The following paper presents a proposal of a theoretical foundation for an application of distributed cognition in overcoming post-war traumas and related social conflicts. The distributed cognition theory states that the cognitive system is a structure distributed between internal-mental and external-objective social world representations across time and space. The basic issue of dialogue in distributed cognition is that distribution as information dissemination in each cognitive component functions in a systemic integrity. The presented perspective of overcoming traumas and war (...) conflicts through dialogue refers to the following aspects of human activity: 1 - the perception of an environment as a construct of own life path and self-image; 2 - active creation of a desired world, life space and desired self; 3 - agentic cognitive mapping of an environment as a real, virtual and potential life space; 4 - a way of elastic control over an environment through discovering objectively present environmental affordances; 5 - achieving agency through discovering possibilities for action rather than barriers; 6 - making the cognitive system more flexible through a change in style of thinking to a constant state of openness to new meanings and values. (shrink)

This paper discusses knowledge of opposites. In particular, attention is given to the linguistic notion of antonymy and how it represents oppositional relations that are commonly found in perception. The paper draws upon the long history of work on the formalisation of antonymy in linguistics and formal semantics, and also upon work on the perception of opposites in psychology, and an assessment is made of the main approaches. Treatments of these phenomena in linguistics and psychology posit that the principles of (...) minimal difference and invariance are centrally important. It will be suggested that the standard approach employing meaning postulates fails to capture the relevant notion of antonymy, in part because it is not informed by these principles, and in part due to a number of other problems with this kind of approach, many of which may be overcome by building in the central principles from the beginning. The paper also discusses the issue of whether we can know that opposites necessarily exclude each other and, if so, how. This issue is intertwined with what is known as the colour incompatibility problem that Wittgenstein wrangled with at various times during his life. The paper assesses various solutions to these problems including an approach that was first put forward by Jerrold J. Katz. The relation between this approach and the theory of determinables and determinates is also examined. A further development upon this approach is proposed and then applied to the case of the formalisation of antonymy. It is argued that this approach avoids the problems suffered by the main approaches discussed earlier in the paper. (shrink)

A growing interest for the emotion of disgust has recently arisen in international contexts across several fields of research. A general definition of disgust will be primarily assumed: by disgust I understand a total rejection that generates a motion of repulsion and removal of an object that is in the proximity of the subject, without constituting a real danger. In reference to the notion of taboo, I will first of all assume its ambivalence. The emotion of disgust, essentially natural and (...) cultural at the same time, as a typical trait of the process of human civilization that distinguishes humans from animals. At variance with other theories of disgust, I will argue that it is not possible to theoretically articulate the overcoming of disgust, but that it is possible to educate about this emotion through artistic experience. On this ground, an ethics of disgust will be outlined, which starts from the acknowledgement of one of our most bodily emotions. (shrink)

A general characterization of logical opposition is given in the present paper, where oppositions are defined by specific answers in an algebraic question-answer game. It is shown that opposition is essentially a semantic relation of truth values between syntactic opposites, before generalizing the theory of opposition from the initial Apuleian square to a variety of alter- native geometrical representations. In the light of this generalization, the famous problem of existential import is traced back to an ambiguous interpretation (...) of assertoric sentences in Aristotle's traditional logic. Following Abelard’s distinction between two alternative readings of the O-vertex: Non omnis and Quidam non, a logical difference is made between negation and denial by means of a more fine- grained modal analysis. A consistent treatment of assertoric oppositions is thus made possible by an underlying abstract theory of logical opposition, where the central concept is negation. A parallel is finally drawn between opposition and consequence, laying the ground for future works on an abstract operator of opposition that would characterize logical negation just as does Tarski’s operator of consequence for logical truth. (shrink)

The paper is a critical analysis of minimalistic interpretations of the notion of moral obligation. The main grounds and arguments for this interpretation are the liberal understanding of justice and priority of negative rights and obligations over positive ones. To move to a more expansive morality we need to change the balance between negative and positive obligations by reconsidering the status of general and positive obligations. However, raising the status of positive obligations immediately leads to the problem of “moral overburden”. (...) One possible way to overcoming moral minimalism could be based on treating positive obligations as a correlate of a set of rights that cannot be ignored. An important qualification is that the recognition of the right to a resource does not automatically mean placing an obligation on all persons satisfying some eligibility criteria. Instead, it could lead to a moral division of labor when different people take on the responsibility to meet positive moral obligations to those with a legitimate “natural right”. An additional consequence is that this approach helps to cope with the “moral overburden” of a moral agent. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I defend a strong version of actual intentionalism. First, I argue against meaning subjectivism, conventionalism and contextualism. Second, I discuss what I take to be the most important rival to actual intentionalism, namely hypothetical intentionalism. I argue that, although hypothetical intentionalism might be acceptable as a definition of the concept of utterance meaning, it does not provide an acceptable answer to the question of what determines an utterance’s meaning. Third, I deal with the most serious objection (...) against actual intentionalism, namely the failure objection. I argue that the failure objection can be overcome within a framework of full-blown actual intentionalism if one distinguishes between categorial and semantic intentions. Moreover, I show how this version of actual intentionalism accounts for the possibility of innovative metaphors and other implicatures. Finally, I demonstrate that actual intentionalism – thus construed – makes it possible to distinguish between communicative failures and the intentional breaking of conventions. (shrink)

