD (gosh, I felt so safe and supported at this fine reality–based practice). And of course my weight.Whoever wrote that felt free to make things up because I’m fat. To repeat, somebody with access to my file at my only source for affordable health care felt free to write things in it that were completely contradicted by the facts just a few sheets below. There’s no need to fact–check your assumptions when you can tell by looking at her that she’s F–A–T, and everybody knows what they are. They’ll explode and die, every last one of them. Better medicate them now before they inevitably break down!Speaking of which, there’s a particular OB at the practice who I’ll call Doctor Eeyore. At every appointment, Doctor Eeyore would take measurements, stare, and say, “Hmm … tch.” If I asked him to tell me what he had found, he would say, “Too big,” or, “Too small,” or indicate some other inadequacy in his glum, word–miserly way. He only bothered to produce complete sentences when he enthusiastically told me that I would die if I didn’t give birth with an IV in place to administer the life–saving drugs for my inevitable cardiac event... (shrink)

In The Antinomies of Realism Fredric Jameson positions realism as a discursive tension between two forms of temporality: on the one hand, the temporality of storytelling and the tale and, on the other, the temporality of affect. The outcome is a ‘scenic present which in reality, but secretly, abhors the other temporalities which constitute the force of the tale or récit in the first place’. This article considers the usefulness of Jameson's diagnosis of realism for discussions of cinema. How are (...) the temporalities that Jameson describes enacted in a medium much more directly invested in an experience of the present? The investigation of this question will occur in the context of a close engagement with two films in which the tension between storytelling and affect is evident at the level of the actors’ performances: John Cassavetes's A Woman under the Influence and Maurice Pialat's A nos amours. (shrink)

The Umayyads (41-132/661-750) were the first Muslim dynastic state established in Damascus after the Rasheedun Caliphs. The Umayyads' transformation of the caliphate into a sultanate, their tribalist and discriminatory approaches, as well as the exaggerated palace life and entertainment of some caliphs have been the subject of criticism. Among the Umayyad caliphs, Yazīd II (101-105/720-724) was remembered for his drinking parties and love affairs with his concubines, and his fondness for entertainment to the degree of debauchery was described. The night (...) life of the caliph in question with his concubines named Sallāma and Habābah and his inclusion of them in the administration did not escape attention.It is known that the Umayyads had some problems in their relations with the new non-Arab Muslims (mawālī). Yazīd II’s elder brother, al-Maslama İbn ʽAbd al-Malik, was prevented on the grounds that his mother was a mawāli, although he was known to be the most worthy candidate for the caliphate among his brothers. Yazīd II, on the other hand, was appointed as the heir apparent with the advantage of being a member of the dynasty on his mother's side and then he was brought to the caliphate.After ‘Umar ibn ʽAbd al-ʽAziz, who was recognised as the ‘Fifth Rasheedun Caliph’ thanks to his piety and effective administrative skills, Yazīd II, who had a completely opposite character and administrative understanding, was brought to the caliphate. Although he imitated ‘Umar ibn ʽAbd al-ʽAziz in the first days of his caliphate, this situation did not last long. Soon after, he came under the influence of his favourites named Sallāma and Habāba and started to govern the state under the influence of these two names. It has also been stated that he jeopardised the future of the state and the dynasty with his arbitrary practices and debauched life. The sources give limited information about the lives of Sallāma and Habābah. Sallāma was born in Mecca as the child of a family whose parents were slaves (muwellada). It is narrated that she memorised almost all poetry and song lyrics from the Jahiliyyah period until the time she lived, and that she was extremely knowledgeable in the al-Qur’ân al-Karîm, hadiths and religious sciences. But with her mesmerising voice and physical beauty, she became famous as a singing courtesan. She gained her real fame when she met Yazid ibn ʽAbd al-Malik and became a part of the palace life. After Yazid II became the caliph, she rose in the palace and started to have a say in the state administration. It has been stated that Habābah was not inferior to Sallāma with her physical beauty, superior performance in singing, knowledge and manners, and even more advanced. As a matter of fact, Yazīd II was enamoured of her at first sight and wanted her very much, but his brother Caliph Sulaymān prevented him. Henceforth Yazīd II seated these two combines on his right and left in his palace and did not leave them until his death.Sallāma was an extremely intelligent, knowledgeable and beautiful woman who could be called Yazīd II’s first love. She almost ruled the state by using the affection and trust that the caliph cherished for her. So much so that the highest bureaucrats of the state could only be appointed with her approval. With her beauty, voice, and sharp intelligence, Habābah also enchanted the caliph, and her intervention in the state administration cost the caliph his life. Yazīd II was very saddened by the sudden death of Habābah during an entertainment party. His body was kept waiting for days and could only be buried after the warning of the caliph’s elder brother al-Maslama. The caliph, who knew the cause of her death from himself, never left her grave day or night. Weeks after the burial, he had her grave opened, embraced and kissed her decomposed corpse, lamented, and it was recorded that he died of grief. This situation, which cost the caliph his life, was expressed as ‘lovesickness’.This information and details are mentioned in Islamic historical sources. In this study, by using classical (Arabic) sources, two of the women who we think were influential on politics are introduced. Thus, we have contributed to the discussions on the presence and role of women in state administration in an early period of Islamic history. In this study, the portraits of two women, Habāba and Sallāma, who we think were involved in politics during the Umayyad period, albeit limited to the reign of Yazīd II, are given. While their short biographies are discussed, the status of women in the Umayyads, palace life and entertainments are touched upon. Again, the concepts of concubine and qayna (singing concubine) and umm al-walad, which express their art and social status in the person of these two concubines are explained. (shrink)

