The aim of our study is to single out a possible path towards the recognition culture in a world strained by deep social cleavages and by a strong conflict among values. In this context, we consider that a recognition culture is possible only by activating the comprehensive being that each of us, humans, is. The study attempts to answer the desideratum of the recognition culture by developing a model of the political founded on the correlation of certain aspects of the (...) human and of the political. The identification of the hypostases of the political and the human and the correlations between them help us understand one of the specific anthropo-political mechanisms that may allow us to reach the recognition culture that is based on accepting the other and assuming one’s own fallibility. This is what we define as the anthropological model of the comprehensive political. (shrink)

We consider that the epistemological recourse to semiotic dimensions could lead to peace: those in favour of an epistemology without a knowing subject are right (if they keep themselves within the syntactic and semantic frames of theoretical construction) and those who add a knowing subject are also right (if they want to express the concrete process of building up scientific convictions).

In this article I discuss Michel Henry’s concept of the political. I firstly show how it is derived within his radical phenomenology, secondly give an outline of his respective critique of totalitarianism, and finally question whether his approach is appropriate for adequately thinking the relationship between the social body and its symbolization, which is of paramount importance for any theoretical consideration of the political.

It was in my view a very important thing that took place when, at the beginning of the Third Century A.D., Ammonius Saccas began his exegeses of Plato, basing himself on the important assumption, much more true than false, of a profound homodoxy or agreement of opinion between Plato and Aristotle. This work involved an attempt to see Plato as something more than a brilliant virtuoso of inconclusive, often fallacious argument—a role only admirable in Socrates on account of his existentially (...) revealed conviction of the impossibility of defining the virtues in a clear-cut manner, or apart from one another, or from the critical activity which redefines them unendingly—and which also sees Plato as something more than an ancestor of the Pythagorean mystagogues who dispensed a way of life to those doomed to live it under the Caesars, or of philosophical littérateurs of Ciceronian and similar types. It represented an attempt to make serious philosophical sense of Plato as a thinker desirous of determining what primarily is, and what only is in some secondary or derivative sense, and how the various grades and senses of being may be accommodated to one another and to the human soul with its profound need to understand and love. And it necessarily sought support in such texts as the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the Symposium, the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Letters, as well as in a suitably interpreted Sophist and Parmenides, and hardly at all in such brilliant recrudescences of Socratic inconclusiveness as the latter half of the Theaetetus. And it incorporated strands from the pre-Socratics and from Aristotle because these were seen as either leading up to, or continuing, the serious Platonic effort. I am myself disposed to ascribe this new wave of Platonic deepening to Ammonius rather than Plotinus, since there is singularly little development of doctrine in the smoothly written Enneads, and since Plotinus only began to publish his doctrine when his two fellow pupils, Erennius and Origen, had started to divulge what their Master had taught them. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the term kinêsis bears different connotations when associated with two different Plotinian hypostases in the Enneads: Intellect and Soul1. I propose an interpretation of this term as intellectual movement when it is associated with the Intellect and spatial movement when it is associated with the Soul.In the first section, I evaluate the meaning of kinêsis in reference to the hypostasis Intellect. In the second section, I turn to a critical examination of kinêsis associated with (...) the hypostasis Soul, emphasising the conceptual complexity of the term. I develop my interpretation on the distinction between kinêsis tês ousias and kinêsis pros ousias, translating the former as ‘movement of the hypostasis’ and the latter as ‘movement from the hypostasis.’ On this revised reading, I conclude that kinêsis in Plotinus is a context-dependent concept that alters its significance according to the hypostasis and introductory locution (‘tês’ or ‘pros’) with which it is associated. I conclude by linking Plotinian henology with Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines to illuminate an ongoing conversation between Plotinian metaphysics and Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of movement. (shrink)

Three hypostases and their relations form the core of Plotinus’ philosophical system. We claim that contrary to some interpretations, there are no overlaps or blurred borders between hypostases, and we demonstrate that mature Plotinus philosophy presents them as clearly defined and separated. This article begins by providing an overall overview of the structure of Plotinus’ metaphysics. We then briefly characterize each of the hypostases to provide firm support for our claims. After this exposition, we discuss the relations of these hypostases (...) and metaphysical differentiating principles, firstly providing an overview of other viewpoints then describing our proposed interpretation. The concluding remarks provide a comparison of our reading of Plotinus with the main interpretative principles of his work. (shrink)

