Corporate accountability is central for dealing with environmental and health effects in complex supply chains. When companies hold their suppliers accountable to certain rules or standards, these become disseminated in the supply chain. This study analyses how voluntary restrictions of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in paper-based food packaging in Sweden are translated as they travel down the supply chain and their relationship to supplier practice. The multidisciplinary approach draws on both interviews with key actors and chemical analysis of (...) PFAS in food packaging. It shows how demands for accountability for chemicals are translated both horizontally in the industry and vertically in supply chains resulting in a set of interrelated voluntary standards and rules. The chemical analysis detected PFAS in almost half of the samples, but at levels indicating non-intentional use, thereby complying with the disseminated rules. The result shows that the standards largely institutionalize established practices in support of “laggards” rather than push the industry to more radical phase-out of PFAS. (shrink)

This paper uses Gerald Postema’s _Law’s Rule_ to take up one of the most controversial questions in rule of law scholarship: whether the ideal can provide the basis for criticizing the state alone, or private individuals and entities exercising power over others as well. An account of the characteristics of states in virtue of which the rule of law licenses control over their power is developed, followed by an examination of some cases in which non-state holders of power over (...) others might take on some of those characteristics. Under such circumstances, there are rule of law reasons to demand state control of private power. (shrink)

Kripke’s version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has been influential. My concern is with how it—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—have been perceived as undercutting the individualistic picture of mathematical practice: the view that individuals— Robinson Crusoes —can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics, and indeed have “private languages.” What has been denied is that phrases like “correctly counting” can be applied to such individuals because these normative notions can only be applied cogently in a context involving community (...) standards. I attempt to show that this shocking corollary doesn’t follow even if Kripke’s Wittgensteinian objections to dispositional approaches to rule-following are largely right. My reason for claiming this is that there is another solution to the rule-following paradox, one that doesn’t favor community standards over individual ones. Furthermore, it doesn’t replace truth conditions with assertability conditions; and this latter maneuver is essential to Kripke’s sceptical solution favoring the community over the individual. (shrink)

Why our workplaces are authoritarian private governments—and why we can’t see it One in four American workers says their workplace is a “dictatorship.” Yet that number almost certainly would be higher if we recognized employers for what they are—private governments with sweeping authoritarian power over our lives. Many employers minutely regulate workers’ speech, clothing, and manners on the job, and employers often extend their authority to the off-duty lives of workers, who can be fired for their political speech, (...) recreational activities, diet, and almost anything else employers care to govern. In this compelling book, Elizabeth Anderson examines why, despite all this, we continue to talk as if free markets make workers free, and she proposes a better way to think about the workplace, opening up space for discovering how workers can enjoy real freedom. (shrink)

In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule.

: We discuss the role that transnational corporations should play in developing global governance, creating a framework of rules and regulations for the global economy. The central issue is whether TNCs should provide global rules and guarantee individual citizenship rights, or instead focus on maximizing profits. First, we describe the problems arising from the globalization process that affect the relationship between public rules and private firms. Next we consider the position of economic and management theories in (...) relation to the social responsibility of the firm. We argue that instrumental stakeholder theory and business and society research can only partially solve the global governance issue, and that more recent concepts of corporate citizenship and republican business ethics deliver theoretically and practically helpful, fresh insights. However, even these need further development, especially with regard to the legitimacy of corporate political activity. (shrink)

I identify one neglected source of support for a Kripkean reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: the analogy between rules and epistemic grounds and the existence of a Kripkean anti-privacy argument about epistemic grounds in On Certainty. This latter argument supports Kripke’s claims that the basic anti-privacy argument in the Investigations (a) poses a question about the distinguishability of certain first-person attributions with identical assertability conditions, (b) concludes that distinguishability is provided by third-person evaluability, and (c) is a general argument, (...) not one about a specific kind of alleged rules. (shrink)

