This study examined the hypothesis that conditional reasoning involves visual short-term memory resources (Johnson-Laird, 1985). A total of 147 university students were given measures of verbal and visual short-term memory capacity and a series of concrete and abstract conditional reasoning problems. Results indicate that there is a positive correlation between verbal working memory capacity and reasoning with both concrete and abstract premises. A positive correlation was also obtained between visual working memory capacity and reasoning with concrete premises.

Concept properties are an integral part of theories of conceptual representation and processing. To date, little is known about conceptual properties of abstract concepts, such as idea. This experiment systematically compared the content of 18 abstract and 18 concrete concepts, using a feature generation task. Thirty‐one participants listed characteristics of the concepts (i.e., item properties) or their relevant context (i.e., context properties). Abstract concepts had significantly fewer intrinsic item properties and more properties expressing subjective experiences than concrete (...) concepts. Situation components generated for abstract and concrete concepts differed in kind, but not in number. Abstract concepts were predominantly related to social aspects of situations. Properties were significantly less specific for abstract than for concrete concepts. Thus, abstractness emerged as a function of several, both qualitative and quantitative, factors. (shrink)

The thesis that follows proffers a solution to the mind-matter problem, the problem as to how mind and matter relate. The proposed solution herein is a variant of panpsychism – the theory that all (pan) has minds (psyche) – that we name pansentient monism. By defining the suffix 'psyche' of panpsychism, i.e. by analysing what 'mind' is (Chapter 1), we thereby initiate the effacement of the distinction between mind and matter, and thus advance a monism. We thereafter critically examine the (...) prevalent view, antithetical to a pansentient monism, that mind is not identical to matter but emergent therefrom (Chapter 2). This anti-emergentist critique acts also as a fortification of the Genetic Argument for panpsychism: if mind is not emergent (nor distinct) from matter, mind must always have existed with matter. But what is 'matter'? Chapter 3 investigates what we understand by 'matter', or 'the physical', and exposes it as a highly deficient concept and percept that in concreto points to its identity with that denoted by 'mind'. This also acts as a fortification of the Abstraction Argument for panpsychism, employing a new taxonomy of physicalism and a new taxonomy of the varieties of abstraction. Thus do we reach a monism that is a parsimonious psycho-physical identity theory. But here we face what can be called The Identity Problem for Panpsychism: if our panpsychism is a psycho-physical identity theory, how can it respond to the powerful objections that beset the identity theory of the twentieth century? In Chapter 4 it will be argued that, like emergentism, this psycho-neural identity theory presupposed a deficient concept of 'matter', down to which mind was reduced away, let alone identified. But to identify down phenomena to what is actually an abstraction is to commit failure of explanation. When the theory is amended accordingly, we move from a psycho-neural identity theory to a genuine psycho-physical identity theory that as such can overcome the aforementioned identity problem. Furthermore, as Chapter 5 clarifies, our pansentient monism has, in addition to parsimony, the explanatory power to resolve the problem of mental causation that afflicts both the reductive physicalism of psycho-neural identity theory and the non-reductive physicalism of emergentism, by genuinely identifying physical and mental causation. Jaegwon Kim considers the place of consciousness in a physical world and the nature of mental causation to be the two key components of the mind-matter problem. Through the critical analysis of our prosaic understanding of mind and matter in this thesis, which incorporates the thought of both classical and contemporary thinkers through a novel fusion, it is hoped that both components are addressed and redressed. That is to say that I present this pansentient monism as a plausible, parsimonious, explanatory, and thus, I think, powerful position towards this ever-perplexing mind-matter mystery. -/- [This thesis was passed in January 2019 with viva examination from Galen Strawson and Joel Krueger. (shrink)

RESUMEN La teleosemántica es el intento de naturalizar el contenido mental mediante el recurso al concepto de función biológica. En el presente artículo se argumenta que la teleosemántica carece de los recursos necesarios para hacer frente a tres problemas: la indeterminación del contenido, el carácter abstracto de este y la inutilidad biológica de algunas de las representaciones que pueden albergar organismos como los humanos. ABSTRACT Teleosemantics is the attempt to naturalize mental content by resorting to the concept of biological (...) function. The article argues that teleosemantics lacks the necessary resources to solve three problems: the indeterminacy of content, its abstract nature, and the biological uselessness of some of the representations of certain organisms such as human beings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 4.1 (1997) 91-93 Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology Articles Allen, J. F., J. Hallperin, and R. Friend. 1985. Removal and diversion tactics and the control of auditory hallucinations. Behavior Research and Therapy 23:601-605.Baker, H. D. 1995. Psychoanalysis and ideology: Bakhtin, Lacan, and Zizek. History of European Ideas 20:499-504.Bernet, R. 1994. Derrida-Husserl-Freud: The trace of (...) transference. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 suppl.:141-158.Boden, M. A. 1996. Commentary on "Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:135-136.Castelfranchi, C., and M. Miceli. 1996. Commentary on "Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, no. 2:129-133.Fowes, B. J., and F. C. Richardson. 1996. Why is multiculturalism good? American Psychologist 51, no. 6:609-621.Frith, C. 1996. Commentary on "Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:91-93.Forde, R. 1996. Inclusion of psychosocial conditions in clinical practice and the problem of medicalization. Theoretical Medicine 17, no. 2:151-161.Gaylin, W., and D. Doukas. 1995. The second-hand suicide threat. Hastings Center Report 25:20-22.Gillet, G. 1995. Consciousness, thought, and neurological integrity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16, no. 3:215-233.Haskell, R. E. 1993. Realpolitik in the addictions field: Treatment-professional, popular-culture ideology, and scientific research. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14, no. 3:257-276.Kuys, T. 1995. The tally argument again. Methodological Science 28, nos. 2-3:43-55.Lear, J. 1995. The heterogeneity of the mental: Sebastian Gardner's irrationality and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 104:863-879.Libet, B. 1996. Commentary on "Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 3:95-96.Lloyd, D. 1996. Commentary on "Toward a design-based analysis of emotional episodes." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:127-128.Pepper-Smith, R., W. R. C. Harvey, and M. Silberfeld. 1996. Competency and practical judgment. Theoretical Medicine 17, no. 2:135-150. [End Page 91]Spence, S. A. 1996a. Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:75-90.------. 1996b. Response to the commentaries. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:99-100.Stein, D. J. 1996. The philosophy of psychopathy. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 39:569-580.Stephens, G. L. 1996. Commentary on "Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:97-98.Varela, C. R. 1995. Ethnogenic theory and psychoanalysis: The unconscious as a social construction and a failed explanatory concept. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 25:4.Weisberger, A. M. 1995. The ethics of the broader usage of Prozac: Social choice or social bias? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 10, no. 1:69-74.Wright, I., A. Sloman, and L. Beaudoin. 1996a. Response to the commentaries. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:137.------. 1996b. Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:101-126. Books American Psychiatric Association. Task Force on Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization. 1993. Consent to voluntary hospitalization. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.Christiansen, H. D. 1972. Ethics in counseling: Problem situations. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.Clark, P., and C. Wright, eds. 1988. Mind, psychoanalysis and science. New York: Blackwell.Comerchero, V., ed. 1970. Values in conflict: Christianity, marxism, psychoanalysis, existentialism. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.Epstein, R. S. 1994. Keeping boundaries: Maintaining safety and integrity in the psychotherapeutic process. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press.Fairbairn, G. J. 1995. Contemplating suicide: The language and ethics of self harm. New York: Routledge.Grubb, A., ed. 1991. Decision-making and problems of incompetence. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Haas, L. J., and J. L. Malouf. 1995. Keeping up the good work: A practitioner's guide to mental health ethics. 2nd ed. Sarasota: Professional Resource Exchange.Hacking, I. 1995. Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the sciences of memory. Princeton: Princeton University... (shrink)