While standard histories of Western political thought represent women’s rights as an offshoot of the earlier movement for the equal rights of men, this essay argues that the eighteenth-century push for democracy and equal rights was grounded in arguments first used to defend women’s right to moral and religious self-determination, based on their rational and spiritual equality with men. In tandem with the rise of critiques of absolute monarchy, ideal marriage, which had previously involved lordship and subjection, (...) was transformed into an equal companionate relationship based on inclination and affection. The essay argues that the transformation, by the time of the American and French revolutions, of neo-Roman republicanism—which had been aristocratic and oligarchic—into egalitarian, democratic republicanism had been mediated by the extension of arguments, widely distributed in the literature criticizing the slavery of marriage, into a general critique of slavery and support for the equal rights of men. (shrink)

This study examines recent French bioethics laws governing the uses of new reproductive and genetic technologies —including in-vitro fertilization, surrogate motherhood, prenatal diagnostics, sex selection, and cloning—in light of feminist claims to women’s rights, especially a woman’s right to reproductive freedom. To this end, the study explores two interrelated questions: First, to what extent have French feminists supported NRGT development and treatment? Second, to what extent do French national bioethics debates, laws, and policies reflect feminist reactions to NRGTs? The (...) investigation of these questions is informed by recent theories of state feminism that show how national policy debates are gendered by particular sets of feminist ideas, and how policy choices resulting from these debates turn some of these ideas into law. Some of the most pressing feminist concerns in this area include women’s loss of control over their bodies and fertility, women’s exploitation and commercialization of their bodies, and women’s health risks from NRGTs. The analysis of pronouncements by French feminist writers, researchers, and policy-makers reveals a multiplicity of feminist stances on NRGTs, showing keenly how feminists contest what constitutes effective feminist public policies to illuminate the fact that these policies are subject to shifting political contestations, rather than the reflection of a fixed set of feminist ideas. While contemporary French feminists grapple with the potential merits and dangers of NRGTS, the study shows that feminists generally seem to support NRGTs, as long as French law protects women’s reproductive autonomy. Seen in this light, France’s strong sense of the right to procreate through facilitation of access to NRGTs is not a contradiction of France’s strong social and legal support for women’s reproductive freedom, but rather enables French lawmakers to regulate NRGTs more effectively. (shrink)

