The value of solidarity, which implies mutual concern and support, is often conveyed in our everyday moral and political language. But what is its conceptual relationship with justice? Influential positions in this debate may argue for the opposition between the two concepts: justice is impartial and universal, while solidarity is partial and limited. The present paper aims to shortly explore a range of theories that may exemplify possible answers to this position, from communitarian and realist views, which ultimately confirm the (...) opposition, to political solidarities, which claim an instrumental need for solidarity as a reaction to injustices. Special attention will be paid to Habermas’s compatibilist account of solidarity as the “reverse side” of justice. The paper contends that a compelling answer should preserve the difference between the two spheres and the essential features of solidarity by also sketching a concept of solidarity as a social duty arising from our moral interdependence. (shrink)

This paper discusses Habermas’s argument that justice requires solidarity as its ‘reverse side’, whereby the former provides the necessary global framework for establishing intersubjective solidarity whilst the latter constitutes an important precondition for igniting social and political change in the direction of social justice. In this paper I argue that such a paradigm of reciprocity might be fruitfully complemented by a less apparent yet substantial nexus: that between solidarity and perceived injustice, which I contend also triggers the (...) emergence of solidarity. Drawing from Arendt’s thematisation of solidarity as a principle that stems from human suffering and recent scholarship on transitional post-conflict justice, I analyse the negative and reactive aspect of solidarity and the role of negative emotions in its emergence. (shrink)

The debate between Jurgen Habermas and Charles Taylor is reflective of the enduring conflict between liberal philosophy with its emphasis upon freedom, equality, and legal rights, and Aristotelianism with its accent upon the cultivation of virtue, personal responsibility and shared notions of the Good. Though grounded in opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum, both men remain critical of the burgeoning effects of instrumental rationality and the social atomization and anomie it continues to generate; both understand the extent to (...) which the self is a social construct and the role of interpersonal intersubjectivity in the development of their individual and collective identities; both argue for the centrality of certain goods in maintaining a minimal degree of social cohesion; and both affirm that the crucial feature of human life is communication and its dialogical character. ;To overcome the adverse manifestations of our positivistic ethos with its over-reliance upon purposive-instrumental reason, each has responded with a countervailing notion of rationality---"phronesis" or Aristotelian practical reason for Taylor and "communicative reason" for Habermas. Each's choice of reason has led to profound differences in their respective notions of the self as well as fundamental incongruities in their moral and political philosophies. In the interest of preserving the autonomy and integrity of the individual while yet affirming universal justice, Habermas argues for the formalism of a "proceduralistic" ethics. Taylor, on the other hand, advocates a "substantialist" one, a communal ethics that arises from out of people's deepest moral intuitions; an ethics bound up with historical values and ideals that stresses the cultivation of virtue and shared notions of the common good. ;I argue that although Habermas's "communicative action" with its focus upon intersubjective communication helps to bridge the competing philosophies of communitarianism and classical liberalism, a basic incommensurability still persists. However, rather than being mutually exclusive, there needs to be a creative, dialectical tension maintained between them whereby each continues to inform and influence the other. In this way, a postmodern ethics rooted in dialogue and communication can be constructed which maintains people's integrity and autonomy while similarly addressing their multiple needs and concerns, but also an ethics grounded in one's deepest moral intuitions which remains sensitive to the concrete, historical, and particularistic distinctions which differentiate their identities. (shrink)

This article investigates one of the major problems of modern political philosophy – the problem of justice in its fundamentally important methodological measurement in the Context of Ukraine. It’s consistently shown that justice belongs to a prominent place among the moral and social values: particularly its people owe to each other, because it is the scale, which measured freedom, equality and human rights.For this purpose it is analyzed the relationship and difference of methodological changes in grasping the concept of (...) justice in the works of K-O-Apel, J.Habermas, O.Höffe, R.Forst. It was found that Habermas interprets a new essence of solidarity and justice as normative principles of a democratic state where the requirement of respect for the dignity of each based on the acceptance of the inviolability of his body, life and property. It is proved that O.Höffe draws attention to the need of fundamental changes in the understanding of social justice, emphasizing the pre-modern, paternalistic sense of distributive models. Іn the writings of R.Frost social justice gain a political dimension, just as political or social relationship can exist only in case of their full justification, respect for human dignity. In the latest theories of justice is said that the victim of injustice is firstly the one who is ignored both in the process of manufacturing and distribution of public goods. To conclude: only the justice of exchange permits us to solve the immediate, practical dilemma: should one hand over a part of one’s freedom to social, state, authoritative structures, or be independent of them and be unable to resort to their assistance in case of emergency. People, perforce, mutually abandon part of their freedom as legal agents in order to enjoy their right for freedom. If this abandonment is universal, such exchange may be considered just. By insisting that everything individual is also social because it requires and is embedded into social context, R.Forst presents intersubjectivity as a fundamental dimension of human existence that shows itself in our ability to self-determination, i.e. freedom, but within the limits of human community. Also his point is that our obligations are no less rooted in our existence than our rights, and law has no priority over good and depends on moral good as a defining factor of justice. (shrink)

Political philosophers since Hobbes often construe social life in terms of a conflict which is rarely reconciled, but rather is accommodated in politics or adjudicated in law. Yet many think that morality pertains even in a formalized situation of attenuated agreement. Following Rawls, this morality is held to be a minimal, incipient, rudimentary form of justice--in Rawls's case, fairness. I argue from Kierkegaard and Habermas that a minimal, incipient, rudimentary form of love--namely, hospitality, the welcome of strangers--is equiprimordial (...) to fairness in establishing the basic social situation. (shrink)