In his left-libertarian theory of justice Hillel Steiner introduces the idea of conceiving our germ-line genetic information as a natural resource as a means to achieving luck-egalitarian equality. This idea is very interesting in and of itself. But it also has the potential of turning Steiner’s theory into a particularly powerful version of left-libertarianism, or so I argue in the first part of this paper. In the second part I critically examine this idea. I show why, in contrast to (...) what Steiner claims, this idea requires us to evaluate not only the pieces of GLGI that we have used, but rather all the pieces of GLGI that our bodies deliver throughout our lives. Then I argue that besides the immense technical difficulties involved in meeting this requirement, which we may overcome in the future, there is also a substantive reason why we cannot meet this requirement. The relevant value of any given piece of GLGI depends on the way it would interact with another piece of GLGI of the opposite sex in a reproductive process. But there is no way of determining which pieces of GLGI should be assigned to each other for the purpose of this evaluation. (shrink)

Nietzsche on Truth and Overcoming traces the development of Friedrich Nietzsche's epistemic criticism. Nietzsche's outright denial of the existence of truth is grounded in his claim that stable metaphysical entities do not exist. The following inquiry examines Nietzsche's method of doubting which compels him to dismiss "being" as a fictitious "perspectival falsification". Nietzsche's denial of the reality of pre-existent "being" creates problems with communicating what he means through normal language. Nietzsche on Truth and Overcoming elucidates the problems (...) which Nietzsche creates through his uprooting of being and provides Nietzsche's hint as to where mankind might still look for the "most real", in art. Through his conception of the Dionysian artist, Nietzsche offers us the tragic annihilator of the "all-too-human" fictions of linguistic truth. This thesis thereby concludes that the Dionysian artist is Nietzsche's "answer" to epistemology, for the tragic wisdom of the Dionysian provides a glimpse into primal reality precisely because he affirms existence in spite of not knowing fiction as the logical opposite of truth. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging conversation, Michael Hardt reflects on recent transformations within Empire. Several unique themes emerge concerning power and pedagogy as they intersect with subjectivity and global crisis. Drawing on the common in conjunction with the tradition of love in education uncovers a different path that attends to today’s real political, ecological, and social needs. Finally, a focus on collectivity points to a possible strategy—collective intellectuality—for educators to revise traditional notions of leadership to encourage more ethical, democratic, and sustainable futures. (...) Yet, what this looks like in practice remains for us to imagine. (shrink)

Private certification as a means of risk regulation and quality assurance can offer advantages over government regulation, including superior technical expertise, better inspection and monitoring of regulated entities, increased responsiveness to consumers, and greater efficiency. This Article examines two examples of reliable private certification in regulatory arenas - fire safety and kosher food - where political opposition and resource constraints have frustrated government regulatory efforts. The Article identifies key features of reliable private certification and analyzes its comparative institutional (...) advantages over government regulation. Critics of private certification question its legitimacy, asserting that private regulation is less participatory, transparent, and accountable than government regulation. The Article responds to these claims, arguing that the two examples of private certification presented here compare favorably with government regulation based on these criteria of legitimacy. (shrink)

