This chapter contains sections titled: The Military and Technology A Nano‐Enabled Military A Nano‐Enabled Defense System Ethical Concerns.

This article analyzes two traditional approaches to teaching military ethics, aspirational and functionalist approach, in light of the existing technological development in the military. Introduction of new technological solutions to waging warfare that involve dehumanization, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as employment of different technological tools to enhance humans participating in war and to improve military efficiency, not only bring to the surfaces the obviously existing weakness and inadequacies of the two traditional approaches to military ethics education, (...) which have been rendered suboptimal, but also raise new challenges. The paper argues that teaching military ethics solely from the two perspective does not meet the demands of the upcoming military technological revolution and that the future will demand a more profound and conceptual moral education of military personnel that will reassess the role of martial virtues, increase responsibility for killing in war and result in military professionals that resemble “a Renaissance man” in their philosophical outlook. Only by ensuring that all military professionals have been properly and adequately ethically educated, future armies, as well as entire societies, can actively aspire toward optimal armed forces structure, a more professional and efficient approach to military profession, and ultimately better and more responsible military personnel in total. (shrink)

When ancient Chinese philosophy culminated in the sixth to third centuries BCE, “hundreds of flowers [intellectual schools] were blooming”, yet not many theoreticians were particularly interested in questions regarding the relationship between animal and human life — despite their profuse discussion of, and heated debates about, both “nature” and “human nature” in their writings. This indifferent attitude towards creatures lower than humans is best illustrated by Confucius (551–479 BCE), who observed: “It is impossible to associate with birds and (...) beasts, as if they were the same as us.” Later, however, this condescending attitude of the Sage would be challenged by the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi (370 to 301 BCE), who untiringly advocates the equity of all creatures in the universe — a place where both living and fabulous organisms cohabit and co-evolve with one another, as well as with their environments. Morever, even Confucius’s descendent Mencius (c.372–289 BCE) did not endorse his mentor’s position, for the latter’s own writings are likewise inhabited by all kinds of creatures which not only serve the passive role of poetic figuration, but actually also construct their respective Umwelten, paralleled by the umwelt-construction of human beings. Recent advances in biosemiotics and ecosemiotics have enabled us to reread some of these philosophical texts, and to shed new light on this obscure aspect of Chinese thinking. This paper will draw upon the sign reflections of C. S. Peirce (1839–1914) and Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), and make use of a composite analytical method of text semiotics and dialogue studies, to examine a number of political and ethical allegories by Zhuangzi and Mencius. Acknowledging the necessarycircularity of interpretation and the homogeneity of observer and observed, the essay explores the ways in which ancient philosophical texts can be made compatible with contemporary biological and semiotic thinking. (shrink)

In hybrid nature that results from a random mix of technological infrastructures and natural ecosystems, environmental fundamentals are modified producing dramatic effects on the semiosis of several species. Human intrusion in ecosystems creates new spatial configurations that have a reduced ecological complexity when compared with systems less affected by human manipulation. This causes cascading effects on other environmental fundamentals. F.i., systems that face a low complexity, are more exposed to changes that in turn can reduce the performances of individual (...) species due to a higher level of uncertainty. The flux of information could be apparently maintained in hybrid nature when some natural patterns and processes are replaced by human artifacts and associated dynamics, but the process of signification could be strongly modified. The strict contact between people and wild organisms in hybrid nature requires new types of strategies to guarantee the continuation of the natural dynamic of populations and communities. Rural sanctuaries are proposed as one of the possible models on which to invest in order to harmonize the technological and natural processes with the goal to assure a multiscale sustainability. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I try to answer the following somewhat Kantian question: How is mental causation possible? For the discussion of the nature of mental properties, I accept the two tenets of functionalism: the multiple realizability thesis and the functional conception of mental properties as causal intermediaries between physical causes and effects. I then introduce the following two principles: the principle of physical realization and the principle of causal power identity. It is the principle of physical realization that dictates (...) that every mental property be physically realized for its instantiation. The principle of causal power identity ensures that the causal power of a mental property is identical with those of its physical realizers. I suggest that the realization relation between the mental and the physical be understood in such a way that a mental property has causal powers identical with those of its physical realizers, but that the mental property itself is not reduced to its physical realizers because the two kinds of properties are not identical. Mental properties are realized in physical properties, and the causal powers of mental properties are identical with those of physical properties; therefore, mental properties are as causally efficacious as their physical realizers. Since mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, they enjoy autonomy with the full causal powers of their realizers. To conclude, mental properties do not lose out to epiphenomenalism; and they have their own autonomy. (shrink)

By promoting greater alignment between law and capital, litigation financing has the potential to further escalate the substantial restructuring that is occurring throughout the legal profession. This article examines regulation of the relationship between litigation funders and lawyers in three common law jurisdictions: the United Kingdom; the United States; and Australia, against the backdrop of a sea change in the way in which legal services are being delivered. It argues that a broad prescriptive approach rather than proscriptive prohibitions (...) are the best way to regulate the emerging relationship between law and capital. (shrink)