This paper poses a relationship between pragmatist understandings of intersubjective communication and long-term “dialogical art” practices promoting social change. Art historian Grant Kester contends that two dialogical art projects by Suzanne Lacy and Austrian Art collective WochenKlausur reflect Habermas’ theory of communicative action through which the “better argument” is universally validated. Kester simultaneously acknowledges such projects inculcate non-competitive modes of intersubjective exchange that appear contrary to Habermas. I look at the “philosophical narrative” debates between Richard Rorty and (...) Habermas to suggest that Rorty’s eschewal of Habermasian rationalization in favor of affective modes of contingent solidarity, taken with Nancy Fraser’s understanding of enmeshed public/private discourse in the context of feminist counterpublics, draws out the political-ethical orientation of activist dialogical art practices. (shrink)

Discourse ethics represents an exciting new development in neo-Kantian moral theory. William Rehg offers an insightful introduction to its complex theorization by its major proponent, Jürgen Habermas, and demonstrates how discourse ethics allows one to overcome the principal criticisms that have been leveled against neo-Kantianism. Addressing both "commun-itarian" critics who argue that universalist conceptions of justice sever moral deliberation from community traditions, and feminist advocates of the "ethics of care" who stress the moral significance of caring for other (...) individuals, Rehg shows that discourse ethics combines impartiality with solidarity. He provides the first systematic reconstruction of Habermas's theory and explores its relationship to the work of such contemporary philosophers as Charles Taylor. His book articulates a bold alternative to the split between the "right" and the "good" in moral theory and will greatly interest philosophers, social and legal scholars, and political theorists. (shrink)

Despite the foment of the last two decades, philosophical ethics has fallen on hard times. While an increasing number of universalistic moral theories in the Kantian tradition limit themselves to questions of social and political justice, neo-Aristotelian theories of the good, like that of Bernard Williams, question the very possibility and desirability of a philosophical ethics. Viewed against this landscape, the program of discourse or communicative ethics, initiated by Karl Otto-Apel and then developed by Jürgen Habermas, is (...) marked by its optimism. Although sharing a great deal with the Rawlsian tradition, discourse ethicists insist that justice is not “the chief virtue of social institutions” alone, but the privileged domain of the moral as such. And although agreeing with neo-Aristotelians’ skepticism—later repeated by Hegel against Kant—about decontextualized ethical theory, discourse ethicists nonetheless believe that an abstract formulation of the moral point of view that would be context-sensitive is still possible. (shrink)

Solidarity is a significant but poorly understood feature of political life. It is typically conceived, in “associative and teleological” terms, as working together for common political aims. But this conception misses the fact that solidarity requires individuals to will collective ends despite incompletely shared interests. Careful consideration of these elements reveals four “dynamics of solidarity”: its characteristic duties, the durability of commitments made in solidarity, the deference it involves, and its effects over time on agents’ habits and capacities. In this (...) article I describe these dynamics, first contrasting solidarity-given duties with duties of beneficence, justice, and loyalty. These contrasts lay bare the distinctive durability of solidarity, which differs from both the liberal’s commitment to justice and the loyalist’s commitment to the group. I then discuss deference, a feature of solidarity that has implications for individual engagement in political life more generally. Finally, I discuss the effects of solidarity on agents’ intellectual and physical capacities. I conclude by drawing out implications of these dynamics, challenging Tommie Shelby’s influential conception and justification of black solidarity and buttressing Philip Soper’s rejection of the Principle of Autonomy. (shrink)

Accounts of solidarity typically defend it in teleological or loyalty terms, justifying it by invoking its goal of promoting justice or its expression of support for a shared community. Such solidarity seems to be a moral option rather than an obligation. In contrast, A Moral Theory of Solidarity develops a deontological theory grounded in equity. With extended reflection on the Spanish conquest of the Americas and the US Civil Rights movement, Kolers defines solidarity as political action on others' terms. Unlike (...) mere alliances and coalitions, solidarity involves a disposition to defer to others' judgment about the best course of action. Such deference overrides individual conscience. Yet such deference is dangerous; a core challenge is then to determine when deference becomes appropriate.Kolers defends defernce to those who suffer gravest inequity. Such deference constitutes equitable treatment, in three senses: it is Kantian equity, expressing each person's equal status; it is Aristotelian equity, correcting general rules for particular cases; and deference is 'being an equitable person,' sharing others' fate rather than seizing advantages that they are denied. Treating others equitably is a perfect duty; hence solidarity with victims of inequity is a perfect duty. Further, since equity is valuable in itself, irrespective of any other goal it might promote, such solidarity is intrinsically valuable, not merely instrumentally valuable. Solidarity is then not about promoting justice, but about treating people justly. A Moral Theory of Solidarity engages carefully with recent work on equity in the Kantian and Aristotelian traditions, as well as the demandingness of moral duties, collective action, and unjust benefits, and is a major contribution to a field of growing interest. (shrink)