Nietzsche unternimmt im Begriff des "individuellen Gesetzes" den Versuch, Individualität and Allgemeinheit so zusammenzudenken, daß die Gesetzlichkeit an die Selbstdeutung des Individuums gebunden bleibt. Dieser Begriff trägt jedoch eine innere Spannung in sich, auf die in verschiedener Weise reagiert werden kann. Der Beitrag zeigt dies zunächst am Gegensatz von Herren- und Sklavenmoral und an der Gesetzgebung des Manu . Beide sind individuelle Gesetze, die jedoch keinen Bestand haben können, weil die von ihnen Beherrschten eine allgemeinere, gerechtere Gesetzgebung einklagen. Dagegen geht (...) es dem freien Geist um Freiheit gegenüber sich selbst, um die Aufgabe, Individualität nicht neuerlich als allgemeine Eigenschaft zu fixieren. Simmels Idee des individuellen Gestzes basiert auf der Möglichkeit einer Versöhnung zwischen den Polen; das Individuum ist in den sozialen Rollen, die es einnimmt, es selbst. Die Spannung, die für Nietzsche besteht, wird dadurch aufgehoben.With the notion of an "individual law", Nietzsche tries to combine individuality and universality in a way that allows to conceive lawfulness under the perspective of the individual, and not in opposition to it. However, the notion of an individual law is characterized by a certain tension, which has led to different reactions. The paper illustrates this tension in regard to master versus slave morality. and the law of Manu . Both are individual laws which have been overcome because the ruled began to claim a more general, a more equitable legislation. On the other side, the free spirit is concerned with freedom from itself, its challenge is to see individuality not as a new general quality. Simmel's notion of the individual law is based on the possibility of a reconciliation between the opposites; the individual remains individual even in its general social roles. This means, however, that the tension manifest in Nietzsche is given up. (shrink)

This paper is a study of a distinctively chemical notion of possibility. This is the notion of possibility that occurs in chemical discourses when chemists speak of the possibility or impossibility of achieving a given result through chemical means. This notion pertains to the possibility of processes, not of compounds, so it differs from the kind of chemical possibility mentioned in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations or the kinds discussed in the literature on Putnam's Twin Earth (...) argument. I argue that this process-oriented notion of possibility cannot be reduced in a simple way to physical possibility, and that standard possible worlds semantics does not allow a natural analysis of this notion. I suggest an extension of possible worlds semantics that may overcome this limitation. I finish by pointing out some open questions about chemical possibility. (shrink)

The authors argue that while meaning holism makes massive error possible, it does not, as Donald Davidson fears, threaten interpretability. Thus they hold, in opposition to Davidson, that meaning holism need not be constrained by an account of meaning according to which in the methodologically most basic cases the content of a belief is given by the cause of that belief. What ensures interpretability, they maintain, is not that speakers' beliefs are in the main true, but rather that beliefs (...) have the contents they do because of events others can in principle identify and describe. (shrink)

Are skeptical arguments invalid because they trade on an ambiguity of the word "possible," asserting that it is possible that our experiences are not of anything outside our own minds and concluding that it is not certain that there is an external world outside our own minds? It is sometimes asserted that such arguments invalidly trade on an ambiguity of "possible" where the premise is true only in the sense "logically possible" while the inference is valid only in the sense (...) "empirically possible." However, once we distinguish different grammatical complements of the phrase "it is possible" we recognize that, when used with the same complement, "possible" is not ambiguous. So the claim that skeptical arguments trade on an ambiguity of "possible" fails. (shrink)

An agent exercises instrumental rationality to the degree that she adopts appropriate means to achieving her ends. Adopting appropriate means to achieving one’s ends can, in turn, involve overcoming one’s strongest desires, that is, it can involve exercising synchronic self-control. However, contra prominent approaches, I deny that synchronic self-control is possible. Specifically, I draw on computational models and empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience to describe a naturalistic, multi-system model of the mind. On this model, synchronic self-control is (...) impossible. Must we, then, give up on a meaningful conception of instrumental rationality? No. A multi-system view still permits something like synchronic self-control: an agent can control her very strong desires. Adopting a multi-system model of the mind thus places limitations on our conceptions of instrumental rationality, without requiring that we abandon the notion altogether. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise the following problem: How does Avicenna define modalities? What oppositional relations are there between modal propositions, whether quantified or not? After giving Avicenna's definitions of possibility, necessity and impossibility, I analyze the modal oppositions as they are stated by him. This leads to the following results: The relations between the singular modal propositions may be represented by means of a hexagon. Those between the quantified propositions may be represented by means of two (...) hexagons that one could relate to each other.This is so because the exact negation of the bilateral possible, i.e. ‘necessary or impossible’ is given and applied to the quantified possible propositions.Avicenna distinguishes between the scopes of modality which can be either external or internal . His formulations are external unlike al-F̄ar̄ab̄;’s ones. However his treatment of modal oppositions remains incomplete because not all the relations between the modal propositi.. (shrink)