Defeasible rules are said to allow for the following two-staged sequence, viz., that p → q and yet p & r → not-q. This is puzzling because in the logic of conditionals the sufficiency of p for q cannot normally be undermined if one adds to the antecedent a further proposition r. Critics argue that the better approach to comprehending defeasibility is explicitly to represent the limiting factor r in a single-stage articulation of the rule, viz., as p & (...) not-r → q. This is a more complete statement of the rule; where the old rule announced, confidently and without qualification, that in circumstances or class of cases p consequence q follows, the new rule admits from the outset that q only follows if we add the qualifier that limits the antecedent circumstances to the smaller class of cases p & not-r. This is not only more complete, the critics argue, it is also a more accurate or truthful statement of the rule. The rule p → q, articulated at the first stage of the defeasible process, is only a pretender encountered along the way to this more complete truth. In this paper I show how, and why, contrary to the critics, the process of private law adjudication supports the multi-staged structure and representation of defeasible legal rules. What matters when one party makes a claim against another party is not so much that the claim is true (or even that it is advanced as a legitimate claim under the rule that is most likely to be true), but rather that the claim is of the sort that the party can justifiably say is true. The latter, at least, is what carries the plaintiff past the initial burden of proof, and what calls for the defendant to reply if the plaintiff is not to carry the day. I illustrate the argument by way of the court’s reluctance in a tort case to entertain a purely statistical basis for a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant has caused her injury. Rather, the court will insist on direct evidence that appears to arise out of the particular circumstances of the case as the plaintiff alleges them to be, and even if, as a purely statistical matter, the latter sort of claim is less likely to be true than the claim grounded in pure statistical likelihood. I relate this argument for defeasible rules (and against rules that are more truthful) to some important arguments offered by the philosopher Stephen Darwall in his recent book The Second Person Viewpoint. Private law’s defeasible rules, I argue, capture the special respect (and interpersonal accountability) that attaches only to rights arising out of “second personal” claiming (and counterclaiming) and which are not realizable merely as a matter of “third personal” (moral) truth. (shrink)

Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is one of the most celebrated and important books in philosophy of language and mind of the past forty years. It generated an avalanche of responses from the moment it was published and has revolutionized the way in which we think about meaning, intentionality, and the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It introduced a series of questions that had never been raised before concerning, most prominently, the normativity of meaning and the (...) prospects for a reductionist account of meaning. This volume of new essays reassesses the continuing influence of Kripke's book and demonstrates that many of the issues first raised by Kripke, both exegetical and philosophical, remain as thought-provoking and as relevant as they were when he first introduced them. (shrink)

Private copying exception is an exception to copyright which is present both in Lithuanian national law and law of the European Union. Recent jurisprudence of Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted legal regulation of private copying exception in the laws of the European Union. The mentioned jurisprudence raised concern whether Lithuanian copyright laws on private copying exception and their interpretation in case law of Supreme Court of Lithuania are compatible with the European Union law. This (...) paper analyses the nature and intention of private copying exception, its reflection in Lithuanian and European copyright law and evaluates Lithuanian laws and case law in the light of recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The authors conclude that recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on private copying exception shall not lead to any dramatic or substantial changes of Lithuanian national copyright laws. (shrink)

Patricia Werhane synthesizes much of later Wittgensteinian thought, bringing together disparate arguments into a coherent text. Keeping in mind what Wittgenstein set out to accomplish in his later writings, the introduction of new material on the private language arguments, and the philosophical significance of these claims, Werhane develops the thesis that the notion of a rule is such a constitutive of language that a private language is impossible. Such a conclusion challenges many contemporary readings of the Philosphical Investigations (...) by bringing into question conventionalism, linguistic relativism, and idealism while defending the thesis that the notion of a private psychological experience makes sense. (shrink)

I examine what I take to be an important consideration for the later Wittgenstein: the understanding of a rule does not exceed or transcend an understanding of explanations or instructions in the rule. I contend that this consideration plays a central role in the later Wittgenstein's views on rule-following. I first show that it serves as a key premiss in a sceptical argument concerning our ability to follow rules. I then argue that this consideration is vital to Wittgenstein's case (...) against what I describe as a realist view of rules. This realist view requires that our understanding of a rule extend beyond what can be understood from any set of instructions or explanation. For Wittgenstein, because this is to transcend publicly available means of conveying understanding, this realist's understanding is a private understanding. He calls this private source of understanding an ‘intuition’ and the main line of argument against intuition in our understanding of a rule draws, appropriately, on what is called his ‘private language argument’. In this paper, I defend a non-verificationist reading of this argument and its use against the realist so-construed. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The rule of law is widely perceived to be a public law doctrine, concerned with the way governmental authority conforms to dictates of law. This book explores the idea that the rule of law instead concerns the conditions under which any relationship - that among citizens as well as that between citizens and the state - becomes subject to law.