Focused on the dynamic of the relations between truth and acknowledgement, this study brings forward the following series of hypotheses: 1) between “the essence of truth”, as revelation and referential experience, cognitive and moral supreme resort and the various embodiments of partial, temporary and relative truths, there is an operational space of thinking and acting, favorable to the comprehensive truths, as we call them; 2) within the unceasing aspiration of overcoming the partial truths and asymptotical closeness to “the essence of (...) truth”, the comprehensive truth is the wide-awakeness of the self-conscience haunted by worries and doubts and which, through the quests for faith and reason, becomes capable of acknowledgement; 3) from an extensional point of view, the comprehensive truth is the acknowledgement in the informational-cognitive area, and from the intentional point of view, the comprehensive truth is the acknowledgement in the axiological and moral areas; 4) if by means of comprehension we acknowledge something or someone, then comprehension and acknowledgement interact with each other, and the path towards a culture of acknowledgement can be realized by living the comprehensive truth as a truth of acknowledgement oriented to understanding and communication; 5) the path towards a culture of acknowledgement implies the establishment and implementation of a human model, a real challenge for each of us. The anthropological model that this study suggests starts from the dynamic of the hypostases of the human being. According to this model, the human nature, as the natural essence of what human means and the human condition of moral and spiritual fulfillment, meet in the human essence synthesized in what Pope John Paul II called “the acting person”. By shaping the real human being, a fallible and creative being, through the dynamic of his hypostasis, we come to a comprehensive truth regarding the human being, a truth on which the culture of acknowledgement is founded. Moreover, the main idea of our demarche is that between acknowledgement and comprehension there is a deep, organic connection for the comprehensive truth that lies at the basis of the culture of acknowledgement. (shrink)

The term natural is effective in the marketing of a wide variety of foods. This ambiguous term carries important meaning in Western culture. To challenge an uncritical understanding of natural with respect to food and to explore the ambiguity of the term, the development of Western ideas of nature is first discussed. Personification and hypostasization of nature are given special emphasis. Leo Marx’s idea of the pastoral design in literature is then used to explore the meaning of natural as applied (...) to food, emphasizing Marx’s distinction between a sentimental and a complex pastoral. The latter is applied to natural as a means of collapsing a dichotomy of man and nature to the idea of second nature. From this perspective an understanding of the industrialization of the food system and the importance of local and organic food are considered. The extent to which processed foods might properly be considered natural is raised and discussed for several common foods. Although marketing of natural foods might make us think that we consume nature, I suggest that what is consumed is more appropriately second nature. I suggest that in order to maintain a critical perspective about one’s relationship to the natural world, everyone should make an attempt to experience the complex pastoral with respect to at least something that is consumed as food. When nature is understood as second nature in the context of a complex pastoral, the question of whether a food or ingredient is to be considered natural is replaced by deliberative thought based on our best knowledge and judgment, and the result will be less constrained by ideology. (shrink)

Le sujet de cette étude est la manière dont Plotin, dans une perspective qui reste essentiellement platonicienne, interprète la notion de noeîn dans Parménide, surtout à la lumière du bien connu Fr. 3 DK, sur l’identité de l’être et de la pensée, dont Plotin, avec Clément d'Alexandrie, est notre source. Cette interprétation est essentielle pour comprendre la nature et la fonction ontologique-métaphysique de l’hypostase plotinienne du Noûs. La conception parménidienne de noeîn est profondément remaniée par Plotin et intégrée dans (...) une perspective compatible avec l’ontologie platonicienne et la métaphysique néoplatonicienne. (shrink)

코기토 철학의 전통에 맞서 자아의 문제를 새롭게 사유하려는 공통된 목적 아래, 레비나스의 침전(hypostase)론과 라깡의 거울단계론은 여러 지점에서 서로 깊이 소통한다. 그럼에도 불구하고 우리가 알기로는 양자의 밀접한 연관성은 이제까지 전혀 조명된 바 없다. 이는 아마도 양자가 서로 다른 학문분과에서 독립적으로 수행되었던 사정 때문일 것이다. 본 논문은 그러한 공백을 메우기 위한 첫 단계의 작업이다. 본 작업이 보여주고자 하는 바, 두 자아론은 자아 발생의 배경을 인간 존재의 근원적 정황에 대한 공통된 이해에 입각하여 조명하고 있으며, 충동에너지의 유동(流動)과 정체(停滯) 및 이 두 위상의 상호 (...) 변환을 추적하는 에너지론의 관점에서 자아 사건을 해명하고 있다. (shrink)

Le sujet de cette étude est la manière dont Plotin, dans une perspective qui reste essentiellement platonicienne, interprète la notion de noeîn dans Parménide, surtout à la lumière du bien connu Fr. 3 DK, sur l’identité de l’être et de la pensée, dont Plotin, avec Clément d'Alexandrie, est notre source. Cette interprétation est essentielle pour comprendre la nature et la fonction ontologique-métaphysique de l’hypostase plotinienne du Noûs. La conception parménidienne de noeîn est profondément remaniée par Plotin et intégrée dans (...) une perspective compatible avec l’ontologie platonicienne et la métaphysique néoplatonicienne. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing "the laws of (...) thought". In this sense, fundamental logical laws are implicit to our "language games" and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so called reflective equilibrium. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as "inferential landscapes" and logicians as "geographers" who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

What, for Galen, are powers, and how are they to be properly individuated? The notion of a power or capacity does a great deal of work in Galen. As in Aristotle, the concept of a dunamis is tightly linked with that of an energeia, but these are not simply logical abstractions. Rather the natural energeiai are the basic functional activities of the animal body and its parts, and just as health consists in proper functioning, so disease is defined as ‘damage (...) to one of the natural energeiai of the body’, and these activities are damaged when something interferes with its related dunamis. Here I try to make sense of the apparently very different things Galen says regarding dunameis. For example, he says that they do not inhabit our bodies as we do our houses; that is, presumably, they are not substantial or hypostasized; rather they are properties of us. Equally, he is perfectly clear that they are relational items: a power is a power for affecting something determinate in some determinate way. They. (shrink)

