Are verbal reports of disgust in moral situations specific indicators of the concept of disgust, or are they used metaphorically to refer to anger? In this experiment, participants read scenarios describing a violation of a norm either about the use of the body (bodily moral) or about harm and rights (socio-moral). They then expressed disgust and anger on verbal scales, and through facial expression endorsement measures. The use of disgust words in the socio-moral condition was largely predicted by anger words (...) and only secondarily by disgust faces, whereas in the bodily moral condition the use of disgust words was predicted to a similar extent by disgust faces and anger words. Angry faces, however, never predicted disgust words independently of anger words. These results support a middle-ground position in which disgust words concerning socio-moral violations are not entirely a metaphor for anger, but bear some relationship to other representations of disgust. In the case of socio-moral violations, however, the use of disgust language is more strongly related to anger language, and less strongly to facial representations of disgust than in the case of bodily moral violations. (shrink)

Automatic synonym extraction plays an important role in many natural language processing systems, such as those involving information retrieval and question answering. Recently, research has focused on extracting semantic relations from word embeddings since they capture relatedness and similarity between words. However, using word embeddings alone poses problems for synonym extraction because it cannot determine whether the relation between words is synonymy or some other semantic relation. In this paper, we present a novel solution for this problem by proposing the (...) SynoExtractor pipeline, which can be used to filter similar word embeddings to retain synonyms based on specified linguistic rules. Our experiments were conducted using KSUCCA and Gigaword embeddings and trained with CBOW and SG models. We evaluated automatically extracted synonyms by comparing them with Alma’any Arabic synonym thesauri. We also arranged for a manual evaluation by two Arabic linguists. The results of experiments we conducted show that using the SynoExtractor pipeline enhances the precision of synonym extraction compared to using the cosine similarity measure alone. SynoExtractor obtained a 0.605 mean average precision for the King Saud University Corpus of Classical Arabic with 21% improvement over the baseline and a 0.748 MAP for the Gigaword corpus with 25% improvement. SynoExtractor outperformed the Sketch Engine thesaurus for synonym extraction by 32% in terms of MAP. Our work shows promising results for synonym extraction suggesting that our method can also be used with other languages. (shrink)

This paper addresses early modern botanical nomenclature, the practices of identifying and publishing synonyms in particular, as a collaborative “information science”. Before Linnaean nomenclature became the lingua franca of botany, it was inevitable that, over time, the same plant was given several names by different people, which created confusion and made communication among botanists increasingly difficult. What names counted as synonyms and actually referred to the same plant had to be identified by meticulously comparing living and dried specimens (...) of this and similar plants as well as relevant illustrations und descriptions in the botanical literature. Identifying synonyms required and generated an ever-expanding mass of data, which was used continuously to adjust and rearrange plant names. Despite the greatest care, judgements on synonyms were not definitive, which meant that published lists of synonyms for individual species of plants were in a state of flux and had to be constantly updated, corrected, and rewritten. This required long-term international collaborations, the accumulated results of which were not published once but consecutively, in augmented and corrected editions of a book. As a result of this networked approach, synonyms are networked names that reflect the epistemic interconnectedness of the botanical community. These questions will be discussed with a focus on the Dutch botanist Johannes Burman, who placed synonyms at the centre of his work as posthumous editor—and co-author—of the botanical manuscripts that were left behind by other botanists. (shrink)

In his critic of the doctrine of Bardaisan, Ephrem the Syrian devotes a lot of space to reflection on the meaning of the terms ītutā and ītyā which, as he denounces, are used inaccurately by his opponent. These Syriac terms can be translated by “being” or “essence”, but also by “substance”. This observation leads us to propose the comparison with the Greek term οὐσία, taking into account many difficulties raised by its uses in theological discourse. The article is devoted to (...) the analysis of the uses of the terms ītutā and ītyā ‑ by Ephrem and by Bardaisan ‑ in their different ways of describing the divine essence. This comparison reveals the peculiarities of the two systems of thought and also their connections with the Greek philosophical doctrines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.3 (1999) 40-62 [Access article in PDF] Syncretism and Its Synonyms: Reflections on Cultural Mixture Charles Stewart * The subject matter of anthropology has gradually changed over the last twenty years. Nowadays ethnographers rarely search for a stable or original form of cultures; they are usually more concerned with revealing how local communities respond to historical change and global influences. The burgeoning literature on transnational flows of (...) ideas, global institutions, and cultural mixture reflects this shift of attention. This increased awareness of cultural interpenetration has, furthermore, been instrumental in the critique of earlier conceptions of "culture" that cast it as too stable, bounded, and homogeneous to be useful in a world characterized by migrations (voluntary or forced), cheap travel, international marketing, and telecommunications. 1 Contemporary social theory has accordingly turned to focus on phenomena such as globalization, transnational nationalism, and the situation of diaspora communities. In this body of literature the word syncretism has begun to reappear alongside such related concepts as hybridization and creolization as a means of portraying the dynamics of global social developments.In what follows I consider some current attempts to theorize mixture before turning to examine the suitability, or not, of the terms listed above. Anthropologists and other social scientists have expressed ambivalence about all three terms--syncretism, hybridity, and creolization. I discuss these reservations before presenting a genealogical consideration of the single term syncretism. My purpose in considering the history of syncretism up to the present is not to enforce a standard usage confined to the domain of religion; nor is it my goal to promote syncretism to a position of primus inter pares in the company of all other terms for mixture. I see my approach instead as an attempt to illustrate historically that syncretism has an objectionable but nevertheless instructive past. If this past can be understood, then we are in a position to consciously reappropriate syncretism [Shaw and Stewart 2] and set the ethnographic study of cultural mixture on new tracks.This might seem too minimalist to readers who currently have no reservations about the term, but many anthropologists, on both sides of the Atlantic, have personally expressed to me strong reservations about ever employing the word syncretism. If asked why they hold this view, they are often unable to articulate a specific reason. Some, however, did express one or both of the following objections: (1) syncretism is a pejorative term, one that derides mixture, and/or (2) syncretism presupposes "purity" in the [End Page 40] traditions that combine. Both of these reservations will be considered below, but it is the broad disagreement within the anthropological community on the appropriateness of the very term syncretism that has stimulated this inquiry. Such ambivalence reflects basic uncertainties about how to conceptualize cultural mixture. Current Discussions of Mixture Cultures, if we still wish to retain this term (and I do), are porous; they are open to intermixture with other, different cultures and they are subject to historical change precisely on account of these influences. 2 This has no doubt always been the case. Certainly decolonization and the entry into a postmodernity where master narratives of purity and homogeneity are vulnerable to doubt have contributed to valorizing recognitions of mixture where formerly they had been stigmatized as inauthentic and hence uninteresting for anthropological study. Research in the Caribbean, in Sidney Mintz's view, started relatively late precisely because this region "was considered theoretically unfruitful... its peoples supposedly lacked culture, or were culturally bastardized" [303].Cultural borrowing and interpenetration are today seen as part of the very nature of cultures [Glissant 140-41; Rosaldo, Foreword xv]. To phrase it more accurately, syncretism describes the process by which cultures constitute themselves at any given point in time. Today's hybridization will simply give way to tomorrow's hybridization, the form of which will be dictated by historico-political events and contingencies. In examining cultural hybridity, writers such as Edward Said and James Clifford [Predicament 14-15] have lifted syncretism out of the framework of acculturation. Syncretism is no longer a transient "stage" which will disappear when, with time, assimilation occurs. As Said... (shrink)

