As Avatar: The Last Airbender concludes, Aang faces an ethical challenge. Philosopher Terrance McConnell notes that many people think of ethical dilemmas as occurring when a person “regards herself as having moral reasons to do each of two actions, but doing both actions is not possible”. Air Nomads live a quasi‐monastic life of non‐attachment, peace, and freedom. Aang, as an Air Nomad, is generally portrayed as deeply compassionate, even as he struggles with having to grow up in wartime. (...) In contrast to Sublime Ahimsic Practice, Avataric philosophy pulls its inspiration from a different source. Aang's dilemma seems to be genuine: his Avataric duties and Air Nomadic beliefs prescribe non‐negotiable obligations that pull in different directions. Sublime Ahimsic Practice aims to remind us that we are all worthy of being treated like we are worth giving a chance. (shrink)

Buddhist Monastic Life, according to the texts of the Theravada tradition. Mohan Wijayaratna, trans. Claude Grangier and Steve Collins, introd. Steve Collins. Cambridge University Press, 1990. xxiv + 190 pp. H/back £27.50, US$37.50, Aus$45.00; p/back £8.95, US$10.95, Aus$22.50.

In Monastic Life in Medieval Daoism, a senior scholar of Daoist studies presents for the first time a detailed description and analysis of the organization and practices of medieval Daoist monasteries. Following an introduction to the wider, comparative issues involved in the study of monasticism, Livia Kohn outlines the origin, history, conceptual understanding, and social position of the monasteries, which came into their own early in the Tang dynasty. She examines texts from this period along with the architectural layout (...) of Daoist monasteries, the daily discipline and interpersonal etiquette of monks and nuns, their implements and vestments, as well as the liturgical dimension of monastic life. Throughout, Professor Kohn maintains a high comparative level, linking the Daoist situation and practices not only with Chinese popular, Confucian, Buddhist, and lay Daoist traditions, but also with relevant examples from Indian Buddhism and medieval Christianity. Monastic Life in Medieval Daoism breaks new ground in Daoist studies, the understanding of Chinese religion and medieval society, and the theoretical understanding and interpretation of the comparative phenomenon of monasticism. It will be required reading for scholars of Daoist studies and Chinese religion and medieval history and illuminating to experts in comparative religion and religious studies in general as well as to the wider public interested in questions of monastic life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Latin Lay Piety in an Islamic Context:The Development of the Third Order Community of St. Mary's of Mt. Sion in Mamluk Jerusalem1Jon Paul Heyne (bio)In the spring of 1353, roughly half a century after the Latin world's loss of Acre, the Florentine lady Sofia degli Arcangeli purchased lands in Mamluk Jerusalem for the establishment of a pilgrim hospital run by a group of select companions.2 Thus began the Latin (...) hospice of St. Mary's of Mt. Sion. For twenty years under Sofia's direction, the foundation obtained numerous privileges from the popes until suddenly, in 1375, Gregory XI denounced Sofia, forbidding her continued association with the hospital. Shortly thereafter, care of St. Mary's fell into the hands of a community of Franciscan friars living in Jerusalem—members of the recently formed Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land—who in turn established various regulations for the workers at the hospital, identified simply as women (mulieres) of the hospice.3 By the fifteenth century, the community at St. Mary's was transformed into a female house of Third Order Franciscans directly under the authority of the Custody, which, [End Page 33] for its own part, had adopted the regular Observance sub vicariis of the Franciscan order.The story of Sofia's hospital and its associated house of workers raises important questions regarding the relationship of penitential lay communities to the papacy and to the mendicant orders in the late medieval period. At first glance, St. Mary's appears simply to have encountered the same fate of many quasi-religious groups in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; driven by papal, clerical, and Observant efforts to establish uniformity and avoid heresy among lay penitents, the hospice fell under the supervision of the Franciscans, and the women living and working there were made tertiary members of the friars' order. Was, however, this clerical interest in regulating penitential groups the primary driving force in the development and transformation of Sofia's hospital? How did the hospital's location in Jerusalem, a city under Islamic rule, influence the dynamics that formed between Sofia and the popes and between the community at St. Mary's and the nearby Franciscan monastery? I argue that both the popes' changing relationship with Sofia and the formation of closer ties between the hospice community in Jerusalem and the Franciscan Custody had as much or more to do with the opportunities and challenges presented by the hospital's position as a Latin establishment in the Mamluk Empire as it did with clerical preoccupations to promote uniformity in the late medieval Church. Thus, the history of St. Mary's expands upon recent scholarly understandings of the creation of the third orders, offering a view of these tertiary communities within the wider scope of Muslim-Christian relations in the Mediterranean.Before examining the history of St. Mary's, I offer a brief overview of recent scholarship on female tertiary communities.4 Traditional narratives on the Franciscan Third Order assert that the tertiaries officially began with St. Francis or at the very least with the creation of an "order of penitents" through the 1289 bull Supra montem.5 Several studies have challenged this older interpretation, describing the formation of the Third [End Page 34] Order Franciscans as a much messier and less coherent process spanning the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries.6 According to some of the most recent revisionist approaches, female penitential establishments first fell under increased clerical scrutiny and canonical regulation in the late thirteenth century and early fourteenth centuries.7 Nonetheless, despite such ecclesiastical efforts to conform penitential groups to more traditional forms of religious life—by requiring enclosure, a rule, and the direct association with an existing order—many lay communities remained merely quasi-religious and even those that adopted Supra montem as a "rule" were only superficially connected to the Franciscan friars. Indeed neither the lay communities nor the friars were typically interested in a more official or direct association, and the adoption of Supra montem was primarily a means by which female penitents put on the façade of a regulated monastic lifestyle so as to evade potential accusations that they were inappropriately... (shrink)