Starting from a teleological understanding of the rule of law, this article argues that private power is a rule of law concern as much as public power. One way of applying the rule of law to private power would be to limit instances of ‘lawlessness’ and arbitrariness through formal requirements and procedural guarantees. However, we argue that private power is, to a significant extent, constituted by law in the first place – and that its lawful exercise is (...) no less pernicious than its unlawful exercise. Drawing on this constitutive function of law, we propose a normative core of the rule of law grounded on the moral equality of individuals. Attention to individuals’ needs, capabilities, and public autonomy points to requirements of distributive justice and democratic participation as part of the power-conferring function of law. Through a discussion of contestations of fossil fuel policy, the article shows the critical and empowering potential of a reconfigured rule of law. (shrink)

Discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy has suffered from a scarcity of commentators who understand his work well enough to explain it in their own words. Apart from certain notable exceptions, all too many advocates and critics alike have tended merely to repeat slogans, with approval or ridicule as the case may be. The result has been an unusual degree of polarization and acrimony—some philosophers abandoning normal critical standards, falling under the spell and becoming fanatical supporters; and others taking an equally extreme (...) opposite view, deriding the absence of analytic technique, and refusing to see anything of value in Wittgenstein's work. (shrink)

This article draws analogies between the making of norms by contract, often seen as typical of private law, and by subordinate law-making, often seen as a typically public function and for public bodies. These analogies are set in the context of those rules which govern the relations between universities and their students, as the same types of rule may find their source in a range of legal sources: prescription, royal charter, parliamentary legislation or contract. Of these different sources, (...) the common law courts long accepted that chartered corporations, created by exercise of royal prerogative, were entitled to make subordinate legislation (known as byelaws) for the furthering of their purposes for both members and non-members, despite this law-making being extra-parliamentary. This article suggests how this power to make byelaws in chartered corporations may apply to chartered universities, noting the difficulties arising from the allegedly eleemosynary nature of these bodies and from the possible coexistence of statutory powers. It then examines the way in which the contract between a student and a university arises, and how this contract may form the legal basis of student rules, whether these rules are conceived as terms of the contract itself or as expressions of a unilateral power in the university arising from the contract. A subsequent article will compare the review of student rules on the grounds of public law principle and of contractual regulation. (shrink)

A year ago, the "Draft Common Frame of Reference" was published for the first time in an interim outline edition. Now we proudly present the final outline edition of the DCFR. - revision of the already published text to take account of the public discussion - major new topics covered - an additional section on the principles underlying the model rules - revised and expanded list of definitions The six-volume full edition of the DCFR including all comments and notes (...) will be published in October 2009. (shrink)

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an (...) independently developed argument in §§243ff of PI, as most commentators take it to be. In this work, I assess Kripke’s skeptical argument both in its own right, and as an interpretation of the rule-following sections of PI. In its own right, I try to show that it is critically flawed. However, as an interpretation of the rule-following sections of PI, I try to show that it is essentially correct. I do this by showing that Kripke’s interpretation squares with and supports the meta-philosophical framework developed by Wittgenstein in §§107-136 of PI, which immediately precedes his remarks on following-a-rule. (Oct 16, 2008. Committee: Paul Horwich, Galen Strawson, Stephen Neale, Michael Levin) -/- . (shrink)

Oddity One : Kripke claims that Wittgenstein has invented "a new form of scepticism", one which inclines Kripke "to regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced" (K, p. 60). However, Kripke also claims that there are analogies (and sometimes the analogies look very much like identities) between Wittgenstein's sceptical argument and the work of at least three and maybe four (...) other philosophers, viz., Quine, Goodman, Hume and Berkeley. Strange stuff indeed. The originality of Wittgenstein's work is especially difficult to see after Kripke claims that Wittgenstein presents a problem concerning the nexus between past . . . 'meanings' and present practice" (K, p. 62), and says that Hume is said to have questioned "the causal nexus whereby a past event necessitates a future one, and the inductive inferential nexus from the past to the future." (K, p. 62). Whither the originality? And the connection with Goodman's work with 'grue' is even closer than that between Kripke's Wittgenstein and Hume. Given that Kripke had read Goodman before "discovering" the rule-following paradox in Wittgenstein, one ought to be sceptical of Kripke's claim that Wittgenstein has invented a new form of scepticism. It would be much more accurate to say that Kripke has strapped Wittgenstein with a hybrid scepticism drawn from Hume and Goodman. (shrink)

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is very much a work on Wittgenstein's epistemology, not on his philosophy of mind. Kripke focuses on Wittgenstein's account, principally set out in sections 1-242 of Philosophical Investigations, of our grasp of concepts and our ability to apply them; he discusses Wittgenstein's views about such topics as imagination, sensations, and consciousness only in passing as they bear on the former topic.