Abstract pictures are distinguished from depictive pictures in that no visibly recognizable objects can be seen in them. Abstract pictures are thus non-depictive and non-figurative. The question still remains, however, if abstract pictures can be representations. The aim of this chapter is to defend the view that abstract pictures can be representational and therefore have content or subject matter. It will be shown that there are at least three ways to understand what the subject matter of (...) abstract pictures can be: it is either abstracted from figurative content, it is spiritual or the subject matter is produced. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Anti-normativists have advanced the view that the involvement of content in norms is not an essential feature of content, but a contingent feature or side effect of the normativity governing attitudes. In this paper, we argue that, in its original formulation, this view puts too much weight on the idea that belief is the fundamental, and perhaps the only, source of content-involving normativity. In its more refined formulation, however, the view does not make justice to a neutral and (...) encompassing characterization of what it is for content to be essentially normative. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when one’s beliefs or desires affect one’s perceptual experience in a particular way. I examine two different models of cognitive penetration and four different accounts of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. I argue that one model of cognitive penetration—“classic” cognitive penetration—is compatible with only one of the accounts of nonconceptual content that I identify. I then (...) consider the other model of cognitive penetration—cognitive penetration “lite”. I provide reasons to think that this is compatible with three accounts of nonconceptual content. Moreover, I argue that the account of nonconceptual content that it is not compatible with is a spurious notion of nonconceptual content that ought to be abandoned. Thus, I claim that cognitive penetration lite is compatible with all reasonable specifications of nonconceptual content. (shrink)

Wright claims that “the epistemology of good abstraction principles should be assimilated to that of basic principles of logical inference”. In this paper I follow Wright’s recommendation, but I consider a different epistemology of logic, namely anti-exceptionalism. Anti-exceptionalism’s main contention is that logic is not a priori, and that the choice between rival logics should be based on abductive criteria such as simplicity, adequacy to the data, strength, fruitfulness, and consistency. This paper’s goal is to lay down the foundations for (...) an application of the anti-exceptionalist methodology to abstraction principles. In Sect. 1 I outline my strategy. I show that anti-exceptionalism has a bearing on the so-called Bad Company problem (Sect. 2), and explore some versions of anti-exceptionalism about abstraction (Sect. 3). I then consider new criteria for choosing between rival abstraction principles, and, in particular, between consistent revisions of Frege’s Basic Law V (Sect. 4). I finally consider how the abstractionist can compare between competing criteria (Sect. 5), and argue that anti-exceptionalists should be pluralists about abstraction (Sect. 6). (shrink)

Kant’s subject as source of universality and necessity in human understanding is Modern Philosophy's solution to the old problem of the universals, a solution which appeared to supersede once and for all the Aristotelian theory of abstraction. The present paper intends to show how Aquinas's Aristotelian doctrine on abstraction may stand the Kantian challenge and resolve the old problem when three principles are brought into play: 1) the same perfection can subsist in two different modes of being, and thus the (...) universal content of knowledge can be present in the particular reality (Summa, I, 84, 1); 2) things which are really distinct between themselves can be known in their distinction, even when they cannot exist separately (metaphysical distinction justifies gnoseological separation); 3) as Cornelio Fabro suggests, it is artificial to separate in the object of experience the object’s different levels of objectivity (quality, configuration and meaning) and, as a result, human experience could be considered the source not only of sensible content but also of intelligible content. This “defense” of Thomistic abstraction intends to offer an account of knowledge which reunites again epistemology with common sense experience, so that philosophy may no longer be a Platonic abstraction but a meaningful explanation of life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 95-99 [Access article in PDF] Delusional Content and the Public Nature of Meaning:Reply to the Other Contributors Robert Klee The contribution by professors Bayne and Pacherie (2004) is an earnest attempt to defend a popular model of monothematic delusions against criticisms launched by John Campbell (2001). This model of monothematic delusions holds that such delusions are rational attempts by the sufferer to (...) explain to herself specific kinds of anomalous sensory/affective experiences. Bayne, Pacherie, Campbell, and for that matter Sass, Harper, and Georgaca, write as if semantic meaning accrued to words in a language term by term, as if meaning is "private" to the deluded person, and that she might therefore mean almost anything by her own idiosyncratic use of the public language she otherwise speaks. This is a notorious mistake. As Hilary Putnam famously put it in his classic 1975 paper "The meaning of 'meaning,'" "Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the head" (1975, 227). That is, meanings are not ethereal interior mental objects, private to the speaker—they are not private inner episodes that take place in some mental center stage of consciousness. The deluded person does not and cannot succeed in changing the meaning of a term in a public language like English merely by an individual act of imaginative will involving the making of a bizarre assertion—not even if she repeats it a thousand times. The public nature of meaning, if I can coin a phrase for it, is the central theme in the work of the later Wittgenstein. Even before Putnam, Wittgenstein had made the same point in his Philosophical Investigations via a famous footnote in which he writes, Can I say 'bububu' and mean "If it doesn't rain I shall go for a walk"?—it is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the grammar of 'to mean' is not like that of the expression 'to imagine' and the like." (2001, 18e) Wittgenstein argues that the answer to the rhetorical question in the footnote is an emphatic No. To mean something by the use of words in a public language is not equivalent to an act of individual free imagination. The languages we each speak, including the unfortunately deluded among us, are public not private, and insofar as the notion of meaning has an understandable sense, the meaning of a term is fixed by its actual public use, across large time intervals, in many different contexts, by the many millions of speakers of the language in question. It is time that segments of the intellectual map beyond the borders [End Page 95] of philosophy got the news about this, for I think an appreciation of this point would forestall certain objections and argumentative moves that otherwise take up space in the psychological literature.Bayne and Pacherie (2004) describe Campbell's model of monothematic delusions as proposing that "delusions can be usefully regarded as Wittgensteinian framework propositions" (p. 7). I have discussed this notion in my main paper, although I do not use the terms framework propositions; I stick to Wittgenstein's own words. Wittgenstein called them, literally in the German, propositions that "stand fast for us" (feststehen). This description strikes me as less misleading than calling them framework propositions, for the latter expression suggests that they could in some sense be replaceable by a different framework of framework propositions, something that Wittgenstein in no way ever meant to suggest. Wittgenstein did not think of these propositions as individualized or privately owned—as beliefs that might vary considerably across the population of speakers of the language in which they are expressed. That is why he explicitly wrote that they stand fast for us. Note the plural pronoun. There is something irreducibly collective, something publicly owned, about the epistemology of these propositions. These propositions represent the accumulated certainties that precipitate out of what is commonly shared in human experience over long time intervals. Precisely because what stands fast for us is... (shrink)

