When can or should citizenship be granted to prospective members of states? When can or should states withdraw citizenship from their existing members? In recent decades, political philosophers have paid considerable attention to the first question, but have generally neglected the second. There are of course good practical reasons for prioritizing the question of when citizenship should be granted—many individuals have a strong interest in acquiring citizenship in particular political communities, while many fewer are at risk of denationalization. Still, loss (...) of membership in a political community is a practice with a long history that continues to take place today. -/- Concerns about national security have recently led several liberal democratic states to pass, strengthen or consider legislation that would empower their governments to denationalize certain persons.] At the international level, formal norms governing denationalization are vague and generally toothless, and there are no international legal norms that restrict denationalization to citizens who hold another citizenship or wish to take up citizenship elsewhere (Worster, 2009). So it is important to determine whether there are conditions under which denationalization can be morally justified and, if so, what those conditions are. We shall argue that while denationalization is ordinarily impermissible, there is a class of crime committed by citizens that may render it not only permissible, but a fitting response on the part of the state. (shrink)

Given the adverse consequences of destructive leadership at work, we examine leader favoritism prevalent in contemporary organizations. Our study builds on previous research on unethical leadership behaviors and extends social exchange theory by assessing whether leader favoritism contributes to employee psychological withdrawal behavior at work and whether perceived unfairness explains this link, addressing a gap in the literature on this topic. In addition, we investigate the condition of perceived employability to seek whether the influence of perceived unfairness due to (...) leader favoritism on psychological withdrawal behavior at work is strengthened when employees think they can secure alternative employment elsewhere. The study utilizes a two-wave data collection approach to gather responses from 206 front end customer service employees working in the hospitality and tourism firms in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The study findings offer empirical support for the proposed mediated moderation model. Specifically, the results demonstrate that leader favoritism directly, indirectly (via perceived unfairness), and positively influence employee withdrawal behaviors. This influence is stronger among employees who believe they can easily find alternative employment options. Our findings highlight the relevance of incorporating social exchange theory into the unethical leadership behaviors and withdrawal behaviors literature and provide valuable insights for managers into how to mitigate the practice of leader favoritism because of its adverse consequences on employees' work attitudes and behavior. (shrink)

Addiction of the variety discussed in this chapter, is a condition that by its very nature compromises decision-making capacity across the decisional spectrum. The impairment is present not only at moments of withdrawal and intoxication, but at all stages of the active addictive cycle, as long as the pathological dispositions to overvalue addictive drugs remain entrenched and operative. In light of this entrenched and pervasive reorientation in pathological values, it seems reasonable to question the unilateral presumption of capacity for (...) cases of this sort. The reason is that there is an important, but restricted, sense in which the addicted individuals in question are not ‘responsible’ for their decisions regarding drug use. The high likelihood of relapse means that, as a clinical matter of fact, they are usually not accountable. At the same time, clinical experience also suggests that we should treat addicted individuals as if they are responsible because that empowerment is crucial to their recovery. In the end, there is probably only one safe course of action to take when faced with such a difficult situation. This is to suspend the unilateral global presumption of capacity and instead assess decision-making capacity on a case-by-case basis, with careful monitoring and encouragement. (shrink)

