Vaesen's description of uniquely human tool-related cognitive abilities rings true but would be enhanced by an account of how those abilities would have evolved. I suggest that a process of technological selection operated on the cognitive architecture of ancestral hominids because they, unlike other tool-using species, depended on tools for their survival.

The evolution of development has become a central concern in both evolu­tionary and developmental research, and human immaturity is no less a proper focus for evolutionary analysis than that of other species-if anything, it is more so. Two new books by David F. Bjorklund, a founder of evolutionary developmental psychology, summarize what we know now and propose that children invented our species. Due to the new phe­nomenon of partly heritable epigenetic modification of genes and the old (...) one of the Bald­win Effect, this claim must be at least partly true. The inherent plasticity of children’s behavior, including play, accelerat­ed the evolution of humanity as instantiated in the human brain. Evolution cannot be understood without extensive reference to development, and nothing in childhood makes sense except in the light of evolution. (shrink)

There are a number of reasons to be interested in building humanoid robots. They include (1) since almost all human artifacts have been designed to easy for humans to interact with, humanoid robots provide backward compatibility with the existing human constructed world, (2) humanoid robots provide a natural form for humans to operate through telepresence since they have the same kinematic design as humans themselves, (3) by building humanoid robots that model humans directly they will be a (...) useful tool in understanding how humans develop and operate as they provide a platform for experimenting with different hypotheses about humans and (4) humanoid robots, given su cient abilities, will present a natural interface to people and people will be able to use their instinctive and culturally developed subconscious techniques for communicating with other people to communicate with humanoid robots. In this paper we take reason (4) seriously, and examine some of the technologies that are necessary to make this hope a reality. (shrink)

Disciplinary Non-Consolidation. On the Origins of Medieval Archaeology in the 1920s and the 1930s. This article investigates the roots of the sub-discipline medieval archaeology that emerged in German-speaking universities in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1930s, research practices crucial for the formation of medieval archaeology, such as the investigation of medieval castles and peasant houses, became more prominent in the humanities, especially in the context of völkisch research. After the Nazis took power in Germany, they encouraged such research (...) because it built a scientific basis for their nationalist policy. This politically motivated funding did not result in a new discipline, in contrast to research fields such as prehistory and folklore studies. In this article, I propose two explanations for why medieval archaeology did not emerge as an interdisciplinary research field in the 1930s and 1940s, even though the course was set for its development. First, for archaeologists, art historians, and regional medieval historians, research objects such as medieval castles were semantically too indeterminate. Archaeologists would investigate a castle as a building completely destroyed and buried under rubble, while art historians would be interested in its building technique, and regional medieval historians in its written record. Second, disciplines that were important for the creation of medieval archaeology, such as prehistoric archaeology, art history, and regional medieval history, structurally did not allow for the emergence of an interdisciplinary research field in the 1930s. In particular, prehistoric archaeology, which was crucial for the development of medieval archaeology, itself was not fully institutionalized at universities in the 1930s. This institutionalization process prevented the emergence and development of an interdisciplinary research field such as medieval archaeology. To demonstrate this argument, I draw on two examples of investigations of castles, one in Nazi Germany and the other in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. (shrink)

This article aims to introduce English-speaking readers to a still little-known tradition of French philosophy of technology: the “biological philosophy of technology.” As recognized by Georges Canguilhem, this philosophy was initiated by Henri Bergson, who conceived of technology as an extension of life, which in its evolution, creates natural tools (organs) and artificial ones (technical objects). The paleontologist André Leroi-Gourhan took up this thesis and put it to the test of archaeological data to demonstrate, on the one (...) hand, the biological basis of technical evolution and on the other hand, the importance of technics for human evolution. Finally, Gilbert Simondon extended Leroi-Gourhan’s scientific technology from the study of tools to that of machines, providing yet another fruitful example of the biological philosophy of technology. (shrink)

The economy and global competitiveness are the bottom line for society and governments, or so says conventional wisdom. But what are the real needs that must be satisfied to live rich, fulfilling lives? This is the question David Suzuki explores in this wide-ranging study. Suzuki begins by presenting the concept of people as creatures of the Earth who depend on its gifts of air, water, soil, and sun energy. He shows how people are genetically programmed for the company of (...) class='Hi'>other species, and suffer enormously when we fail to live in harmony with them. And he analyzes those deep spiritual needs, rooted in nature, that are also a crucial component of a loving world. Drawing on his own experiences and those of others who have put their beliefs into action, "The Sacred Balance" is a powerful, passionate book with concrete suggestions for creating an ecologically sustainable, satisfying, and fair future by rediscovering and addressing humanity' s basic needs. (shrink)

Language’s intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, (...) voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. (shrink)

Language's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, (...) voluntary) production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. (shrink)

Currently, some philosophers and technicians propose to change the fundamental constitution of Homo sapiens, as by significantly altering the genome, implanting microchips in the brain, and pursuing related techniques. Among these proposals are aspirations to guide humanity’s evolution into new species. Some philosophers have countered that such species alteration is unethical and have proposed international policies to protect species integrity; yet, it remains unclear on what basis such right to species integrity would rest. An answer may (...) come from an unexpected angle of rights issues: Some cultures have indicated that they want no part of our technological culture, preferring to retain their practices. Yet, rights documents do not explicitly establish that any individual has a right to species integrity. Careful interpretation of rights documents nonetheless reveals that such a right to species integrity is implicit. Interpreting these so as to reveal this needed right is also necessary to retain the foundations of rights documents and institutions. Further, acknowledging a right of species integrity could mean, because of practicalities, a limit to the freedom of proponents to implement proposals to manipulate the species. (shrink)