In this paper, we analyze Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s arguments against epistemic privacy. The main focus of the paper is to explore their views on this issue and examine the connections between their argumentation and that of Saul Kripke to see to what extent these views coincide. The reason for comparing the said authors is that they all oppose the received view of the argument against private language, which claims that the discussion of private language (...) begins with PI 243. In fact, these philosophers claim that Wittgenstein already discussed the issue of the impossibility of a private language in his rule–following reflections, especially in PI 201 and 202. We will also explore some drawbacks of the interpretation of Wittgenstein offered by the Hintikkas and attempt to provide an overall perspective of the viability of their position in relation to Wittgenstein’s argument against epistemic privacy. (shrink)

The implementation of transnational standards — in codes of conduct, certification, and monitoring initiatives — necessarily intertwines with domestic law and other types of rules. Yet much of the existing literature overlooks or obscures this fundamental point. Indeed, scholars often err either by treating private regulatory standards as transcendent or by viewing implementation as fundamentally a technical problem. This Article argues that understanding the operation of transnational private regulation requires attention to the layering of multiple rules (...) in a given location. It develops a framework for examining this layering and illustrates it by briefly looking at two major issues—community rights in sustainable forestry standards and freedom of association in fair labor standards — and their implementation in Indonesia. In various ways, these domains illustrate how conflict and complementarity between public and private standards structure the practice of private regulation. (shrink)

I. Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical Investigations p)I 38 — 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy (...) to explain why. To begin with, the dialectic Kripke uncovered from Wittgenstein's.. (shrink)

I first distinguish issues about rules and issues about language in Wittgenstein. I then I distinguish private and private rules and argue that there can be private rules because norms of reasoning are private rules. I suggest that Wittgenstein may have equated rules with public rules. I end with reflections on private language.

This article examines the power relationship between the prime minister and ruling party legislators. I theoretically explore the power relationship between the prime minister and ruling party legislators, and examine legislators' parliamentary voting, focusing on the political process of postal service privatization of 2005. This analysis presents three arguments. First, theoretically, when the prime minister attempts to achieve a project, risking his or her job, he or she can firmly control ruling party legislators. Second, empirically, the anti-Koizumi legislators' rebellion was (...) based on their unfounded assumption about the prime minister's behavior or ultimate outcomes. Third, the anti-Koizumi legislators' electoral incentives to secure their reelection and ruling incentives to weaken or overthrow the Koizumi Cabinet drove them to rebel against the prime minister in the Lower House, while the ruling incentives alone caused the rebellion in the Upper House. (shrink)

This article recalls the fact that until the mid-19th century neither company legislation, nor jurists, nor economists, envisioned companies to be private or small. Nevertheless, once freedom of incorporation and general limited liability were enacted, a new practice was set in motion in Britain. Smaller companies were formed in growing numbers, replacing partnerships, family firms and even sole proprietorships. They operated in sectors in which corporations had not been found before. These companies did not seek access to the stock (...) markets. The article tracks the take-up pattern and changing characteristics of the corporate form in Britain between the enactment of free incorporation and general limited liability (1844–62) and the formal legal recognition of the private company (1907). It shows the dramatic increase in annual incorporation and the parallel decrease in the average capital and average number of shareholders in newly formed companies. The article then analyses the reasons for the decision of businesspersons to incorporate their small firms. The main motivations were the possibility to create asset partitioning between personal and business assets and the ability to use the floating charge. Finally, the article examines the legal reaction to the bottom up emergence of the private company. It examines the reactions of the courts (in the famous Salomon v Salomon case) and of the legislature to this unpredicted practice. It argues that incorporators and their lawyers used the available contractual flexibility to privately design Articles of Association and to adjust them to the specific needs of private and small companies, often by introducing partnership internal governance rules into company Articles. The present study relies on newly gathered data on the take-up of the company form and a newly produced sample of company files collected at Companies House and the National Archives. (shrink)

Why government outsourcing of public powers is making us less free Many governmental functions today—from the management of prisons and welfare offices to warfare and financial regulation—are outsourced to private entities. Education and health care are funded in part through private philanthropy rather than taxation. Can a privatized government rule legitimately? The Privatized State argues that it cannot. In this boldly provocative book, Chiara Cordelli argues that privatization constitutes a regression to a precivil condition—what philosophers centuries ago called (...) "a state of nature." Developing a compelling case for the democratic state and its administrative apparatus, she shows how privatization reproduces the very same defects that Enlightenment thinkers attributed to the precivil condition, and which only properly constituted political institutions can overcome—defects such as provisional justice, undue dependence, and unfreedom. Cordelli advocates for constitutional limits on privatization and a more democratic system of public administration, and lays out the central responsibilities of private actors in contexts where governance is already extensively privatized. Charting a way forward, she presents a new conceptual account of political representation and novel philosophical theories of democratic authority and legitimate lawmaking. The Privatized State shows how privatization undermines the very reason political institutions exist in the first place, and advocates for a new way of administering public affairs that is more democratic and just. (shrink)