From the state to the family: reconfiguring the responsibility for long‐term nursing care at homeThis paper discusses the implications of the shift in the location of the provision of healthcare services from healthcare institutions to the home, which has occurred or is projected to occur in coming years. It is argued that the responsibility for the provision of care and assistance needed by the elderly living at home and people with long‐term conditions living at home has shifted from public services (...) to the family. Studies of care‐givers have shown that in many situations they experience tremendous burdens, financial difficulties and health problems. Their social lives have been confined to the home, and contacts with friends and neighbors have been significantly reduced. This situation needs to be addressed by nurses, who in many cases serve as the bridge between the home and the official healthcare system. Using Foucault’s exploration of power, particularly his idea of governmentality, a genealogy of care‐giving in the home in Iceland’s health‐care has been constructed. The main findings were that, although this is occurring somewhat later than in many other countries, the state is withdrawing from its previously defined responsibility for the health and well‐being of the nation. At the same time the citizen’s responsibility for maintaining health is emphasized. Based on these findings, the argument is made that nurses in Iceland can have a profound influence on policy‐making in relation to the organization of services provided in those homes. Suggestions are made as to how this can be done, which may be of interest to nurses in other countries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Tracing a Traumatic Temporality: Levinas and Derrida on Trauma and ResponsibilityCathrine Bjørnholt Michaelsen (bio)For more than three decades, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas develop their conceptions of trauma and responsibility in close, critical, and engaged readings of each other’s works.1 In a text first published in 1973, Levinas explicitly considers different aspects and implications of Derrida’s “new style of thought,” as well as his own relation to Derrida, describing (...) their recurring crossing of paths as “a contact at the heart of a chiasmus,” which is further said to constitute “the very modality of the philosophical encounter” (PN 56, 62).Since the publication of “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in 1990, in which Derrida makes the somewhat surprising announcement that justice can be considered the undeconstructible condition of deconstruction (AR 243), as well as the subsequent publication of Specters of Marx in 1993, which is often designated as the work in which Derrida begins to consider ethico-political concerns more explicitly than hitherto, there has been much scholarly discussion about a so-called “ethical turn” of deconstruction.2 Throughout [End Page 43] the 1990s and up until this day a tendency prevails among certain scholars to strive for the establishment and legitimization of a more or less harmonic accordance between Levinas and Derrida with reference to concepts that preoccupy them both (e.g., “justice,” “hospitality,” “the other,” or “responsibility”). However, as Martin Hägglund has convincingly argued, a certain disjoining of Derrida and Levinas is required in order not to conflate what ultimately amount to two very different styles of writing and thinking. Such disjoining is particularly important when it comes to an issue such as responsibility, which is too often and too quickly categorized as an “ethical issue,” as if such a categorization were self-explanatory.3The aim of this article is not to carry out a comparative study focusing on the similarities and dissimilarities of the writings of Derrida and Levinas. Instead, the article is an attempt to let a “third” voice arise from the ongoing philosophical conversation between Derrida and Levinas, which is neither entirely accordant nor discordant, in order to emphasize a certain traumatic temporality of responsibility that finds a space in both their works while indicating the subtle nuances of disjuncture separating these spaces. In what follows, I therefore wish to explore some of the most significant displacements to which the notions of trauma and responsibility are subjected throughout the writings of Derrida and Levinas, as a result, to some extent at least, of their repeated chiasmic encounters.By way of introduction, it should be noted that both Derrida and Levinas transport the notion of trauma away from its most frequent psychopathological, psychoanalytic, or neurological areas of interpretation, just as they transport the notion of responsibility away from its usual autonomist or decisionist connotations toward a more extensive space of signification.4 Bearing this introductory note in mind, the question concerning what precisely enables this transport of trauma will direct the approach of the article. In other words, the article will question what it is about the structure of “trauma” or “traumatism” that allows the somewhat “fearsome” generalizations—to employ [End Page 44] Derrida’s own formulation from “Typewriter Ribbon”5 —to take place in the writings of both Derrida and Levinas.The suggestion in what follows will be that it is the peculiar temporality of trauma that allows for the generalizations, openings, and disseminations of trauma in Derrida and Levinas. More specifically, this traumatic temporality inscribes itself through an interruption of what might, with a reference to Heidegger, be called the vulgar understanding of time.6 Drawing attention to the temporality of trauma as a vehicle of transportation, the article advances in six main sections, each exploring different aspects of the relationship between temporality, trauma, and responsibility displayed in Derrida and Levinas.Traumatic TemporalityAs is well known, at least since Freud, trauma only becomes a trauma belatedly, or after its own fact, since a trauma only manifests itself by withdrawing itself in the traces it leaves behind, that is, by its aftermath and its effects of repetition and deferral. Trauma is somehow... (shrink)

