This chapter seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition; this theory is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and (...) then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global neuronal workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception; furthermore, this theory can subsume and unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness, in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for selection of representational content into consciousness. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to give an assessment of prediction error minimization as a unifying theoretical framework for the study of social cognition. We show how this framework can be used to synthesize and systematically relate existing data from social cognition research, and explain how it introduces new constraints for further research. We discuss PEM in relation to other theoretical frameworks of social cognition, and identify the main challenges that this approach to social cognition will need to (...) address. (shrink)

We propose expanding the authors’ shared novelty-seeking basis for creativity and curiosity by emphasizing an underlying computational principle: Minimizing prediction errors (mismatch between predictions and incoming data). Curiosity is tied to the anticipation of minimizing prediction errors through future, novel information, whereas creative AHA moments are connected to the actual minimization of prediction errors through current, novel information.

This chapter focuses on what’s novel in the perspective that the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework affords on the cognitive-scientific project of explaining intelligence by appeal to internal representations. It shows how truth-conditional and resemblance-based approaches to representation in generative models may be integrated. The PEM framework in cognitive science is an approach to cognition and perception centered on a simple idea: organisms represent the world by constantly predicting their own internal states. PEM theories often stress the hierarchical structure of (...) the generative models they posit. The novel explanatory power of the PEM account derives largely from the way in which pairs of generative and recognition models interact. “Predictive coding” refers to an encoding strategy in which predicted portions of an input signal are subtracted from the actual signal received, so that only the difference between the two is passed as output to the next stage of information processing. (shrink)

In his paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization, which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. (...) Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight wha... (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jakob Hohwy argues that the emerging predictive processing perspective on cognition requires us to explain cognitive functioning in purely internalistic and neurocentric terms. The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the view that PP entails a wholesale rejection of positions that are interested in the embodied, embedded, extended, or enactive dimensions of cognitive processes. I will argue that Hohwy’s argument from analogy, which forces an evidentiary boundary into the picture, lacks the argumentative resources to (...) make a convincing case for the conceptual necessity to interpret PP in solely internalistic terms. For this reason, I will reconsider the postulation and explanatory role of the evidentiary boundary. I will arrive at an account of prediction error minimization and its foundation on the free energy principle that is fully consistent with approaches to cognition that emphasize the embodied and interactive properties of cognitive processes. This gives rise to the suggestion that explanatory pluralism about the application of PP is to be preferred over Hohwy’s explanatory monism that follows from his internalistic and neurocentric view of predictive cognitive systems. (shrink)

The proposal that probabilistic inference and unconscious hypothesis testing are central to information processing in the brain has been steadily gaining ground in cognitive neuroscience and associated fields. One popular version of this proposal is the new theoretical framework of predictive processing or prediction error minimization, which couples unconscious hypothesis testing with the idea of ‘active inference’ and claims to offer a unified account of perception and action. Here we will consider one outstanding issue that still looms large at the (...) core of the PEM framework: the lack of a clear criterion for distinguishing conscious states from unconscious ones. In order to fulfill the promise of becoming a unifying framework for describing and modeling cognition, PEM needs to be able to differentiate between conscious and unconscious mental states or processes. We will argue that one currently popular view, that the contents of conscious experience are determined by the ‘winning hypothesis’, falls short of fully accounting for conscious experience. It ignores the possibility that some states of a system can control that system’s behavior even though they are apparently not conscious. What follows from this is that the ‘winning hypothesis’ view does not provide a complete account of the difference between conscious and unconscious states in the probabilistic brain. We show how this problem for the received view can be resolved by augmenting PEM with Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness. This move is warranted by the similar roles that attention and internal competition play in both the PEM framework and the multiple drafts model. (shrink)

SummarySubjecting to a detailed analysis Kant's diagnosis of dialectical error in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique, the author posits that Kant's understanding of such error is, to the extent that it conflates the subjective‐objective, phenomenal‐noumenal, and regulative‐constitutive distinctions, fundamentally incoherent. The author argues not only that these three distinctions cannot on Kant's own terms be conflated, but also that Kant's treatment of dialectical error is further vitiated by circularity of argument: Kant proposes to explain the three distinctions by (...) means of the notion of transcendental error, which however the distinctions themselves were supposed to explain in the first place. After showing that Kant's diagnosis of dialectical error cannot be salvaged even by resorting to the Kantian concept of “transcendental subreption”, the author concludes that unless Kant could in some other way spell out the minimal conditions for dialectical error, Kant's very distinction between understanding and reason becomes difficult to justify. (shrink)