In this article we study how members of an interdisciplinary research team use an online forum for communicating about their research project. We use the concepts of "community of practice" and "connectivity" to consider the online interaction within a wider question of how people from different academic traditions "do" interdisciplinarity. The online forum for this Grey and Pleasant Land project did not take off as hoped, even after a series of interventions and amendments, and we consider what the barriers were (...) and how they might be overcome. Barriers to involvement included participants' expectations of interaction and collaboration--expectation that real interaction happens elsewhere, tensions between academic discourse and forum talk norms, unfamiliarity with the technology, and different conceptions of appropriate academic discussion. We suggest that common academic practice does not prepare us well for creating interdisciplinary research communities through online collaboration tools, whereas such tools are our best bet currently for including geographically dispersed members in collaborative projects. Therefore, careful planning and competence building would be necessary if such tools are to be used in collaborative research. Suggested interventions, based on our experience, include providing a more focused forum, making technical support easily available, and setting up particular tasks or items to debate, within a preset, synchronous timeframe, focusing on issues relevant to the project at that time. (shrink)

A logical theory of oppositions deals with the relation between propositions and their truth values. On the basis of a formal semantics that proceeds by means of questions-answers, three theses are claimed in the following: (1) the concept of opposition usually refers to incompatibility, but our logical analysis focusses upon a broader relation of difference; (2) more generally, opposition has to do with negativity; our semantics accounts for it through opposite-forming operators; (3) subalternation is a particular case (...) of non-contradiction expressing an “opposition of an opposition”; it is not a proper opposition, accordingly, but its very meaning depends upon the latter. There is not only one but rather a number of expressions for negativity and the paper presents a detailed analysis of these "floating" expressions in a twofold sense of the word: floating quantification is closely related to the logical operations of sentential negation and denial; to what extent natural languages do not clearly express the meaning of a negative thought will be exemplified. L'objectif du texte qui suit est double : non seulement proposer une analyse logique du concept d'opposition, susceptible d'apporter de la précision à cette notion tout aussi vague que courante ; mais aussi, proposer une explication des différentes façons dont la négation se manifeste dans les langues naturelles, en particulier dans notre modèle local de la langue française. Tandis que la communauté des linguistes propose couramment une distinction entre une négation logique et une négation linguistique, l'article qui suit a la prétention d'une explication unifiée de la négation, c'est-à-dire un cadre théorique commun dans lequel ces deux aspects de l'opérateur de négation apparaissent comme des cas particuliers aux significations distinctes. Il n'y aurait donc pas une négation logique, d'un côté, et une négation linguistique ou "métalinguistique", de l'autre. Une approche structurelle des expressions négatives devrait apporter un éclairage sur ce point, par le biais d'une analyse algébrique de la signification en termes de questions-réponses. Mais revenons pour commencer sur l'origine philosophique du concept d'opposition, avant d'en exposer les propriétés logiques par la suite et les expressions linguistiques pour conclure. (shrink)

The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, I argue that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may arise in the encounter between clinicians and patients with psychosis. In this context, what is communicated is often deemed to lack meaning or to be difficult to understand. While a degree of un-shareability is inherent to subjective life, I argue that issues of unintelligibility can be (...) addressed by shifting from individualistic conceptions of understanding to an interactionist view. This takes into account the contextual, historical and relational background within which meaning is co-constituted. I conclude by providing a corrective for hermeneutical injustice, which entails a specific attentiveness towards the person’s subjectivity, a careful sensitivity to contingent meaning-generating structures, and a degree of hermeneutical flexibility as an attitude of openness towards alternative horizons of possibility. (shrink)

: Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn have proposed a purely referential-causal semantics, a semantics without meanings. Adopting Pylyshyn’s previous treatment of the fact that we can perceive and track something before we have any idea of what that is, these authors claim that such causal relations to external entities allow us to word-label them and thereby build an entire lexicon with specific referents. I disagree and explain why I do so. The kind of semantics that I prefer is radically opposite: (...) the one proposed by Noam Chomsky and Paul Pietroski. This is an internalist semantics that only has meanings, reference being indirect, often indefinite, sometimes problematic. Chomsky insists that the only posit that is tenable is the internal structure of the speaker-hearer, a complex, abstractly characterizable, computational-derivational apparatus, optimal if left alone, that interfaces with other cognitive apparatuses: the articulatory-perceptual one and the conceptual-intentional one, satisfying the constraints that they impose. I show that the semantics proposed by Fodor and Pylyshyn is especially problematic when inexistent entities, possible entities, fictional characters and objects in the remote past are examined. It is, however, problematic even when dealing with more ordinary concepts. On the contrary, an internalist semantics avoids all these problems. Keywords: Internalist Semantics; Theory of Meaning and Reference; Jerry A. Fodor; Noam Chomsky; Paul Pietroski Menti con significati Riassunto: Jerry Fodor e Zenon Pylyshyn hanno proposto una semantica interamente causale-referenziale, una semantica priva di qualsiasi nozione di significato. Adottando la precedente trattazione di Pylyshyn di come è possibile percepire e inseguire oggetti prima di avere alcuna idea di cosa essi siano, questi autori pretendono che queste interazioni causali con enti esterni bastano a etichettarli con dei termini lessicali, costruendo un intero lessico con referenti specifici, senza la componente del significato. Io dissento e spiego perché. Il tipo di semantica che adotto è diametralmente opposto, una semantica che ha solo significati, per la quale i referenti esterni sono indiretti, spesso non definiti, talvolta problematici. Noam Chomsky e Paul Pietroski hanno perfezionato questa semantica puramente internalista, insistendo che l’unico attributo sostenibile è la struttura mentale interna al locutore, una struttura complessa, caratterizzabile solo a un livello di astrazione adeguato, atta a soddisfare i vincoli imposti dai sistemi cognitivi con i quali interagisce: quello articolatorio-percettivo e quello concettuale-intenzionale. Mostro che la semantica proposta da Fodor e Pylyshyn si scontra con problemi insolubili quando tratta enti inesistenti, enti possibili, invenzioni letterarie e oggetti appartenenti a un passato remoto. In effetti, si scontra con problemi insolubili anche quando tratta oggetti e proprietà ordinari. Una semantica interamente internalista non incontra nessuno di questi problemi. Parole chiave: Semantica internalista; Teoria del significato e del riferimento; Jerry A. Fodor; Noam Chomsky; Paul Pietroski. (shrink)

