We will be in a better position to evaluate some important skeptical theses if we first investigate two questions about justified suspended judgment. One question is this: when, if ever, does one justified suspension confer justification on another suspension? and the other is this: what is the structure of justified suspension? the goal of this essay is to make headway at answering these questions. After surveying the four main views about the non-normative nature of suspended judgment and offering a (...) taxonomy of the epistemic principles that might govern which suspended judgments are justified, I will isolate five important principles that might govern which suspended judgments are justified. I will call these suspension-to-suspension principles. I will then evaluate these principles by the lights of each of the four views about what suspensions are. I close by drawing some conclusions about the prospects for skepticism, the structure of justified suspended judgment, and the importance of theorizing about justified suspended judgment. (shrink)

This volume offers a state-of-the-art collection of studies in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of cognitive poetics. In coupling cognitive linguistics and poetics, cognitive poeticians aim to offer cognitive readings of literary texts. By bringing together key players and critics in a setting of interdisciplinary dialogue, this volume captures the goals, gains and gaps of this emerging field.

Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not possible. The main obstacle to (...) characterizing Pyrrhonism as both investigative and suspensive is the fact that it seems that the mature sceptics, after they have suspended judgement and thus reached tranquillity, have no motivation for further inquiry. Any inquiry they seem to be interested in after they have suspended judgement is the refutation of beliefs needed for maintaining tranquillity. I try to show that the mature sceptics' removal of distress does not ipso facto mean removal of the desire for knowledge. This is because distress is not just a matter of unsatisfied desire, but of belief that one of the opposed appearances must be true, or, more generally, of belief that the truth is the only worthwhile epistemic goal. Having abandoned this belief, the sceptics can still engage in philosophical inquiries. This is because Sextus does not assume that philosophy is the search for truth: it is so only for the dogmatists. In a more general sense, applicable to the sceptics as well, philosophy is just an inquiry into certain things, and for the sceptics, its epistemic goal is still open. (shrink)

In this paper, we compare the two Global Reporting Initiative reporting standards, G3.1, and the most current version G4.0. We do this through the lens of political corporate social responsibility theory, which describes the broadened understanding of corporate responsibility in a globalized world building on Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy and ethical discourse. As the regulatory power of nation states is fading, regulatory gaps occur as side effects of transnational business. As a result, corporations are also understood to (...) play a “political role” to fill regulatory gaps and contribute to a global governance system by voluntarily engaging in self-regulation. Such corporate political action, however, is not always legitimate as it suffers from a democratic deficit. Consistent with scholars in the field of political CSR, this paper argues that only by means of communication and discourse can this drawback be avoided. That is why CSR reporting and guidelines for standardizing the disclosed CSR information is key for political CSR. By comparing the GRI standards from a political CSR perspective, one can see whether these often-used reporting guidelines fulfill the communicative requirements and whether they are adequate tools to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. We present results from a theory-derived and criteria-driven comparison of the two guidelines. Indication of the effectiveness of voluntary self-regulation is, for example, important considering the 2014 directive of the European Union to make CSR reporting mandatory. We offer a guideline-based view on current CSR theory as well as CSR reporting practice. We discuss implications for CSR theory, particularly the appropriateness of deliberation in the Habermasian sense, which is the basis of political CSR theory. We do so by introducing the notion of “uncommitted deliberation” with regard to the refined concept of materiality in GRI 4.0, which induces subjectivity and reduces data-driven comparability. Finally, we address the limitations of this research as well as research questions for future studies. (shrink)

Bridging Social Inequality Gaps - Concepts, Theories, Methods, and Tools focuses on contemporary discussions around multifaceted causes, explanations, and responses to social disparities. The contributors provide studies related to social and cultural dimensions of inequality, economic and technological dimensions of inequality, environmental dimensions of inequality, and political, ethical, and legal dimensions of inequality, as well as a variety of other perspectives on disparities. The volume also covers crucial issues and challenges for the global, national, regional, and local implementation of (...) public policies to reduce inequalities, including innovative actions, projects, and programs focused on achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The collection includes chapters encompassing research and practical recommendations from various disciplines such as sociology, economics, management, political science, administrative science, development studies, public health, peace and conflict studies, cultural studies, educational studies, communication studies, and social work. This book is an asset to academic and expert communities interested in theories of social inequality as well as effective measurement tools, public services, and strategies. Moreover, the volume helps students, practitioners, and people working in government, business, and nonprofit organizations to build more equitable social relationships. (shrink)

Surveillance programs supporting the management of One Health issues such as antibiotic resistance are complex systems in themselves. Designing ethical surveillance systems is thus a complex task (retroactive and iterative), yet one that is also complicated to implement and evaluate (e.g., sharing, collaboration, and governance). The governance of health surveillance requires attention to ethical concerns about data and knowledge (e.g., performance, trust, accountability, and transparency) and empowerment ethics, also referred to as a form of responsible self-governance. Ethics in reflexive governance (...) operates as a systematic critical-thinking procedure that aims to define its value: What are the “right” criteria to justify how to govern “good” actions for a “better” future? The objective is to lay the foundations for a methodological framework in empirical bioethics, the rudiments of which have been applied to a case study to building reflexive governance in One Health. This ongoing critical thinking process involves “mapping, framing, and shaping” the dynamics of interests and perspectives that could jeopardize a “better” future. This paper proposes to hybridize methods to combine insights from collective deliberation and expert evaluation through a reflexive governance functioning as a community-based action-ethics methodology. The intention is to empower individuals and associations in a dialogue with society, which operation is carried out using a case study approach on data sharing systems. We based our reasoning on a feasibility study conducted in Québec, Canada (2018–2021), envisioning an antibiotic use surveillance program in animal health for 2023. Using the adaptive cycle and governance techniques and perspectives, we synthesize an alternative governance model rooted in the value of empowerment. The framework, depicted as a new “research and design (R&D)” practice, is linking operation and innovation by bridging the gap between Reflexive, Evaluative, and Deliberative reasonings and by intellectualizing the management of democratizing critical thinking locally (collective ethics) by recognizing its context (social ethics). Drawing on the literature in One Health and sustainable development studies, this article describes how a communitarian and pragmatic approach can broaden the vision of feasibility studies to ease collaboration through public-private-academic partnerships. The result is a process that “reassembles” the One Health paradigm under the perspective of global bioethics to create bridges between the person and the ecosystem through pragmatic ethics. (shrink)