Psychological research has shown that cognitive illusions, of which visual illusions are just a special case, are systematic and pervasive, raising epistemological questions about how error in all forms of research can be identified and eliminated. The quantitative sciences make use of statistical techniques for this purpose, but it is not clear what the qualitative equivalent is, particularly in view of widespread scepticism about validity and objectivity. I argue that, in the light of cognitive psychology, the ‘error question’ cannot be (...) dismissed as a positivist obsession, and that the concepts of truth and objectivity are unavoidable. However, they constitute only a ‘minimal realism’, which does not necessarily bring a commitment to ‘absolute’ truth, certainty, correspondence, causation, reductionism, or universal laws in its wake. The assumption that it does reflects a misreading of positivism and, ironically, precipitates a ‘crisis of legitimation and representation’, as described by constructivist authors. (shrink)

Psychological research has shown that cognitive illusions, of which visual illusions are just a special case, are systematic and pervasive, raising epistemological questions about how error in all forms of research can be identified and eliminated. The quantitative sciences make use of statistical techniques for this purpose, but it is not clear what the qualitative equivalent is, particularly in view of widespread scepticism about validity and objectivity. I argue that, in the light of cognitive psychology, the ‘error question’ cannot be (...) dismissed as a positivist obsession, and that the concepts of truth and objectivity are unavoidable. However, they constitute only a ‘minimal realism’, which does not necessarily bring a commitment to ‘absolute’ truth, certainty, correspondence, causation, reductionism, or universal laws in its wake. The assumption that it does reflects a misreading of positivism and, ironically, precipitates a ‘crisis of legitimation and representation’, as described by constructivist authors. (shrink)

Assembly of minimal genomes revealed many genes encoding unknown functions. Three overlooked functional categories account for some of them. Cells are prone to make errors and age. As a first key function, discrimination between proper and changed entities is indispensable. Discrimination requires management of information, an authentic, yet abstract, cur- rency of reality. For example proteins age, sometimes very fast. The cell must identify, then get rid of old proteins without destroying young ones. Implementing discrimination in cells leads to (...) the second set of functions, usually ignored. Being abstract, information must nevertheless be embodied into material entities, with unavoidable idiosyncratic properties. This brings about novel unmet needs. Hence, the buildup of cells elicits specific but awkward material implementations, ‘kludges’ that become essential under particular settings, while difficult to identify. Finally, a third functional category char- acterizes the need for growth, with metabolic implementations allowing the cell to put together the growth of its cytoplasm, membranes, and genome, spanning different spatial dimensions. Solving this metabolic quandary, critical for engineering novel synthetic biology chassis, uncovered an unexpected role for CTP synthetase as the coordinator of nonhomothetic growth. Because a significant number of SynBio constructs aim at creating cell factories we expect that they will be attacked by viruses (it is not by chance that the function of the CRISPR system was identified in industrial settings). Substantiating the role of CTP, natural selection has dealt with this hurdle via synthesis of the antimetabolite 30-deoxy-30,40-didehydro- CTP, recruited for antiviral immunity in all domains of life. (shrink)

Elicitation methods in decision-making under risk allow us to infer the utilities of outcomes as well as the probability weights from the observed preferences of an individual. An optimally efficient elicitation method is proposed, which takes the inevitable distortion of preferences by random errors into account and minimizes the effect of such errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions. Under mild assumptions, the optimally efficient method for eliciting utilities and probability weights is the following three-stage (...) procedure. First, a probability is elicited whose subjective weight is one half. Second, the utility function is elicited through the midpoint chaining certainty equivalent method using the probability elicited at the first stage. Finally, the probability weighting function is elicited through the probability equivalent method. (shrink)

Genomic instability is a hallmark of cancer. Cancer cells that exhibit abnormal chromosomes are characteristic of most advanced tumours, despite the potential threat represented by accumulated genetic damage. Carcinogenesis involves a loss of key components of the genetic and signalling molecular networks; hence some authors have suggested that this is part of a trend of cancer cells to behave as simple, minimal replicators. In this study, we explore this conjecture and suggest that, in the case of cancer, genomic instability has (...) an upper limit that is associated with a minimal cancer cell network. Such a network would include (for a given microenvironment) the basic molecular components that allow cells to replicate and respond to selective pressures. However, it would also exhibit internal fragilities that could be exploited by appropriate therapies targeting the DNA repair machinery. The implications of this hypothesis are discussed. (shrink)

The quantization error in a fixed-size Self-Organizing Map (SOM) with unsupervised winner-take-all learning has previously been used successfully to detect, in minimal computation time, highly meaningful changes across images in medical time series and in time series of satellite images. Here, the functional properties of the quantization error in SOM are explored further to show that the metric is capable of reliably discriminating between the finest differences in local contrast intensities and contrast signs. While this capability of the QE is (...) akin to functional characteristics of a specific class of retinal ganglion cells (the so-called Y-cells) in the visual systems of the primate and the cat, the sensitivity of the QE surpasses the capacity limits of human visual detection. Here, the quantization error in the SOM is found to reliably signal changes in contrast or colour when contrast information is removed from or added to the image, but not when the amount and relative weight of contrast information is constant and only the local spatial position of contrast elements in the pattern changes. While the RGB Mean reflects coarser changes in colour or contrast well enough, the SOM-QE is shown to outperform the RGB Mean in the detection of single-pixel changes in images with up to five million pixels. This could have important implications in the context of unsupervised image learning and computational building block approaches to large sets of image data (big data). (shrink)