While the prevalence of opioid use disorder among pregnant women has multiplied in the United States in the last decade, buprenorphine treatment for peripartum women with OUD has been administered to reduce risks of repeated cycles of craving and withdrawal. However, the maternal behavior and bonding in mothers with OUD may be altered as the underlying maternal behavior neurocircuit is opioid sensitive. In the regulation of rodent maternal behaviors such as licking and grooming, a series of opioid-sensitive brain regions (...) are functionally connected, including the ventral pallidum. In humans, these brain regions, interact with the supplementary motor area to regulate maternal behaviors and are functionally dysregulated by opioids. It is unclear how these brain regions respond to the emotions of their child for mothers receiving BT. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging pilot study in 22 mothers within the first postpartum year, including six mothers receiving BT and 16 non-OUD mothers as a comparison group, we devised a child face mirroring task in fMRI settings to assess maternal responses to pictures of facial expressions of own child and an unknown child in an empathic mirroring condition and a non-mirroring observation condition. In each condition, faces of neutral, ambiguous, distressed, and joyful expressions of each child were repeatedly displayed in a random order. The response of SMA during empathic mirroring vs. non-mirroring of own child was reduced among BT/OUD vs. CG. Within MBN, the left VP, critical for parental sensitivity, had a similar deficit. This study outlines potential mechanisms for investigating the risks of deficits in the neural responses to actual maternal sensitivity and parenting behavior in mothers with OUD, and potential targets for interventions that reduce stress and augment maternal behavior and child outcome. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility”Daniel W. Shuman (bio)Stephen Braude’s essay, “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility,” discusses a number of important issues about the moral and legal responsibility of persons diagnosed with multiple personality disorder (MPD), known in DSM-IV as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). One issue that is fundamental to this debate, which Braude does not address, however, is the empirical reality underlying the debate. Does MPD/DID exist? (...) A prerequisite to a debate about the legal consequences of MPD/DID is legally sufficient proof of its existence and its behavioral consequences.Proof that MPD/DID exists, its impact on legal standards of responsibility, and that the defendant suffers from it, must come from expert testimony; it is not part of the common knowledge or experience of the typical judge or juror. Courts are, however, increasingly, unwilling to assume that because an expert has impressive qualifications, he or she will necessarily present scientifically valid evidence. Particularly in cases of psychiatric and psychological evidence, courts that once looked solely at the expert’s qualifications to determine the admissibility for expert scientific evidence, now understand that the expert’s qualifications are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the presentation of accurate expert testimony. Courts increasingly want to know how experts know what they claim to know and whether their methods of knowing meet the hallmarks of good science.Thus, from a legal standpoint, a prerequisite to admissibility of the evidence that serves as a basis for a discussion of the legal implications of MPD/DID is rigorous scientific proof of its existence. Proof of the existence of MPD/DID has not, however, been the subject of rigorous scientific research, but instead has consisted of non-falsifiable clinical experience where the risk of iatrogenesis (i.e., hypnosis and suggestion) is ever present. While these clinical observations and opinions may ultimately be proven valid by subsequent research, there is simply no way to know whether that is so in the absence of rigorous scientific research. If proof of the existence of MPD/DID is clinically but not scientifically grounded, legal rules based upon it are suspect. Moreover, claims of MPD/DID often arise in a legal context where there are significant benefits to be gained from receiving the diagnosis which heightens the importance of rigorous scientific scrutiny.Diagnostic validity and reliability matters in different ways in the forensic context than it does in the therapeutic context. These contextual differences [End Page 59] are reflected in disparate standards for scrutinizing each. There is no threshold requirement, for example, that a psychotherapist prove that a diagnostic category is valid or that a psychotherapeutic treatment used for a person suffering from it is generally recognized as safe and effective before using it; however, there is a threshold requirement of rigorous scientific scrutiny before admission of this information in evidence. If a therapist’s diagnostic hypothesis that there are two personality states influencing a patient’s behavior is not borne out, it can be revised in later sessions. Even if MPD/DID does not exist, treatment that assumes it does may nonetheless be effective because therapeutic outcome is more closely tied to the nature of the therapist-patient relationship than the content of therapy, or because multiple personality states is an effective therapeutic metaphor. Moreover, if the patient is not satisfied that the diagnosis or treatment rendered is helpful, the patient can leave therapy or seek another therapist.In contrast, judicial determinations are a one-shot determination which cannot be revisited in light of subsequently acquired knowledge. The defendant/patient is not free to change courts, or withdraw from the legal proceedings. Thus, it would be entirely appropriate for psychiatrists and psychologists to treat patients presenting symptoms of what they label MPD/DID and for courts to reject exculpatory evidence from psychiatrists and psychologists of that disorder.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Multiple Personality and Moral ResponsibilityCommentary: Commentary by ClarkCommentary: Commentary by ShumanDaniel W. Shuman Daniel W. Shuman, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75235, USA.Copyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