In this paper I outline the most relevant traits of the term ‘trust’ understood as one of the synonyms for ‘certainty’ that Ludwig Wittgenstein used in his posthumous work On Certainty. To this end, I analyze the paragraphs of On Certainty in which reference is made to pupils who are expected to trust what is taught by their teacher: in addition, I note that such a process is largely based on the attitude of rejection and bewilderment that teachers promote (...) towards people who call into doubt those certainties that pupils are expected to assimilate. Subsequently, after emphasizing the importance that Wittgenstein attached to the ineffability of certainties, I explain how such certainty or trust can be staged. Lastly, I clarify why an appropriate contemplation of this staging can be of great help for pupils to achieve at least four goals of educational interest: thus, children can not only strengthen their capacity for wonder, but also experience what things are ineffable, glimpse the limits of rationality, and become more tolerant of people who are partakers of a different world-picture. (shrink)

Among philosophers as well as linguists the battle is still joined between those who view the correlation between meaning and linguistic form as strictly determined by convention and those who argue for the essential indeterminacy of the relationship between meaning and form.1 Plato's Cratylus aside, the philosphical dialogue that forms the locus classicus of this debate is the following: "You're holding it upside down!" Alice interrupted. "To be sure I was!" Humpty Dumpty said gaily, as she turned it round for (...) him. "I thought it looked a little queer. As I was saying. that seems to be done right - though I haven't time to look it over thoroughly just now - and that shows that there are three hundred and sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday presents -" "Certainly," said Alice. "And only one for birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you!" "I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't - till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!'" "But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,'" Alice objected. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."2 · 1. This should not be taken as an argument for the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning itself. Quite the contrary; it is because meaning can be stable and determinate despite variations in mental acts and linguistic forms that the relation between form and meaning must be indeterminate on the basis merely of rules and conventions.· 2. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, chap. 6. E. D. Hirsch, Jr. is Kenan Professor of English at the University of Virginia. He is the author of Validity in Interpretation and Wordsworth and Schelling: A Typological Study of Romanticism. A second edition of his book on Blake, Innocence and Experience, will appear next year, as will a new book on critical theory. (shrink)

This paper corrects a pervasive mistake in readings of Buber’s iconic trope, “I-Thou” (Ich-Du; hereafter, I-You). The mistake lies in considering it synonymous to the principal concept of his dialogical thought, “relation” (Beziehung). A detailed reading of relevant passages in Buber’s I and Thou (hereafter, IAT) reveals their difference: While both “relation” and “I-You” refer to the same reality—to the dialogic moment—they do so with a different focus and scope: “Relation” refers to the dialogic moment in its bilateral entirety. However, (...) “primary word I-You” (hereafter, PWIY)—the phrase in which the I-You trope in fact appears in IAT—focuses on the active share of only one of the two interlocutors in the dialogic moment. While PWIY does refer to the dialogical moment (which is indeed bilateral), it denotes only a partial aspect of the dialogical moment. It focuses exclusively on my active turning toward you and defocuses your concurrent turning toward me (which, no doubt, is present as well). This mistake, I show, is due to interpreters’ enthusiastic endorsement of Buber’s later phrase, the “I-You relation,” which is indeed synonymous with “relation.” It is then easy to read back the “I-You relation” into the earlier, more focused concept of PWIY. Furthermore, this enthusiasm has blinded readers from realizing that, following IAT, Buber in fact abandoned the I-You trope and used it only reluctantly, mainly when addressing his interpreters who used it themselves, or when discussing IAT where it indeed appeared. (shrink)