Political philosophers commonly tackle the issue of climate change by focusing on fundamental interests as a basis for human rights. This approach struggles, however, in cases where one set of fundamental interests requires one course of action, and another set of fundamental interests requires another course of action. This article advances an alternative response to climate change based on an account of global justice that gives weight to utilitarian, prioritarian, and luck egalitarian considerations. A practical (...) application of this pluralistic account is provided, which shows that it handles trade-offs between individuals’ interests in an appealing way, and that it supports an aggressive policy of climate change mitigation. This account provides a more plausible justification for rights against the harms of climate change. (shrink)

This paper presents the results of the authors’ study of the philosophical heritage of the Ancient Chinese philosopher Pan Maoming, who played an essential role in the development of spiritual culture, as well as Philosophy and Science of Ancient Southern China. The authors carried out historiographical research of currently available ancient and modern sources, which contain data on the life and philosophical ideas of Pan Maoming; reconstructed the Pan Maoming’s intellectual biography; revealed the main features of his worldview. The authors (...) reconstructed the social, cultural, and philosophical context of the historical epoch in which Pan Maoming’s philosophical and scientific views arose and developed; clarified the philosopher’s historical role in the development of local culture in the Southern region of Ancient China.The article contains the author’s description and interpretation of the main philosophical ideas of Pan Maoming, the main amid which the authors consider the ethical concept of “peace and emptiness,” the concept of “clumsiness”; the idea of “monasticism for the happiness of the people.” The authors compared Pan Maoming’s philosophical ideas with Lao-tzu’s philosophical doctrine and came to the conclusion that Pan Maoming formed his own unique and original elaboration of Taoist philosophy, significantly developed its linguistic apparatus and worldview. The authors paid particular attention to the description and analysis of Pan Maoming’s cosmological views, which include the doctrine of “Inner alchemy”, the doctrine of “chaos, order and causality.” The authors concluded that Pan Maoming’s cosmological ideas significantly developed a way of understanding the Universe, the relationship between “inert” and “living” matter, the “world of nature” and the “world of human” in the Taoist philosophical culture. The authors also presented and substantiated their point of view that some philosophical and cosmological ideas of Pan Maoming have not only of historical value but can also be used for developing and enriching the local spiritual culture of Guangdong Province in the form of ethical and educational practices, as well as practices of strengthening cultural unity and identity. (shrink)

This book exhibits deep philosophical quandaries and intricacies of the historical development of science lying behind a simple and fundamental item of common sense in modern science, namely the composition of water as H2O. Three main phases of development are critically re-examined, covering the historical period from the 1760s to the 1860s: the Chemical Revolution, early electrochemistry, and early atomic chemistry. In each case, the author concludes that the empirical evidence available at the time was not decisive in settling (...) the central debates and therefore the consensus that was reached was unjustified or at least premature. This leads to a significant re-examination of the realism question in the philosophy of science and a unique new advocacy for pluralism in science. Each chapter contains three layers, allowing readers to follow various parts of the book at their chosen level of depth and detail. The second major study in "complementary science", this book offers a rare combination of philosophy, history and science in a bid to improve scientific knowledge through history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

It is well known that one of Poincaré’s most important contributions to mathematics is the creation of algebraic topology. In this paper, we examine carefully the stated motivations of Poincaré and potential applications he had in mind for developing topology. Besides being an interesting historical problem, this study will also shed some light on the broad interest of Poincaré in mathematics in a concrete way.

Building on my previous writings on presentism, pluralism, and “complementary science”, I develop an activist view of historiography. I begin by recognizing the inevitability of presentism. Our own purposes and perspectives do and should guide the production of our accounts of the past; like funerals, history-writing is for the living. There are different kinds of presentist history, depending on the historians’ purposes and perspectives. My particular inclination is pluralist. Science remembers its own history from a particular perspective, which views the (...) past as imperfect versions of the present; if professional historians of science shared this perspective, our work would be redundant. Instead, we can make it our task to illuminate the aspects of the past of science that scientists themselves tend to ignore and forget. History of science can also take a more productive role in the creation and improvement of scientific knowledge. Scientific progress as we know it tends to involve the shutting down of alternative paths of inquiry, resulting in a loss of potential and actual knowledge. A critical and sympathetic engagement with the past allows us to recover the lost paths, which can also suggest new paths. These points will be illustrated by a number of examples, especially from the history of chemistry and physics, including the recovery and extension of past experiments. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that Ch'oe Han-gi (1803-1877), a Korean Confucian scholar from the late Chosŏn, can be credited with finding the full philosophical significance of the notion of experience (kyŏnghŏm). At the same time, his philosophy of experience can be interpreted adequately in the context of not British empiricist but Confucian philosophical assumptions. There is both continuity and discontinuity in Ch'oe's relation to Confucian tradition. Unlike the Confucian traditionalist, he admitted that inherited knowledge and practice are potentially (...) fallible. Confucian tradition, though still reliable, becomes less important than the process of the world itself, in whose flux all experience must be repeatedly tested. For Ch'oe, humans imbued with configurative energy and with their capability for correlative thinking become skilled in experiencing the world directly without absolute dependence on past Confucian traditions. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to understand transformative choices, choices that change ‘who you are.’ First, it distinguishes two broad models of transformative choice: 1) ‘event-based’ transformative choices in which some event—perhaps an experience—downstream from a choice transforms you, and 2) ‘choice-based’ transformative choices in which the choice itself—and not something downstream from the choice—transforms you. Transformative choices are of interest primarily because they purport to pose a challenge to standard approaches to rational choice. An examination of the event-based (...) transformative choices of L. A. Paul and Edna Ullman-Margalit, however, suggests that event-based transformative choices don’t raise any difficulties for standard approaches to rational choice. An account of choice-based transformative choices—and what it is to be transformed—is then proposed. Transformative choices so understood not only capture paradigmatic cases of transformative choice but also point the way to a different way of thinking about rational choice and agency. (shrink)