Two problems continue to haunt Heideggerian scholarship and to pose needless obstacles to those who seek to enter his thought. One is the almost ritualistic repetition of the master’s terminology—especially at its most manneristic—on the part of his disciples. Another is the tendency, which is found in Heidegger as well as in his disciples, to hypostasize “being” into an autonomous “other” that seems to function on its own apart from entities and from man. Both of these problems gather around Heidegger’s (...) key word Ereignis and therefore around his interpretation of the history of philosophy, and they obscure a clear insight into what he was trying to say. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plotinus and the Parmenz'des B. DARRELL JACKSON IN 1928 E. R. DODDSARGUED that the first two hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides are the primary source of Plotinus' doctrines of the One and of Nous. I Dodds' main evidence was a list of parallels between the Parmenides and the Enneads? He argued further that the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Parmenides as positive metaphysics was neo-Pythagorean in origin. Several Plotinus scholars have (...) accepted and extended Dodds' view of the importance of the Parmenides for Plotinus. This group includes ]~mile Br6hier, ~ A. H. Armstrong, 4 Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, 5 and Paul Henry. n But Dodds' position is by no means universally accepted. Elmer O'Brien has recently argued that the Plotinian One was derived ultimately from Philo and mediated to Plotinus through Albinus and Numenius. 7 He says that Dodds' case, though good, is not convincing. It. A. Wolfson has been the great advocate of the Philonic origin of Plotinus' views. According to Wolfson, the doctrines attributed by Plotinus to Plato are not Plato's but mainly Philo's. 8 Others see Plotinus in varying degrees of dependence upon Plato. Philip Merlan holds that Plotinus is more in debt to the immediate successors of Plato and to Aristotle's interpretation of Plato than to the Platonic writings themselves. 9 C. J. de Vogel sees Plotinus as dependent upon Plato for a hierarchy of being which was accepted and elaborated by various middle Platonists and Gnostics. 1~According to de Vogel, the Parmenides wus not importan% in this hierarchy tradition, n In this article I shall re-examine Dodds' position. I believe the case for Plotinus' dependence upon the Parmenides can be strengthened. I shall try to do this by examining the systematic relation of Plotinus' thought to the Parmenides. Dodds x"The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'," The Classical Quarterly, XXII (1928), 129-142. 2Ibid., 132 f. *In the introductions to Enneads V.3 (esp. pp. 43 f., 46 f.), V.5 (pp. 87 ft.), VI.4-5 (pp. 161163,165-168),and VI.7 (pp. 49, 60) in his Bud~ edition and translation of the Enneads (Paris, 1931-38). 4The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, at the University Press: 1940), pp. 14-28. In his article "Plotinos", Vol. 21, pt. 1 of Paulys Real-Encyclopgdie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 1951, cols. 552-554. eIntroduction to the second edition of Stephen MacKenna's translation of the Ennead.~ (New York: Pantheon Books Inc., n. d.), pp. xli-xliv. Elmer O'Brien (ed. and trans.), The Essential Plotinus (New York: Mentor, 1964),p. 15. 8"Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes," Harvard Theological Review, XXXXV (1952), 115. 9From Platonism to Neoplatonism (2n ed. rev.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). 10"On the Neoplatonic Character of Platonism and the Platonic Character of Neoplatonism," Mind, LXIII (1953), 43-64. 11Ibid., 58. [3]5] 316 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY considered only parallel terminology. I shall in addition look at parallel argumentation and conclusions. Furthermore, since Dodds accounts only for Plotinus' first two hypostases, I shall consider the relation of the third hypostasis (soul) to the Parmenides. My primary interest is not the source of Plotinus' interpretation of the Parmenides but the way he carries that interpretation out. TM The former issue has often been focal in the literature on this subject. ~8It is certain thay many of the ideas used by Plotinus were already in circulation. But it is equally certain that in his combination of these ideas of a hierarchy, of transcendence, etc., Plotinus is original. I shall argue that this originality of combination is largely determined by an interpretation of the Parmenides. I should add that I am not concerned with whether Plotinus' interpretation is correct. ~4 In the following pages I shall attempt to show three things: (1) how Plotinus explicitly interprets the Parmenides, (2) to what extent he draws upon the language of the Parmenides, and (3) to what extent Plotinus' system may be understood by its relation to the Parmenides. I. Plotinus' Interpretation of the Parmenides The obvious place to begin an analysis of Plotinus' relation to the Parmenides is Enneads V... (shrink)