To answer whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, two different methods for justifying compatibilist conditions of responsibility have emerged in recent literature. First-person approaches, such as Hilary Bok's, appeal to the first-person experience of human agency to justify our practices of holding agents responsible. In contrast, T. M. Scanlon and Jay Wallace, following P. F. Strawson, begin with an account of the interpersonal significance of holding each other responsible in order to discern the conditions under which it is appropriate (...) to assign that significance to an agent's actions. In this dissertation, I evaluate these different methodologies, and I examine the details of each view in order to find a proper understanding of the conditions of responsibility and of the significance of responsibility judgments within our interpersonal lives. ;I argue that the backward-looking significance we attach to responsibility judgments, including those of blame and praise, can be captured only by an interpersonal approach. Specifically, I argue that the significance of responsibility is not found in the negative consequences or emotions that we associate with holding agents responsible. Rather, ascribing to an agent the status of being responsible is a form a deep respect, which has practical implications. I argue that our intuitions concerning victims of severely deprived childhoods are best accounted for if we recognize that ascription as a form of respect and we separate the question of whether an agent is responsible from considerations of appropriate punishments. ;With regard to the conditions of responsibility, I argue that practical reasoners should be considered responsible not only for their choices, but also for negligent omissions, moral beliefs, and certain emotional reactions, even if such phenomena are not based on their choices. In addition, I argue that compatibilists do not need to add the capacity to grasp distinctly moral reasons to the requirements of responsible agency because that capacity is entailed by the basic capacity to reason practically. I examine the psychological literature on psychopaths---agents who supposedly are practical reasoners without moral understanding---to counter an objection to my view. (shrink)

A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show (...) that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations. (shrink)

In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for the right reasons. Conceptualization (...) Conditions demand that agents who act for the right reasons deploy or be able to deploy certain normative concepts in acting. I argue that views of this type run into a host of overintellectualization problems. The positive aim is to argue for my Right Reasons view, which appeals to know-how to avoid overintellectualization. (shrink)

An approach to emotion is described in which emotions are defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by stimuli that are the goals for action. This leads to a theory of the evolutionary adaptive value of emotions, which is that different genes specify different goals in their own self-interest, and any actions can then be learned and performed by instrumental learning to obtain the goals. The brain mechanisms for emotion in brain regions such as the orbitofrontal and anterior (...) cingulate cortex provide a foundation for understanding the neural basis of emotion. Classically conditioned effects may modulate the actions initiated by this system. In addition to this instrumental learning system, some stimuli may elicit responses, for example approach, withdrawal, or fixed action patterns, but intervening states are not required for this type of adaptive response. In addition, a rational thought system involved in multistep planning can allow gene-specified goals to be deferred or avoided in order to achieve longer-term types of goals that may be more advantageous to the individual than to the genes. (shrink)

The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterization of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topic-neutral specification would be given in a uniform way (...) for all response-dependent concepts. In this paper I argue, using a thought experiment, that only topic-neutral specifications will deliver the a priori knowledge constitutive of response-dependence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT “Lockdown!” has articulated our collective and individual fear response to the novel coronavirus. Two regnant specialized discourses fostered by the academy—science and ideology critique—could not redirect this inadequate response nor generate their own adequately broad and focused social responses. This suggests the desirability of the academy adding phronesis as a goal for its pedagogical practices.