Critical Constructivism and postphenomenology are two possible ways of describing, analysing and evaluating the role and meaning of technology in contemporary society and world. Whereas Critical Constructivism looks at the way technologies are dealt with on a macro level considering systems and programs, then postphenomenology digs into the individual and personal appropriation and understanding of technology in everyday life. This means that there is a gap for what concerns levels, but also in relation to what they want to accomplish. The (...) critical stance of Andrew Feenberg in conceiving societal and political problems as ripe for radical technological change is met by postphenomenology’s pragmatic focus on how to build appropriate and meaningful structures for handling of emergent and imminent problems together with and through technology. This paper tries to bridge this gap by introducing the concept of scaffolding, which is inspired by Heidegger’s “Gestell,” but re-read in a new and different way than the usual pessimistic and deterministic interpretation where exploitation and “enframing” is at hand. Scaffolding is read as a common enterprise where we stretch and reach out towards each other in order to create platforms for interventions and activism. The paper is an attempt to direct this common enterprise in specific directions, and this directedness is indicative for our aims and goals. It is the claim that Critical Constructivism and postphenomenology should meet, and perform a certain kind of Techno-Activism when confronted with problems in technological society. (shrink)

The essay brings a summation of human efforts seeking to understand our existence. Plato and Kant & cognitive science complete reduction of philosophy to a neural mechanism, evolved along elementary Darwinian principles. Plato in his famous Cave Allegory explains that between reality and our experience of it there exists a great chasm, a metaphysical gap, fully confirmed through particle-wave duality of quantum physics. Kant found that we have two kinds of perception, two senses: By the spatial outer sense we perceive (...) phenomena, objects in space. Our temporal inner sense lets us perceive our inner state, noumena . Kant's two senses are fully confirmed through bilateral brain duality of cognitive science. The bilateral brain serves inner, temporal sense, logic & noumena in the left hemisphere. The right brain half is for the outer, spatial sense, geometry & phenomena. We form a whole system, a bilateral interior cosmos, a kind of world model, expressing what may lie beyond the metaphysical gap. In the right brain we build a phenomenal cosmos, to resemble the outer environment. In the brain's left hemisphere a noumenal cosmos, a model of our private world including Saint Teresa of Avila's castillo interior. The cosmos is regularly updated with novel sense data integrated into our memory banks. This was recognized early by Helmholtz (1860s). Our lives, health & well-being depend on us keeping our interior cosmos in good order. This used to be seen as saving one's precious soul from perdition. While we endeavour to keep our phenomenal cosmos neat & orderly by protecting the environment from harm, our noumenal cosmos to be livable requires us to engage in ethical conduct. This bilateral cosmos is responsible for our common sense judgment power, that we depend on for being able to lead a good & benign life. The 200 million neurons of BA10 in the prefrontal lobe have global access to the interior cosmos, & apply massive feedback to identify environmental conditions rapidly. The global access also gives conscious presence of the individual to itself, all that is present in the interior cosmos, for total freedom of action. In the left brain private ego, we are guarded by faith in divine mercy, & guided to choose the best course of action, able to survive under the most adverse conditions. For this, we receive directions from the Holy Ghost in Saint Teresa's castillo interior. (shrink)

The spread of misinformation and fake news raises important problems for our society and for our democracy. From the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol to vaccine hesitancy, from suppressing voter turnout to peddling conspiracy theories, we know that these problems are real and need to be taken seriously. While misinformation is not a new problem for democracy, it can spread more quickly and easily because of new media’s design and popularity. Given these problems, it is encouraging that some (...) technology companies are taking steps to reduce the spread of misinformation and fake news on the platforms they manage. Despite this seemingly positive development, some scholars have criticized some interventions designed to combat the spread of misinformation and fake news as paternalistic. For example, a 2019 Facebook intervention called Click-Gap aimed to reduce the amount of low-quality content (including fake news and misinformation) that users see on their NewsFeed. Click-Gap has been criticized as an instance of epistemic paternalism because it was adopted (1) with the goal of improving the epistemic status of its users and (2) irrespective of what the company believed the wishes of its users to be. If interventions like Click-Gap are problematic because paternalistic, those of us interested in the ethics of technology would face a dilemma—either endorse technology companies treating their users paternalistically or endorse their failing to act to combat the spread of misinformation and fake news on their platforms. Both options seem to me to be problematic. While paternalism may sometimes be permissible, I think we should be very hesitant to endorse a paternalistic relationship between technology companies and their users. The relationship does not seem to bear the right sort of structure to one in which paternalism might be appropriate, if it ever is. The second option seems, if anything worse: surely technology companies should not stand by and change nothing about their platforms despite the spread of misinformation and fake news in those spaces. In this paper, I argue that Click-Gap and interventions like it are not paternalistic, contrary to the conclusion of other scholars. Further, I will argue that the focus on paternalism itself is actually a red herring here. While not just any intervention or strategy that purports to reduce fake news and misinformation is permissible, we should want technology companies to take user well-being seriously and be able to take that well-being as a direct reason for action. Their doing so is not paternalistic nor even morally problematic, and it should not be criticized as such. (shrink)