At the heart of Kantian theory lies the prohibition against treating humanity merely as a means. Two of the most influential interpretations of what this means are Wood's and O'Neill's. Drawing on these thinkers' ideas, Kerstein formulates two accounts of what is involved in the idea of treating a person merely as a means: the and accounts. Kerstein's attempt is to show that they are problematic. He introduces his to alleviate the problems they face. I argue that (...) the end-sharing and possible consent accounts are not vulnerable to Kerstein's criticism. However, they both face a shortcoming: they fail to support the Kantian conclusion that the prostitute and the servile person are treated merely as means. Through reconstructing these accounts, I surmount this difficulty. Moreover, my proposal helps Kerstein's own account overcome a problem he admits it has, without the need to resort to consequentialism. (shrink)

During decades, the history of philosophy has kept Kierkegaardrsquo;s and Hegelrsquo;s thought apart, and their long-standing opposition has swept through the speculative greatness of Kierkegaardian existentialism and the existential power of Hegelian philosophy. In contrast to such unfortunate misinterpretation, this article aims at showing the deep convergence that relates interiorly the Kierkegaardian ethical stage with the most important Hegelian logic categories. Kierkegaard and Hegel conceive of the idea as the real power of subjective becoming, and the existence as the (...) actual concretion of the ideal. To both of them, the pure emeneacute;rgeia/em of freedom, which starts in the abstract and aesthetical possibility of the subjective immediacy, realizes itself as the actual concretion of finitude, assuming time and contingency by the eternal and necessary force of duty. The Kierkegaardian repetition is nothing but this powerful idea, mediating the flux of finite differences in the eternal identity of subject. However, for Kierkegaard as well as for Hegel there is an absolute contradiction, which promotes the overcoming of ethics. (shrink)

Purpose. The aim of this article is to analyse the essential features of religious faith as an existential-personalistic model of the formation of a person, his worldview orientations and activities. This requires a consistent solution of the following tasks: a) to focus on different approaches to understanding the phenomenon of "religious faith" ; b) to reveal the spiritual potential of religious faith, its capabilities in boundary situations. Theoretical basis. The author thinks that the interpretation of religious faith as confidence in (...) the invisible is unsatisfactory, one-sided and superficial. Religious faith is the existential, due to which a person overcomes the contradictions between finiteness and infinity. It is the construct of the human spirit, which makes its way into the transcendental realm. In this context, religious faith is a kind of criterion for the "growth" of the "human" in human, the criterion of his spirituality and humanity. Religious faith, being an integral part of human existence, gives it irrational dimensions, makes the possibility of impossible. The existential potential of religious faith serves as the "fulcrum" of a person, thanks to which he self-actualizes, self-fulfills and forms a certain worldview model. Originality. The author has proved that religious faith, which is the projective model of a person, turns out to be one of the possible ways to solve its existential problems, as it concerns not only the nature of the essential characteristics, the properties of the Divine itself but also the ultimate foundations of person in all the uniqueness and specificity of his being. Conclusions. Religious faith, acting as a factor in human activity, builds his value-worldview model of the world. Faith deals with the "ultimate" problems of human existence since it is of exceptional importance in solving life-meaning issues of human existence. The existential experience of the believer acquires the status of an event that opens up a field of new possibilities, a new spiritual experience. The accumulative effect of such experience forms the spiritual and value priorities of human existence, sets certain coordinates of his vital activity, due to which he self-determines, being in dialogue with the Absolute. Religious faith, unfolding as a permanent process of "search and finding" opens the "code" of transcendence, a new level of relations of the Human and Divine. (shrink)