Publication date: 22 December 2020 Source: International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences Vol. 89 Author: Oleg Tarnopolsky, Marina Kabanova The article analyzes using Content and Language Integrated Learning for teaching one of the optional humanities disciplines to Ukrainian university students of different majors. The discipline discussed in the article as an example of using CLIL methodology is “The Fundamentals of Psychology and Pedagogy” and it is in the list of optional humanities subjects for the first-year students of Alfred Nobel (...) University in Dnipro, Ukraine. However, unlike the other optional humanities disciplines, the methodology underlying this course is based on teaching the subject in English, instead of Ukrainian, following the CLIL approach widely used in the European education but still little known in Ukraine. The purpose of the paper is to expose and analyze the original methodology developed that conditioned the specific structure of the relevant course, and the specific learning activities used in it. The essence of the developed CLIL theory-based methodology and its practical application are manifested through learning activities that include students’ mini-lectures/workshop-type presentations, brainstorming, case-studies, discussions, and a learning project with its results summarized in students’ essays, abstracts, and summaries written in English. The students collect the information required for completing their tasks not only from the teacher’s lectures and the recommended literature but also by way of doing extensive Internet-search on psychological and pedagogical sites in English. All this makes CLIL in the case under discussion experiential-interactive, blended, autonomous, and cooperative. As the result, students mostly self-construct their knowledge of the discipline by way of using the target language as the tool for such self-construction. This makes the elaborated course a clear-cut case of constructivism in CLIL pedagogy. Subject Classification Numbers: PACS 01.40.-d. (shrink)

Much neuroethics literature concludes with a set of normative recommendations. While these recommendations can be a helpful way of summarizing a proposal for a future direction, some have recently argued that ethics scholarship has devoted insufficient attention to considerations of audience and real-world applications. To date, however, while scholars have conducted topic analyses of neuroethics literature, to our knowledge no study has evaluated who neuroethics scholarship addresses and what it recommends. The objective of the present study therefore was to provide (...) a preliminary characterization of recommendations offered in neuroethics scholarship and an assessment of their target audiences. Rather than attempting to demarcate what constitutes “neuroethics scholarship,” we analyzed text that authors’ had self-identified as being neuroethics-related: abstracts presented at the International Neuroethics Society (INS) annual meetings and published as top abstracts in AJOB Neuroscience in the last decade (2011–2020). We found that a majority of abstracts utilized conceptual methods (62.2%) and provided conceptual recommendations (68%). Roughly 77% of all abstracts did not explicitly address a target audience, yet nearly all of these were implicitly directed at other scholars. The remainder specified a target audience of scholars (12.2%), regulators (6.7%), healthcare providers (6.7%) and industry (2.6%). Only a subset of abstracts provided practical or policy recommendations (19.7%). Of those, the majority (61.5%) did not specify a target audience. Among the subset with actionable recommendations, a clarification of target audience may help increase the impact. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence: Comments on Cummins' "Hume on the Idea of Existence"1 Fred Wilson Hume'sviews on theconceptofexistence: thisisone ofthemore obscure parts of Hume's philosophy. Professor Cummins has done a valuable service simply by trying to unravel some ofthe puzzles; it is still more valuable for shedding as much light as it does on the issues. There are nonetheless problems with the interpretation that (...) he develops, and I would like to bring out some ofthese. I will address three questions: (a)What, more precisely, is the (abstract) idea ofexistence? (b)What is the notion of"necessity" as Hume would use it in connection with the notion that something exists "necessarily," or, contrarily, "contingently"? (c)Does it follow from the fact that whatever thing we conceive we conceive as existent that every thing necessarily exists? In order toanswerthese questions somethingwillhave tobe said about Hume's doctrine ofabstractideas. Butonall theseissues, Humeis often not so much inadequate as incomplete; and I shall suggest that a numberofpoints canbeilluminatedbylookingatthe historical context that Hume himselfcould take for granted. The upshot will not be that Hume's views are unproblematic, but only that they are perhaps less problematic than Professor Cummins makes out. I. Abstract Ideas In many respects, Hume's doctrine of ideas is fairly traditional. We think in terms ofideas. In particular, our capacity to think generally, and to use general terms, is a matter ofhaving abstract ideas. In this, Hume follows the views ofhis predecessors such as Locke, Descartes and the Port Royal logicians. Hume also adopts the principle that what is conceivable is possible. Again, he follows the same tradition ofLocke, Volume XVII Number 2 167 FRED WILSON Descartes and the Port Royal logicians. Where Hume differs from his predecessors is in his account of what precisely an abstract is. For Hume's predecessors, one forms an abstract idea by separation. Thus, for Locke, forming ideas by abstraction consists in "separating them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real existence."2 This sortofseparation is the mechanism bywhich "the Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects, to become general" (Essay, 2.11.9). The Port Royal logicians make the same point: abstraction occurs with respect to "choses... composées" when one "les considérant par parties, et comme par les diverses faces qu'elles peuvent recevoir." In abstraction what is thus known is considered separately from the whole; either one considers "les parties séparément" in the case of"parties intégrantes," or one "peut séparer les choses en divers modes," or, finally, "quand une même chose ayant divers attributs, on pense à l'un sans penser à l'autre."3 The former occurs when, for example, we separate in thought the parts ofthe body. Thisis the simplestform ofabstraction. Berkeleyhas noproblems with this notion: "Iwill notdenyI can abstract, ifthatmay properlybe called abstraction, which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects, as is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder."4 Neither does Hume have problems with this notion; it is the basis of his—and Berkeley's—view that ideas are either simple or complex and that some of the complex ideas are a result of our combining simple parts in ways that are not found in reality, as, for example, in our idea ofthe New Jerusalem.5 It is the other two sorts ofabstraction that are more problematic. Consider the first of these two forms of abstraction. We begin with simple ideas ofsensation, for example, white (Essay, 2.3.1). One forms the abstract idea of white by separating the property white from the other qualities with which it is conjoined in the white particulars, for example, snow or milk (Essay, 2.21.73), that are given in sense experience. The resultingideais distinct from other ideas, for example, blue or heat (Essay, 2.12.1). The example given by Nicole and Arnauld is thatofthe geometers who explore the idea ofthree-dimensional space by considering first length alone, then area, and finally volumes or solids (which is the same, for these Cartesians as "corps," body) (Logique, 1.5). This is one form ofseparation. By this means one forms abstract... (shrink)