We succeed to say something on the identities of when μ > θ > cf with μ strong limit θ-compact or even μ is limit of compact cardinals.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SuspenseDonald BeecherSuspense is one of those workaday terms so integrated into the discussion of literature that definition would hardly seem necessary. It does receive pro forma entries in most literary handbooks, but never provokes more than a statement of the self-evident: that it is a "state of uncertainty, anticipation and curiosity as to the outcome of a story or play, or any kind of narrative in verse or prose,"1 (...) that such anticipations arise "particularly as they affect a character for whom one has sympathy," and that plot types vary in ways that affect the ethos of suspense: those situations in which the outcome is uncertain and readers are concerned with how they will be resolved, and those in which the outcome is inevitable and readers, in their fear, concentrate merely on knowing when the catastrophe will be complete.2 Indicatively, Roger Fowler's A Dictionary of Modern Critical Terms gives it a pass altogether.3 But even these generic representations of the concept must venture such quizzical terms as "state" and "sympathy," both of which are seen to inhere not in texts and narratives, but in spectators and readers. Suspense, then, must have two sides: that which is invested in the design of the story as an emotion prompt; and that which is a feature of mind.This critical divide can be stated in many ways. One could say that evaluating the emotionality embedded in a text is an act of literary criticism, while the study of the emotionality aroused by literature belongs to cognitive psychology. These are, of course, two sides to the proverbial coin worthy of critical alignment—namely that which authors know about organizing narratives to produce suspense, and that which readers "know" through the constitution of their brains about responding to situations of alarm or disorientation involving themselves or others, and the compelling limbic reinforcement that impels them toward ends [End Page 255] that will release them from incertitude or danger. The critical challenge at this juncture is to decide whether a study of suspense should begin in narratology or psychology, for without the récit of events in time there are no prompts, even though suspense as experience does not reside in texts but in psyches.Wolfgang Iser calls for a balanced approach to literary study in general that "lays full stress on the idea that, in considering a literary work, one must take into account not only the actual text, but also, in equal measure, the actions involved in responding to that text."4 But that does not help in determining whether suspense should be defined according to a minimum prescription of narrative procedures and characteristics, or as a literary subset of a human, genetically-conditioned response mechanism selectively engineered to meet a range of stressors in the environment.The first question in the creation of a rapprochement between these domains must deal with the very capacity for mind states to be emotionally moved by literary configurations, insofar as literary suspense borrows from the vocabulary of limbic arousal responses. The second question pertains to what readers are brought to feel more particularly for make-believe persons in make-believe situations of danger. Are these also make-believe emotions, for then it must be determined what an exclusively literary emotion might be. Subsequent questions must deal with the range of suspense arousing situations, whether they involve only protagonists, their desires and prospects, or whether suspense applies to any motivated pursuit of information deemed vital to mental satisfaction. These distinctions and their relationship will prove critical.Almost universally, in the limited number of critical studies that exist, literary suspense entails liked characters under duress whose futures are perilous and uncertain—futures about which readers hold strong preferences. This perspective stands in opposition to potentially broader definitions that include curiosity, problem-solving sequences, cognitive jags, or pattern completion. One obstacle is that problem-solving activities appear to exceed the capacities of minds already absorbed in the events of fictive worlds, arriving merely as distractions from the conditions of high, dramatic suspense. They can be said to fall outside the fictive representation altogether, particularly as they pertain to the patterns of fiction, or a... (shrink)

In most, if not all, jurisdictions with active organ transplantation programs, there is a persistent desire to increase donation rates because the demand for transplantable organs exceeds the supply. China, in particular, faces an extraordinary gap between the number of organs donated by deceased donors and the number of people seeking one or more transplants. China might look to Western countries with higher donation rates to determine how best to introduce Western practices into the Chinese system. In attempting to increase (...) its organ donation rate, China must not only ensure that its organ donation system reflects different Chinese cultural values, but also that it avoids the ethical problems of the United States and of other Western systems. This article examines four such problems. They concern the family, obtaining permission for organ donation, the definition and diagnosis of “brain death,” and trust. Revisions to the Chinese system should involve a careful look to China and Chinese cultural resources rather than to Western models. (shrink)

It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes “to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief (...) on a certain issue even if one’s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)”. My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland’s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus. (shrink)

This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl’s “twofold-access theory,” is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although twofold-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way “eliminates” conscious experience; rather, it provides a parsimonious and (...) explanatorily fruitful theory of the consciousness-body relation which faithfully preserves the nature of conscious experience while going quite far in “bridging” the various explanatory gaps distinguished below. (shrink)

In line with [2], [12, 13, 14] carefully studies the Leibnizian notion of suspensive condition—notion that Leibniz sometimes names moral condition. Thiercelin points out Leibniz’ will to provide a rigorous definition of that kind of condition. Leibniz not only establishes a link between the legal notion of condition and the logical notion of condition, but he also grasps the problematic of suspensive condition through its epistemic and dynamic features. In this paper we start from Thiercelin’s reflections about Leibniz’ suspensive condition. (...) Thiercelin’s work offers an inventory of different clauses that a logical conditional must fulfill to capture the legal meaning of suspensive condition. Our aim is to compare such a definition with the Public Announcement operator semantics ([16]) taking advantage of both its model theoretic semantics and its dialogical semantics (introduced for the first time in [5]). We show that the public announcement operator entails the same dynamic and epistemic features than the ones that Leibniz requires with its notion of suspensive condition. (shrink)

In (Harman 2007) I argued “that a purely objective account of conscious experience cannot always by itself give an understanding of what it is like to have that experience.” Following Nagel (1974), I suggested that such a gap “has no obvious metaphysical implications. It [merely] reflects the distinction between two kinds of understanding,” objective and subjective, where subjective understanding or “Das Verstehen” (Dilthey 1883/1989) of another creature’s experience involves knowing what it is like to have that experience—knowing what sort of (...) experience of one’s own would correspond to the other creature’s experience. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that some cases of naked statistical evidence license a high credence, but not an outright belief. If this is correct, there cannot be an unconditional bridge principle from credence to outright belief. We show that at least one prominent putative counterexample to such a bridge principle is based on a mistake, by demonstrating that the statistical evidence falls short not only of licensing rational belief, but also of justifying a high credence.