From renowned classicist Edith Hall, ARISTOTLE'S WAY is an examination of one of history's greatest philosophers, showing us how to lead happy, fulfilled, and meaningful lives Aristotle was the first philosopher to inquire into subjective happiness, and he understood its essence better and more clearly than anyone since. According to Aristotle, happiness is not about well-being, but instead a lasting state of contentment, which should be the ultimate goal of human life. We become happy through finding a purpose, realizing our (...) potential, and modifying our behavior to become the best version of ourselves. With these objectives in mind, Aristotle developed a humane program for becoming a happy person, which has stood the test of time, comprising much of what today we associate with the good life: meaning, creativity, and positivity. Most importantly, Aristotle understood happiness as available to the vast majority us, but only, crucially, if we decide to apply ourselves to its creation--and he led by example. As Hall writes, "If you believe that the goal of human life is to maximize happiness, then you are a budding Aristotelian." In expert yet vibrant modern language, Hall lays out the crux of Aristotle's thinking, mixing affecting autobiographical anecdotes with a deep wealth of classical learning. For Hall, whose own life has been greatly improved by her understanding of Aristotle, this is an intensely personal subject. She distills his ancient wisdom into ten practical and universal lessons to help us confront life's difficult and crucial moments, summarizing a lifetime of the most rarefied and brilliant scholarship. (shrink)

There are two ways of thinking about the natural numbers: as ordinal numbers or as cardinal numbers. It is, moreover, well-known that the cardinal numbers can be defined in terms of the ordinal numbers. Some philosophies of mathematics have taken this as a reason to hold the ordinal numbers as (metaphysically) fundamental. By discussing structuralism and neo-logicism we argue that one can empirically distinguish between accounts that endorse this fundamentality claim and those that do not. In particular, we (...) argue that if the ordinal numbers are metaphysically fundamental then it follows that one cannot acquire cardinal number concepts without appeal to ordinal notions. On the other hand, without this fundamentality thesis that would be possible. This allows for an empirical test to see which account best describes our actual mathematical practices. We then, finally, discuss some empirical data that suggests that we can acquire cardinal number concepts without using ordinal notions. However, there are some important gaps left open by this data that we point to as areas for future empirical research. (shrink)

‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...) exercise of the will can afford us special freedom in determining our reasons? I argue that normative approaches to answering this question prove to be inadequate. To vindicate the thought that normative powers can make our reasons ‘up to us’, we need an altogether different approach to understanding them, one that is located not in the normative but in the metaphysical. I end the paper by sketching a metaphysical explanation of normative powers. This metaphysical defence of normative powers provides a window into a different, more agent-centered way of thinking about rational agency. (shrink)

Conflicts between morality and prudence are often thought to pose a special problem because the normativity of moral considerations derives from a distinctively moral point of view, while the normativity of prudential considerations derives from a distinctively prudential point of view, and there is no way to ‘put together’ the two points of view. I argue that talk of points of view is a red herring, and that for any ‘prumoral’ conflict there is some or other more comprehensive value – (...) often nameless – that accounts for the relative normative weight of conflicting moral and prudential considerations. The rational resolution of conflict is possible only in virtue of a more comprehensive value that includes the conflicting moral and prudential considerations as parts. (shrink)

This article attempts to develop further the conception of dynamics in Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO): its model of how objects develop and change. Objects are affected by relations between them, and have the potential both to produce and undergo effects, as realised in interaction with other objects. To elaborate on the change of objects in OOO, an idea is adopted from transcendental ontology. A key Hegelian question in this article is how the realisation of existing potential can (...) produce new potential (Schelling: potentialisation, going from the actual to the possible). Stated differently: how can objects change to the point of breaking their identity and generating a new object? One needs to consider that objects are nested at different levels, and that the degree of how radical change may be depends on the perspective of any given level. To address this issue, the article employs the notion of a script: a structure of nodes, each with its own subscripts. The analysis is applied and developed further through a comparative analysis of change in evolution, economics, a theory of discovery, and linguistics. The dual intention of this is to see if OOO can help us understand those phenomena, and to see in turn if those phenomena can inform the further development of OOO. (shrink)