In the paper, titled ‘Choosing death in unjust conditions: hope, autonomy and harm reduction,’ Wiebe and Mullin argue that people living in unjust social conditions are sufficiently autonomous to request medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The ethical issue is that some people may request MAiD primarily because of unjust social conditions, not their illness, disease, disability or decline in capability. It is easily agreed that people living in unjust social conditions can be autonomous. Nevertheless, Wiebe and Mullin fail to appreciate (...) that autonomy is only a necessary condition for MAiD. In addition to autonomy, one must decide that providing assisted dying to a patient because they are living in unjust social conditions is ethical. Central to making this ethical decision is the principle of non-maleficence, famously articulated as ‘do no harm.’ The authors admit that performing MAiD in response to unjust social circumstances is harmful, but they justify this harmful action by appealing to the principle of harm reduction. A fundamental flaw of their approach is that it relies on the legislative definition of intolerable suffering, which is based on circular reasoning and given that 99.2% of patients that have applied for MAiD satisfied this criterion, it is essentially equivalent to no standard/criterion. Canadian society is struggling with the ethical implications of its permissive MAiD programme, and, fundamental to this debate, will be determining the proper balance between autonomy and non-maleficence for people living in unjust social conditions. (shrink)

(1998). Aristotle and sartre on the human condition: lack, responsibility and the desire to be god 1 . Angelaki: Vol. 3, Impurity, authenticity and humanity, pp. 29-37.

Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, and it is high time for a full volume on the topic. The chapters in this volume address the following central questions. Does the epistemic condition require (...) akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one’s culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one’s action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one’s quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition? (shrink)

ExcerptOne of the most disappointing human rights debacles in the last few years was the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. For those who still take an interest,1 the human rights situation there has become horrendous, with Human Rights Watch documenting the denial of schooling and employment to women, extrajudicial killings, and torture.2 Moreover, in a severe rebuttal to those who supported the withdrawal, Taliban rule has created the conditions for a renewal of terrorist groups that can now (...) develop and train in Afghanistan with impunity.3 There is also a good case to be made that the U.S. withdrawal there emboldened Putin to invade Ukraine, calculating that the United States and its allies no longer have the stomach for protracted conflicts in order to prevent human rights abuses. It may be that we have traded a low-grade conflict in Afghanistan for a high-intensity one in Ukraine.4 The lesson here is that the struggle for human rights, while beginning as a moral problem about our common responsibilities, can only be taken seriously when we consider its political ramifications. What do we owe to our fellow humans, and what sacrifices should we make in order to fulfill those responsibilities? (shrink)

This article examines our ethical responsibility toward artists engaged in harmful behaviors. Specifically, I demonstrate when and why we are morally obligated to withdraw our public and financial support from Artists Who Cause Harm such as Louis C.K., Terry Richardson, and Ryan Adams. Using a moral distinction presented by Philippa Foot and others, I identify this support as enabling harm when the wealth and influence that we support removes typical barriers that protect victims from harm and interposes barriers that prevent (...) victims from avoiding harm. I proceed to demonstrate that our personal support is morally significant, and we have a moral responsibility to make contributions to collective action when the cost is low or the degree of belief that others will contribute is high. Here we have both a strong belief that others will withdraw support and a relatively low cost to ourselves to do so. I acknowledge that enabling current harms is only a sufficient condition to withdrawing support from an artist and should not minimize other reasons for avoiding certain artists and their works. However, when we do believe that our support enables an artist engaged in harmful behaviors, we have an obligation to withdraw that support. (shrink)