That all human beings are one another’s moral equals is taken by many to be the fundamental premise of contemporary moral, political, and legal theory. It is also the demand of individuals and groups to be treated as equals that drives much of political practice and protest today. However, what does such a claim of ‘basic equality’ between human beings mean? How can it possibly be true, given that we are unequals in almost every other aspect of our lives? And, (...) who, exactly, is meant to fall within its scope? This volume brings together today’s foremost thinkers on basic equality to address these questions. Collectively, they explore the concept in history and critique, encompassing novel efforts to overcome the problem of explanation as well as scepticism about it, and discussion of its implications for inclusion and marginalization. (shrink)

Un survol historique des principales conceptions du fatalisme dans l’histoire sert ici de fil conducteur pour envisager le dépassement possible d’une conception fataliste qui caractériserait la pensée moderne dans son ensemble, et par conséquent le dépassement de la notion de liberté qu’on peut lui associer. Ce fatalisme moderne est celui que l’on peut attacher à la conception moderne de l’histoire, ce mot - histoire - étant entendu non comme la suite accidentelle des faits par opposition à une raison objective, (...) mais comme l’horizon même, explicite ou implicite, de l’ensemble de la conceptualisation rationnelle moderne. Il s’agit donc, ici, de considérer la possibilité d’un dépassement de cet horizon généralement tenu pour ultime et du type de fatalisme qui lui correspond.A historical survey of the main conceptions of fatalism is made. This serve us as a guide in order to conceive a mean for going beyond a conception of fatalism which seems to be typical of modern thought as a whole. Accordingly this can permit us to go beyond an idea of liberty which is linked to it. We can attach this modern fatalism to the modern conception of history, where we understand this word - history - not as an accidental succession of facts as opposed to an objective reason, but as the explicit or implicit horizon itself of the modern rational conceptualisation as a whole. Therefore we are concerned here about the possibility to go beyond this horizon which is generally considered as ultimate, and beyond the kind of fatalism which corresponds to it. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that lives and activities can be meaningful or meaningless, but few have appreciated that they can also be anti-meaningful. Anti-meaning is the polar opposite of meaning. Our purpose in this essay is to examine the nature and importance of this new and unfamiliar topic. In the first part, we sketch four theories of anti-meaning that correspond to leading theories of meaning. In the second part, we argue that anti-meaning has significance not only for our attempts to (...) theorize about meaning in life, but also for our ability to lead meaningful lives in the modern world. (shrink)

THE MEANING of a word is in the letters not like fruit in a dish but more like one’s reflection in a mirror. Just as a man sees himself by looking in the mirror rather than at it, so he enjoys insight into possible routes by inspecting the map instead of just glancing at it, and he understands meaning in signs and images. In our experience of living there is the problem of bringing order out of chaos, of taking the (...) ‘1’ out of the world to transform it into a meaningful word. Art is the communication of society, and social dealienation depends on our creating and sustaining symbols of integration great enough to overcome the disintegrative forces of fear and weakness. Hence, man’s quest for the real meaning of words. (shrink)

Religious tensions in America, as well as abroad, are nothing new. Yet, in this current epoch various cultures around the world are involved in internal clashes between religious and secular groups that pull at the attention of the public more often than not. Though a myriad of issues confront anyone interested in investigating these tensions, one must first wonder what, exactly, blasphemy means to both sides of the debate. In the course of doing so, one interesting question arises: What (...) does it mean to consider speech against a secular group’s belief in a given object, text, or even another belief as blasphemous? The point of this paper is to inquire into the semantic status of blasphemy. First, I will outline various possible definitions of blasphemy and take into consideration what such definitions mean to those on the opposite side of the fence . Second, I will explore how extending such a definition to both parties would change the semantic landscape of the current cultural debates. Last, I will propose a modest solution to how one should view issues surrounding blasphemous speech and the freedom of expression. (shrink)