Chora – le «cratère à mélanger» maternel, vannant et secouant de Platon – remplit «l’écart explicatif» entre les paradigmes formels «intelligibles et toujours existants» (48E5) et un monde encosmique «généré et visible». Proclus traite la gamme polysémique des termes utilisés par Platon pour chôra : hypodochê (réceptacle), kratêr (cratère à mélanger), etc., comme désignant des forces actives dans un univers où la sympathie cosmique règne, à partir des plus élevées, jusqu’aux plus basses manifestations de l’ «Un» transcendant. L’univers proclusien est (...) un «hénothéisme», dans lequel une «unité» dominante surgit sur la totalité de l’Être et du Devenir. Chôra permet à la fois au monde immatériel et au monde matériel de recevoir, de manière appropriée à chacun, les mêmes dons transcendants que leurs homologues intellectifs‑intelligibles superieurs. Aucun niveau de la réalité n’est dépourvu de cette donation. La réceptivité (hypodochê), indéterminée, mais toujours active, est présente à tous les niveaux. L’âme reçoit l’Intellect, la temporalité reçoit le temps monadique, la matière reçoit la structure géométrique polyédrique, etc. Chôra n’est pas l’equivalent de la matière, mais permet à la matière d’être imprimée par des paradigmes formels. Dans son rôle de «cratère à mélanger», elle protège la matière de sa potentielle itérabilité et dissolution infinie. Dans l’univers proclusien, le Bien atteint la dernière et la plus extrême de ses limites, il est espace et lieu, recevant à la fois l’expansivité et une capacité à donner place à la forme pour qu’elle puisse s’imposer à la matière. Après tout, les dons lui sont accordés depuis la plus haute hypostase, celle de la Limite et de l’Illimité, premier niveau après l’Un lui‑même. Vitale pour la création, la Chôra est alors la «mère» de tout. Il n’est donc pas étonnant que, comme nous le dit Proclus, la chôra soit, en fait, la déesse Rhéa. En hommage à la littérature révélatrice antique, comme les Oracles chaldaïques, Homère et Hésiode, Proclus fournit une élucidation non seulement philosophique, mais aussi théologique, de la chôra. À la différence de Platon, il théologise la Physique. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 54 - 69 In this essay, I reconstruct Merleau-Ponty’s implicit critique of Husserl in his lectures on Husserl’s concept of the earth as _Boden_ or ground. Against Husserl, Merleau-Ponty regards the earth seen as pure _Boden_ as an idealization. He emphasizes the ontological necessity for the earth as _Boden_ to always hypostasize itself into the Copernican concept of earth as object. In turn, Merleau-Ponty builds this necessity into an essential feature of being, allowing (...) himself to retrieve ontology itself from its status as external to being, and to make room for it within the structure of being: ontology is one of the ways in which experiences become objectified, thereby allowing being to achieve its essential movement of hypostatization. (shrink)

1988, as the TV cycle ‘Decalogue’ was finished by Krzysztof Kieslowski, one of the most intriguing appearances throughout its episodes was the character of the silent witness, a young man played by Arthur Barciś. He is the first character who appears at the beginning of Decalogue I and therefore of the whole series and who returns in eight from the ten films of the cycle in very different hypostases: as nomadic camper, surveyor, nurse, bus driver, or rowboat driver, traveler on (...) foot or by bike etc. The film critics were intrigued by this character and interpreted him in different ways, especially in key either religious or ethical. They all and Kieslowski himself agreed that the silent witness is a strange and symbolic appearance that comes out from the frames of everyday life. It is as if a curtain would break or be torn and from beyond it something foreign and strange would appear, difficult to integrate into our categories, but which is surprisingly so eloquent for us. The phenomenology, that Kieslowski describes, is broken in this manner, but, paradoxically, also consolidated by this presence, that gives it meaning and content. (shrink)

This article examines the notions of subject and nature as well as their relationship in F. W. J. Schelling’s naturephilosophy (Naturphilosophie), primarily based on the contemporary interpretation provided by I. H. Grant. It is explained that naturephilosophy, which treats the subject as produced by nature, and nature itself as absolute productivity, at the same time critically reacts against the inclination of I. Kant’s transcendental idealism to hypostasize the subject by separating it from nature. The article argues that naturephilosophy comes close (...) to materialist logic, according to which, the subject, being the product of nature’s productivity, is one of the nature’s moments, and therefore its pretentions to once and for all define nature are doomed to fail. This indeterminacy is not the effect of epistemological lack, but the ontological condition of nature and its products. (shrink)

The Adventure of the Image Through the Conflict of Interpretations. Starting from the self-image, through the image adventure landscape seen as an ensemble of conflict of interpretation, not only from a single glance or direction, whether it is evasive or complex, we follow our decipherment and transformation, be it process or state. Through multiple hypostases, whether isolated or open, I will focus on certain details that will be addressed as a dimension by means of text or material reproduction, or through (...) the passage of the same image we face each time through the filter of our own existence. We stop the other or ourselves against the other, thus removing the observer or viewer, thus providing not only distinct perspectives on the same subject or the same situation or even the same consequences, but also giving him the opportunity to choose how to relate to the internal and external environment, thus convincing that, to a lesser extent, or greater, he is the one who drives everything. This approach is based not only on the adventure of self-image in the archive of own experiences but also from the outside, from the archive of common experiences perceived by other people. (shrink)

Résumé L’équilibre des forces (le pape, l’empereur, le corps épiscopal) fut plus apparent que réel à Chalcédoine. Sa définition n’en a pas moins sa validité permanente : empêcher d’occulter la réalité humaine du Christ, tout en tenant qu’il est « un seul et le même » avec le Verbe. Deux christologies savantes, celle d’Antioche et celle d’Occident résumée par Léon, se sont ici heurtées et combinées avec la vision de la personne du Christ se constituant à Alexandrie, formulée non sans (...) imprécision par Cyrille. Refus par certains orientaux des « deux natures après l’union » pour « une seule nature incarnée du Verbe ». « Jacobites » et « melkites ». Éclaircissement de Constantinople II (553) relativement à la notion d’hypostase. Situation actuelle de la christologie chalcédonienne. (shrink)