This article assesses Nietzsche’s engagement with the sublime in Dawn to shed light on an aspect thereof that has so far been overlooked: Nietzsche’s deployment of the sublime as a philosophical framework for coming to terms with epistemic limits and transcendental errors. By engaging with the sublime both descriptively and methodologically, Nietzsche promotes an awareness of cognitive limits that fosters, instead of impeding, the pursuit of knowledge and the accomplishment of philosophical endeavors. While complicating the minimal existing literature on (...) the topic, this article highlights Nietzsche’s philosophically unique use of the sublime in navigating a characteristically post-Kantian epistemic issue (the awareness of epistemic partiality and inadequacy) and in mitigating an illusory faith in reason. (shrink)

In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view 'there are Fs' can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as (...) truthmakers for S if it is true. I rebut some recent objections that have been levelled against this metaontological view. (shrink)

It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the (...) fact that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity? The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful. (shrink)

This essay takes the position, consistent with Ayer’s own retrospective judgments, that the philosophical significance of Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) was minimal at best, and that its real significance was socio-historical. LTL stands as one of the most influential expressions of an overzealous and simplistic scientism that swept through Western culture in the first half of the twentieth century. This scientism played a crucial role in problematizing the West’s relationship to truth in ways that contributed to the eventual emergence (...) of “post-truth” culture, with its “post-truth politics.” This in turn made possible the disastrous results of recent votes and elections in Britain and, above all, in the United States. In short, LTL’s real significance resides in the role it played as a sophisticated and successful bit of propaganda for an ideology that played a crucial role in loosing Western culture from its moral and epistemic moorings. (shrink)

We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case (...) of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth. (shrink)

A behavioral drive directed solely at minimizing prediction error would cause an agent to seek out states of unchanging, and thus easily predictable, sensory inputs (such as a dark room). The default to an evolutionarily encoded prior to avoid such untenable behaviors is unsatisfying. We suggest an alternate information theoretic interpretation to address this dilemma.

Patient safety has assumed a prominent role on the policy agenda since the Institute of Medicine report To Err Is Human was released in November 1999. The report maintained that medical error is the predominant mechanism by which patients in the United States and around the world are injured. This finding, along with the report’s recommendation for a “systems” approach to reducing medical error, provided an extremely important insight into the operation of our medical delivery system. Clearly, while advances in (...) medical technology, diagnostic techniques, and knowledge provide the foundation for saving lives, medical error has resulted in their loss. However, recognition that medical error is a primary cause of these avoidable patient injuries and deaths is a key one and may result in improvements within our system of health-care delivery as well as minimization of the emotional and financial toll that iatrogenic injury causes. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose the model averaging estimation method for multiplicative error model and construct the corresponding weight choosing criterion based on the Kullback–Leibler divergence with a hyperparameter to avoid the problem of overfitting. The resulting model average estimator is proved to be asymptotically optimal. It is shown that the Kullback–Leibler model averaging estimator asymptotically minimizes the in-sample Kullback–Leibler divergence and improves the forecast accuracy of out-of-sample even under different loss functions. In simulations, we show that the KLMA (...) estimator compares favorably with smooth-AIC estimator, smooth-BIC estimator, and Mallows model averaging estimator, especially when some nonlinear noise is added to the data generation process. The empirical applications in the daily range of S&P500 and price duration of IBM show that the out-of-sample forecasting capacity of the KLMA estimator is better than that of other methods. (shrink)