Since antiquity, opposed concepts such as the One and the Many, the Finite and the Infinite, and the Absolute and the Relative, have been a driving force in philosophical, scientific, and mathematical thought. Yet they have also given rise to perplexing problems and conceptual paradoxes which continue to haunt scientists and philosophers. In Oppositions and Paradoxes, John L. Bell explains and investigates the paradoxes and puzzles that arise out of conceptual oppositions in physics and mathematics. In the process, Bell not (...) only motivates abstract conceptual thinking about the paradoxes at issue, he also offers a compelling introduction to central ideas in such otherwise-difficult topics as non-Euclidean geometry, relativity, and quantum physics. These paradoxes are often as fun as they are flabbergasting. Consider, for example, the famous Tristram Shandy paradox: an immortal man composing an autobiography so slowly as to require a year of writing to describe each day of his life and he would, if he had infinite time, presumably never complete the work, although no individual part of it would remain unwritten. Or imagine an English professor who time-travels back to 1599 to offer a printing of Hamlet to Shakespeare, so as to help the Bard overcome writer's block and author the play which will centuries later inspire an English professor to travel back in time. These and many other paradoxes straddle the boundary between physics and metaphysics, and demonstrate the hidden difficulty in many of our most basic concepts. (shrink)

In this text, I connect the concept of existence worked out by Heidegger with the concepts of radical understanding. Under this concept I mean the idea that existence is the radical content of every understanding. The fact that according to Heidegger existence is understanding is then explained through their common structure: existence is possibility as well as understanding is directed prominently to possibility. But, as it is shown through wider references to ancient as well as to some contemporary (...) discussions, possibility introduces in the structure of existence a certain incommensurability: that is why existence can never be reduced to a positive, actual reality, but is always “something more” than actuality. (shrink)

A professor’s experience of attending the 17th annual Reconceptualizing Early Childhood Education (RECE) Conference on pedagogies of hope demonstrates her desire to experiment on an immanent plane. As she looks back on her past experiences of depression, working in a revolutionary psychiatric clinic, experiencing a near catatonic state, and an action research study of women in early childhood education at the precipice of an immanent plane, the reader is led on their own journey to consider deeply the differences between transcendence (...) and immanence. In the end, the author’s story of returning from a catatonic state through bodily movements and triumph in human relationships and connections demonstrates how one moves out of his or her own disconnection between mind and body. Further, the meaning in the experiences of the action research project - the phenomenon - occurs when a misrepresented group of early childhood workers discovers their own power and voice in overcoming transcended expertise. They rise in immanence like the Humpty Dumpties that needed to exchange and word their new agency, connecting in a worldwide rhizome (image of thought). Finally, the reconceptualists in early childhood education are asked to take in these experiences and play with them in order to resist transcendence and to determine their own outcome as an organization. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 12, Special Edition May 2012. (shrink)

In an attempt to find some new ways of tackling old problems about meaning, I explore some possible models in which meaning may be conceptually situated. I take a close look at a traditional realist conception of meaning and give some reasons as to why we may have more room to move within this than is immediately apparent. Alternative frameworks are explored along the way. The approach of thus situating meaning is an ontological one, but it is also an epistemological, (...) as well as a hermeneutical one; in that the models put forward illuminate central issues and offer potential solutions to outstanding puzzles ranging across (at least) all of these broad realms of enquiry. Such solutions give a set of initial conceptualizations of the potential role meaning can play across broader frameworks of enquiry. As such they offer fresh inroads into otherwise deadlocked debates over the nature and place of meaning across philosophical enquiry in general. (shrink)

Our aim is to show that translating the modal graphs of Moretti’s “n-opposition theory” (2004) into set theory by a suited device, through identifying logical modal formulas with appropriate subsets of a characteristic set, one can, in a constructive and exhaustive way, by means of a simple recurring combinatory, exhibit all so-called “logical bi-simplexes of dimension n” (or n-oppositional figures, that is the logical squares, logical hexagons, logical cubes, etc.) contained in the logic produced by any given modal (...) graph (an exhaustiveness which was not possible before). In this paper we shall handle explicitly the classical case of the so-called 3(3)-modal graph (which is, among others, the one of S5), getting to a very elegant tetraicosahedronal geometrisation of this logic. (shrink)

Contextualism in philosophy of language and in epistemology are two distinct but closely entangled projects. The epistemological thesis is grounded in a semantic claim concerning the context-sensitivity of the predicate “know”: we gain insight into epistemological problems by investigating our linguistic intuitions concerning knowledge attribution sentences. Our aim here is to evaluate the plausibility of a project that takes the opposite starting point: the general idea is to establish the semantic contextualist thesis on the epistemological one. According to semantic contextualism, (...) virtually no sentences of a natural language express complete propositions – meaning underdetermines truth conditions. In our paper, instead of assuming the traditional view of meaning in terms of truth conditions, we suggest that a theory of meaning as justification may shed new light on the contextualist approach. We thus show how the notion of justification can be contextualized, arguing that our attempt provides an interesting and quite straightforward way of contextualizing meaning. (shrink)

Narcissistic personality disorder describes people who demonstrate an exaggerated sense of entitlement, lack empathy and crave admiration. But philosopher Simone de Beauvoir argued that, even if a person isn't a pathological narcissist, narcissism can be a strategy that some people use to help them cope with being undervalued. Through examples such as singer-songwriter Taylor Swift, I show how Beauvoir's philosophy gives us a framework to understand some narcissistic behaviour and possibilities for more authentic ways of being in the world.

