It has become commonplace in the theory of concepts to distinguish between questions about the structure and questions about the ontology of concepts. Structural questions concern the way concepts are composed of, or otherwise related to, other concepts (or non-conceptual constituents), while ontological questions concern the metaphysical nature of concepts: how concepts exist (if they exist); what kind of entities they are. A tacit assumption in discussions about the structure and ontology of concepts seems to be that structural (...) and ontological questions can be treated more or less independently of each other. Correspondingly, it might be assumed that one can rather arbitrarily combine structural analyses of concepts with any hypothesis about their ontological make-up. In this paper, we would like to question this assumption with regard to a particular recent development in the structural analysis of concepts, the so-called frame theory. As a matter of fact, most frame theorists adopt a subjectivist theory of concepts. Yet, subjectivism attracts philosophical criticisms, which originate mainly in the writings of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein. While Wittgenstein appreciated the cognitive dimension of concepts, he came to reject the subjectivist’s causal analysis of mental explanation and their ensuing reification of concepts as causally operative mental particulars. Instead, Wittgenstein suggested that concepts are socially imparted norms of classification and inference – i. e., abstractions from collective word-usages and other practices associated with categorizing and higher-order thinking, which may serve as instructions for individual agents on how to discriminate and interact with things of different kinds. Applying the Wittgensteinian critique of subjectivism to the frame analysis, the we not only find that the frame approach quite nicely dovetails with what the pragmatist has to say about concepts and categorization, insofar as frames seem particularly well-suited to depict the defeasible and context-dependent default character of our usual criteria for semantical understanding. Indeed, pragmatism, with its emphasis on the holistic, indeterminate and normative nature of our conceptual activities, seems able to explain why concepts are frames. This shows that there exist at least some interconnections between structural and ontological analyses, which must not be ignored, especially in interdisciplinary investigations on concepts. Even if frame theory is not strictly incompatible with a subjectivist ontology, it does license an abductive inference to a pragmatist ontology of concepts, as frames precisely formalize the insights into our actual conceptual practice that led Wittgenstein to develop his pragmatist view. (shrink)

This book aims to synthesize different directions in knowledge studies into a unified theory of knowledge and knowledge processes. It explicates important relations between knowledge and information. It provides the readers with understanding of the essence and structure of knowledge, explicating operations and process that are based on knowledge and vital for society. The book also highlights how the theory of knowledge paves the way for more advanced design and utilization of computers (...) and networks. (shrink)

The crisis resilience of vital social systems is currently the target of constant development efforts in Finland, as their drifting into crisis would weaken societies’ functional abilities, safety, and security. This is also the case regarding the Finnish health care system. In an attempt to move beyond existing frameworks of crisis imagination, this article takes an unconventional stance by elucidating endogenous crisis dynamics present in the Finnish health care system. Delphi process was conducted for top experts in Finnish health care (...) and crisis management. With a dissensus-seeking orientation, our aim was to fertilize disagreements among panelists to reveal key vulnerabilities in the health system. Despite our efforts to evoke dissensus, the panelists ended up generating a consensus that aims to protect the underlying assumptions of the health system’s knowledge structure. Through inductive analysis of expert discourses, the data was analyzed through our research question “what constitutes a crisis-proof health system and a crisis-prone health system”. What is framed as a strength of the system by our panelists, namely the ability to maintain legitimacy, improve efficiency, and guarantee continuity, can still have questionable implications that are left ungrasped. A system’s theory approach illustrates how such effects can develop and escalate beyond the reach of social interventions, and thus be predisposed to cause objectionable yet concealed social crises. The discussion illustrates how these endogenous crisis dynamics could be seen to materialize in real-life cases. (shrink)

1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...

