This paper examines parents experiences of medical decision-making and coping with having a critically ill baby in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) from a cross-cultural perspective (France vs. U.S.A.). Though parents experiences in the NICU were very similar despite cultural and institutional differences, each system addresses their needs in a different way. Interviews with parents show that French parents expressed overall higher satisfaction with the care of their babies and were better able to cope with the loss (...) of their child than American parents. Central to the French parents perception of autonomy and their sense of satisfaction were the strong doctor–patient relationship, the emphasis on medical certainty in prognosis versus uncertainty in the American context, and the sentimental work" provided by the team. The American setting, characterized by respect for parental autonomy, did not necessarily translate into full parental involvement in decision-making, and it limited the rapport between doctors and parents to the extent of parental isolation. This empirical comparative approach fosters a much-needed critique of philosophical principles by underscoring, from the parents perspective, the lack of emotional work" involved in the practice of autonomy in the American unit compared to the paternalistic European context. Beyond theoretical and ethical arguments, we must reconsider the practice of autonomy in particularly stressful situations by providing more specific means to cope, translating the impersonal language of rights" and decision-making into trusting, caring relationships, and sharing the responsibility for making tragic choices. (shrink)

This study explores the experiences and challenges of students with hearing impairment in a Colombian university within the framework of inclusive education. Through a qualitative approach, the perceptions of students and their caregivers regarding admission policies, academic participation, and institutional and curricular environments were analyzed. The findings indicate that, although inclusion policies exist, they are not fully effective, presenting significant barriers to the access and participation of deaf students, such as insufficient availability of qualified interpreters, lack of curricular adjustments, and (...) lack of adequate infrastructure. In addition, participants pointed to attitudes of exclusion on the part of peers and university staff, as well as an institutional culture that does not fully promote diversity. The study suggests the need to strengthen inclusive strategies to guarantee the right to education in conditions of equality and respect for diversity in higher education. (shrink)

Background: Studies from Western countries show that doctors working in neonatal intensive care units find withdrawal of treatment to be their most difficult ethical dilemma. There is less knowledge of how this is experienced in other economic, cultural, religious and educational contexts.Objectives: To explore and describe how Indian doctors experience ethical dilemmas concerning the withdrawal of treatment among critically sick and/or premature neonates.Method: Qualitative data from interviews was analysed according to Giorgi's phenomenological approach. The subjects were 14 doctors with (...) various levels of neonatal experience, recruited from two state‐owned NICUs in India. Main outcome measures: description reflecting the nature of ethical dilemmas and how they are experienced.Results: All doctors reported situations where the question of withdrawal of treatment was experienced as the worst part of their job. They felt that they lacked training in how to handle such dilemmas, and some had never talked about ethics before. They were especially concerned about non‐medical considerations that do not feature in current treatment guidelines. In describing their personal experiences, the informants mentioned their sense of responsibility in situations where they were aware that their decisions would influence a family's economy and reputation, availability of food and education for siblings, other children's access to equipment in the unit, and the use of resources in an underprivileged population. Sometimes lack of resources, usually ventilators, forced them to make decisions about which babies should get the chance to live. Other reported dilemmas included difficulties co‐operating with uneducated and poor parents.Conclusion: While Western doctors seem to focus on the rights and problems of the individual child, Indian doctors tend to refer to consequences for other children, for parents and society. There is a need for further research in this field, and for the development of guidelines on how to cope with differences in resources, and how to handle different patient groups’ cultural and religious concerns. (shrink)

The work of Professor Kraus is more than welcome at a time in which Psychopathology has become increasingly shallow and lacking in density, content with the role of an ideal “observer” whose only ambition is an objective description of signs and symptoms in order to fulfil operational criteria which reliably bestow a place for the case under observation within the grid of diagnostic classification.

