Taking multidimensional ethics scale approach, this article describes an empirical survey of top managers’ moral decision-making patterns and their change from 1994 to 2004 during morally problematic situations in the Finnish context. The survey questionnaire consisted of four moral dilemmas and a multidimensional scale with six ethical dimensions: justice, deontology, relativism, utilitarianism, egoism and female ethics. The managers evaluated their decision-making in the problems using the multidimensional ethics scale. Altogether 880 questionnaires were analysed statistically. (...) It is concluded that relying on the utilitarian principles is a core ethical evaluation criterion amongst top business managers in Finland. This study proves that managers’ moral decision-making patterns change over time. According to the results of this research, managers’ moral decision-making became more multidimensional during the study period. The change is explained by the inclusion of female ethics items in the scale which allows managers to show more diversity in their decision- making, the change in the Finnish economic context from depression to economic prosperity and growth during the study period, which is conducive to the spread of post materialist values, such as the importance of social relations and the increasing public discussion of the importance ethical issues in business. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to pose significant health, economic, and social challenges. Given that many of these challenges have moral relevance, the present studies investigate whether the COVID-19 pandemic is influencing moral decision-making and whether moralisation of behaviours specific to the crisis predict adherence to government-recommended behaviours. Whilst we find no evidence that utilitarian endorsements have changed during the pandemic at two separate timepoints, individuals have moralised non-compliant behaviours associated with the pandemic such as failing to (...) physically distance themselves from others. Importantly, our findings show that this moralisation predicts sustained individual compliance with government-recommended behaviours. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic provided the opportunity to determine whether age-related differences in utilitarian moral decision-making during sacrificial moral dilemmas extend to non-sacrificial dilemmas in real-world settings. As affect and emotional memory are associated with moral and prosocial behaviors, we also sought to understand how these were associated with moral behaviors during the 2020 spring phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Older age, higher negative affect, and greater reports of reflecting on negative (...) aspects of the pandemic were associated with higher reported purchase of hard-to-find goods, while older age and higher negative affect alone were associated with higher reported purchase of hard-to-find medical supplies. Older age was associated with what appeared at first to be non-utilitarian moral behaviors with regard to the purchasing of these supplies; However, they also reported distributing these goods to family members rather than engaging in hoarding behaviors. These findings suggest that advancing age may be associated with engagement in utilitarian moral decision-making in real-world settings more than the sacrificial moral decision-making literature would suggest. (shrink)

Scott Hershovitz argues that law is a moral practice. In this response, I argue that he is right that we do well to turn our attention to moral questions. However, I argue that Hershovitz should embrace a more thoroughgoing eliminativism, according to which we don't say that law is a moral practice, but rather say nothing at all about law and address the moral questions directly. Hershovitz says that the rule of law requires us to see (...) legal practices as sources of morality. But that requires settling what a ‘legal practice’ is, reproducing questions that more comprehensive eliminativism enables us to avoid. I argue that the rule of law cannot require seeing legal practices as sources of constraint in advance. Instead, we must always determine what is morally required in light of our practices in an all-things-considered assessment. Hershovitz further argues that lawyers are moral experts; I respond that none of us can claim moral expertise, but all of us have the moral responsibility to make our best assessment of what is morally required of us in a given situation, and we cannot rely on ideas of the law or the rule of law to settle that difficult question. (shrink)

To advance current knowledge on ethical decision-making in organizations, we integrate two perspectives that have thus far developed independently: the organizational identification perspective and the ethical climate perspective. We illustrate the interaction between these perspectives in two studies, in which we presented participants with moral business dilemmas. Specifically, we found that organizational identification increased moral decision-making only when the organization’s climate was perceived to be ethical. In addition, we disentangle this effect in Study 2 (...) from participants’ moral identity. We argue that the interactive influence of organizational identification and ethical climate, rather than the independent influence of either of these perspectives, is crucial for understanding moral decision-making in organizations. (shrink)