When we're inquiring to find out whether p is true, knowing that we'll get better evidence in the future seems like a good reason to suspend judgment about p now. But, as Matt McGrath has recently argued, this natural thought is in deep tension with traditional accounts of justification. On traditional views of justification, which doxastic attitude you are justified in having now depends on your current evidence, not on what you might learn later. McGrath proposes to resolve this tension (...) by distinguishing between different ways of having a neutral attitude. I argue that McGrath's account is unable to account for the full range of cases in which an agnostic attitude is warranted. We can remedy this by pairing his account with my theory of transitional and terminal attitudes, which claims that attitudes are justified in different ways depending on whether they are formed in intermediate stages of deliberation or as conclusions of deliberation. I compare my view with an alternative, more parsimonious one, according to which deliberation itself is a source of new evidence. I argue that this alternative proposal is faced with a dilemma: it either generates a vicious regress, or it fails to capture the relevant cases. (shrink)

Ethics has traditionally been taught in the 'ivory towers' of academia. Recent develop ments and reforms in nurse education have given ethics a prominent position in most curricula. However, the vast majority of ethics teaching continues to take place in academic departments. This approach fuels the practitioner's views that nursing is a pragmatic activity whilst ethics is a cognitive endeavour; such perspectives entrench ethics firmly in the traditional gap between theory and practice. The focus of this paper presents an argument (...) that the teaching of ethics must be versed in clinical reality if bridges are ever to be built and the theory-practice gap crossed. Suivant la tradition, l'éthique est enseigné dans les tours d'ivoire des universités. Des développements et réformes récents dans l'éducation infirmier donnent à l'éthique une position prominante dans la plupart des programmes d'études. Mais la majorité de l'enseignement éthique continue dans les départements académiques. Cette façon d'enseigner alimente la vue des infirmiers/ères que soigner est une activité pragmatique pendant que l'éthique est un effort intellectuel. Ces attitudes retranchent l'éthique dans le vide traditionel entre la théorie et le pratique. Le thème de cet article présent l'argument que l'enseignement de l'éthique doit être posé dans la réalité clinique, si des ponts peuvent jamais être bâtis et le vide entre théorie et pratique peut être traversve. Ethik wurde traditionsmässig im Elfenbeinturm einer Universität gelehrt. Neuliche Entwicklungen und Reformen in der Ausbildung des Pflegepersonals haben der Ethik eine prominente Position gegeben in ihren Lehrplänen. Die meiste Lehre von Ethik findet jedoch weiterhin in akademischen Abteilungen statt. Dieses Vorgehen treibt die Ansicht des praktizierenden Pflegepersonals, dass Krankenpflege eine pragmatische Aktivitat ist und Ethik eine wissenschaftliche Bemühung. Solche Ansichten verwurzeln die Ethik in der traditionellen Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Das Zentrum dieses Artikels ist die These, dass die Lehre von Ethik auf klinischer Realität basiert sein muss so dass Brücken gebaut werden können und die Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis überschritten werden kann. (shrink)

Abstract:Unable to produce scales of one-to-one in places or spaces, people interact as they develop common representations, actions, and objects. In places, they can point to connect representations and objects. Places may be small spaces, but spaces can contain places and even more variations. Unable to name each variation, actors and analysts create abstractions. They might use a part to represent the whole, with miles of track for railroads, kilowatt-hours for electric power, and barrels of oil for energy. Some treat (...) their representations as hegemonic, even true. However, dealing with social and material variations, actors and analysts represent, build, maintain, and repair combinations of cultures, economies, governments, and materials. Thus, railroads and power systems, like other technologies and infrastructures, do not design, build, or repair themselves. To resolve problems, people with relevant skillsets interact in places to create common representations, actions, and objects tying themselves and others together in spaces. (shrink)

This study investigates how filler-gap dependencies associated with subject position are formed in online sentence comprehension. Since Crain and Fodor, “filled-gap” studies have provided evidence that the parser actively seeks to associate a wh-filler with a gap in direct object position of a sentence wherever possible; the evidence that this same process applies for subject position, is, however, more limited. We examine the processing of complement clauses, finding that wh dependency formation is actively attempted at embedded subject position, unless, however, (...) the embedded clause contains a complementizer. The absence of the dependency formation in the latter case demonstrates that the complementizer-trace effect is, like syntactic island constraints, immediately operative in online structure building. (shrink)