Tackling global injustice requires appropriate and effective institutions as well as cosmopolitan solidarity. This paper assumes that the ‘constitutionalized world society’ theorized by Habermas offers a viable proposal to make the protection and promotion of human rights more feasible. His account of solidarity, however, reveals a conundrum: If strong forms of solidarity grow out of shared political institutions and a related collective identity, but it is precisely those institutions that we need to enhance at the global level, then how (...) can we build sufficient solidarity to support this process? Habermas relies on a global consensus on human rights, but I argue that his version of cosmopolitan solidarity is too weak to motivate the measures needed to fully realize economic, social and cultural rights and the package of institutional reforms that he proposes. We thus need a narrative of the human condition that can lend additional support to the idea of human rights and cosmopolitan duties. I find the seeds of such a position, which I call cosmocommonism, in the work of Nancy. Having shown how this can motivate cosmopolitanism and support for human rights, I then consider in the conclusion its compatibility with the political institutions that Habermas proposes. (shrink)

Solidarity is one of the primary principles of Catholic Social Teaching. Pope Francis invoked it and called for prayer and fasting in his August 20, 2018 letter addressing the sexual abuse scandal and attendant cover-up in the church. Offering some thoughts regarding what the duty of solidarity requires in light of the Catholic Church sexual abuse scandal and subsequent cover-up, this article suggests a number of concrete things that lay Catholics can do in claiming our place as church.

Ethical considerations from both the clinical and public health perspectives have been used to examine whether it is ethically permissible to mandate the seasonal influenza vaccine for healthcare workers (HCWs). Both frameworks have resulted in arguments for and against the requirement. Neither perspective resolves the question fully. By adding components of justice to the argument, I seek to provide a more fulsome ethical defence for requiring seasonal influenza immunisation for HCWs. Two critical components of a just society support requiring vaccination: (...) fairness of opportunity and the obligation to follow democratically formulated rules. The fairness of opportunity is informed by Rawls’ two principles of justice. The obligation to follow democratically formulated rules allows us to focus simultaneously on freedom, plurality and solidarity. Justice requires equitable participation in and benefit from cooperative schemes to gain or profit socially as individuals and as a community. And to be just, HCW immunisation exemptions should be limited to medical contraindications only. In addition to the HCWs fiduciary duty to do what is best for the patient and the public health duty to protect the community with effective and minimally intrusive interventions, HCWs are members of a just society in which all members have an obligation to participate equitably in order to partake in the benefits of membership. (shrink)

In 2017, Carson and Flood outlined a general duty to be vaccinated, arguing from Catholic social teaching on justice, love, solidarity and the common good. This necessarily relied on assumptions about the typical nature of vaccination, assumptions which do not always hold true in concrete situations. I identify twelve criteria that, where they hold, strengthen the particular duty to be vaccinated, and, if not met, weaken or reverse it. These pertain to the biological agent which vaccination aims to protect (...) against, the vaccine and its supply, the costs and benefits of vaccination to the individual and society, and the alternative courses of action. The two-way relationship between the moral duty to be vaccinated and vaccine mandates is discussed. Individuals and policy-makers need to know these criteria – and be provided the necessary information to evaluate vaccination against them – in order to make a truly rational judgement. (shrink)

Will globalization promote or hinder social justice throughout the world? In this cogent analysis philosopher Kai Nielsen argues that in its present form capitalist globalization will only ensure that the rich get richer and the poor poorer. Noting that the ratio of the richest countries to the poorest has steadily grown larger under capitalism in the 20th century and that the total dollar value of the world economy has increased fivefold while the number of people living in poverty has (...) doubled, Nielsen clearly demonstrates that globalization has made and still is making a bad situation worse. While inveighing against capitalist globalization, he makes the important point that a globalization based on "market socialism" - to ensure both needed efficiency and an egalitarian conception of justice - would be a trend that people in all nations would welcome. Democratic socialism, despite historical betrayals and recent setbacks, Nielsen contends, is still humanity's best hope for achieving a classless, nonracist, and nonsexist world community. He devotes a number of chapters to a discussion of the critical theory that is the basis of this vision of a completely egalitarian international society, and he compares and contrasts his own position with that of such thinkers as Richard Rorty, John Rawls, Juergen Habermas, G. A. Cohen, and others. This well-argued critique of capitalist globalization and defense of democratic socialism as a viable alternative is essential reading for philosophers, political scientists, students of international relations, and anyone concerned about the future of democratic and egalitarian ideals. (shrink)

It is sometimes held that modern institutionally-focussed conceptions of social justice are lacking in one essential respect: they ignore the importance of civic friendship or solidarity. It is also, typically simultaneously, held that Aristotle’s thought provides a fertile ground for elucidating an account of civic friendship. I argue, first, that Aristotle is no help on this score: he has no conception of distinctively civic friendship. I then go on to argue that the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties (...) is more useful than talk of civic friendship in capturing the non-institutional demands of social justice. (shrink)

Over the last half decade or so, Jürgen Habermas has increasingly employed the interview format, both as a means of presenting his changing views on philosophical topics in an accessible way, and as a means of debating current social and political issues. This new, expanded edition of Autonomy and Solidarity includes an additional five interviews in which Habermas discusses such themes as the history and significance of the Frankfurt School, the social and political development of (...) post-war Germany, the moral status of civil disobedience, the implications of the "Historians' Dispute," and the function of national identity in the modern world. Never before published autobiographical material covering Habermas' early years at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research is followed by an extended philosophical interrogation of his latest thinking on the relations between ethics, morality and law. With an extended introduction by Peter Dews, exploring the status and prospects of Critical Theory in the light of the recent revolutionary transformations in Europe, Autonomy and Solidarity should be of interest and value both to newcomers and those already familiar with Habermas' thought. (shrink)