This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit’s notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to ‘the standard view’. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of ‘better than’, (...) ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. Imprecise comparability, which can be understood in terms of the more familiar notions of cardinality and incommensurability, rejects only the first claim while parity rejects both claims of the standard view. -/- I then argue that insofar as those attracted to imprecise comparability assume that all rankings are trichotomous, as Parfit appears to, the view should be rejected. This is because imprecise equality is not a form of equality but is a sui generis ‘fourth’ basic way in which items can be ranked. We should, I argue, understand imprecise equality as parity, and imprecise comparability as entailing ‘tetrachotomy’ – that if two items are comparable, one must better than, worse than, equal to, or on a par with the other. Thus those attracted to the idea that cardinality can be imprecise should abandon trichotomy and accept parity and tetrachotomy instead. -/- Finally, I illustrate the difference between Parfit’s trichotomous notion of imprecise comparability and parity by examining how each notion might be employed in different solutions to the problem posed by the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. I suggest that parity provides the arguably more ecumenical solution to the problem. (shrink)

Teachers' adaptive expertise has received increasing attention in the current English as foreign language teaching field, however, it has seldom been examined with adaptive practices by teachers in on-going classes among existing literature. Adopting a mixed-method design with data triangulation, this study was conducted to explore the complexity of teachers' adaptive expertise and adaptive teaching practices that an EAP writing teacher demonstrated in academic writing courses, from a Complex Dynamic Systems Theory perspective. Semi-structured interviews, classroom observations, and questionnaires were arranged (...) to collect qualitative and quantitative data from an EAP writing teacher and 43 EFL learners in a Chinese university. Thematic analysis and SPSS were mainly used in the current work for data analysis. Our findings confirmed the complexity of TAE and ATP with specific features of non-linearity, interconnectedness, and self-organization, which are classic CDST characteristics; the TAE evolved with meta-cognitive, cognitive, affective and social components that are intertwined and contributed to the teacher's adaptive teaching practices in her academic writing course; being facilitated by TAE, the teacher's adaptive teaching practices significantly enhanced EFL learners, learning motivation of academic writing and their learning efficiency. Findings of the current work pave the way for future studies in researching TAE and ATP with a thorough consideration of language teachers, students and contexts from the CDST perspective. Moreover, pedagogical contributions are highlighted through the detailed examinations of the EAP writing teacher's ATP, including the class design, teaching plans, and methods, which would be fruitful for the development of tertiary EAP writing research. (shrink)

What, exactly, is so hard about hard choices? I suggest that what is distinctively hard about hard choices is that they present us with the volitional difficulty of putting ourselves behind an alternative and thereby making it true of ourselves that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. Making it true through your commitments that, for instance, you have most reason to be a philosopher rather than a lawyer makes the choice between the careers hard. This (...) answer is in contrast to that of Sergio Tenenbaum, who understands the hardness of a hard choice as a deliberative difficulty in specifying our alternatives and ends in ways that conform with certain proposed constraints of rationality. For Tenenbaum, the hardness of hard choices is not distinctive to such choices but is a general difficulty rational agents face when they need to further specify their alternatives and ends, even if the choice is easy. (shrink)

‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is (...) mistaken. The plurality of values is also thought to raise problems for rational choice. If two irreducibly distinct values conflict, it seems that there is no common ground that justifies choosing one over the other. The metaphysical plurality of values does not, however, have the implications for rational choice that many have supposed. A charitable interpretation of value pluralist writings suggests a ‘nonreductive’ form of value pluralism. Nonreductive value pluralism maintains that in the context of practical choice, there are differences between values—whether or not those values reduce to a single supervalue—that have important implications for rational choice. This article examines the main arguments for metaphysical value pluralism, argues that metaphysical value pluralism does not have certain implications that it is widely thought to have, and outlines three forms of nonreductive value pluralism. (shrink)

As rational agents, we are governed by reasons. The fact that there’s beer at the pub might be a reason to go there and a reason to believe you’ll enjoy it. As this example illustrates, there are reasons for both action and for belief. There are also many other responses for which there seem to be reasons – for example, desire, regret, admiration, and blame. This diversity raises questions about how reasons for different responses relate to each other. Might certain (...) such reasons be more fundamental than others? Should certain reasons and not others be treated as paradigmatic? At least implicitly, many philosophers treat reasons for action as the fundamental or paradigmatic case. In contrast, this paper articulates and defends an alternative approach, on which reasons for attitudes are fundamental, and reasons for action are both derivative and, in certain ways, idiosyncratic. After outlining this approach, we focus on defending its most contentious thesis, that reasons for action are fundamentally reasons for intention. We offer two arguments for this thesis, which turn on central roles of reasons: that reasons can be responded to, and that reasons can feature as premises of good reasoning. We then examine objections to the thesis and argue that none succeed. We conclude by sketching some ways in which our approach is significant for theorising about reasons. (shrink)

Many philosophers are completely unaware of the world of executive education and business events, and Specialist Public Lectures often arise from these occasions. They range from informal retreats, usually held in some tawny spot of nature for the purpose of team‐building among the employees of a firm, to exclusive, luxury junkets for C‐suite executives and VIPs at a spa or golfing resort for the purpose of networking and “upping one's game.” Most public lectures involve a sharing of information – (...) arresting facts or gasp‐inducing statistics – interwoven with a large interpretive claim, usually left quite vague. Metaphysicians can illuminate ideas of gender; epistemologists can weigh in on the epistemic authority afforded new technologies; philosophers of religion can reveal insights into character and secular civic education; and legal philosophers can guide debates about regulation. (shrink)