This article challenges the belief – popular in modern scholarship – in the predominantly lay character of monastic communities before the 7th century. A closer look at the early 6th century Life of the Jura Fathers shows monasteries rich in monks who were at the same time presbyters and deacons. The paper investigates the reasons behind the clerical ordinations of monks and examines the various roles of presbyters and deacons in their monasteries. Finally, it considers the ways in which (...) the ordained monks could have destabilized the community and the measures employed to counter their negative influence. (shrink)

What is a rule, if it appears to become confused with life? And what is a human life, if, in every one of its gestures, of its words, and of its silences, it cannot be distinguished from the rule? It is to these questions that Agamben's new book turns by means of an impassioned reading of the fascinating and massive phenomenon of Western monasticism from Pachomius to St. Francis. The book reconstructs in detail the life of the (...) monks with their obsessive attention to temporal articulation and to the Rule, to ascetic techniques and to liturgy. But Agamben's thesis is that the true novelty of monasticism lies not in the confusion between life and norm, but in the discovery of a new dimension, in which "life" as such, perhaps for the first time, is affirmed in its autonomy, and in which the claim of the "highest poverty" and "use" challenges the law in ways that we must still grapple with today. How can we think a form-of-life, that is, a human life released from the grip of law, and a use of bodies and of the world that never becomes an appropriation? How can we think life as something not subject to ownership but only for common use? (shrink)

This article explores the extent to which Christian traditions, especially the monastic way of life, possess a transformative potential toward a socio-ecological society. Christian ideas are not unbroken utopias, but they possess an eschatological proviso based on God's otherness. Neither is monastic life a prefiguration of the Kingdom of God, nor do Christians or the Church prefigure a heavenly society, but Christian action and religious communities can be regarded as forms of _refigurative practice_, which can fail again and (...) again without losing hope. This article describes the relationship between niche and transformation, between monastic cell and utopia, as such a refigurative practice. (shrink)

By the late 1830s, John Henry Newman and Edward Bouverie Pusey were discussing the re-introduction of monastic/religious life into the Church of England. Though Newman did not remain in the Church of England long enough to see the full flowering of this effort, his writings as an Anglican theologian reveal that he viewed the monastic/religious life as a central way in which a person could grow in holiness and also a means of fostering the holiness of the Church (...) as a whole. (shrink)

Through the examination of the lives of several immortal beings, this paper defends a version of Moritz Schlick’s claim that the meaning of life is play. More precisely: a person’s life has meaning to the extent it there are things in it that the person values intrinsically rather than merely instrumentally and above a certain threshold of intensity. This is a subjectivist account of meaning in life. I defend subjectivism about meaning in life from common objections (...) by understanding statements about life’s meaning in quasi-realist terms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Gethsemani Encounter: A Dialogue on the Spiritual Life by Buddhist and Christian MonasticsDavid G. HackettThe Gethsemani Encounter: A Dialogue on the Spiritual Life by Buddhist and Christian Monastics. Edited by Donald W. Mitchell and James Wiseman, O.S.B. New York: Continuum, 1997. 306 pp.Ever since the landmark meeting of Thomas Merton and the Dalai Lama in 1968, the Christian and Buddhist contemplative communities have been building toward (...) the kind of deeply spiritual encounter that is so ably narrated in this book. For five days in July of 1996, a pantheon of advanced spiritual practitioners, led by the Dalai Lama, met at Thomas Merton’s monastery in Kentucky to dialogue on the spiritual life. The resulting exchanges provided not only mutual aid on the spiritual journey but were themselves a spiritual path. In recounting this meeting, The Gethsemani Encounter marks a watershed in the spiritual dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism. [End Page 232]A history of interfaith contacts and the deeply spiritual character of intermonastic dialogue prepared the way for the success of this historic encounter. In 1978, ten years after the death of Thomas Merton, two dialogue commissions were created: the “Monastic Interreligious Dialogue” (MID) in North America, and the “Dialogue Inter-Monastic” (DIM) in Europe. These commissions fostered a rapid expansion in the number of nuns and monks engaged in interfaith dialogue. Christian monastics spent time living in Tibetan and Zen monasteries in the East, and Buddhist nuns and monks were guests of Christian monasteries in the West. These encounters gradually evolved into a profound discussion of the spiritual life in all its nuances and its implications for humankind.The inspiration for the Gethsemani Encounter came from the Dalai Lama. At the Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993, during a morning session on “Emptiness and Kenosis,” the Tibetan leader suggested that the conversation continue in a monastic setting. His idea was to gather a small group of mature Buddhist and Christian monastics who are teachers of spirituality. They would dialogue about the practice of spirituality and its value for the world in a setting where they could also live, meditate, and celebrate together.A variety of Buddhists reflecting the diversity of contemporary Buddhist practices were invited to Gethsemani. These included Theravadin, Zen, and Tibetan monks from Asia and lay leaders from the emerging American Buddhist communities. Efforts were made to include women’s voices from each tradition. Most of the Buddhists who came to Gethsemani were living in Buddhist communities in the United States. The hope was that this meeting would catalyze future local encounters between Buddhist and Christian spiritual communities.The Christian monastics were primarily drawn from Benedictine and Trappist MID board members or advisors from Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia. Invited as well were the abbot general of the Trappist Order, the head of the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, and Bishop Joseph Gerry, O.S.B., to represent the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. The MID advisors also included some priests and lay practitioners—Catholic and Protestant—with experience in Buddhist dialogue. In the end, twenty-five Christian and twenty-five Buddhist spiritual leaders were invited to the Gethsemani Encounter by MID and the Dalai Lama.Reading through the talks and dialogues that compose this book provides an opportunity to enter into the spiritual adventure of discovery experienced by the participants. The first part presents the twenty-five short talks that were given during morning, afternoon, and evening sessions over the four full days of the encounter. Each of these talks was intended to provide a short and insightful glimpse into the dynamics of Buddhist and Christian spirituality. For students of the Buddhist-Christian dialogue, much of this material is familiar. But two elements are new: first, the variety of Buddhist and Christian perspectives that are brought to bear on such topics as “prayer and meditation” (where three different Buddhist and two Christian approaches are considered), and second, the organization of this material into six chapters that move outward from prayer to community to spirituality and society. As [End Page 233] the book progresses, there is a palpable movement away from comparative analysis for the sake... (shrink)