A broad set of public policy debates concern the limits of humanity’s control over nature. Attitudes towards such topics are not well explained by the standard 2-dimensional political model favored by political scientists of i) a left/right economic spectrum and ii) a liberal/authoritarian social spectrum. I pose a new, orthogonal, political spectrum to fill the void. It is a spectrum of value held for, on the one hand, nature, and on the other, technological progress. This harks back (...) to the 18th Century Enlightenment and Romanticism, but manifests again and again, including in recent debates about human enhancement biotechnology. (shrink)

ArgumentBiological drawings of newly described or revised species are expected to represent the type specimen with greatest possible accuracy. In taxonomic practice, illustrations assume the function of mobile representatives of relatively immobile specimens. In other words, such illustrations serve as “immutable mobiles” in the Latourian sense. However, the significance of drawing in the context of first descriptions goes far beyond that of illustration in the conventional sense. Not only does it synthesize the verbal catalogue of the type's morphological (...) characteristics: it also enables the examination of these traits. The efficacy of drawing is thus closely related to its power to direct and redirect observation; it is inextricably bound up with the act of making a drawing. Although the invariance of the “immutable mobiles” is a key virtue of the logistics of “paperwork,” the recovery of graphic knowledge requires a much stronger dynamic activity – a process of sequential processing that brings out differences by translating the phenomenon under examination into various modes of graphic representation. (shrink)

Most philosophers are familiar with the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and the clay. A sculptor begins with some clay, eventually sculpting a statue from it. Are the clay and the statue one and the same thing? Apparently not, since they have different properties. For example, the clay could survive being squashed, but the statue could not. The statue is recently formed, though the clay is not, etc. Godehart Link 1983’s highly influential analysis of the count/mass distinction recommends that English (...) draws a distinction between uncountable “stuff” and countable “things”. There are two mereological relations, related in specific ways. Our primary question here is whether an empirically adequate account of the mass/count distinction really does require distinguishing “things” from “stuff”, and thus postulating two corresponding mereological relations, or if instead positing only one sort of entity and corresponding mereological relation is sufficient, as other semantic theories would have it. This question is meant to be one of what we call natural language mereology. We are asking about the mereological commitments of English, or perhaps competent speakers of English, and not about ultimate reality as such. There is no pretense that we will definitively solve the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and clay. (shrink)

: The nature/culture dualism has long been criticized for constructing social beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that fail to respect and value the natural world. One possible way to bridge the divide between the human and non-human worlds is the process of identification. Orangutans, an endangered species found in Indonesia and Malaysia, enable individuals to bridge, connect, and identify with a seemingly separate natural world. Through identification with orangutans, humans come to reevaluate their own perspectives and (...) dichotomous ways of thinking about their relationships with nature. (shrink)

Most philosophers are familiar with the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and the clay. A sculptor begins with some clay, eventually sculpting a statue from it. Are the clay and the statue one and the same thing? Apparently not, since they have different properties. For example, the clay could survive being squashed, but the statue could not. The statue is recently formed, though the clay is not, etc. Godehart Link 1983’s highly influential analysis of the count/mass distinction recommends that English (...) draws a distinction between uncountable “stuff” and countable “things”. There are two mereological relations, related in specific ways. Our primary question here is whether an empirically adequate account of the mass/count distinction really does require distinguishing “things” from “stuff”, and thus postulating two corresponding mereological relations, or if instead positing only one sort of entity and corresponding mereological relation is sufficient, as other semantic theories would have it. This question is meant to be one of what we call natural language mereology. We are asking about the mereological commitments of English, or perhaps competent speakers of English, and not about ultimate reality as such. There is no pretense that we will definitively solve the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and clay. (shrink)

Archer presents a traditional view of intrasexual competition. Knowledge of a species' social structure provides a more complete picture. Human males compete against individuals with whom they may cooperate later in inter-group aggression. By contrast, females compete against individuals for a mate's continued support. Females' aggression may aim at eliminating the competition, whereas males simply may attempt to dominate others.