This research examines wearable, fashionable interaction design to mediate the narrative and semiotic concepts found in technology and fashion. We discuss the principles of design anthropology using Taiwan proverbs to transmit the “people-situation-reason-object” method and analyze five case studies that provide new approaches for designers engaged in future industry. Design anthropology attempts to engage physiological and psychological design through technological function, meaning formation, and fashion aesthetics to achieve cognition between people and the environment. The wearable, fashionable interaction displays characteristics of (...) narrative and semantics transmitted through craft culture as well as collective, cheerful, and creative performance. It is a confident and innovative attempt, which bears a joyful and fundamental interface. This study takes two directions, with cultural thinking serving as the basis to establish a set of traditional craft designs and interactive objects that assist designers in using the senses to inform and initiate new lifestyle values. (shrink)

Once Zheng Xuan, a man of Han dynasty, made notations of “Yiwei”, he said: “The word ‘change’ contains three meanings: the first is simplifying, the second is transformation, and the third is unchanging ”, thus called to “three changes”. The wording “three changes” is able to be the different explanations of “Zhouyi”, and also can be understand to three meanings of the word “change” in “Zhouyi”. Everywhere in the nature, and in nature science, there are incalculable (...) examples about “three changes”. The process of “simplifying”, it is that nature science obtains the principles by means of summing up the multitudinous complex spontaneous phenomena. There is “the fundamental of thinking economy”, and “Aucum razor” in the west, then they emphasize to wipe off the miscellaneous and keep up the simple, and to eliminate the false and retain the true. Therefore, it can say where there is no “simplifying”, there is no nature science. “Transformation” means movement and change. This is the essentiality of the nature. From the biggest such as the universe to the smallest such as cells, all these are the outcomes of evolution, and are changing continueously. Physics researching from static objects to dynamic objects, and mathematics calculation from the constant to the variable, all of these studies are closing up to the essentiality of the natural “transformation” nearer and nearer. If there is no “transformation”, nature science world stop, and the nature world be deathly stillness. “Unchanging” means that the static state exists in the dynamic state, and the constant exists in the variation. The various theorems and laws, such as the theorem of constant of light velocity and the law of conservation of energy, are the summation and accumulation of the regularities of which the relative stabilization is kept in changeable movement. Various kinds of equation are all linked by equal-sign, and based on the condition recognizing which the two sides is equal constantly. Therefore the calculation of the relations between matter characteristics can be set up. Otherwise, not only the nature world be disorder and unsystematic, but also the science world have no laws to go by. (shrink)

Vitoria’s 1537 lecture On the American Indians asserts moral equality and fundamental rights for all humans but is contradicted by the significant inequalities between Spanish conquistadores and indigenous peoples of Mexico and Peru. Despite recognizing these rights, Vitoria’s vision supports an unequal Euro-American relationship regarding territorial sovereignty, self-defense, self-determination, and religious freedom. His insights have implications for contemporary international law concerning indigenous rights. However, his theological framework limits this potential. To better address indigenous issues today, I advocate reframing (...) Vitoria’s perspective by replacing his natural law-based human-rights essentialism with a naturalistic approach that views human rights as social constructs. This shift can help develop international law to prevent violent interactions and promote equality between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, reducing reliance on nation states to safeguard indigenous rights. Received: 03 August 2023 Accepted: 18 April 2024. (shrink)

In the early seventeenth century Galileo broke free from the hold of ancient Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. He drastically changed the framework through which we view the natural world when he asserted that we should base our theory of reality on what we can observe rather than pure thought. In the process, he invented what we would come to call science. This set the stage for all the breakthroughs that followed--from Kepler to Newton to Einstein. But in the early twentieth (...) century when quantum physics, with its deeply complex mathematics, entered into the picture, something began to change. Many physicists began looking to the equations first and physical reality second. As we investigate realms further and further from what we can see and what we can test, we must look to elegant, aesthetically pleasing equations to develop our conception of what reality is. As a result, much of theoretical physics today is something more akin to the philosophy of Plato than the science to which the physicists are heirs. In The Dream Universe, Lindley asks what is science when it becomes completely untethered from measurable phenomena? (shrink)

An organization emits carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) through its daily operations, such as the electricity used to power its offices, manufacture products, and then fossil fuels used in vehicles to distribute them. This is referred to as an organization’s carbon footprint, and there is increasing stakeholder and regulatory pressure on management teams globally to reduce them. On other words, it is increasingly critical that the quantity of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that a company is (...) releasing into the atmosphere can be accurately measured in order to ensure that is being reduced accordingly. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the most crucial tool for decarbonizing Europe, but it has also become a money-making machine. States and financial investors earn; for the power industry, which pays for it, the worst thing is not the system’s presence but its instability. Huge price jumps make it impossible to plan budgets and investments sensibly. This paper provides an introduction to the EU’s Emissions Trading System. As such it provides a discussion of the historical and legal context in which the EU ETS developed and now operates. This article covers the various ways in which these market dynamics, regulatory requirements and stakeholder expectations have converged to make European carbon markets a critical topic for today’s analyst. (shrink)