Prior research shows mixed findings regarding individuals’ belief-revision strategies. The current research is aimed to test (a) whether individuals’ reasoning across abstract vs real-world content shows similarity, and (b) whether individuals’ syllogistic reasoning predicts their belief-revision strategies. Experiment 1, testing 76 participants (50 females), provides evidence for the similarity in reasoning across abstract and real-world content (p.05). Individuals seem to revise the conditional statement in the AC and DA inferences, especially when the content poses a threat. In contrast, (...) individuals prefer to revise the categorical premise in the MT inferences, especially when the content poses a threat. These findings suggest that in the face of inconsistency individuals’ decision about which of their prior beliefs they should revise is influenced by the structure and content of the belief-contravening problem rather than their reasoning ability. (shrink)

There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.

In this article I offer an explicating interpretation of the procedure of content recarving as described by Frege in §64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that the procedure of content recarving may be interpreted as an operation that while restricting the subject matter of a sentence, performs a generalization on what the sentence says about its subject matter. The characterization of the recarving operation is given in the setting of Yablo’s theory of subject matter and it is based (...) on the relation of determination between properties. The main advantage of the proposal is its generality, for it is applicable not just to the case of abstraction principles. (shrink)

If representation is resemblance, how we do we think of groups or classes of things? According to a tradition Berkeley opposed—a tradition represented by Locke—we do so by forming abstract or incomplete ideas. I show that Berkeley's opposition does not depend on his own personal failure to form abstract images, but on what he took to be the impersonal or objective impossibility of abstract objects. Berkeley himself accounts for general thinking not in terms of abstract or (...) incomplete ideas, but in terms of our selective attention to ideas both concrete and determinate. Contentful thought about the natural world is impossible without ideas as objects, Berkeley believes, but ideas do not, in his view, completely fix the content of our thought. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intractable. I will argue that Frege’s version of the content/force distinction is immune from these objections. In order to do so, I will reconstruct his argument that ‘the nature of a question’ requires a distinction between force and content. I will answer the concern about the unity (...) of the proposition by outlining how the distinction can be combined with a Fregean account of the unity of thought. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. In the first place, I should like to show that Adorno’s philosophy is dependent, to a degree perhaps not always directly recognized in the literature, on a deeply contentious view on the relationship between the mind and the body. In order to show this, I explore and bring out the epistemic and ethical stakes for Adorno’s theory of the relationship between mind and body. Secondly, I move to better articulate precisely what Adorno’s view (...) on the nature of this relationship is. I hold that his position revolves around positing a porous boundary between the domains of the somatic and the cognitive. In closing, I show that Adorno’s account relies on this domain boundary being unidirectionally porous, in that determination of somatic impulses by cognitive content does not seem a live option for Adorno. I go on to note that this smuggles in a dubious position which does a lot of unearned work. The stakes which his implicit account of the body and mind relationship serv.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Arthur A. Krentz DRAMATIC FORM AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONTENT IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES AN intriguing innovation in the history of philosophical discourse is Plato's employment ofdramatic dialogues as his deliberately chosen means ofcommunication. Throughout the history of philosophy scant attention has been focused on this feature of Plato's works. Recently, however, some students of Plato's writings contend that it is crucial for interpreters to give careful attention to the dialogue (...) form in order to reach an essential understanding of the philosophical content. Thus WernerJaeger, commenting in 1934 on the importance of the form of Aristotle's philosophical works, mentions as an aside that, "Even in the case of Plato, the importance of the form for the understanding of his particular thought has often been overlooked for long periods; departmental philosophers and students ofliterature in particular are always prone to consider it as something literary which had no material significance for Plato, in spite of the fact that it is unique in die history of philosophy. By now, however, most persons know mat the study of the development of the form ofhis writing is one of me main keys to a philosophical understanding of him." ' In spite ofJaeger's contention that most contemporary interpreters of Plato are aware of the significance of investigating the dramatic form for an understanding of a dialogue's content, a survey of the literature on Plato shows that interpreters often abandon such a concern in their own approach to his dialogues. For example, many interpreters treat dialogues as treatises, ignoring the dramatic features in order to concentrate on the examination of the logical, epistemológica!, ethical or other philosophical aspects of the argumentation in a single dialogue or group ofdialogues; as a result interpreters tend to separate the content from the form of Plato's works.2 The effect of this approach is one-sided, for, although such interpretations attempt to do justice to the arguments, they ignore the dramatic features of the dialogues and their bearing on an interpretation of die philosophical substance. Currently a growing number of interpreters of Plato in Europe and North America hold that a consideration of the form of Plato's dialogues is important 32 Arthur A. Krentz33 for an understanding oftheir content and philosophical message.3 1 am in agreement with this position and in this article I consider some reasons that may have led Plato to adopt dialogue as his medium of philosophical expression and attempt to show how attention to the dialogue form shapes the interpretation of their content. Unlike his philosophical predecessors who cast their writings in the form of extended poems, aphorisms, or treatises "On Nature," Plato wrote dramas. That the dramatic form ofhis writings is not incidental to his philosophical purposes becomes apparent as one considers how Plato presents philosophy in a fundamentally different way from that of his predecessors and successors who adopted the essay and treatise as the paradigm ofphilosophical communication. In a philosophical work such as a treatise, an author ordinarily attempts to state his own position on issues under discussion as clearly and as forcefully as possible. This, however, is not the primary aim of Plato's works, for certain features of his dramas indicate that he deliberately concealed his own views. Of special note in this regard is the fact that Plato never speaks on his own behalf in the discourses he creates. There is no character named "Plato" unequivocally declaring the author's own position.4 Instead a variety of interlocutors ask questions, investigate philosophical problems, and puzzle over solutions while Plato remains noticeably silent. This silence of Plato indicates that he did not regard the unequivocal presentation of his own views to be of paramount importance. If this had been his aim, Plato had only to write a dialogue which included himselfas one ofthe characters clearly stating his own position. Having engaged in many philosophical discussions with Socrates and with his own students, Plato could have written a dialogue based on such conversations. His not doing so is sufficient to show that he did not use his writings as a primary vehicle for transmitting his own position in his own words. Nor did Plato use... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Social and Moral Aspects of the WarBertrand Russell and Introduced by Andrew G. BoneAmong nine loose-leaf folders of typed transcriptions of Russell's History of Western Philosophy lectures at the Barnes Foundation1 are two copies of a fourteen-page stenographic record of a political talk he gave there on 2 March 1941.2 The bulk of this significant new accrual to the Russell Archives, bearing as it does on Russell's most (...) successful philosophical work, could stimulate much further research and textual study. But his isolated Barnes lecture, about the politics of American neutrality, Nazi Germany's brutal and expansionist dictatorship, and the causes and possible consequences of the war against it, is also of considerable interest.The transcription reads more like detailed notes than a verbatim account, and there is no evidence that Russell approved this text.3 The stenographer initially recorded Russell in the third person, dispensed with this device before the second [End Page 52] paragraph, but then occasionally returned to it.4 There is also more enumeration of Russell's points than he would have supplied in a prepared script. Even the title may not be his: there is nothing in the text on any social changes wrought by the war. But this title has been retained in the absence of a more plausible alternative in a short report of the speech (quoting sixteen sentences) in the next day's Philadelphia Evening Bulletin.5 Russell's hour-long address on the "Social and Moral Aspects of the War" appears to have been the only occasion when he "laid philosophy aside"6 at the Barnes Foundation. It was delivered on a Sunday to an audience of 160 students (and possibly some invitees, although none are mentioned in the newspaper article), sandwiched between two of his weekly philosophical lectures (on Socrates and Sparta7) in the series scheduled for each Thursday.In opening his case for the United States joining the Allied war effort, Russell challenged the arguments for the "policy of conciliation" which, by his own recent admission in the New York Times,8 he had earlier endorsed. Published two weeks before Russell spoke on a similar topic at the Barnes Foundation, this 2,000-word letter to the editor served as a very detailed and public renunciation of the pacifist viewpoint—neutrality for national governments combined with non-resistance for individuals—which Russell had promoted in Which Way to Peace? (1936) and continued to condone after the Munich Agreement (September 1938) and even the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (March 1939).Yet Russell the "relative political pacifist"9 also admitted in this most programmatic statement of his prewar position that "In other times and other circumstances, I should be prepared to consider gains and losses, and to concede that war might be worth while" (WWP, pp. 151–2).That moment had obviously arrived and may have done so already when on 15 October 1939 Russell confided to Constance Malleson that his passionate desire for a British victory made a "thorough-going pacifism difficult" (ra Rec. Acq. 596). But six months later he still did "not feel sufficiently sure of the opposite to say anything publicly by way of recantation"—before adding in this letter to Gilbert Murray that "it may come to that" (21 April 1940, ra Rec. Acq. 71g). It clearly did shortly afterwards—when the "phoney war" in Western Europe was dramatically ended by the invasion of France and the [End Page 53] Low Countries. On 13 May Russell asked the editor of the New Statesman and Nation to notify its readers that he had abandoned his once strongly held pacifist convictions.10In his lecture to the Barnes Foundation, Russell turned next to the defence of American non-intervention by Robert M. Hutchins (see n. 16 below)—which he had already critiqued in the New York Times. Although rather precariously situated as a resident alien in the United States, Russell was hardly circumspect about pushing a policy that so sharply divided American opinion.11 He also listed the faults of the League of Nations and the most grievous diplomatic mistakes made since the end of the last war and the fatally... (shrink)