It is now a quarter of a century ago that Wolfgang Stegmfiller wrote his monograph 'Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik' (1957) which dealt with Tarski's and Carnap's foundational work in the field of semantics. While this book is about the definition of the basic semantical concepts in artificial formal languages there is an article written a year earlier (1956) in which Stegmfiller addresses himself specifically to the relation between logic and natural language. Here he gives a logical analysis (...) of the standard structural expressions in language that are still of primary concern for current semantics: quantifiers, pronouns, articles, etc. The motives for such an analysis at that time were mainly philosophical: the aim was to expose the misconceptions and pitfalls of traditional philosophy arising from the disregard of various systematic semantic ambiguities in everyday language. Or as Stegmfiller puts it: Ober sie [i.e. einige nicht triviale F~ille von Vagheit in der A11tagssprache] Klarheit zu gewinnen, ist schon deshalb yon auBerordentlicher Bedeutung, weil Unkenntnis fiber sie zu schwersten philosophischen Verirrungen ffihren kann, namlich entweder der Unterlassung von berechtigten Fragestellungen, oder, was weit h~ufiger vorgekommen ist, der Formulierung yon falsch gestellten Fragen, denen gegenfiber man dann nur die Wahl hat, entweder fiberhaupt keine oder nur sinnlose Antworten zu geben. So logic was to regiment language. Sentences involving the copula and the above-mentioned structure words are assigned one or more unambiguous formal representations in an already interpreted formal language, usually the first order predicate calculus. The natural language expressions thereby receive a precise meaning, since the semantics of the formal language has been specified in advance, as is always assumed. This procedure has, of course, always been common practice, witness the typical syntactical argot of the mathematicians. It carries, however, an obvious methodological presupposition: it is the idea that the logic of our choice to which the formal representations belong is in some sense an adequate framework to express our thoughts. (shrink)

As the third volume of a trilogy which also comprises The Insect Societies and Sociobiology, On Human Nature sets out to identify and to solve certain contemporary spiritual "dilemmas." According to Wilson, we have now clearly recognized that the intersection of the causality of natural selection with that of environmental necessity explains human nature. This awareness, he suggests, has brought us today to experience these three dilemmas: first, that the human species "lacks any goal (...) external to its own biological nature"; second, that "morality evolved as instinct"; and finally, that we will soon be able to control our own evolution through molecular engineering and cloning. For Wilson, human life has no transcendent source of meaning, of moral values, or of guidance for its own future evolution. Having offered this diagnosis of the human condition, Wilson prescribes replacing the old humanistic, religious, and Marxist mythologies with wholehearted assent to "the mythology of scientific materialism." Wilson's sociobiological version of scientific materialism has, he claims, the added power of being able to explain the old mythologies themselves as products of natural selection and cultural determinism. The minimum claims of the "evolutionary epic" are these. (shrink)

The German tradition of considering species, and higher taxonomic entities, as individuals begins with the temporalization of natural history, thus pre-dating Darwin’s ‘Origin’ of 1859. In the tradition of German Naturphilosophie as developed by Friedrich Schelling, species came to be seen as parts of a complex whole that encompasses all (living) nature. Species were comprehended as dynamic entities that earn individuality by virtue of their irreversible passage through time. Species individuality was conceived in terms (...) of species taxa forming a spatiotemporally located relational system (complex whole), a conception of species that was easily assimilated to an evolutionary world view. However, the dynamics of an evolutionary process driven by variation and natural selection created a tension between continuity in nature as opposed to the discreteness and relative stasis of species. As a consequence, some authors such as Ernst Haeckel and Karl August Möbius denied the reality of species, while others explicitly linked the reality and individuality of species to their temporal duration. The mature conception of species as individuals, as formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy and adopted by Willi Hennig, is one of an historically conditioned, spatiotemporally located, causally integrated, dynamic yet transiently homeostatically stabilized relational system. (shrink)

The improbability of a spontaneously generated self-assembling molecule has suggested that life began with a set of simpler, collectively replicating elements, such as an enclosed autocatalytic set of polymers (or autocell). Since replication occurs without a self-assembly code, acquired characteristics are inherited. Moreover, there is no strict distinction between alive and dead; one can only infer that an autocell was alive if it replicates. These features of early life render natural selection inapplicable to the description of its change-of-state because they (...) defy its underlying assumptions. Moreover, natural selection describes only randomly generated novelty; it cannot describe the emergence of form at the interface between organism and environment. Self-organization is also inadequate because it is restricted to interactions amongst parts; it too cannot account for context-driven change. A modified version of selection theory or self-organization would not work because the description of change-of-state through interaction with an incompletely specified context has a completely different mathematical structure, i.e. entails a non-Kolmogorovian probability model. It is proposed that the evolution of early life is appropriately described as lineage transformation through context-driven actualization of potential, with self-organized change-of-state being a special case of no contextual influence, and competitive exclusion of less fit individuals through a selection-like process possibly (but not necessarily) playing a secondary role. It is argued that natural selection played an important role in evolution only after genetically mediated replication was established. (shrink)

This article explores the possibility that John Dewey’s silence on the matter of which democratic means are needed to achieve democratic ends, while confusing, makes greater sense if we appreciate the notion of political technology from an anthropological perspective. Michael Eldridge relates the exchange between John Herman Randall, Jr., and Dewey in which Dewey concedes “that I have done little or nothing in this direction [of outlining what constitutes adequate political technology, but that] does not detract from my (...) recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters.” Dewey’s concession could be interpreted as an admission that he was unqualified to identify political machinery or institutions suitable for realizing his vision of democracy as a way of life. Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty democratic ends is not problematic, though, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey’s work (especially Human Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas. For then experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural conditions such that specifying explicit means to structure that experience risks stymieing the organic development of political practice. When pressured to operationalize political technology, he chose the appropriately open-ended and, at times, frustratingly vague means of education and growth. In short, Dewey did not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip the possibilities of practice, so he left the task of specifying exact political technology (or which democratic means are best suited to achieve democratic ends) unfinished. (shrink)