Background Moral decision-making consists of a complex process requiring individuals to evaluate potential consequences of personal and social decisions, including applied organizational contexts.Methods This research aims to investigate the behavioral (offer responses and reaction times, RTs) and electrophysiological (EEG) correlates underlying moral decision-making during three different choice conditions (professional fit, company fit, and social fit) and offers (fair, unfair, and neutral).Results An increase of delta and theta frontal activity (related to emotional behavior and processes) (...) and beta frontal and central activity (linked to cognitive and attentional processes) was found. A left beta, delta, and theta frontal activity was observed for fair offers in professional fit conditions, while increased right frontal delta and theta activity was found in response to unfair offers in company fit conditions. Also, an increase of left delta and theta parietal activity for unfair offers in social fit condition was detected. Finally, higher accepted responses were found for fair and neutral offers in professional and social fit conditions, with increased RTs for unfair offers suggesting decisions’ cognitive load and complexity.Conclusions By revealing a greater involvement of left and right frontal areas in decision-making processes based on choices and offers, personal interest evaluations and emotional values, and of parietal areas in more prosocial and altruistic moral behavior, current findings provide information about the neural and behavioral correlates underlying company moral behavior. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that moral rules and principles, such as ‘Keep your promises,’ ‘Respect autonomy,’ and ‘Distribute goods according to need ,’ should play an essential role in our moral deliberation. Particularists have challenged this view by arguing that principled guidance leads us to engage in worse decision making because principled guidance is too rigid and it leads individuals to neglect or distort relevant details. However, when we examine empirical literature on the use of rules (...) and principles in other domains, we find that people can learn to use rules discriminately and that rule-based models tend to outperform even expert judgment. I argue that this evidence poses a problem for the moral particularist. If the particularist claims that we should not rely on decision-making rules when making practical decisions and it turns out that these rules help us make better decisions, then the particularists’ prescriptive account is deficient. However, if the particularist claims that we should rely on practical decision-making rules but not on moral rules, she needs to explain how practical rules are different from moral rules and why we should rely on the former but not the latter. (shrink)

As moral decision making in financial markets incorporates moral considerations into investment decisions, some rational decision theorists argue that moral considerations would introduce inefficiency to investment decisions. However, market demand for socially responsible investment is increasing, suggesting that investment decisions are influenced by both financial and moral considerations. Several models can be applied to explain moral behavior. We test the suitability of (a) multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT), (b) theory of planned behavior, (...) and (c) issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations. In an experimental setting, 141 participants traded company shares in a computerized asset market. Over 12 periods, companies varied in morality (i.e., treatment of employees) and in profitability (i.e., expected dividends per share). Participants’ bids and asks for shares were recorded. Results indicate that moral considerations influence investment decisions, controlling for profit. Differences between the three models are discussed. (shrink)

: How do people make decisions? Previous psychological research consistently shed light on the fact that decisions are not the result of a pure rational reasoning, and that emotions can assume a crucial role. This is particularly true in the case of moral decision-making, which requires a complex integration of affective and cognitive processes. One question that is still open to debate concern the individual factors that can affect moral decisions. Gender has been consistently identified as (...) a possible variable of interest for the adoption of different strategic behaviors, with men using more rational processes and women more deontological principles. In the present study we aimed at exploring the presence of gender differences in different decision-making scenarios. Results showed that the moral scenario led to a similar acceptance rate in both genders, while economic and shopping offers were more likely to be accepted by men. Also, women were more inclined to refuse unfair offers, which included a higher personal benefit at the expense of the opponent, even if this meant a total loss for both parties. Finally, correlational analyses revealed a different relation between risk propensity and decision-making in men and women in different scenarios. Keywords: Decision-making; Utilitarianism; Altruism; Moral Decision-making; Economic Decision-making Decisioni morali, economiche e d’acquisto a confronto. Effetti di genere e utilitarismo Riassunto: Come prendiamo le decisioni? La letteratura psicologica disponibile ha chiarito in ampia misura come le decisioni non siano il risultato di un ragionamento puramente razionale e che le emozioni possono assumere un ruolo cruciale. Questo è particolarmente vero nel caso delle decisioni morali, che richiedono una complessa integrazione tra processi affettivi e cognitivi. Una questione ancora aperta riguarda i fattori individuali che possono incidere sulle decisioni morali. Il genere è stato identificato come una possibile variabile da considerare rispetto all’adozione di comportamenti strategici differenti, in cui gli uomini sembrano più inclini a far uso di processi razionali e le donne a considerare principi deontologici. In questo lavoro abbiamo provato a esplorare la presenza di differenze di genere in diversi contesti decisionali. I risultati hanno mostrano come in ambito morale entrambi i generi siano portati ad accettare opzioni simili, mentre offerte economiche e commerciali sono accettate in misura maggiore dagli uomini. Le donne sarebbero più inclini a rifiutare offerte inique che comprendono benefici personali maggiori a discapito di una controparte, anche se questo implica una perdita totale da ambo le parti. Infine, le analisi correlazionali hanno mostrato una diversa relazione tra propensione al rischio e processi decisionali tra uomini e donne in contesti diversi. Parole chiave: Processi decisionali; Utilitarismo; Altruismo; Processi decisionali morali; Processi decisionali economici. (shrink)