"In the vast literature of love, The Seducer's Diary is an intricate curiosity--a feverishly intellectual attempt to reconstruct an erotic failure as a pedagogic success, a wound masked as a boast," observes John Updike in his foreword to Søren Kierkegaard's narrative. This work, a chapter from Kierkegaard's first major volume, Either/Or, springs from his relationship with his fiancée, Regine Olsen. Kierkegaard fell in love with the young woman, ten years his junior, proposed to her, but then broke off their engagement (...) a year later. This event affected Kierkegaard profoundly. Olsen became a muse for him, and a flood of volumes resulted. His attempt to set right, in writing, what he feels was a mistake in his relationship with Olsen taught him the secret of "indirect communication." The Seducer's Diary, then, becomes Kierkegaard's attempt to portray himself as a scoundrel and thus make their break easier for her. Matters of marriage, the ethical versus the aesthetic, dread, and, increasingly, the severities of Christianity are pondered by Kierkegaard in this intense work. (shrink)

In the wake of the Civil War, women’s suffrage activists hoped that the U.S. Congress would meet their demand for enfranchisement. But not only did the Fourteenth Amendment, first introduced in 1865, leave that out, but it introduced an explicit mention of sex into the Constitution for the first time by referring to the rights of “male citizens.” When efforts to change the amendment’s language failed, some within the suffrage movement publicly opposed its ratification. Tensions mounted further when the (...) Fifteenth Amendment—“the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”—failed to... (shrink)

(2008). william godwin's memoirs of the author of a vindication of the rights of woman and the gender of romantic biography. Angelaki: Vol. 13, re-coupling gender and genre, pp. 17-31.

The so-called genetics revolution rests on a history which at its least can be described as controversial. Modern genetics needs to bear this history in mind. In particular, as with the past, the area of reproductive choice seems particularly vulnerable to potential abuse. Courts in the UK and elsewhere have already shown themselves willing to interfere with the choices of women in the management of their pregnancies. Medical advance, perhaps particularly the capacity to visualise the developing foetus, has added complexity (...) to the question of whether the health care provider has one patient (the woman) or two patients (the woman and the foetus). Additionally, pregnancy is thoroughly monitored in modern medical practice and genetics may provide a further impetus or incentive to mandate increased policing of pregnancy. Gene therapy, once offered, will add further to the desire to ensure that women make the 'right' choice, especially when the invasion required is relatively minimal. Further, genetic information is at best predictive, but may, because of its scientific nature, appear to those receiving it to be certain. Thus, the provision of genetic information may reduce rather than enhance choice, unless carefully and sensitively provided. A mature and sophisticated debate about the role of genetics in reproduction is required-engaging rather than bypassing the public-if the real potential of genetics is to be vindicated. (shrink)

One of the greatest woman intellectuals of eighteenth‐century Germany is Elise Reimarus, whose contribution to Enlightenment political theory is rarely acknowledged today. Unlike other social contract theorists, Reimarus rejects a people's right to violent resistance or revolution in her philosophical dialogue Freedom. Exploring the arguments in Freedom, this paper observes a number of similarities in the political thought of Elise Reimarus and Immanuel Kant. Both, I suggest, reject violence as an illegitimate response to perceived political injustice in a way that (...) opposes Locke's strong voluntarism and the absolutism of Hobbes. First, they emphasize the need to maintain the legal state as a precondition for the possibility of external right. Second, they share an optimistic view of the inherently “just” nature of the tripartite republican state. And finally, Reimarus and Kant both outline an alternative, nonviolent response to political injustice that consists in the freedom of public expression and a discourse on the moral enlightenment of man. (shrink)

Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman was a ground-breaking work of literature which still resonates in feminism and human rights movements of today.

The article aims to examine how individuality is projected in Paper Towns by John Green. John Green’s writings are known for sharp dialogue, unrequited love, and many heart-breaking twists. Green identifies the individualistic spirit through Margo's character, which becomes a focus of this paper. The different facets of the character are explored to reveal the bildungsroman journey undertaken. John Green's Paper Towns is the primary text of analysis in this study. Other secondary sources are also consulted to substantiate the arguments (...) presented in this study, and other sources. The theoretical framework is built on feminism and relevant critical insights.and other sources. Liberal feminism theory is employed in the analysis of the primary text to comprehend the woman’s problem in the novel. The sociological approach was also used to show the social context in John Green’s Paper Towns as it represents Florida’s society in the 21st century. It concludes that a woman must fight for her rights as they become her natural rights. For Margo, leaving Florida is only the beginning of pursuing her goal. (shrink)