Monasteries were famous for their extensive libraries and richly decorated churches. Less well known are their observatories and their mathematical-physical collections with telescopes, air pumps, and friction machines. But how did the way of life in the monastery and scientific practices influence each other? This paper examines the interaction of scientific practices and religious way of life using the example of southern German monasteries in the second half of the eighteenth century. It shows how the monks pragmatically linked (...) monastic life and research practice, thereby forming their own specific scientific culture. This closes an important gap in the understanding of scholarship in the eighteenth century by foregrounding the monasteries as places of knowledge production, which have so far received little attention alongside universities and academies. (shrink)

In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired (...) by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief. (shrink)

The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status (...) of our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts. (shrink)

This article examines the monastic diet during the high and late medieval periods. The evolution of this central aspect of daily life gives us greater insight into contemplative monks’ increasing worldliness. Monks not only fell short of their forefathers’ ideals, but also of their own codes of behavior. Their diet gradually became more akin to that of noblemen than to that of their ancient brothers and sisters. Frugality and temperance all too often gave way to indulgence and debauchery. Days (...) on which one should have expected to endure the austerity of fasting were sometimes more reminiscent of the lavishness of feasts. In addition to mead, merriment, and music, meat invaded the cloister. (shrink)

Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, such as whether euthanasia is permissible or whether utilitarianism is true. However, accommodating the phenomenon of degrees of normative certitude is a difficult challenge for non-cognitivist and expressivist views, according to which normative judgements are desire-like attitudes rather than beliefs. Several attempts have been made on behalf of non-cognitivism and (...) expressivism to meet the challenge Studies in metaethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Sepielli in Philos Stud 160: 191–207, 2012; Eriksson and Francén Olinder in Aust J Philos 94: 719–735, 2016). These attempts have all been found wanting. Michael Ridge has recently offered a quasi-realist solution, according to which expressivists can say exactly what cognitivists say about certitude, including normative certitude. In this paper, we explain the basic problem and Ridge’s quasi-realist solution. We then argue that the quasi-realist account of normative certitude faces severe difficulties that do not arise for cognitivist accounts, according to which normative judgements are beliefs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Origins of Buddhist Monastic Codes in China: An Annotated Translation and Study of the Chanyuan QingguiMario PoceskiThe Origins of Buddhist Monastic Codes in China: An Annotated Translation and Study of the Chanyuan Qinggui. By Yifa. Kuroda Institute, Classics in East Asian Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002. Pp. xxiii + 352.Despite the central place of monasticism in the historical development of Chinese Buddhism, studies on the (...) topic, with some prominent exceptions, are not as developed as other aspects of Chinese Buddhist history. Rev. Yifa's excellent book on the Chinese Buddhist monastic codes, The Origins of Buddhist Monastic Codes in China: An Annotated Translation and Study of the Chanyuan Qinggui, goes a long way toward rectifying this situation. This book provides a wealth of information on the production of texts about monastic discipline and the institutional history of Chinese Buddhism, as well as a reliable translation of the Chanyuan qinggui (Rules of purity for Chan monasteries), compiled in 1103, the oldest comprehensive monastic code produced by the Chan school. As someone with a background in both the religious and academic worlds, Yifa (an abbess in the Foguang Shan order with a Ph.D. from Yale), brings to the subject a high level of scholarship and keen sensitivity to the intricacies of monastic life and institutions. As an end product of her comprehensive research into monastic literature and other pertinent sources, this book (based on her 1996 Ph.D. dissertation) makes an important contribution to Buddhist studies by helping to illuminate the institutional history of Chinese [End Page 499] Buddhism up to the Song period (960-1279), thereby reshaping our understanding of the evolution of monasticism in China and the place of the Chan school in that protracted process.The first part of the book is a historical overview of the development of monastic regulations during roughly the first millennium of Chinese Buddhist history. This provides a broad context for understanding the emergence, contents, and functions of Chan monastic codes such as the Chanyuan qinggui. The first half of chapter 1 surveys the history of Chinese engagements with the Vinaya (the canonical code of monastic discipline) and the growth of associated textual production, which included translations of and commentaries on the Vinayas of various schools of Indian Buddhism and the creation of related works by Chinese monks. The Chinese texts include monastic codes and instruction manuals created by noted monks such as Daoan (312-385), Huiyuan (334-416), and Zhiyi (538-597). Such texts were meant to supplement the Vinaya and provide sets of regulations and guidelines for a range of issues and procedures relevant to the pursuit of monastic life in medieval China.The second half of the chapter contextualizes the Chan school's involvement in the production of monastic legislation, first by commenting on the legend concerning Baizhang Huaihai's (749-814) creation of the first Chan monastic code (see below), which, according to tradition, signaled the Chan school's move toward institutional independence, and then by surveying the subsequent legacy and influence of the Chanyuan qinggui in China and Japan (but not Korea).The second chapter discuses major influences that shaped the monastic rules and practices codified in the Chanyuan qinggui. The first key area of influence was the Vinaya texts and traditions. The author shows how many of the rules included in the Chan code can be traced back to Indian precedents, especially Vinaya rules. Accordingly, the Chan regulations often represented the continuation of received traditions rather than original developments unique to the Chan school. The second key area was the influence of Chinese culture, which included the various strategies used by the imperial state to exert control over the monastic order, and a plethora of Chinese ritual practices and patterns of social interaction that the author lumps under the category of "Confucian ritual" (a broad characterization that perhaps should be reconsidered). This is arguably the most creative part of the book. Yifa's careful analysis does an excellent job of placing the emergence of Chan monastic codes in relation to the relevant religious and historical milieus. Doing this undermines normative/traditional views about Chan's uniqueness and independence, instead... (shrink)

