The opposition between “in real life” an “in virtual life” is often used of, in order to distinguish between two parts of the world. We are supposed to live a virtual life on the Internet, behind the lightened screen of our computer, while we are supposed to live a real life in the real world. I claim that the Internet is not a virtual world, and that it is a part of the actual world for there are (...) causal links between the Internet and the so-called real world. According to David Lewis, worlds that are causally linked to each other cannot be different worlds. The only way to conceive of the Internet as a part of the actual world is to adopt Maurizio Ferraris’ hypothesis about documentality because, under such a hypothesis, what one writes has a causal power. (shrink)

IN "THE INCARNATION AS A CONTINUING REALITY," RELIGIOUS STUDIES 6,303-27 (DECEMBER 1970), DAVID PAILIN CLAIMS THAT THE INCARNATION REVEALS THE NECESSARY, EMPIRICALLY NON-FALSIFIABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF GOD’S "ACTIVE ACTUALITY". GOD’S "PASSIVE ACTUALITY," THE WAY HE EXPERIENCES THE WORLD, IS METAPHYSICALLY KNOWN, BUT NOT HIS "ACTIVE ACTUALITY," THE WAY IN WHICH HE RESPONDS TO THE WORLD, FOR HE COULD HAVE RESPONDED OTHERWISE. NEVERTHELESS GOD’S CONCRETE RESPONSE IS EMPIRICALLY NON-FALSIFIABLE, FOR EVERYTHING THAT CAN POSSIBLY HAPPEN IN THE ACTUAL WORLD WILL REFLECT THAT (...) RESPONSE. I REPLY THAT THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES AS WELL COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OTHERWISE, BUT GOD’S PRIMORDIAL DECISION DETERMINES WHICH MUST BE EXEMPLIFIED BY ALL POSSIBLE ACTUALITIES WHATSOEVER. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF GOD’S RESPONSE TO THE WORLD IS THEREBY METAPHYSICALLY KNOWABLE. THE INCARNATION OF THE CHRIST REVEALS TO US THE CONTINGENT CHARACTER OF GOD’S RESPONSE TO THE PARTICULARITIES OF HUMAN EXISTENCE, AND THIS. (shrink)

is the second-order theory of the part-whole relation. It can express such hypotheses about the size of Reality as that there are inaccessibly many atoms. Take a non-empty class to have exactly its non-empty subclasses as parts; hence, its singleton subclasses as atomic parts. Then standard set theory becomes the theory of the member-singleton function—better, the theory of all singleton functions—within the framework of megethology. Given inaccessibly many atoms and a specification of which atoms are urelements, a singleton function exists, (...) unique up to isomorphism. (This article is partly abridged from my Parts of Classes, partly a sequel.). (shrink)

In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly (...) his pluriverse of possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non- Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti- systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience. (shrink)

David Lewis (1941–2001) was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th Century. He made significant contributions to philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, decision theory, epistemology, meta-ethics and aesthetics. In most of these fields he is essential reading; in many of them he is among the most important figures of recent decades. And this list leaves out his two most significant contributions. -/- In philosophy of mind, Lewis developed and defended at length (...) a new version of materialism (see the entry on physicalism). He started by showing how the motivations driving the identity theory of mind and functionalism could be reconciled in his theory of mind. He called this an identity theory, though his theory motivated the position now known as analytic functionalism. And he developed detailed accounts of mental content (building on Davidson’s interpretationism) and phenomenal knowledge (building on Nemirow’s ability hypothesis) that are consistent with his materialism. The synthesis Lewis ended up with is one of the central positions in contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. -/- But his largest contributions were in metaphysics. One branch of his metaphysics was his Hume-inspired reductionism about the nomological. He developed a position he called “Humean supervenience”, the theory that said that there was nothing to reality except the spatio-temporal distribution of local natural properties. And he did this by showing in detail how laws, chances, counterfactual dependence, causation, dispositions and colours could be located within this Humean mosaic. The other branch of his metaphysics was his modal realism. Lewis held that the best theory of modality posited concrete possible worlds. A proposition is possible if and only if it is true at one of these worlds. Lewis defended this view in his most significant book, On the Plurality of Worlds. Alongside this, Lewis developed a new account of how to think about modal properties of individuals, namely counterpart theory, and showed how this theory resolved several long-standing puzzles about modal properties. (shrink)

Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism.