In Sweden, palliative care has, over the past decades, been object to policies and guidelines with focus on how to achieve “good palliative care”. The aim of this study has been to analyse how experts make sense of the development and the current state of palliative care. Departing from this aim, focus has been on identifying how personal experiences of ‘the self’ are intertwined with culturally available meta-level concepts and how experts contribute to construct new scripts on palliative care. Twelve (...) qualitative interviews were conducted. Four scripts were identified after analysing the empirical material: 1. script of paths towards working within palliative care; 2. script of desirable and deterrent reference points; 3. script of tensions between improvement and bureaucracy; and 4. script of low status and uncertain definitions. The findings of this study illustrate how experts in complex ways intertwine experiences of ‘the self’ with meta-levels concepts in order to make sense of the field of palliative care. The participants did not endorse one “right way” of “good” deaths. Instead, palliative care was considered to be located in a complex state where the historical development, consisting of both desirable ideals, death denials and lack of guidelines, and more recent developments of strives towards universal concepts, “improvement” and increased bureaucracy altogether played a significant role for how palliative care has developed and is organised and conducted today. (shrink)

There is currently unprecedented attention in Australia on the misidentification of women victim-survivors as family violence ‘predominant aggressors’—this focus has largely been oriented towards the role of the police. Less research has considered court responses to misidentification and specifically, the role that legal practitioners play in recognising and responding to clients who have been misidentified. This article addresses this key gap in the literature through an exploration of 18 legal practitioners’ experiences of representing misidentified clients in the civil protection order (...) system in the Australian state of Victoria. The findings suggest that legal practitioners face a number of challenges when representing clients who have been misidentified and that the magistrates’ courts are ill-equipped to respond to misidentification. As a consequence, a culture of respondents consenting to orders that should never have been made against them is maintained. This article calls for a greater focus on the role that the courts can play in providing a ‘safety net’ for victim-survivors who have been misidentified. (shrink)

The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks ‘knowledge synthesis’, is poorly supported by ‘theory’, has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. ‘culture’, ‘social learning’, ‘cumulative culture’) (...) in ways that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous ‘grand challenges’ emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers. (shrink)

Museums are essential for improving cultural understanding and instruction. Exhibitions showcasing ethnic cultures provide insightful perspectives on many cultures and civilizations. These educational opportunities can be made as effective as possible by assessing their influence on visitor satisfaction.Investigation into the impact of ethnic culture exhibitions on audience pleasure, participation, and comprehension is lacking, despite their significance. By investigating how these displays affect visitors' knowledge acquisition and participation, the study seeks to close this disparity.Utilizing a combined methods technique that (...) integrated quantitative surveys with qualitative comments, the study polled 62 museum visitors who had attended ethnic cultural exhibitions. The questionnaire evaluated knowledge of culture, instructional impact, involvement, and tourist pleasure. Data analysis using the SPSS software was utilized to analyze how different factors affect results and find significant indicators by doing logistic and multinomial logistic regression. This study discovered a substantial correlation between improved knowledge of culture and exhibition participation, as well as a significant improvement in visitor satisfaction and educational results when interactive components and cultural content are included. Through the use of interactive material, ethnic culture exhibitions improve the educational experience and increase visitor happiness. Museums ought to take demographic factors into account while planning different exhibitions for the future. (shrink)

Cultural differences pose a serious challenge to the ethics and governance of artificial intelligence from a global perspective. Cultural differences may enable malignant actors to disregard the demand of important ethical values or even to justify the violation of them through deference to the local culture, either by affirming the local culture lacks specific ethical values, e.g., privacy, or by asserting the local culture upholds conflicting values, e.g., state intervention is good. One response to this challenge is the (...) human rights approach to AI governance, which is intended to be a universal and globally enforceable framework. The proponents of the approach, however, have so far neglected the challenge from cultural differences or left out the implications of cultural diversity in their works. This is surprising because human rights theorists have long recognized the significance of cultural pluralism for human rights. Accordingly, the approach may not be straightforwardly applicable in “non-Western” contexts because of cultural differences, and it may also be critiqued as philosophically incomplete insofar as the approach does not account for the role of culture. This commentary examines the human rights approach to AI governance with an emphasis on cultural values and the role of culture. Particularly, I show that the consideration of cultural values is essential to the human rights approach for both philosophical and instrumental reasons. (shrink)

