Le Moïse de Spinoza présente la particularité entre les convocations habituelles en philosophie politique, d’être à la fois prophète et législateur, vecteur d’un mode théologique de production des lois : il est le seul prophète à constituer un peuple, une république. Cela procède d’un premier pacte avec Dieu, au fondement d’une théocratie imaginaire, réellement une démocratie. Mais ils sont terrifiés (perterriti) en allant consulter Dieu. Comment comprendre l’usage de ce mot rare en latin? Il faut le replacer dans le (...) réseau sémantique de l’admiration, solidaire de l’imaginaire théologique qui cristallise leur expérience comme nation. Il nomme l’expérience du sacré et de l’augural et aboutit à un second pacte qui fonde la monarchie de Moïse. Nous examinerons les institutions qui font sa force en associant le peuple aux décisions du monarque et les causes internes de sa destruction. (shrink)

Christophe Litwin | : Au sens strict, la démocratie est pour Jean-Jacques Rousseau la forme de gouvernement où les corps du gouvernement et du peuple souverain sont identiques. Rousseau jugeant cette forme de gouvernement impossible, les commentateurs opposent à cette acception du terme une acception plus large : « démocratie » désignerait non plus la forme du gouvernement, mais celle de la souveraineté populaire elle-même. Cet article réfute cette interprétation encore trop formelle. Partant du constat que la démocratie est impossible (...) comme forme de gouvernement, sauf pour « un peuple de dieux », je montre d’une part que son idée doit moins se comprendre comme forme que principe de gouvernement, et d’autre part que l’emploi du législateur s’identifie rigoureusement à la mise en application initiale de ce principe. Je dégage ensuite la relation entre ce sens principiel du concept de démocratie et la vertu politique dont Rousseau reprend de façon critique le concept à Montesquieu. Dans la dernière partie, je discute du problème que pose cette conception de la démocratie et de la vertu – qui suppose qu’on mette la loi au-dessus de l’homme – dans le contexte historique et moral de l’Europe moderne où la vertu ne peut plus s’appuyer sur un ressort religieux national. | : According to Rousseau, “democracy” in the strict sense is a specific form of government in which the bodies of government and of the sovereign people are identical. Since Rousseau considers democracy in this formal sense to require a “people of gods” to be possible, commentators often identify “democracy” in Rousseau with the broader notion of popular sovereignty. I argue that they thus substitute one formal conception of democracy for another and that democracy in Rousseau names not so much an impos-sible form of government or form of sovereignty as it does the active principle of every l egitimate state. I identify the initial enactment of this democratic principle with the action of the legislator and his ability to “make the gods speak” to the people and I show the relationship between democracy as such a principle and Montesquieu’s concept of political virtue. Then, I examine how this principle operates in Rousseau’s Project of Constitution for Corsica. Finally, I discuss the problems raised by this conception of democracy and virtue—which requires that the laws be placed above men—in the historical and moral context of modern Europe in which virtue cannot stem from a national religion. (shrink)

Much of the debate about post-secularism has presumed a background of Western countries and the sort of statutory law that legislatures should make, and how they should make it, in the light of residents’ religious attitudes and practices. In this chapter I address a fresh context, namely, that of South Africa and the way that courts have interpreted, and should interpret, law in the face of African traditional religions. Specifically, I explicate the fact that, by South Africa's famously progressive Constitution, (...) religious customs already count as law, and I illustrate how such customary law could work with three court cases related to indigenous African spirituality. Then, I lay out and evaluate the two central arguments that jurists have made in favour of South Africa's Constitutional practice of deeming long-standing religious ways of life to be sources of law. I contend that these influential arguments for customary law, which are substantially individualist, are weak, and also sketch more promising rationales, which invoke more communitarian considerations. My aim is not so much to convince the reader that South Africa’s approach to post-secularism is justified as to identify some argumentative strategies that particularly promise to justify it. (shrink)

Une premisse majeure met en place les arguments les plus normatifs de la Republique : les caracteres des hommes sont la cause des caracteres des cites. Le gouvernement de Kallipolis est le meilleur de tous, explique Socrate, pour une raison tres simple : c’est le gouvernement des meilleurs. Dans une demokratia, en revanche, n’importe qui peut revetir un role de pouvoir par tirage au sort, et n’importe qui peut dire n’importe quoi. Tandis que les meilleurs des Gardiens se soucient du (...) bien politique au superlatif, le peuple n’en a cure. Il foule aux pieds l’idee meme qu’il faudrait choisir et eduquer les magistrats. Le Peuple ne saurait être philosophe. Et pourtant, à Athènes, la parole politique et le langage à l’oeuvre dans l’administration de la cite montrent une quete acharnee du mieux possible. Le temoignage epigraphique nous devoile une citee pavee de bonnes intentions, engagee dans un perfectionnisme democratique que Platon refuse de reconnaitre. (shrink)

Les passages du Traité théologico-politique qui décrivent la République des Hébreux ont un enjeu politique concernant la relation entre Église et État au xviie siècle ; ils révèlent aussi une conception précise de la nature humaine. Les institutions d’un peuple affrontent et utilisent des mécanismes anthropologiques généraux (obéissance et rébellion, désir de changement, soif de reconnaissance, transfert des affects) qui ne se présentent pas dans le même ordre que dans l’Éthique. Ils les gèrent dans des circonstances particulières, marquées par (...) l’histoire propre de chaque peuple et par les conséquences de cette histoire sur son ingenium. (shrink)

The Iraqi constitution of 2005 grants freedom of religious thought, belief and practice for all religions. This study was also based on the premise that the constitutional rights are not adhered to in Iraq, even by government officials, which could be due to the absence of suitable legislations subsequent to the framing of the constitutional provisions. An analytical and descriptive research design was adopted for this study. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources through documentation research and evaluation of (...) historical sources. The primary data comprised Articles of the Iraqi constitution, and a few national and international legal instruments related to religious freedom. Secondary data included empirical research studies, books, articles and other published sources. This study therefore took the form of an empirical legal research as it involved the issues of constitutional reforms in the field of religious freedom. A comparative approach was adopted in analyzing the documents about religion and politics related to both the Arab region and the West. The focus was on the measures that should be adopted to advance the dialogues of religious freedom and maintain religious neutrality in all government policies. The study found out that there were apparent contradictions between the constitutional provisions and the State Laws. Similarly, the Iraqi civil and penal codes remain silent regarding legal remedies for the violation of constitutional provisions. (shrink)

" L'enfant est l'interprète du peuple. Que dis-je? Il est le peuple même, dans sa vérité native, avant qu'il ne soit déformé, le peuple sans vulgarité, sans rudesse, sans envie, n'inspirant ni défiance ni répulsion ". Les termes de Michelet peuvent faire sourire, mais quand on parle de populaire (langage) ou de populiste (discours), n'y a-t-il pas là une sorte de défiance et de répulsion? Le projet de ce livre est né d'une inquiétude, celle de voir le mot peuple rejoindre (...) sans espoir de retour le groupe des mots tels que république ou laïcité, dont le sens a évolué pour servir au maintien de l'ordre. Malgré leur diversité, les textes ici réunis ont en commun de montrer ce que peuple garde de solidement ancré du côté de l'émancipation. (shrink)

Le livre reprend les six premiers chapitres de celui que Mariette Sineau avait publié en 2001. Il est enrichi d’un chapitre, « Parité An X », qui propose un bilan des changements quantitatifs et qualitatifs liés à la législation instituant la parité. Pour mémoire, la révision constitutionnelle de 1999 a introduit, à l’article 3 de la Constitution, le fait que « la loi favorise l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux et fonctions électives ». En conséquence, la (...) loi du 6 ju... (shrink)