BackgroundThis research explores how the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the ways doctors make end-of-life decisions, particularly around Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR), treatment escalation and doctors’ views on the legalisation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.MethodsThe research was conducted between May and August 2021, during which COVID-19 hospital cases were relatively low and pressures on NHS resources were near normal levels. Data were collected via online survey sent to doctors of all levels and specialties, who have worked in the (...) NHS during the pandemic.Results231 participants completed the survey. The research found that over half of participants reported making more patients DNACPR than prepandemic, and this was due, at least in part, to an increased focus on factors including patient age, Clinical Frailty Scores and resource limitations. In addition, a sizeable minority of participants reported that they now had a higher threshold for escalating patients to ITU and a lower threshold for palliating patients, with many attributing these changes to formative experiences gained during the pandemic. Finally, our study found that there has not been a statistically significant change in the views of clinicians on the legalisation of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide since the start of the pandemic.ConclusionThe COVID-19 pandemic appears to have altered several aspects of end-of-life decision making, and many of these changes have remained even as COVID-19 hospital cases have declined. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often held to be incompatible: (a) a commitment to a strong form of ethical objectivity and (b) a thoroughgoing historicism about ethical value. The notions of species and life-form invoked by ethical naturalism do not, I argue, rely upon an ahistorical picture of human nature. I develop this idea by building upon Philippa Foot's defence of ethical naturalism in Natural Goodness. I go on to argue that (...) linguistic changes in the ways we articulate the conditions of human flourishing can be understood, in some cases, as transforming those very conditions. (shrink)

The structure and “metabolism” (movement and conversion of goods and energy) of urban areas has caused cities to be identified as “super‐organisms”, placed between ecosystems and the biosphere, in the hierarchy of living systems. Yet most such analogies are weak, and render the super‐organism model ineffective for sustainable development of cities. Via a cluster analysis of 15 shared traits of the hierarchical living system, we found that industrialized cities are more similar to eukaryotic cells than to multicellular organisms; enclosed systems, (...) such as factories and greenhouses, paralleling organelles in eukaryotic cells. We further developed a “super‐cell” industrialized city model: a “eukarcity” with citynucleus (urban area) as a regulating centre, and organaras (enclosed systems, which provide the majority of goods and services) as the functional components, and cityplasm (natural ecosystems and farmlands) as the matrix. This model may improve the vitality and sustainability of cities through planning and management. (shrink)

Kripke's argument for the rigid designation of natural kind terms is fallacious because he does not distinguish natural kinds from second-order functional properties; by clarifying the concepts of natural kind and functional property, we can show that natural kind terms do designate their referents rigidly, but that functional property terms are not rigid designators. My discussions of functional property will also help dispel the worry about the alleged cases of contingent identity with regard to theoretical statements in science. There is (...) no contingent identity even in the form of second-order logic: Property identity is also a necessary identity. The principle of necessary identity rules relentlessly. (shrink)

Technology is not only an object of philosophical reflection but also something that can change this reflection. This paper discusses the potential of computer-supported argument visualization tools for coping with the complexity of philosophical arguments. I will show, in particular, how the interactive and web-based argument mapping software “AGORA-net” can change the practice of philosophical reflection, communication, and collaboration. AGORA-net allows the graphical representation of complex argumentations in logical form and the synchronous and asynchronous collaboration on those (...) “argument maps” on the internet. Web-based argument mapping can overcome limits of space, time, and access, and it can empower users from all over the world to clarify their reasoning and to participate in deliberation and debate. Collaborative and web-based argument mapping tools such as AGORA-net can change the practice of arguing in two dimensions. First, arguing on web-based argument maps in both collaborative and adversarial form can lead to a fundamental shift in the way arguments are produced and debated. It can provide an alternative to the traditional four-step process of writing, publishing, debating, and responding in new writing with its clear distinction between individual and social activities by a process in which these four steps happen virtually simultaneously, and individual and social activities become more closely intertwined. Second, by replacing the linear form of arguments through graphical representations of networks of inferential relations which can grow over time in an infinite space, these tools do not only allow a clear visualization of structures and relations, but also forms of collaboration in which, for example, participants work on different “construction zones” of larger argument maps, or debates are performed at specific points of disagreement on those maps. I introduce the term synergetic logosymphysis to describe a practice that combines these two dimensions of collaborative- and web-based argument mapping. (shrink)

Thank you all, and good morning. Let’s start with slide one. That’s me, the obsessive, and obsessive is the key word here. I’m food obsessive. I have several obsessions actually, but today we talk about food. When I get home, my wife will ask me, “how did it go?”, and my answer will be, “the breakfast was excellent!” So I travel a great deal, I cook a great deal, and I write an on-line dining guide. I’m one of those people (...) who lives to eat. For a long time now, I have been writing about culture, and creativity, and diversity, and now I am writing about food. And my interest in food really stems from my life, and that is from my obsessive nature. I wanted to be going out there, eating in the best places possible. With this attitude every meal counts. But if every meal is going to count, you have to know how to eat. (shrink)