IntroductionThose in mental health-related consumer movements have made clear their demands for humane treatment and basic civil rights, an end to stigma and discrimination, and a chance to participate in their own recovery. But theorizing about the politics of recognition, 'recognition rights' and epistemic justice, suggests that they also have a stake in the broad cultural meanings associated with conceptions of mental health and illness.ResultsFirst person accounts of psychiatric diagnosis and mental health care (shown here to represent 'counter stories' (...) to the powerful 'master narrative' of biomedical psychiatry), offer indications about how experiences of mental disorder might be reframed and redefined as part of efforts to acknowledge and honor recognition rights and epistemic justice. However, the task of cultural semantics is one for the entire culture, not merely consumers. These new meanings must be negotiated. When they are not the result of negotiation, group-wrought definitions risk imposing a revision no less constraining than the mis-recognizing one it aims to replace. Contested realities make this a challenging task when it comes to cultural meanings about mental disorder. Examples from mental illness memoirs about two contested realities related to psychosis are examined here: the meaninglessness of symptoms, and the role of insight into illness. They show the magnitude of the challenge involved - for consumers, practitioners, and the general public - in the reconstruction of these new meanings and realities.ConclusionTo honor recognition rights and epistemic justice acknowledgement must be made of the heterogeneity of the effects of, and of responses to, psychiatric diagnosis and care, and the extent of the challenge of the reconstructive cultural semantics involved. (shrink)

The current research tested the idea that it is the cultural fit of emotions, rather than certain emotions per se, that predicts psychological well-being. We reasoned that emotional fit in the domains of life that afford the realization of central cultural mandates would be particularly important to psychological well-being. We tested this hypothesis with samples from three cultural contexts that are known to differ with respect to their main cultural mandates: a European American ( N = (...) 30), a Korean ( N = 80), and a Belgian sample ( N = 266). Cultural fit was measured by comparing an individual’s patterns of emotions to the average cultural pattern for the same type of situation on the Emotional Patterns Questionnaire ( De Leersnyder et al., 2011 ). Consistent with our hypothesis, we found evidence for “universality without uniformity”: in each sample, psychological well-being was associated with emotional fit in the domain that was key to the cultural mandate. However, cultures varied with regard to the particular domain involved. Psychological well-being was predicted by emotional fit (a) in autonomy-promoting situations at work in the U.S., (b) in relatedness-promoting situations at home in Korea, and (c) in both autonomy-promoting and relatedness-promoting situations in Belgium. These findings show that the experience of culturally appropriate patterns of emotions contributes to psychological well-being. One interpretation is that experiencing appropriate emotions is itself a realization of the cultural mandates. (shrink)

Ethics in research can be broadly divided into two epistemic dimensions. One dimension focuses on bureaucratic procedures (i.e., procedural ethics), while the other focuses on contextually and culturally contested practice of ethics in research (i.e., ethics in practice). Researchers experience both dimensions distinctly in their qualitative research. The review of ethics in prospective research through bureaucratic procedures aims to measure compliance with documented requirements relating to research participants, data management, consent, and ensure researchers can demonstrate their ethical competence before they (...) commence their research. However, researchers often experience unanticipated ethical issues within the context of their research; sometimes ethics-related situations, including language sensitivity, cultural humility, and data processing experienced by researchers can be very different from what was included in bureaucratic procedures. In this study, phenomena related to research ethics in practice, as experienced by social scientists (n = 5) in their qualitative research, are hermeneutically explored and interpreted. The selected phenomena represent the researchers’ lived experiences regarding the practice of participant autonomy, specifically exploring participants’ right to withdraw from research. These phenomena are interpreted from the theoretical perspectives of situational relativism and self-determined autonomy. The interpreted phenomena reveal the current practices in ethical management of data collected from participants before their decision to withdraw from research (i.e., withdrawal data), are predominantly focused on tangible forms of data (i.e., the information that can easily be distinguished from other data), but ethical concerns associated with intangible forms of data are often neglected. The intangible forms of data are experiential knowing and understanding that include, feeling, emotion, courage, respect, celebration, anger, and the sense of being and belonging. The study recommends that researchers and research professionals should exercise ethical sensitivity and humility towards intangible forms of data collected during qualitative research when participants withdraw their consent. (shrink)