The New Jersey Supreme Court has continually avoided making moral judgments about the value of life and emphasized that such decision making should be the province of the potential parents. Recently, in Acuna v. Turkish, the court elaborated on the limitations of the decision-making right of the potential parents, and its decision demonstrated that New Jersey courts were only willing to require physicians to disclose all relevant medical information, and not moral statements (...) that had not been agreed upon by the state's medical community, people, or legislature. Acuna might be read as a departure from the trend displayed by New Jersey courts in “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” actions toward empowering potential parents to decide if they want to bring the pregnancy to term. However, the decision actually fits squarely within this trend in that the reluctance to expand the information to which potential parents are entitled from their physicians can be directly tied to the reluctance of the New Jersey Supreme Court to weigh in on the value of life in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits. (shrink)

The failure of medical codes to provide adequate guidance for physicians' moral dilemmas points to the fact that some rules of analysis, informed by moral theory, are needed to assist in resolving perplexing ethical problems occurring with increasing frequency as medical technology advances. Initially, deontological and teleological theories appear more helpful, but critcisms can be lodged against both, and neither proves to be sufficient in itself. This paper suggests that to elude the limitations of previous approaches, a method (...) of moral decision making must be developed incorporating both coherence methodology and some independently supported theoretical foundations. Wide Reflective Equilibrium is offered, and its process described along with a theory of the person which is used to animate the process. Steps are outlined to be used in the process, leading to the application of the method to an actual case. (shrink)

Stress is prevalent in our daily life, and people often make moral decision-making in a stressful state. Several studies have indicated the influence of acute stress on moral decision-making and behavior. The present study extended the investigation to chronic stress, and employed a new approach, the CNI model, to add new insights regarding the mechanism underlying the association between chronic stress and moral decision-making. A total of 197 undergraduates completed the Perceived (...) Stress Scale and made moral decision-making on a series of deliberately designed moral dilemmas. The results indicated that the high-stress group (one standard deviation above the mean) preferred more deontological options than the low-stress group (one standard deviation below the mean). Process-dissociation analysis revealed that the two groups had differences on deontological inclinations but not on utilitarian inclinations. And CNI model analyses suggested that the high-stress group showed a stronger general preference for inaction than the low-stress group did, but there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or sensitivity to moral norms between the two groups. Finally, the implications of our findings were discussed. (shrink)

The challenge of designing computer systems and robots with the ability to make moral judgments is stepping out of science fiction and moving into the laboratory. Engineers and scholars, anticipating practical necessities, are writing articles, participating in conference workshops, and initiating a few experiments directed at substantiating rudimentary moral reasoning in hardware and software. The subject has been designated by several names, including machine ethics, machine morality, artificial morality, or computational morality. Most references to the challenge elucidate one (...) facet or another of what is a very rich topic. This paper will offer a brief overview of the many dimensions of this new field of inquiry. (shrink)

