The use of comparative methods to study in China since reform and opening up and development of higher education faces challenges and opportunities. Pointed out: At present, China's higher education development to a new stage and critical period, opportunities and challenges, we must establish and implement the scientific concept of development, people-oriented, co-ordination of higher education and economic development of the coordinated development of the connotation and extension of the coordinated development of Road, correctly grasp the scale and quality (...) of the dialectical relationship between the advance of different types, levels, ownership and coordination of higher education in the development of different regions. The development of higher education in China has reached a new and crucial stage currently, facing both opportunities and challenges. We must establish and implement a scientific concept of development, which is human-oriented. By both intensive form and extensive form, the increasing speed of the scale of higher education should be coordinated with that of economic development. The dialectical relationship between the scale and quality has to be mastered. The development of different types, levels, ownerships and regions of higher education should be coordinated and balanced. (shrink)

The article reveals the essence of the concept of public diplomacy and a retrospective of its formation in the current scientific discourse. It is noted that the field of US public diplomacy is quite actively researched by modern scientists. It is shown that the term “public diplomacy” should be understood as the activity of various actors, both governmental and non-governmental, which is intended to explain to the foreign public the foreign policy pursued by the country and to encourage this (...) or that state to make its foreign policy decisions in the direction that is beneficial to the given actor. It has been established that the concept of “cultural diplomacy” is narrower than the concept of “public diplomacy”, which should be understood as a set of activities carried out by both central and foreign bodies of external relations of the state with the aim of researching the attitude and informing the foreign public. as well as establishing contacts abroad, with the aim of improving the state’s image and achieving national interests. So, in the United States of America, there is no separation of “cultural diplomacy” from “public diplomacy”. The concept of paradiplomacy is also considered as a tool of activity of subnational actors in the international arena and components of diplomatic communication processes taking place in the modern world. It has been proven that paradiplomacy is an integral part of modern international relations along with public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. (shrink)

Given that the practices and institutions of knowledge production commonly referred to as ‘science’ are believed to have ‘Western’ origins, their apparent proliferation entails negotiations and power dynamics that shape both science and diplomacy in specific locales. This paper investigates a facet of this co-production of science and diplomacy in the emergence of knowledge infrastructure in Japan during the Allied Occupation. It focuses on the 1947 delegation from the United States National Academy of Sciences to Japan and its role in (...) creating the Science Council of Japan (SCJ). While historians view this mission as having been dispatched to provide advice on the foundation of the SCJ, it was in fact an unintentional outcome. The original plan was to recruit long-term scientific advisers on science policy to Douglas MacArthur's headquarters. The creation of the SCJ was not the brainchild of any individual but the result of an unforeseen alteration of the original idea through negotiations among various actors. By examining the transnational aspects of this process and the complex social process underlying it, and drawing on Manuel DeLanda's assemblage theory, this paper proposes the concept of ‘techno-diplomatic assemblage’ for understanding the transnational construction of knowledge infrastructure such as the emergence of the SCJ. (shrink)

This is a response to a short communication on our research presented in Solbrække et al. (Med Health Care Philos 20(1):89–103, 2017), which raises a series of serious allegations. Our article explored the rise of ‘the breast cancer gene’ as a field of medical, cultural and personal knowledge. We used the concept biological citizenship to elucidate representations of, and experiences with, hereditary breast cancer in a Norwegian context, addressing a research deficit. In our response to Møller and Hovig’s (Med Health (...) Care Philos 21(2):239–242, 2018a) opinionated piece, we start by questioning on which scientific grounds they base their knowledge claims and situate their criticism in a pre-determined positivist script, which exposes their incompetency when it comes to establishing a useful critique of our research. We tie this to an attitude of scientific supremacy, which reduces the complexity and specificity of different knowledges into a clichéd divide between ‘hard evidence’ and ‘fiction’—presented in a predictable narrative which seeks to establish research protagonists and antagonists. We elaborate on the rationale of our qualitative approach to analyzing and interpreting situated and mediated aspects of BRCA 1/2. We counter claims that our research does harm to patients. We refer to a medical scandal emerging from Norway where 21 women were wrongfully diagnosed and surgically treated for a mis-interpreted cancer gene mutation. In conclusion, we stand by the integrity of our research as reported in the original paper. Scientific supremacy and pre-scripted criticism impose considerable obstacles for the possibility of establishing interdisciplinary dialogue across knowledge paradigms in health care and medicine. We therefore urge readers to reflect on how we can establish and sustain ethically careful and truthful dialogue—without doing violence to epistemological differences—to protect and advance the interdisciplinarity that constitutes the journal’s scope. (shrink)