Bernoulli’s 1713 golden theorem is viewed retrospectively in the context of modern model-based frequentist inference that revolves around the concept of a prespecified statistical model Mθx\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{M}}_{{{\varvec{\uptheta}}}} \left( {\mathbf{x}} \right)$$\end{document}, defining the inductive premises of inference. It is argued that several widely-accepted claims relating to the golden theorem and frequentist inference are either misleading or erroneous: (a) Bernoulli solved the problem of inference ‘from probability to frequency’, and thus (b) the golden theorem (...) cannot justify an approximate Confidence Interval (CI) for the unknown parameter θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\theta$$\end{document}, (c) Bernoulli identified the probability PA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$P\left( A \right)$$\end{document} with the relative frequency 1n∑k=1nxk\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\frac{1}{n}\sum\nolimits_{k = 1}^{n} {x_{k} }$$\end{document} of event A as a result of conflating f(x0|θ)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f({\mathbf{x}}_{0} |\theta )$$\end{document} with f(θ|x0),\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f(\theta |{\mathbf{x}}_{0} ),$$\end{document} where x0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf{x}}_{0}$$\end{document} denotes the observed data, and (d) the same ‘swindle’ is currently perpetrated by the p value testers. In interrogating the claims (a)–(d), the paper raises several foundational issues that are particularly relevant for statistical induction as it relates to the current discussions on the replication crises and the trustworthiness of empirical evidence, arguing that: [i] The alleged Bernoulli swindle is grounded in the unwarranted claim θ^nx0≃θ∗,\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hat{\theta }_{n} \left( {{\mathbf{x}}_{0} } \right) \simeq \theta^{*},$$\end{document} for a large enough n, where θ^nX\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\hat{\theta }_{n} \left( {\mathbf{X}} \right)$$\end{document} is an optimal estimator of the true value θ∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\theta^{*}$$\end{document} of θ. [ii] Frequentist error probabilities are not conditional on hypotheses (H0 and H1) framed in terms of an unknown parameter θ since θ is neither a random variable nor an event. [iii] The direct versus inverse inference problem is a contrived and misplaced charge since neither conditional distribution f(x0|θ)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f({\mathbf{x}}_{0} |\theta )$$\end{document} and f(θ|x0)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f(\theta |{\mathbf{x}}_{0} )$$\end{document} exists (formally or logically) in model-based (Mθx\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{M}}_{{{\varvec{\uptheta}}}} \left( {\mathbf{x}} \right)$$\end{document}) frequentist inference. (shrink)

ABSTRACTComparative effectiveness studies, referred to here as “usual-care” trials, seek to compare current medical practices for the same medical condition. Such studies are presumed to be safe and involve only minimal risks. However, that presumption may be flawed if the trial design contains “unusual” care, resulting in potential risks to subjects and inaccurately informed consent. Three case studies described here did not rely on clinical evidence to ascertain contemporaneous practice. As a result, the investigators drew inaccurate conclusions, misinformed research participants, (...) and subjects’ safety was compromised. Before approving usual-care protocols, IRBs and scientific review committees should evaluate the quality and completeness of information documenting usual-care practices. Guidance from governmental oversight agencies regarding evidence-based documentation of current clinical practice could prevent similar occurrences in future usual-care trials. Accurate information is necessary to ensure that trials comply with government regulations that require minimizing research risks to subjects and accurate informed consent documents. (shrink)

The spin-j Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bohm experiment is examined in the context of how the quantum theoretic probability distributions for the spin measurement outcomes are to be coarse-grained in order to yield classical behavior in the $$j \rightarrow \infty$$ limit. A coarse-graining protocol is found that can be viewed as imperfection either in the detection process or in state preparation process, and is in both viewpoints minimal in the sense that it is no more than what is needed to wash out the (...) execess quantum correlations. In the first point of view the coarse-grained distribution can be written in terms of a Bell-type factorizable hidden variable model wherein the conditional distributions for the spin measurement outcome of each particle is not just nonnegative but actually attains the value zero for some choice of measurement axis. In the second point of view the coarse-grained distribution arises from a spin state whose Wigner function is not just nonnegative but actually attains the value zero for some spin orientations. That such a remarkable dual interpretation should be possible suggests that this type of complementary coarse graining is an intrinsic aspect of how classicality is obtained in the large j limit, but this conclusion remains speculative. (shrink)

Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An (...) interesting debate has arisen with regard to which is the more adequate epistemological interpretation of PEM. Indeed, Hohwy maintains that given that PEM supports an inferential view of perception and cognition, PEM has to be considered as conveying an internalist epistemological perspective. Contrary to this view, Clark maintains that it would be incorrect to interpret in such a way the indirectness of the link between the world and our inner model of it, and that PEM may well be combined with an externalist epistemological perspective. The aim of this paper is to assess those two opposite interpretations of PEM. Moreover, it will be suggested that Hohwy’s position may be considerably strengthened by adopting Carlo Cellucci’s view on knowledge (2013). (shrink)

An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain (...) and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses. (shrink)

We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed (...) in relation to previous research on temporal phenomenology. Finally, we discuss how there may be individual differences in the experience of temporal flow, in particular along the autism spectrum. The resulting view is that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception results from an internal, inferential process. (shrink)

This paper combines domestic and international research results to analyze and study the difference between the attribute features of English phrase speech and noise to enhance the short-time energy, which is used to improve the threshold judgment sensitivity; noise addition to the discrepancy data set is used to enhance the recognition robustness. The backpropagation algorithm is improved to constrain the range of weight variation, avoid oscillation phenomenon, and shorten the training time. In the real English phrase sound recognition system, there (...) are problems such as massive training data and low training efficiency caused by the super large-scale model parameters of the convolutional neural network. To address these problems, the NWBP algorithm is based on the oscillation phenomenon that tends to occur when searching for the minimum error value in the late training period of the network parameters, using the K-MEANS algorithm to obtain the seed nodes that approach the minimal error value, and using the boundary value rule to reduce the range of weight change to reduce the oscillation phenomenon so that the network error converges as soon as possible and improve the training efficiency. Through simulation experiments, the NWBP algorithm improves the degree of fitting and convergence speed in the training of complex convolutional neural networks compared with other algorithms, reduces the redundant computation, and shortens the training time to a certain extent, and the algorithm has the advantage of accelerating the convergence of the network compared with simple networks. The word tree constraint and its efficient storage structure are introduced, which improves the storage efficiency of the word tree constraint and the retrieval efficiency in the English phrase recognition search. (shrink)