For the one who studies the socio-anthropology of religions, the book itself is the main character of the fascinating journey that Moshe Idel proposes in Perfections that absorb. Cabala and interpretation Starting from the imaginary of the book in the Judaic mystical literature, as presented by Moshe Idel, we have found four main hypostases of the book: the book as a pre-existent paradigm, the book as creation, the book as a paradox, and the book as a knowledge tool. We have (...) noticed that these hypostases are to be found also in the folk products from the traditional Romanian settings this showing the presence of similar aspects regarding the representations of the book on a social imaginary level in various cultural areas. Thus, we have tried to present the hermeneutics of the negative and its applicability for the socio-anthropological study of some divinatory phenomena that make reference to the book or whose central point is the book. Moreover, the conclusions of this analysis have demonstrated the large applicability of the hermeneutics of the negative so well described by professor Moshe Idel. This can also be extended to other socio-humanistic sciences. (shrink)

Richard Rorty was one of the most committed and respected critics of the distinction between philosophy and literature. He urged philosophers to adapt an ironist stance, characterized by a double commitment to historicism and nominalism, thereby simultaneously abandoning their inveterate representationalism as well as their predilection for hypostasizing abstract concepts. The ensuing return to the individual and contingent was also supposed to facilitate the absorption of philosophy into the realm of literature proper. This brief essay focuses on some aspects of (...) the relationship between philosophy, literature, and history, highlighting thereby the role that theorizing of an abstract kind plays in the construction of fictional worlds—marking out a territory within the crafting of literature itself that draws on the non-nominalist mode of discourse usually favored by philosophers. (shrink)

Résumé Bien que membres de la même famille philosophique, Plotin et Proclus sont en désaccord sur de nombreux points. La question du temps, et principalement de son origine, en fournit un exemple très révélateur. Après une présentation générale des raisons conduisant à ces désaccords, nous abordons plus spécifiquement et précisément le problème de la production du temps. Nous voyons alors la différence d’attitude entre Plotin, pour qui le temps est produit par l’Âme, et Proclus, pour qui le Temps devient une (...) hypostase supérieure à l’âme.Even though they belong to the same philosophical family, Plotinus and Proclus disagree on several important issues. The question of time is very revealing in this regard. After introducing some reasons for the differences between those philosophers, the article discusses in detail the origin of time in their view. Here one can see clearly how Plotinus and Proclus are apt to differ. For the former, time is produced by the World Soul, while for the latter, Time is a hypostasis over and above the Soul. (shrink)

Lykaon est changé en loup pour avoir sacrifié un enfant nouveau-né à Zeus Lykaios; après lui, chaque année un homme serait transformé en loup sur le Lycée. Ces traditions ont d’abord été mises en rapport avec un dieu loup honoré par une confrérie de loups-garous. Puis l’interprétation « initiatique»s’est imposée : les lycanthropes, dont Lykaon fournirait le parangon, seraient une classe d’âge soumise à une initiation tribale. Maintenant, l’intérêt se porte sur Lykaon, pour son ambivalence « civilisé/sauvage » : sa (...) « transgression » des règles de la civilisation est punie d’une « régression » à l’état de bête. Kallisto, séduite par Zeus et mère d’Arkas, est métamorphosée en ourse. Elle a d’abord été considérée comme l’hypostase d’une déesse ourse Artémis, puis comme un modèle mythique pour l’initiation des adolescentes. Actuellement, on insiste sur sa « transgression » de la loi d’Artémis, qui provoque sa « régression » à l’état sauvage. Pour Lykaon et Kallisto les interprétations ont évolué parallèlement; la diversité des approches successives ne participe-t-elle pas plus ou moins d’une mode? (shrink)

À partir des contextes homériques, cette recherche situe l’arrière-plan de la formule ἢ οἵη parmi les genres du discourslittéraire de l’oralité archaïque. Son emploi est réservé aux récits enchâssés ou aux propos qui thématisent l’exemplum d’une femme . L’étude caractérise ensuite la structure narrative et les particularités d’une diction traditionnelle, dans les cinq livres du Catalogue « hésiodique » des femmes. Par l’entremise de nœuds conflictuels, le réseau des généalogies déployait la mythopoïèse d’une Hellade légendaire, avec ses héroïnes et leurs (...) descendants, demi-dieux ou personnages fabuleux, qui sont souvent les éponymes ou les hypostases personnifiées des régions et des cités.The Typology of the Ehoae Catalogues. A Thematised Genealogical Network. The aim of this paper is to determine the typological framing of the “Hesiodic” Catalogue of women. The formula ἢ οἵη is submitted to a thorough examination, with the background of its Homeric use, most of the time introducing an embedded narration. Furthermore, various arguments foster the reconstruction of an archaic stage in the oral transmission of the Ehoae , perceived as an independent genre or – in any case – singled out as a bundle of legendary topoi. At a certain point , the ‘Hesiodic’ poem succeeded in interweaving an overall story of the dispersed heroic lineage, in order to expatiate through the Achaean past using an original narrative device: the catalogic digest of stories of heroines and demigods referring to various eponymic entities of the demes. (shrink)

Les quatre chapitres de cette étude sont intitulés : le système des hypostases; la matière intelligente; la matière sensible; le monde sensible. [SDM].