Bradley N. Seeman charges that my book, The End of Apologetics: Christian Witness in a Postmodern Context, tends toward “the idolatry of linguistic license.” I point out some ways this runs against the text of the book and then outline a Wittgensteinian approach to language and truth that is alethically “quasi-realist.” On this view truth is both epistemic, or deflationary, in the sense that it depends upon assertability conditions for its truth values, while there is also a nonepistemic, realist component (...) to truth in that these assertability conditions derive from forms of life that involve precognitive involvement with extralinguistic affairs. (shrink)

Corporate codes of ethics, which have spread in the last decades, have shown a limited ability to foster ethical behaviors. For instance, they have been criticized for relying too much on formal compliance, rather than taking into account sufficiently agents and their moral development, or promoting self-reflexive behaviors. We aim here at showing that a code of ethics in fact has meaning and enables ethical progress when it is interpreted and appropriated with practical wisdom. We explore a model that represents (...) an uncommon organizational code of ethics: the monastic Rule of St. Benedict, written in the sixth century and still used today. Our empirical study—conducted in several monasteries living under this rule—shows that organization members interpret this rule, both hermeneutically and ethically, to adapt it to situations. They also appropriate this rule as a way of life and treat it as a dynamic framework that helps them to follow their purpose within their organization. This exceptional code actually offers an alternative model for practicing codes of ethics, in a virtue-ethical manner, beyond mere compliance with the text. The way in which reflexive and active agents practice the code, both individually and collectively, shapes their organizational experience and fosters their moral development. (shrink)

Through an approach primarily inspired by the Aisthetik (Gernot Böhme) and the Neue Phänomenologie (Hermann Schmitz) I define the atmospheric perception as the first pathic impression and investigate the relationship between this kind of perception (possibly initially immersive, then reflective) and the expressive qualities of our lifeworld. Pathic aesthetics therefore ceases to be just a theory of works of art. It considers the perceiver as a being first of all emotionally and felt-bodily touched by atmospheric feelings widespread in her (lived) (...) space but these atmospheric feelings are also affordances, ontologically rooted in things and quasi-things of her lifeworld. By exploring how she unintentionally exposes herself to what happens in this lifeworld, man turns out to be not a “subject of something” but rather a “subject to something”: a human being who is “sovereign” to the extent she is free from the claim of rational autonomy imposed by the western Modernity. (shrink)

Actuality of theme. At the end of the XX century, the religious life of Ukraine has undergone significant transformations. With the collapse of the totalitarian regime and the gaining of independence by Ukraine, religious communities were in a new socio-political and socio-cultural environment for themselves. There was a significant increase in the role of religious institutions in the development of civil society.

Eros Corazza presents a fascinating investigation of the role that indexicals play in our thought. Indexicality is crucial to the understanding of such puzzling issues as the nature of the self, the nature of perception, social interaction, psychological pathologies, and psychological development. Corazza draws on work from philosophy, linguistics, and psychology to illuminate this key aspect of the relation between mind and world. By highlighting how indexical thoughts are irreducible and intrinsically perspectival, Corazza shows how we can depict someone else's (...) indexical thought from a third-person perspective. The phenomenon of quasi-indexicality is introduced here: to represent Jane saying, "I am prosperous", we use what Castañeda termed a quasi-indicator in a report of the form "Jane said that she is prosperous". Corazza argues that quasi-indicators play such an important role in our linguistic, social, and psychological life that they have a cognitive primacy over other mechanisms of reference. Quasi-indexicality also emerges as a key notion when we come to consider our ability to understand other minds. Corazza argues that indexicality and quasi-indexicality are two sides of the same coin, best understood within the framework of direct reference. (shrink)

Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life or radical phenomenology understands life as immanent and transcendental affectivity. From this point of view, ethics can be characterized as the ethics of affectivity, the central stake of which lies in the recognition of life. However, the question is to what extent a philosophical discourse can be held on a reality that, being immanent, is principally inaccessible for intentionality and how such discourse is in fact possible. As radical phenomenology relies on certainty (...) opposed to evidence, it can be shown that both the possibility and the practical effectiveness of its discourse are ultimately rooted in life’s self-revelation. Henry’s works may then be understood as mediation towards the recognition of life, especially through the concepts of quasi-performativity and translation. (shrink)

Massimiliano Simons provides the first systematic study of Serres' work in the context of late 20th-century French philosophy of science. By proposing new readings of Serres' philosophy, Simons creates a synthesis between his predecessors, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Louis Althusser as well as contemporary Francophone philosophers of science such as Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers. Simons situates Serres' unique contribution through his notion of the quasi-object, a concept, he argues, organizes great parts of Serres' work into a promising philosophy (...) of science as well as a challenge to the narrower field of French epistemology, to which it has often been limited. Simons highlights how the concept encompasses Serres' commitment to positive relations between science and culture and his rejection of pleas to purify the scientific self from imaginative and cultural elements. It helps to situate Serres between the distinct traditions of Bachelard and Latour as well as progressing the innovative aspects of Serres' philosophy for current debates in the philosophy, history, and sociology of science. Showing how Serres' philosophy can serve as a normative approach to science and technology, Michel Serres and French Philosophy of Science takes in themes of materiality, religiosity, modernity and ecology to advance a timely alternative to philosophy of science for contemporary life. (shrink)

Books reviewed:Renate Egger‐Wenzel, Ben Sira's GodPaul J. Achtemeier, Joel B. Green and Marianne Meye Thompson, Introducing the New Testament, Its Literature and TheologyI. Boxall, Revelation: Vision and Insight. An Introduction to the ApocalypseS. Moyise, Studies in the Book of RevelationG. R. Osborne, Revelation: The Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New TestamentN. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of GodGillian Clark and T. Rajak, Philosophy and Power in the Graeco‐Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam GriffinRichard Paul Vaggione, Eunomius of (...) Cyzicus and the Nicene RevolutionStephen T. Davies, Daniel Kendall S. J. and Gerald O'Collins, The Incarnation. An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of GodRichard Cross, The Metaphysics of the IncarnationHugh Connolly, SinAnthony W. Bartlett, Cross Purposes: The Violent Grammar of Christian AtonementStanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church's Witness and Natural TheologySarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and GenderChristopher Cocksworth and Rosalind Brown, Being a Priest Today: Exploring priestly identityRandall Balmer, Encyclopedia of EvangelicalismKate Armstrong, Crisis and RepetitionAnthony A. Barrett, Livia: First Lady of Imperial RomeGerhard Podskalsky, Von Photios zu Bessarion: Der Vorrang humanistisch geprägter Theologie in Byzanz und deren bleibende BedeutungNicola Coldstream, Medieval ArchitectureW. J. Armstrong, J. A. W. Hellmann and W. Short, Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, IIIEllen E. Kittell and Thomas F. Madden, Medieval and Renaissance VeniceTheodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historisch‐systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und PhilosophieAndrew Brown, Church and Society in England, 1000–1500Renate Blumenfeld‐Kosinski, Duncan Robertson, and Nancy Warren, The Vernacular Spirit: Essays on Medieval Religious LiteratureBarry Collett, Female Monastic Life in Early Tudor England, with an Edition of Richard Fox's Translation of the Benedictine Rule for Women, 1517Marc R. Forster, The Catholic Revival in the Age of the Baroque. Religious Identity in Southwest Germany, 1550–1750W. R. Ward, Christianity under the Ancien Régime 1648–1789Nigel Aston, Religion and Revolution in France 1780–1804Catharine Edwards, Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture, 1789–1945Bruce L. Kinzer, England's Disgrace? J. S. Mill and the Irish QuestionJohn Corrigan, Business of the Heart: Religion and Emotion in the Nineteenth CenturyPeter M. Chisnall, John Henry Cardinal Newman: A Man of Courage, Conflict and ConvictionVincent Ferrer Blehl, Pilgrim Journey: John Henry Newman 1801–1845Kester Aspden, Fortress Church. The English Roman Catholic Bishops and Politics 1903–63David Alvarez, Spies In The Vatican: Espionage and Intrigue From Napoleon to the HolocaustPeter McDonough and Eugene C. Bianchi, Passionate Uncertainty: Inside the American JesuitsRuby Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues. (shrink)