Malta traditionally enjoys a Roman Catholic Society, with the official religion of the country being cited in the second article of the constitution. Recently the government proposed to legislate to regulate human reproductive technology, in particular In Vitro Fertilization, which has been practiced for over two decades without controlling legislation. A Parliamentary Committee for social affairs was set up to study the situation inviting most stakeholders. The arguments gravitated mostly on issues of the status of the embryo and the media (...) played a considerable role. At the end of the discussion the Archbishop made a statement which pointed out that IVF involves destruction of embryos and the process stopped. This article examines what caused the deterioration of the process and points favourably towards a way forward within the context of a Catholic Country. (shrink)

Despite their regional, ethnic, and linguistic differences, the recent social and political upheavals of the Middle East have shared one basic concern. From the 2009 Green Movement in Iran to the 2011 Tunisian revolts which ignited the Arab Uprisings, and from the first Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt in 2012 to the protests in Turkey’s Taksim Square in 2013, a central issue has been how to establish a democratic state with a modern constitution while adhering to many shari’a rules and (...) regulations. This debate is not a new one in the Middle East and, as this article will demonstrate, it has been a central theme of Iranian politics ever since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. At the time of that first Iranian revolution, Iran was ruled by two sets of laws, shari’a religious law and ‘urf customary law. Shi’i clerics, with their elaborate institutional hierarchy, controlled shari’a law, which was considered the more important law of the land, whereas the monarch and local rulers were nominal guardians of ‘urf laws. Soon the novel discourses of the Constitutional Revolution would create a paradigm shift in Iranian society.1 Constitutionalist clerics had assumed that a new political order reformed ‘urf rulings, leaving shari’a laws more or less intact. They were stunned by the realization that a constitutional order revamped both legal systems and overturned sacrosanct social and religious hierarchies. Many clerics resisted these reforms. The result was a bifurcated set of laws that institutionalized clerical authority, while also placing limits on clerics in legislative and judicial branches of the government. (shrink)

These matched essays constitute an extremely valuable contribution on the place of religious ideas in our country’s political life. Robert Audi defends an “exclusivist” position: participants in political life fulfill the responsibilities of liberal citizenship best if they support only measures justified on secular grounds. Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for an “inclusivist” position: citizens and legislators are encouraged to rely on whatever sources, including religious ones, they find convincing.

Proponents of the capabilities approach claim that it should be used to give guidance for the implementation of good constitutional laws. This suggests that it also gives us grounds to support attempts to create or protect constitutions based on something like the capabilities approach. The Turkish Republic claims that in order to protect secularism and the equal status of women, it needs to keep certain Islamic practices away from the public domain. The wearing of the headscarf has been singled out (...) as such a practice, and the Turkish Republic has therefore legislated against headscarf wearing in schools, universities, and government buildings. In consequence many women are forced to choose between religion over education and politics in a way that curtails central human capabilities. Nussbaum claims that the best way to help states resolve the dilemma presented by the conflict between religious choice and other central capabilities is to refer to principles embodied in to the US Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993, which states that a law can burden a person's exercise of religion only when the burden is a furtherance of a compelling state interest. In this paper I consider how this advice partly vindicates the Turkish case and how the solution it yields is in many ways more satisfactory than that of more traditional approaches in political philosophy. (shrink)

Les grandes interrogations sur la politique, la Cité, la République, se posent le plus souvent au cours de périodes où les réalités auxquelles ces notions sont communément référées sont en voie de délitement. Il en était ainsi dans l'Antiquité, comme en attestent, parmi d'autres, les préoccupations qui se font jour dans les écrits de Démosthène, Aristote, Cicéron. C'est aussi, en substance, ce qu'énonçait il y a plus de quinze siècles, Augustin, lorsque, dans une formule ramassée, se fondant sur la (...) définition cicéronienne de la respublica, il confrontait celle-ci à sa réalité : La république n'est plus puisqu'elle a cessé d'être la chose du peuple. Nous n'avons plus que le nom de république dont la réalité est dès longtemps perdue. Dans des circonstances où paraissent, une nouvelle fois, se défaire des institutions humainement construites, politique, république ou nation, il importe de savoir si l'usage de ces mots recouvre des réalités vivaces ou en voie de déconstitution. Il convient pour cela de "savoir à quoi on a affaire", de quels objets on parle, c'est là l'ambition de cet essai. Il ne s'agit pas pour autant de forger de toutes pièces des concepts inédits et vides, mais plutôt de travailler à penser la politique et ses lieux de réalisation, non en tant qu'idées, mais en tant que "choses", réalités concrètes, faisant retour aux réflexions de ceux qui se sont attachés à les concevoir dans leurs processus de constitution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Republicanism, Religion, and Machiavelli’s Savonarolan MomentMarcia L. ColishMachiavelli’s readers often take at face value his claim that Christianity has weakened Italy’s civic spirit and martial valor, leaving it open to priestcraft and foreign invasion. Some scholars see this critique of Christianity as an expression of the irreligious, immoral, neopagan, or scientific Machiavelli, making it the chief index of his modernity. 1 One subset within this group treats Machiavelli’s [End (...) Page 597] anthropology as a secularized version of Augustine on original sin, absent an Eden behind it and a redemption before it. 2 Another view of Machiavelli on religion sees him as treating religion, whatever its teachings, functionally, as an instrument promoting desirable political behavior. 3 This is why they regard [End Page 598] Machiavelli as original and modern; although Maury D. Feld notes rightly that Machiavelli is here simply imitating the ancient Roman historians, who all treat religion in just this way. 4 For some proponents of the functionalist interpretation, it does not preclude Christian belief on Machiavelli’s part. For them his brief is not against Christianity itself but against clericalism, the papacy, and Christianity as it is currently interpreted. 5 Still others recognize Machiavelli’s acceptance of signs and portents, saintly behavior and miracles, and other indices of God’s existence and action in human history. They also note Machiavelli’s praise of biblical leaders seen as divinely inspired and his inclusion of them among the founders of religions and states who head his list of heroes. 6 Going farther, some scholars argue that Machiavelli was a conventional, if not an ardent or impeccable, Christian, who joined a religious confraternity before which he preached his Exhortation to Penitence, and the apparent recipient of the last rites of his church after a deathbed confession. 7 [End Page 599]Can these conflicting assessments of Machiavelli and religion be integrated? To some extent, yes. Once, that is, we consider a number of issues not always brought to bear on this question. Machiavelli recognizes that the foreigners who have overrun Italy and deprived Florence of the republic he had served are as Christian as the Italians. At home and abroad, their Christianity has not undermined their military strength or the civic virtue Machiavelli associates with republics. Within contemporary Florence there were three kinds of republicanism on offer, for those unhappy with the Medici restoration of 1512. One group sought to restore the pre-Medici governo stretto constitution dominated by the ottimati. Their opponents defended governo largo republicanism. Machiavelli advocated this type of polity, informed by his reading of ancient history and his assessment of human nature. But another, competing version of governo largo was put forth by Girolamo Savonarola during the Dominican friar’s stormy career as de facto head of the Florentine state from 1494 to 1498. Savonarola’s republican theory combined a number of ideas that Machiavelli loathed: the appeal to the Venetian Great Council as a model, the wish to purge Florence of her sins so that she could serve as the New Jerusalem in the coming apocalypse, and the notion that governo largo was a means to these religious ends, since the more broad-based the government, the more readily could it legislate and enforce moral reform. And, far from self-destructing after the friar’s ashes had been strewn on the Arno, Savonarolan republicanism continued to draw support from a diverse and substantial group of Florentines. Equally alarming, the agents [End Page 600] of this protracted Savonarolan moment seemed to have preempted Machiavelli’s own anticlerical, antipapal, antioligarchic, and antiMedicean positions, as well as a theory of governo largo. If we foreground Machiavelli’s desire to defend his own version of republicanism by undermining the Savonarolan alternative and if we recall that he treats Christianity positively in other contexts, it becomes possible to read those passages where he criticizes Christianity as practiced in Italy as texts with an antiSavonarolan subtext. Read this way, they are not incompatible with his acceptance of Christianity as true or as politically constructive elsewhere. In approaching this topic, we should also remember the longstanding associations that bound Christianity to politics and warfare.Addressing this last point... (shrink)