This book deals with the ethics of technology and addresses specific ethical problems related to some emerging technologies, mainly in the field of computer science (from machine learning models to extracting value from data to human–robot interaction). The contributions are authored mainly by scholars in ICT and other engineering fields who reflect on ethical and societal issues emerging from their own research activity. Thus, rather uniquely, the work overcomes the traditional divide between pure ethical theory that disregards (...) what practitioners do and mere R&D practice that ignores what theorists conceptualize. Conversely, the reader is enabled to understand what ethics means when it is actually put into work by engineering researchers. The book arises from a joint program between MIT and Politecnico di Milano aimed at training early career researchers in addressing the ethical issues of technology and critically reflecting on the social impacts of the emerging, and even disruptive, technologies they are currently developing through their novel research. Overall, it aims at spreading the task of developing technologies that, from the beginning, are designed to be responsible for human life, society, and nature. (shrink)

In recent years, many studies have highlighted the changing nature of scholarly research, reflecting the new digital tools and techniques that have been developed. But researcher uptake of these tools is strongly influenced by existing information behaviour, itself affected by a number of factors, particularly discipline. This article outlines findings from a recent study which used six case studies to look at the information behaviours of researchers working in different disciplinary fields or academic departments, or using specific tools. The (...) study suggested that researchers’ uses of, and attitudes towards, digital technologies are affected by existing disciplinary habits and preconceptions. Furthermore, it found that the computational and collaborative complexity of the tools that researchers used was linked to their disciplinary backgrounds. (shrink)

Although there is a history in urban thought wherein scholars view cities as technologies, the encompassing character of such views inherently limits them. In turn, their usefulness does not efficiently support the kind of thinking that is required to deliver worthwhile outcomes that can promote social justice and human flourishing. However, narrowing the focus through examining municipalities as technologies offers possibilities that can help us achieve such goals. To maximize the utility of this endeavor, employing the structural-ethics approach (...) provides a way to assess urban technologies to achieve success. In this paper, the author explores the ideas above, revealing how they advance our thinking when it comes to remaking, planning, and building existing and future cities. The article concludes by linking these claims to other lessons in urban studies and geography. (shrink)

Barbarism was by no means unique to the past 100 years, Jonathan Glover tells us, but ''it is still right that much of 20th-century history has been a very unpleasant surprise.'' This was the century of Passchendaele, Dresden, Nanking, Nagasaki and Rwanda; of the Final Solution, the gulag, the Great Leap Forward, Year Zero and ethnic cleansing -- names that stand for killings in the six and seven figures and for suffering beyond comprehension. The technological progress that inspired the optimism (...) of the Victorians turned out also to multiply the effects of old-fashioned evil and criminal stupidity. (shrink)

English summary: The compound terms formed with 'post-' - from Postmodernity through Postdemocracy to Postcrisis as the New Normal - can be seen as a symptom of theoretical helplessness. These compounds are based on a kind of dialectics which they explicitely refuse: The idea of a New Normal postulates a return to normalcy at the end of the series of crises in the early 21th century, but it states simultaneously that the old normalcy has eventually been lost forever. In (...) order to shed light on this question, theoretical effort is needed: This study proposes the concepts of normalism, interdiscourse, and collective symbolism. Taking seriously Michel Foucault's idea of a theoretical tool box, it introduces a new and operational concept of antagonism alternative to the one which originates from dialectics. Antagonism in an operational definition represents a dynamic of irriversible de-normalization (i.e. loss of normality, failure of normalism). Using these analytical instruments, categories such as Postmodernity and New Normal can be explained in a new and satisfying manner. The study hereby takes into consideration positions denying antagonism in Postmodernity (e.g. Francis Fukuyama) as well as theories which claim new kinds of antagonism (e.g. Negri and Hardt, Laclau and Mouffe, or Ranciere).These theoretical developments go together with topical analyses of the series of crises after 2001 and particularly after 2007: from the financial crisis through the Euro crisis to the refugees and populism crises. The analytical approach proposed here is particularly apt for studying the role of topical media as well as political discourses in normalization and denormalization processes. As a result, the study proposes a processual scheme of the series of crises as well as a new definition of populism based on the approach of normalism. Finally, it also considers the problems of alternative 'transnormalistic' ways out of the crisis ('flightlines').Interspersed with the study are short literary essays on novels dealing with current antagonisms: by Albert Camus, Thomas Bernhard, Sibylle Berg, Stephen King, Jean Marie Gustave Le ClEzio, Jonathan Littell, and Michel Houellebecq. German description: Die Krisenserie zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhundert, von der Finanz- und Eurokrise bis zur Fluchtlings- und Populismuskrise, hat die vorgangigen Normalitaten in vielen Dimensionen beeintrachtigt. Das lasst sich als Denormalisierung begreifen und wirft die Frage auf, wie soziokulturelle Normalitaten produziert und reproduziert werden. Darauf antwortet das hier aktualisierte, diskurstheoretische Konzept des Normalismus. Kann die Krisenserie sogar zu einem 'Ende der Normalitat' (Gabor Steingart) fuhren und was wurde das bedeuten? Das ist die Frage nach einer belastbaren Bedeutung des in den USA entstandenen Konzepts eines New Normal: Wenn es das Ende der Krisenserie meinen sollte - was unterscheidet es dann von einem 'Old Normal'? Und wie verhalt sich ein New Normal zum ebenso schillernden Begriff einer Postmoderne? Die Antwort der Studie auf solche Fragen kombiniert die Kategorien des Normalismus und des Antagonismus. Sie schlagt ein gegenuber seiner dialektischen Herkunft neues, diskurstheoretisch fundiertes und operatives (empirisch belastbares) Konzept von Antagonismus als tendenziell irreversible Denormalisierung vor. Mit diesem Instrumentarium wird zunachst die Postmoderne (einschliealich der anderen 'Postismen') als das Konzept einer vorgeblich historischen Epoche ohne Antagonismen gefasst. Anschlieaend werden die Krisenserien unter diesem Aspekt analysiert und ein vorlaufiges Prozessschema der Krisenverlaufe erstellt. Dabei wird auch die Krise der politischen Normalitat (Populismuskrise) transparent. Daraus ergibt sich ein Ausblick auf die Alternative zwischen der Gefahr eines katastrophischen Kollapses des Normalismus auf der einen und transnormalistischen Auswegen auf der anderen Seite. (shrink)