The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFScW) and UNESCO share roots in the Social Relations of Science (SRS) movements and in the Franco-British scientific relations which developed in the 1930s. In this historical context (the Great Depression, the rise of Fascism and the Nazi use of science, the social and intellectual fascination for the USSR), a new model of scientific internationalism emerged, where science and politics mixed. Many progressive scientists were involved in the war efforts against Nazism, (...) and tried to prolong their international commitments into peacetime. They contributed to the establishment of the WFScW and of UNESCO in 1945–1946. Neither the WFScW nor UNESCO succeeded in achieving their initial aims. Another world emerged from the immediate post-war years, but it was not the world fancied by the progressive scientists from the mould of scientific internationalism. The aim of this article is to follow the path from the Franco-British networks towards the establishment of the WFScW and UNESCO; from an ideological scientific internationalism towards practical projects. It is to understand how these two bodies came to embody two different scientific internationalisms during the Cold War. (shrink)

The idea of replication is based on the premise that there are permanent laws to be replicated and verified, and the scientific method is adequate for doing so. Scientific truth, however, is not absolute but relative to time and context, and the method used. Time and context are inextricably interwoven, in that time creates different contexts and contexts (e.g., Christmas Day vs. New Year’s Day) create different experiences of time, rendering psychological phenomena inherently variable. This means that internal (...) and external conditions fluctuate and are different in a replication study vs. the original. Thus, a replication experiment is just another empirical investigation that has no special status in the establishment of scientific truth. It is not the final arbiter of whether or not something exists. In their pursuit of homogeneous external conditions, replications have ignored the homogeneity of internal conditions. There is not a single replication reported in the literature that would have shown participants’ feelings and thoughts—both conscious and nonconscious—to be identical to those of the original participants. Experimental instructions can create varying ratios of conscious over nonconscious processing from one study to another. Ironically, every replication is a failure at the fundamentals of human psychology. While patterns can be discovered, they are not permanent or unchangeable laws of human behavior to be proven by the pinpoint statistical verification through replication. As scientific knowledge in physics is temporary and incomplete, should it be any surprise that science can only provide “temporary winners” for psychological knowledge of human behavior? (shrink)

In the original publication, the article title has been published incorrectly. Now the same has been corrected in this correction.

Türkiye'de din eğitimi bilimi, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi'ndeki akademik disiplinler içinde doğmuş ve alanın ilk akademisyenleri bu fakültede yetişmiştir. Fakültenin açılışından uzun bir süre sonra kurulan Din Eğitimi Anabilim Dalı, yeni kurulan ilahiyat fakültelerinin din eğitimi akademisyenlerini yetiştirmede öncü rol oynamıştır. Bu makalede, alanında ilk ve lider olmasından dolayı Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi üzerine yoğunlaşılarak, din eğitiminin Türkiye'de bilimsel bir disiplin olarak gelişmesi tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki mevcut din eğitiminin genel kurumsal görünümü ile ilgili bilgi verilmektedir. Araştırmada, din eğitimi bölümünün tarihsel (...) gelişimini ortaya koymak amacıyla Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi arşivleri incelenmiştir. İlk elden bilgiler, Yönetim Kurulu, Profesörler ve Fakülte Kurulu karar defterlerinden alınmıştır. Din Eğitimi Bölümü'nün karakteristik özellikleri, bilimsel yönelimleri ve katkıları incelenirken, bölümün akademisyenleri tarafından yürütülen bilimsel çalışmalar ve onların lisans ve lisansüstü öğrencilerine atıfta bulunulmuştur. In this article, the theoretical and practical contributions concerning the rise and development of religious education science, its basic characteristics, orientations and fields as an academic discipline in Turkey are discussed. Religious education made its first step into academic disciplines at the Ankara University Divinity Faculty. And first academicians in the field of religious education were taught at this faculty. Department of Religious Education, which was established after a long time, took the lead in educating religious education academicians in newly established divinity faculties. Moreover; the end of this article, information is given in relation to the general institutional appearance of religious education in nowdays Turkey. During the research, in order to reveal the historical development of department of religious education, archives of Ankara University Divinity Faculty were examined. First-hand information was derived from decision books of Administrative, Professors and Faculty Board. When exploring the characteristic features, scientific orientations and contributions of Department of Religious Education, the scientific works carried out by department’s academicians and their graduate and postgraduate students were referred to. (shrink)

A Scientific Integrity Consortium developed a set of recommended principles and best practices that can be used broadly across scientific disciplines as a mechanism for consensus on scientific integrity standards and to better equip scientists to operate in a rapidly changing research environment. The two principles that represent the umbrella under which scientific processes should operate are as follows: Foster a culture of integrity in the scientific process. Evidence-based policy interests may have legitimate roles to (...) play in influencing aspects of the research process, but those roles should not interfere with scientific integrity. The nine best practices for instilling scientific integrity in the implementation of these two overarching principles are Require universal training in robust scientific methods, in the use of appropriate experimental design and statistics, and in responsible research practices for scientists at all levels, with the training content regularly updated and presented by qualified scientists. Strengthen scientific integrity oversight and processes throughout the research continuum with a focus on training in ethics and conduct. Encourage reproducibility of research through transparency. Strive to establish open science as the standard operating procedure throughout the scientific enterprise. Develop and implement educational tools to teach communication skills that uphold scientific integrity. Strive to identify ways to further strengthen the peer review process. Encourage scientific journals to publish unanticipated findings that meet standards of quality and scientific integrity. Seek harmonization and implementation among journals of rapid, consistent, and transparent processes for correction and/or retraction of published papers. Design rigorous and comprehensive evaluation criteria that recognize and reward the highest standards of integrity in scientific research. (shrink)