The article is updated by several circumstances, which the authors reflect on. In their opinion, there are 1) obvious and external threats — violations of freedom of conscience in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, which arose as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and 2) internally hidden and potential dangers for freedom of religions of Ukrainian citizens. The well-known examples of discrimination of believers of certain faiths in the so-called DPR-LPR and Crimea given by the authors are constantly (...) updated. Relevant monitoring and analytical reports are prepared by both Ukrainian and international experts. They submitted these reports to international human rights organizations, including the rights for Freedom of Religion and Belief. Despite such convincing documented materials, separate accusations have recently appeared against Ukraine, which allegedly violates freedom of religion in the territory under its control. Some are trying to prove that Ukraine, taking advantage of the war situation and referring to the spiritual dangers for Ukraine from those religious organizations whose centers are in the aggressor country, threatens some churches, thereby violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience, which guarantee for all citizens, regardless of from their religious affiliation, freedom of religion. The authors refute these narratives lashed out by Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. Such negative conclusions, which express concern about the situation in Ukraine regarding freedom of conscience and religion, influence on the world public, experts on issues of freedom of conscience, religious organizations, spoil the image of Ukraine as a country with high level of freedom of conscience even among European countries. Religious freedom, as the authors conclude, needs protection today, but they call for separating real threats from imaginary ones and clearly defining who persecutes, whom he/she persecutes and where persecutes. Ukraine is consistent in its intentions to protect the rights of people and communities, to protect the freedoms of believers and their organizations. (shrink)

The right of freedom of religion is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Malaysian Constitution. The provision over the right to freedom of religion is seen as one of the most crucial provisions ever stated in the Federal Constitution. Article 11 has never been amended. Indeed, provision in Article 3 reiterates the right of individuals, especially the non-Muslims to profess and practise their religion freely, without any fear and interference. The special status of the religion of Islam enshrined (...) in Article 3 does not mean that non-Muslims have no right in matter of freedom of religion. However, the Federal Constitution seems to restrict the right to freedom of religion, in the sense that freedom of religion in Malaysia is not absolute. There have been several restrictions imposed not only within the constitutional framework but also other general legislations. Among provisions that furnished such restrictions can be seen in Articles 11, 11 and 10 of the Federal Constitution. Moreover, the Parliament had also passed several legislations allowing such restrictions. This can be seen, among others, the Internal Security Act of 1960, the Societies Act of 1966, the Police Act of 1967, the Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984, the Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 and the Penal Code. As such, Muslims and non-Muslims alike must adhere to certain religious constraints for the sake of public order, public health and morality.While freedom of religion is guaranteed for individuals in the Malaysian Constitution, some states in Malaysia have penalised Muslims who renounced the Islamic faith. Although there is no death penalty for apostasy in Malaysia, apostates are subject to punishments like fine, imprisonment and to a certain extent whipping. In certain states, apostates are detained at the rehabilitation centre for up to 36 months. These have brought concern to human rights activists because such punishments and detention may seem contrary to the right to freedom of religion enshrined under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution and Article 5 that guarantees individual liberty. This article attempts to investigate whether restrictions over the right of freedom of religion particularly when Muslims renounce the Islamic faith is constitutionally valid. It also intends to highlight the conflict in the laws surrounding the punishment for apostasy in various states in Malaysia. (shrink)

Through the analysis of certain aspects of Leonardo Bruni’s language, and in particular his use of “popolo” and “res publica”, we strive to understand the extent to which the politics of the early humanists remained rooted in the recent past of the City of Florence, despite the obvious ideological innovations (and without considering those of a stylistic and literary nature). Bruni seems to have inherited the primacy and unity of the Florentine people directly from the discourses of the 14th-century jurists. (...) On the other hand, “respublica” turns out to be, in his texts, both an entirely traditional notion and the emblem of the process of essentialisation of a people reconstituted in its universal dimension thanks to the definitive expulsion of conflict from the horizon of possibilities. At the same time, in a dialogue with Claudia Moatti in particular, we try to ascertain how, with which tools, some research on Roman history helps us grasp the metamorphoses of the ‘people’ in a much later period. (shrink)

Jean Bodin définit la souveraineté comme la puissance perpétuelle et absolue de la République, c ́est-à-dire une puissance législative qui ne connaît ni conditions, ni contraintes, ni obligations. Or, il affirme aussi que tous les souverains sont soumis aux lois de Dieu et de la nature et à plusieurs lois humaines communes à tous les peuples. Mais comment un pouvoir définit comme absolue peut-il avoir des limites? Voilà la contradiction signalée par plusieurs interprètes de sa pensée politique. Mon but (...) est de démontrer l'imprécision de ces avis et de proposer une interprétation qui rend cohérente l'idée selon laquelle le souveraineté, pouvoir, droit, loi, Jean Bodin souverain peut être à la fois au-dessus de la loi civile et soumis à des limites qui restreignent son pouvoir de légiférer. (shrink)

According to Corey Brettschneider, we can protect freedom of religion and promote equality, by distinguishing religious groups’ claims to freedom of expression and association from their claims to financial and verbal support from the state. I am very sympathetic to this position, which fits well with my own views of democratic rights and duties, and with the importance of recognizing the scope for political choice which democratic politics offers to governments and to citizens. This room for political choice, I believe, (...) is necessary if people are to have any chance of reconciling the conflicting moral and political obligations they are likely to face, however idealized our conception of democracy or morality. Granted that no amount of personal and political choice will ever guarantee that we do not encounter tragic choices, and painfully conflicting moral demands, it is an important feature of democracy – or so I believe – that its rights reflect the importance of mitigating these conflicts so that people are able, as a rule, to act as they ought, so that they do not experience their moral sentiments, beliefs and capacities simply as grounds for recrimination, alienation and despair. I therefore believe that democracies have good reason not to force the consciences of the undemocratic and the intolerant, where it is possible to accommodate such people without threatening the rights of others. However, the fact that I share many of Brettschneider’s intuitions and beliefs does not mean that I share them all. In particular, I find his conception of democracy unduly narrow, and unduly based on a rather idealized conception of the American constitution which is unlikely to appeal to those whose conceptions of democracy are more republican, more socialist, more pragmatic and more international than his. I have explained these worries elsewhere and drawn out some of their implications for his arguments about privacy and judicial review. There is no need to repeat them here. I will also set to one side my worries about his uninflected, overly abstract and rather reified characterization of the State, in the hope that others will discuss this and that, in the end, a more nuanced conception of the State and a more lively appreciation of the conflicting people, institutions, histories and norms which make up most states, will prove consistent with his arguments. Finally, I do not propose to enter into a detailed discussion of the difficulties of Brettschneider’s overly abstract and reified conception of State ‘speech’ and ‘expression’ which, while motivated by the language of American constitutionalism, appears to cover pretty much anything a government might do, from raising and spending taxes, to accepting judicial interpretations of contested constitutional provisions, or to affirmatively pronouncing on the goals that will animate its legislative agenda and its aspirations for citizen’s lives. Again, while I would have wished for a more nuanced and analytical discussion of so central a concept as ‘expression’ and, in particular, expression by ‘the State’, I am uncertain that anything fundamental in Brettschneider’s account of citizen rights and duties would be altered in the process. Instead, then, I want to focus on points in Brettschneider’s argument that intrigue, and sometimes puzzle, me the most and where issues of nuance and clarification might make a substantial difference to our views of equality and religious freedom. (shrink)