Water quality control helps in the estimation of water bodies and detects the span of pollutants and their effect on the neighboring environment. This is why the water quality of the northern part of Lake Manzala has been studied here from January to March, 2016. This study aims to model and create a program for linear and nonlinear regression of the water elements in Lake Manzala to assess and predict the water quality. Water samples have been extracted from various depths, (...) and physio-chemical properties and heavy metal concentrations have been evaluated. This study has proposed a new algorithm for predicting water quality called “Algorithm of Estimation Regression Model”. On the contrary, in renewable energy applications, statistical modeling and forecasting the solar radiation remains a significant issue with detect to reinforce power management. A new proposed method for forecasting the average Monthly Global Solar Energy in Queensland, Australia, is called, Converting Data Set into Markov Model. It was used to obtain Markov transition probability matrices for three and six states of the solar energy. The proposed forecasting method yielded accurate results with minimal error. (shrink)

This research delves into a unique and vital aspect of addressing criticisms by some grammarians (al-nohaat) and interpreters against various continuous Quranic readings, focusing on the robustness of their transmission chains (isnad). These chains, often deemed weak by certain grammarians, are examined to understand how they reinforce the credibility of the readings, given the prevalent view that a solid transmission chain significantly minimizes errors in recitations. The data was collected through desk review of library sources, references, journal articles (...) and books. The data was confined to Qur’anic recitations and transmission of two scholar Ibn Aamir and Abu Jafar, who attracted great attention of the grammarians regarding their chain of transmission in their recitations. The data was analyzed in three stages, starting with data reduction, data display, and data verification. This was done to transform data into a meaningful discourse. Key conclusions of the study include the recognition of the Holy Quran, in its multiple readings, as a primary source for Arabic grammar (al-Nahw), with the two scholars using these readings as fundamental evidence for establishing grammatical rules. It also finds a broad scholarly consensus that the "ten recitations" of the Quran are authoritative and immune to criticism. The findings highlight the Quran's profound influence on Arabic language structures and consensus on the authority of recitations with roots in Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) teaching. Pioneers like Abu Hayyan celebrated linguistic diversity over rigid rules, while incorporating narrator biographies, geographical mapping, and morphological analysis continues to enrich the textual tradition. Recommendations of the study include expanding research on transmission tracking science, boosting recitation studies through computational linguistics, emphasizing ceaseless inspiration manifesting Quran's inimitability, and acknowledging multiplicity under universal wisdom principles. (shrink)

It has recently become popular to suggest that cognition can be explained as a process of Bayesian prediction error minimization. Some advocates of this view propose that attention should be understood as the optimization of expected precisions in the prediction-error signal (Clark, 2013, 2016; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012, 2013). This proposal successfully accounts for several attention-related phenomena. We claim that it cannot account for all of them, since there are certain forms of voluntary attention that it cannot accommodate. (...) We therefore suggest that, although the theory of Bayesian prediction error minimization introduces some powerful tools for the explanation of mental phenomena, its advocates have been wrong to claim that Bayesian prediction error minimization is ‘all the brain ever does’. (shrink)

How do intelligent agents spawn and exploit integrated processing regimes spanning brain, body, and world? The answer may lie in the ability of the biological brain to select actions and policies in the light of counterfactual predictions – predictions about what kinds of futures will result if such-and-such actions are launched. Appeals to the minimization of ‘counterfactual prediction errors’ (the ones that would result under various scenarios) already play a leading role in attempts to apply the basic toolkit of (...) the neurocomputational theory known as ‘predictive processing’ to higher cognitive functions such as policy selection and planning. In this paper, I show that this also leads naturally to the discovery and use of extended processing regimes defined across heterogeneous mixtures of biological and non-biological resource. This solves a long-standing puzzle concerning the ‘recruitment’ of the right non-neural processing resources at the right time. It reveals how (and why) human brains spawn and maintain extended human minds. (shrink)

Autism Spectrum Condition presents a challenge to social and relational accounts of the self, precisely because it is broadly seen as a disorder impacting social relationships. Many influential theories argue that social deficits and impairments of the self are the core problems in ASC. Predictive processing approaches address these based on general purpose neurocognitive mechanisms that are expressed atypically. Here we use the High, Inflexible Precision of Prediction Errors in Autism approach in the context of cultural niche construction to (...) explain atypicalities of the relational self, specifically its minimal, extended, and intersubjective aspects. We contend that the social self in ASC should not be seen as impaired, but rather as an outcome of atypical niche construction. We unpack the scientific, ethical, and practical consequences of this view, and discuss implications for how the challenges that autistic persons face should be approached. (shrink)