The ArgumentDespite more than fifty years of debate on the Merton thesis, there have been few attempts to substantiate Merton's argument through empirically based comparative studies. This study of the Jesuit scientific tradition is intended to serve as a test of some of Merton's central claims.Jesuit science is remarkable for its scope and longevity, and is distinguished by its markedly empirical and utilitarian orientation. In this paper I examine the ideological structure of the Society of Jesus and find at (...) its core an “apostolic spirituality” that explains the legitimation of these forms of science within the Society. The values of apostolic spirituality strongly encouraged an activist mentality among Jesuits, which in turn led to the formation of apostolates in education, at court, and in the overseas missions. The values associated with apostolic spirituality led to the initial acceptance of active-empirical sciences within the Society, which became established as traditions because they were useful in fulfilling the goals of the Society's apostolates.This study, by providing a qualified confirmation of Merton's central claims, suggests the importance of a supra-confessional sanctification of labor and learning in the growth of active-empirical sciences. (shrink)

There is a robust scientific consensus concerning climate change and evolution. But many people reject these expert views, in favour of beliefs that are strongly at variance with the evidence. It is tempting to try to explain these beliefs by reference to ignorance or irrationality, but those who reject the expert view seem often to be no worse informed or any less rational than the majority of those who accept it. It is also tempting to try to explain these (...) beliefs by reference to epistemic overconfidence. However, this kind of overconfidence is apparently ubiquitous, so by itself it cannot explain the difference between those who accept and those who reject expert views. Instead, I will suggest that the difference is in important part explained by differential patterns of epistemic deference, and these patterns, in turn, are explained by the cues that we use to filter testimony. We rely on cues of benevolence and competence to distinguish reliable from unreliable testifiers, but when debates become deeply politicized, asserting a claim may itself constitute signalling lack of reliability. (shrink)

Integrated information theory is an example of “ironic science” and obstructs the scientific study of consciousness. By confusing the ontological status of a method to quantify network complexity with that of a theory of consciousness, IIT has to square the circle and spirals toward its panpsychism conclusion. I analyze the consequences of this fallacy and suggest how the study of consciousness can be brought back into the realm of rational, empirical science.

Slovenian epistemology is characterised by an idiosyncratic canon, based on three fundamental authors: Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, and Thomas Kuhn. What binds this canon together is the attitude that the history of science should be viewed as a history of radical breaks or revolutions in scientific thought. The drawback of such an anthology of authors is not only that it is outdated, but that, from the position of this canon, it is difficult to discern the problems stemming from the (...) approach to history of science it endorses. In order to highlight the blind spots of Slovenian epistemology, I examine a different interpretative trajectory of the notion of scientific revolution in the United Kingdom and the United States. The methodological program, which focuses on revolutionary breakthroughs in scientific ideas, is thus re-evaluated by considering its strategic role in the institutionalisation of the history of science as a discipline. The event that marked the translation of French epistemology into English history of science were the lectures of the delegates from the Soviet Union at the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology in 1931. In post-war Anglo-American history of science, the concept of scientific revolution was adopted as a means of excluding Marxist studies of science – which had spread under the influence of the Soviet delegation – from the realm of acceptable discourse. I demonstrate how the Cold War historiography of science introduced a divide between the “internal” and “external” factors of scientific development, and their supposed synthesis in the work of Thomas Kuhn. Finally, I review the critiques that the sociology of scientific knowledge levelled at the story of the Scientific Revolution and point out the importance of these controversies for current epistemological research. (shrink)

Following on from Roy Bhaskarâe(tm)s first two books, A Realist Theory of Science and The Possibility of Naturalism, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, establishes the conception of social science as explanatoryâe"and thence emancipatoryâe"critique. Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation starts from an assessment of the impasse of contemporary accounts of science as stemming from an incomplete critique of positivism. It then proceeds to a systematic exposition of scientific realism in the form of transcendental realism, highlighting a conception of (...) science as explanatory of a structured, differentiated and changing world. Turning to the social domain, the book argues for a view of the social order as conditioned by, and emergent from, nature. Advocating a critical naturalism, the author shows how the transformational model of social activity together with the conception of social science as explanatory critique which it entails, resolves the divisions and dualisms besetting orthodox social and normative theory: between society and the individual, structure and agency, meaning and behavior, mind and body, reason and cause, fact and value, and theory and practice. The book then goes on to discuss the emancipatory implications of social science and sketches the nature of the depth investigation characteristically entailed. In the highly innovative third part of the book Roy Bhaskar completes his critique of positivism by developing a theory of philosophical discourse and ideology, on the basis of the transcendental realism and critical naturalism already developed, showing how positivism functions as a restrictive ideology of and for science and other social practices. (shrink)