The aim of this paper is to outline a methodological framework for brand equity planning with structuralist rhetorical semiotics. By drawing on the connectionistconceptual model of the brand generative trajectory of signification it will be displayed in a stepwise fashion how a set of nuclear semes and classemes or anintended semic structure that underlies manifest discursive structures may be projected by its internal stakeholders with view to attaining differential brand associations. The suggested methodological framework focuses on the strength and (...) uniqueness of brand associations as integral aspects of a brand’s equity structure and comprises a set of calculi that aim at addressing from a brand textuality point of view how associations may be systematically linked to their key sources with an emphasis on the ad filmic text. The propounded methodology is exemplified by recourse to a corpus of ad filmic texts from the major brand players in the UK cereals market. The argumentative thrust is intent on demonstrating that structuralist rhetorical semiotics is not only useful for analysing/interpreting brand texts, but, moreover, for constructing and for managing them over time. This demonstration is deployed by adopting a synchronic/diachronic and intra--filmic/inter--filmic approach to the formation of brand associations that make up a projected brand equity structure, in the context of embedded product category dynamics. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 687-694.

Contemporary architecture is increasingly grounded in science and mathematics. Architectural discourse has shifted radically from the sometimes disorienting Derridean deconstruction, to engaging scientific terms such as fractals, chaos, complexity, nonlinearity, and evolving systems. That's where the architectural action is -- at least for cutting-edge architects and thinkers -- and every practicing architect and student needs to become conversant with these terms and know what they mean. Unfortunately, the vast majority of architecture faculty are unprepared to explain them to students, not (...) having had a scientific education themselves. Here is an architecture book by an architect/scientist, just in time to help architects in the new millennium. Alexander discusses many of the scientific terms arising in cutting-edge architecture, and explains them to those who don't have scientific training or advanced mathematical knowledge. We find discussions of the evolution of forms; the importance of process in design; iteration; genetic algorithms; sequences of transformations; different levels of scale (i.e. fractals); etc. They are explained here by an architect who is also a scientist, because he wants to change the way architects think and build. Alexander is not merely popularizing other scientists' results and making them accessible to architects: he is in fact presenting new and original scientific work that ties many of these concepts together in a way that will be useful to architects. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie qualitative Interviewstudie analysiert informelle Wissensstrukturen von Pflegenden und Ärzten hinsichtlich der beiden Einflussfaktoren „Alter“ und „Kosten“ auf Therapieentscheide am Lebensende als Grundlage ethischer Meinungsbildung. Als Auswertungsmaterial dienen spontane Aussagen zu „Alter“ und „Kosten“, die nicht im Kontext von Fragestellungen zu Ageism oder Rationierung erhoben wurden. Diese Aussagen wurden einer Inhaltsanalyse unterzogen, und zwar anhand von qualitativen und quantitativen Analyseschritten.Die Studie zeigt, dass der Faktor „Alter“ wesentlich häufiger als Einflussfaktor auf Therapieentscheide am Lebensende genannt wird als der Faktor „Kosten“. Zudem (...) gibt es Hinweise auf mögliche Ungleichbehandlung sowie auf Überversorgung von Patienten am Lebensende. Die Befunde stützen die Annahme, dass Therapieentscheidungen eher auf informellen, nicht-institutionalisierten Prozessen beruhen. Eine stärker explizite Strukturierung des Prozesses zur Therapieentscheidung könnte die Risiken von Ungleichbehandlung und Überversorgung reduzieren und dadurch zu ethisch besser vertretbaren Ergebnisse führen. (shrink)

Professor Pandit, working among the admirable group of philosophers at the University of Delhi, has written a fundamental criticism and a constructive re-interpretation of all that has been preserved as serious epistemological and methodological reflections on the sciences in modern Western philosoph- from the times of Galileo, Newton, Descartes and Leibniz to those of Russell and Wittgenstein, Carnap and Popper, and, we need hardly add, onward to the troubling relativisms and reconstructions of historical epistemologies in the works of Hanson, Kuhn, (...) Lakatos and Feyerabend. His themes are intrigu ing, set forth as they are with masterly case studies of physics and the life sciences, and within an original conceptual framework for philosophical analysis of the processes, functions, and structures of scientific knowing. Pandit's contributions deserve thoughtful examination. For our part, we wish to point to some among them: (1) an interactive articulation of subjective and objective factors of both problems and theories in the course of scientific development; (2) a striking contrast between the explanatory power of a scientific theory and its 'resolving power', i. e. (shrink)