How is the ethically unacceptable persistence of the unnecessary suffering of extraordinarily poor street children in extraordinarily rich European Union capital cities to be durably remedied? Perhaps centrally, this philosophical essay argues, by re-articulating current inadequate understandings in the European Union of social injustice not as an absence of solidarity but as the failure to imagine and to act on "mutualities." First presented in 2011 as invited lectures for the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, (...) this extended reflection explores four central elements of the empirical situations of such extreme child poverty amid great affluence in the contexts of a progressively developed case study of destitute street children in Paris. The essay focuses successively on such utterly destitute children's poor health, poor housing, poor food, and poor education. In each case, outstanding contemporary philosophical reflections on violations of social justice - those of J. Rawls, A. Sen, R. Dworkin, and J. Habermas - are found to be deeply suggestive but finally insufficient for understanding such legally and morally intolerable situations. Yet each may be interpreted as contributing substantively to a progressive re-articulation of at least four critical elements of what a renewed idea of social justice in the European Union tomorrow must involve - "mutualizations" of fairness, understanding, respect, and articulacy. (shrink)

In this essay Krassimir Stojanov attempts first to reconstruct the “heart” of Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics, namely the so-called “principle of universalization” of ethical norms. This principle grounds Habermas's proceduralist account of social justice via equal access of all concerned to the practices of deliberative validation of norms. Stojanov claims with regard to this account that it could only be implemented if the social actors are involved in a process of education as discursive initiation. After (...) using R. S. Peters's educational theory to distinguish discursive initiation from a traditionalist understanding of educative initiation, he discusses some central social prerequisites for the development of discursive skills in growing individuals; to identify these prerequisites, he draws on Axel Honneth's conception of the intersubjective origins of individuals' development of rational autonomy. In the final part of the essay, Stojanov briefly explores some implications of his elaborated account of discursive initiation and its social preconditions for schooling and pedagogy. (shrink)

n this paper, I argue that political solidarity is important to justice. At its core, political solidarity is a relational concept. To be in a relation of political solidarity, is to be in a relation of connection or unity with one’s fellow citizens. I argue that fellow citizens can be said to stand in such a relation when they have attitudes of collective identification, mutual respect, mutual trust, and mutual support and loyalty toward one another. I argue that political solidarity, (...) so conceived, is an integral element of a theory of justice. I argue that there are distinctly social bases for political solidarity and that justice requires that we promote these. Furthermore, as an example of the sort of social and political arrangements that might encourage political solidarity, I discuss Canada’s response to the recent H1N1 pandemic and the failings of this response with respect to members of the Aboriginal community within Canada. I argue that ensuring that members of the Aboriginal community had equal access to the goods they needed to protect themselves against H1N1 infection would have promoted relations of political solidarity and, in turn, would have promoted justice more effectively. (shrink)

This volume explores the relationship between justice and freedom in Hegel's practical philosophy, with a particular focus on the pivotal concept of reciprocal recognition. The contributors analyze the intersubjective relations between individuals and institutions through the lens of Hegel and demonstrate how his account of justice and freedom can be applied to address pressing issues in political philosophy. Despite extensive scrutiny of the concept of justice by political philosophers, Hegel's unique account has been notably overlooked. What sets Hegel apart is (...) his emphasis on the inseparable link between justice and freedom. Freedom is inextricably tied to an account of just social relations and institutions, while justice itself is intertwined with a robust endorsement of freedom. The chapters comprising this volume examine three crucial dimensions of Hegel's framework for freedom and justice. First, the contributors address how Hegel's distinctive integration of freedom and justice sheds new light on the nature of his practical philosophy. Second, they relate Hegel's theory to other prominent accounts of justice, including Rawlsian forms of Kantian constructivism, Habermas' neo-Kantian discourse theory, republican views, neo Aristotelian accounts, and critical theory approaches. Finally, the contributors apply Hegel's reconstructed theory of justice to ongoing debates encompassing criminal justice, distributive justice, global justice, environmental justice, and issues related to racial and gender justice, as well as populism. Justice and Freedom in Hegel will appeal to scholars and advanced students engaged in research on Hegel's practical philosophy, 19th-century philosophy, and political philosophy. (shrink)

In Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements, Monique Deveaux criticizes and reframes the traditional, moral (and often individualistic) response to poverty in favor of a political and collective one that centers the role of the poor and poor-led groups in the anti-poverty agenda. I have two aims in this review, a supportive one and a more critical one. On the supportive side, I examine the advances Deveaux makes by 1) expanding the category of agents of justice; 2) putting the (...) poor at the center of an effective response to poverty; and 3) changing the emphasis from individual duties to a collective response. On the critical side, I revisit Deveaux’s critique of the traditional approach and argue that she unnecessarily shifts the moral burden away from the affluent whose complicity and capacity remain important grounds of obligation. In conclusion, I consider some remaining challenges that are (helpfully) exposed by Deveaux’s account. (shrink)