The name Iphianassa occurs only once in Latin literature—in the proem toDe Rerum Natura(=DRN). Here Lucretius illustrates the evils of religion with a description of Iphianassa's sacrifice at Aulis (1.80–101):illud in his rebus uereor, ne forte rearisimpia te rationis inire elementa uiamqueindugredi sceleris. quod contra saepius illareligio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta.Aulide quo pacto Triuiai uirginis aramIphianassai turparunt sanguine foedeductores Danaum delecti, prima uirorum.cui simul infula uirgineos circumdata comptusex utraque pari malarum parte profusast,et maestum simul ante aras adstare parentemsensit et (...) hunc propter ferrum celare ministrosaspectuque suo lacrimas effundere ciuis,muta metu terram genibus summissa petebat.nec miserae prodesse in tali tempore quibatquod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem.nam sublata uirum manibus tremibundaque ad arasdeductast, non ut sollemni more sacrorumperfecto posset claro comitari Hymenaeo,sed casta inceste nubendi tempore in ipsohostia concideret mactatu maesta parentis,exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur.tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.It is clear that Lucretius treats the name Iphianassa as a synonym for Iphigenia. Homer (Il. 9.145, 9.287) and Sophocles (El. 157) mention a daughter of Agamemnon called Iphianassa, but in neither author is she the daughter who was sacrificed at Aulis (and in several versions rescued at the last moment by Artemis). The first known mention of this myth was in theCypria, where, according to the summary of Proclus, the daughter was called Iphigenia (Kinkel,EGF19; Bernabé,PEG1.41). Hesiod refers to it in theCatalogue of Women, where he calls the daughter Iphimede (Cat. fr. 23a.15–26 + b M-W). From the fifth centuryb.c.e., the extant sources, beginning with Pindar (Pyth. 11.22) and Aeschylus (Ag. 1526, 1555), call her Iphigenia. Why did Lucretius choose Iphianassa? (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has attracted an increasing amount of attention, both positive and negative. Its potential applications in healthcare are indeed manifold and revolutionary, and within the realm of medical imaging and radiology (which will be the focus of this paper), significant increases in accuracy and speed, as well as significant savings in cost, stand to be gained through the adoption of this technology. Because of its novelty, a norm of keeping humans “in the loop” wherever AI mechanisms are deployed (...) has become synonymous with good ethical practice in some circles. It has been argued that keeping humans “in the loop” is important for reasons of safety, accountability, and the maintenance of institutional trust. However, as the application of machine learning for the detection of lumbar spinal stenosis (LSS) in this paper’s case study reveals, there are some scenarios where an insistence on keeping humans in the loop (or in other words, the resistance to automation) seems unwarranted and could possibly lead us to miss out on very real and important opportunities in healthcare—particularly in low-resource settings. It is important to acknowledge these opportunity costs of resisting automation in such contexts, where better options may be unavailable. Using an AI model based on convolutional neural networks developed by a team of researchers at NUH/NUS medical school in Singapore for automated detection and classification of the lumbar spinal canal, lateral recess, and neural foraminal narrowing in an MRI scan of the spine to diagnose LSS, we will aim to demonstrate that where certain criteria hold (e.g., the AI is as accurate or better than human experts, risks are low in the event of an error, the gain in wellbeing is significant, and the task being automated is not essentially or importantly human), it is both morally permissible and even desirable to kick the humans out of the loop. (shrink)

This article looks at the similarities and differences between Karl Marx’s theory of value and J.S. Mill’s theory of value, where value is synonymous with ‘utility’. It explores how the authors treated the spheres of use and exchange; possibilities of revolutionary social praxis under each of their philosophies; and their respective ability to endure in relevance for the contemporary social world. This article also analyzes their methodologies for achieving utility, focusing on the humanistic and mechanistic aspects of both Marxism and (...) utilitarianism. Connections between their logical aims are also made in the field of ethics. Epistemic considerations are taken into account when making a value judgement on their works, in that materialist philosophy sometimes melds with idealist philosophy in the works of both authors. Finally, an idea will be given as to who was the ‘better philosopher’ judging by consistency of means and ends. (shrink)

The goal Kahn sets for himself in this impressive and important book is "to give an account of the ordinary, nontechnical uses of the Greek verb [eimi]... by dealing extensively with the earliest evidence and by referring to parallel evidence in cognate languages" so as to "make this a study of the Indo-European verb be". He uses a modified version of Zellig Harris’ transformational grammar for analyzing the copula, existential and veridical uses of the verb be in Chs. IV, VI, (...) and VII, which are the core of the book and which will be of special interest to students of linguistics. Ch. II on the concepts of subject and predicate, Ch. V on the general theory of be as copula, and Ch. VIII on the conceptual unity between the multiple uses of be are geared "for readers whose interest is primarily philosophical.". (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to support contextual ethics as a broad and open understanding of ethics and the ethical by commenting on the origin of the words ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ in Greek philosophy and on the ambiguities built into them from the beginning. I further list some complexities that arose when the Latinate words ‘morals’ and ‘moral’ began to be used in Roman, medieval and modern philosophy, sometimes as synonyms of and sometimes in contrast to ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’. (...) Finally, I return to discuss the prospects of contextual ethics in the context of developments in moral philosophy in the twentieth century, adding some pragmatist arguments in its favour. (shrink)

Beauchamp and Childress’ biomedical principlism is nearly synonymous with medical ethics for most clinicians. Their four principles are theoretically derived from the “common morality”, a universal cache of moral beliefs and claims shared by all morally serious humans. Others have challenged the viability of the common morality, but none have attempted to explain why the common morality makes intuitive sense to Western ethicists. Here I use the work of Charles Taylor to trace how events in the Western history of ideas (...) made the common morality seem plausible and yet, ironically, underscore the cultural particularity of the so-called common morality. I conclude that the supposedly universal common morality is actually quite culturally contained. Importantly, this should give us pause about the global authority of principlism and Beauchamp and Childress’ claim to a global bioethics project. (shrink)

With the increasing prevalence of Internet usage, Internet-Delivered Psychological Treatment (IDPT) has become a valuable tool to develop improved treatments of mental disorders. IDPT becomes complicated and labor intensive because of overlapping emotion in mental health. To create a usable learning application for IDPT requires diverse labeled datasets containing an adequate set of linguistic properties to extract word representations and segmentations of emotions. In medical applications, it is challenging to successfully refine such datasets since emotion-aware labeling is time consuming. Other (...) known issues include vocabulary sizes per class, data source, method of creation, and baseline for the human performance level. This paper focuses on the application of personalized mental health interventions using Natural Language Processing (NLP) and attention-based in-depth entropy active learning. The objective of this research is to increase the trainable instances using a semantic clustering mechanism. For this purpose, we propose a method based on synonym expansion by semantic vectors. Semantic vectors based on semantic information derived from the context in which it appears are clustered. The resulting similarity metrics help to select the subset of unlabeled text by using semantic information. The proposed method separates unlabeled text and includes it in the next active learning mechanism cycle. Our method updates model training by using the new training points. The cycle continues until it reaches an optimal solution, and it converts all the unlabeled text into the training set. Our in-depth experimental results show that the synonym expansion semantic vectors help enhance training accuracy while not harming the results. The bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) architecture with an attention mechanism achieved 0.85 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC curve) on the blind test set. The learned embedding is then used to visualize the activated word's contribution to each symptom and find the psychiatrist's qualitative agreement. Our method improves the detection rate of depression symptoms from online forum text using the unlabeled forum texts. (shrink)