This article details the variety of critical strategies in Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, finding strong connections with her writing as a reviewer for the Analytical Review, the literary review published by the reformer and Dissenter Joseph Johnson. In Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft employed textual analyses and an evolving set of theoretical positions that had been introduced in the course of her career at the Analytical Review. By elucidating the importance of the reviews and (...) the specificity of Wollstonecraft’s procedures, this article contributes to a growing consensus that Rights of Woman initiated feminist literary criticism. (shrink)

This article sets out to show that Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) was translated by Félicité Brissot de Warville, the wife of the prominent Girondin leader, Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, and annotated by both. The demonstration is carried out through a study of the works translated by them, together or singly, before 1792: the annotation of those earlier works is echoed by the themes of the notes in the later chapters of the Vindication. These notes (...) reflect J.-P. Brissot’s admiration for Quakers and for British intellectual figures such as Richard Price and Joseph Priestley (whom he knew), dislike of clergy and interest in education. Two long notes also express Félicité’s frustration at being confined to the role of mother and housewife, and can be paralleled with statements in her correspondence. To some extent, she appears as an alter ego of Wollstonecraft. (shrink)

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has recently handed down its judgement in the case of three women contesting the abortion law in the Republic of Ireland, which has one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the world. Although the Court ruled that Ireland had to clarify the current law following the success of one of the three claims, the failure of the other two claims allows Ireland to continue to enforce its law, which (...) has an adverse effect on women's health. This paper, therefore, proposes an amendment to abortion legislation in the Republic of Ireland that would be compatible with safeguarding women's health, highlighting several circumstances in which the continuation of a pregnancy may have a detrimental impact on a woman's physical and/or mental health. (shrink)

Although a pregnant woman can now refuse any medical treatment needed by the fetus, the Court of Appeal has acknowledged that ethical dilemmas remain, adverting to the inappropriateness of legal compulsion of presumed moral duties in this context. This leaves the impression of an uncomfortable split between the ethics and the law. The notion of a pregnant woman refusing medical treatment needed by the fetus is troubling and it helps little simply to assert that she has a legal right to (...) do so. At the same time, the idea that a pregnant woman fails in her moral duty unless she accepts any recommended treatment or surgery—however great the burdens—is also not without difficulty. This article seeks to find a way between these two somewhat polarized positions by arguing that, instead of being a question primarily about whether legally to enforce moral obligations, the «maternal—fetal conflict» begins with previously unrecognized difficulties in determining when a woman's prima facie moral rights invoked in the treatment context should «give way» to the interests of the fetus. This difficulty is mirrored within the law. Thus, how can we tell when a pregnant woman has the moral or legal duty to submit to a caesarean section? Seen in this way, the conflict is a problem which lies at the interface between moral and legal rights and duties, showing that there are important conceptual links between the ethics and the law. Against this background, this article explores the limits of a pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity by focusing upon the idea of her moral duty to aid the fetus through her body. Here we find difficulties in determining the existence and extent of this somewhat extraordinary duty. Such a duty is contrasted with both negative and positive duties toward others in the course of «general conduct». Attention to the social context of pregnancy and the refusal of treatment within this is also instructive. Overall, the purpose is to foster understanding and acceptance of the current legal position. (shrink)