This paper examines Georg Ernst Stahl's first book, the Zymotechnia Fundamentalis, in the context of contemporary natural philosophy and the author's career. I argue that the Zymotechnia was a mechanical theory of fermentation written consciously against the influential "fermentational program" of Joan Baptista van Helmont and especially Thomas Willis. Stahl's theory of fermentation introduced his first conception of phlogiston, which was in part a corpuscular transformation of the Paracelsian sulphur principle. Meanwhile some assumptions underlying this theory, such as the composition (...) of matter, the absolute passivity of matter and the "passions" of sulphur, reveal the combined scholastic and mechanistic character of Stahl's natural philosophy. In the conclusion I show that Stahl's theory of fermentation undermined the old fermentational program and paved the way for his dualist vitalism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Information Warfare—the warfare characterised by the use of information and communication technologies. This is a fast growing phenomenon, which poses a number of issues ranging from the military use of such technologies to its political and ethical implications. The paper presents a conceptual analysis of this phenomenon with the goal of investigating its nature. Such an analysis is deemed to be necessary in order to lay the groundwork for future investigations into this topic, (...) addressing the ethical problems engendered by this kind of warfare. The conceptual analysis is developed in three parts. First, it delineates the relation between Information Warfare and the Information revolution. It then focuses attention on the effects that the diffusion of this phenomenon has on the concepts of war. On the basis of this analysis, a definition of Information Warfare is provided as a phenomenon not necessarily sanguinary and violent, and rather transversal concerning the environment in which it is waged, the way it is waged and the ontological and social status of its agents. The paper concludes by taking into consideration the Just War Theory and the problems arising from its application to the case of Information Warfare. (shrink)

This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a mathematical (...) proof is given in the appendix). I also suggest that there are three senses of ‘rationally permissible’ which, once distinguished, show that parity does distinctive practical work that cannot be done by the usual trichotomy of relations or by incomparability. In this way, we have an additional argument for parity from the workings of practical reason. (shrink)

Why does climate change continue to be a forceful idea which divides people? What does this tell us about science, about culture, and about the future? Despite disagreement, how might the idea of climate change nevertheless be used creatively? In this essay I develop my investigation of these questions using four lines of argument. First, the future risks associated with human-caused climate change are severely underdetermined by science. Scientific predictions of future climates are poorly constrained; even more (...) so the consequences of such climates for evolving human socio-technological and natural ecosystems. Second, I argue that to act politically in the world, people have to pass judgments on the facts of science; facts do not speak for themselves. Third, because these judgments are different, the strategic goals of policy interventions developed in response to risks associated with future climate change are inevitably multiple and conflicting. Finally, reconciling and achieving diverse goals requires political contestation. “Moving forward” on climate change then becomes a task of investing in the discursive and procedural preconditions for an agonistic politics to work constructively, to enable ways of implementing policies when people disagree. (shrink)

Procedural justice, or the ability of people affected by decisions to participate in making them, is widely recognized as an important aspect of environmental justice. Procedural justice, moreover, requires that affected people have a substantial understanding of the hazards that a particular decision would impose. While EJ scholars and activists point out a number of obstacles to ensuring substantial understanding—including industry’s nondisclosure of relevant information and technocratic problem framings—this article shows how key insights from Science and Technology Studies about the (...) nature of knowledge pose even more fundamental challenges for procedural justice. In particular, the knowledge necessary to inform participation in decision making is likely not to exist at the time of decision making, undermining the potential for people to give their informed consent to being exposed to an environmental hazard. In addition, much of the local knowledge important to understanding the consequences of hazards will develop only after decisions have been made, and technoscientific knowledge of environmental effects will inevitably change over the period during which people will be affected by a hazard. The changing landscape of knowledge calls into question the idea that consent or participation during one decision-making process can by itself constitute procedural justice. An STS-informed understanding of the nature of knowledge, this article argues, implies that procedural justice should include proactive knowledge production to fill in knowledge gaps, and ongoing opportunities for communities to consent to the presence of hazards as local knowledge emerges and scientific knowledge changes. (shrink)

The appearance of mass media and a versatile medium of videos can serve the convenience and instructive information for children; on the other hand, it could abet them in implicit image consumption. Now is the time for kids' to be in need of thinking power which enables them to make a choice, applications andcriticism of information within such visual cultures. In spite of these social changes, the realities are that our curriculum still doesn't meet a learner's demand properly. This research, (...) in this context, is aimed at looking out on the currently implemented art appreciation learning process in a critical fashion, and also aimed at suggesting a plan for visual culture learning by applying the philosophy program for kids as a new alternative. The purpose of such education is toenhance the capability to solve a variety of problems they are facing in the course of daily life by reflecting their matter of concern in a curriculum. What we have to pay attention to in visual culture learning is 'visual literacy.' Such an interpretative faculty of a critical reading of images is a must especially when kids should make a judgment of value hidden in images in their daily events, make an analysis of an ideological message and make an information-oriented decision. Therefore, learners have to enrich their higher-order thinking power as well as critical thinking faculty in modern society. If there is no objection to these social surroundings, it is quite natural that philosophy education, which forms a base of a higher-order thinking for children should be handled significantly at school. (shrink)