This article contributes to a critical discussion of how `question' and `questioning' may be defined in terms of form and function by analyzing the interactional usage of two apparently synonymous `question' words, German warum and wieso and their common English translation why. Warum and why are employed for two different interactional achievements. Wieso marks the utterance as an information request. In this respect, it is affiliative. In contrast, warum points to something wrong and is thus complaint implicative. Recipients orient to (...) warum as disaffiliative. A contrastive analysis of German warum and wieso with English why shows that why allows for ambiguity, whereas warum and wieso are unambiguous. While there is a core usage of these lexical items, they are also employed differently with an orientation to institutionality. In business meetings, there is a correlation between the occurrence of the complaint-implicative warum and the leadership status of the speaker in the team. (shrink)

The study explores the etymological and semantic challenges associated with the term beauty. The authors highlight that beauty is among the most vague and multifaceted concepts. As a result, its users often grasp completely different aspects/dimensions of it. After addressing etymological differences and conducting a conceptual analysis of its synonyms, the authors present empirical findings and a model outlining the semantic space of the term beauty. In the second part of the study, the authors shed light on the reasons (...) behind the use of this ambiguous term, particularly focusing on its evolutionary and existential significance. The conclusion of the study draws attention to the fact that, despite the vagueness of the concept, beauty continues to play a key role in our lives, reflecting our need to share it, and portraying the human being as homo aestheticus. (shrink)

BackgroundDespite its ubiquity in academic research, the phrase ‘ethical challenge(s)’ appears to lack an agreed definition. A lack of a definition risks introducing confusion or avoidable bias. Conceptual clarity is a key component of research, both theoretical and empirical. Using a rapid review methodology, we sought to review definitions of ‘ethical challenge(s)’ and closely related terms as used in current healthcare research literature.MethodsRapid review to identify peer-reviewed reports examining ‘ethical challenge(s)’ in any context, extracting data on definitions of ‘ethical challenge(s)’ (...) in use, and synonymous use of closely related terms in the general manuscript text. Data were analysed using content analysis. Four databases (MEDLINE, Philosopher’s Index, EMBASE, CINAHL) were searched from April 2016 to April 2021.Results393 records were screened, with 72 studies eligible and included: 53 empirical studies, 17 structured reviews and 2 review protocols. 12/72 (17%) contained an explicit definition of ‘ethical challenge(s), two of which were shared, resulting in 11 unique definitions. Within these 11 definitions, four approaches were identified: definition through concepts; reference to moral conflict, moral uncertainty or difficult choices; definition by participants; and challenges linked to emotional or moral distress. Each definition contained one or more of these approaches, but none contained all four. 68/72 (94%) included studies used terms closely related to synonymously refer to ‘ethical challenge(s)’ within their manuscript text, with 32 different terms identified and between one and eight different terms mentioned per study.ConclusionsOnly 12/72 studies contained an explicit definition of ‘ethical challenge(s)’, with significant variety in scope and complexity. This variation risks confusion and biasing data analysis and results, reducing confidence in research findings. Further work on establishing acceptable definitional content is needed to inform future bioethics research. (shrink)

A method of generating synonyms for a stimulus word using a computer is proposed. Vector Space Model, where words in text data are arranged in a multi-dimensional space and degree of similarity between two words of them is calculated from how close the words are in the space, may be available to the method. However, it is not easy to optimize parameters in the method because there is no appropriate standard synonym database where proper synonyms for a stimulus (...) word are thoroughly collected. Therefore, we first built such a standard database employing two steps of human subjects expriments, and optimized the parameters of the method of generating synonyms. As the result, it was found that the Vector Space Model-based method using an electronic dictionary as source is better to generate synonyms than the one using a text corpus and an ordinal method using a thesaurus. (shrink)

Morris and Menzel’s view that God is the Creator of abstract as well as concrete objects is variously referred to by the labels “absolute creation” and “theistic activism.” To use these labels synonymously, however, exhibits a lack of discrimination. Theistic activism is the project of grounding modality in God, particularly in the divine will. Absolute creationism is a nonmodal project which regards abstract objects as created by God. The synonymous use of these terms results in confusion in debates over divine (...) aseity and sovereignty. Philosophical discussion will benefit if we adopt a uniform terminology discriminating between these different views. (shrink)

This paper is a comparative study of two texts separated by a considerable temporal-spatial gap. The methodological approach is, as we would like to define it, a-philological. Five central concepts drawn from the Dàshèng qǐxìn lùn, traditionally associated with Aśvaghoṣa, Paramārtha, and Śikṣānanda, shall be examined against the related ideas found in Ratnākaraśānti’s Prajñāpāramitopadeśa. Our observations are the following: 1) The two dimensions of the single mind advocated in the QXL are doctrinally identical to the two forms of the dependent (...) nature in the PPU. 2) The intermingling mind which is taken as ālayavijñāna in the QXL, corresponds to the imagination of the unreal in the PPU. 3) The mutual perfuming of the real and the unreal is in essence the same as the false inseparability of clear light and image in the PPU. 4) The essence of perception and its synonyms used in the QXL, its commentarial literature and other related texts, find equivalents such as prakāśamānatā, prakāśātmatā, saṃvedyatā, buddhilakṣaṇa, in the PPU. 5) The concept of activated perception in the QXL sheds light on a puzzling word in the PPU, arvāk, which can be interpreted as the opposite of “suddenly” in the QXL. Our investigation reaffirms the philosophical value as well as the religious legitimacy of the QXL, and it underscores the significance of the late mādhyamika texts for Buddhist Studies. (shrink)

The word excellence is derived from the Latin word excellentia, and it means the quality of being extremely good. Human excellences could be defined as those human qualities that make a person outstanding, exceptional, superior, or, in one word, the best of one's kind in any field of human activities. Frequently, it is synonymously used with the word virtue, narrowly meaning moral excellence.