This richly woven history ranges from the seventeenth century to the present as it masterfully traces the movement of American women out of the home and into the public sphere. Matthews examines the Revolutionary War period, when women exercised political strength through the boycott of household goods and Elizabeth Freeman successfully sued for freedom from enslavement in one of the two cases that ended slavery in Massachusetts. She follows the expansion of the country west, where a developing frontier attracted strong, (...) resourceful women, and into the growing cities, where women entered public life through employment in factories and offices. Matthews illuminates the contributions of such outstanding Civil War women as Mary Ann "Mother" Bickerdyke, who supervised a cattle drive down the banks of the Mississippi so that soldiers would have fresh milk; Clara Barton, whose humanitarian work on behalf of the International Red Cross led her to become the first American woman to serve as official representative of the federal government; and Sojourner Truth, the impassioned black orator who devoted herself to emancipation. And Matthews brings the narrative to the 1970s, detailing the growing presence of women in American politics--from the suffrage marches of the early twentieth century, to the courageous stands women took during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. A fascinating and perceptive look at women throughout our history, The Rise of Public Woman offers an important perspective on the changing public role of women in the United States. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article I discuss Bernardine Evaristo’s Girl, Woman, Other as a transmodern narrative that gives voice to a marginalised group of black women living in Britain. Written in a hybrid style that combines prose and poetry and eschewing punctuation and long sentences, the novel interweaves sundry stories from the late nineteenth to the twenty-first century set in countries ranging from Africa, the Caribbean, and America to Britain. This networked structure exposes transtemporal and transnational patterns of diversity, connectedness and (...) relationality, as well as the distinctive genealogy of black British women and their maternal empowerment. I argue that the resilience of the characters in the face of social, racial and gender marginalisation springs from their empathic relatedness and solidarity. This emphasis on the importance of care for the other highlights the need for improving not only women’s rights and socioeconomic opportunities but of benefiting humanity on a broader scale. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many philosophers who wish to defend abortion, but who have become frustrated by the resistance of the personhood question to yield to any nonarbitrary solution welcomed Judith Thomson's ‘A defense of abortion.’Thomson argues that abortion is sometimes justifiable even if the foetus is a person. In this paper I argue that Thomson's argument is a defense of abortion, rather than merely extraction without death, only because of the current state of medical technology. Once the technology is in place to (...) extract foetuses while preserving their lives and to allow them to develop to full term outside the uterus, Thomson cannot defend the killing of the foetus. If she is right, however, a woman will still have the right to have a foetus extracted from her body. Finally, it is pointed out that the source of the problem with Thomson's argument is the major premise in most arguments for the permissibility of abortion: a woman's right to control her own body. If the defence of abortion is to entail a defence of the termination of the foetus, then this premise, understood as the right to remove an unwanted entity from one's body or the right to alter one's body as one wishes, simply will not do the trick. (shrink)

The works of Mary Wollstonecraft ranged from the early Thoughts on the Education of Daughters to The Female Reader, a selection of texts for girls, and included two novels. But her reputation is founded on A Vindication of the Rights of Woman of 1792. This treatise is the first great document of feminism—and is now accepted as a core text in western tradition. It is not widely known that the germ of Wollstonecraft's great work came out of an earlier (...) and much shorter vindication—A Vindication of the Rights of Men , written in the context of the issues raised by the French Revolution. This edition, which follows the model of other Broadview Editions in including a range of materials that help the reader to see the work in the context of its era out of which it emerged, is arranged chronologically, opening with Wollstonecraft's "other vindication." It also includes a wide range of other documents in appendices, as well as a comprehensive and authoritative introduction, chronology, and full index. (shrink)