Background: Providing care for a home-dwelling person with dementia who resists care is an ethical and practical complex and challenging task. Faced with a growing number of persons with dementia, the healthcare professional’s understanding of how to best care for and prevent unnecessary use of coercion with persons with dementia is of key importance. Research aim: The aim of this study was to explore the use of trust-building interventions in home-dwelling persons with dementia resisting care, as described by health (...) professionals in documents of decisions of forced treatment and care. Research design: A qualitative thematic document analysis inspired by critical realism was conducted. Participants and research context: Descriptions of trust-building interventions were extracted from 88 documents of forced treatment and care for home-dwelling persons with dementia, receiving home healthcare, in 2015 and 2016. Ethical considerations: Approved by the Regional Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics, reference number 2017/788, and controlled by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data, reference number 54897. The study adhered to the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki. Findings: We found that “balancing safe care with the person’s integrity” was an overarching theme that permeated the descriptions of trust-building interventions in the study. Three main themes were identified when the data were analyzed: safeguarding care, protecting integrity, and optimizing the environment. Discussion and conclusion: Health professionals balanced on a thin line between care and integrity when met with resistance from person with dementia. However, the trust-building interventions used in the most challenging situations did not differ from the interventions used in general in dementia care. Two knowledge gaps were identified: how to perform appropriate assessments of situations of home-dwelling persons with dementia when met with resistance to care, and whether environmental initiatives may also benefit home-dwelling persons with dementia who are not easily cared for. (shrink)

Are doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions.

In this essay, I shall scold a Jinn, recommend a position in Islamic theology to my Muslim neighbors, explore a famous dilemma recounted in Genesis, and participate in a debate occasioned by an interpretive puzzle in Kierkegaard studies. I investigate two opposed ways of understanding the phrase, ‘the teleological suspension of the ethical’, offer some critical remarks on the interpretation of that phrase in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, and defend a range of considerations that speak in favor of one of (...) the options over the other. Finally, I show how one may invoke my preferred interpretation to confront the puzzle common to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theology presented by the story of Abraham and the binding of Isaac and also how a related strategy can be invoked to address the story of Iblis and the puzzle peculiar to Islamic theology to which it gives rise. (shrink)

Vocabulary knowledge affects any learner’s general language proficiency and the lack of vocabulary is often seen as an obstacle in a student’s progress. This statement becomes even truer when considering languages for specific purposes as the knowledge of technical vocabulary is closely connected to mastering professional skills. The research on vocabulary learning distinguishes two types of learning, incidental and intentional, which should complement each other. One of the most efficient intentional strategies proved to be the use of flashcards. Modern technologies (...) have contributed to further development of this rather popular method by offering new ways of vocabulary consolidation as well as novel forms of interaction. The main objective of the paper is to introduce a teaching methodology aimed at the intentional building of students’ vocabulary, however, at the same time making students being aware of a broader context in which a word or a collocation is used. The presented methodology involves student generated and recycled content as well as the use of electronic tools, namely Google docs and Quizlet. In the course of three subsequent spring semesters, students first created a Google Docs collaborative learning log with lists of vocabulary, the following year’s students uploaded the lists of definitions and translations into Quizlet sets and in the final year the words in Quizlet flashcards where supplemented with example sentences. Students’ performance showed that both Google Docs and Quizlet are efficient tools not only for vocabulary learning, but also for language teaching. The proposed methodology was used in legal English classes, however, it can be implemented in any language course. (shrink)

This essay takes as its chief point of departure Jacques Ellul’s contention that imaginative treatments of malevolent technology in antitechnological science fiction, by way of inviting rejection, refusal, dismissal, or condemnation, conspire in facilitating human acceptance of and adjustment to technology as it otherwise presently is. The author extends Ellul’s argument to accounts of cryonic suspension, or “cryonics,” the practice of freezing human corpses, by way of gradually subjecting them, at the moment of legal death, to extremely low temperatures in (...) hopes that medicine will at some future point achieve the necessary kinds and levels of technology to facilitate “reanimation.” The author maintains that, analogous to Ellul’s treatment of science fiction, most extant accounts of cryonic suspension, by focusing almost exclusively on issues pertaining to the scientific legitimacy and technological feasibility of the practice, fall prey to the performative conventions of a discursive- cum-epistemic trap, one that ultimately works to facilitate the acceptance of and adjustment to technology as it otherwise presently is. (shrink)

In this chapter, Odenbaugh first provides a conceptual framework for thinking about climate modeling, specifically focused on general circulation models. Second, he considers what makes models independent of one another. Third, he shows robustness analysis, which depends on models being independent of one another, can be used to remove doubts about idealizations in general climate models. Finally, he considers a dilemma for robustness analysis; namely, it leads to either an infinite regress of idealizations or a complete removal of idealizations. A (...) response to the dilemma is given defending a form of epistemic contextualism and by drawing a distinction between relative and absolute robustness. (shrink)

We develop a partial solution to the meta-problem of consciousness that builds on our previous psychological account of an apparent explanatory gap. Drawing from empirical work on explanatory cognition and conceptual development, we sketch a profile of cognitive systems for which primitive concepts facilitate explanatory gaps. This account predicts that there will be multiple explanatory gaps. We suggest that this is borne out by the existence of primitivist theories in multiple philosophical domains.

Recent progress in artificial intelligence has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats that of humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and (...) thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes toward these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models. (shrink)

Development in animals is frequently characterized by periods of heightened capacity for both neural and behavioral change. So‐called sensitive periods of development are windows of opportunity in which brain and behavior are most susceptible to modification. Understanding what factors regulate sensitive periods constitutes one of the main goals of developmental neuroscience. Why is the ability to learn complex behavioral patterns often restricted to sensitive periods of development? Songbirds provide a model system for unraveling the mysteries of neural mechanisms of learning (...) during development. Like many songbirds, zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) learn a specific vocal pattern during a restricted period early in life. Young birds must hear songs produced by members of their species; this auditory experience is thought to engender specific changes in the brain to guide the process of vocal learning. Many studies of the songbird system have focused on examining relationships between brain development and learning. One goal of this work is to elucidate mechanisms that regulate basic processes of neural development, and in so doing to shed light on factors governing the emergence of a complex learned behavior. (shrink)