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper (...) argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether. (shrink)

The use of the terms λογισμός and διάνοια in the writings of Plotinus has already been discussed by H. J. Blumenthal in his book entitled Plotinus’ Psychology (1977). Blumenthal here defended the thesis that the terms were used as synonyms in the Enneads. Indeed, though some passages seem to indicate a difference between λογισμός and διάνοια, in the majority of cases Plotinus nonetheless seems to use these words interchangeably. We propose to analyze in detail the terms λογισμός and διάνοια (...) by referring, inter alia, to Treatise 49 [V 3], 2‑3, where the terms seem indeed to be used synonymously, as well as other treatises such as Treatise 28 [IV 4], where Plotinus seems to give each word a different sense. Other scholars, namely E. K. Emilsson, think that we can establish a clear distinction between logismos and dianoia, by a thorough study of the World‑Soul, which has the dianoia, but not the logismos. After a review of Emilsson’s thesis, we will finally propose that Plotinus employs the word διάνοια when he refers to the soul’s capacity to store data for judgement, while he employs the term λογισμός to describe the process of judging this content, which may be distinguished from other processes. (shrink)

The use of lexical concepts in Levelt et al.'s model requires further refinement with regard to syntactic factors in lexical choice, the prevention of pleonasm, and the representation of near-synonyms within and across languages.

Paul Gilroy's subtle use of Theodor Adorno in Postcolonial Melancholia misses the opportunity to forge for the postcolonial world a sense of responsibility for the colonial cultures that this postcolonial world helped to create. Gilroy rightly emphasizes the naïveté often associated with attempts to “dwell convivially with difference”. His negatively dialectical reading of the deterministic logics of racial difference brings into view an already present demotic multiculturalism. He neglects, however, how Adorno's conception of negative dialectics can be understood as postcolonial (...) in its understanding of difference. In other words, both Adorno and Gilroy focus on recuperating a conception of non-antagonistic difference, that is, an understanding of difference as heterogeneity. Yet, Gilroy maintains an a priori sense of cultural difference from Adorno in spite of Postcolonial Melancholia's trajectory of positing a negative dialectics of conviviality. This conviviality is the “fragile, emergent substance of vital planetary humanism” that refuses to render postcoloniality synonymous with the maintenance of nation-state boundaries. Thus, Gilroy forfeits the prospect of conducting a radical postcolonial reading of Adorno, which would demonstrate precisely how colonial history provides “an opening onto the multicultural promise of the postcolonial world”. (shrink)

The use of intention in ethics has been the subject of intense debate for many years, but no consensus has emerged over whether intention is morally relevant, or even how it should be understood. In this paper I wish to make a thorough, though by no means exhaustive, examination of the concept and the concepts around it, some to be seen as near-synonyms, and some as contrasting ideas. My interest is in the ethical use of the concept, though my (...) own analysis of it will be indebted to discussions in the philosophy of action. The most famous ethical use, which will not, however, be my direct focus here, is the ‘principle of double effect,’ which states that an agent may cause or allow something bad as long as, first, no evil is intended as an end or a means; and, second, that the foreseen bad is not out of proportion with the anticipated good. It is important to note the principle’s testimony to the plausibility of prohibitions expressed in terms of intentions, and, alongside these, a general prohibition on doing inordinate harms even without intention. (shrink)

Metamodernism, which is used synonymous with post-postmodernism or neo-modernism, has come forward in response to postmodernism and the emerged crises, instabilities, and uncertainties in all areas of this epoch. Metamodernism is a perspective situated epistemologically with modernism, ontologically between modernism and historically beyond modernism. It seeks an oscillation between modernism and postmodernism with mediating between them and responding to existing cultural modes. Thus, metamodernism is a paradigm beyond modernism and postmodernism, trying to explain today’s cultural and intellectual developments which are (...) not sufficiently criticized by modernism nor postmodernism. This paper questions and discusses the understanding of this paradigm and its reflections on education, school leadership, and schooling in the Nordic countries. By reviewing education related reports, survey reports, books and articles about these countries, comprehending their philosophy of education throughout the years, and analyzing the ongoing educational developments, the main notion of metamodernism and its influences on schooling, leadership implications, classroom activities and research in education are focused on this paper. (shrink)

The term “value theory” is used in at least three different ways in philosophy. In its broadest sense, “value theory” is a catch-all label used to encompass all branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and sometimes feminist philosophy and the philosophy of religion — whatever areas of philosophy are deemed to encompass some “evaluative” aspect. In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory of particular concern to consequentialists. In (...) this narrow sense, “value theory” is roughly synonymous with “axiology”. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states, or objective states of the world. (shrink)

The paper uses insights from the so-called rape in disguise case study to describe forensic DNA practices in the Netherlands in late 1980s. It describes how "reliabilities" of forensic DNA practices were achieved. One such reliability - convincing evidence - proliferates body parts through time and space. Then, attention shifts to the individual who was suspected of having committed the rape. He was asked to deliver tissue for DNA typing, but refused to do so. Hence DNA typing could not be (...) used to connect the suspect to a cervical smear collected from the body of the victim. His refusal and the legal impossibility to use force to obtain his biological material led first to questions in the Dutch parliament and then to the Dutch forensic DNA law. Other legal measures enacted after this are also described. I argue that, by means of the various Dutch forensic DNA laws and new forensic genetic techniques, the application of forensic DNA practices have shifted from identification and evidence to a tool for criminal investigation and prevention of future crimes. In the final part of the paper, the right to inviolability of the body and its synonym bodily integrity are emphasised. I argue that despite the various forensic DNA laws, bodily integrity of obtained tissue for DNA typing is still at stake as the result of convincing evidence. (shrink)

Two declarative sentences are synonymous if, and only if, the statements they can be used to make are. given certain assumptions about the truth or falsity of other statements, confirmed or disconfirmed to the same degree by the same evidence. This criterion of synonymy is Quinean in that it treats confirmation holistically. But unlike Quine's criterion of synonymy, it conforms to and explains our intuitions of sentence synonymy.