The thought that it might be possible to develop a method of scientific discovery, a procedure of investigation and reasoning which, so long as its principles were studiously followed, would be guaranteed to result in scientific knowledge, has long been recognized to be a mere philosophers' dream, with no more possibility of fulfilment than the alchemists' dream of producing a philosophers' stone which would turn base metals into gold. Yet it remains the case that the authority of science (...) rests on claims made on behalf of its methods; they are regarded as somehow superior to, or more reliable than, any other means of acquiring beliefs about the world around us. To say that there is no scientific evidence that any of the food additives currently permitted in Britain have any harmful effects is a way of dismissing as groundless and irrational the fears of those who think that such additives do have harmful effects. Whereas to say that it is scientifically established that smoking causes lung cancer is a way of saying that this is something a smoker ought to worry about. (shrink)

Substantial progress in handling scientific misconduct cases has been made since the first cases were investigated by the NIH Office of Scientific Integrity in 1989. The successor Office of Research Integrity (ORI) has simultaneously reduced the backlog of cases and increased the professionalism with which they are handled. However, a spate of lawsuits against universities, particularly those brought under the federal False Claims Act, threatens to undermine the ORI by encouraging use of the courts as an alternate route (...) for resolving claims of research misconduct. Next steps should include establishing a government-wide definition of scientific misconduct, providing immunity from lawsuits for institutions that follow proper procedures in investigating charges of scientific misconduct, and participating in the development of international guidelines for maintaining scientific integrity. (shrink)

: Implicit instruction about values occurs throughout scientific communication, whether in the university classroom or in the larger public forum. The concern of this paper is that the kind of values education that occurs includes "reverse moral education," the idea that moral considerations are at best extra scientific if not simply irrational. The (a)moral education that many scientists unwittingly foist on their "students" undergirds the scientific establishment's typical responses to larger social issues: "Huff!" In this paper I (...) explain the nature of moral education which occurs in the "science classroom" and argue that it is wrongheaded--though there are remedies for its negative effects. (shrink)

This study examined scientific tolerance as a human way to life in the context of Sunnah, a much debatable topic among critics and scholars. The study also highlighted prophetic visions in the application of scientific tolerance. Using a normative descriptive approach in this qualitative research, the data was collected from library archives and Islamic data sources. This approach enabled to raise questions about the nature of scientific tolerance in the light of Sunnah, prophetic mechanisms used to establish (...) the scientific tolerance, and its advantages. The findings revealed that scientific tolerance was integrated to the prophetic visions and the Sunnah, aiming at peace, tranquility, and stability for the entire mankind. The study found out how the Sunnah of the Prophet laid the foundation of scientific tolerance, and how it was carried forward by the Companions and mujtahids through their discussions, dialogues, and debates. It was also observed that the scientific tolerance reached its peak in the era of Arab and Islamic civilization, through the translation movement that began in the Umayyad era and reached its culmination, and gained heights through scientific discoveries, innovations, and civilizational achievements. In the Abbasid era, the subsequent transfer and translation of these languages into Latin and other European languages, further enhanced the depth of scientific tolerance in the contemporary renaissance and modern civilization. (shrink)

Background: In the neonatal intensive care unit, immigrant parents may experience even greater anxiety than other parents, particularly if they and the nurses do not share a common language. Aim: To explore the complex issues of trust and the nurse–mother relationship in neonatal intensive care units when they do not share a common language. Design and methods: This study has a qualitative design. Individual semi-structured in-depth interviews and two focus group interviews were conducted with eight immigrant mothers and eight neonatal (...) intensive care unit nurses, respectively. Data analysis was based on Braun and Clarke’s thematic analytic method. Ethical considerations: Approval was obtained from the hospital’s Scientific Committee and the Data Protection Officer. Interviewees were informed in their native language about confidentiality and they signed an informed consent form. Results: Trust was a focus for mothers and nurses alike. The mothers held that they were satisfied that their infants received the very best care. They seemed to find the nurses’ care and compassion unexpected and said they felt empowered by learning how to care for their infant. The nurses discussed the mother’s vulnerability, dependency on their actions, attitudes and behaviour. Discussion: Lack of a common language created a challenge. Both parties depended on non-verbal communication and eye contact. The nurses found that being compassionate, competent and knowledgeable were important trust-building factors. The mothers were relieved to find that they were welcome, could feel safe and their infants were well cared for. Conclusion: The parents of an infant admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit have no choice but to trust the treatment and care their infant receives. Maternal vulnerability challenges the nurse’s awareness of the asymmetric distribution of power and ability to establish a trusting relationship with the mother. This is particularly important when mother and nurse do not share a verbal language. The nurses worked purposefully to gain trust. (shrink)

To establish the scientific-theoretical and philosophical- methodological foundations for the transition from classical set theory (Cantor set) to fuzzy set theory, the mathematical and ontological structures of the Cantor set are presented in a localized manner. This approach aligns with the research direction, incorporating philosophical reflections on the fundamental concepts of this theory, such as infinity, continuum, and the empty set. Particular emphasis is placed on infinity and infinite sets (countable and continuum), which are crucial to the development of (...) set theory as a scientific field and have been subjects of inquiry in both scientific and philosophical cognitive processes from ancient times to the present. In addition, a relatively concise explanation of the mathematical and ontological structures of both classical set theory and fuzzy set theory is provided. Through certain epistemological and cognitive approaches, the article identifies the scientific-theoretical and philosophical-methodological bases for the emergence of fuzzy set theory, framed within the context of the scientific-philosophical reflections on classical set theory and its core concepts. (shrink)