Within the Irish government there is a discussion regarding the possibility of limiting the legal protection afforded to the confessional secret. This paper addresses the question of whether this suggestion, if it were to be implemented by the legislature, would be compatible with the right to religious freedom under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This text will also highlight the role of the confessional secret in canon law and the protection of it under German law. (...) Catholic priests, should this plan that is currently under discussion be implemented, were obliged to disclose the knowledge gained in confession to law enforcement authorities. The canonical consequence of such a breach of the confessional secret would be excommunication. In such cases priests therefore would only have the choice between breaking the law (which would probably also be punishable under criminal law) and excommunication, with all the resulting disadvantages. In this paper, the canonical law rules regarding confession are presented before the provisions relating to the confessional secret in § 53 para. 1 No. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, § 383 para. 1 No. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and § 139 para. 2 of the Criminal Code are discussed. Specifically, the question is raised as to whether a duty of priests to co-operate with the law enforcement authorities may be established by law. Here in particular the protection of the confessional secret under the protection of freedom of religion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights will be discussed. It has to be noted however that the protection afforded by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights extends far less than the scope of § 53 para. 1 No. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, § 129 para. 2 of the Criminal Code and § 383 para. 1 No. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as Art. 9 ECHR only protects the confessional secret as far as it is required from a religious point of view, but not a general pastoral secret. The article then includes a discussion on the limitations of Article 9 ECHR. Limitations of Article 9(1) ECHR on religious freedom under Article 9(2) ECHR are only permitted if they are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public order, health, morals or the rights of others. This is discussed against the background of the legislative goal of more effective law enforcement. As a result, a limitation of the protection of confessional secret through normal (sub-constitutional, domestic) laws, despite the understandable goal of more effective law enforcement, is not compatible with Article 9 of the ECHR. (shrink)

Having constituted a new epoch in human history and a new religiouspolitical order, the revealed religions challenged the tradition of Greek philosophy to adjust to, investigate, and make intelligible a religiouspolitical order based on prophecy, revelation, and the divine law. The challenge led certain Arab and Muslim philosophers to reassess the relative distance between the thought of the Greek masters, and the doctrines propagated by the revealed religions, and to make use of such works as Plato's Republic and Laws, rather (...) than Aristotle's Politics, when offering a philosophic account of the new religious–political phenomenon and of such new disciplines as the science of the divine law and the science of revealed theology. Les religions révélées, en inaugurant une ère nouvelle dans l'histoire humaine et un nouvel ordre “religio-politique”, ont constitué un défi pour la tradition de la philosophie grecque. Celle-ci devait s'adapter a un ordre religio-politique fondé sur la prophétie, la révélation et la loi divine, en faire un objet d'investigation et le rendre intelligible. Ce défi conduisit certains philosophes arabes et musulmans à réévaluer la distance qui sépare la pensée des maîtres grecs des doctrines propagées par les religions révelées. Il les conduisit aussi à faire usage d'oeuvres telles que la République et les Lois de Platon, plutôt que la Politique d'Aristote dans leur effort de rendre compte philosophiquement du phénomène religio-politique nouveau et des nouvelles disciplines telles que la science de la loi divine et la science de la théologie révélée. (shrink)

La philosophie kantienne du droit, qui se fonde dans l'Idée morale des droits de l'homme, a pour condition la politique (le droit public) et s'inscrit dans la perspective de l'Idée de république. La république, en son opposition au despotisme, est la manière de gouverner conformément à l'idéal de la paix perpétuelle, qui requiert, à l'intérieur des Etats et entre eux, l'exigence morale du droit public, c'est-à-dire de l'institution d'un peuple comme volonté souveraine éclairée. Mais le droit des hommes (...) n'est sacré que pour autant qu'il se fonde dans la loi morale, elle-même pensée comme sainte. l'administration de ce droit, qui n'est autre que la politique, se fonde donc dans l'Idée de Dieu. Ce livre montre comment la pensée juridico-politique procède d'une application de l'Idée pratique de liberté, comment cette pensée se constitue architectoniquement, et quels sont le sens et la valeur de la théologie morale (ou rationnelle) dans la constitution de la pensée et de l'action politiques. (shrink)

This paper reassesses Sismondi's Nouveaux principes d?économie politique (1819) by locating the origins of his unorthodox political economy in the republican tradition of thought. Deeply influenced by both Smith and Rousseau, Sismondi first expounded his republican creed in a political treatise, Recherches sur les constitutions des peuples libres (1797?1801). He was in favour of a balanced constitution combined with public virtue. Sismondi's major historical work, the Histoire des républiques italiennes du Moyen Age (1807?1818), amounts to a tribute to the liberty (...) and patriotism brought about by republican governments. After a brief examination of De la richesse commerciale (1803), the third section of the paper is devoted to a close analysis of the Nouveaux principes. The foci of interest are Sismondi's views on property, commercial wealth, work and leisure, division of labour, consumption and luxury, paper money and public credit, and citizenship. The paper concludes by suggesting that Sismondi managed to transform Genevan republicanism into a set of ideas which has nourished economic radicalism up to the present. (shrink)

Recent judicial rulings and changes in federal and state legislation have given for-profit corporations a growing list of rights and constitutional protections, including the right to practice religion free from many types of federal or state restriction. In this paper, we highlight the implications of these developments using Rawls’ Theory of Justice to explore the consequences of for-profit corporate religious freedom for consumers and employees. We identify preliminary principles to spark a discussion as to how expanding religious freedom for businesses (...) and fair access to goods and services can coexist in the for-profit marketplace. (shrink)

The constitutional system of the Czech Republic, which is established on the principles of a parliamentary form of government, takes into account the possibility of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The Chamber of Deputies is a chamber to which the government is accountable and this is the chamber in which the major part of the authority of Parliament is concentrated. Parliamentary systems have been also structured according to whether a certain amount of balance (...) of power is preserved between parliament and the government. A typical characteristic of every parliamentary form of government is the possibility for a vote of confidence in the government by parliament, meaning a dependency of the government on the will of parliament. Some parliamentary systems counterbalance this relationship with a greater or lesser possibility for the government of dissolving that chamber of parliament, which votes confidence in it. This makes it possible for the government to be able to more significantly fulfil the role of political leader in a given country and it can actively initiate and form a political state. (shrink)

Legislated Rights: Securing Human Rights through Legislation aims to correct certain imbalances in constitutional thought and scholarship that burden the legislature and rights with misconceptions...

The constitutional provision for the separation of the Church and the State has been in existence for over 200 years. They are now referring to it, no longer remembering how it came about. The fact is that the French Revolution of 1789 was anti-feudal and anticlerical. It separated the affairs of the state from the ecclesiastical so that bishops and cardinals would govern the Church, not the state. The 1917 revolution in Russia also tore the triumvirate of "statehood, orthodoxy, nationality." (...) The state and the Church should have existed separately. The Bolsheviks rejected the old state and the Church, but in their legislation in 1919 the Decree recorded the separation of the Church from the state and the school from the Church. Because they disregarded law, morality and religion and absolutized the state, the state, and especially its punitive organs, trampled on morality, ethics, religion, clergy and their defenders... (shrink)

In March 2004 the French parliament controversially adopted legislation regulating the wearing of symbols indicating religious affiliation in public educational establishments. This note discusses several features of the new law indicating its origins, its rationale and its position within French constitutional discourse on religious freedom and secularity. It is based on a panel discussion held in April 2004 within the Gender Studies Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence. Placing the French legislative initiative in (...) the context of recent developments in national and European case law (suggesting clear limitations to freedom of religion), the note explores the complexity of issues of gender, identity and difference in the present debate, especially when considered in the light of reactions to the law in Islamic countries. (shrink)

This review essay examines the contribution of Legislated Rights (Webber et al, Cambridge 2018) to a central issue in constitutional theory: namely, how the institutional division of labour between the legislature and the judiciary with respect to the task of giving effect to constitutional rights is best understood and conceived. In doing so, the essay situates the work within contemporary scholarship and adopts a broadly comparative lens — a perspective that is mindful of key developments in constitutional law and theory (...) over the past several decades. Ultimately, it is suggested that a critical weakness of the capacity of Legislated Rights to contribute to contemporary debates about judicial review is its lack of engagement with these developments. As a result, the work’s intervention largely misses its mark. It speaks to an outdated view that does not reflect contemporary constitutional practice or scholarship. (shrink)