A leading philosopher takes a mind-bending journey through virtual worlds, illuminating the nature of reality and our place within it. Virtual reality is genuine reality; that's the central thesis of Reality+. In a highly original work of "technophilosophy," David J. Chalmers gives a compelling analysis of our technological future. He argues that virtual worlds are not second-class worlds, and that we can live a meaningful life in virtual reality. We may even be in a (...) class='Hi'>virtual world already. Along the way, Chalmers conducts a grand tour of big ideas in philosophy and science. He uses virtual reality technology to offer a new perspective on long-established philosophical questions. How do we know that there's an external world? Is there a god? What is the nature of reality? What's the relation between mind and body? How can we lead a good life? All of these questions are illuminated or transformed by Chalmers' mind-bending analysis. Studded with illustrations that bring philosophical issues to life, Reality+ is a major statement that will shape discussion of philosophy, science, and technology for years to come. (shrink)

The rapid evolution of information, communication and entertainment technologies will transform the lives of citizens and ultimately transform society. This paper focuses on ethical issues associated with the likely convergence of virtual realities and social networks, hereafter VRSNs. We examine a scenario in which a significant segment of the world’s population has a presence in a VRSN. Given the pace of technological development and the popularity of these new forms of social interaction, this scenario is plausible. However, it brings (...) with it ethical problems. Two central ethical issues are addressed: those of privacy and those of autonomy. VRSNs pose threats to both privacy and autonomy. The threats to privacy can be broadly categorized as threats to informational privacy, threats to physical privacy, and threats to associational privacy. Each of these threats is further subdivided. The threats to autonomy can be broadly categorized as threats to freedom, to knowledge and to authenticity. Again, these three threats are divided into subcategories. Having categorized the main threats posed by VRSNs, a number of recommendations are provided so that policy-makers, developers, and users can make the best possible use of VRSNs. (shrink)

This is a virtual reality simulation that imagines its subject as emerging from a long stint in Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine." The simulation is an interview (with many branching paths) meant to gauge the subject's views on the metaphysics of virtual objects and the ethics of virtual actions. It draws heavily from the published work of David Chalmers, Mark Silcox, Jon Cogburn, Morgan Luck, and Nick Bostrom. *Requires an Oculus Rift (or Rift-S) or HTC Vive and (...) a VR capable computer. To open the files, uncompress the downloaded .zip folder and run the executable (.exe) file. **This module is made possible due to an APA Small Grant and a grant from Oculus Education. (shrink)

David Lewis David Lewis is an American philosopher and one of the last generalists, in the sense that he was one of the last philosophers who contributed to the great majority of sub-fields of the discipline. He made central contributions in metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and probabilistic and practical … Continue reading David Lewis →.