According to the neo-Fregean abstractionism, numerical expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’, introduced by Hume’s Principle, should be read as purportedly referential singular terms. I will explore the prospects of a version of abstractionism in which such expressions have presuppositional content, as in Strawson’s account. I will argue that the thesis that ‘the number of Fs’ semantically presupposes the existence of a number is inconsistent with the required ‘modest’ stipulative character of the truth of Hume’s Principle: since Hume’s (...) Principle is true and provably presupposes that numbers exist, what it presupposes is also true; and so numbers exist. This, however, means that numbers are conjured into existence by a direct stipulation. (shrink)

Multimedia learning research addresses the question of how to design instructional material effectively. Signaling and adding graphics are typical instructional means that might support constructing a mental model, particularly when learning abstract content from multiple representations. Although signals can help to select relevant aspects of the learning content, additional graphics could help to visualize mentally the subject matter. Learners’ prior knowledge is an important factor for the effectiveness of both types of support: signals and added graphics. Therefore, we conducted (...) an experimental study situated in a university course of computer science with N = 124 participants. In our 2 × 2 factorial design, we investigated the effects of signals and illustrating graphics on learning outcomes and their potential interplay. Based on our regression analysis, we revealed prior knowledge as a significant moderator. Although learners with low levels of prior knowledge can profit from all types of help but still gain rather weak learning outcomes, learners with medium levels of prior knowledge profit from the synergy of both helps. With higher levels of prior knowledge, signals were particularly hampering. To improve the understanding of these supportive or hampering effects, a more fine-grained analysis of these processes and motivational effects is necessary. (shrink)

According to the antirealist view of history, history is something historians construct in the present. Although the warrants they may gather in favour of past events do not form a coherent class, such warrants constitute the assertibility conditions of our statements about the past. They are by nature partial, gradual and defeasible. The antirealist is then faced with two problems. One is to account for a notion of historical significance, either in terms of causal links, broad patterns, or justified historiographic (...) generalizations. A second one is to secure a bound to the holistic construal of historical cognitive content. A coherent antirealist about history must explain why historical claims are in the market for truth, without taking the position of an ideal observer looking at the past from an a-historical fixed point outside time. (shrink)

Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the (...) subjectivity of conscious experience in this way. This paper examines this claim in some detail in the context of a more general criticism of this kind of attempt to explain subjectivity and proposes a different reading of Kant that also leads to an alternative account of subjectivity independent from content. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:17. HUME AND ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS In his discussion of abstract ideas in the Treatise, Hume offers what "...may... be thought... a plain dilemma, that decides concerning the nature of those abstract ideas..." He states the dilemma in these words: The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities; which 'tis concluded it cannot do, but either by representing (...) at once all possible sizes and all possible qualities, or by representing no particular one at all. Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition, as implying an infinite capacity in the mind, it has been commonly infer'd in favour of the latter; and our abstract ideas have been suppos'd to represent no particular degree either of quality or quantity. (T, 1,1,7,?.18) However, with respect to this dilemma, Hume says: But that this inference is erroneous, I shall endeavor to make appear, first, by proving, that 'tis utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precise notion of its degrees: And secondly by showing, that tho' the capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of quantity and quality, in such a manner at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the purposes of reflexion and conversation. (T, 1,1,7, p. 18) The second item Hume claims he is about to prove is aimed at the first disjunct of the above-stated dilemma; more specifically, it is aimed at the claim that (1) An abstract idea (e.g., of a man) represents all possible degrees of quantity and quality (in men) only if the human mind is infinite in capacity. To show that (1) is false, Hume offers his own positive account of how ideas which are particular in nature may nevertheless be general in representation, even though the mind's capacity is finite. The first item Hume sets out to prove is aimed at the second disjunct, and conclusion, of the dilemma; it is aimed, that is, at 18. (2)Abstract ideas represent no particular degree of either quantity or quality. In this paper I will be concerned solely with Hume's attack on (2); it is this attack in which Hume says I "place my chief confidence." (T, I, I, 7, p. 24) I_ As stated, (2) is ambiguous, since it might be taken to mean that abstract ideas fail to represent altogether, or that they fail to represent any quantity or quality however construed. But, I believe, Hume means neither of these; he means, instead, that (2a) Abstract ideas represent non-particular, indeterminate degrees of quantity or quality. Now recall that Hume tries to refute (2a) by establishing, as he says, that (3)It is impossible to conceive any quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of its degrees. But how, by establishing (3), would Hume thereby refute or aid in the refutation of (2a)? And, for that matter, how does he support (3)? Hume's case for (3) consists of three arguments, the respective conclusions of which are most pertinent here. He concludes his first argument by saying that (4)...the general idea of a line...has in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of quantity and quality. (T, 1,1,7, p. 19) The conclusion of the second argument is this : (5)An idea is a weaker impression; and as a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its copy or representative.(T, 1,1,7, p. 19) 19. and of the third it is this: (6)Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, tho' the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal.(T, 1,1,7, p. 20) Construed in a fully general way, these conclusions assert that (7)Each idea is determinate with respect to öegree of) quantity and quality. But notice that (7) is not equivalent to, and does not obviously imply, (3). Hence, Hume... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and PsychologyArticlesAntonak, R. J., C. R. Fielder, and J. A. Mulick. 1993. A scale of attitudes toward the application of eugenics to the treatment of people with mental retardation. Journal of Intellect Disabilities Research 37:75–83.Arens, K. 1996. Commentary on “Lumps and bumps.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:15–16.Bavidge, M. 1996. Commentary on “Minds, memes, and multiples.” (...) Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:29–30.Blashfield, R. K. 1973. Evaluation of the DSM-II classification of schizophrenia as a nomenclature. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 85(2):140–150.Braude, S. E. 1996. Multiple personality and moral responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:37–54.Broverman, I. K., S. R. Vogel, D. M. Broverman et al. 1972. Sex-role stereotypes: a current appraisal. Journal of Social Issues 28:59–78.Broverman, I. K., D. M. Broverman, P. E. Clarkson et al. 1975. Sex-role stereotypes and clinical judgments of mental health. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 34:1–7.Checkland, D., and M. Silberfeld. 1996. Mental competence and the question of beneficient intervention. Theoretical Medicine 17(2):121–134.Clark, S. R. L. 1996. Commentary on “Multiple personality and moral responsibility.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:55–57.Clark, S. R. L. 1996. Minds, memes, and multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:21–28.Dickenson, D., and D. Jones. 1995. True wishes: The philosophy and developmental psychology of children’s informed consent. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:287–303.Donaldson, T. 1978. Psychoanalyzing the practical inference model. Philosophical Research Archives 4:1215.Eekelaar, J. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:305–307.Fisher, S., and R. P. Greenberg. 1993. How sound is the double-blind design for evaluating psychotropic drugs? Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 181:345–350.Fulwiler, C., and M. F. Folstein. 1995. Commentary on “Chris Walker’s interpretation of Karl Jaspers’ phenomenology.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:345–346.Heinze, M. 1995. Commentary on “Moralist or therapist?” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:31–32.Iturrate, M. 1977. Man’s freedom: Freud’s therapeutic goal. Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 15:32–45.Littlewood, R. 1991. From diseae to illness and back again. Lancet 337:1013–1015.Maddox, J. 1993. New genetics means no new ethics. Nature 364:97.McCormick, S. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:309–310.Murray, T. H. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:311–312.Muzika, E. G. 1989. Object relations theory, Buddhism, and the self-synthesis of eastern and western approaches. International Philosophical Quarterly 30(1):59–74.Parker, M. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:313–314.Phillips, J. 1996. Key concepts: Hermeneutics. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:61–69.Pole, D. 1970. Self and personality. The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1:30–36.Priebe, S. 1989. On the subjectivity of psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric Praxis 16:86–89.Radden, J. 1996. Lumps and bumps: Kantian faculty psychology, phrenology, and twentieth-century psychiatric classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:1–14.Sampson, E. E. 1981. Cognitive psychology as ideology. American Psychologist 36:730–743.Sarbin, T. R. 1976. Contextualism: A worldview for modern psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 24:1–41.Senft, P. A. 1975. The self-contradictions (antinomies) of psychotherapy: Is a solution in social action possible? The Human Context 7:367–372.Shuman, D. W. 1996. Commentary on “Multiple personality and moral responsibility.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:59–60.Sprigge, T. 1996. Commentary on “Minds, memes, and multiples.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:31–36.Wallace, K. 1996. Commentary on “Lumps and bumps.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:17–20.Wells, L. A. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:315–317.Wiggins, O. P., and M. A. Schwartz. 1995. Chris Walker’s interpretation of Karl Jaspers’ phenomenology: a critique. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:319–343.BooksAmerican Hospital Association. 1994. Values in conflict: Resolving ethical issues in health care. 2nd ed. Chicago: American Hospital Association.American Medical Association. 1992. Code of medical ethics: Annotated current opinions of the council on ethical and judicial affairs. Chicago: American Medical Association.———. 1994. Council on ethical and judicial affairs... (shrink)

ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT THE TITLE I have chosen for this work is a mere label for a set of problems; the controversial views that have historically been ...