Les Républicains français poursuivent la mise en œuvre du projet de société des Lumières, dans la ligne, volontiers anticléricale, de la sécularisation de la société. Rejetant l'idée de l’utilité sociale de la religion, ils lui opposent l'idéal d'un humanisme laic, censé capable de satisfaire les aspirations les plus hautes des hommes. Ils entendent aussi fonder l'État sur la souveraineté populaire, les droits de l'hornme et les libertés civiques.Léon XIII combat inlassablement ces conceptions de la société et de l'autorité qui ne (...) font pas référence à Dieu, ni ne respectent le Statut auquel l'Église a droit, et ne peuvent que causer la ruine des États et des Peuples. L'effort du Pape de « rallier » les catholiques monarchistes à la République n'empêcha pas la dégradation des relations entre l'Église et l'État. Capable de s'adapter aux situations qu'elle réprouvait , la pensée politique de Léon XIII et des théologiens romains a toujours revendiqué avec intransigeance la place centrale de l’Église dans la société.French Républicans continued to pursue the Enlightenment’s project towards the secularization of society, wbich often was consciously anti-clerical. Rejecting the idea of the social value of religion, they opposed it with the idea of a lay humanism, whicb they tbougbt capable of satisfying mans highest aspirations. They also wanted to found the State on popular sovereignty, the rights of man, and civil liberties.Leo XIII untiringly fought those conceptions of a society and authority, that made no reference to God : they did not respect the statute to wbicb the Churcb had a rigbt and they would bring about the ruin of States and its peoples. The effort of the Pope to “rally” Catbolic monarchists to the Republic did not impede the degradation of relations between the Cburch and the State. Capable of adapting himself to the situations of wbicb he disapproved, Leo XIII’s political tbought and that of Roman theologians had always claimed witb insistence the central place of the Cburcb in society. (shrink)

Background The Constitutional Court of South Korea declared that an abortion ban was unconstitutional on April 11, 2019. The National Health Care System will provide abortion care across the country as a formal medical service. Conscientious objection is an issue raised during the construction of legal reforms. Methods One hundred sixty-seven perioperative nurses responded to the survey questionnaire. Nurses’ perception about conscientious objection, support of legislation regarding conscientious objection, and intention to object were measured. Logistic regression was used to explore (...) the factors associated with support of the legislation and the intention to conscientiously object. Results Only 28.8% of the responding nurses were aware of health care professionals’ conscientious objection. The majority felt that patients’ rights should be prioritized over health care professionals’ conscientious objection. On the other hand, 45.8% supported the legislation on conscientious objection to abortion, and 42.5% indicated a willingness to refuse to participate in an abortion case if conscientious objection was permitted. Religion, awareness of conscientious objection, and prioritizing of nurses’ right to conscientious objection were significantly associated with supporting the legislation. Moreover, religion and prioritizing nurses' rights were significantly associated with the intention to conscientiously object. Conclusions This study provides information necessary for further discussion of nurses’ conscientious objection. Nursing leaders, researchers, and educators should appeal to nurses and involve them in making policies that balance a women's right to non-discrimination and to receiving appropriate care with nurses' rights to maintain their moral integrity without compromising their professional obligation. (shrink)

"Après la proclamation de la république, en 1848, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), le fondateur du positivisme, remanie son système et fonde la religion de l'Humanité. Considérant que le moment est venu de terminer la révolution et de donner à la société son organisation définitive, il expose son programme, de 1849 à 1851, dans des leçons publiques sur l'histoire de l'Humanité destinées à rallier le peuple parisien, où il dresse le tableau de l'avenir d'après l'ensemble du passé et prépare ce qui (...) allait devenir le Système de politique positive (1851-1854). Aucune trace écrite de cet enseignement ne nous était parvenue jusqu'à la découverte récente du manuscrit de César Lefort, un document unique qui nous renseigne sur la forme et les enjeux de ce que Comte appelait lui-même ses « prédications hebdomadaires ». L'édition critique de ce cours comporte une introduction dans laquelle L. Fedi restitue le contexte et étudie les transformations doctrinales et organisationnelles du positivisme."--Back cover. (shrink)

Hegel rejected this view. The laws of phenomena constitute a general copy of the phenomena themselves. This copy lacks the internal relation of the phenomena's schema and, being their Abbild, it follows the phenomena. For Hegel the subject-matter of philosophy is the whole, and he could not, therefore, confine the character of philosophy to the exploration of legislation which applies to data or which is only a form replacing empirical data. Being a cognition of fullness, philosophy is also the self-reflection (...) of the Idea which in turn is identical with being. Here Hegel follows in the footsteps of Aristotle. Once he elaborates the subject-matter of philosophy, Hegel also elaborates what we may call the philosophy of philosophy, that is, the delineation of philosophical thinking as against any other activity of the mind including science, art, religion. Hegel's substantive notions of philosophy are imbued with his conceptions of the nature of philosophy, and these two aspects of his system are closely interrelated. (shrink)

Nos sociétés recherchent des principes d'action, en particulier de législation, dont la justice ne soit pas fondée uniquement sur le fait qu'ils sont énoncés dans un code. Où chercher cette légitimité qui échappe à l'arbitraire du moment? L'histoire a décliné ses références: le consentement populaire, la tradition, le génie du peuple, la décision, l'idéal commun, la raison, la religion... L'expression droit naturel a souvent cristallisé cet enseignement du passé, mais la formule a-t-elle encore un sens aujourd'hui? En d'autres termes, faut-il (...) en relancer l'histoire? "Il s'agit donc de signifier une exigence peu commune, quelque chose comme une normativité pure. J'y verrais volontiers une entreprise pluriséculaire et, de ce point de vue, les contributions ici offertes au titre d'une histoire du concept vaudraient pour nous aussi bien comme la mise en scène d'un travail du concept.". Le comité éditorial, réuni aux Facultés universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, a sollicité, de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique, la contribution de quinze auteurs afin qu'ils exposent ici le sens et la portée que les grandes figures de la philosophie du droit, de l'Antiquité à la Modernité, attribuent au concept de droit naturel. Précédés d'un Grand angle qui les resitue sur la ligne du temps, ces différents Focus sont suivis de quatre Contre-jours qui les synthétisent dans une relecture chaque fois particulière. Après Platon, Aristote, Cicéron, Augustin, al Fârâbî, Maïmonide, Thomas d'Aquin, Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, et Hegel, nous voici invités, juristes et philosophes, à affronter les mêmes questions qu'eux. (shrink)

This article discusses how the persistence of child labor, especially in Brazil and the United States of America, constitutes a current facet of neo-colonialism. Cultivated as an educational and dignifying activity, exploited child labor persists and is naturalized. Schools, religions, and the legislation contribute to making the working class come to love and naturalize what in the past was understood as torture and punishment, thus jointly acting as a fundamental means of forming a new cultural form: the love of work. (...) Initially, the article discusses how the culture of work is historically founded and then argues against the idealist and postmodern explanations that naturalize it. The argument is based on the understanding that culture has a material basis and is linked to the production and social reproduction of life. Data from the empirical research on child labor in tobacco farming in Brazil and the USA reveal the persistence of the problem among Latino children and families. We conclude with the need to found a new culture for contemporary society, based on other social and economic relations, which allows the working class to free itself from what dominates and exploits it. (shrink)