We present a proof for a conjecture previously formulated by Dzhafarov et al.. The conjecture specifies a measure for the degree of contextuality and a criterion for contextuality in a broad class of quantum systems. This class includes Leggett–Garg, EPR/Bell, and Klyachko–Can–Binicioglu–Shumovsky type systems as special cases. In a system of this class certain physical properties \ are measured in pairs \ \); every property enters in precisely two such pairs; and each measurement outcome is a binary random variable. Denoting (...) the measurement outcomes for a property \ in the two pairs it enters by \ and \, the pair of measurement outcomes for \ \) is \ \). Contextuality is defined as follows: one computes the minimal possible value \ for the sum of \ ) that is allowed by the individual distributions of \ and \; one computes the minimal possible value \ for the sum of \ across all possible couplings of the entire set of random variables \ in the system; and the system is considered contextual if \ ). This definition has its justification in the general approach dubbed Contextuality-by-Default, and it allows for measurement errors and signaling among the measured properties. The conjecture proved in this paper specifies the value of \ in terms of the distributions of the measurement outcomes \ \). (shrink)

In biosemiotics, life and living phenomena are described by means of originally anthropomorphic semiotic concepts. This can be justified if we can show that living systems as self-maintaining far from equilibrium systems create and update some kind of representation about the conditions of their self-maintenance. The point of view is the one of semiotic realism where signs and representations are considered as real and objective natural phenomena without any reference to the specifically human interpreter. It is argued that the most (...) basic concept of representation must be forward looking and that both C. Peirce’s and J. v. Uexküll’s concepts of sign assume an unnecessarily complex semiotic agent. The simplest representative systems do not have phenomenal objects or Umwelten at all. Instead, the minimal concept of representation and the source of normativity that is needed in its interpretation can be based on M. Bickhard’s interactivism. The initial normativity or natural self-interest is based on the ‘utility-concept’ of function: anything that contributes to the maintenance of a far from equilibrium system is functional to that system — every self-maintaining far from equilibrium system has a minimal natural self-interest to serve that function, it is its existential precondition. Minimal interactive representation emerges when such systems become able to switch appropriately between two or more means ofmaintaining themselves. At the level of such representations, a potentiality to detect an error may develop although no objects of representation for the system are provided. Phenomenal objects emerge in systems that are more complex. If a system creates a set of ongoingly updated ’situation images’ and can detect temporal invariances in the updating process, these invariances constitute objects for the system itself. Within them, a representative system gets an Umwelt and becomes capable of experiencing triadic signs. The relation between representation and its object is either iconic or indexical at this level. Correspondingly as in Peirce’s semeiotic, symbolic signs appear as more developed — for the symbolic signs, a more complex system is needed. (shrink)

Current explanatory frameworks for social norms pay little attention to why and how brains might carry out computational functions that generate norm compliance behavior. This paper expands on existing literature by laying out the beginnings of a neurocomputational framework for social norms and social cognition, which can be the basis for advancing our understanding of the nature and mechanisms of social norms. Two neurocomputational building blocks are identified that might constitute the core of the mechanism of norm compliance. They consist (...) of Bayesian and reinforcement learning systems. It is sketched why and how the concerted activity of these systems can generate norm compliance by minimization of three specific kinds of prediction-errors. (shrink)

The prediction error minimization framework denotes a family of views that aim at providing a unified theory of perception, cognition, and action. In this paper, I discuss some of the theoretical limitations of PEM. It appears that PEM cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of motivated reasoning, as instantiated in phenomena such as self-deception, because its cognitive ontology does not have a separate category for motivational states such as desires. However, it might be thought that this objection confuses levels of explanation. (...) Self-deception is a personal level phenomenon, while PEM offers subpersonal explanations of psychological abilities. Thus, the paper examines how subpersonal explanations couched in the PEM framework can be thought of as related to personal level explanations underlying self-deception. In this regard, three views on the relation between personal and subpersonal explanations are investigated: the autonomist, the functionalist, and the co-evolutionary perspective. I argue that, depending on which view of the relation between the personal and subpersonal is adopted, the PEM paradigm faces a dilemma: either its explanatory ambitions should be reduced to the subpersonal domain, or it cannot provide a satisfactory account of motivated reasoning as instantiated in self-deception. (shrink)

John McDowell's "minimal empiricism" is one of the most influential and widely discussed doctrines in contemporary philosophy. Richard Gaskin subjects it to careful examination and criticism, arguing that it has unacceptable consequences, and in particular that it mistakenly rules out something we all know to be the case: that infants and non-human animals experience a world. Gaskin traces the errors in McDowell's empiricism to their source, and presents his own, still more minimal, version of empiricism, suggesting that a correct (...) philosophy of language requires us to recognize a sense in which the world we experience speaks its own language. (shrink)