Moral development has become an integral part in military training and the importance of moral judgment and behavior in military operations can hardly be overestimated. Many armed forces have integrated military ethics and moral decision-making interventions in their training programs. However, little is known about the effectiveness of these interventions. This study examined the effectiveness of a 1-week training program in moral decision making in the Swiss Armed Forces. The program was based (...) on a strategy-based interactional moral dilemma approach. Results of this quasi-experimental intervention study showed significant improvements in content-related (moral and instrumental awareness, quality of moral information processing, development of compensatory actions) as well as process-related (situational analysis, development and evaluation of alternative solutions, justification of decision) aspects in moral decision making. Results of a follow-up test indicated positive long-term effects with regard to moral and instrumental awareness and process-related aspects. Findings are discussed, and consequences for leadership development programs and further research are explored. (shrink)

Recently, a multinomial process tree model was developed to measure an agent’s consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and generalized inaction/action preferences when making moral decisions (CNI model). However, the CNI model presupposed that an agent considersconsequences—norms—generalizedinaction/actionpreferences sequentially, which is untenable based on recent evidence. Besides, the CNI model generates parameters at the group level based on binary categorical data. Hence, theC/N/Iparameters cannot be used for correlation analyses or other conventional research designs. To solve these limitations, we developed the CAN (...) algorithm to computenormandconsequencesensitivities and overallaction/inactionpreferences algebraically in a parallel manner. We re-analyzed the raw data of the original CNI model to test the methodological predictions. Our results demonstrate that: (1) theCparameter is approximately equal between the CNI model and CAN algorithm; (2) theNparameter under the CNI model approximately equalsN/(1 −C) under the CAN algorithm; (3) theIparameter andAparameter are reversed around 0.5 – the larger theIparameter, the more the generalized inactionversusaction preference and the larger theAparameter, the more overall actionversusinaction preference; (4) tests of differences in parameters between groups with the CNI model and CAN algorithm led to almost the same statistical conclusion; (5) parameters from the CAN algorithm can be used for correlational analyses and multiple comparisons, and this is an advantage over the parameters from the CNI model. The theoretical and methodological implications of our study were also discussed. (shrink)

Biotechnology companies have been forced to take account of the social and ethical pressures which increasingly surround their activities. A research project was undertaken with the aims of identifying the practices and procedures which companies put in place as a response to these pressures, and of advising the European Commission on ways by which interaction between these companies and their stakeholders might be improved. Two questionnaires were administered, and although the response rate was not high a reasonably balanced sample was (...) achieved. The results indicated that although there was a high degree of ethical awareness and a willingness to pursue an ‘integrity approach’ to decision‐making as opposed to a ‘compliance approach’, companies on the whole lacked the institutional tools which would enable them to operationalise an integrity approach to corporate decision‐making. (shrink)

How should driverless vehicles respond to situations of unavoidable personal harm? This paper takes up the case of self-driving cars as a prominent example of algorithmic moral decision-making, an emergent type of morality that is evolving at a high pace in a digitised business world. As its main contribution, it juxtaposes dilemma decision situations relating to ethical crash algorithms for autonomous cars to two edge cases: the case of manually driven cars facing real-life, mundane accidents, on (...) the one hand, and the dilemmatic situation in theoretically constructed trolley cases, on the other. The paper identifies analogies and disanalogies between the three cases with regard to decision makers, decision design, and decision outcomes. The findings are discussed from the angle of three perspectives: aspects where analogies could be found, those where the case of self-driving cars has turned out to lie in between both edge cases, and those where it entirely departs from either edge case. As a main result, the paper argues that manual driving as well as trolley cases are suitable points of reference for the issue of designing ethical crash algorithms only to a limited extent. Instead, a fundamental epistemic and conceptual divergence of dilemma decision situations in the context of self-driving cars and the used edge cases is substantiated. Finally, the areas of specific need for regulation on the road to introducing autonomous cars are pointed out and related thoughts are sketched through the lens of the humanistic paradigm. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of clinical supervision on nurse’ moral decision making. The sample consisted of 15 registered nurses who took part in clinical supervision sessions. Data were obtained from interviews and analysed by a hermeneutic transformative process. The hermeneutic interpretation revealed four themes: increased self-assurance, an increased ability to support the patient, an increased ability to be in a relationship with the patient, and an increased ability to take responsibility. In (...) conclusion, it seems that clinical supervision enhances nurse’ ability to provide care on the basis of their decision making. However, the qualitative and structural aspects of clinical supervision have to be investigated further in order to develop professional insight into the way that nurses think and react. (shrink)