How a group G can know that p has been the subject of much investigation in social epistemology in recent years. This paper clarifies and defends a form of non-supervenient, non-summative group knowledge: G can know that p even if none of the members of G knows that p, and whether or not G knows that p does not locally supervene on the mental states of the members of G. Instead, we argue that what is central to G knowing (...) that p is whether G has an epistemic structure that is functioning appropriately in accord with the action-related purposes of the group, and this structure may include non-agential elements such as devices that retain or process information. We argue that recent objections to non-summative group knowledge given by Jennifer Lackey do not in fact succeed in undermining the view, but do help to clarify the nature of non-summative group knowledge. The main upshot of our response to Lackey’s objections is that groups put their knowledge into action in ways that often differ from how individuals do so, and social epistemologists should be careful to notice these differences, especially insofar as groups often structure themselves by employing various epistemically-relevant devices. (shrink)

Given a controversial issue, argument mining from texts in natural language is extremely challenging: besides linguistic aspects, domain knowledge is often required together with appropriate forms of inferences to identify arguments. Via the analysis of various corpora, this contribution explores the types of knowledge that are required to develop an efficient argument mining system. We show that the Qualia structure of the Generative Lexicon with some extensions and a specific interpretation has some expressive capabilities which are appropriate (...) for this task. (shrink)

Robert C. Stalnaker presents a set of essays on the structure of inquiry. First he focuses on the concepts of knowledge, belief, and partial belief, and on the rules and procedures we ought to use to determine what to believe. Then he explores the relations between conditionals and causal and explanatory concepts.

I argue that there is a cognition condition on intention and intentional action. If an agent is doing A intentionally, she has knowledge in intention that he is doing A. If an agent intends to do A, she has knowledge in intention that she is going to do A. In both cases, the agent has knowledge of eventual success, in this sense: she knows that it will be no accident if she ends up having done A. In (...) both cases, the agent’s knowledge is of what is happening, or what is going to happen, in the world; it is not knowledge merely of her state of mind. This knowledge is practical: it the cause of what it understands; without it what is happening, or what is going to happen, is not an intentional action, and any practical thought of the agent’s about what is happening, or what is going to happen, does not hit the heights of intention. I demonstrate that famous examples (from Davidson and Bratman) purporting to show that the cognition condition should be rejected (or its content or scope weakened) are ineffective, because they trade on confusions about the different kinds of failure to which intentional action may be susceptible, confusions remedied via reflection on the structure of intentional action. I show that the cognition condition is grounded not in reflection about the directions of fit and guidance of different kinds of mental states, nor in the indicative content of linguistic expressions of intention, but in the calculative and temporal structure of intentional action itself. (shrink)

As clinical ethics consultants move toward professionalization, the process of certifying individual consultants or accrediting programs will be discussed and debated. With certification, some entity must be established or ordained to oversee the standards and procedures. If the process evolves like other professions, it seems plausible that it will eventually include a written examination to evaluate the core knowledge competencies that individual practitioners should possess to meet peer practice standards. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has published core (...) knowledge competencies for many years that are accepted by experts as the prevailing standard. Probably any written examination will be based upon the ASBH core knowledge competencies. However, much remains to be done before any examination may be offered. In particular, it seems likely that a recognized examining board must create and validate examination questions and structure the examination so as to establish meaningful, defensible parameters after dealing with such challenging questions as: Should the certifying examination be multiple choice or short-answer essay? How should the test be graded? What should the pass rate be? How may the examination be best administered? To advance the field of health care ethics consultation, thought leaders should start to focus on the written examination possibilities, to date unaddressed carefully in the literature. Examination models—both objective and written—must be explored as a viable strategy about how the field of health care ethics consultations can grow toward professionalization. (shrink)

The study aims to help characterize the sort of structures about which people can acquire unconscious knowledge. It is already well established that people can implicitly learn n-grams and also repetition patterns. We explore the acquisition of unconscious structural knowledge of symmetry. Chinese Tang poetry uses a specific sort of mirror symmetry, an inversion rule with respect to the tones of characters in successive lines of verse. We show, using artificial poetry to control both n-gram structure and (...) repetition patterns, that people can implicitly learn to discriminate inversions from non-inversions, presenting a challenge to existing models of implicit learning. (shrink)

Originally published in 1925. If we are to know what intelligence is, how the brain can think, and what place mind holds in the scheme of things, we must first have a science of the sensory basis and structure of knowledge. This book supplies that need; it also serves as a short introduction to the systematic psychology of cognition.