In June 2016, David Chalmers delivered the Petrus Hispanus Lectures at the LanCog research group, University of Lisbon, on the subject of objects, properties, and perception in virtual reality environments. The paper resulting from these lectures was subsequently published in Disputatio as “The Virtual and the Real” (vol. IX, 2017, No. 46, pp. 309–52). In it, Chalmers defends virtual realism, according to which virtual objects are bona fide digital objects with virtual counterparts of perceptible (...) properties such as colour and shape, and perception in virtual reality environments is typically veridical rather than illusory. This special issue collects responses to Chalmers due to Claus Beisbart, Jesper Juul, Peter Ludlow, Neil McDonnell and Nathan Wildman, Alyssa Ney, Eric Schwitzgebel, and Marc Silcox; together with a detailed response by Chalmers to each paper. You can read the target article (Chalmers 2017, “The Virtual and the Real”) under discussion in this Special Issue here: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0009. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christ in the Life and Teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus by Andrew Hofer, O.P.Lewis AyresChrist in the Life and Teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus. By Andrew Hofer, O.P. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xi + 270. $105.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-19-968194-5.Fr. Andrew Hofer has written a cleverly conceived treatise on Gregory Nazianzen, one whose main focus is Gregory’s vision of his own life (and the life of (...) Christians more generally) as both imitatio Christi and participatio Christi. Hofer grounds his account of this imitatio and participatio in Gregory’s core dogmatic account of the person of Christ. The book thus offers us a study, focusing on one central author, of the ways in which a Nicene Christology could shape and stimulate (as well as be shaped and stimulated by) an account of the Christian life.The first chapter is an extended meditation on the nature of the “word” in Gregory. Here, Hofer begins by exploring how Gregory situates himself in the ancient battle—or at least the ancient literary topos of such a battle—between philosophy and rhetoric. Not surprisingly, Hofer emphasizes that Gregory sees himself as a philosopher, but one for whom the Christian life offers the true form of a philosophical life. The discussion then turns toward ways in which Gregory sees the Scriptures as providing a basis for discussing and modeling virtually all aspects of the Christian life. Hofer offers a little discussion of the manner in which Gregory adapts ancient rhetorical traditions of, for example, the paradeigma (see 44), but these debts are acknowledged mostly en passant.The second chapter takes us to the heart of the book and does an excellent job of setting up the author’s theme. Considering Gregory’s poetic auto-biographical [End Page 314] writing, Hofer argues that Gregory not only “blends Christ into the troubles, fears, and joys of his own life” but that he also “makes present the baptismal mysteries of one’s life immersed in Christ’s life” (56). In chapter 5, this extra dimension will receive a foundation in an account of the ways in which Gregory sees Christians drawn into the very events of Christ’s life (156-60, commenting particularly on Gregory’s Or. 40). There, Hofer emphasizes that Christ’s life is itself “a mimesis of ours” (160), creating realities that may be models for ours, models into which we are then drawn. But, in chapter 2 itself, Hofer’s main concern is to show the sheer variety of ways in which Gregory interweaves the scriptural account of Christ’s life and ministry with his own. This complex set of reference styles is termed Gregory’s “autobiographical Christology.”Chapter 3 pursues this agenda by turning to the ways in which Gregory uses the terminology of “mixture” to describe Christ—and to describe Christ’s relationship to Christians. It is this chapter that Stanley Hauerwas, were he endorsing the book, would say is “worth the price of the book alone.” Two things are particularly noteworthy. The first is the helpful discussion of the philosophical traditions that lie behind the terms Gregory uses. Hofer wishes us to take seriously traditions of thought on this theme that run between Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, rather than to place most weight on the Stoic tradition. Hofer advocates for his thesis in a sensitive fashion, emphasizing the difficulty in distinguishing distinct traditions in late antiquity. Second, there is much to be learned from the manner in which Hofer stretches discussion of Christ himself as “mixture” so that it provides insight into Gregory’s account of the Christian’s relationship with Christ.Chapter 4 follows a similar pattern, showing that a discussion of Christ’s person in Gregory’s writings (in this case, the famous sequence epp. 101, 102, and 202) has repercussions for wider themes. This chapter is less successful, in large part because of the sheer scale of the exercise attempted by Hofer. The largest section of the chapter (123-47) offers an extended discussion of Gregory’s ep. 101. This famous letter gives an extended critique of Christological error. Hofer begins by situating... (shrink)

David Lewis is most famous in the analytical metaphysics literature for his analysis of the truth conditions of counterfactual conditionals in terms of possible worlds, and for his analysis of causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals. He uses a notion of comparative similarity of possible worlds in his analysis of counterfactual conditionals. However, since he attributes reality to possible worlds he has attracted many criticisms. The aim of our paper is to present some counterfactuals whose account cannot be (...) given within a Lewisian framework, and to point to some devastating results for Lewis of such an inadequacy. (shrink)

Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism.

Despite the alarming drop in numbers of students studying science throughout the Western world today there is no more important subject in our time than science broadly construed, and these three books provide some of the reasons. Their diversity indicates the shape of the debates occurring about the scientist in Western culture, science's tortured philosophical realism and representation as troubled categories, and, most predictably, life on the screen in the age of the Internet.