Weber-Fechner Law states that the perceived intensity is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus. Recent experiments suggest that this law also holds true for perception of numerosity. Therefore, the use of a logarithmic scale for the quantification of the perceived intensity may also depend on how the cognitive apparatus processes information. If Weber-Fechner law is the result of natural selection, then the logarithmic scale should be better, in some sense, than other biologically feasible scales. We consider the minimization of (...) the relative error as the target of natural selection and we provide a formal proof that the logarithmic scale minimizes the maximal relative error. (shrink)

Predictive processing models of perception take issue with standard models of perception as hierarchical bottom-up processing modulated by memory and attention. The predictive framework posits that the brain generates predictions about stimuli, which are matched to the incoming signal. Mismatches between predictions and the incoming signal – so-called prediction errors – are then used to generate new and better predictions until the prediction errors have been minimized, at which point a perception arises. Predictive models hold that all bottom-up (...) processes are signals conveying prediction errors to higher areas, which respond by updating their predictions. We take issue with this claim and argue that object recognition requires bottom-up processing that cannot be understood in terms of prediction errors. Along the way, we expand on previous work casting doubt on the framework's ability to account for attention. Specifically, we argue that the type of attention that allows us to rapidly extract the gist of an object or scene presents an additional challenge to the predictive approach. We conclude by considering how the framework may be augmented to avoid these problems. (shrink)

The current contents of visual working memory can be disrupted by previously formed memories. This phenomenon is known as proactive interference, and it can be used to index the availability of old memories. However, there is uncertainty about the robustness and lifetime of proactive interference, which raises important questions about the role of temporal factors in forgetting. The present study assessed different factors that were expected to influence the persistence of proactive interference over an inter-trial interval in the visual recent (...) probes task. In three experiments, participants encoded arrays of targets and then determined whether a single probe matched one of those targets. On some trials, the probe matched an item from the previous trial, whereas on other trials the probe matched a more distant item. Prior studies have found that recent negative probes can increase errors and slow response times in comparison to non-recent negative probes, and this offered a behavioral measure of proactive interference. In Experiment 1, factors of array size and inter-trial interval were manipulated in the recent probes task. There was a reduction in proactive interference when a longer delay separated trials on one measure, but only when participants encoded two targets. When working memory capacity was strained by increasing the array size to four targets, proactive interference became stronger after the long delay. In Experiment 2, the inter-trial interval length was again manipulated, along with stimulus novelty. Proactive interference was modestly stronger when a smaller number of stimuli were used throughout the experiment, but proactive interference was minimally affected by the inter-trial interval. These findings are problematic for temporal models of forgetting, but Experiment 3 showed that proactive interference also resisted disruption produced by a secondary task presented within the inter-trial interval. Proactive interference was constantly present and generally resilient to the different manipulations. The combined data suggest a relatively durable, passive representation that can disrupt current working memory under a variety of different circumstances. (shrink)

Medical ethics is a realm where four important subjects of philosophy, medicine, theology and law are covered. Physicians and philosophers cooperation in this area will have great efficiency in the respective ethical rules formation. In addition to respect the autonomy of the patient, physician's obligation is to ensure that the medical intervention has benefit for the patient and the harm is minimal. There is an obvious conflict between duty of confidentiality and duty of mandatory reporting. Professional confidentiality is one of (...) the basic components in building a constant physician-patient relationship which nowadays, beside the novelty, it is the subject of discussion. Legal obligation of confidentiality is not absolute. In physician-patient relationship, keeping patient's secrets and maintaining confidentiality is a legal and ethical duty, and disclosure of such secrets is mainly through specific statutes. Thus, there are a number of situations where breach of confidentiality is permitted in different legal systems. One of the situations where breaching confidentiality is permitted is the medical mandatory reporting to the relevant authority which is in accordance with many countries' legal systems. Some situations are considered in many countries legal systems' such as notification of births and deaths, infectious diseases, child abuse, sport and relevant events, medical errors, drug side effects and dangerous pregnancies. In this paper, we will examine and discuss medical mandatory reporting and its ethical and legal aspects in the judicial and legal system of Iran and few other countries. Finally we will suggest making Medical Mandatory Reporting Law in Iran. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider how certain longstanding philosophical questions about mental representation may be answered on the assumption that cognitive and perceptual systems implement hierarchical generative models, such as those discussed within the prediction error minimization framework. We build on existing treatments of representation via structural resemblance, such as those in Gładziejewski :559–582, 2016) and Gładziejewski and Miłkowski, to argue for a representationalist interpretation of the PEM framework. We further motivate the proposed approach to content by arguing that it (...) is consistent with approaches implicit in theories of unsupervised learning in neural networks. In the course of this discussion, we argue that the structural representation proposal, properly understood, has more in common with functional-role than with causal/informational or teleosemantic theories. In the remainder of the paper, we describe the PEM framework for approximate Bayesian inference in some detail, and discuss how structural representations might arise within the proposed Bayesian hierarchies. After explicating the notion of variational inference, we define a subjectively accessible measure of misrepresentation for hierarchical Bayesian networks by appeal to the Kullbach–Leibler divergence between posterior generative and approximate recognition densities, and discuss a related measure of objective misrepresentation in terms of correspondence with the facts. (shrink)