This paper compares the Cīvaravastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya with its counterparts in the other four Sthavira Vinayas, namely the Cīvarakkhandhaka/Cīvaradharma[ka] sections of the Vinayas of the Theravādins, Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas and Sarvāstivādins. It demonstrates that a significant number of stories and rules in the Cīvaravastu have no parallel in the other Sthavira Vinayas. Even those stories and rules that have parallels or partial parallels in the other Sthavira Vinayas can still offer us glimpses into the distinctive concerns of the Mūlasarvāstivādin (...) jurists who wrote or redacted this text. Based on three comparative tables and two examples, this paper argues that the Mūlasarvāstivādin authors/redactors of the Cīvaravastu, contrasted with the jurists of other Sthavira sects or schools, displayed at least five characteristics. First, they shared some common narrative lore with the Śvetāmbara Jainas, which is not found in the other Sthavira Vinayas. Second, they showed a stronger predilection for including past-life stories. Third, they repeatedly used the learned-but-greedy monk Upananda to create comic effect. Fourth, they were strongly and explicitly concerned with a wider range of legal issues related to Buddhist monastic inheritance, and came up with detailed solutions to such issues. Fifth, they showed a more acute awareness of the connection between monastic clothing and public image, as well as the need for thoroughly differentiating the appearance of Buddhist monks from that of other religious groups in ancient India. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aquinas and Dōgen on Entrance into the Religious LifeDouglas K. MikkelsonComparative studies of Christianity and Buddhism have the potential to draw on a wide array of dialogic partners from their respective histories. Two promising candidates are Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Dōgen (1200–1253). Aquinas was the angelic doctor whose theological thinking became normative for Roman Catholicism; Dōgen was the prominent Zen master whose influence on the intellectual development of Zen (...) Buddhism is unsurpassed. As it happens, both men "entered into the religious life," and within their respective collected works we see considerable attention to the topic. If we seek to explore what they had to say on the subject, we might benefit by identifying some texts from both thinkers that could serve as focal points for a comparative analysis. Of the massive accumulated writings of both men, the largest are Aquinas's Summa Theologiae and Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō. So it seems logical to start our search by turning our attention to these monumental works.Let us begin with the Summa Theologiae. In the secunda secundae Aquinas addresses a total of 189 topics presented in a question-and-answer format. The first 170 topics concern "themes related to all stations of life"; questions 171–189 explore "details related to particular callings" (2a2ae, Prologus). Question 189, hereinafter identified as 2a2ae q. 189, is specifically devoted to the topic of "entering the religious life" (de ingressu religionis).1When we turn to the Shōbōgenzō, we find a work titled Shukke Kudoku. "Kudoku" means "merit"; "shukke," commonly translated as "leaving home," denotes a person who has renounced home and family in order to enter monastic life. Thus "Shukke Kudoku" can be rendered in English as "The Merit of Entering the Religious Life."2Given that these texts are relatively accessible and substantive presentations of comparable length on issues pertaining to the religious life, they seem to be good focal points for this discussion. At the same time, both thinkers addressed the subject in other venues also, and we can briefly refer to this material as well. But in this article I will primarily concentrate on how a comparative analysis of these two texts illuminates the subject. Defining the discussion in this fashion has the advantage of presenting Aquinas's and Dōgen's views in a particular time and place, leaving aside the more complex issue of how their views may have changed over time. [End Page 109]Let us begin with Aquinas. Aquinas begins 2a2ae q. 189 by outlining ten points of inquiry to be pursued, in effect dividing the question into ten subquestions. The first on the list is "whether those alone should enter religious life who are practiced in keeping the commandments." The commandments he means, of course, are the precepts of the decalogue, the Ten Commandments of Exodus 20:17 and Deut. 5:6–21.Aquinas's standard modus operandi was to first entertain arguments leading to aconclusion opposing his own. In this question he outlines five lines of argument, and in each instance the arguments lead to the assertion that one should not practice the counsels "until one is practiced in keeping the commandments" (nisi prius sit exercitatus in praeceptis); by "counsels" Aquinas means the observance of poverty, chastity, and obedience that are undertaken by those who enter the religious life. As he had explained previously, "The difference between a counsel and a precept lies in this, that a precept implies necessity, while a counsel is left to the choice of the one to whom it is given" (1a2ae q. 108.4).3 Precepts such as the commandments, in other words, enjoin an obligation; counsels are optional.We will discover Aquinas's own answer soon, but we should first note how Aquinas begins his discussion of entrance into the religious life. He begins by posing a question about whether or not one practiced in keeping the commandments should enter the religious life. In the course of answering his own question, he essentially reframes it, seeking to explore whether or not one should practice the counsels before one has become adept at keeping the commandments. For Aquinas, both formulations... (shrink)

The ideas of thinkers belonging to the subjective or existential understanding, including Pascal, or people with mystical orientation are presented in a way that is compatible with different periods of their lives. We can see this in Pascal's short life, from scientific research to society meetings and then to monastic life. Pascal, who was a mystic and initially opposed to living in a monastery, thought of the crisis he experienced in changing his life as a sign. Pascal's (...) work Pensées is considered as a source that leads to philosophical thoughts as well as religious ones. In his work, Pascal tried to reveal the relationship between God and human wills, including conceptual analysis. This situation is related to the period in which the work was written and the author was in. Therefore, without knowing Pascal's life periods, it cannot be fully understood what he was trying to express, especially in his late works. With his work, Pascal showed that it was possible for a person to be both an excellent mathematician, a profound scientist, and a humble believer. Pascal's next period includes the previous one; We saw that while he was a good mathematician, he was also interested in science, and while he was a religious person, he used the principles of mathematics and science. He did not separate the elements encompassed that his life in an intellectual sense, but continued by combining them and changing their places of importance. After all, the essence of what Pascal is looking for is to find out what motivates people or what makes people human. In this article, the mental, material and spiritual areas expressed as Pascal's life stages will be discussed and examined as dialectical stages of his life. As a result, the nature of the relationship between religion and science will be tried to be shown with the example of Pascal. (shrink)