The subject of the article is the philosophical and cultural methodology of digital "virtual reality", comparing the declarations of developers with the practical possibilities and social consequences of using such technologies. The developers presented projects of online digital content services for all five senses using special equipment (glasses, headphones, interactive gloves, joysticks, costumes, printers of smells and tastes, etc.). It was assumed that virtual reality would surpass the reliability of previous multimedia content and interactive computer games, and the (...) persuasiveness and attractiveness of traditional technical means of art and the press. Failure to fulfill these promises has led to significant losses since 2022 for leading companies developing digital virtual reality technologies Meta (recognized by the court as an extremist organization on 03/21/2022, activity is limited in the territory of the Russian Federation), Microsoft HapticLinks, Cave, AlloSphere, Teslasuit, VRealizer. There was a need to assess how and to what extent the methodology used and the predicted capabilities of digital virtual reality were correct. Philosophical and cultural analysis as a research method reveals: the developers of digital virtual reality promised the methodologically impossible, reducing human perception to the "sum" of the external "five senses" out of connection with the "self", inner sensitivity, bodily self-perceptions. A person is only partially amenable to algorithmized digital interaction; a critical barrier to digital virtuality is the socio-cultural identity of society and personality. The novelty of the results of the analysis lies in the conclusion: digital virtual reality in many respects is fundamentally inferior in effectiveness to traditional technical means of sensory and emotional impact and cognition, used both for creative and destructive purposes. In terms of creative potential, digital virtual reality is inferior to the technical means of art, science, education, upbringing, etc., and in terms of destructive capabilities, it is already used in the press and other mass communications technologies for manipulating public and individual consciousness, as well as psychotropic substances that cause addiction. National regulation of the development of digital "virtual reality" is recommended, aimed at protecting and developing the socio-cultural identity of Russian citizens and society, as well as for cognitive and educational purposes. It is recommended to limit the remote use of such developments to trusted domestic Internet services. (shrink)

David Lewis’s work in the past few decades produced a powerful and thought-provoking system, and this collection of eleven essays represents state-of-the-art engagement with that system across a range of topics. The title would suggest that the papers would deal in particular with Lewis’s doctrine of Humean supervenience, the doctrine that all the contingent truths are ultimately determined by instantiations of fundamental categorical properties at points of space-time, and the spatiotemporal relationships between those instantiations: that everything in (...) our world supervenes on “local, particular matters of fact.” It is a bold philosophical program, with a reductionist approach to our everyday theoretical commitments and a goal of explaining the connections between the mental and the physical, laws and regularities, causes and effects, and chances and their outcomes, all without “necessary connections between distinct existences.” It is a program that many philosophers believe deserves attention in detail, even if many would wish to dispute parts of the picture. Indeed, Lewis himself does not so much defend Humean supervenience outright as argue that it need not be given up on philosophical grounds —in principle the materials allowed by Lewis would be enough to enable the world to contain such things as minds, causation, people, and languages; and in principle, Lewis claims, his Humean world has everything needed for truths of counterfactual conditionals and statements of objective chances. Lewis leaves open the question of whether physics in fact delivers us such a sparse world, but he thought that the lessons of his in-principle defense of Humean supervenience would carry over to a system including whatever fundamental physical posits will be eventually settled upon by science. (shrink)

Sensorimotor learning refers to improvements that occur through practice in the performance of sensory-guided motor behaviors. Leveraging novel technical capabilities of an immersive virtual environment, we probed the component kinematic processes that mediate sensorimotor learning. Twenty naïve subjects performed a simulated marksmanship task modeled after Olympic Trap Shooting standards. We measured movement kinematics and shooting performance as participants practiced 350 trials while receiving trial-by-trial feedback about shooting success. Spatiotemporal analysis of motion tracking elucidated the ballistic and refinement phases of (...) hand movements. We found systematic changes in movement kinematics that accompanied improvements in shot accuracy during training, though reaction and response times did not change over blocks. In particular, we observed longer, slower, and more precise ballistic movements that replaced effort spent on corrections and refinement. Collectively, these results leverage developments in immersive virtual reality technology to quantify and compare the kinematics of movement during early learning of full-body sensorimotor orienting. (shrink)