Les architectures médiévales du savoir conçues dans le monde islamique, constituent un cas particulier : elles reflètent parfaitement la compétition entre les différentes traditions et approches intellectuelles. D’une part, certaines des classifications sont centrées sur ce qui était perçu comme sciences indigènes durant leur période de formation, c’est-à-dire ces sciences qui émergent en connexion avec la nouvelle religion qu’est l’Islam et la langue de sa révélation, l’arabe. D’autre part, les savants ont repris avec empressement et adapté les disciplines dérivant de (...) cultures non-arabes et non-musulmanes, principalement la science et la philosophie grecques. Cependant, ces traditions transmettent leurs propres conceptions de la connaissance, en partie en conflit avec les idées arabes/islamiques. Dans cet article, je propose un aperçu des approches diverses puis me concentre sur Fārābī et Avicenne, afin de retracer un développement remarquable : la dissolution graduelle des frontières aussi bien au sein qu’entre les différentes sphères et paradigmes scientifiques et ce sur des bases épistémologiques. (shrink)

There are several approaches implementing reasoning based on conditional knowledge bases, one of the most popular being System Z (Pearl, Proceedings of the 3rd conference on theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, TARK ’90, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 121–135, 1990). We look at ranking functions (Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) in general, conditional structures and c-representations (Kern-Isberner, Conditionals in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief (...) Revision: Considering Conditionals as Agents, vol. 2087 of LNCS, Springer, Berlin, 2001) in order to examine the reasoning strength of the different approaches by learning which of the known calculi of nonmonotonic reasoning (System P and R) and Direct Inference are applicable to these inference relations. Furthermore we use the recently proposed Enforcement-postulate (Kern-Isberner and Krümpelmann, Proceedings of the 22nd international joint conference on artificial intelligence, vol. 2, IJCAI’11, AAAI Press, pp. 937–942, 2011) to show dependencies between these approaches. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombe characterised practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. As Anscombe recognised, accepting this view involves rejecting certain basic orthodox epistemological assumptions. But even once this is done, a challenge remains for a conception of practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. For while practical knowledge would appear to be a kind of propositional knowledge, intentions would appear to be a kind of non-propositional attitude. I call this the ‘Structural Challenge’ for an intention-based account of (...) practical knowledge. After rejecting two suggested responses – one which views intentions as propositional attitudes; one which views practical knowledge as non-propositional knowledge – I offer my own solution by showing how simply having and carrying out an intention to φ will ordinarily meet a plausible neutral condition on propositional knowledge. Knowing a fact will in general involve being mentally related to it via a successful exercise of relevant concepts. The account I develop turns on viewing a person’s carrying out an intention to φ as their constituting the fact that they are φ-ing, through a practical exercise of their concept of φ-ing. The resulting account sheds light both on the analogies, and on the crucial formal differences, between practical and theoretical knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper we propose an informal exposition of the structure approach in the philosophy of science. Scientific knowledge is here considered as a collection of scientific theories. Each scientific theory has logico-linguistic, model-representing, pragmatic-procedural, and problem-heuristical subsystems and a subsystem of ties. The pivotal methodological concept for the exact description of these subsystems is the named set. We also outline the possibility of applying the structure-nominative approach to certain problems in the philosophy of science.