In Life Beyond the Gene, Steven Rose offers a theory of life which insists that we as humans -- and indeed all living creatures -- create our own futures, though in circumstances not of our own choosing. Placing the organism at the center of life, Rose confronts the ideology of reductionism and ultra-Darwinism, with its insistence that all aspects of human life from sexual preference to infanticide, political orientation to violence, male domination to alcoholism, are in (...) our genes and are the inevitable consequences of natural selection. These claims, Rose asserts, are not only socially naive, but fundamentally misunderstand the active and irreducible nature of living processes. Rose argues that life depends on the elaborate web of interactions that occur within cells, organisms, and ecosystems, in which DNA has one part to play. From early in their development, living organisms have to be capable of quasi-independent existence while growing to maturity. If we are to understand life, we must recapture an understanding of the entire living organism and its trajectory through time and space. Rose calls these trajectories lifelines. Provocative and incisive, Life Beyond the Gene provides a compelling response to those enthusiasts of the gene who would deny the complexity of life. (shrink)

Interpretations of Anselm's Proslogion range between the extremes of 'rationalism' and 'fideism' because of the challenge of unifying its philosophical and devotional aspects. In this book, Bayer argues that a 'monastic interpretation' - or an interpretation that takes seriously the intellectual significance of our existential commitments - offers a powerful compromise. Through an extensive study of Anselm's spiritualty, especially as it is manifested in his letters and homiletic works, coupled with a profound study of Anselm's philosophy of language in the (...) De grammatico and Monologion, Bayer aims to reveal the Anselmian unity of life and thought, and thereby also the harmony between faith and reason. In this way, he defends the Proslogion as a unified and probative argument. (shrink)

This chapter explores similarities between one’s mental activities while in the theatre and while dreaming. In Confessions 3 Augustine identifies the “paradox of tragedy”: why do we respond emotionally to representations of the fates of persons who we know never existed? The chapter discusses Kendall Walton’s suggestion that our psychological states in response to drama are “quasi-attitudes” that are not identical to the mental states we have when dealing with ordinary life. Walton’s suggestion does not fully resolve Augustine’s plight. (...) Augustine’s description of the soul’s power of imagination sheds light on his attitude toward dramas and dreams. His account does not dispel his worries about the persistency of his erotic dreams, disclosed in Confessions 10. He would like to disavow responsibility for them, but he never succeeds. If playwrights can be held accountable for the content of their plays, then “dreamwrights” seem responsible for the content of their dreams. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 369 - 389 The article’s aim is to measure the potential of Derrida’s work for a philosophy of technique. It shows why Derrida does not present a positive philosophy of technology but rather describes technique as a _quasi_-technique, _as if_ a technique. The article inquires into the potential of such a quasi-technique for a contemporary philosophy of technology: it is suggested that it can function as a salutary “deconstruction” of mainstream philosophy of technology (...) because it shows how to think technique _in_ the absence of essence and _as_ the absence of essence.The article begins with a survey of the machines that figure in Derrida’s texts. It then examines three propositions concerning technology in Derrida’s work:Derrida thinks technology as a metaphor of _writing_ and not the other way round.Derrida thinks technique as _prosthesis_, firstly of memory, then more generally of life.Derrida’s quasi-technique relies on his peculiar conception of the incorporal _materiality_ of technique. (shrink)

Organisational Ethics could be more effectively taught if organisational agency could be better distinguished from activity in other group entities, and defended against criticisms. Some criticisms come from the side of what is called “methodological individualism”. These critics argue that, strictly speaking, only individuals really exist and act, and organisations are not individuals, real things, or agents. Other criticisms come from fear of the possible use of alleged “corporate personhood” to argue for a possible radical expansion of corporate rights e.g. (...) to claim a right to vote. Others say that if corporate businesses were persons, and judged as such, they would be sociopaths (Bakan 2004). Large corporate businesses are one kind of organisation, and if organisations were allowed to claim to be full persons, this would mean that the latter criticisms were valid. The proposed account goes between the horns of the above dilemma: impersonal aggregates or full persons. It avoids both the reductive individualism and expansive, full personhood account. It gives grounds for attributing and distributing praise and blame to organisations as whole complex entities, and to their parts. Primarily, responsibility belongs to Board incumbents within them, on the basis of their goals; their direction of the acts of the other main internal role incumbents, managers and staff, and enablers, in the role structure; their own ethical decision methods; the impact of their acts on external stakeholders like end-users, other players in the practice or local community, and on the state. These factors are picked out on the basis of a theory of meaning Aristotle’s theory of analogy of attribution, some architectonic features of his Philosophical Anthropology; and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (NAVE). The paper expounds a quasi-person model of organisations, (QPM), previously described in this journal (Ardagh 2011, 2012, 2013). This model identifies functional similarities at three levels, between capacities within natural persons (NPs) on the one hand and the roles/ incumbents within the structure of organisational artificial/quasi-persons (APs on the other). In each entity, we find an architectonic direction, sub-ordered operational entities, and enablers (a DOE structure) in a communicative structure or reporting chain of authority. The common elements between natural persons (NP) and artificial persons (AP) and their ethically relevant attributes are captured in an acronym –GRAEOS. Both persons and organisations have a “top” entity capable of having/choosing worthwhile ethically permissible goals, G; of architectonically directing the use of capacities/repertoires or incumbents in designed architectonic roles, R, within a DOE-type structure, well or badly; of using ethical decision making procedures, E; of execution of good choices for the person or organisation in action, A, with good or bad impacts on others, or with others, O, in the context practice or domain; and of having good relations with the law and the state, S. Application to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, and public sector organisations, is briefly discussed to illustrate the potential to deal with short or long case study narratives. (shrink)