We study the problem of the approach to equilibrium in a macroscopic quantum system in an abstract setting. We prove that, for a typical choice of “nonequilibrium subspace”, any initial state (from the energy shell) thermalizes, and in fact does so very quickly, on the order of the Boltzmann time τ B := h/(k B T ). This apparently unrealistic, but mathematically rigorous, conclusion has the important physical implication that the moderately slow decay observed in reality is not typical (...) in the present setting. (shrink)

Overlaps in form and meaning between morphologically related words have led to ambiguities in interpreting priming effects in studies of lexical organization. In Semitic languages like Arabic, however, linguistic analysis proposes that one of the three component morphemes of a surface word is the CV-Skeleton, an abstract prosodic unit coding the phonological shape of the surface word and its primary syntactic function, which has no surface phonetic content (McCarthy, J. J. (1981). A prosodic theory of non-concatenative morphology, Linguistic Inquiry, (...) 12 373-418). The other two morphemes are proposed to be the vocalic melody, which conveys additional syntactic information, and the root, which defines meaning. In three experiments using masked, cross-modal, and auditory-auditory priming we examined the role of the vocalic melody and the CV-Skeleton as potential morphemic units in the processing and representation of Arabic words. Prime/target pairs sharing the vocalic melody but not the CV-Skeleton consistently failed to prime. In contrast, word pairs sharing only the CV-Skeleton primed reliably throughout, with the amount of priming being as large as that observed between word pattern pairs sharing both vocalic melody and CV-Skeleton. Priming between morphologically related words can be observed when there is no overlap either in meaning or in surface phonetic form. (shrink)

What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information (...) in a specific format, information as a limited or local increment, structured by a number of underlying parameters. It is in the form of such increments that information drives cognition and behavior. This is why, perhaps of all aspects of content, it is incremental information which matters most when we want to understand cognitive attitudes and performances. This in turn must have an impact on our philosophical notions of content, propositional attitudes, inference, justification and knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Authorship ofthe Abstract Revisited David Raynor In a recent issue ofHume Studies, J. 0¿ Nelson challenges the received view that Hume himself composed the Abstract, and argues instead that we know that Adam Smith wrote it.1 But his main argument is so blatantly fallacious that charity requires that we interpret his intervention as ajeu d'esprit. I have no idea why he wishes to tease Hume (...) scholars so mercilessly. Most probably he wishes to keep the issue of the authorship of the Abstract alive until either someone disproves his belief that Smith wrote the pamphlet, or the scholarly community comes round to accepting Smith as the real author. Whatever his motive, I intend here to squelch his mischievous conjecture once and for all. Nelson first sought to cast doubt on Hume's authorship of the Abstract in an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly for 1976. In the fifteen years since that paper appeared, he has become convinced that Smith wrote the pamphlet. It was not always so. Here is how he judiciously concluded his earlier article: "According to the external evidence it is most improbable that Hume was the author of the Abstract and it is plausible to suppose that Adam Smith was; but according to the internal evidence, it is most improbable that Adam Smith was its author and almost certain that Hume was. How these incompatible conclusions are to be resolved I have no idea." 2 Nelson now has no doubt that any such discomfort should be resolved by allowing the external evidence tooutweigh the internal, becausehehas come to regard the external evidence as showing that it is not simply improbable that Hume wrote the work, but downright impossible. Nelson'sentire case rests on theidentityofthe "Mr Smith"referred to in a letter of 4 March, 1740 from Hume at Ninewells to Professor Francis Hutcheson at Glasgow. The crucial passage reads: My Bookseller has sent toMr Smith aCopy ofmy Book, which I hope he has received, as well as your Letter. I have not yet heard whathe has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in the WOrAe ofthe Learned; therehavingbeen an article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.3 Volume XTX Number 1 213 DAVID RAYNOR Until Keynes and Sraffa argued otherwise in their 1938 edition of the Abstract, some scholars believed that Adam Smith was the "Mr Smith" referred to in H, and that he wrote theAbstract at Hutcheson's suggestion. Keynes and Sraffainstead argued that the "MrSmith"was John Smith, Hutcheson's Dublin pubUsher, and that Hume himself wrote the Abstract (as all the internal evidence suggests). Norman Kemp Smith, in a review ofKeynes and Sraffa's edition, accepted their interpretation.4 Now Nelson seeks to prove all of them wrong. He argues thus: the "Mr Smith" in His eitherJohn Smith or Adam Smith; itcan'tbeJohn Smith;thereforeitmustbeAdamSmith.We canreadily agree with Nelson that the "Mr Smith" was notJohn Smith the Dublin publisher. But it will not follow—as Nelson supposes—that the man referred to must have been Adam Smith who, at the time, was still an undergraduate at Glasgow. "But ifthe Mr Smith ofH was not John Smith... who could he be excepttheAdam Smithofthe traditional theory?" asks Nelson.6 1have elsewhere suggested that the man in question was William Smith, one ofthepublishers oftheAmsterdam periodicalBibliothèqueraisonnée.6 Hutcheson'sInquiry had been pubUshed in Dublin by John Smith andWilliam Smith. The latter subsequently moved to Amsterdam and married into the Wetstein pubhshing family. William Smith was responsible for directing the firm's periodical, the Bibliothèque raisonnée, which employed Pierre Desmaizeaux as its London correspondent. The issue of this periodical for April-June, 1735, published aletterfrom Hutcheson tohis "ancien & intimeAmi"William Smith concerning Robert Simson's book on conic sections. In light ofH, it is probable that copies of the first two books of the Treatise, a manuscript copy oftheAbstract, and aletterfrom Hutcheson were sent to WilUam Smith in early 1740. The April-May-June issue of the Bibliothèqueraisonnée for 1740 published a largely favourable review of the first... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thucydides 1.22.1: Content and Form in the SpeechesThomas F. GarrityThe interpretive problem posed by the speeches of Thucydides is one of the oldest chestnuts in classical scholarship. It has long been debated whether the historian claimed and/or attempted to present verbatim accounts of the arguments put forward by the speakers on each occasion as best he could, or whether he felt free to modify or to invent particular (...) arguments or even whole speeches. And the controversy has been fueled by what has been widely regarded as the ambiguity of the second of the two parts of Thucydides’ famous statement of aims and methods in 1.22.1,. I propose here, instead, that the language in which scholars have found confusion is actually a clear statement pertaining both to the content and to the form in which the speeches are presented by Thucydides.THE ASSUMPTION IN SCHOLARSHIPThe perceived ambiguity of 1.22.1 has baffled generations of scholars, as they have attempted to relate their understanding of Thucydides’ statement concerning the presentation of speeches to what they themselves perceive as the historian’s practice throughout the History. In general, the debate has been characterized by a concerted and ongoing attempt to control the grammar, syntax, and vocabulary in 1.22.1 as a necessary ingredient in the construction of interpretive arguments. This uncompromising insistence on a study based on a close examination of Thucydides’ Greek is most evident in the early German scholarship, conducted [End Page 361] primarily from the point of view of the problem of composition.1 In subsequent research, scholars begin to place less emphasis on the significance of the programmatic statement strictly in relation to the problem of composition, but they remain devoted to the idea that a correct understanding of the historian’s aims and methods derives from a precise understanding of the Greek in 1.22.1.2 For all the efforts, however, of such well–known students of Greek, scholars remain sharply divided over the precise meaning of Thucydides’ programmatic statement.Not all participants in the debate, however, have felt this obligation to deduce the precise meaning of the Greek contained in the historian’s programmatic statement. And it is perhaps a measure of despair over finding a solution to the perceived enigma in 1.22.1 that some scholars have found it possible, especially in more recent times, to construct elaborate theories about the historian’s presentation of speeches without providing a detailed analysis of Thucydides’ own statement of aims and methods. The accepted ambiguity of 1.22.1, moreover, has provided such scholars with what they consider to be primary evidence with which they might successfully call into question the “objectivity” of Thucydides as a “scientific historian,” and with which they might thereby persuasively promote the view of him as either an impassioned (outraged) moralist or a tendentious manipulator of his reader’s sympathies.3 [End Page 362]In particular, the traditional view that the dependent participial clause,, is a qualification, or refinement, of the main assertion,,..., is what has led to the assumption that Thucydides is making two separate statements limited to the aspect of the content of the speeches.4 The result of this assumption has been to accept the notion that ambiguity exists in 1.22.1, as no satisfactory analysis has been put forward to explain how Thucydides can at one and the same time be presenting—in terms of content—“what was appropriate” () and “what was really said” (). And some scholars, for whom it is not adequate simply to question the reliability of Thucydides as a historical source, have taken a more extreme step: seizing on the traditional acknowledgment of the difficulties present in 1.22.1, they argue that the dependent participial clause,, is not a qualification at all but rather actually an explicit contradiction of the main assertion,.5 Thucydidean scholarship, then, has presented itself with an ironic result: the inherited assumption in scholarship that both parts of 1.22.1 refer only to the content of the speeches, first developed and seemingly permanently entrenched by early readers of Greek—so many of whom were committed to defending... (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper explores how children (aged 7–11) in the UK are educated about sustainability and climate change, through exploring a sample of 155 learning resources from public, private and third sector organisations. Using qualitative content analysis, key codes captured a) how sustainability was represented; b) how responsibilities for sustainability are imagined and allocated within society; and c) how children are encouraged to act for sustainability. The paper shows how sustainability resources represent children as powerful agents of social change (...) charged with the responsibility and means to change their (and their close relatives’) behaviour within the household and school. Drawing on critical debates about sustainability education, I argue these representations are problematic because they do not equip children with an understanding of the political and moral economies that shape their actions (or inactions) as citizens, nor provide them with opportunities to develop collaborative competencies. (shrink)