Regardless of unpredictable and contingent geopolitical events such as last year’s surprising rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, this coming year will certainly witness a large surge in patriotism. The Winter Olympics in February, and the World Cup in the summer, both promise to whip national sentiments into a fever pitch. One other thing is certain, though: journals of philosophy and ethics will continue to debate the virtues of cosmopolitanism, as this number of Ethical Perspectives does (...) through its contributions below.Why is this? Why do philosophers and academics hold on to this idea of cosmopolitanism, an idea utterly lacking in the convictions of the general public? Is it perhaps because the first cosmopolitans were in fact philosophers? The first to identify himself as a cosmopolitan was Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato’s dialogues paint many of the Sophists in cosmopolitan hues. Although people generally support the idea of internationalism as far as it promotes trade, travel, and football tournaments, once it begins to meddle in internal affairs, as it does with outsourcing and transnational constitutions, they tend to fall back upon the patria. They killed Socrates for corrupting the youth of Athens, not the youth of the world.Whether it is the service and manufacturing industries of Asia and India ‘stealing’ American jobs, or widespread fears of Brussels’ legendary bureaucrats, the non-academic public consistently turns from its tepid embrace of cosmopolitanism to patriotism whenever threatened. Are we too quick to label this as self-interest or even selfishness? Or is there something else at work in the debate between cosmopolitanism and patriotism? Some approaches to cosmopolitanism are certainly guilty of an absolute removal of difference, of wishing away the nation state, of replacing it with an international body based on purely universal principles, and of wiping away the competencies of nations on many levels. The call for the world state can come across as an appeal for an anodyne and internationalist homogeneity based on a clinical morality that, for all its sensitivity, runs roughshod over the well-engrained cultural, legal, and social beliefs of many peoples.Clearly, this is what many Europeans fear, and to a large degree, Americans as well in their dislike for the International Court of Justice. Even the economic hegemony of outsourcing removes national power, and replaces it with pure economic rationality.Our contributors below do not advocate these reductions, although some may point to them. Key to each contribution below is sensitivity to the world as it is, to its need for difference even in the face of an ever-increasing globalisation that sometimes is connected with cosmopolitanism. Yet, every proponent of cosmopolitanism must sketch how it is possible in practice. Of course, an obvious problem is how to dwell consequently as a cosmopolitan. Not many contemporary cosmopolitans would be prepared to follow Diogenes’ commitment to rootlessness: living in exile after having been included in a forgery conviction aimed at his father, the ascetic Diogenes called a barrel his home. Such was his drive to live a levelled life that he cast away his only bowl upon seeing a poor peasant boy drinking from cupped hands. Today’s cosmopolitan leads a much more prosaic life, and hence the problem with cosmopolitanism begins as something mundane. Does not a cosmopolitan still pay national taxes? Does not a cosmopolitan still need a national passport and second country visas? But, the questions quickly turn ontological: how can one shed oneself of one’s nationality, of one’s belonging, as if it is just an accident of one’s own constitution, instead of as an important property of one’s own constitution? In other words, belonging is important: a citizen of the world still values citizenship. Clearly, the absolute cosmopolitan reduction is an absurdity: one is always rooted, in some sense. Even cosmopolitanism is rooted in a specific Western mindset, and is no self-evident preference of human existence.As Rudi Visker’s contribution so clearly shows through an investigation of the narcissism of minor differences, these questions revolve around the question of confrontation with alterity. What I am, in no small way plays off what I am not. I cannot be everything, if I am something. Freud’s analysis of minor differences reveals that members of a group identify with that group on the basis these minor differences. What is self-evident to a particular culture marks that culture off from another culture, a culture that by definition does not share the same set of the self-evident. To be a foreigner, as any ex-patriot can attest, is to stand outside of the self-evident, whether this means interpreting gestures, understanding commercial practices, or, as Freud would have it, staying on the correct side of national taboos. There is thus a dialectic of inner and outer, a dialectic which refuses a reduction of one to the other. As Visker puts it, recognising the stranger within oneself is quite different than recognising the stranger outside of oneself, and to confuse these as being the same is not only to misunderstand the very issue at stake, it is also a dangerous trivialisation of difference.But clearly, there is something viable and laudable in the idea of cosmopolitanism, since it stresses the universal moral community of humanity. Cosmopolitanism is an attempt to see all human subjects as subject to the same moral law. Indeed, the sort of federation to which cosmopolitanism leads, at least in a modified Kantian expression as Bert van Roermund tells us, even gives us good grounds to recognise the legitimacy and moral equivalence of states. Importantly, the international legal order does not draw its power from any supranational force, but from the choice of independent national actors to recognise it. Hence, this cosmopolitan order depends on nationhood, and good standing within this order depends on the degree to which a country decides to participate. Again, the universal here depends on well-rooted particularity, a particularity able to choose for the universal.What do we do, then, with outlaw nations, those nations that are hostile to the choice for the universal? Through a clear reading of Hegel, Paul Cobben proposes that the metric for a state’s legality is the measure to which it permits the moral freedom of its citizens to bloom. A free person requires a free legal order; only in such can a person obtain the full measure of human rights due. States that do not permit this blooming are illegitimate; they contradict the nature of the human person, and citizens dwelling under the yoke of these have the right to ask for outside assistance in removing this illegitimate power above them. However, for this plea to be met, two conditions must obtain: the oppressed people must have the wherewithal to form a political order after the removal of the illegitimate state, and the action must be grounded in the principles and support of a legal community, which in essence would be a world federation of states. In fact, it is morally incumbent upon all legal states to aim at such a world federation, upon pain of contradiction.Our duty to others does not end with the politically oppressed; the economically oppressed also lay a moral claim upon us. So, as Toon Vandevelde asks in his contribution, what about the global poor? The poor are hungry and in need of shelter and a future, but to address these issues at the level of rights is in a way heartless: what good does it do to legislate that everyone has the right to food, when this right can never be called upon, or enforced, in any meaningful sense? Moreover, approaches that demand non-prioritised generosity not only ignore the fundamental economic fact of scarcity, they also run the risk of creating the moral hazard of dependence on charity. The true cosmopolitan approach is the recognition of our common humanity and of our concomitant duty to help others as far as this help does not endanger us. This duty is compounded by the marginalisation of the poor through globalisation, a globalisation that they did not ask for. The extent of our help is indeterminate, but its direction is clear: it must aim to integrate those poor who wish it within our international systems, and so to ease their own transitions from poverty.Both Gil Anidjar and Maria Bonnafous-Boucher continue this theme of economy, but each from a highly specific viewpoint. Indeed, their contributions are perhaps somewhat darker, delving into an aspect of the unspoken underneath the choice for the universal. Anidjar begins with the relation between religion and economy within the interplay of Judaism and Christianity, whereas Bonnafous-Boucher focuses on the development of political economy through a Foucaultian lens. Although highly distinct contributions, both share the insight that the economy is now the central theme of our power structures, and that economy, isolated from questions of morality or justice, must likewise play a decisive role within the structure of cosmopolitanism, or, at minimum, the political unity of peoples. For, national government long ago ceded to a promiscuous mix of governance, and religion to economy. This nexus enthrones governance as an economic rationale stripped of all other trappings, and inscribes any possible cosmopolitanism within a framework of an aggressive capitalism, a kind of economic theology, a kind of hegemony in which state boundaries are essentially liquefied. Capital, after all, knows no boundaries. (shrink)