Offers an explanation of Kant's denial that there can be any genuine moral dilemmas and criticizes Alan Donagan's claim that we can put ourselves into a moral dilemma by our own wrongdoing. Although genuine moral dilemmas, in which one would be wrong no matter what one did, are impossible, “gaps” in moral theory may leave us with no resolution in tragic cases of moral conflict. Kantian moral theory has such gaps, but attempts to develop theories without such (...) class='Hi'>gaps are not necessarily desirable. Finally, the essay addresses “residues” of moral feeling and attitude after one has acted in a case of tragic conflict in which one could find no morally better option. Perhaps surprisingly, Kantians should affirm that, even though feeling guilty for the choice is inappropriate, there is an important sense in which one should feel especially bad about those one has harmed, and regret one's own role, in such cases. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to discuss a problem that arises when we try to understand the connections between justification, knowledge, and suspension. The problem arises because some prima facie plausible claims about knowledge and the justification for judging and suspending are difficult to reconcile with the possibility of a kind of knowledge or apt belief that a thinker cannot aptly judge to be within her reach. I shall argue that if we try to accommodate the possibility of this kind (...) of knowledge, we should reject a widely held view about justification. We can correct this mistaken view about the connection between justification and knowledge by connecting justification to a kind of competence, but not the one we might have expected. In the course of this discussion, I shall flag some questions about the explanatory ambitions of the telic virtue-theoretic approach. (shrink)

Carroll William Westfall has claimed that building types can serve as natural symbols of (the purposes served by) activities such as venerating, celebrating, trading, and dwelling. The aim of this paper is to interpret Westfall’s claim in a way that makes it non-trivial and yet worthy of further investigation. In particular, an attempt is made to explain the connection between building types and what they symbolize without appealing to convention. The question is also answered whether a non-conventional connection (...) is compatible with one and the same building type having a different significance in different cultures. (shrink)

While research ethics and developing respective competencies is gaining prominence in higher education institutions, there is limited knowledge about the learning process and scaffolding during such training. The global health crisis has made the need for facilitator-independent training materials with sufficient support even more pronounced. To understand how knowledge building takes place and how computer-supported collaborative learning supports research ethics learning, we analysed: 1) how the participants’ understanding was displayed during the collaborative learning process utilising the developed ethics resource; (...) and 2) whether the scaffolding provided by the resource supported the learning process. Epistemic evidence was collected during design-based research involving 36 PhD students and researchers with supervisory experience divided into 11 groups. Data was analysed qualitatively utilising the SOLO taxonomy. The results revealed that: 1) participants displayed high levels of understanding and the need for the facilitator support decreased with the use of the online ethics resource; 2) the learners were able to evaluate their learning outcomes with satisfactory accuracy; 3) when used linearly, the online ethics resource helped learners to achieve high levels of understanding even when the scaffolding gradually faded. Based on the lessons learnt, design principles were extracted to develop research ethics competencies in higher education, and also recommendations for research ethics training were outlined. (shrink)

HIV prevention is a critical health issue in Nigeria; a country that has one of the worst HIV epidemic profiles in the world. With 270,000 new infections in 2012, Nigeria is a prime site for HIV prevention research. One effect of the HIV epidemic has been to revolutionalise ethical norms for the conduct of research: it is now considered unethical to design and implement HIV related studies without community engagement. Unfortunately, there is very little commensurate effort in building the (...) capacity of local persons to engage actively with researchers, and there is no existing platform to facilitate dialogue between researchers and communities engaged in research in Nigeria. In an effort to address this gap, we undertook a series of three community dialogues and two community-researcher interface meetings in Nigeria. This paper aims to give an empirical account of the dialogue from these community engagement processes and provide a resulting critique of the implementation of research ethics practices in Nigeria. It is anticipated that the outputs will: support researchers in designing community-based research protocols; inform ethics committees of key considerations during research protocol reviews from a community perspective; and inform policy makers and research sponsors about issues of primary concern to communities with respect to HIV research. (shrink)

Pseudogapping is no misnomer. Despite the many tempting similarities, Gapping and Pseudogapping are distinct constructions. Pseudogapping is a special instance of VP Ellipsis, while Gapping, I will argue, is a special instance of across-the-board movement. Squeezing Gapping into across-the-board movement has its own discomforts, however, which I will suggest can be remedied by re-tailoring our syntax to include string-based output constraints. I give a sketch of one such alteration that involves apparent Left Branch Condition violations.