For various reasons several authors have enriched classical first order syntax by adding a predicate abstraction operator. “Conservatives” have done so without disturbing the syntax of the formal quantifiers but “revisionists” have argued that predicate abstraction motivates the universal quantifier’s re-classification from an expression that combines with a variable to yield a sentence from a sentence, to an expression that combines with a one-place predicate to yield a sentence. My main aim is to advance the cause of predicate abstraction while (...) cautioning against revisionism. In so doing, however, I shall pursue a secondary aim by conveying mixed blessings to those who hold the view that in the logical sense of “existence” some existing object is such as to exist contingently. Advocates of this view must concede Williamson’s recent contention that the domain of unrestricted objectual quantification could not have been narrower than it is actually, but predicate abstraction affords them some hope of accommodating this concession. (shrink)

Today we are facing the rising of new needs for the firms, especially for the small ones; they find themselves acting in a context characterized by the great content of information technology. This paper wants to analyse some aspects tied to the use of some particular kinds of resources, such as knowledge and organizational culture. It's necessary, especially in the new economy, to add another attribute to the four set by Barney as elements able to make the resources sustainable competitive (...) advantage sources in 1991: this attribute is freedom, essentially as freedom of reaching and using resources. This attribute, more than coming along with the four already set, can be considered in many cases as a pre-condition to the other ones in existence.The theoretical part will be completed by the reference to a particular organizational model that is based on freedom, that is the open source model; we'll try to show how freedom is not an abstract concept in business. (shrink)

Abstract I first suggest some ways in which the externalist account of psychological content can be reconciled with the aspectual character of intentionality. I then give an argument against the externalist account which includes as premises the claims that a system capable of having intentional states must understand a language, and that a system that understands a language must be capable of consciousness. I defend the latter claim by arguing that a correct understanding of observation sentences requires conscious, sensory (...) experience, and by appealing to the fact that language has meaning in a holistic manner. (shrink)

The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. The guidance theory offers a way of fixing representational content that gives the causal and evolutionary history of the subject only an indirect role, and an account of representational error, based on failure of action, that does not rely on any such notions as proper functions, ideal conditions, or (...) normal circumstances. Moreover, because the notion of error is defined in terms of failure of action, the guidance theory meets the “meta-epistemological requirement” that representational error should be potentially detectable by the representing system itself. In this essay, we offer a brief account of the biological origins of representation, a formal characterization of the guidance theory, some examples of its use, and show how the guidance theory handles some traditional problem cases for representation: the representation of fictional and abstract entities. Being both representational and actiongrounded, the guidance theory may provide some common ground between embodied and cognitivist approaches to the study of the mind. (shrink)

A great deal of the criticism directed at Locke's theory of abstract ideas assumes that a Lockean abstract idea is a special kind of idea which by its very nature either represents many diverse particulars or represents separately things that cannot exist in separation. This interpretation of Locke has been challenged by scholars such as Kenneth Winkler and Michael Ayers who regard it as uncharitable in light of the obvious problems faced by this theory of abstraction. Winkler and (...) Ayers argue that Locke instead held that to have an abstract idea is to attend selectively to some portion of the content of a particular idea. On this view, to have an abstract idea is not to have a special kind of idea but to have an ordinary idea in a special way. Ayers argues that Locke inherited this theory from Arnauld. I argue that the case made by Ayers for the attribution of the extrinsic theory to Locke rests on a misinterpretation of Arnauld. In fact, both Locke and Arnauld regard selective attention as part of a process whereby a new kind of idea is constructed. (shrink)