In its central use “phenomenology” names a movement in twentieth century philosophy. A second use of “phenomenology” common in contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be in them. Thus, it is sometimes said that emotional states have a phenomenology while belief states do not. For example, while there is something it is like to be angry, there is nothing it is like to (...) believe that Paris is in France. Although the two uses of “phenomenology” are related, it is the first which is the current topic. Accordingly, “phenomenological” refers to a way of doing philosophy that is more or less closely related to the corresponding movement. Phenomenology utilizes a distinctive method to study the structural features of experience and of things as experienced. It is primarily a descriptive discipline and is undertaken in a way that is largely independent of scientific, including causal, explanations and accounts of the nature of experience. Topics discussed within the phenomenological tradition include the nature of intentionality, perception, time-consciousness, self-consciousness, awareness of the body and consciousness of others. Phenomenology is to be distinguished from phenomenalism, a position in epistemology which implies that all statements about physical objects are synonymous with statements about persons having certain sensations or sense-data. George Berkeley was a phenomenalist but not a phenomenologist. -/- Although elements of the twentieth century phenomenological movement can be found in earlier philosophers—such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Franz Brentano—phenomenology as a philosophical movement really began with the work of Edmund Husserl. Following Husserl, phenomenology was adapted, broadened and extended by, amongst others, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Phenomenology has, at one time or another, been aligned with Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental philosophy, existentialism and the philosophy of mind and psychology. -/- This article introduces some of the central aspects of the phenomenological method and also concrete phenomenological analyses of some of the topics that have greatly exercised phenomenologists. (shrink)

This article analyses the use of the term “‘political oeconomy” in the Wealth of Nations, considered by many the founding text of the discipline of Political Economy. It shows that Adam Smith could not accept the use of the term “political oeconomy” that had been made by other authors to indicate the subject matter of his scientific inquiry, devoted to the nature and causes of the wealth of nations; he used the term “political oeconomy” as a synonym for economic policy, (...) especially in the fourth book of the Wealth of Nations. In order to understand this statement, it is necessary to keep in mind the methodological and epistemological perspective developed by Smith; in his view, the inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations would have to discover the almost unchangeable rules that presided over the choices of the legislators in the field of public economy and in the management of public resources. By contrast, the term “political oeconomy” was used by Smith exactly to indicate the policies really adopted in these fields, policies which frequently altered the system of natural liberty. (shrink)

Although they are often used as synonyms, emancipation and liberation constitute two distinct normative horizons in critical theory of society. In this article, I offer an analysis of these two concepts, including their historical and epistemological characteristics, pointing out similarities, differences and the possibilities for their combined use as basis of models of normative social criticism. I argue that the critical horizon of human emancipation emerges in post-Kantian European thought, while the horizon of liberation was developed in Latin American (...) decolonial thinking in the second half of the 20th century. The horizon of emancipation arises with the critique of the primacy of systemic domination, while liberation emerges in the resistance to the primacy of the experience of oppression. The analytical distinction between these two normative horizons can be helpful to better understand both the foundations of epistemic decolonization and the potential for dialogue between the critical perspectives of center and periphery. (shrink)

Thayer-Bacon uses this opportunity to further explore Rancière's ideas concerning equality as described in The Ignorant Schoolmaster and their connection to democracy, as he explains in Hatred of Democracy. For Rancière, intelligence and equality are synonymous terms, just as reason and will are synonymous terms. Rancière recommends the only way to really teach a student is by viewing the student as an equal. Thayer-Bacon learned to view students as equals through her experience as a Montessori teacher, and so she brings (...) Montessori into conversation with Rancière to further explore the idea of equality between teachers and students, as well as between citizens in a democracy. There are problems with both Rancière's perspective and Montessori's that feminist theory, in the form of a relational ontology and epistemology, can help us solve by finding our way out of the paradoxes of democracy and on to trusting our students, our future democratic citizens. (shrink)

This paper relates to a formal statement of the mechanisms that are thought minimally necessary to underpin consciousness. This is expressed in the form of axioms. We deem this to be useful if there is ever to be clarity in answering questions about whether this or the other organism is or is not conscious. As usual, axioms are ways of making formal statements of intuitive beliefs and looking, again formally, at the consequences of such beliefs. The use of this style (...) of exposition does not entail a claim to provide a mathematically rigorous formal deductive system. Conventional mathematical notation is used to achieve clarity, although this is elaborated with natural language in an attempt to reduce terseness. In our view, making the approach axiomatic is synonymous with building clear usable tests for consciousness and is therefore a central feature of the paper. The extended scope of this approach is to lay down some essential properties that should be considered when designing machines that could be said to be conscious. In the broader discussion about the nature of consciousness and its neurological mechanisms, it may seem to some that axiomatisation is premature and continues to beg many questions. However, the approach is meant to be open- ended so that others can build further axiomatic clarifications that address the very large number of questions which, in the search for a formal basis for consciousness, still remain to be answered. Of course, in discussions about consciousness many will also argue that the subject is not one that may ever be formally addressed by means of axioms. The view taken in this paper is 'let's try to do it and see how far it gets'. (shrink)

The first time Umāsvāti uses the word manas in his Tattvārtha-sūtra, the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala. These are the pramāṇas. In TAS 1, 14 mati or sense perception is said to be caused by indriya and aninindriya; Pūjyapāda’s commentary says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the manas/anindriya in mati, manaḥ-paryāya (...) and śruta, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system manas is seen as both an organ of cognition and an organ of action. It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of manas in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system. (shrink)

Frege puzzles exploit cognitive differences between co-referential terms. Traditionally, they were handled by some version of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, which avoided disruptive consequences for epistemology. However, the Fregean programme did not live up to its original promise, and was undermined by the development of theories of direct reference; for semantic purposes, its prospects now look dim. In particular, well-known analogues of Frege puzzles concern pairs of uncontentious synonyms; attempts to deal with them by distinguishing idiolects or (...) postulating ‘narrow contents’ or elaborate forms of context-sensitivity are inadequate or semantically implausible. Although ascriptions of knowledge, belief, and other attitudes are ubiquitous in epistemology, epistemologists have not properly come to terms with the surprising consequences of anti-Fregean semantic accounts of attitude ascriptions. In ‘A Puzzle about Belief ’, Saul Kripke shows that natural-seeming disquotational principles for ascribing belief lead to apparently unacceptable consequences, including outright contradictions, in problem cases. Such disquotation principles, I argue, are best regarded not as conceptual connections but just as heuristics in the psychological sense, quick and easy ways of assessing belief ascriptions, usually accurate under normal conditions but far from 100% reliable. I discuss similar heuristics for ascribing knowledge and other attitudes. That the principles have a merely heuristic status need not be pre-theoretically manifest to their users. This view vindicates Kripke’s conclusion that it would be wrong-headed to draw semantic conclusions from Frege puzzles. I discuss the epistemological consequences of an anti-Fregean approach to Frege puzzles, including for Kripke’s cases of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori, but also for evidence, for epistemic modalities, and for epistemic and subjective conceptions of probability. Anna Mahtani’s recent identification of Frege puzzles for the ex ante Pareto Principle as used in welfare economics provides an interesting example. I suggest a model-building methodology as the most promising way of handling at least some of the difficulties. A final issue is the choice between different anti-Fregean approaches to semantics, from very coarse-grained intensional approaches on which sentences express functions from possible worlds to truth-values to more fine-grained hyperintensional approaches on which sentences express functions from possible or impossible worlds to truth-values or else Russellian structured propositions. Some of the hyperintensional theories violate semantic compositionality. More generally, since our attitude ascriptions rely on heuristics, they should be expected to exhibit some level of error; although hyperintensional approaches may be able slightly to reduce the level of postulated error, they do so at the cost of vastly increased theoretical complexity, and so have weak explanatory power. Methodologically, a simple intensional approach does better. (shrink)