Levinas' ethical metaphysics opens up a nexus of relationships, in the midst of which God becomes accessible as the counterpart of the justice I render to others. Although Levinas refuses a theorising theology which does violence to God, we attempt in this article nonetheless to glimpse the possibility of a divine threesome which can be articulated in the language of ethical metaphysics. We seek to trace a Trinity, not in Levinas, but with Levinas. We seek to ‘leash God with Levinas.’Thus, (...) we argue the liturgical nature of God. God is utterly ‘for‐the‐other.’ The Father, as utterly self‐diffusive, is ‘for‐the‐Son’, and the Son, as utterly responsive, is ‘for‐the‐Father.’ The divine nature is the ethical reality of ‘for‐the‐other.’ Secondly, this one nature has three distinct hypostases, which need to be understood ethically. The relationship between Father and Son is not the same as the relationship between the Son and the Father. The Father and the Son are the same in that they are essentially ‘for‐the‐other,’ bound by a bond or a Spirit of responsibility. Yet, the Son's relation to the Father is responsive, whereas the Father's relation to the Son is initiative or originary. Thus, there is both an identity yet a non‐identification of Father and Son. Again, since responsibility is the ethical hypostasis of ‘the‐other‐person‐in me,’ we might say that the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father , in a non‐identical way, and that it is precisely this perichoresis of the one in the Other which constitutes the hypostasis of each. (shrink)

Cette étude analyse comment Kelsen, pour libérer le droit et la démocratie des traces de ce qu'il appelle les hypostases collectives ou la mythologie de l'âme collective, prend position face aux grandes théories de la sociologie et de la psychologie sociale de son temps. D'abord, il s'agira de montrer comment Kelsen critique les métaphores de l'âme collective ; ensuite, de montrer comment la pensée kelsénienne sur le droit et la démocratie essaie d'échapper aux problèmes liés à la métaphore de l'âme (...) collective. Cela peut laisser entrevoir quelques points communs entre la théorie de Kelsen et les théories contemporaines sur le droit et la démocratie libérées des prémisses de l'idée d'une communauté homogène. The aim of this essay is to analyse how Kelsen criticises the major theories of sociology and social psychology of his time in order to liberate law and democracy from what he calls collective hypostasis or the mythology of the "collective soul". The first part investigates how Kelsen criticises the metaphors of the collective soul. The second part addresses how Kelsen built a theory of law and democracy that sought to escape from problems correlated to the metaphors of the collective soul. The results enable the reader to glimpse some common points between Kelsen's ideas and contemporary projects to elaborate a theory of law and democracy released from the premises implicated by the idea of a uniform community. (shrink)

Les grands paradigmes des sciences humaines ont été constitués, au fil de l’histoire, par l’éviction progressive de la dimension affective des objets et méthodes scientifiques. Après un long désintérêt, pour partie dû à la préoccupation de l’objectivation des phénomènes retenus par l’analyse sociologique, mais aussi à l’hypostase du social, qui a trouvé notamment chez Durkheim un accomplissement encore plus accentué que dans la plupart des conceptions holistes, la question des émotions est l’...

The myth in Plotinus is a constitutive element of his metaphysics, as it is present in several treatises of the Enneads as an element aimed at justifying certain metaphysical theses through recourse to an analogy with the ancient tradition. In the case of the divine triad Ouranos‑Kronos‑Zeus, the relationship is extremely problematic since, from a Platonic perspective, these figures relate to two dialogues in particular : the Cratylus and the Timaeus. Regarding the Cratylus, the greatest difficulty for Plotinus lies in (...) matching the Socratic etymological method with the actual nature of the hypostases. From this point of view, the role of Ouranos appears particularly problematic since the very nature of the first principle is incompatible with Platonic etymology. As far as the Timaeus is concerned, a fundamental role is that of Zeus as demiurge, which respects all the problematic nature of the Plotinian perspective, which is unable to precisely delineate the role of the demiurge, for which Zeus is twofold : Intellect and Soul. It thus emerges how the role of the Cratylus and Timaeus are merely strategic for Plotinus, called upon only to justify his metaphysical theses. The myth thus has the role of justifying an analogy between the metaphysics of hypostasis and the archaic tradition, but it presents problems of interpretative oscillation that Plotinus himself does not seem able to resolve. (shrink)