Between 1935 and 1942, a total of 130 men, aged seventeen to twenty-four, mostly of indigenous Hawaiian heritage, colonized Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands for the United States, in rotation, over the course of twenty-six expeditions. As part of the American Equatorial Islands Colonization Project (AEICP), they compiled meteorological data, observed and recorded the natural life of their surroundings, collected specimens for the Bishop Museum in Honolulu, mapped the islands, and built a landing strip on Howland for Amelia Earhart. In (...) doing so, they confirmed U.S. possession of the islands, its imperial and military power in the Pacific, and helped establish aviation routes in the South Seas, all of which assisted American efforts during World War II. At the time, the AEICP colonists did not know the role they were playing in this larger project. While some thought they were recruited as part of the museum’s scientific research, others were under the impression that they were stationed on the islands to contribute to commercial air travel. This article will examine the AEICP’s scientific framework, how it was deployed as a pretext for larger military and imperial goals, and the ways in which it is an example of the hidden or invisible labor of science that dominated the interwar years, World War II, and the Cold War era. Moreover, it will also expose the underlying scientific racist hierarchy of the AEICP wherein the colonists themselves were classified as “types” and “specimens” to be studied. (shrink)

This article examines the nature of scientific knowledge generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) and assesses their impact on scientific discoveries and the philosophy of science. LLMs, such as GPT‑4, are advanced deep learning algorithms capable of performing various natural language processing tasks, including text generation, translation, and data analysis. The study aims to explore how these technologies influence the scientific research process, questioning the classification and validity of AI‑assisted scientific discoveries. The methodology involves a comprehensive (...) review of existing literature on the application of LLMs in various scientific fields, coupled with an analysis of their ethical implications. Key findings highlight the benefits of LLMs, including accelerated research processes, enhanced accuracy, and the ability to integrate interdisciplinary knowledge. However, challenges such as issues of reliability, the ethical responsibility of AI‑generated content, and environmental concerns are also discussed. The paper concludes that while LLMs significantly contribute to scientific advancements, their use necessitates a reevaluation of traditional concepts in the philosophy of science and the establishment of new ethical guidelines to ensure transparency, accountability, and integrity in AI‑assisted research. This balanced approach aims to harness the potential of LLMs while addressing the ethical and practical challenges they present. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in investigating science communication. Some studies that address this issue attempt to develop a model to determine the level of confidence that an author or a scientific community has at a given time towards a theory or a group of theories. A well-established approach suggests that, in order to determine the level of certainty authors have with regard to the statements they make, one can identify specific lexical and morphosyntactical markers which (...) indicate their epistemic attitudes. This method is considered particularly appealing because it permits the development of an algorithmic model based on the quantitative analysis of the occurrence of these markers to assess automatically and objectively the opinion of an author or the predominant opinion of a scientific community on a topic at a given time. In this contribution we show that this line of research presents many kinds of problems especially when it is applied to research articles. To this aim, we propose two main lines of reasoning. The first one relies generally on the argumentative structure of scientific articles and shows that certainty/uncertainty markers are used differently in different argument forms and that therefore their number/frequency of use does not offer reliable indications for determining whether the topic at issue is considered by the authors to be more or less factual/speculative. The second one is based on the analysis of a sample of psychiatric research articles on homosexuality written over a long time span and taken from The British Journal of Psychiatry. Since the psychiatric perspective on homosexuality changed radically during the decades in which these articles were published, they offer an inventory of various kinds of argumentative strategies directed both at defending and confuting dominant as well as marginal positions. We focus especially on uncertainty markers and show that frequently the positions stated using expressions indicating uncertainty are actually not considered as conjectural or speculative by their authors, but that the use of uncertainty markers is motivated by a number of different and often incongruent rhetorical strategies. (shrink)

Philosophers and historians of philosophy have come to recognize that at the core of logical positivism was an attachment to prediction as the necessary condition for scientific knowledge.1 The inheritors of their tradition, especially the Bayesians among us, continue to seek a theory of confirmation that reflects this epistemic commitment. The importance of prediction in the growth of scientific knowledge is a commitment I share with the positivists, so I do not blanch at that designation, much less employ (...) it as a term of abuse. Precisely expressing and conclusively establishing the claims of prediction as a necessary condition for certifying claims as increments of knowledge is a goal that has so far eluded us post-positivists. Philosophers know the problems well: defining a positive instance, distinguishing projectible from nonprojectible predicates, deciding whether retrodiction is as epistemically probative as prediction. 2 But I can't help thinking that these problems are technicalities - important and arresting, but not impediments to embracing the positivist demand that increments in scientific knowledge withstand tests of predictive success. (shrink)