This paper examines the institutional and social dimensions of cooperation in the Alliance of Science Organisations, the central corporatist stakeholder in German science policy, in the 1970s and 1980s, which were a crucial period for this committee. In doing so, this essay mainly focuses on the way science organizations interact with each other, as well as with national politics. The Federal Ministry of Research invited the Alliance to regular meetings and thereby fostered its involvement into political decision-making processes. (...) Consequently, the question of who belonged to the Alliance came into the focus of different players. Although the members of the Alliance themselves decided on the composition of their committee, they were not able to completely insulate themselves from external demands. Including new members into the Alliance had a destabilizing effect on the carefully balanced distribution of power within this committee, as will be shown through the case study on the admission of the Association of the Major Research Centers in 1976. In order to restabilize the situation, the members of the Alliance tried to exclude the AGF from certain issues. At the same time, the AGF itself was keen on being regarded as an equal partner and thus strove for its inclusion. This complex interplay of cooperative and competitive actions finally resulted in the institutionalization of the Alliance.ZusammenfassungDer vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die institutionelle und soziale Dimension der Zusammenarbeit in der Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen, dem zentralen korporatistischen Akteur in der bundesdeutschen Wissenschaftspolitik, in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, einer wichtigen Scharnierphase für dieses Gremium. Dabei liegt der Fokus insbesondere auf der Analyse der vielfältigen Interaktionen zwischen den Wissenschaftsorganisationen, ebenso wie zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik.Um seine forschungspolitische Agenda mit den Wissenschaftsorganisationen abzustimmen, etablierte das Bundesforschungsministerium regelmäßige Konsultationen mit den Präsidenten der Allianz, die eine verstärkte Einbindung des Gremiums in politische Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse zur Folge hatte. Folglich rückte auch die Zusammensetzung der Allianz immer wieder in den Fokus verschiedener Akteure. Obwohl die Allianz prinzipiell selbst über ihre Zusammensetzung entschied, konnte sie sich nicht gänzlich gegenüber von außen an sie herangetragenen Forderungen verschließen, was zu Öffnungen des Gremiums führte – wie im Falle der Aufnahme der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Großforschungseinrichtungen 1976. Das wiederum wirkte destabilisierend auf das zuvor sorgfältig austarierte Machtverhältnis in der Allianz. Um die Situation zu restabilisieren, initiierten die Allianzmitglieder von innen heraus gegenüber der AGF in bestimmten Fragen partielle Schließungen, die allerdings erneute Öffnungen nach sich zogen, da die AGF selbst darum bemüht war, als gleichberechtigter Partner in der Allianz agieren zu können. Dieses komplexe Zusammenspiel von kooperativen und kompetitiven Handlungsmodi resultierte schlussendlich in einer Institutionalisierung und Festigung der Allianz. (shrink)

An individual-based approach is used to describe population dynamics. Two kinds of models have been constructed with different distributions illustrating individual variability. In both models, the growth rate of an individual and its final body weight at the end of the growth period, which determines the number of offspring, are functions of the amount of resources assimilated by an individual. In the model with a symmetric distribution, the half saturation constant in the Michaelis–Menten function describing the relationship between the growth (...) of individuals and the amount of resources has a normal distribution. In the model with an asymmetric distribution, resources are not equally partitioned among individuals. The individual who acquired more resources in the past, will acquire more resources in the future. A single population comprising identical individuals has a very short extinction time. If individuals differ in the amount of food assimilated, this time significantly increases irrespectively of the type of model describing population dynamics. Individuals of two populations of competing species use common resources. For larger differences in individual variability, the more variable species will have a longer extinction time and will exclude less variable species. Both populations can also coexist when their variabilities are equal or even when they are slightly different, in the latter case under the condition of high variability of both species. These conclusions have a deterministic nature in the case of the model with the asymmetric distribution—repeated simulations give the same results. In the case of the model with the symmetric distribution, these conclusions are of a statistical nature—if we repeat the simulation many times, then the more variable species will have a longer extinction time more frequently, but some results will happen when the less variable species has a longer extinction time. Additionally, in the model with the asymmetric distribution, the result of competition will depend on the way of the introduction of variability into the model. If the higher variability is due to an increase in the proportion of individuals with a low assimilation of resources, it can produce a longer extinction time of the less variable species. (shrink)