Exposure Therapy (ET) has demonstrated its efficacy in the treatment of phobias, anxiety and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), however, it suffers a high drop-out rate because of too low or too high patient engagement in treatment. Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy (VRET) is comparably effective regarding symptom reduction and offers an alternative tool to facilitate engagement for avoidant participants. Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that both ET and VRET normalize brain activity within a fear circuit. However, previous studies have employed brain (...) imaging technology which restricts people’s movement and hides their body, surroundings and therapist from view. This is at odds with the way engagement is typically controlled. We used a novel combination of neural imaging and VR technology—Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) and Immersive Projection Technology (IPT), to avoid these limitations. Although there are a few studies that have investigated the effect of VRET on a brain function after the treatment, the present study utilized technologies which promote ecological validity to measure brain changes after VRET treatment. Furthermore, there are no studies that have measured brain activity within VRET session. In this study brain activity within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) was measured during three consecutive exposure sessions. N = 13 acrophobic volunteers were asked to walk on a virtual plank with a 6 m drop below. Changes in oxygenated (HbO) hemogl... (shrink)

The paper discusses the thesis of virtual realism presented by David Chalmers in his paper “The Virtual and the Real” (2017). Here, I suggest an even stronger version of the claim that I call “virtual physicalism”. According to this view, virtual objects are not only real but physical as they are identical to the physical states of computers that run VR software. I suggest that virtual objects should have a similar ontological status to toys—they (...) should be treated as models or simplifications of ordinary objects. Just like toys, virtual objects can sometimes be good enough to be used instead of their ordinary counterparts. In these cases, virtual objects start to be treated as instantiations of the same kind. In the last part of the paper, I use Johan Huizinga’s notion of a “magic circle” to suggest how different objects could be successfully “virtualized”, that is, moved into a digital realm while remaining objects of the same kind as their non-virtual counterparts. I suggest this will happen once virtual reality becomes permanent and causally connected with non-virtual reality. I finish the paper by looking at examples of natural kind objects and individuals, which seem to be the hardest cases for successful virtualization. (shrink)

Rich sensorimotor interaction facilitates language learning and is presumed to ground conceptual representations. Yet empirical support for early stages of embodied word learning is currently lacking. Finding evidence that sensorimotor interaction shapes learned linguistic representations would provide crucial support for embodied language theories. We developed a gamified word learning experiment in virtual reality in which participants learned the names of six novel objects by grasping and manipulating objects with either their left or right hand. Participants then completed a word–color (...) match task in which they were tested on the same six words and objects. Participants were faster to respond to stimuli in the match task when the response hand was compatible with the hand used to interact with the named object, an effect we refer to as affordance compatibility. In two follow up experiments, we found that merely observing virtual hands interact with the objects was sufficient to acquire a smaller affordance compatibility effect, and we found that the compatibility effect was driven primarily by responses with a compatible hand and not by responses in a compatible spatial location. Our results support theoretical views of language which ground word representations in sensorimotor experiences, and they suggest promising future routes to explore the sensorimotor foundations of higher cognition through immersive virtual experiments. (shrink)

As the technological phenomenon known as the worldwide web permeates civilization, it creates some cultures and destroys others. In this pioneering book, philosopher Thomas Langan explores "virtual reality"Can inherently contradictory phrase"and the effects of technology on our very being. In our present-day high- technology environment, making simple, everyday decisions is difficult because the virtual world we've created doesn't necessarily operate according to the old "common sense." To retain our intellectual fitness, we must, Langan argues, consider these essential questions: (...) If virtual reality is, in fact, reality, what is this life that we are caught up in? What is _being_ within the context of virtual reality? How can we establish a system for distinguishing truth from fiction? Although technology minimizes distances between people and makes the information they seek more accessible, it simultaneously blurs the line dividing fact from falsehood and real from virtual. An individual's intellectual survival is threatened as technological advancement challenges our collective understanding of what reality is. Because much of the information that is presented as fact simply works to fulfill a specific agenda, we cannot accept as truth everything that appears on the internet or in the media. To survive, we must learn to manage our lives and resources despite the flood of information we are bombarded with daily. Addressing the general educated reader, _Surviving the Age of Virtual Reality_ expertly interweaves the worlds of technology and philosophy, pushing the analysis of this technological and human phenomenon to new depths. (shrink)