People who have not experienced diseases and health conditions tend to judge them to be worse than they are reported to be by people who have experienced them. This phenomenon, known as the disability paradox, presents a challenge for health policy, and in particular, healthcare resource distribution. This divergence between patient and public preferences is most plausibly explained as a result of hedonic adaptation, a widespread phenomenon in which people tend to adapt fairly quickly to the state they are in, (...) good or bad, and adjust their baseline utility accordingly.If patient utilities can be shown to be inappropriate for use in public policy decision making, the disability paradox fades away. This paper offers a critique of one such attempt: the idea that adaptation leads to adaptive preferences. I argue that none of the main accounts of adaptive preferences in fact characterise adapted patient preferences as irrational. Adapted preferences should not, therefore, be treated as synonymous with adaptive preferences. I suggest that much patient adaptation should be understood as a form of the ubiquitous human ability to respond to environmental change. Consequently, we ought not to discount patient preferences. (shrink)

The phrase "natural kind term" has come into the linguistic and philosophical literature in connection with well-known work of Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1970, 1975a). I use that phrase here in the sense it has acquired from those and subseqnent works on related topics. This is not the transparent sense of the phrase. That is, if I am right in what follows there are words for kinds of things existing in nature which are not natural kind terms in the current (...) sense - e.g. planet, woman, and weed. I use the term "nondescriptional", following Salmon (1981), to mean "lacking a Fregean sense", where a Fregean sense is taken to be a property or group of properties semantically associated with an expression which determines its denotation. I hope that the term "nondescriptional" will be clarified in subsequent discussion, but perhaps a few words about it and its opposite, "descriptional", would be useful here. These terms (as Salmon notes (p.15, n. 11)) should be taken as technical terms. The idea is that descriptional words, of which bachelor is the overwhelmingly favorite example, express a semantic content, or sense, which is what mediates their denotation. Entities fall in their denotation in virtue of possessing the property or properties expressed as their sense. (It is not necessary, however, that this sense be as easily paraphrasable with descriptive synonyms as it is typically held to be in the case of bachelor, or even that it be paraphrasable at all.) In the case of nondescriptional words there is no Fregean sense to mediate the link between word and object. Hence such terms are described by what Salmon, following Kaplan, calls "the theory of direct reference". What it is that does associate such terms with their denotations is another question which will be touched on briefly at the end. I have several aims in this paper. The first is to defend a conservative position on nondescriptionality. I will argue that relatively few natural language words have this property. My other aims are primarily clarificatory. Among the issues I would like to clarify are those connected with the determination of this property and flae explanation of why it exists, its relationship with other properties such as rigid designation and essentiality, and its significance for lexical semantics. The organization of the paper is as follows. The first section identifies the position taken here on the question of which expressions are nondescriptional and provides a general defense of it. The second section is a critical examination of criteria associated with nondescriptionality. In the third section provide further defense for the conservative position, and in the fourth section we turn to related issues in lexical semantics. (shrink)

Among others, the term problem plays a major role in the various attempts to characterize interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, as used synonymously in this paper. Interdisciplinarity is regarded as problem solving among science, technology and society and as problem orientation beyond disciplinary constraints. The point of departure of this paper is that the discourse and practice of ID have problems with the problem. The objective here is to shed some light on the vague notion of problem in order to advocate a (...) specific type of interdisciplinarity: problem-oriented interdisciplinarity. The outline is as follows: Taking an ex negativo approach, I will show what problem-oriented ID does not mean. Using references to well-established distinctions in philosophy of science, I will show three other types of ID that should not be placed under the umbrella term problem-oriented ID : object-oriented ID, theory-oriented ID, and method-oriented ID. Different philosophical thought traditions can be related to these distinguishable meanings. I will then clarify the notion of problem by looking at three systematic elements: an undesired state, a desired state, and the barriers in getting from the one to the other. These three elements include three related kinds of knowledge: systems, target, and transformation knowledge. This paper elaborates further methodological and epistemological elements of problem-oriented ID. It concludes by stressing that problem-oriented ID is the most needed as well as the most challenging type of ID. (shrink)

The current study investigates how native speakers of a morphologically complex language handle uncertainty related to linguistic forms that have gaps in their inflectional paradigms. We analyze their strategies of dealing with paradigmatic defectivity and how these strategies are motivated by subjective contemporaneousness, frequency, acceptability, and other lexical and structural characteristics of words. We administered a verb production task with Finnish native speakers using verbs from a small non-productive inflectional type that has many paradigmatic gaps and asked participants to inflect (...) the verbs in a given context. Inflectional uncertainty was measured by the number of different forms the participants produced for each verb. We classified produced forms that were not expected as either synonymous or novel and measured their optimal string alignment distance to expected forms. Our analyses revealed that a usage-based approach to paradigmatic defectivity fits better with the obtained results than a classical approach typically met in dictionaries and descriptive grammars. Thus, we argue, that paradigmatic defectivity can be better described as a dynamic rather than a static system, where gaps represent a continuum of possible inflectional choices rather than a lack of an inflectional variant. (shrink)