I argue that (1) if scientific progress, construed in revolutionary terms, were to continue indefinitely long, then any non-trivial question answerable by the use of the scientific method would in fact be answered in a way that would allow for further refinement without undermining the essential correctness of the answer; and (2) it is reasonable to believe that scientific progress will continue indefinitely long. The establishment of (1) and (2) entails that any non-trivial empirically answerable question will (...) be answered in a way that allows for further indefinite refinement.Moreover, inasmuch as the establishment of (1) and (2) undermines the ontological relativity inherent in the commonly held view that unto eternity there will be competing alternative scientific theories of differing ontological commitment, it provides for the ontologically and epistemologically privileged position of science. (shrink)

After a historically oriented discussion of the classical works on the methodology of science, and the most recent works on the subject of scientific discovery the following two questions are distinguished: Is there a logic of discovery? and Should philosophers of science be at all interested in the subject of scientific discovery? I argue that both those who advocate the methodological significance of scientific discovery and those who oppose this view only contribute to the current misformulation of (...) the problem of discovery. Both positions involve major confusions regarding the meaning of "discovery." They all, mistakenly, conceive of the scientific enterprise as comprising several logically distinct stages, one of which is discovery. I show that an appreciation of the proper meaning of "discovery" proves this conception wrong, and both establishes that scientific discovery is a legitimate subject for the philosopher of science and provides a new account of the scientific enterprise as a whole. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scientific Expertise, Service Users and Democratising Psychiatric ResearchThe author reports no conflict of interests.Friesen outlines six different reasons for democratizing scientific research. Three of them are epistemic and three are ethical. In this commentary I consider how service users might relate to values if significant levels of scientific knowledge are required to understand those values. I specifically consider the traditional theoretical virtues discussed by philosophers of (...) science (Psillos, 1999; Solomon, 2001) whereby we might judge scientific concepts based upon their simplicity, consistency or coverage. This raises questions of how democratic approaches should function when expertise is important.There is a general problem of how democratic institutes should function when members lack understanding. For example, most voters in current European democracies have limited understanding of economics. They may understand some broad principles but would not understand how to actually manage an economy on a daily basis. A simple solution to this is that political parties outline a broad framework and then are given consent to run the economy once elected. Our elected representatives or members of an unelected bureaucracy actually then make the "on the ground" decisions about how to run the economy given the broad framework which the political party was voted in on. This hopefully then means that, with varying degrees of success, people who have some understanding of economies are playing a key role. We can certainly ask important questions about this system, such as what level of economic understanding do citizens have and what level they need, who should constitute the unelected bureaucracy and whether the bureaucracy could actually be elected. My simple point is that this is one approach to limiting the decision-making of people who may lack economic expertise. In relation to democratizing psychiatric research, I consider whether Friesen's approach might mean service users require a level of expertise that they typically lack.Friesen outlines how there is a very high level of value decision involved in psychiatry given the gap between data and theories. Friesen thinks service users should be included in decisions over what values to use. I now provide an example of where making good value decisions might require [End Page 135] significant levels of scientific knowledge. I consider a specific type of value applied to a specific area. There has been recent discussion of service users being involved in decision-making over modifying psychiatric diagnoses, whereby they might play a role in deciding what psychiatric diagnoses there are and what their diagnostic criteria should be (Bueter, 2019; Fellowes, 2023; Tekin, 2022). I consider how we can assess psychiatric diagnoses using theoretical virtues. It should be emphasized that this problem may or may not have applicability to other areas of service user involvement, that theoretical virtues are not the only values which are important for assessing psychiatric diagnoses and that scientists might themselves make bad decisions in relation to theoretical virtues. I now outline five theoretical virtues.First, simplicity. There are lots of different ways to understand simplicity but here I consider how simple a system of psychiatric diagnoses (i.e., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM]) is. We can ask if the system of psychiatric diagnoses is too simple because it contains too few diagnoses or too complicated because it contains too many diagnoses. Simplicity and complexity might also depend on the degree different diagnoses have overlapping symptoms. We can judge a particular psychiatric diagnosis on the degree it adds to simplicity or complexity. Establishing the strength of this theoretical virtue requires knowledge of many different psychiatric diagnoses.Second, coverage. This relates to the degree that all the phenomena that we desire covered are being covered. We can ask whether a system of psychiatric diagnoses is or is not covering all the symptoms that we think need covering by psychiatry. We can judge particular diagnoses on how they contribute to coverage. Assessing this requires knowledge of a vast range of symptoms.Third, embedded within a theoretical network. Scientific concepts can be connected to other scientific concepts. A diagnosis can be judged on the degree it connects to other well-established areas of science, whereby the diagnosis might have been formulated based upon being... (shrink)