Theories of autonomy divide into two conflicting categories: theories that emphasize freedom to choose among alternatives, and theories that focus on personal authenticity. This conflict can be resolved by recognizing the basic function of natural authenticity, and its deep roots in human and animal behavior. Authenticity functions to keep options open that might be too hastily abandoned. Thus forms a natural symbiotic union with autonomy as alternatives. Human authenticity is a special adaptation, but it is not different in (...) kind from the authenticity of many other species. My naturalistic account of authenticity avoids traditional problems concerning willing addicts and happy slaves and reaffirms the traditional link between authenticity and autonomous choices among alternatives. (shrink)

The fact that the names of biological species refer independently of identifying descriptions does not support the view of Ghiselin and Hull that species are individuals. Species may be regarded as natural kinds whose members share an essence which distinguishes them from the members of other species and accounts for the fact that they are reproductively isolated from the members of other species. Because evolutionary theory requires that species be spatiotemporally localized their (...) names cannot occur in scientific laws. If natural kind status is denied to species on this ground, it must also be denied to most classes of concrete entities which are now accorded such status. (shrink)

David Wallace has recently argued that the eigenstate–eigenvalue (E–E) link has no place in serious discussions of quantum mechanics on the grounds that, as he claims, the E–E link is an invention of philosophers rather than the community of practicing physicists. This raises an historical question regarding the origin of the link. This paper aims to answer this question by tracing the historical development of the link through six key textbooks of quantum mechanics. In light of the historical evidence (...) from these textbooks, it is argued that Wallace provides insufficient grounds for dismissing the E–E link from discussions of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Sagoff [Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (2005), 215–236] argues, against growing empirical evidence, that major environmental impacts of non-native species are unproven. However, many such impacts, including extinctions of both island and continental species, have both been demonstrated and judged by the public to be harmful. Although more public attention has been focused on non-native animals than non-native plants, the latter more often cause ecosystem-wide impacts. Increased regulation of introduction of non-native species is, therefore, warranted, (...) and, contra Sagoff’s assertions, invasion biologists have recently developed methods that greatly aid prediction of which introduced species will harm the environment and thus enable more efficient regulation. The fact that introduced species may increase local biodiversity in certain instances has not been shown to result in desired changes in ecosystem function. In other locales, they decrease biodiversity, as they do globally. (shrink)

This essay is meant as a form of philosophical exorcism. The goal is to dispel the view that there are general secular grounds for holding human germline genetic engineering to be intrinsically wrong, a malum in se, or a morally culpable violation of human nature. The essay endorses the view that major obligations of prudence and care attend the development of this technology. However, these justifiable moral concerns can be seen more clearly when one has dispelled (...) what must, from a secular perspective, be regarded as pseudo-issues. (shrink)

In the current research landscape, there are increasing demands for research to be innovative and cutting-edge. At the same time, concerns are voiced that as a consequence of neoliberal regimes of research governance, innovative research becomes impeded. In this paper, I suggest that to gain a better understanding of these dynamics, it is indispensable to scrutinise current demands for innovativeness as a distinct way of ascribing worth to research. Drawing on interviews and focus groups produced in a close collaboration with (...) three research groups from the crop and soil sciences, I develop the notion of a project-innovation regime of valuation that can be traced in the sphere of research. In this evaluative framework, it is considered valuable to constantly re-invent oneself and take ‘first steps’ instead of ‘just’ following up on previous findings. Subsequently, I describe how these demands for innovativeness relate to and often clash with other regimes of valuation that matter for researchers’ practices. I show that valuations of innovativeness are in many ways bound to those of productivity and competitiveness, but that these two regimes are nevertheless sometimes in tension with each other, creating a complicated double bind for researchers. Moreover, I highlight that also the project-innovation regime as such is not always in line with what researchers considered as a valuable progress of knowledge, especially because it entails a de-valuation of certain kinds of long-term epistemic agendas. I show that prevailing pushes for innovativeness seem to be based on a rather short-sighted temporal imaginary of scientific progress that is hardly grounded in the complex realities of research practices, and that they can reshape epistemic practices in potentially problematic ways. (shrink)

Implicit in the value sensitive design (VSD) approach is a concern for understanding, and where possible, disrupting problematic power relationships. Yet an awareness of the issues and ethics of power relations is a pre-requisite for such a concern to bear fruit. This article provides some insight into the issues, and through a case study of technology design to support care arrangements for age-related cognitive decline, illustrates how finding a satisfactory resolution can be particularly troublesome.