In this essay, we aim at framing the ‘negative emotion’ of indifference, starting from its diachronic declination, which seems to beneficiate from a form of justification from the moral point of view (§1). In order to prevent indifference as an outcome – together with its intrinsic motivational strength –, we introduce a methodological account to frame the struggle of motivation internal to the single agent, by classifying different forms of ‘reasons to act’ (§2). We will develop a two-move strategy. Firstly, (...) we deploy what we could call a positive emotion – the sense of solidarity diachronically understood – against that negative one, in order to show that indifference is not the sole possible destination for the humankind (§3). Secondly, to integrate and strengthen the motivational role of that positive emotion, we will rehabilitate a moral approach aimed at setting up a unique normative linkage among generations, by reshaping the interplay between ‘wide’ and ‘narrow obligations’ presented by Kant (§4). The ultimate goal is to contrast the moral strength which is offered by indifference as negative emotion by articulating a motivational path devoted at legitimizing the diachronic moral commitment and duties of justice among generations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Compassionate Justice: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue with Two Gospel Parables on Law, Crime, and Restorative Justice by Christopher D. MarshallGlen StassenCompassionate Justice: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue with Two Gospel Parables on Law, Crime, and Restorative Justice CHRISTOPHER D. MARSHALL Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012. 386 pp. $33.60Christopher Marshall is known to Society of Christian Ethics members for his highly acclaimed book on restorative justice, Beyond Retribution, and for his plenary (...) address at the SCE annual meeting published in the JSCE 27, no. 2 (2007). The plenary address forms one chapter of the present Compassionate Justice. Well [End Page 221] informed on ethics, criminal justice, and human rights, Marshall is a New Testament scholar at Victoria University in New Zealand.Marshall points out that the two best-known of Jesus’s parables—the Compassionate Samaritan, and the Prodigal Son—have been the most influential of Jesus’s parables in Western culture and legal theory. The Compassionate Samaritan is Jesus’s response to a lawyer’s question that answers a central legal question of the time: Who is my neighbor, whom I am obligated by Leviticus 19:7 to love as myself? In the Prodigal Son, the three main characters in legal offense are clearly portrayed as the offender, the victim, and the law-abiding community; in turn, as Marshall points out, “the older brother’s reaction centers directly on the justice of his father’s actions” (192–93). Marshall argues that present legal theory can learn from careful dialogue with these two parables. These parables are not only historically influential but also so insightfully and beautifully crafted that dialogue with them can bring incisive insights. In addition, dialogue with them presses Anglo-Saxon liberalism where it is weak and needs to grow.The parable of the Compassionate Samaritan opens up questions about the need for Good Samaritan laws that defend persons who come to the aid of a person in danger of death (e.g., from an accident, fire, or drowning) against liability for inadvertently and unintentionally causing damage. Under present Anglo-Saxon law, such good Samaritans can be sued for damages. This is not the case, however, in most European countries. Similarly, most European and Latin American countries have bad Samaritan laws: Where “victims are in mortal danger and unable to save themselves,” there is a legal duty for “those who are consciously aware of the victim’s predicament, who are close enough to intervene, and who have the effective means of intervention available to them” to come to the aid of the victims. “The most glaring exception to this pattern,” Marshall argues, “occurs in Anglo-American legal systems” because of liberalism’s maximization of individual liberty even against coercion to come to the aid of persons who would die if no help arrives (155). Samaritan laws “give formal expression to the supreme value of human life, to the bonds of solidarity and empathy that comprise human identity and that bind people together in social community, and to ongoing need human beings have to be committed to one another’s rescue and restoration when severe harm befalls them” (174).Responding to the parable of the Prodigal Son, Marshall argues that both compassion and repentance are crucial for understanding the humanity and the sufferings of persons being defended or judged by law. This does not replace the standard tools of legal interpretation; it takes account of the more holistic context (288–90). In fact, “unreflective compassion can be dangerous and distorting” (296). Marshall discusses the complications insightfully and in a balanced [End Page 222] way. He concludes with an extensive discussion and refutation of perhaps the most important book-length criticism of restorative justice.Marshall’s interpretation of these two parables surpasses any other that I have read. His sensitive and thoughtful analysis of the experience of victimization goes beyond any other interpretation of the Compassionate Samaritan that I have seen. In this he resembles Daniel Philpott’s interpretation of victimization in Just and Unjust Peace (Oxford University Press, 2012). His description of the shameful rupture of relationship with father, family, and community by the prodigal son goes well beyond what I have seen previously. I think... (shrink)

The concept of hermeneutic science is outlined by Habermas as a reflection within the ordinary language, addressed to the dialogic dimension of intersubjective recognition and connected to the juridical guarantee. The guarantee function fulfilled by the discursive agreement towards every real dialogue is obvious: it indicates the main reference point for the regulation and coordination of social action, tracing a line of demarcation between being and having to be, facts and norms. Speech, communicative agreement and legal guarantee are (...) mutually qualified terms where the public discussion of institutional issues makes it possible to define the normative validity as non-assimilatory generality, placed beyond any populistic yearning, tracing a line of demarcation between law and power. The idea of deliberative democracy expresses the relationship and distinction between the universalism of rights and the factuality of the norm issuing, between the idea of good and the idea of right, in order to support democratic decision-making legitimacy. Combining the reasons of the markets with those of civil solidarity, through independent forms of regulation both from the obsolete state sovereignties and from the traditional international perspectives, represents a primary challenge of the Habermasian theory where the critical role of the rational public sphere appears fundamental. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contribute to the formulation of a non-excluding concept of solidarity which is of relevance to contemporary society. The assumption is that in the present individualized and culturally diverse society there is an urgent need for a new form of solidarity to create social cohesion. The central theme is that contemporary solidarity is about recognition and a fair distribution of chances for recognition. This ideal may function as a normative standard for critical research (...) and as a guideline for people in their moral struggles. What ultimately needs to be done is not a purely theoretical question but something which must be settled by a judgement that constitutes a battlefield where conflicting values and perceptions of reality confront each other. (shrink)