An increasingly common form of naturalism associated with the study of morality is what might be called “scientific naturalism,” which takes as its subject matter various empirical phenomena associated with talk of “morality” and aims to subject them to scientific inquiry, just like any other empirical phenomena. This is unproblematic when it comes to scientific investigations into the origins of the human capacity for normative guidance or moral emotions, or the neurophysiology associated with moral feeling and behavior, (...) but things get much more complicated when it comes to the project of explaining our moral beliefs. It is, of course, an empirical phenomenon that we hold the moral beliefs we do, so it may seem obvious that this too can be causally explained using scientific tools. But, while there is room for scientific inquiry into causal factors, such as evolutionary influences, that have plausibly helped to shape many moral beliefs to some degree, it is a mistake to assume that our moral beliefs across the board can best be explained through appeal exclusively to scientifically accessible causes. This scientific naturalist exclusivity assumption is in fact deeply problematic, overlooking (or prematurely dismissing) the possibility that at least many of our moral beliefs are best explained through our grasping of good reasons for them – considerations we correctly understand as justifying them, though this is not something that shows up in scientific causal explanations. It is easy to miss this point about the potential role of the appreciation of justification by the believing mind when considering moral judgments simply from the external perspective of an amoral anthropologist, but it becomes clear when taking up the internal perspective of the committed moral agent, as when thinking about why we ourselves believe that human trafficking is wrong. This matters because, while science is invoked by those who purport to provide “debunking explanations” of our moral beliefs across the board (showing them to result simply from causal factors insensitive to any objective moral facts), they are actually relying on the scientific naturalist exclusivity assumption, thus begging the question against their opponents, who hold that we have knowledge of objective morality as a result of grasping good reasons for it. I explore these complexities surrounding the explanation of our moral beliefs and argue that while the picture advocated by debunkers remains a possibility, it is certainly not established by science, and recent arguments purporting to debunk the idea of knowable, objective morality fail. (shrink)

This article concerns itself with the reception of Rous’ 1911 discovery of what later came to be known as the Rous Sarcoma Virus. Rous made his discovery at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research which had been primarily established to conduct research into infectious diseases. Rous’ chance discovery of a chicken tumor led him to a series of conjectures about cancer causation and about whether cancer could have an extrinsic cause. Rous’ finding was received with some scepticism by the (...) class='Hi'>scientific community that held that cancer was not infectious and favored explanations which located the origins of cancer in the inner mechanism of the cell. After 4 years of unsuccessful effort to isolate and further determine the virus Rous felt compelled to discontinue his work on cancer viruses. When 55 years later, the significance of Rous’s discovery was attested by the award of the Nobel Prize, it opened up debates about the issues of delayed recognition and scientific reputation. This article also considers why Rous’ hypothesis of a viral origin of cancer could not be incorporated into the existing body of knowledge about cancer before the 1950s. (shrink)

“We can avoid, above all, the mistake of thinking that unless one is big one is negligible.”This paper tries to think about the contexts of scientific practices in peripheral spaces, spaces that exist outside the domain of the resource-rich and well-established scientific communities. I ask the question whether contributions from such modest circumstances can give rise to any creative expertise that is capable of producing novel outcomes in science, and whether exploring such contexts might give us reasons for (...) changing our current mental model of what we take science to be. I assume, of course, that scientific thinking can be present in modest as well as in resource-rich circumstances, and little-known episodes... (shrink)

What role do science and scientists play in the transition between food regimes? Scientific communities are integral to understanding political struggle during food regime transitions in part due to the broader scientization of politics since the late 1800s. While social movements contest the rules of the game in explicitly value-laden terms, scientific communities make claims to the truth based on boundary work, or efforts to mark some science and scientists as legitimate while marking others as illegitimate. In doing (...) so, scientific communities attempt to establish and maintain the privileged position of science in contests over policy. In this paper, we situate scientific boundary work within its world historical context in order to ask two key questions: (1) how does scientific boundary work vary across food regimes; and, in turn, (2) what role does scientific boundary work play in the political contestation that drives transitions between food regimes? We explore these questions through the case of one scientific community—the AOAC (Association of Official Analytical Communities)—involved in food safety regulation across the British, US, and corporate food regimes. We argue that scientific boundary work is shaped by historically specific patterns of social conflict within food regimes and, in particular, the double-movement dynamics that Polanyi (The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times. Boston: Beacon, 1957[1944]) theorizes. Moreover, as scientific communities reconstruct their internal rules, norms, and procedures to claim their own legitimacy in relation to prevailing forms of social conflict, they also reshape who sets scientific agendas and thus the knowledge available for making new rules within periods of food regime transition. To elaborate this argument in theoretical terms, we build on recent efforts to integrate a neo-Polanyian perspective into food regime analysis and link this to research on scientific boundary work by scholars in science and technology studies. (shrink)

By the decree of the Presidium of the Higher Attestation Commission of Ukraine of 08.02.1996. Approved composition of the Specialized Academic Council D. 01.25.05 on specialty 05.00.11 - Religious studies. The Council was established at the Department of Religious Studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Being the only one in Ukraine on its profile, it is the main link in the system of certification of scientific personnel of the highest qualification in (...) this specialty. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Paul Thagard's computational approach to studying science, which is a contribution to the cognitive science of science. I present several criticisms of Thagard's approach and use them to motivate some suggestions for alternative approaches in cognitive science of science. I first argue that Thagard does not clearly establish the units of analysis of his study. Second, I argue that Thagard mistakenly applies the same model to both individual and group decision making. Finally, I argue that (...) in attempting to account for psychological and social processes as well as providing a philosophical model of successful reasoning Thagard attempts to explain too much with one model, thus straining the plausibility of his model. (shrink)