It is well known that the appearance of food, particularly its color, can influence flavor perception and identification. However, food studies involving the manipulation of product color face inevitable limitations, from extrinsic flavors introduced by food coloring to the cost in development time and resources in order to produce different product variants. One solution lies in modern virtual reality technology, which has become increasingly accessible, sophisticated, and widespread over the past years. In the present study, we investigated whether making (...) a coffee look milkier in a VR environment can alter its perceived flavor and liking. Thirty-two United Kingdom consumers were given four samples of black cold brew coffee at 4 and 8% sucrose concentration. They wore VR headsets throughout the study and viewed the same coffee in a virtual setting. The color of the beverage was manipulated in VR, such that participants saw either a dark brown or light brown liquid as they sipped the coffee. A full factorial design was used so that each participant tasted each sweetness x color combination, Participants reported sweetness, creaminess, and liking for each sample. Results revealed that beverage color as viewed in VR significantly influenced perceived creaminess, with the light brown coffee rated to be creamier than dark brown coffee. However, beverage color did not influence perceived sweetness or liking. The present study supports the role of VR as a means of conducting food perception studies, either to gain a better understanding of multisensory integration, or, from an industry perspective, to enable rapid product testing when it may be time-intensive or costly to produce the same range of products in the real-world. Furthermore, it opens potential future opportunities for VR to promote healthy eating behavior by manipulating the visual appearance of foods. (shrink)

The integration of virtual reality into STEM education has generated growing interest in how this technology impacts the understanding and application of scientific concepts. This study focuses on investigating this relationship by using the MICMAC technique to identify key variables and their interactions in virtual educational environments. It was found that variables such as the design of educational content, the quality of the virtual experience, and the interactivity of the environment are key to the learning process in (...) STEM. In addition, determinant and autonomous variables were identified, which play fundamental roles in the generation of scientific knowledge for students. These results highlight the relevance of considering various aspects of virtual educational design to improve the effectiveness of learning in STEM. The practical implications of this study are significant for educators and educational program designers, highlighting the need to create immersive, interactive, and collaborative virtual environments to promote better understanding and application of scientific concepts. This study contributes to existing knowledge by providing a deeper understanding of how virtual reality can enhance learning in STEM, and suggests directions for future research in the field. (shrink)

Where will the philosophers of the future come from and can we have civilization without them? In this paper I argue that there is a co-dependent relationship between philosophy and civilization, one that has emerged and developed in relation to the emergence of information technologies, particularly writing and print and conditions for deep and prolonged concentration. The internet, however, today’s powerful information technology which is increasingly mediating humanities relationships, is proving to be a technology which threatens this relationship. The internet (...) is a technology which draws us in, obliterating the distance required for critical thought. Unless we can find ways to distance ourselves from this technology, this creator of high fidelity virtual realities, we will become trapped in our hi-tech representations. This will be the triumph of virtual reality and perhaps the end of civilization and philosophy. (shrink)

I argue that virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality. In particular, I argue for virtual digitalism, on which virtual objects are real digital objects, and against virtual fictionalism, on which virtual objects are fictional objects. I also argue that perception in virtual reality need not be illusory, and that life in virtual worlds can have roughly the same sort of value as life in non-virtual worlds.