Bernard Williams has argued that on a consequentialist moral theory, individuals cannot possess what he calls "integrity." I argue that one central strand of this criticism concerns how persons must think about life-shaping decisions. I interpret "integrity" as a pattern of continuity in an agent's moral decision-making. In order to have integrity an agent must possess a stable character which unifies one's choices. Since a sophisticated consequentialist moral structure can properly value the having of a (...) character on the basis of which agents guide their lives, it can successfully address this criticism. (shrink)

Current frameworks on ethical decision-making process have some limitations. This paper argues that the consideration of moral competencies, understood as moral virtues in the workplace, can enhance our understanding of why moral character contributes to ethical decision-making. After discussing the universal nature of four moral competencies (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), we analyse their influence on the various stages of the ethical decision-making process. We conclude by considering the managerial implications (...) of our findings and proposing further research. (shrink)

This article examines how people with type 2 diabetes perceive autonomous decision making and which moral capacities they consider important in diabetes nurses' support of autonomous decision making. Fifteen older adults with type 2 diabetes were interviewed in a nurse-led unit. First, the data were analysed using the grounded theory method. The participants described a variety of decision-making processes in the nurse and family care-giver context. Later, descriptions of the decision-making processes (...) were analysed using hermeneutic text interpretation. We suggest first- and second-order moral capacities that nurses specializing in diabetes need to promote the autonomous decision making of their patients. We recommend nurses to engage in ongoing, interactive reflective practice to further develop these moral capacities. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that intuitive methods of moral decision making are objective tools on the grounds that they are reasons based. First, I will conduct a preliminary analysis in which I highlight the acceptance of methodological pluralism in the practice of medical ethics. Here, the point is to show the possibility of using intuitive methods given the pluralism framework. Second, I will argue that the best starting point of elaborating such methods is (...) a bottom-up perspective. Third, I will address the worry of subjectivism. Under the influence of certain rationalist positions and recent developments in cognitive science and moral psychology, one might think that intuitive methods of moral decision making are essentially subjective and emotion based. If moral intuitions are the result of emotional reactions and intuitive reasoning is emotionally driven, then there are reasons to believe intuitive methods are subjective and relative to particular psychological constitution. Against this picture, I will argue that intuitive methods of moral decision making are essentially reasons-based. A Wittgensteinian approach will show that intuitive methods of moral decision making are conceptually linked with criteria of morality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study investigated the influence of different emotions and social consensus on moral decision-making using a mixed 2 × 2 experimental design. The results showed that the main effect of social consensus was significant: the moral decision-making level of participants under the condition of low social consensus was lower than that of participants under the condition of high social consensus, while no main effect of emotion emerged. Second, the results showed that emotion and (...) social consensus have interactive effects on moral decision-making. When social consensus was high, there was no significant difference in moral decision-making between individuals with positive emotions and individuals with negative emotions. When social consensus was low, individuals with negative emotions were more likely to make immoral decisions than individuals with positive emotions. These results reveal that emotion and social consensus work together in affecting moral decision-making. (shrink)

Past research showed that the ability to focus on one’s internal states positively correlates with the self-regulation of behavior in situations that are accompanied by somatic and/or physiological changes, such as emotions, physical workload, and decision-making. The analysis of moral oriented decision-making can be the first step for better understanding the legal reasoning carried on by the main players in the field, as lawyers are. For this reason, this study investigated the influence of the (...) class='Hi'>decision context and interoceptive manipulation on the moral decision-making process in the legal field gathering the responses of two groups of lawyers. A total of 20 lawyers were randomly divided into an experimental group, which was explicitly required to focus the attention on its interoceptive correlates, and a control group, which only received the general instruction to perform the task. Both groups underwent a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, where are presented three different moral conditions and three different offers. Results highlighted a significant increase of Acceptance Rate in those offers that should be considered more equal than fair or unfair ones, associated with a general increase of Reaction Times in the equal offers. Furthermore, the interoceptive manipulation oriented the Lawyers toward a more self-centered decision. This study shows how individual, situational, contextual, and interoceptive factors may influence the moral decision-making of lawyers. Future research in the so-called Neurolaw field is needed to replicate and expand current findings. (shrink)