For the last three decades, the discussion on Hilary Putnam’s provocative suggestions around the issue of realism has raged widely. Putnam’s various formulations of, and arguments for, what he called internal realism in contrast to what he called metaphysical realism have been scrutinised from a variety of perspectives. One angle of attack has been missing, though: the view from the social sciences and the ontology of society. This perspective, I believe, will provide further confirmation to the observation that Putnam’s two (...) concepts of realism are all too aggregative in that they conflate elements that had better be kept distinct, at least for many important purposes (e.g. Niiniluoto 1996). The present essay can be read as an argument for a topic-specific examination of realism. This means that it challenges the overall validity of Richard Boyd’s arguments against what he calls “realism about”, that is, against “a certain fragmented conception of scientific realism, one according to which realism is deeply topic specific” (Boyd 1990, p. 175). Boyd takes the ‘x’ in realism about x” to designate two kinds of things: entities postulated in scientific theories (“realism about the ether” and “realism about higher taxa”) and scientific disciplines (“realism about physics” and “realism about biology”) (ibid., pp. 175, 190). He also suggests that “it seems possible cogently to accept realism about the natural sciences while denying it about at least some of the social sciences” (ibid., p. 191). In Boyd’s view, the possibility of realism about social sciences is undermined by their weak instrumental success; it is the instrumental reliability of method that he takes as the basis for a realist account of science. I do not underwrite this connection between realism and instrumental success, thus I am not compelled to reject realism about social sciences on these grounds; and, as we shall see, social sciences have other peculiarities as well (see Mäki 1996). I think we should, at least to some degree, disaggregate and relativize the issue of realism. I do have sympathy with Boyd’s strategic arguments against “realisms about”, but yet I believe realists will be better off by adopting a more concrete and localized approach to the issue (Mäki 2005). Social objects and social sciences deserve a separate treatment. There are two strategies that can be followed in examining a realism about x (type of entity, theory, discipline). One is to first fix the meaning of realism’ and then specify the extension of ‘x’. This is Boyd’s strategy. The other is to fix some part of the extension of ‘x’ and then adjust the meaning of ‘realism’ so as to accommodate whatever peculiarities the x in question may have (and finally to check whether the adjusted meaning of ‘realism’ meets the criteria of a minimal notion of realism; it would be here that we encounter a relatively fixed idea of some minimal realism, or a set of realist intuitions). The latter is my approach here. I begin with the interconnected ideas of “realism about social objects” andrealism about social sciences”. I am not only interested in what comes after ‘about’; I am also interested in what goes before it, namely ‘realism’ itself. Here is one premise of the discussion: the issue of proper forms of realism for dealing with specific problems is an issue to be settled at least partly a posteriori. Here is the problem for which a solution will be sought: what constraints, if any, does what we know about the social sciences and society (as depicted by the social sciences and our commonsense views) impose upon the forms of realism that can justifiably be adopted about them? This paper suggests to offer only some partial insight into this issue. It seeks to do so indirectly by discussing Putnam’s characterizations of internal and metaphysical realism. The focus will be on two aspects of Putnam’s realisms: [1] the role and kinds of independence and dependence (in relation to the human mind and related things); and [2] the possibility of error. It is shown that the nature of social objects has implications concerning the appropriate constraints on [1] and [2], and thereby on the kinds of realism that are available to social scientists. (shrink)

Social norms are commonly understood as rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community. Many researchers have sought to explain the ubiquity of social norms in human life in terms of the psychological mechanisms underlying their acquisition, conformity, and enforcement. Existing theories of the psychology of social norms appeal to a variety of constructs, from prediction-error minimization, to reinforcement learning, to shared intentionality, to domain-specific adaptations for norm acquisition. In (...) this paper, we propose a novel methodological and conceptual framework for the cognitive science of social norms that we call normative pluralism. We begin with an analysis of the explanatory aims of the cognitive science of social norms. From this analysis, we derive a recommendation for a reformed conception of its explanandum: a minimally psychological construct that we call normative regularities. Our central empirical proposal is that the psychological underpinnings of social norms are most likely realized by a heterogeneous set of cognitive, motivational, and ecological mechanisms that vary between norms and between individuals, rather than by a single type of process or distinctive norm system. This pluralistic approach, we suggest, offers a methodologically sound point of departure for a fruitful and rigorous science of social norms. (shrink)