Human dignity consists of freedom. Yet freedom simultaneously means both autonomy and heteronomy, being an absolute and relation. As an absolute a human is in the realm of being , and as relative in the realm of having . Without "alterity" or "otherness" there is no having. The following aspects of social life must be distinguished: social transcendentals, categories, institutions and groups. The state , for example, cannot be equated with politics . Of the categories , the former are conditions, (...) the latter guiding instances. In the absence of a logical interplay between these conditions and guiding instances, one abides in abstraction. The interplay, the relation between them, is not random. Today economy has become a guiding instance. This attempt can never be finally consummated. Without private property, production is impossible. But private property needs to be universalized, justified and thus requires law. Law is always intrinsically pre-positive, but just as the economy cannot be realized without law, law cannot be enforced without politics. Politics determines law; however without a political element, law remains, although real, nevertheless powerless, impractical. Justification, of which political decisions are also in need, is post-positive law. In relation to law, a purely rational foundation for legislation is insufficient and thus impractical. Consequently there is a) pre-positive law as universally recognized by society; b) positive law as established by the political instances; c) post-positive law as the sphere from which politicians justify their legislation. This differentiation is necessary to illuminate the specific duality of conditions and guiding instances. A politician never simply acts on mandate or as proxy for the general will of the people. Post-positive law thus always involves a certain ethical position as a criterion for decision-making. Yet religion is that instance which imparts final practicability, effective force to ethics. In short, no social sub-system can exercise total or despotic power over the others. Any mistake in this respect makes the entire social stratum abstracter and less constituted. Die Würde des Menschen besteht in seiner Freiheit; Freiheit aber bedeutet gleichermaßen Autonomie und Heteronomie, zugleich absolut und Verhältnis sein. Als Absolutes tritt der Mensch in den Bereich des Seins, als Relatives in den Bereich des Habens. Ohne "Alterität" oder "Andersheit" gibt es kein Haben. Im gesellschaftlichen Leben sind zu unterscheiden: gesellschaftliche Transzendentalien, Kategorien, Institutionen und Gruppen. Der Staat ist z.B. nicht mit Politik gleichzusetzen. Bei den Kategorien sind die ersteren Bedingungen, die letzteren sind Leitinstanzen. Ohne diese Logik der Bedingungen und Leitinstanzen bleibt nur das Verharren in der Abstraktion. Das Spiel, das Verhältnis zwischen den einen und den anderen ist nicht beliebig. Heute ist Wirtschaft Leitinstanz. Dieser Versuch kann nie endgültig gelingen. Ohne Privateigentum ist kein Erwirtschaften möglich. Jenes bedarf aber einer Verallgemeinerung, einer Rechtfertigung und fordert damit die Präsenz des Rechts. Das Recht ist immer wesentlich vorpositiv, aber genau wie die Wirtschaft ohne das Recht nicht realisierbar ist, ist das Recht ohne Politik auch nicht vollstreckbar. Die Politik setzt das Recht; ohne ein politisches Element jedoch bleibt das Recht zwar reell, aber machtlos, unpraktisch. Die Rechtfertigung, der auch die politische Entscheidung bedarf, ist nach-positives Recht. In bezug auf das Recht ist eine reine Vernunftbegründung des Gesetzes unzulänglich und deshalb unpraktisch. Kurz: es gibt a) vor-positives Recht als das von der Gesellschaft allgemein anerkanntes Recht; b) positives Recht als das von der politischen Instanz gesetztes Recht; c) nach-positives Recht als die Sphäre aus der die Politiker die Begründung ihrer Gesetzgebung schöpfen. Diese Unterscheidung ist notwendig, um die spezifische Dualität von Bedingungen und Leitungsinstanzen besser ans Licht zu bringen. Der Politiker ist nie ein reiner Mandatar oder Bevollmächtigter des allgemeinen Volkswillens. Im nach-positiven Recht ist daher das Entscheidungskriterium immer eine gewisse ethische Position. Die Religion ist jedoch diejenige Instanz, die der Ethik letzte Praktizität, effektive Gewalt, verleiht. Kurz gesagt: kein gesellschaftliches Subsystem kann über die anderen total oder despotisch verfügen. Ein Irrtum diesbezüglich macht das ganze soziale Gefüge abstrakter, unkonstituierter. (shrink)

In Voyous, Jacques Derrida develops his argument starting from the presupposition that democracy as such is the entity whose integrity and immunity are at stake and, therefore, under investigation. This gesture reflects the setting in which ten years before, in Foi et savoir, he had cast his reasoning about the logic of immunity. There, it was one of the sources of religion, the immunity of the sacred, that operated according to this logic. The hyphen between these two essays, beside Derrida’s (...) own crossed references, is the genealogical reasoning on the meaning and essence of the concept of democracy: contrary to what Derrida claims, it will be maintained that Athenian democracy had a clear immune matrix, whose constant exercise is clearly defined, in spite of himself, by Vernant, and it will be shown how modern democracy has been forced to change policy. Modern democracy is an entity characterized by an immune deficiency. In order to save Derrida’s intuition from both the collapse of different vantage points and from a quite bizarre reticence in taking into account of the immune value of rituals, our starting point will be René Girard’s œuvre and his reading of the role of immune logic in sacred systems and, more generally, in modernity. The threshold between the auto-immune reaction, immune deficiency and auto-immune disease, between the sacrifice who delimits and constitutes the self and the holocauste du peuple en détail, is the space where, constantly exposed to the risk of auto-denial, democracy lives. (shrink)

Depuis le début du XXe siècle, se sont succédé en Iran quatre générations d’intellectuels. La première a vu officiellement le jour sous la Révolution constitutionnelle, et se réclamait d’un pluralisme politique entretenant des relations ambiguës avec l’islam. La seconde, sous Réza Shah, dans les années 1930 et 1940, se réclamait du nationalisme ou du marxisme, l’islam étant marginal dans leur horizon intellectuel. La troisième génération, à partir des années 1960, revient à l’islam et y puise les ressources pour lutter contre (...) l’autocratie du chah et l’impérialisme occidental. L’islamo-marxisme en est la conséquence pour la grande majorité d’entre eux. Enfin, après la Révolution islamique s’ouvre, dans les années 1990, une nouvelle période où les intellectuels « religieux » présentent une version pluraliste de l’islam qui remet en cause la théocratie islamique au nom d’un islam spirituel ou qui laisse le champ politique à la société. Cette nouvelle version de l’islam remet en cause le gouvernement du Jurisconsulte Islamique sur lequel est fondée la République Islamique d’Iran. L’opposition intellectuelle au pouvoir se décline désormais pour la première fois de manière explicite à partir d’une vision qui entend concilier islam et démocratie.Since the early 20th century, four generations of intellectuals have followed each other in Iran. The first was officially born in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution. It was based on a political pluralism maintaining ambiguous relations with Islam. The second, under the rule of Reza Shah, in the 1930s and 1940s, combines nationalism and marxism, Islam being of marginal interest at the time. The third generation, after the 1960s, reverts to Islam, in which it finds the intellectual weapons against the despotism of the monarch and Western imperialism. As a result, a combination of Islam and marxism defines their intellectual horizon. Eventually, after the Islamic Revolution, in the 1990s, a new period sets in, in which the « religious intellectuals » work out a pluralist version of Islam that questions Islamic theocracy in the name of a spiritual Islam or a religion that does not impose its views on the political arena. This new version of islam puts into question the Government of the Islamic Jurist upon which the Islamic Republic in Iran is based. From now on, the intellectual opposition to the government expresses itself from a perspective that intends to reconcile Islam and democracy. (shrink)

En dépit des réformes dites libérales des années 1860, l'Empire russe resta tout au long du XIX e siècle un empire dont le souverain s'intitulait officiellement : « Tsar et Autocrate de toutes les Russies ». L'autocratie différait fortement de la monarchie française d'Ancien Régime, qu'embarrassaient et que contenaient mille traditions et reliques du passé : droit coutumier et droit romain, vieilles lois de sources diverses toujours en vigueur, privilèges, prérogatives, immunités, franchises, exceptions et exemptions, Église indépendante, etc. Dans le (...) système russe du « césaropapisme », l'empereur faisait également office de souverain pontife de la religion orthodoxe : il en était le « défenseur et gardien ». - En 1881, le tsar Alexandre II fut tué dans un attentat, alors que l'octroi d'une Constitution semblait imrm'nent. Son règne avait été marqué par une série de réformes, dont la plus célèbre (1861) est celle qui avait émancipé les paysans serfs. Constantin Pétrovitch Pobedonostsev (1827-1907), célèbre juriste et homme d'État russe, qui avait été le précepteur des fils d'Alexandre II, va alors devenir le principal représentant d'une politique de contre-réformes, d'une politique refusant que soit faite la moindre concession aux idées libérales. Nommé par Alexandre III procureur du Saint-Synode, il exercera une influence prépondérante en Russie pendant la première partie du règne de ce tsar (c'està-dire de 1881 à 1887). Certains de ses écrits, pamphlets ou manifestes ont été réunis dans un Recueil de Moscou, paru en 1896. Nous y verrons Pobedonostsev dénoncer une à une toutes les institutions qui pourraient, si jamais elles étaient importées d'Occident, limiter les prérogatives du tsar autocrate : séparation de l'Église et de l'État ; suffrage universel et discours sur la prétendue souveraineté du peuple ; instruction gratuite et obligatoire, impliquant une limitation du travail des enfants ; liberté de la presse et invocation constante de l' « opinion publique » ; institution (à l'anglaise) de jurys populaires dans les tribunaux. - Mais nous aurons la surprise de trouver également, dans ce même Recueil de Moscou, un catalogue très raisonné des principales « pathologies » qui, selon Pobedonostsev, accompagnent nécessairement un régime de démocratie représentative : corruption des représentants ; combinaisons et tractations incessantes entre les partis ; indifférentisme massif et hypertrophie du moi personnel chez les électeurs ; omniprésence d'une presse dépourvue de tout mandat électif et parlant cependant au nom du public ; etc. Un tel catalogue constitue à n'en pas douter ce que l'œuvre de Pobedonostsev, ce réactionnaire « sur toute la ligne », contient de moins inactuel. (shrink)