Olivier Tinland | : Dans cet article, je me propose de clarifier la manière dont Jürgen Habermas utilise le terme « quasi-transcendantal » dans l’ensemble de son oeuvre. Examinant successivement le projet épistémologique de Connaissance et intérêt, l’élaboration de l’« éthique de la discussion » et le « tournant pragmatiste » des dernières oeuvres, j’entends montrer que Habermas, loin d’abandonner une telle manière ambiguë de réactualiser le projet kantien, a tenté, tout au long de son évolution philosophique, de trouver une (...) formulation cohérente de la tension entre la contingence empirique des contextes sociaux de la vie humaine et la nécessité contrefactuelle des prétentions universelles à la vérité et à la validité normative. | : In this paper, I intend to clarify the way Jürgen Habermas uses the term “quasi-transcendental” throughout his whole work. Starting from the epistemological project of Knowledge and Interest, going on with the elaboration of the “ethics of discussion”, ending with the “pragmatist turn” of the late works, I want to show that Habermas, far from abandoning such an ambiguous way of updating the Kantian project, has tried, all along his philosophical development, to find a consistent formulation of the tension between the empirical contingency of social contexts of human life and the counterfactual necessity of universal claims about truth and normative validity. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, with vocations to the Christian religious orders of the West in marked decline, an authentic Christian presence in health care is threatened. There are no longer large numbers of women willing to offer their life labors bound in vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, so as to provide a real preferential option for the poor through supporting an authentic Christian mission in health care. At the same time, the frequent earlier death of (...) men leaves a large number of widows, some in need of care and some able to provide care. Drawing on the role of widows sketched in I Timothy 2, one can envision Christian widows entering a life of prayer and service in health care settings. As female monastics, such widows could reintroduce a salient Christian presence in health care. How one ties this response to the message of I Timothy 2 will depend on one’s understanding of the status of Scripture, the significance of tradition, the nature of theological epistemology, the meaning of theology, the nature of the Church, and the ontology of gender. The position taken on these issues will define the character of a Christian bioethics of care. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of an educational intervention regarding end-of-life discussion directed at older Japanese adults and their attitude to and acceptance of this intervention. A quasi-experimental design was used. A total of 121 older adults, aged 65 years and over, consented to participate. Data from 55 intervention and 57 control participants were used for the analysis. The intervention consisted of an education program comprising a video, a lecture using a handout, and discussion (...) among participants. The control group received only the handout. Both groups were followed up after one month. The intervention group’s attitude became more favorable towards advance directives, especially living wills (P = 0.024). In addition, their expression of preference for life-sustaining treatment by means of artificial nutrition was less at follow up, demonstrating that these older adults had become more autonomous (P = 0.008). There was greater acceptance of the intervention as a whole by the intervention group compared with the control group (P = 0.011). Although few participants overall completed living wills, at follow up twice as many in the intervention group had discussed end-of-life matters with family members and/or their physician. (shrink)

That life has value is a tenet eliciting all but universal agreement, be it amongst philosophers, policy-makers, or the general public. Yet, when it comes to its employment in practice, especially in the context of policies which require the balancing of different moral choices—for example in health care, foreign aid, or animal rights related decisions—it takes little for cracks to appear and for disagreement to arise as to what the value of life actually means and how it should (...) guide our actions in the real world. I argue that in no small part this state of affairs is a consequence of the infirmity of the foundations that the claim respecting the value of life supervenes upon once its theological foundations are abandoned. Hence, I depart radically from the contemporary thought and argue that life has no inherent value. Far from lowering the portcullis to Pandemonium, the abandonment of the quasi-Platonistic claim that life has intrinsic value, when understood and applied correctly, leads to a comprehensive, consistent, and compassionate ethical framework for understanding the related problems. I illustrate this using several hotly debated topics, including speciesism and show how the ideas I introduce help us to interpret people’s choices and to resolve outstanding challenges which present an insurmountable obstacle to the existing ethical theories. (shrink)

As Christians, all twelfth-century Latin thinkers identified true happiness with the happiness God promises in the afterlife. This happiness was believed to be entirely spiritual, consisting in the endless vision of God. Nevertheless, along with this beatitudo in patria we also find in some twelfth-century authors the idea of a beatitudo in via as the philosophical life. This life can be characterized either as completely contemplative and solitary, or as one that remains partially attached to material circumstances and (...) action in society. Within this broad framework, this paper emphasizes three points:a. the ascetic and almost purely contemplative character of the ideal of the philosophical life as we find it in twelfth-century authors like Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury;b. the role played by philosophers in some twelfth-century triads of human types;c. the fact that, in spite of the monastic touch which often color them, many theses held by twelfth-century defenders of the philosophical... (shrink)

There is an increasing demand by society that university students demonstrate competitive skills to enable them to achieve greater success when entering the workplace. Creativity and life satisfaction correlate positively with academic performance, productivity, and excellence in the working environment. The presence of creativity and emotional intelligence in the curriculum and teaching methods in Spanish universities, however, is surprisingly lacking. Studies that examine gender differences in these variables provide conflicting results. The purpose of our research is to analyse the (...) changes produced in both creativity and life satisfaction in university students by a positive emotional and creative intervention and explore individual differences by gender. The methodology used was a quasi-experimental pre- test/post- test design with experimental/control groups. Three hundred university students from the Community of Madrid completed three exercises that evaluated creativity and life satisfaction. The results show significantly higher results in creativity and life satisfaction in women, who continued to achieve high results after the intervention. Finally, we discuss the need for emotional and creative education in universities and focus on the employability and the guarantee of equal opportunities through the development of these competencies. (shrink)