Genetic testing reveals information about a patient's health status and predictions about the patient's future wellness, while also potentially disclosing health information relevant to other family members. With the increasing availability and affordability of genetic testing and the integration of genetics into mainstream medicine, the importance of clarifying the scope of confidentiality and the rules regarding disclosure of genetic findings to genetic relatives is prime. The United Nations International Declaration on Human Genetic Data urges an appreciation for principles of equality, (...) justice, solidarity and responsibility in the context of genetic testing, including a commitment to honoring the privacy and security of the person tested. Considering this global mandate and recent professional statements in the context of a legal amendment to patient privacy policies in Australia, a fresh scrutiny of the legal history of a physician's duty to warn is warranted. This article inquiries whether there may be anything ethically or socially amiss with a potential future recommendation for health professionals or patients to universally disclose particular cancer predisposition genetic diagnosis to genetic family members. While much of the discussion remains applicable to all genetic diagnosis, the article focuses on the practice of disclosure within the context of BRCA1/2 diagnosis. An ‘ethic of care’ interpretation of legal tradition and current practice will serve to reconcile law and medical policy on the issue of physician disclosure of genetic results to family members without patient consent. (shrink)

The article discusses the impact different concepts of solidarity can have on debates on models of consent for non-interventional research. It introduces three concepts of solidarity that have been referenced in bioethical debates: a purely descriptive concept, a concept that claims some derivative value for most but not all practices of solidarity, as well as a clearly normative concept where solidarity is tied to justice and taken to ground moral duties. It shows that regarding the rivalling models of study-specific consent, (...) tiered consent and broad consent, the first two concepts can be taken to favour tiered consent while only normative solidarity supports a model of broad consent—or an argument to allow non-interventional research without requiring consent at all. As normative solidarity is tied to considerations of justice, however, the argument appears less straightforward than one might expect: It presupposes that the research contributes to overcoming existing social injustices. (shrink)

In Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas works out the legal and political implications of his Theory of Communicative Action (1981), bringing to fruition the project announced with his publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962. This new work is a major contribution to recent debates on the rule of law and the possibilities of democracy in postindustrial societies, but it is much more. The introduction by William Rehg succinctly captures the special nature of (...) the work, noting that it offers a sweeping, sociologically informed conceptualization of law and basic rights, a normative account of the rule of law and the constitutional state, an attempt to bridge normative and empirical approaches to democracy, and an account of the social context required for democracy. Finally, the work frames and caps these arguments with a bold proposal for a new paradigm of law that goes beyond the dichotomies that have afflicted modern political theory from its inception and that still underlie current controversies between so-called liberals and civic republicans. The book includes a postscript written in 1994, which restates the argument in light of its initial reception, and two appendixes, which cover key developments that preceded the book. Habermas himself was actively involved in the translation, adapting the text as necessary to make it more accessible to English-speaking readers. (shrink)

Habermas's 1971 Gauss Lectures, plus two additional essays, outlining an intersubjective approach to social theory.

The relation between Kant’s philosophy and the “philosophy of balance” as it is described in the report Come on! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet, delivered to the Club of Rome in 2018, requires some analysis. The authors of the report consider Kant to be a philosopher of European Enlightenment which laid the foundations of the modern world, but also proved to be the source of global problems. The report characterises the philosophy of the Enlightenment as lop-sided (...) rationalism which dismisses everything that does not possess desirable properties. In exchange, the authors offer a philosophy of balance, described in several points as the balance between conflicting values. The overarching problem of the philosophy of balance is the restraining of egoism. For this reason I first examine the relationship between duty and human inclinations in Kant’s ethics. I then demonstrate that the topic of political forecasts and the recommendations which Kant prescribes both in his philosophy of history and in his reflections on politics, right and justice, essentially boils down to three points of the philosophy of balance: the balance between development and justice (Kantian republicanism), between the speed and stability of development (external policy, the Kantian peace project), and between the short-term and long-term perspectives (reform policy). I then touch upon the problem of the implementation of Kantian principles in politics in the light of the reception of Kant in the modern theories of social conflicts, the communication theory of J. Habermas and the justice theory of J. Rawls. The overall conclusion is that Kant’s philosophy is not a philosophy of exclusion, capitalist values and utilitarianism and is not their ideological basis. (shrink)

The article deals with Habermas's intersubjective approach to critical social theory, focusing on his intersubjective accounts of truth, justice and democratic legitimacy. Distinguishing between stronger and weaker versions of an intersubjective account, it draws attention to Habermas's recent move from a strong intersubjective, constructivist, interpretation of truth to a weaker, non-constructivist, one. It then looks at his refusal to make a similar move in the case of justice, arguing that it is not well-founded, even from the point (...) of view of Habermas's overall concerns. It contends, in particular, that a strong intersubjective conception is not necessary in order to maintain the close link between normative validity and argumentation that plays an important role in Habermas's project of a critical social theory and concludes that the advantages of abandoning a strong intersubjective position outweigh the disadvantages. Consequently, it recommends extension of the weaker, non-constructivist, account that Habermas now proposes in the case of truth to justice as well. In the final section, it considers the implications of this recommendation for Habermas's conception of normative validity in the domain of law and politics. (shrink)