Grush and Churchland (1995) attempt to address aspects of the proposal that we have been making concerning a possible physical mechanism underlying the phenomenon of consciousness. Unfortunately, they employ arguments that are highly misleading and, in some important respects, factually incorrect. Their article ‘Gaps in Penrose’s Toilings’ is addressed specifically at the writings of one of us (Penrose), but since the particular model they attack is one put forward by both of us (Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996), it is (...) appropriate that we both reply; but since our individual remarks refer to different aspects of their criticism we are commenting on their article separately. The logical arguments discussed by Grush and Churchland, and the related physics are answered in Part l by Penrose, largely by pointing out precisely where these arguments have already been treated in detail in Shadows of the Mind (Penrose, 1994). In Part 2, Hameroff replies to various points on the biological side, showing for example how they have seriously misunderstood what they refer to as ‘physiological evidence’ regarding to effects of the drug colchicine. The reply serves also to discuss aspects of our model ‘orchestrated objective reduction in brain microtubules – Orch OR’ which attempts to deal with the serious problems of consciousness more directly and completely than any previous theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Loopholes, Gaps, and What Is Held Fast”Lorraine Code (bio)Keywordsepistemology, incredulity, knowing other people, memory, testimonyNancy Potter’s compelling essay points to some of the limitations of the theoretical apparatus that the post-positivist empiricist epistemologies of the Anglo-American mainstream make available for evaluating experiential memory claims in general, and “false memory syndrome” in particular. The loopholes and gaps in these theories of knowledge push urgent questions about (...) testimony, trust, and the politics of knowledge into a prominent place on the agendas of successor epistemology projects. These politics are enacted in societies whose dominant rhetoric privileges eye-witness evidence and “knowledge by acquaintance” as sources of objective knowledge, yet whose practices of incredulity—of granting and withholding acknowledgement to testimonial knowledge claims—expose power-saturated structures of dominance and subordination and of arbitrarily uneven distributions of epistemic authority. 1For classical empiricists and their successors, perception, memory and testimony, hierarchically ordered with perception on top, count as the principal sources of empirical knowledge. This ordering maps the relative reliability of the processes, with perception ranking as most stable, reliable and secure, memory coming second on all of these scores, and testimony ranking a poor third, closer to opinion, hearsay and rumor than to the other more respectable sources. Perception, for these theories, is “immediate” in that it is direct, bare, uncontaminated either by the particularities of the perceiving subject or of the perceptual event: from its presumed (but contestable) immediacy, all the rest follows. Memory counts as perception at one remove, its reliability a function of the relative “vividness” of the perceptions it commemorates. The esteem commonly claimed for eye-witness testimony derives from this conception of memory, which is believed to ground the testimony because of its presumed proximity to “immediate” perception. Yet testimony, even in its restricted “knowledge by description” form, tends by contrast with perception and memory to be a shaky affair; and as the temporal distance between event and testimony increases, so knowledge of matters unavailable to direct observation fares less and less well in classical and post-positivist epistemologies. A distrust of testimony is at once understandable and odd, because so small a proportion both of communal and of “individual” knowledge indeed derives from first-hand observations and experiences: most of it comes from testimony in an extended sense that encompasses books, teachings, media reports, all of the sources and resources on which both secular and scholarly knowledge relies for much of its substance. This expanded construction of the term runs alongside [End Page 255] the first-personal “testimonial” sense that is more plainly operative in discussions of false memory syndrome which, despite its experiential source, is often likewise contested on grounds that discredit the “privileged access” status that these same epistemologies claim for experience at first hand.Epistemologists commonly assimilate testimony to monologic, observational knowledge, deriving its constitutive features from instances where a testimonial utterance can pose as another perception—this time an auditory one—in a personal set of knowledge-producing observations (e.g., Fricker 1987). Because the speaker may be lying or mistaken, the process may fail to transmit knowledge; but this failure can be read as a simple perceptual error or a misremembering. Such approaches ignore the constitutive function of an interpreter/listener in fostering or thwarting testimonial knowledge to subsume it, too, much under an observational model. Indeed, not only do they separate the knower from the known and the process of knowing, as Potter observes, they also separate the knower from other knowers to guard against their influencing (= contaminating) the knowledge-production process. Experiences where an interlocutor actually enables the production of knowledge do not figure in such analyses, 2 whose effect is to suggest that giving or hearing testimony invokes no more significant moral-political issues than do acts of perceiving tables and chairs: that hearing, like seeing, is believing. (Norman Malcolm’s analysis of memory, which Potter cites, would also underwrite such a view of testimony.) Yet standard empiricist and post-positivist epistemologies generate an inquisitorial model of eliciting testimony in which the more generalized “testimony” in the knowledge that people acquire from books, media reports, conversation, reference sources recedes from... (shrink)

In deliberative argument, in political discourse, in teaching, and in casual conversation, as rhetors we often hope that our attempts at interaction will have some effect on the participants in these discursive environments. The phenomena of stubbornness, however, would seem to suggest that, despite our efforts, there are times when rhetoric just doesn't work. This dissertation complicates this premise, and in so doing complicates common understandings of both stubbornness and rhetorical effect. As I argue, rhetorical effects exist within a complex (...) rhetoric system, within which they circulate and are interconnected with a diversity of other rhetorical and non-rhetorical elements. Using N. Katherine Hayles's concept of "making the cut," I argue that within such complex systems, stability and change are tangled up in an interdependent relationship; in short, in order for complexity to exist it must be constrained by contingent stabilities. These necessary stabilities mask the way that systems are always moving, and so we often do not see changes in the rhetoric systems we inhabit. In this sense, these changes are compensatory, and they work to maintain a stability that can manifest precisely as stubbornness. In delineating what I call a "rhetoric-systems" approach, this dissertation maps the stabilities and movements of several different rhetoric systems, and provides new insight into the complex and relational movement of rhetorical effect. Our use of this approach asks us to recognize the existence and value of certainty and stability, and then to pull back and recognize the existence of complexity and change. The approach integrates insights from systems theory into existing rhetorical theory, and in so doing models an interdisciplinary approach to public rhetorics and writing studies that is firmly grounded in rhetorical theory. (shrink)

1 IntroductionNumerous solutions have been proposed to the semantic paradoxes. Two that are frequently singled out and compared are the following. The first is that according to which paradoxical sentences are neither true nor false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gaps. The second is that according to which paradoxical sentences are both true and false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gluts. Calling the first of these a solution is, in fact, somewhat (...) misleading: it is rather like calling an opening gambit a game of chess. For the solution runs into severe problems almost immediately, and so can be only the first of a series of moves made to defend the original weak opening. Nonetheless, the symmetry involved in the gap and glut solutions is obvious enough to make the comparison a natural one. (shrink)