In Voyous, Jacques Derrida develops his argument starting from the presupposition that democracy as such is the entity whose integrity and immunity are at stake and, therefore, under investigation. This gesture reflects the setting in which ten years before, in Foi et savoir, he had cast his reasoning about the logic of immunity. There, it was one of the sources of religion, the immunity of the sacred, that operated according to this logic. The hyphen between these two essays, beside Derrida’s (...) own crossed references, is the genealogical reasoning on the meaning and essence of the concept of democracy: contrary to what Derrida claims, it will be maintained that Athenian democracy had a clear immune matrix, whose constant exercise is clearly defined, in spite of himself, by Vernant, and it will be shown how modern democracy has been forced to change policy. Modern democracy is an entity characterized by an immune deficiency. In order to save Derrida’s intuition from both the collapse of different vantage points and from a quite bizarre reticence in taking into account of the immune value of rituals, our starting point will be René Girard’s œuvre and his reading of the role of immune logic in sacred systems and, more generally, in modernity. The threshold between the auto-immune reaction, immune deficiency and auto-immune disease, between the sacrifice who delimits and constitutes the self and the holocauste du peuple en détail, is the space where, constantly exposed to the risk of auto-denial, democracy lives. (shrink)

This paper examines the significance of Epicureanism for Nietzsche’s critique of Christian monotheism and his subsequent attempt to reanimate a kind of this-worldly, affirmative religiosity of immanence. After a brief overview of the pivotal role that Epicurus’ thought plays in the death of God, I focus on Epicurus’ own residual conception of the gods and the ways in which Nietzsche strategically retrieves it and puts it use in his writing. Nietzsche juxtaposes the distant, serene, indifferent Epicurean gods with the omniscient, (...) intrusive, jealous and needy God of middle-Eastern monotheisms. One might say that they constitute a ‘halfway house’ of sorts between Christianity and Nietzsche’s new Dionysian religion of the earth. But they also figure prominently in his own conflicted desire to intervene in the aleatory course of natural history and legislate the the future of humanity: Nietzsche finds he cannot simply look down with “the mocking and aloof eyes” of an Epicurean god upon the degeneration and diminution of the human being under Christian ascetic regimes of cultivation. Ultimately, Nietzsche fails to achieve the divine temperament of the Epicurean gods (looking down from afar on human ignorance, desire and suffering with a noble pathos of distance). Forthcoming 2022. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A new ‘political philosophy’ is indispensable to the ‘post-Corona world,’ and this paper tries to analyze the future of ‘liberal democracy’ in it. It shows that ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that has begun before, but the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic,’ as a setback for it, strongly encourages that crisis. ‘Liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed by ‘political philosophers’ to go together, are now becoming decoupled, and the ‘liberal values’ of ‘democracy’ are eroding. To find why and (...) how, this paper analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ and the evils and propensities of ‘democracy’ that bring about further erosions of ‘liberal values.’ There may be difficult trade-offs to be made between ‘liberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ ‘values’ - and, after the experience of ‘Coronavirus,’ this paper shows the ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy’ may become stronger. -/- KEYWORDS: democracy, liberalism, liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, the novel Coronavirus pandemic, Covid-19, authoritarianism, totalitarianism. -/- EXTENDED ABSTRACT For almost a century in West, ‘democracy’ has meant ‘liberal democracy’-a political system marked not only by ‘free and fair elections,’ but also by ‘liberal values.’ ‘Liberalism’ applied to the problem of the limits of the criminal law would require commitment to the presumption in favor of ‘liberty.’ If the word ‘liberal’ is to have any utility in this context, it should refer to one who has so powerful a commitment to ‘liberty’ that she is motivated to limit the number of acknowledged liberty-limiting or coercion-legitimizing principles as narrowly as possible. So, she only believes in ‘harm-principle’ as the morally relevant reason for criminal prohibitions. ‘Offense principle’ and ‘paternalistic’ and ‘moralistic’ considerations, when introduced as support for penal legislation, have no weight at all. So, it means ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-regarding vs. other-regarding actions distinction’ based on which the human is the owner of her mind and body and everything consenting adults do is beyond the realm of morality and law. It leads to ‘individual’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties’ of ‘speech,’ ‘religion,’ and ‘property’ and ‘collective’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties of assembly,’ ‘civil society,’ ‘political pluralism,’ ‘democratic institutions,’ and ‘non-governmental organizations.’ ‘Liberalism’ also believes in ‘equality of conditions, ‘equal and free participatory rights in political decision making,’ and ‘collective self-governance.’ It also believes in the ‘rule of law,’ a ‘separation of powers,’ and ‘checks and balances.’ However, even under fair and free elections, the elected leaders can be ‘populists,’ ‘ultra-nationalists,’ ‘racists,’ ‘fascists,’ and ‘authoritarians’ who do not respect ‘inviolable basic rights and liberties,’ and suppress ‘minorities.’ Democratically elected leaders can routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive their citizens of ‘basic rights and liberties.’ The two strands of ‘liberal democracy’ have been coming apart in the world, and the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ have been fraying and eroding even before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ Even before the Coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of ‘liberal democracy.’ In particular, there has been a debate about whether ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled. This paper shows ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that had begun before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ It also analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ ‘liberalism,’ and ‘democracy’ and shows that Covid-19 is a setback for ‘liberal democracy.’ What is striking about the current moment is that many of the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ are so far holding up under immense pressure. ‘Illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many countries. This model of ‘illiberal democracy,’ in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights and liberties are curtailed, may emerge stronger from this new crisis. In that sense, the ‘pandemic’ may become a challenge not only to ‘democracy’ as such but also to ‘liberal democracy’ in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. ‘Authoritarian’ procedures may succeed in mitigating the spread of the ‘Coronavirus,’ but the world now faces another problem: that when the virus recedes, many ‘liberal democracies’ will be far less ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ than they were before. In times of crisis, ‘liberal values’ have been ignored temporarily in the name of executive power. However, the ‘temporary’ can become ‘permanent.’ In addition, if citizens lose their faith in the legitimacy of ‘liberal democracy’ as the best form of government, and think ‘liberal democracy’ cannot function effectively during a crisis, and ‘authoritarian regimes’ manage the crisis more decisively, the world will slide towards ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy,’ and many ‘liberal democracies’ will be at grave risk of failure. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security - and, after the experience of Covid-19, many citizens may choose security. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that in order to secure the commitment of believers in reasonable comprehensive doctrines to political liberalism a third principle of justice needs to be adopted in the Original Position. Rawls acknowledges that neutral legislation by the liberal state may negatively affect some reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and I offer a third principle of justice to help alleviate this problem. This principle, which I believe is in keeping with the United States constitutional history especially where church-state relations (...) are concerned, maintains that a constitutional regime should, insofar as possible, avoid adopting rules with harmful effects upon those comprehensive doctrines which satisfy the conditions of reasonable pluralism. (shrink)