In this paper we use a series of examples to show how oppositions and dichotomies are fundamental in legal argumentation, and vitally important to be aware of, because of their twofold nature. On the one hand, they are argument structures underlying various kinds of rational argumentation commonly used in law as a means of getting to the truth in a conflict of opinion under critical discussion by two opposing sides before a tryer of fact. On the other hand, they (...) are argument structures underling moves made in strategic advocacy by both sides that function as platforms for different kinds of questionable argumentation tactics and moves that are in some instances tricky and deceptive. (shrink)

This book offers a new perspective on current semantic theory by analysing key aspects of linguistic meaning and non-truth-conditional semantics. It applies non-truth-conditional semantics to various areas of language and critically considers earlier approaches to the study of semantic meaning, such as truth-conditional semantics, Speech Act theory and Gricean conventional implicatures. The author argues that those earlier approaches to linguistic semantics do not stand up to close scrutiny and are subject to a number of counterexamples, indicating that they are insufficient (...) for a comprehensive and unified account of linguistic semantics.<BR> An alternative framework is then presented based on recent developments in the field, demonstrating that it is possible to provide a unified account of linguistic semantics by making two fundamental distinctions between (a) conceptual and procedural meaning and (b) explicit and implicit communication. These two distinctions, combined with the various levels of representation available in linguistic communication, allow researchers to capture the variety of linguistic meaning encountered in natural language. The study includes a discussion of a number of areas within linguistic semantics, including sentence adverbials, parentheticals, discourse/pragmatic connectives, discourse particles, interjections and mood indicators. (shrink)

A formal theory of oppositions and opposites is proposed on the basis of a non- Fregean semantics, where opposites are negation-forming operators that shed some new light on the connection between opposition and negation. The paper proceeds as follows. After recalling the historical background, oppositions and opposites are compared from a mathematical perspective: the first occurs as a relation, the second as a function. Then the main point of the paper appears with a calculus of oppositions, by means (...) of a non-Fregean semantics that redefines the logical values of various sorts of sentences. A num- ber of topics are then addressed in the light of this algebraic semantics, namely: how to construct value-functional operators for any logical opposition, beyond the classical case of contradiction; Blanché's "closure problem", i.e., how to find a complete structure connecting the sixteen binary sentences with one another. All of this is meant to devise an abstract theory of opposition: it encompasses the relation of consequence as subalternation, while relying upon the use of a primary "proto- negation" that turns any relatum into an opposite. This results in sentential negations that proceed as intensional operators, while negation is broadly viewed as a difference-forming operator without special constraints on it. (shrink)

Formalized physical theories are not, as a rule, stated in intensional languages. Yet in talking about them we often treat them as if they were. We say for instance: 'Consider what would happen if instead of p's being true q were. In such a case r would be likely.' If we say this sort of thing, p, q and r appear to stand for the meanings of sentences of the theory, but meanings in some intensional sense. Now it is very (...) easy to extend the syntax of the formal theory by adding all sorts of intensional operators, e.g. a modal operator; and it is possible to extend the semantics by adding a set of possible worlds and evaluating the modal formulae in the usual way. But this procedure is open to the criticism that we are extending the theory by adding something which is not already there. In particular the criticism will be that the possible worlds required by the semantics seem to have no connection with the intended interpretations of the original physical theory. The aim of this paper is to shew how a set of possible worlds is already implicit in the intended interpretations of a formally presented physical theory and that these interpretations induce, in a comparatively direct way, an intensional semantics which corresponds to the original one. (shrink)

Kant taught us that there are two kinds of norms: Categorical imperatives that one ought to follow regardless of one's personal aims and circumstances, and hypothetical imperatives that direct us to employ the means towards our chosen ends. Kant's distinction separates two approaches to normative epistemology. On the one hand, we have principles of "inductive rationality", typically supported by considerations such as intuitive plausibility, conformity with exemplary practice, and internal consistency. On the other hand, we may assess rules for (...) forming belief by how well they attain the objectives that motivate inquiry; in Levi's words, "the ends of inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences" [Levi 67, p. 241]. A doctrinaire attitude would ignore one of these perspectives in favour of the other; a balanced approach is to develop both and compare [cf. Helmann 97, Sec.2]. There are three possible relationships between hypothetical and categorical imperatives for empirical inquiry. (shrink)