The cogency of a scientific study utilizing historical data tends to be, unfortunately, very largely a matter of the methodological presuppositions of the reader. Indeed, the barriers to a more general and thorough scientific use of history are, for the most part, methodological. There are two such barriers: the uncertainty as to the validity of an intensive scientific investigation of historical problems, and the lack of a clear delineation of the fields of research.Concerning the first, two problems (...) must be considered: on the one hand, the nature of historical knowledge and on the other, the nature of scientific knowledge. The predictive assumption of the present discussion is that to understand the essential identity of historical and scientific knowledge is to justify the scientific manipulation of data which are unquestionably historical. The thesis which is being argued here is that all data are historical, that all reality—whatever its level or type—is event-structured, that events have an existential dependence on one another, that therefore relationships of relevance and causation may be established, and that the determination of such relationships is the function of scientific research in any field. (shrink)

According to Bourdieu, the `collective intellectual' resembles the sports team in terms of the spirit which drives it (in this case the `scientific spirit', in the sense that Bachelard used the term), the collectivist attitudes implied by its activity, and the form of apprenticeship involved - constant, intensive and regular training. The combination of these elements gives rise to gestures and syntheses which are constantly, incessantly repeated to the point where they become a habitus (what Bourdieu called the (...) class='Hi'>scientific habitus); it also creates the mutually supportive force, mobilized in its practical, articulate and coherent mode, which Bourdieu believed a research centre - a specific form taken by the collective intellectual in the scientific sphere - should constitute. His prime concern, a principle evident from the start both in his experience of teaching and in the first research projects he led in Algeria, was in fact to establish and institutionalize a collective sociological practice based on a habitus shared by all those involved in the activities he instigated. (shrink)

This paper examines how scholars of Greek and Roman antiquity in the German-speaking territories in the first half of the nineteenth century define scientificity (Wissenschaftlichkeit). I will argue that antiquity studies in this period of its foundation as a discipline is an instructive case to examine with regard to questions as to how scientific knowledge is established as different from other forms of knowledge, how scientific fields establish relative autonomy from other fields and what forms scientific autonomy (...) can take. Widely recognised as important for the history of the modern research university, the case is not only interesting because it is influential. It is also interesting because the discussions in this period are so different to discussions in the later nineteenth century in the social sciences and the humanities, which have shaped debates about scientificity in sociology and cognate disciplines: We find here a notion of social and cultural research as a scientific endeavour, discussed not primarily with reference to or in defence against the natural sciences, but rather defined against imitative learning and the expectation that research provide moral support for the emerging Germany by idealizing the Greeks. The case highlights moralization as a source of heteronomy in cultural fields in addition to the more widely discussed forces of the market and the influence of the state. (shrink)

During the Third Reich, state‐sponsored violence was linked to scientific research on many levels. Prisoners were used as involuntary subjects for medical experiments, and body parts from victims were used in anatomy and neuropathology on a massive scale. In many cases, such specimens remained in scientific collections and were used until long after the war. International bioethics, for a long time, had little to say on the issue. Since the late 1980s, with a renewed interest in the Holocaust (...) and other Nazi crimes, a consensus has increasingly taken hold that research on human tissues and body parts from the Nazi era is inadmissible, and that such specimens should be removed from scientific collections and buried. The question of what to do with scientific data obtained from these sources has not received adequate attention, however, and remains unsolved. This paper traces the history of debates about the ethical implications of using human tissue or body parts from the Nazi period for scientific purposes, primarily in the fields of anatomy and neuropathology. It also examines how this issue, from after the war until today, influenced the establishment of legal and bioethical norms on the use of human remains from morally tainted sources, with a particular emphasis on Germany and Austria. It is argued that the use of such specimens and of data derived from them is unethical not only because of potential harms to posthumous rights of the victims, but also because such use constitutes a moral harm to society at large. (shrink)

Isaac Newton's Scientific Method examines Newton's argument for universal gravity and his application of it to resolve the problem of deciding between geocentric and heliocentric world systems by measuring masses of the sun and planets. William L. Harper suggests that Newton's inferences from phenomena realize an ideal of empirical success that is richer than prediction. Any theory that can achieve this rich sort of empirical success must not only be able to predict the phenomena it purports to explain, but (...) also have those phenomena accurately measure the parameters which explain them. Harper explores the ways in which Newton's method aims to turn theoretical questions into ones which can be answered empirically by measurement from phenomena, and to establish that propositions inferred from phenomena are provisionally accepted as guides to further research. This methodology, guided by its rich ideal of empirical success, supports a conception of scientific progress that does not require construing it as progress toward Laplace's ideal limit of a final theory of everything, and is not threatened by the classic argument against convergent realism. Newton's method endorses the radical theoretical transformation from his theory to Einstein's. Harper argues that it is strikingly realized in the development and application of testing frameworks for relativistic theories of gravity, and very much at work in cosmology today. (shrink)