A paradox, it is claimed, is a radical form of contradiction, one that produces gaps in meaning. In order to approach this idea, two senses of “separation” are distinguished: separation by something and separation by nothing. The latter does not refer to nothing in an ordinary sense, however, since in that sense what’s intended is actually less than nothing. Numerous ordinary nothings in philosophy as well as in other fields are surveyed so as to clarify the contrast. Then follows (...) the suggestion that philosophies which one would expect to have room for paradoxes actually tend either to exclude them altogether, or to dull them. There is a clear alternative, however, one that fully recognizes paradoxes and yet also strives to overcome them. (shrink)

This book shares innovative approaches to effectively engage students and faculty working in research labs, lab-based classrooms and courses to build inclusive ethical cultures. The frameworks and approaches presented move beyond traditional research ethics training to strengthen the ethical culture in research labs. The chapters in the book showcase best practices and approaches to embedding educational interventions in courses, research labs and departments. The book is based on the two-day workshop “Building Inclusive Ethical Cultures in STEM” (April 23-24, 2021). (...) Moving beyond the two-day conference that inspired this collected volume, the various chapters address questions like: What are approaches and tools to integrate ethics education in STEM effectively? How can STEM ethics education be improved? What can researchers do to build more inclusive research environments? How can meaningful discussions about ethics be effectively integrated into STEM courses, research labs, and workplace environments? While each chapter takes a different perspective and is located in its respective context, the contributions are united by the goal of effectively including ethical reflection in STEM education. Instructors from both four-year and two-year colleges who teach STEM and lab-based STEM courses; young principal investigators/junior faculty who are in the process of building their research groups; departmental chairs interested in programmatic approaches for improving mentoring, research ethics education, and the research culture of their department, will find this work to be a very valuable resource in their daily practice. (shrink)

Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicate---a series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is some (...) sense in which vague predicates are gappy which may be expressed neutrally by saying that on any appropriately constructed sorites series for a given vague predicate there will be a gap between the objects of which the predicate is denitely true and those of which it is denitely false. Taking as primitive the operator ‘it is denitely the case that’, abbreviated as ‘D’, we may stipulate that a predicate F is denitely true (or denitely false) of an object just in case ‘DF (a)’, where a is a name for the object, is true (or false) simpliciter.1 This yields the following conditional formulation of a ‘gap principle’: (D Φ (x) ∧ D¬ Φ (y)) → ¬R(x, y). Here ‘ Φ ’ is to be replaced with a vague predicate, while ‘R’ is to stand for a sorites relation for that predicate: a relation that can be used to construct a sorites series for the predicate---such as the relation of being just one millimetre shorter than for the predicate ‘is tall’. Disagreements about the sense in which it is correct to say that vague predicates are gappy can then be recast as disagreements about how to understand the denitely operator. One might give it, for example, a pragmatic construal such as ‘it would not be misleading to assert that’; or an epistemic construal such as ‘it is known that’ or ‘it is knowable that’; or a semantic construal such as ‘it is true that’. (shrink)

In this article we argue for the importance of building critical communities as an integral, yet neglected, aspect of education for social justice. We begin by defining critical communities and by describing goals and vision for social justice education. We then explore how community is discussed in the education literature, limitations and challenges of calling for community, and images of critical communities in social justice work. We end by exploring the role that individuals can play in nurturing and enabling (...) social justice efforts, offering some strategies to promote community building within and beyond higher education. (shrink)

Though numerous disciplines are cultivating pedagogical relationships with the emerging field of digital humanities, philosophy appears to be among the least interested in what digital humanities has to offer. This is a missed opportunity. Through a proper pedagogical framing of both fields, I argue that philosophy educators would benefit from building a pedagogical relationship with digital humanities. First, I outline digital humanities methods and teaching practices, then I identify several core educational aims and teaching methods in philosophy, which I (...) conceptualize in terms of a creative art. Ultimately, I argue that digital humanities practices would enhance philosophy’s education aims by making philosophy more relevant and accessible to students’ needs, by fostering active learning, by establishing more equitable, collaborative participation, and by balancing skill-development with philosophical creation. The goal of this essay is not to replace traditional philosophy pedagogy, but rather to supplement it to better support modern students’ needs. (shrink)

In his influential paper Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps' reprinted in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal (...) system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principle of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show ‐ with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e. von Wright's Truth Logic ‐ that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth‐values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting‐point for analyzing the relationships among norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

Having a “normal” professional job and doing research impose different social and personal connotations. These differences materialize at least in two clear ways. First, it is common that researchers in the making find it very difficult to communicate to their closest social network (e.g., family and old close friends) the content and the importance of their work, as they lose known sources of social comparison. Meanwhile, professional job titles (e.g., brand manager, auditor, lawyer) are self-explanatory, and they provide for the (...) owner an immediate social contextualization and recognition. Second, students normally receive delayed and ambiguous feedback and reinforcement while doing a PhD, contrasting with the continuous flow of assessment that companies give to their employees. In this article, I analyze how young researchers may develop a feeling of social isolation as the communication bridges with family, old friends, and undergraduate colleagues become narrower than before, making it difficult to receive external reinforcement on their social position and comparative achievement. This feeling, combined with the ambiguous feedback during the early stages of a research career, challenges the self-esteem of PhD students, forcing them to develop a self-contained personal security in order to cope with those two social contexts. Some young researchers might even withdraw from PhD programs should they fail to develop such psychological strength. I approach the issue through my own experience, first as a junior consultant in a multinational firm and then as a PhD candidate in economics. Second, I explore the behavioral phenomena that occur beneath those feelings in order to understand how to build such psychological strength. My goal is, through the exploration of my personal experience of becoming a researcher, to offer young researchers a useful narrative to help face the potentially negative feelings that may emerge when learning to balance these conflicting social roles. (shrink)

Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, (...) peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue that even if one assumes that peer disagreements are symmetrical, it might still be rational to stick to one’s guns in the light of peer disagreement. (shrink)