Applied a theory of information integration to decision making with probabilistic events. 10 undergraduates judged the subjective worth of duplex bets that included independent gain and lose components. The worth of each component was assumed to be the product of a subjective weight that reflected the probability of winning or losing, and the subjective worth of the money to be won or lost. The total worth of the bet was the sum of the worths of the 2 components. (...) Thus, each judgment required multiplying and adding operations. The multiplying model worked quite well in 4 experimental conditions. The adding model showed more serious discrepancies, though these were small in magnitude. The theory of functional measurement was applied to scale the subjective values of the probability and money stimuli. Subjective and objective values were nonlinearly related both for probability and for money. (shrink)

Upon hearing a scalar adjective in a definite referring expression such as “the big…,” listeners typically make anticipatory eye movements to an item in a contrast set, such as a big glass in the context of a smaller glass. Recent studies have suggested that this rapid, contrastive interpretation of scalar adjectives is malleable and calibrated to the speaker's pragmatic competence. In a series of eye‐tracking experiments, we explore the nature of the evidence necessary for the modulation of pragmatic inferences in (...) language comprehension, focusing on the complementary roles of top–down information ‐ (knowledge about the particular speaker's pragmatic competence) and bottom‐up cues (distributional information about the use of scalar adjectives in the environment). We find that bottom‐up evidence alone (e.g., the speaker says “the big dog” in a context with one dog), in large quantities, can be sufficient to trigger modulation of the listener's contrastive inferences, with or without top‐down cues to support this adaptation. Further, these findings suggest that listeners track and flexibly combine multiple sources of information in service of efficient pragmatic communication. (shrink)

This paper examines information integrity, with the premise that sound, dependable information enhances the values of the entire society. Several issues about information integrity of great concern to Africa are access to information, the right of individuals to correct records that are erroneous, accurate and culturally appropriate translations, and the standard of freedom of the press. The basis for this paper is human rights doctrine largely embodied in the ethical principals of the international informatics community.

This paper describes how Tononi’s information integration theory of consciousness was used to make detailed predictions about the distribution of phenomenal states in a spiking neural network. This network had approximately 18,000 neurons and 700,000 connections and it used models of emotion and imagination to control the eye movements of a virtual robot and avoid ‘negative’ stimuli. The first stage in the analysis was the development of a formal definition of Tononi’s theory of consciousness. The network was then (...) analysed for information integration and detailed predictions were made about the distribution of consciousness for each time step of recorded activity. This work demonstrates how an artificial system can be analysed for consciousness using a particular theory and in the future this approach could be used to make predictions about the phenomenal states associated with biological systems. (shrink)

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory. We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize. We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike (...) GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim. (shrink)

Most models of risky decision making assume that all relevant information is taken into account (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). However, there are also some models supposing that only part of the information is considered (e.g., Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). To further investigate the amount of information that is usually used for decision making, and how the use depends on feedback, we conducted a series of three experiments (...) in which participants choose between two lotteries and where no feedback, outcome feedback, and error feedback was provided, respectively. The result show that without feedback participants mostly chose the lottery with the higher winning probability, and largely ignored the potential gains. The same result occurred when the outcome of each decision was fed back. Only after presenting error feedback (i.e., signaling whether a choice was optimal or not), participants considered probabilities as well as gains, resulting in more optimal choices. We propose that outcome feedback was ineffective, because of its probabilistic and ambiguous nature. Participants improve information integration only if provided with a consistent and deterministic signal such as error feedback. (shrink)

The environment is a continuous source of matter and energy, which dynamizes the adaptive processes of biological systems, so that these systems emerge, persist or are extinguished as a consequence of their reactions to the environment. This perspective, forged from classical physics, gives way to multiple ecological theories, with evolution being the most prominent one. In all these cases, information would be both dependent and subsequent to matter and energy. Thus, the emergence and dynamics of genetic material or ecological (...) attributes such as abundance, richness or diversity depend mainly on the interaction of these two fundamental states. However, recent approaches from quantum physics and complexity views put forward the notion that information can be independent and prior to matter and energy, which allows us to see ecological processes from another perspective, i.e., as including complex biological systems as capable of showing emergent properties such as cognition. We proposed here a set of postulates and ideas that suggests how the ability to manipulate (internalize, integrate, store and generate) information can be developed by those systems, which would directly and non-randomly influence ecological attributes and their dynamics; i.e., how this property can possibly help replacing the notion of the environment as the ultimate cause of changes. Besides fully detailing the sources of knowledge and our rationale in this sense, we have also discussed how these thoughts and possibilities can be employed in devising better and more comprehensive approaches for biological conservation strategies. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this research, we investigated whether appraisals of faces follow distinct rules of information integration under arousing versus non-arousing conditions. Support for this prediction was found in four experiments in which participants observed angry faces that were presented with a direct versus an averted gaze, on a red versus a grey background, and after performing a motor exercise versus no exercise. Under arousing conditions, participants’ appraisals of faces reflected summation whereas, under non-arousing conditions, appraisals did not reflect summation (...) and could instead be accounted for by three alternative rules of information integration based on averaging, mere exposure, or the number of strong stimuli. (shrink)