The present piece focuses on the influence of Plotinus' understanding of time and eternity as articulated in Plotinus' third and fifth Enneads upon Mīr Dāmād's (d. 1631–2) conception of eternity, perpetuity, and time found in his Book of Blazing Brands (Kitab al‐Qabasāt). Although Mīr Dāmād's conception of eternity, perpetuity, and time resembles that of Plotinus' cosmology and ontology, he departs from Plotinus' hypostases in establishing strict parameters for each domain. Unlike Plotinus, Mīr Dāmād argues that the realm of eternity is (...) reserved for God alone, while the realm of Perpetuity contains the Platonic Forms. For Mīr Dāmād, the realm of time is an effect of the realm of Perpetuity and a tool for human beings to understand how to measure events in the temporal world. Unlike many other Shī'ite philosophers, Mīr Dāmād's articulation of these three cosmological realms incorporates thought found in the works of both prominent Sunni and Shī'ite scholars such as Ibn Sīnā, Abū Ḥāmid al‐Ghāzālī, Suhrawardī, and Naṣīr al‐Dīn Ṭūsī. Although his most successful student, Mullā Ṣadrā Shirazī, had ultimately disagreed with his teacher's cosmological doctrine, he remained influenced by the multitude of sources that his teacher had used. (shrink)

The theology of Pier Damiani († 1072) is still an understudied theme in his scholarship, in particular, for what it concerns his Trinitarian and Christological doctrines. The aim of this study is to reconstruct and discuss especially Damiani’s Christological views as formulated in Letter 81, better known as his De fide catholica. It is argued that Damiani’s approach is mostly exegetical, as he mainly points to and comments on Biblical passages in support of Catholic doctrines. Still, he assumes a peculiar (...) method of investigation, as he devotes the main body of the Letter to the question of the correct understanding (recta intelligentia) of the Catholic interpretation of Christology, and reserves only the final summary to a discussion of Biblical authorities. Eventually, it is argued that despite Damiani’s attempts at clarifying the matter, he acknowledges an inherent difficulty in explaining how it is possible that God became man without truly assuming the person of man, and, if He did so, how this did not give rise to two, however indistinct, persons or hypostases. The concept of ‘co-union’ of human and divine natures, introduced by Damiani, makes the simultaneous unity and distinction of the two natures intuitively clear, but it remains a concept that is not clarified in all its details and implications. (shrink)

Beau Branson rounds out the previous two chapters, by exploring the doctrine of inseparable operations ad extra in the writings of St Gregory of Nyssa. This doctrine says that all the activities of the three hypostases of the Trinity, at least insofar as they relate to things outside of (“ad extra”) the Trinity, are not only qualitatively identical but numerically identical. Importantly, Branson focuses his attention on Gregory’s theory of action and the individuation of events that emerges from his theological (...) defense of the doctrine of inseparable operations ad extra. Through a heavy engagement with contemporary metaphysics, Branson shows that Gregory’s philosophy of action is not only coherent, anticipating current trends in the ontology of actions and events, but may provide novel solutions to longstanding problems in this field. (shrink)

My hypothesis in this article is that it is possible to use the philosophical concept of technics to solve a conflict in contemporary continental ontology between speculative materialist and phenomenological approaches. More precisely, I will show that technics gives a privileged access to ontology because it leads to a “materialist” ontology, avoiding both theological and nihilistic approaches, and because technics, being by definition a domain of artificiality, precludes any explication of it in terms of naturalist materialism. I start by critically (...) examining two techno-ontologies that come from speculative realism and object-oriented ontology: Levi R. Bryant’s onto-cartography and Graham Harman’s tool-being. I then present, as a counter-position, Jean-Luc Nancy’s idea of “ecotechnology”. In conclusion, I evaluate the usefulness of the concept of technics for ontology and argue that Nancy’s post-phenomenological approach is preferable because it avoids indefensible hypostases and is more attentive to its own discursive status. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dominus Deus Noster Deus Unus Est:Aquinas on Divine UnityArchbishop Rowan Williams"The Lord our God is one LORD," says the Shema (Deut 6:4), echoed by Christians and Muslims alike. "We believe in one God," the Nicene Creed announces; and the Shahada's "There is no deity but God" affirms the same. But at first sight, Christian theology looks like the outlier here, as St. Thomas obliquely acknowledges when, early in his (...) discussion of the Trinity (Summa theologiae [ST] I, q. 30, a. 1, obj. 1 and ad 1), he quotes Boethius: "That [alone] is truly one in which there is no numeration" (obj. 3). If there is a plurality of relation in God, there is something that can be enumerated, says Thomas. This objection is duly met by distinguishing between "absolute" plurality and the mutually definitory relations of the Trinitarian life which rule out any "composition" in God. But, for this fully to make sense, we must return to Thomas's explicit discussion of divine unity (ST I, q. 11). The present essay attempts a brief examination of how divine unity is understood in this quaestio, in the hope of clarifying an aspect of Aquinas's Trinitarian thought, and also of suggesting ways of developing an implicit theme of some significance for contemporary theology.It is still a textbook commonplace that "Western" Trinitarian theology begins from the divine unity and treats the distinction of the divine persons only in the light of this prior reality. The eloquent polemic of Orthodox theologians like Vladimir Lossky has played a major role in canonizing this supposed opposition. He writes, for example, that Western Trinitarianism treats the relationships of the divine hypostases as "a system of relationships within the one essence: something logically posterior to the essence," with [End Page 555] the distinguishing "relations of origin" (originary fatherhood, generatedness, procession) as "more or less swallowed up in the nature or essence."1 Examples could be multiplied, from Lossky and many others, and from Western theologians influenced by this characterization.2 The very structure of Aquinas's Summa theologiae, with the quaestiones de Deo uno preceding those de Trinitate, is sometimes adduced in support of this analysis of the ambiguities and inadequacies of Thomist Trinitarianism, and of a general Western resistance to the radical personalism of authentic patristic theology.But, polemic apart, what is Aquinas actually saying in his treatment of divine unity, primarily in ST I, q. 11? The four articles of the quaestio deal with whether saying that something is "one" actually tells us anything beyond the postulation of something as a coherent subject/substance; with whether unity and plurality are simply opposed and incompatible notions; with whether it is right to say that God is one, and if so, whether he is maxime unus, one in a unique and unsurpassable sense. Basic to his argument, as we shall see, is something touched on briefly in ST I, q. 30, a. 1, where his response (ad 3) to the Boethian formulation associates divine unity with simplicity—that is, with non-composition:3 affirming the divine unity is, crucially, denying the applicability of certain kinds of discourse in theology. But, as we shall see, part of the abiding importance of Aquinas's discussion is, perhaps unexpectedly, to open the door to a new ontological perspective in which laying out the difference between different senses of "unity" allows for the development of a more systematically relational metaphysics. Related to this is the distinction drawn (especially in ad 2 of [End Page 556] a. 3) between "mathematical" and "metaphysical" unity; one of the problems with a good deal of modern criticism of Western Trinitarianism is a failure to reckon with the diversity of ways in which "unus est" might be used, and St. Thomas is in fact abundantly clear about the senses that must be ruled out in theology—including any sense that would oppose an "individual" essence to "multiple" hypostases, as if the divine essence were itself a sort of numerically identified individual.The ground for this is laid in the first article. If we say that something is "one," we are surely offering a determination of it, specifying one way of... (shrink)