This article deals with the burning issue of moral decision-making by major church assemblies,such as regional and general synods. Moral decisions by church assemblies have createdmany conflicts in churches in the past and at times did an injustice to the prophetic testimonyof churches in society. The question arises as follows: To what extent should church assembliesbe involved in moral decision-making? The central theoretical argument of this study is thatalthough the notion of a ‘biblical (...) ethic’ is valid, synods and council of churches should beextremely cautious and even hesitant to formulate moral decisions because of differences inhermeneutical approaches and the principle that the church is primarily the ‘local congregationof believers’. The church is not in the first instance a national, general or international socialstructure that should pass conclusive resolutions and that testifies by way of moderators orelected church leaders. To unfurl this central theoretical argument, the researcher refers to thecurrent hermeneutical discourses and proposes certain ideas regarding the possible role ofthe church with respect to moral decision-making. In view of the information provided, apoint of view is advocated regarding the way in which churches could be involved in moraldecision-making today. (shrink)

To advance current knowledge on ethical decision-making in organizations, we integrate two perspectives that have thus far developed independently: the organizational identification perspective and the ethical climate perspective. We illustrate the interaction between these perspectives in two studies, in which we presented participants with moral business dilemmas. Specifically, we found that organizational identification increased moral decision-making only when the organization’s climate was perceived to be ethical. In addition, we disentangle this effect in Study 2 (...) from participants’ moral identity. We argue that the interactive influence of organizational identification and ethical climate, rather than the independent influence of either of these perspectives, is crucial for understanding moral decision-making in organizations. (shrink)

This study compares the neural substrate of moral decision making processes between Korean and American participants. By comparison with Americans, Korean participants showed increased activity in the right putamen associated with socio-intuitive processes and right superior frontal gyrus associated with cognitive control processes under a moral-personal condition, and in the right postcentral sulcus associated with mental calculation in familiar contexts under a moral-impersonal condition. On the other hand, American participants showed a significantly higher degree of (...) activity in the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) associated with conflict resolution under the moral-personal condition, and in the right medial frontal gyrus (MFG) associated with simple cognitive branching in non-familiar contexts under the moral-impersonal condition when a more lenient threshold was applied, than Korean participants. These findings support the ideas of the interactions between the cultural background, education, and brain development, proposed in the field of cultural psychology and educational psychology. The study introduces educational implications relevant to moral psychologists and educators. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: In Good Conscience: Reason and Emotion in Moral Decision Making. By Sidney Callahan.

This book moves away from the frameworks that have traditionally guided ethical decision-making in the Western clinical setting, towards an inclusive, non-coercive and, reflective dialogic approach to moral decision-making. Inspired in part by Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory of morality and principles of communicative action, the book offers a proportionist approach as a way of balancing out the wisdom in traditional frameworks, set in the actual reality of the clinical situation at hand. Putting this approach into (...) practice requires having a conversation, a dialogue or a discourse, with collaboration amongst all the stakeholders. The aim of the dialogue is to reach consensus in the decision, via mutual understanding of the values held by the patient and others whom they see as significant. This book aims to underscore the moral philosophical foundations for having a meaningful conversation. Life and Death Decision in the Clinical Setting is especially relevant in our contemporary era, characterised medically by an ever-increasing armamentarium of life-sustaining technology, but also by increasing multiculturalism, a multiplicity of faiths, and increasing value pluralism. (shrink)