This contribution addresses the topic of the metaphysics of linguistic tokens as they are used in communication in virtual reality. It is argued that some of these linguistic tokens differ in ontological status from those that are normally used in communication, while others do not. The contribution discusses recent work on virtual reality by David Chalmers in which he claims that virtual objects are real objects because they are, or supervene on, digital objects with causal powers. (...) This approach is extended by employing an ontology that was put forward by Jerrold J. Katz to explain the nature of linguistic tokens. The ontology is applied to the objects of virtual reality, taking into account their dual nature as computational objects, and helps to provide a metaphysical account of linguistic tokens as used in communication in virtual reality. This allows for a distinction between some forms of communication in virtual reality and corresponding non-virtual forms of communication, such as sign language produced by the virtual body of an avatar and sign language produced by a flesh and blood body. Such distinctions treat both forms of communication as real, but draw a distinction between them based on whether they contain concrete or composite components. (shrink)

Purpose:Human navigation skills are essential for everyday life and rely on several cognitive abilities, among which visual-spatial competences that are impaired in subjects with cerebral palsy. In this work, we proposed navigation tasks in immersive virtual reality to 15 children with CP and 13 typically developing peers in order to assess the individual navigation strategies and their modifiability in a situation resembling real life.Methods:We developed and adapted to IVR an application based on a 5-way maze in a playground that (...) was to be navigated to find a reward. The learning process, navigation strategies, and adaptation to changes were compared between participants with CP and their TD peers and correlated with visual-spatial abilities and cognitive competences.Results:Most participants with CP needed more attempts than TD participants to become proficient in navigation. Furthermore, the learning phase was correlated to visual-spatial memory but not with cognitive competences. Interestingly, navigation skills were comparable between groups after stabilization. While TD participants mainly relied on allocentric strategies based on environmental cues, egocentric strategies based on body motion prevailed in participants with CP. Furthermore, participants with CP had more difficulties in modifying their navigation strategies, caused by difficulties in executive processes beyond the visual-perceptual impairment, with an inefficient shift between implicit and explicit competences.Conclusions:The navigation abilities in participants with CP seem to be different from their TD peers in terms of learning and adaptation to new conditions; this could deeply affect their everyday life and ultimately participation and inclusion. A regular assessing and focused rehabilitative plans could help to better navigate the environment and affect self-perception. (shrink)

In “The Virtual and the Real,” David Chalmers argues that there is an epistemic and ontological parity between VR and ordinary reality. My argument here is that, whatever the plausibility of these claims, they provide no basis for supposing that there is a similar parity of value. Careful reflection upon certain aspects of the transition that individuals make from interacting with real-world, physical environments to interacting with VR provides a basis for thinking that, to the extent that there (...) are good reasons to deny the reality of virtual objects, there are also reasons to place a correspondingly higher value upon the experience of interacting with a VR environment. Chalmers’ assumption to the contrary arises from a subtle misrepresentation of how the phenomenon of cognitive penetration works in the perception of virtual objects, and from an unwillingness to acknowledge how our attitudes toward virtual environments are conditioned by the values we adopt when engaged in gameplay. (shrink)

As David J. Chalmers claims, “virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality, virtual objects are real objects, and what goes on in virtual reality is truly real.” In this paper, I will suggest that the philosophical hypothesis that we might live in a simulation can be considered to be the last and most nihilistic episode in the series of narrations about the true and apparent worlds that Nietzsche sketched in The Twilight of the Idols. I (...) will argue that Nietzsche’s prediction about the obliteration of the apparent world has actually been fulfilled by Chalmers, and I will show why his theory must be considered one of the many fables that humans have been producing in order to organise the world according to their own ends. (shrink)