The international relations curriculum has long presented a dichotomy between the so-called “realist” and “idealist” positions. Idealists seek to embody universal norms of justice in foreign policy. Realists, by contrast, see competition between states, the balance of power, and relative advantage as basic to international politics. Though considered polar opposites, both the realist and idealist affirm the primacy of the nation state as a sovereign political unit, and so neither embraces cosmopolitanism in the strongest sense, i.e., the transcendence of (...) national divisions as such. Opening up the IR curriculum to such a radical possibility requires its reframing in terms of underlying, ethical worldviews. Under this lens, it becomes evident that the realist and idealist share far more in common than contemporary policy debates would suggest. It also points us toward the space for an alternate ethical worldview, provided by Stoic rationalism, which is more viable for grounding cosmopolitan thought. (shrink)

This article compares two science advisory organizations: the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), with a special focus on how their respective policy systems absorb the knowledge delivered for use in decision processes. The science-policy processes of these two organizations differ in important respects; ICES delivers highly specified knowledge to a specified uptake mechanism, while the IPCC produces unspecified knowledge for an unspecified uptake mechanism. Since both environmental governance areas (...) are criticized for lack of needed action, a comparison is of interest asking how this might relate to the organization of science advice. As theoretical resources for this explorative comparison we utilize two approaches from the field of science and technology studies: the co-production approach, which focuses on the entanglements of scientific and political processes, and the systems-theory-oriented multiple-worlds model, which assumes a clear difference in institutional logics between the scientific and the political field. Since the IPCC has been critically analysed by several studies utilizing resources from the two approaches, we contribute with new insights by bringing in ICES, which is a much less studied organization exposing a different science-policy structure. One important finding is that the two theoretical approaches focus on different aspects, exposing ‘links’ and ‘integration’, both of which we argue are important for analysing and assessing science advisory organizations. Moreover, these aspects can be advantageously integrated into a single theoretical framework. (shrink)

This article argues that Richard Rorty’s philosophy has a blind spot regarding our relationship with nature. It examines his distinct version of pragmatism to find ways to address this shortcoming. Rorty’s antirepresentational “pragmatism as anti-authoritarianism” and its anthropocentric character are discussed. His linguistic instrumentalism is problematized since it entails an unapologetic Baconian view of knowledge as power and nature as a manipulable object. While Rorty’s Darwinian image of the human being somewhat relativizes this Baconian humanism, it (...) does not address the dependence of the human species on its natural environment. According to the romantic dimension in Rorty, the human being is rather exalted, and the imperative of infinite self-creation ignores natural limits. However, there are valuable resources in Rorty’s philosophy that can limit this imperative and his instrumentalism. For instance, Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism reminds us of the moral responsibility of choice about (our) nature. Furthermore, his inclusivist ethic of solidarity implies the potential extension beyond the human species. Lastly, his notion of philosophy as cultural politics could foster democratic discussion on the pressing issues of technological advance. (shrink)

Despite well-founded critiques on the concept of nature and even claims that the concept is decidedly obsolete, evidence would suggest that nature continues to play a pivotal role in orienting people towards environmental practices and advocacy. Given nature’s unyielding relevance, this paper takes inspiration from Sally Haslanger’s project of conceptual amelioration to examine how meanings ascribed to nature can lead to the actualization of desired sociomaterial realities. By building on posthumanist political ecology and Michel Callon’s notion (...) of performation, I illustrate a dynamic in which meanings of nature emerge through the engagement in practices with the environment which are, more often than not, mediated by different technologies. After exploring this proposal through the lens of different environmentalisms, I argue that technologies can play a significant role in mediating conceptualizations of nature. To support this argument, I introduce a few elements of mediation theory and examine the meaning of nature that may emerge when social media users interact with online content of climate and ecological collapse. Overall, this approach advances a postphenomenological contribution to the scholarly trend of examining how technologies may disrupt fundamental concepts with which we respond to ethical issues. This approach underscores the role of technologically mediated practices in processes of conceptualization, as well as the significant political dimension of conceptual engineering projects. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the debate between two accounts of the continuum. On one account the continuum has discrete elements. On the other it has no discrete elements. Each account has its own strengths and weaknesses. The paper introduces several different explications of continuity before stating and discussing an antinomy and some options to resolve it. An assessment follows in which certain astute philosophical views are vetted. If the dispute concerns the reality of the continuum, there (...) seems to be nothing that could further decide the matter. If the dispute concerns our access to the continuum, there are many adequate options. But, in either case, the dispute is not merely verbal. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Will We be Able to Clone Geniuses? Human Genomics and the Search for Smart Genes Doogie's Downside Nuclear Powered Vacuum Cleaners or Nuclear Bombs A Pragmatic Optimism about Enhancement Technologies.