Mary Wollstonecraft was one of the greatest philosophers and writers of the Eighteenth century. During her brief career, she wrote novels, treatises, a travel narrative, a history of the French Revolution, a conduct book, and a children's book. Her most celebrated and widely-read work is _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_. This Guidebook introduces: Wollstonecraft’s life and the background to _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_ The ideas and text of _A Vindication of the Rights (...) of Woman_ Wollstonecraft’s enduring influence in philosophy and our contemporary intellectual life It is ideal for anyone coming to Wollstonecraft’s classic text for the first time and anyone interested in the origins of feminist thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bearing the Other and Bearing Sexuality: Women and Gender in Levinas’s “And God Created Woman”Deborah Achtenberg (bio)Much ink has been spilled on the question of the role of women for Levinas’s ethics in accounts containing a gamut of claims, from Stella Sandford’s that woman is aligned with sexual difference in such a way that Levinas’s attempts to install her within the human fail,1 to Diane Perpich’s that one reason (...) Otherwise than Being is preferable to Totality and Infinity is that the ethics in the former does not rest on a failed narrative of family life and woman’s role in it as ethics does in the latter,2 to Claire Katz’s that there is a rich, positive ethical component to women’s role for Levinas since he uses maternity as an example of being-for-the-other.3This essay complements those accounts by giving a detailed analysis of the discussion of women in Levinas’s talmudic commentary, “And God Created Woman.”4 Specifically, I ask whether Levinas is right, in his commentary, that, according to Talmud Berakhot 61a, women are not ultimately inferior to men because both men and women are human and their humanity precedes the division of humanity into male [End Page 137] and female. I pursue the question by reading the talmudic passage the way Levinas, in his commentary, tells us that we should read Talmud, namely, by situating texts quoted in it in their broader textual context in Torah rather than treating them as proof texts.When I put quotations cited in Berakhot 61a in their textual context, I find that the male figures treated in the texts from Torah are dismayingly dismissive of women in distress, suggesting that women are treated as inferior, but then learn their mistake and treat the women as equal or even superior, suggesting that Talmud does see them as having a humanity that precedes sexual difference. Nonetheless, I go on to argue, though the talmudic passage does not see women as ultimately inferior to men, it nonetheless treats them as inferior on the day-to-day level and such treatment belies the attempt to treat them as human.I go on to ask about Levinas’s stance toward this problem in the talmudic text, Does he accept the treatment of women as inferior? I argue, to the contrary, that Levinas sees the problem and attempts to overcome it by criticizing two ways the talmudic passage treats women as inferior on the day-to-day level: he rejects the passages’ prohibitions on certain types of male contact with women—such as looking at them!—and he reinterprets its association of women with makeup and deception. His stance is more complicated, though, because he goes on to find a kernel of truth to preserve in each of the problematic talmudic positions: in the first, the fundamental ethical ambiguity of sexuality, since sexuality points toward the other as other but also toward one’s own satisfaction; in the second, what we might anachronistically call women’s ways of knowing that, for Levinas, have a certain ethical superiority over the ways men know. The two resolutions have their own problems, I maintain, since if Levinas is to avoid gender norming and gender hierarchy, he needs to make it clear that both the problematic ethical ambiguity of sexuality and also the ways of knowing he thinks are ethically superior are not essentially associated more with women than with men. [End Page 138]1Reading Levinas’s way, I search out the context of quotations, taking them not as proof texts, but as invitations to interpret. In “And God Created Woman,” he says, “each time a biblical verse is brought in as proof it is not likely that the sages of the Talmud are looking in these texts, squeezed every which way in spite of grammar, for a direct proof of the thesis they are upholding. It is always an invitation to search out the context of the quotation” (NT 166/DSS 130–31). As a feminist, when I search out the context of the quotations Levinas refers to in his reading of Berakhot 61a, I... (shrink)

Sweden features near the top of most gender-equality rankings. The World Economic Forum rates it as having one of the narrowest gender gaps in the world. But Sweden is not only a good place to be a woman: it also appears to be an idyll for new dads. Close to 90% of Swedish fathers take paternity leave. In 2013, some 340,000 dads took a total of 12 million days’ leave, equivalent to about seven weeks each. Women take even more leave (...) days to spend time with their children, but the gap is shrinking. Why do Swedish dads take so much time off work to raise their children? (shrink)

The works of Mary Wollstonecraft ranged from the early _Thoughts on the Education of Daughters_ to _The Female Reader_, a selection of texts for girls, and included two novels. But her reputation is founded on _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_ of 1792. This treatise is the first great document of feminism—and is now accepted as a core text in western tradition. It is not widely known that the germ of Wollstonecraft’s great work came out of an earlier (...) and much shorter vindication—A Vindication of the Rights of Men, written in the context of the issues raised by the French Revolution. This edition, which follows the model of other Broadview Editions in including a range of materials that help the reader to see the work in the context of its era out of which it emerged, is arranged chronologically, opening with Wollstonecraft’s “other vindication.” It also includes a wide range of other documents in appendices, as well as a comprehensive and authoritative introduction, chronology, and full index. (shrink)

The liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot (...) alone be grounds for the State to insist that she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role ….For years, Jehovah's Witnesses have posed a challenge to the medical profession. Bound by religious belief to refuse blood and blood products, they can frustrate physicians who, since World War II, have utilized transfusions when indicated in the course of treatment. (shrink)