Based on a brief overview of the history of ontology and on some philosophical problems of virtual reality, a new approach to virtuality is proposed. To characterize the representational technologies in the Internet age, I suggest that Aristotle’s dualistic ontological system be complemented with a third form of being: virtuality. In the virtual form of being actuality and potentiality are inseparably intertwined. Virtuality is potentiality considered together with its actualization. In this view, virtuality is reality with a measure, (...) a reality which has no absolute character, but which has a relative nature. This situation can remind us the emergence of probability in the 17th century: then the concept of certainty, now the concept of reality is reconsidered and relativized. Currently, in the descriptions of the world created by representational technologies, there are two coherent worldviews with different ontologies: the world is inhabited by actual and potential beings—or all the beings in the world are virtual. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. ChalmersAnand Jayprakash Vaidya (bio)Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. By David J. Chalmers. New York, NY: W.W Norton & Company, 2022. Pp. xi + 520. Hardcover $22.49, isbn 978-0-393635-80-5.It isn't uncommon to think that virtual worlds, the worlds we engage with in video games, for example, are not real or (...) at least less real than the ordinary world. After all, they are worlds that are created by us, and thus are less real than the world we didn't create, mind-independent reality. However, in Reality+, David Chalmers argues for the thesis that virtual reality is genuine reality.Reality+ is the twenty-first century equivalent of Bertrand Russell's twentieth century The Problems of Philosophy, published 110 years prior. Like Russell, Chalmers' goal is to explain the basic problems of philosophy to a wide audience.The book's twenty-four chapters are organized into seven different parts: virtual worlds, knowledge, reality, real virtual reality, mind, value, and foundations. Each section has about three to four chapters. Having taught the book in an upper-division philosophy of mind course, I would say that the first nine chapters should be read together to get a good sense of the whole project, because they give shape and structure to Chalmers' basic arguments and positions. The following fifteen self-explanatory, self-contained, chapters, are independently engaging, and can be taught separately, as standalone works of philosophy.Chalmers engages in what he terms technophilosophy, which is the combination of (1) asking philosophical questions about technology and (2) using technology to help answer traditional questions of philosophy. He claims that he draws inspiration for the project from Patricia Churchland's 1986 Neurophilosophy, where she does the equivalent of (1) and (2) with neuroscience. Reality+ delivers clear arguments, referencing historical and contemporary philosophical work, while frequently drawing from science fiction, including several outstanding Rick and Morty -style illustrations. The use of science fiction helps to connect students to abstract ideas, while the robustly constructed arguments serve to instruct students on how to go about critically examining the ideas. My students found the book accessible and engaging. I imagine the book [End Page 1] will become even more relevant to successive classes, as the issues Chalmers discusses grow more dominant in the future.Chapter 1, "Is this the real life?", begins by discussing Indian and Chinese philosophy in relation to Greek philosophy with respect to theme of illusion/dreams vs. reality. In all three traditions, one finds discussion of the nature of reality and whether we can know it. Chalmers thinks that each of these traditions helps to formulate the basic questions of his book: the knowledge question, the reality question, and the value question.The knowledge question: can we know whether or not we are living in a virtual world? In part 2, Chalmers argues that we cannot know that we are not living in a virtual world. He does so by defending his own version of Nick Bostrom's simulation argument (2003), which very roughly goes as follows: (1) If there is nothing (technological or otherwise) that would serve to block the creation of a perfect simulation of a humanlike being into existence (what he calls a sim blocker), then most humanlike beings are simulations. (2) if most humanlike beings are simulations, we are probably simulations. So, (3) if there are no sim blockers, we are probably sims.The reality question: are virtual worlds real? He argues that virtual worlds are genuinely real by examining a variety of definitions of what makes something real in chapter 6. I will examine this argument in more detail in the following section.The value question: can you lead a good life in a virtual world? He argues that one can, in parts 5 and 6. He says: "In principle, life in virtual reality can have the same sort of value as life in nonvirtual reality. To be sure, life in virtual reality can be good or bad" (p. 311).As successful as Reality+ is, philosophical counterpoints arose in my mind. In the next section, I present... (shrink)

Firstly, this contribution proposes to address synthographies – images generated through Text-to-image technologies – by deepening the epistemological shift related to the possibility of transposing the image-creation process from the analogue arts to the notational ones (or, by drawing on Nelson Goodman's terminology, from the “autographic” to the “allographic” forms of art). Secondly, the paper highlights how synthographies can be considered partly autographic and partly allographic, since the linguistic prompts constitute only the notational aspect of the generated images. Furthermore, this (...) contribution argues that the recent critiques around such images, which referenced aspects related to the absence of authorial presence and mechanicality, characterised the history of photography since its beginning. Finally, the contribution explores how the possibility to create synthographies that are almost indistinguishable from photographies easily might further separate the interaction between the detective and the depictive functions to the advantage of the latter, erasing what remains of the visual reliability and documental value of images. (shrink)