The cognitive unbinding paradigm suggests that the synthesis of neural information is attenuated by general anesthesia. Here, we analyzed the functional organization of brain activities in the conscious and anesthetized states, based on functional segregation and integration. Electroencephalography recordings were obtained from 14 subjects undergoing induction of general anesthesia with propofol. We quantified changes in mean information integration capacity in each band of the EEG. After induction with propofol, mean information integration capacity was reduced (...) most prominently in the γ band of the EEG . Furthermore, we demonstrate that loss of consciousness is reflected by the breakdown of the spatiotemporal organization of γ waves. We conclude that induction of general anesthesia with propofol reduces the capacity for information integration in the brain. These data directly support the information integration theory of consciousness and the cognitive unbinding paradigm of general anesthesia. (shrink)

The integration of information resources in the life sciences is one of the most challenging problems facing bioinformatics today. We describe how Language and Computing nv, originally a developer of ontology-based natural language understanding systems for the healthcare domain, is developing a framework for the integration of structured data with unstructured information contained in natural language texts. L&C’s LinkSuite™ combines the flexibility of a modular software architecture with an ontology based on rigorous philosophical and logical principles (...) that is designed to comprehend the basic formal relationships that structure both reality and the ways humans perceive and communicate about reality. (shrink)

We investigated the key anatomical structures mediating interhemispheric integration during the perception of apparent motion across the retinal midline. Previous studies of commissurotomized patients suggest that subcortical structures mediate interhemispheric transmission but the specific regions involved remain unclear. Here, we exploit interindividual variations in the propensity of normal subjects to perceive horizontal motion, in relation to vertical motion. We characterize these differences psychophysically using a Dynamic Dot Quartet (an ambiguous stimulus that induces illusory motion). We then tested for correlations (...) between a tendency to perceive horizontal motion and fractional anisotropy (FA) (from structural diffusion tensor imaging), over subjects. FA is an indirect measure of the orientation and integrity of white matter tracts. Subjects who found it easy to perceive horizontal motion showed significantly higher FA values in the pulvinar. Furthermore, fiber tracking from an independently identified (subject-specific) visual motion area converged on the pulvinar nucleus. These results suggest that the pulvinar is an anatomical hub and may play a central role in interhemispheric integration. (shrink)

The integrated information theory is a promising theory of consciousness. However, there are several problems with IIT's axioms and postulates. Moreover, IIT entails that some twodimensional grids of identical logic gates have more consciousness than humans. Many have found this prediction to be implausible, and as will be argued here, this prediction also exacerbates the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. Recently, it has been argued that if we treat the phenomenological aspects of consciousness as an illusion, we can avoid (...) the hard problem altogether by replacing it with the more tractable illusion problem: the problem of explaining how introspection systematically misrepresents experiences as having phenomenology. IIT is intended to be a theory of the phenomenological aspects of consciousness. However, it is possible to reformulate the axioms and postulates of IIT consistently with illusionism. Here it is argued that the resulting theory -- illusionist integrated information theory -- removes several problems for IIT including the hard problem and the logic gate problem, and also enables meaningful progress for illusionists on solving the illusion problem. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying emergentist metaphysics, specifically of a kind that has received minimal attention and we may call functionalist emergentism. I will try to show that in this scientific theory conscious experience is a functional-role property possessed by the whole system, not by their parts, which is dependent on, but also (purportedly) causally powerful over and above, the properties of the parts. However, I will argue that depicting (...) conscious experience as a functional-role emergent property threatens the whole coherence of the theory because, by definition, functional-realizers do all the causal work associated with the instantiation of any functional-role property on any occasion. Hence, to preserve the causal power of consciousness, which, as we will see, is one of the fundamental building blocks of the theory, linked to the assertion of the very existence of consciousness, phenomenal properties should be re-thought as realizers of the relevant informationally integrated causal-roles. (shrink)

Integrated information theory (IIT) is a candidate theory of consciousness that highlights the role of complex interactions between parts of a system as the basis of consciousness – and, due to its general information-theoretic formulation, is capable of making statements about consciousness in neural and non-neural systems alike. Here, we argue that a system radically different to a human brain, host to complex physiological and functional structures capable of integrating information, can be found in the meristems and (...) vascular system of higher plants. Following a pragmatic and ontologically innocent approach, neither taking for granted that plants are conscious nor dismissing the possibility that they are, we argue that the time is ripe to apply analysis tools inspired by IIT to plants, taking advantage of recent developments in both plant imaging and information theory. We introduce and discuss the relevant literature, and pro information and integration in plant behaviour, assessing the plausibility of plant sentience. If successful, these experiments could position plants as the next frontier in consciousness science, and urge us to rethink our perspectives on consciousness, how to measure it, and its prevalence amongst living beings. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTononi’s Integrated Information Theory explains consciousness as integrated information, that is, the informational state produced by the whole system over the sum of its parts. M...