The current article is the first in a series of review articles addressing biosemiotic terminology. The biosemiotic glossary project is inclusive and designed to integrate views of a representative group of members within the biosemiotic community based on a standard survey and related publications. The methodology section describes the format of the survey conducted in November–December 2013 in preparation of the current review and targeted on the terms ‘agent’ and ‘agency’. Next, I summarize denotation, synonyms and antonyms, with special (...) emphasis on the denotation of these terms in current biosemiotic usage. The survey findings include ratings of nine citations defining or making use of the two terms. I provide a summary of respondents’ own definitions and suggested term usage. Further sections address etymology, connotations, and related terms in English and other languages. A section on the notions’ mainstream meaning vs. their meaning in biosemiotics is followed by attempt at synthesis and conclusions. Although there is currently no consensus in the biosemiotic community on what constitutes a semiotic agent, i.e., an agent in the context of semiosis, most respondents agree that core attributes of an agent include goal-directedness, self-governed activity, processing of semiosis and choice of action, with these features being vital for the functioning of the living system in question. I agree that these four features are constitutive of biosemiotic agents, and stipulate that biosemiotic agents fall within three major categories, namely 1) sub-organismic biosemiotic agents, 2) organismic biosemiotic agents and 3) super-organismic biosemiotic agents. (shrink)

Ever since John Leslie Mackie’s ‘popularization’ of moral error theories in meta-ethics, increasing attention has been focused on how to escape the force of nihilism. For many opponents of the moral error theory, ‘moral nihilism’ is used as a derogatory synonym associated with immorality and selfishness, but such a defamatory usage of the label is obviously not very helpful for a serious philosophical examination of the view. The goal of this paper is to draw on insights by David Hume and (...) other Humean philosophers such as J.L. Mackie, Richard Joyce, and Richard Garner, in order to turn ‘moral nihilism’ from a term of abuse to a ‘badge of honour’. (shrink)

This book provides an overview of key features of (philosophical) materialism, in historical perspective. It is, thus, a study in the history and philosophy of materialism, with a particular focus on the early modern and Enlightenment periods, leading into the 19th and 20th centuries. For it was in the 18th century that the word was first used by a philosopher (La Mettrie) to refer to himself. Prior to that, 'materialism' was a pejorative term, used for wicked thinkers, as a near-synonym (...) to 'atheist', 'Spinozist' or the delightful 'Hobbist'. The book provides the different forms of materialism, particularly distinguished into claims about the material nature of the world and about the material nature of the mind, and then focus on materialist approaches to body and embodiment, selfhood, ethics, laws of nature, reductionism and determinism, and overall, its relationship to science. For materialism is often understood as a kind of philosophical facilitator of the sciences, and the author want to suggest that is not always the case. Materialism takes on different forms and guises in different historical, ideological and scientific contexts as well, and the author wants to do justice to that diversity. Figures discussed include Lucretius, Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, Toland, Collins, La Mettrie, Diderot, d'Holbach and Priestley; Büchner, Bergson, J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong. (shrink)

Philosophy of history, theory of history, and historical theory are three existing labels that are sometimes, but not always, treated as synonyms.1 Each of these has been used by both historians and philosophers to define a specific field of inquiry, which entailed its own approaches, methods, concepts, and problems, as well as specific venues and audiences, though these often overlap each other. As such, it is difficult to state clearly which label has been used by which community for what (...) ends. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 195-198 [Access article in PDF] Implicit and Explicit Temporality Thomas Fuchs Keywords implicit/explicit temporality, embodiment, intersubjectivity, desynchronization, melancholia, schizophrenia Since Minkowski (1970), Strauss (1966), v. Gebsattel (1954), and Tellenbach (1980), temporality has been a main subject of phenomenological psychiatry. Drawing on philosophical concepts of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, these authors have analyzed psychopathologic deviations of time experience, mainly from an individual point of (...) view, for example, as a slowing down or inhibition of lived time in depression or obsessive–compulsive disorder. Their analyses are still most valuable today, but may be carried further by introducing concepts such as embodied and intersubjective temporality into psychopathology. Martin Wyllie (2005), by opening up a wide scope of temporal phenomena and related concepts, makes a laudable effort to contribute to such a progress.In my commentary, I would like to propose a distinction that is suggested by much of Wyllie's analysis and may shed further light on psychopathology, namely between implicit and explicit temporality. If we look at a child while obliviously playing with his toys, lost to the world, we may assume that there is no sense of the time passing. Lived time runs with the movement of life, implicit in the child's experience of being engaged in his play and directed toward his goals. It "unfolds through the processes of bodily activity" (Wyllie 2005). Future and past do not stand out against the pure presence of "becoming." This implicit mode of temporality is retrieved every time that we are absorbed in what we are doing, and may even reach the climax of "flow experiences" (Csikszentmihalyi 1988) where the sense of time is lost in unimpeded, fluent performance.However, this changes when a gap arises between need and satisfaction, desire and fulfillment, or plan and execution. Now the future appears as a "not yet" or "yet to come," experienced as the temporality of awaiting, striving, or longing for. Time is felt as passing by and refusing the desired fulfillment; it becomes conscious or explicit. A similar gap arises between the present and something irretrievably lost, bringing the past to consciousness as a "no more." Again time is experienced explicitly, but now as moving on relentlessly and separating us from the lost object. The gap to the past may not be bridged any more: this is the temporality of missing or mourning. In both cases, explicit time arises as a negation of implicit or lived time (here my use of the term is a bit divergent from Wyllie's); it is experienced as a "not yet" or "no more," often with a component of displeasure or suffering (Fuchs 2001a, 2003)."Implicit" versus "explicit time" thus come near to another distinction well known in phenomenology, namely between the "lived" and [End Page 195] the "corporal body" (Leib versus Koerper). The first term refers to the body functioning in the tacit mode, as the medium of everyday performance. The second term points to the body as turning into the object of attention, for example, when it puts up resistance to our purposes, or is used as an instrument deliberately (Fuchs 2001b). In fact, implicit temporality and tacit performance of the body are nearly synonymous: Lived time may be regarded as a function of the lived body, opened up by its potentiality and capability. The more we are engaged in our tasks, the more we forget time as well as the body; we are, as it were, "inside time." On the other hand, in explicit temporality the body often appears in the corporal or explicit mode as well. For example, when falling ill, we experience our body no more as a tacit medium but rather as an object or obstacle, while we notice the slowing down of time and may even feel excluded from the movement of life. Thus, embodiment and temporality have a parallel background–foreground structure.I now try to carry these considerations further by including the intersubjective dimension of time. In an earlier paper, I describe the attunement of the living being to its environment as a continuous synchronization on the biological as... (shrink)