This paper attempts to build on the contribution to moral imagination theory by Patricia Werhane by further integrating moral imagination with new theoretical developments that have taken place in the business ethics field. To accomplish this objective, part one will review the concept of moral imagination, from its definitional origins to its full theoretical conceptualization. Part two will provide a brief literature review of how moral imagination has been applied in empirical research. Part three will analyze (...) and apply the construct of moral imagination as it relates to the key process stages of ethical decision making including awareness, judgment, intention, and behavior. Immoral imagination is then discussed, along with other behavioral ethics concepts as they relate to moral imagination. The paper concludes with potential future research directions, as well as teaching and managerial implications for the moral imagination construct. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the moral and scientific value of ‘expertise by experience’, that is, knowledge based on personal experience of ill mental health as a form of expertise in mental health research. In contrast to individualistic theories of personal autonomy and the first-person in bioethics, my account of shared decision-making is focussed on how a relational approach to the ‘person’ and ‘patient values’ can throw new light on our understanding of ‘voice’ in mental health (...) research. The mistake, I argue, is to think that a commitment to listening to the patient voice in the process of perspective taking implies a threat to ‘objectivity’ in clinical practice and the very concept of evidence in the philosophy of science more generally. Instead, I use Helen Longino's account of epistemic validity in philosophy of science to argue that narrative experience and ‘patient perspective’ should be understood as an ongoing dynamic partnership working between the different stakeholders’ knowledge perspectives. I also address the connection between expertise by experience and the psychiatric significance of the personal self for the entrenched topics of agency, self-hood, personal identity, and self-knowledge in psychiatric diagnosis. In contrast to identity politics, my model of shared decision-making preserves a critical distance between perspective-taking and value itself in self/other appraisal as the gold standard for good clinical practice. (shrink)

It is by now a well-supported hypothesis in cognitive neuroscience that there exists a functional network for the moral appraisal of situations. However, there is a surprising disagreement amongst researchers about the significance of this network for moral actions, decisions, and behavior. Some researchers suggest that we should uncover those ethics [that are built into our brains ], identify them, and live more fully by them, while others claim that we should often do the opposite, viewing the cognitive (...) neuroscience of morality more like a science of pathology. To analyze and evaluate the disagreement, this paper will investigate some of its possible sources. These may include theoretical confusions about levels of explanation in cognitive science, or different senses of ‘morality’ that researchers are looking to explain. Other causes of the debate may come from empirical assumptions about how possible or preferable it is to separate intuitive moral appraisal from moral decisions. Although we will tentatively favor the ‘Set Aside’ approach, the questions outlined here are open areas of ongoing research, and this paper will be confined to outlining the position space of the debate rather than definitively resolving it. (shrink)

This paper explores, in the light of recent empirical results from neurobiology, some issues having to do with the contrast between “emotion” and “cognition” and the ways in which these figure in moral judgment and decision-making. The role of reward learning in emotional processing and the implications of this for "rationalist" moral theories is emphasized.

Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in general, comprehensive models of human cognition. Such models aim to explain higher-order cognitive faculties, such as deliberation and planning. Given a computational representation, the validity of these models can be tested in computer simulations such as software agents or embodied robots. The push to implement computational models of this kind has created the field of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Moral decision making is arguably one of the most challenging (...) tasks for computational approaches to higher-order cognition. The need for increasingly autonomous artificial agents to factor moral considerations into their choices and actions has given rise to another new field of inquiry variously known as Machine Morality, Machine Ethics, Roboethics, or Friendly AI. In this study, we discuss how LIDA, an AGI model of human cognition, can be adapted to model both affective and rational features of moral decision making. Using the LIDA model, we will demonstrate how moral decisions can be made in many domains using the same mechanisms that enable general decision making. Comprehensive models of human cognition typically aim for compatibility with recent research in the cognitive and neural sciences. Global workspace theory, proposed by the neuropsychologist Bernard Baars (1988), is a highly regarded model of human cognition that is currently being computationally instantiated in several software implementations. LIDA (Franklin, Baars, Ramamurthy, & Ventura, 2005) is one such computational implementation. LIDA is both a set of computational tools and an underlying model of human cognition, which provides mechanisms that are capable of explaining how an agent’s selection of its next action arises from bottom-up collection of sensory data and top-down processes for making sense of its current situation. We will describe how the LIDA model helps integrate emotions into the human decision-making process, and we will elucidate a process whereby an agent can work through an ethical problem to reach a solution that takes account of ethically relevant factors. (shrink)

Joshua Greene and his colleagues have proposed a dual-process theory of moral decision-making to account for the effects of emotional responses on our judgments about moral dilemmas that ask us to contemplate causing direct personal harm. Early formulations of the theory contrast emotional and cognitive decision-making, saying that each is the product of a separable neural system. Later formulations emphasize that emotions are also involved in cognitive processing. I argue that, given the acknowledgement that (...) emotions inform cognitive decision-making, a single-process theory can explain all of the data that have been cited as evidence for Greene’s theory. The emotional response to the thought of causing harm may differ in degree, but not in kind, from other emotions influencing moral decision-making. (shrink)