Entrepreneurs generally lack the marketing capabilities necessary to bring their new product to market. To engage the resources required to do this, they must somehow place a value on the enterprise. However, all of the methods of valuation currently available are based on the use of historical or current revenues, and therefore are not applicable to an entrepreneurial enterprise with a first-time product. In Valuing an Entrepreneurial Enterprise, Audretsch and Link present a valuation method uniquely tailored to emerging technology-based (...) ventures that have no revenue history to lean on. Unlike many traditional methods, theirs does not take into account the track record of companies and products similar to that being valuated. Instead, it draws on economic theory to formulate a solution to the problem. The book develops conceptual ground, including trends in entrepreneurship, models of innovation, and the economics of standards and entrepreneurship policy. The authors review the traditional valuation methods and illustrate them numerically with case studies to show how the traditional approach produces an incorrect valuation. The core of the book presents the new methodology and demonstrates how it avoids the pitfalls of past approaches. The authors also show how public policy on technology and infrastructure changes valuations of start-up firms in areas such as stem-cell products and renewable fuels projects. Valuing an Entrepreneurial Enterprise will serve as a valuable resource for advanced students, economists, financial planners, and valuators interested in new valuation methods and the theory behind them, as well as those interested in entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom holds that the murder rate has plummeted since the Middle Ages; humankind is growing more peaceful and enlightened; man is shortly to be much improved -- better genes, better neural circuits, better biochemistry; and we are approaching a technological singularity that will usher in utopia. Human Nature eviscerates these and other doctrines of a contemporary nihilism masquerading as science. In this wide-ranging work polymath David Berlinski draws upon history, mathematics, logic, and literature to retrain our (...) gaze on an old truth many are eager to forget: there is and will be about the human condition beauty, nobility, and moments of sublime insight, yes, but also ignorance and depravity. Men are not about to become like gods. (shrink)

Cet article s’interroge sur les ressources caractéristiques d’une mobilisation de sans-papiers. C’est au travail symbolique de présentation de soi et de sa cause qu’il faudra s’intéresser. Le tableau de ce type de lutte implique ainsi de souligner l’importance de l’obtention d’une « légitimité émotionnelle ». Autrement dit, le désespoir social et la faiblesse deviennent des armes dans une dramaturgie où s’affrontent la Morale et le Droit. Néanmoins, bien d’autres facteurs seront nécessaires à l’obtention d’un « succès public ». La spectacularisation (...) du conflit, son florilège de personnalités de tous ordres, et son long cortège médiatique participeront activement à cette réussite. À tous les niveaux de la mobilisation, ce sera l’humanisme qui s’imposera comme code idéologique indépassable du soutien aux sans-papiers.This article addresses the resources which characterize an irregular migrant mobilization. We’ll focus on the symbolic work carried out in the setting-up of a picture of oneself and of one’s cause. As a result, this kind of struggle also implies a quest for an « emotional legitimacy ». In other words, social despair and weakness become weapons in a dramaturgy confronting Moral philosophy and Right. However, many other factors will have to be brought together to trigger a « public success ». The spectacularization of the conflict – which boasts a large number of prominent figures from all social spheres and extensive media coverage – will be actively instrumental in this success. At each level of the mobilization, humanism appears as the inescapable ideological code of the support lent to irregular migrants. (shrink)

Living organisms are the ultimate survivalists, having evolved phenotypes with unprecedented adaptability, ingenuity, resourcefulness, and versatility compared to human technology. To harness these properties, functional descriptions and design principles from all sources of biodiversity information must be collated − including the hundreds of thousands of possible survival features manifest in natural history museum collections, which represent 12% of total global biodiversity. This requires a consortium of expert biologists from a range of disciplines to convert the observations, data, and (...) hypotheses into the language of engineering. We hope to unite multidisciplinary biologists and natural history museum scientists to maximize the coverage of observations, descriptions, and hypotheses relating to adaptation and function across biodiversity, to make it technologically useful. This is to be achieved by developments in meta‐ taxonomic classification, phylogenetics, systematics, biological materials research, structure and morphological characterizations, and ecological data gathering from the collections − the aim being to identify and catalogue features essential for good biomimetic design. (shrink)

Irish traditional music is a complex system of interconnections and relationships. For example, the same tune title can refer to many different tunes, and the same tune can have many different titles. Developing a system whereby a tune can be presented with all its variants and relations, along with its source recordings, has been the work of many scholars in the field. It is only with the advent of Linked Data technologies that a solution to this issue can be (...) truly envisaged. One element of this solution is the creation of authority files presented as SKOS thesauri, such as the ITMA Subject Thesaurus. Best-practice in thesauri creation was followed to create the IST. Existing literature on the subject was surveyed for terms and phrases that could be included. The terms were organised within 21 facets, each facet being a discrete unit describing some element of the tradition. This research builds on ITMA’s existing Linked Data offerings. It provides a road-map for the creation of other thesauri and is a foundation stone for ITMA on which future developments in Linked Data can be built. (shrink)

Examines the nature of historical knowledge, study, and writing and their functions and purposes in human societies through descriptions and illustrations of the three types of history, commemorative, critical, and invented.

One persisting problem in political philosophy today is explaining clearly enough for effective remedies the problematic notion of “the lack of political will.” Failures of political will underestimate a cardinal element in the basically contested notion of so-called political will, namely social egoisms. This is what the founder of Eco-ethics, Tomonobu Imamichi, described by analogy with “egoism” as “nosism.” I try to elaborate here Imamichi’s analogy of individual egoism and social “nosism” in terms of the still elusive fundamental notion not (...) only of human nature itself but of the nature at issue in human nature. My basic claim will be that most political talk today of “the lack of political will” makes insufficient allowance for what we might call tentatively “the nature of human nature.” That is, the nature of human nature, I argue, involves necessarily an always present, and largely negative, major element of social and not just individual egoism. The nature in post-essentialist human nature is neither exclusively physical nor exclusively cultural. Rather, the nature in human nature is a dynamic, interacting mixture of both material and non-material aspects, including very powerful individual and social egoisms. (shrink)