The relationship between being and consciousness has been characterised as one of alienation , reification , instrumentalization , and 'one dimensionalization' . More recently Jurgen Habermas has described the 'colonization of the lifeworld'. Each of these theorists argues that social and political philosophy has two primary tasks. First, a political philosophy should construct a model of how we might best structure our social and political situation so as to maximize freedom and self-determination. Second, a political philosophy should (...) provide an analysis of presently existing conditions. The gap between the model and the actually existing reality provides the space for social and political criticism, as well as social and political struggle. In his account of 'the colonization of the lifeworld', Habermas attempts to explain the relation between being and consciousness in terms of his theory of communicative action and to locate possible points of social and political crisis in advanced capitalist society. ;In this dissertation I trace theories of the relationship between being and consciousness from Marx through Lukacs and the Frankfurt School to Habermas' recent work The Theory of Communicative Action. I argue that in terms of his stated goal of providing a critical social theory with practical intent Habermas has been only partially successful. I present an account of Habermas' theory and claim it is potentially more politically efficacious than post-structuralist theories, though only if his theory is attentive to the concerns of those same post-structuralist theories. After arguing that at a certain level of abstraction Habermas is right in his account of our present situation, I conclude that he falls short of his goal in so far as his theory fails to take adequate account of many actually existing struggles for political self-determination, and many hypotheses for alternative social organization which do not agree with his assumptions about validity and consensus. (shrink)

Two countervailing trends mark the intellectual tenor of our age the spread of naturalistic worldviews and religious orthodoxies. Advances in biogenetics, brain research, and robotics are clearing the way for the penetration of an objective scientific self-understanding of persons into everyday life. For philosophy, this trend is associated with the challenge of scientific naturalism. At the same time, we are witnessing an unexpected revitalization of religious traditions and the politicization of religious communities across the world. From a philosophical perspective, this (...) revival of religious energies poses the challenge of a fundamentalist critique of the principles underlying the modern Wests postmetaphysical understanding of itself. The tension between naturalism and religion is the central theme of this major new book by Jrgen Habermas. On the one hand he argues for an appropriate naturalistic understanding of cultural evolution that does justice to the normative character of the human mind. On the other hand, he calls for an appropriate interpretation of the secularizing effects of a process of social and cultural rationalization increasingly denounced by the champions of religious orthodoxies as a historical development peculiar to the West. These reflections on the enduring importance of religion and the limits of secularism under conditions of postmetaphysical reason set the scene for an extended treatment the political significance of religious tolerance and for a fresh contribution to current debates on cosmopolitanism and a constitution for international society. (shrink)

Discourse ethics represents an exciting new development in neo-Kantian moral theory. William Rehg offers an insightful introduction to its complex theorization by its major proponent, Jürgen Habermas, and demonstrates how discourse ethics allows one to overcome the principal criticisms that have been leveled against neo-Kantianism. Addressing both "commun-itarian" critics who argue that universalist conceptions of justice sever moral deliberation from community traditions, and feminist advocates of the "ethics of care" who stress the moral significance of caring for other (...) individuals, Rehg shows that discourse ethics combines impartiality with solidarity. He provides the first systematic reconstruction of Habermas's theory and explores its relationship to the work of such contemporary philosophers as Charles Taylor. His book articulates a bold alternative to the split between the "right" and the "good" in moral theory and will greatly interest philosophers, social and legal scholars, and political theorists. (shrink)

Over the past 25 years, Jürgen Habermas has presented what is arguably the most coherent and wide-ranging defence of the project of European unification and of parallel developments towards a politically integrated world society. In developing his key concepts of the transnationalisation of democracy and the constitutionalisation of international law, Habermas offers the main players in the struggles over the fate of the European Union a way out of the current economic and political crisis, should they choose (...) to follow it. In the title essay Habermas addresses the challenges and threats posed by the current banking and public debt crisis in the Eurozone for European unification. He is harshly critical of the incrementalist, technocratic policies advocated by the German government in particular, which are being imposed at the expense of the populations of the economically weaker, crisis-stricken countries and are undermining solidarity between the member states. He argues that only if the technocratic approach is replaced by a deeper democratization of the European institutions can the European Union fulfil its promise as a model for how rampant market capitalism can once again be brought under political control at the supranational level. This volume reflects the impressive scope of Habermas?s recent writings on European themes, including theoretical treatments of the complex legal and political issues at stake, interventions on current affairs, and reflections on the lives and works of major European philosophers and intellectuals. Together the essays provide eloquent testimony to the enduring relevance of the work of one of the most influential and far-sighted public intellectuals in the world today, and are essential reading for all philosophers, legal scholars and social scientists interested in European and global issues. (shrink)

In past work, Habermas has claimed that justice and solidarity stand in a complementary relationship—that ‘ethical’ relations of solidarity are the ‘reverse side’ of justice. Yet in a recent address to the World Congress of Philosophy, he rejects this idea. This paper argues against this rejection. After explaining the idea, arguing for its centrality to Habermas' thought, and evaluating Habermas' scant reflections on this major transformation, I argue that his rejection of the idea is a result of (...) a newfound skepticism about the power of secular reason, and should thus be understood in terms of his corresponding turn to religious traditions as alternative sources of solidarity. I argue against this ‘religious turn’ by developing an alternative advocated by Habermas himself in earlier reflections—attention to real sociopolitical movements. In particular, I analyze feminist and black liberation movements to demonstrate that Habermas' pessimism about secular sources of justice-producing solidarity is unwarranted, and that, while ‘postsecular’ sources may provide one avenue for actionable solidarity, they are not the only one. I conclude by identifying a conceptual commonality in these two alternatives: an inclusive conception of what it means to be human. (shrink)