Recently, some of the leading proponents of the view that there is widespread incommensurability among goods have suggested that the incommensurability of some goods is a constitutive feature of the goods themselves. So, for example, a friendship and a million dollars are incommensurable because it is part of what it is to be a friendship that it be incommensurable with money. According to these ‘constitutive incommensurabilists’ incommensurability follows from the very nature of certain goods. In this paper, I examine (...) this idea and argue that constitutive incommensurabilists have mistaken for constitutive incommensurability a particular emphatic kind of comparability. This examination involves an account of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ goods and an explanation of how goods of different ‘types’ figure in practical conflict. (shrink)

What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...) facts (or the facts that subvene them) about what you want, such as the fact that having it would be good in some way. This paper argues that value-based theorists are wrong; if we try to find a single kind of consideration that can always be normative reason, we find that sometimes our reason is the fact that we want something and not any corresponding evaluative fact. (shrink)

We explore corporate environmental accountability by examining how carbon emissions affect voluntary climate-related information disclosure based on TCFD principles. Using computerized textual analysis to measure such climate-related disclosure, our results show that firms with higher levels of carbon emissions disclose more climate-related information. This relation is stronger in firms belonging to carbon-intensive industries, such as energy, materials, and utilities. We also examine this relationship at the category level for Governance, Strategy, Risk Management, and Metrics and Targets, finding that carbon emissions (...) drive disclosure in all categories except in Governance. Overall, our findings indicate that high carbon emitting firms appear to discharge their corporate accountability by increasing climate-related disclosure, consistent with legitimizing their potentially unethical actions and submitting to stakeholder and societal pressure. (shrink)

The central aim of this book is to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. This work is the first book length treatment of the topics of incomparability, value, and practical reason.

The alleged but unclear distinction between so-called “immanent” and so-called “transeunt” causation is structurally similar to an Aristotelian distinction between two kinds of potentiality (dunamis). It is argued that Aristotle’s distinction is in turn grounded in one between a metaphysically basic notion, rooted in his property theory, and a metaphysically posterior notion proper to the understanding of change in the science of nature. By examining Aristotle’s distinction, we can give a satisfying account of immanent and transeunt causation more (...) generally. Furthermore, once we clarify the distinction in this way, some contemporary appeals to immanent causation turn out to be misguided, while others look promising. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept a response constraint on normative reasons: that p is a reason for you to φ only if you are able to φ for the reason that p. This constraint offers a natural way to cash out the familiar and intuitive thought that reasons must be able to guide us, and has been put to work as a premise in a range of influential arguments in ethics and epistemology. However, the constraint requires interpretation and faces putative counter-examples due (...) to Julia Markovits, Mark Schroeder, and others. This paper develops and motivates an interpretation of the response constraint that avoids the putative counter-examples. (shrink)

One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...) the question of how the different considerations relevant to an all-things-considered judgment come together in a way that gives each relevant consideration its proper due. I propose an answer which provides a unified account of all-things-considered judgments and highlights a deep connection between value and reason. My suggestion is that ‘all things considered’ is, in effect, a placeholder for a more comprehensive, sometimes nameless, value that includes the things considered as parts, and that this more comprehensive value determines how the things considered normatively relate. (shrink)

He drove a taxi. Now he drives a truck. So, must he be driving the truck right now? Must he, as long as he's working as a truck driver, keep driving his truck all day and all night? What do we speak of, when we speak of "now"? In this talk, some popular conceptions in the philosophy of time will be put under critical scrutiny: (1) The present (the "now") is an instant, a time point with no length; (2) the (...) "content" of the present is always an event, a happening, which constitutes a segment of a larger process; (3) what (time) is now, is determined by the passage of time (itself). The following points will be defended respectively: (1) The present may be a time period. "Now" is not an indivisible time-atom in the substantival sense. (2) What is now can be an event, a process, or a state. "Driving a truck now" – in the sense of being a truck driver – is neither an event nor something happening to him. (3) "Now", among other temporal concepts, is not a name for any thing, but schemata under which we understand ways things being themselves. There are variety of ways of being, and accordingly there are multiple aspects of now-ness. (shrink)

He drove a taxi. Now he drives a truck. So, must he be driving the truck right now? Must he, as long as he's working as a truck driver, keep driving his truck all day and all night? What do we speak of, when we speak of "now"? In this talk, some popular conceptions in the philosophy of time will be put under critical scrutiny: (1) The present (the "now") is an instant, a time point with no length; (2) the (...) "content" of the present is always an event, a happening, which constitutes a segment of a larger process; (3) what (time) is now, is determined by the passage of time (itself). The following points will be defended respectively: (1) The present may be a time period. "Now" is not an indivisible time-atom in the substantival sense. (2) What is now can be an event, a process, or a state. "Driving a truck now" – in the sense of being a truck driver – is neither an event nor something happening to him. (3) "Now", among other temporal concepts, is not a name for any thing, but schemata under which we understand ways things being themselves. There are variety of ways of being, and accordingly there are multiple aspects of now-ness. (shrink)