Software application ontologies have the potential to become the keystone in state-of-the-art information management techniques. It is expected that these ontologies will support the sort of reasoning power required to navigate large and complex terminologies correctly and efficiently. Yet, there is one problem in particular that continues to stand in our way. As these terminological structures increase in size and complexity, and the drive to integrate them inevitably swells, it is clear that the level of consistency required for such (...) navigation will become correspondingly difficult to maintain. While descriptive semantic representations are certainly a necessary component to any adequate ontology-based system, so long as ontology engineers rely solely on semantic information, without a sound ontological theory informing their modeling decisions, this goal will surely remain out of reach. In this paper we describe how Language and Computing nv (L&C), along with The Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Sciences (IFOMIS), are working towards developing and implementing just such a theory, combining the open software architecture of L&C’s LinkSuiteTM with the philosophical rigor of IFOMIS’s Basic Formal Ontology. In this way we aim to move beyond the more or less simple controlled vocabularies that have dominated the industry to date. (shrink)

(2001). Is Informed Consent Enough? Monetary Incentives for Research Participation and the Integrity of Biomedicine. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 49-51.

We present a novel spontaneous collapse model where size is no longer the property of a physical system which determines its rate of collapse. Instead, we argue that the rate of spontaneous localization should depend on a system’s quantum Integrated Information, a novel physical property which describes a system’s capacity to act like a quantum observer. We introduce quantum Integrated Information, present our QII collapse model and briefly explain how it may be experimentally tested against quantum theory.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) stands out as one of the most promising approaches to scientifically understand the emergence of consciousness. Even if it borrows from the phenomenology of consciousness to derive its axiomatic formulation, IIT does not initially adhere to any particular ontological position. However, its founder leans towards Panpsychism. More recently, Owen has studied the pros and cons of different ontologies as a metaphysical basis for IIT, defending a hylomorphic stance where en-grounding, en-forming relations gain the upper hand (...) in the causal narrative. This paper aims at (1) complementing Owen’s work by invoking additional arguments against physicalist IIT, both reductive and non-reductive; and (2) improving Owen’s characterization of non-physicalist causality through a “nested” version of hylomorphism that avoids the combination problem of Panpsychism. (shrink)

Giulio Tononi's integrated information theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness,phi(Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the (...) consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range of natural systems and artifacts that include, but are not limited to, large-scale electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, some electronic circuit boards, and social networks. Instead of treating this consequence of the theory as a disconfirmation, IIT embraces it. By regarding these systems as bearers of consciousnessex hypothesi, IIT is led toward the orbit of panpsychist ideation. This departure from science as we know it can be avoided by recognizing the functional misattribution at the heart of IIT's identity claim. We show, for example, what function is actually performed, at least in the human case, by the cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT identifies with consciousness. Finally, we examine what lessons may be drawn from IIT's failure to provide a credible account of consciousness for progress in the very active field of research concerned with exploring the phenomenon from formal and neural points of view. (shrink)

David Gamez, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 21 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400046.

Similar case analysis (SCA) is an essential topic in legal artificial intelligence, serving as a reference for legal professionals. Most existing works treat SCA as a traditional text classification task and ignore some important legal elements that affect the verdict and case similarity, like legal events, and thus are easily misled by semantic structure. To address this issue, we propose a Legal Event-Context Model named LECM to improve the accuracy and interpretability of SCA based on Chinese legal corpus. The event-context (...) integration mechanism, which is an essential component of the LECM, is proposed to integrate the legal event and context information based on the attention mechanism, enabling legal events to be associated with their corresponding relevant contexts. We introduce an event detection module to obtain the legal event information, which is pre-trained on a legal event detection dataset to avoid labeling events manually. We conduct extensive experiments on two SCA tasks, i.e., similar case matching (SCM) and similar case retrieval (SCR). Compared with baseline models, LECM is validated by about 13% and 11% average improvement in terms of mean average precision and accuracy respectively, for SCR and SCM tasks. These results indicate that LECM effectively utilizes event-context knowledge to enhance SCA performance and its potential application in various legal document analysis tasks. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with having a maximum amount of integrated information. But a thing’s having the maximum amount of anything cannot be intrinsic to it, for that depends on how that thing compares to certain other things. IIT’s consciousness, then, is not intrinsic. A mereological argument elaborates this consequence: IIT implies that one physical system can be conscious while a physical duplicate of it is not conscious. Thus, by a common and reasonable conception of intrinsicality, (...) IIT’s consciousness is not intrinsic. It is then argued that to avoid the implication that consciousness is not intrinsic, IIT must abandon its Exclusion Postulate, which prohibits overlapping conscious systems. Indeed, theories of consciousness that attribute consciousness to physical systems, should embrace the view that some conscious systems overlap. A discussion of the admittedly counterintuitive nature of this solution, along with some medical and neuroscientific realities that would seem to support it, is included. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that these causal (...) powers aren’t tied to protoplasmic material. Whatever these causal powers are, they don’t consist in mere information-processing or computation. IIT agrees, and also positively characterizes the relevant causal powers as those involved in generating integrated information. Examining the further commitments of each theory reveals that IIT renews a fundamentally ontological challenge to information-processing and computational theories of mind. (shrink)