Having scandalous unethical research practices in the mid and late 20th century, study protocols of biomedical research reviewed by the Ethics Committee (EC) has become the accepted international standard. The Declaration of Helsinki uniformly requires that all biomedical research involving human participants, including research on identifiable human material or data, should be approved by the EC. Today, concerns over the quality of the EC functions worldwide. There are research globally in this regard but no data are available from Bangladesh. Hence, (...) we conducted a questionnaire based pilot study on knowledge and attitude of EC members on bioethics and structure & function of EC in Bangladesh. (shrink)

This account of the conflict between phrenologists and anti-phrenologists in early nineteenth-century Edinburgh is offered as a case study in the sociological explanation of intellectual activity. The historiographical value and propriety of a sociological approach to ideas is defended against accounts which assume the autonomy of knowledge. By attending to the social context of the debate and the functions of ideas in that context one may construct an explanation of why the conflict took the course it did.

Information-seeking interactions in multi-agent systems are required for situations in which there exists an expert agent that has vast knowledge about some topic, and there are other agents (questioners or clients) that lack and need information regarding that topic. In this work, we propose a strategy for automatic knowledge acquisition in an information-seeking setting in which agents use a structured argumentation formalism for knowledge representation and reasoning. In our approach, the client conceives the other agent as an (...) expert in a particular domain and is committed to believe in the expert’s qualified opinion about a given query. The client’s goal is to ask questions and acquire knowledge until it is able to conclude the same as the expert about the initial query. On the other hand, the expert’s goal is to provide just the necessary information to help the client understand its opinion. Since the client could have previous knowledge in conflict with the information acquired from the expert agent, and given that its goal is to accept the expert’s position, the client may need to adapt its previous knowledge. The operational semantics for the client-expert interaction will be defined in terms of a transition system. This semantics will be used to formally prove that, once the client-expert interaction finishes, the client will have the same assessment the expert has about the performed query. (shrink)

Knowledge has become an important resource that can help enterprises gain a competitive advantage in the market. In this regard, knowledge sharing in the process of cooperative innovation provides an important way to acquire knowledge. With the development of innovation, the innovation network has become an important carrier of knowledge sharing, which can also have an influence on knowledge sharing. Based on knowledge management theory and complex network theory, this study constructed a multilayer network (...) environment for knowledge sharing. It then identified the network elements and knowledge-sharing paths that influence knowledge sharing from microperspectives and macroperspectives. On this basis, the effects of node cohesion and weak connection on knowledge sharing in small-world and scale-free topologies were analyzed by computer simulation. The results showed that, in an innovation network with a scale-free topology, cohesion and weak ties had a great influence on the average knowledge level and knowledge equilibrium. Meanwhile, in small-world topological innovation networks, a mixed path had the best promotion effect on network knowledge sharing. (shrink)

Awareness structures by Fagin, Halpern (Artif Intell 34:39–76, 1988) (FH) feature a syntactic awareness correspondence and accessibility relations modeling implicit knowledge. They are a flexible model of unawareness, and best interpreted from an outside modeler’s perspective. Unawareness structures by Heifetz et al. (J Econ Theory, 130:78–94, 2006, Games Econ Behav 62:305–324, 2008) (HMS) model awareness by a lattice of state spaces and explicit knowledge via possibility correspondences. Sublattices thereof can be interpreted as subjective views of agents. Open questions (...) include (1) how implicit knowledge can be defined in HMS structures, and (2) in which way FH structures can be extended to model the agents’ subjective views. In this paper, we address (1) by defining implicit knowledge such that it is consistent with explicit knowledge in HMS models. We also introduce a variant of HMS models that instead of explicit knowledge, takes implicit knowledge and awareness as primitives. Further, we address (2) by introducing a category of FH models that are modally equivalent relative to sublanguages and can be interpreted as agents’ subjective views depending on their awareness. These constructions allow us to show an equivalence between HMS and FH models. As a corollary, we obtain soundness and completeness of HMS models with respect to the Logic of Propositional Awareness, based on a language featuring _both_ implicit and explicit knowledge. (shrink)

We investigated the implicit learning of a linguistically relevant variable in a natural language context . Trial by trial subjective measures indicated that exposure to a form–animacy regularity led to unconscious knowledge of that regularity. Under the same conditions, people did not learn about another form–meaning regularity when a linguistically arbitrary variable was used instead of animacy . Implicit learning is constrained to acquire unconscious knowledge about features with high prior probabilities of being relevant in that domain.