Although the role of imagination in moral reasoning is often neglected, recent literature, mostly of pragmatist signature, points to imagination as one of its central elements. In this article we develop some of their arguments by looking at the moral role of imagination in practice, in particular the practice of neonatal intensive care. Drawing on empirical research, we analyze a decision-making process in various stages: delivery, staff meeting, and reflection afterwards. We show how imagination aids medical (...) practitioners demarcating moral categories, tuning their actions, and exploring long-range consequences of decisions. We argue that imagination helps to bring about at least four kinds of integration in the moral decision-making process: personal integration by creating a moral self-image in moments of reflection; social integration by aiding the conciliation of the diverging perspectives of the people involved; temporal integration by facilitating the parties to transcend the present moment and connect past, present, and future; and epistemological integration by helping to combine the various forms of knowledge and experience needed to make moral decisions. Furthermore, we argue that the role of imagination in these moral decision-processes is limited in several significant ways. Rather than being a solution itself, it is merely an aid and cannot replace the decision itself. Finally, there are also limits to the practical relevance of this theoretical reflection. In the end, it is up to care professionals as reflective practitioners to re-imagine the practice of intensive care and make the right decisions with hope and imagination. (shrink)

Building artificial moral agents (AMAs) underscores the fragmentary character of presently available models of human ethical behavior. It is a distinctly different enterprise from either the attempt by moral philosophers to illuminate the “ought” of ethics or the research by cognitive scientists directed at revealing the mechanisms that influence moral psychology, and yet it draws on both. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have tended to stress the importance of particular cognitive mechanisms, e.g., reasoning, moral sentiments, heuristics, intuitions, (...) or a moral grammar, in the making of moral decisions. However, assembling a system from the bottom-up which is capable of accommodating moral considerations draws attention to the importance of a much wider array of mechanisms in honing moral intelligence. Moral machines need not emulate human cognitive faculties in order to function satisfactorily in responding to morally significant situations. But working through methods for building AMAs will have a profound effect in deepening an appreciation for the many mechanisms that contribute to a moral acumen, and the manner in which these mechanisms work together. Building AMAs highlights the need for a comprehensive model of how humans arrive at satisfactory moral judgments. (shrink)

Previous studies have revealed the effect of interoceptive accuracy, a behavioral measure of the ability to feel physiological states and regulation for that, which origin emotion on decision-making such as gambling. Given that decision-making in moral dilemma situations is affected by emotion, it seems that IAcc also affects moral decision-making. The present study preliminarily investigates whether IAcc affects decision-making and emotional ratings such as regret for one’s own choices in (...) class='Hi'>moral dilemma situations. IAcc did not affect moral choice, but affected regret ratings for one’s moral choice in portions of dilemma scenarios. Moreover, people with higher IAcc make deontological choices more rapidly than those with lower IAcc in self-related dilemma scenarios. These results suggest that people with higher IAcc feel stronger emotional conflicts about utilitarian choices but weaker conflicts about deontological choices than people with lower IAcc depending on the moral dilemma scenario. (shrink)

This paper analyses managers'' moral decision-making, and studies the role of ethical theories in it by following the research tradition using the multidimensional ethics scale. The research question is: what kinds of ethical dimensions do Finnish business managers reveal when they are making moral decisions, and how have these dimensions changed in the 1990s? This question is answered by examining what kinds of factors emerge when the multidimensional ethics scale is used to analyse Finnish managers'' (...) attitudes toward moral dilemmas. The results show that Finnish managers'' decision-making reflects a variety of ethical theories. Teleological thinking is strongly emphasised by Finnish managers, and relativist thinking is used as well, but often combined with either deontology or justice thinking. In addition, a strong moralistic dimension emerged in Finnish managers'' decision-making. The analysis was carried out in two different surveys in years 1994 and 1999, and the results show that the ways of decision-making were more complex at the end of the 1990s than almost six years earlier. (shrink)