In the 5th century, Cyril of Alexandria wrote a large apologetic work, as a response to Julian the Apostate's anti-Christian work Against the Galileans. Aside from the obvious divide of one being a Christian and one a pagan, Cyril's religious views were very different from Julian's. Julian's arguments against the Christian doctrine do not greatly differ from those used in the second century by Celsus, and by Porphyry in the third and he regarded the relations between Neoplatonic criticism of Christian (...) Word. As a pagan, Julian had adopted the Platonic and Neoplatonic conception of the one God. Cyril doesn't stack up against the Platonic one. Cyril's goal in responding to Julian is, therefore, to help the skeptical reader to find the real faith. Cyril invokes precisely the evidence of Platonist philosophers in favour of the Trinitarian doctrine. Cyril shows, unlike Julian, that the Greek philosophers accept the three principal hypostases and using the term triad, they agree with Christian teaching. So, ancient philosophers as Porphyry supported that the substance of the divinity has proceeded towards three hypostases. Cyril confronts not only Julian's view against Christian, but he also confirms something that Justin the Martyr supported centuries ago about the 'spermatic logos'. In this paper, we will examine this two works, 'Against the Galileans' of Julian and 'Against Julian' of Cyril, not only from their theological opinions but as arguments using the 'common images' (eikota),the possible logical arguments, in supporting the positions of Julian and Cyril in a legal struggle. (shrink)

Philosophers wanted commonsense to fight skepticism. They hypostasized and destroyed it. Commonsense is skeptical--Bound by a sense of proportion and of limitation. A scarce commodity, At times supported, At times transcended by science, Commonsense has to be taken account of by the critical-Realistic theory of science. James clerk maxwell's view of today's science as tomorrow's commonsense is the point of departure. It is wonderful but overlooks the value of the sense of proportion.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The reconstruction of Paul Ricoeur's philosophical project presented in this thesis endeavours to bring together his various ideas concerning human willing in order to assess the contribution they are able to make to contemporary Christian theology. This critical assessment identifies the field of concepts and issues that comprise Ricoeur's Kantian account of willing; it also challenges his reliance on a paradoxical account of the human subject as being both (...) temporal and non-temporal. ;Ricoeur's dual-aspect account of willing assumes that the human subject is not merely passive in receiving the intuitions of experience but is actively involved in the constitution of objective experience and in the self-recognition of human freedom as 'a captive free will'. Human freedom, then, can only be adequately understood in terms of the symbolism of 'captivity' and 'deliverance'. For Ricoeur it is the Judaeo-Christian 'myths' concerning the origin and the end of evil which uniquely symbolise the experience of deliverance from captivity by representing Jesus Christ as the decisive figure of hope for a transformation of human consciousness and circumstances. ;However, at the same time as offering this positive assessment it is argued that Ricoeur's dual-aspect account of human willing--privileging, as it does, the conceptual hypostases of 'the temporal' and 'the non-temporal'--is founded upon a transcendental idealist problematic. In order to go beyond adherence to an abstract and possibly mystifying view of 'the non-temporal' the ultimate emphasis in this thesis is placed upon the transformative and transignifying possibilities of the dual reconstructive process which both constitute and are constituted by Ricoeur's 'hermeneutics of suspicion' and 'hermeneutics of faith'. An authentic faith--and thus the paramount condition of an authentic theology itself--depends, in Ricoeurian terms, upon both a critical and restorative reconstruction and reconstitution of the human bond with the sacred. (shrink)