This collection of Habermas's recent essays on philosophical topics continues the analysis begun in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. In a short introductory essay, he outlines the sources of twentieth-century philosophizing, its major themes, and the range of current debates. The remainder of the essays can be seen as his contribution to these debates.Habermas's essay on George Herbert Mead is a focal point of the book. In it he sketches a postmetaphysical, intersubjective approach to questions of individuation and (...) subjectivity. In other essays, he develops his distinctive, communications-theoretic approach to questions of meaning and validity. The book as a whole expands on his earlier efforts to define a middle ground between nostalgic revivals of metaphysical conceptions of reason and radical deconstructions of reason. Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt.The Essays: The Horizon of Modernity is Shifting. Metaphysics after Kant. Themes in Postmetaphysical Thinking. Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning. Peirce and Communication. The Unity of Reason in the Diversity of Its Voices. Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity. Philosophy and Science as Literature? (shrink)

Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral-legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the (...) concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those "dignities" that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, "human dignity" still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status—in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody. (shrink)

There is tension in the US healthcare system due to conflicting goals of maximizing the public's health and at the same time ensuring shareholder profit among the many private organizations that provide care to those in need. As a result, nurses (often the frontline workers in this mixed public/private and economized system) may experience dissonance between their professional values and the capitalistic values embodied in the healthcare system. Beyond the workplace, nurses are also committed to championing health and wellness, to (...) advocating for social justice, and driving health policy. Yet, constrained by the conflicts between neoliberal values in an economized system and the values of care that inspire many to join the healthcare profession, nurses may lose the ability to live up to their moral ideals, to champion social justice, and to improve public health outcomes. In this paper, we use the critical theory of Juergen Habermas to explore these tensions and to suggest a path forward for nurses. We suggest that by engaging in dialog with each other and the public, and working for greater inclusivity, nurses can find ways to deconstruct ideologies inherent in our current healthcare system, to consider alternatives, and liberate healthcare from the dominance of market forces. (shrink)

This article argues that there is a marked ambivalence in Habermas’ concept of intersubjectivity in that he wavers between an interactionist and a discursive understanding. This ambivalence is demonstrated with reference to his recent critique of Robert Brandom's normative pragmatic theory of discursive practice. Although Habermas is a leading theorist of discourse as an epistemically steered process, he allows his interpretation of Brandom's theory as suffering from objective idealism to compel him to recoil from discourse and to defend (...) a purely interactionist or dialogical position. It is argued that the ambivalence in question is related to Habermas’ incomplete theorization of communication as a process of structure formation that unfolds sequentially through time on different levels. His architectonic of communicative intersubjectivity is marred by a missing concept. His characteristic concept of coordination is insufficient and must be complemented by a concept of synthesis at the discursive level. Key Words: Brandom • communication • coordination • discursive • synthesis • Habermas • Luhmann • objectivism • process • sequentiality • structure formation • time. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative source of modern basic rights consists in the idea of human dignity. It is this idea through which rights derive a universalistic content of morality. Due to their being rights, human rights can serve to protect human dignity, which in turn owes its connotations of self-respect and social recognition to the intramundane status of democratic citizenship. This is associated with a realistic utopia whose aim at realizing social justice is intrinsic to the (...) very institutions of democratic constitutional states. (shrink)

Both the pragmatic logic of social critique and the idea of a critical social theory presuppose the possibility of distinguishing progressive from regressive forms of social change. Thus, a condition of adequacy of social critique in general, and of critical social theory in particular, is the theoretical capacity to identify progressive social change. I begin this study by showing that, since it incorporates a theory of social evolution, Habermas's conception of critical (...) class='Hi'>social theory satisfies this condition. ;Habermas's theory of social evolution, however, is a source of much misunderstanding in the literature. I attempt to clarify the theory with a careful reconstruction of its concepts and fundamental theses, and by systematizing the theory as a whole. The central thesis of the theory of social evolution that functions to identify progressive change is that the logic and the content of social change can be distinguished, and that we can rationally reconstruct the developmental logic of the normative structures of societies. I analyze the concept of developmental logic and defend it against some common objections, including the objection that the theory draws a false analogy between the structures of individual maturation and social rationalization. This 'ontogenetic fallacy' is not committed, I argue, because Habermas translates only the formal features of the concept of developmental logic from its genesis in psychology to social theory. ;I conclude by arguing that Habermas's theory of social evolution does entail an adequate conception of progress, but that it is insufficiently differentiated. That is, Habermas's theory explains progress in each of the dimensions of cognitive knowledge and moral insight; but it lacks an explanation of progress in the dimension of expressive self-realization. Drawing upon the conceptual resources of Habermas's theory, I show that it can account for this dimension if it also includes a notion of expressive action that is pre-discursive. (shrink)

The out?dated intentionalistic assumptions manifest in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action undermine a solution to the problem of order in action theory beyond utilitarianism. An analysis of his intersubjectivistic conception, which is based on the theory of the speech?act, shows that the incompleteness of Habermas's linguistic turn is due to his attempt to revive the older Critical Theory's concept of critique. The claims for a scientifically well?founded revival of a universal concept of reason ? which are asserted in (...) this concept ? invalidate the intersubjectivistic paradigm in action theory and therefore obstruct the way to a de?individualized formulation of the theory of social contract that avoids the paradox of utilitarian models. (shrink)

The Article focuses on the concept of social solidarity, as it is used in the Report of the International Bioethics Committee On Social Responsibility and Health. It is argued that solidarity plays a major role in supporting the whole framework of social responsibility, as presented by the IBC. Moreover, solidarity is not limited to members of particular groups, but potentially extended to all human beings on the basis of their inherent dignity; this sense of human solidarity is (...) a necessary presupposition for a genuinely universalistic morality of justice and human rights. (shrink)