Background Informed consent is considered to be the standard method for respecting the autonomy of individual participants in research and practices and is thought to be based on several conditions: (1) providing information on the purpose of the research or a specific treatment, what it will entail, (2) the participants being mentally competent to understand the information and weigh it in the balance, and (3) the participants to be free from coercion. While there are studies of informed consent in other (...) countries, especially Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs), this study explored the experiences of clinicians regarding the process of obtaining informed consent to participate in a Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) in particular and treatment in general in healthcare settings, both general and mental health, specifically focusing on the tension between individualistic concept of autonomy and collectivist values in cultures such as Pakistan. Methods Qualitative interviews with 20 clinicians from healthcare settings in Pakistan who also served as recruiters in a suicide prevention RCT in Pakistan. The interviews were guided by semi-structured topic guide. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Results The interviews revealed that shared decision making was more morally important than individual autonomy, the role of the family played a dominant part in the consent-taking procedure, the decision of the elder and/or family patriarch took prominence, and that clinician-researchers encountered significant challenges in consent process in Pakistan, while recruiting patients into the trial as well as during routine treatment processes in healthcare settings. Four distinct themes emerged which were (1) Family deciding for patients, (2) Benefits of involving family in consent process, (3) Gender disparity in consent process, (4) Challenges experienced by clinician-researchers during consent process in Pakistan. Conclusions The concept of consent is generally considered important in many cultures, however, there are two strands of understanding. There seems to be consensus that participant agreement is necessary to protect the participant but with regards to autonomy there are significant cultural differences whether it is the right for autonomy of the individual (individualistic concept) or family, community, or expert authority in other cultures. In Pakistan clinician-researchers sometimes preferred one approach and sometimes the other as they appreciated the interests of the patient to be. (shrink)

The author reviews recent books by Alasdair MacIntyre and Garrett Barden that critique the impulse to foundational theory and transhistorical argumentation in moral theory; these arguments are then set in relation to books by Franklin Gamwell and Karl-Otto Apel that seek, in new ways, to defend that impulse. Although far more sympathetic to the latter perspective, the author maintains that all four of these second-order theoretical discussions lack an appropriate understanding of and engagement with the post-Enlightenment tradition of moral theorizing.

Taken at face value, Professor Maclntyre’s charge that modern culture is “emotivist” is conceptually incoherent and betrays epistemological confusion. Examination of the modern concept and practice of rights indicates hat his comparisons between modern and pre-modern cultures exaggerate the irrationality, individualism, and fragmentation of the former, the rationalism, unity, and communalism of the latter. There are important differences among the several cultural forms that Maclntyre distinguishes. It is less clear that, lacking (as he admittedly does) a satisfactory account (...) of moral reasoning, Maclntyre has made persuasive his case for abandoning modern liberalism in favor of communalisms inspired by pre-modern cultures. (shrink)

Across cultures people construct spatial representations of time. However, the particular spatial layouts created to represent time may differ across cultures. This paper examines whether people automatically access and use culturally specific spatial representations when reasoning about time. In Experiment 1, we asked Hebrew and English speakers to arrange pictures depicting temporal sequences of natural events, and to point to the hypothesized location of events relative to a reference point. In both tasks, English speakers (who read left to right) (...) arranged temporal sequences to progress from left to right, whereas Hebrew speakers (who read right to left) arranged them from right to left, replicating previous work. In Experiments 2 and 3, we asked the participants to make rapid temporal order judgments about pairs of pictures presented one after the other (i.e., to decide whether the second picture showed a conceptually earlier or later time-point of an event than the first picture). Participants made responses using two adjacent keyboard keys. English speakers were faster to make “earlier” judgments when the “earlier” response needed to be made with the left response key than with the right response key. Hebrew speakers showed exactly the reverse pattern. Asking participants to use a space-time mapping inconsistent with the one suggested by writing direction in their language created interference, suggesting that participants were automatically creating writing-direction consistent spatial representations in the course of their normal temporal reasoning. It appears that people automatically access culturally specific spatial representations when making temporal judgments even in nonlinguistic tasks. (shrink)

At an international conference on philosophy and anthropology held in 1968, French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida remarked that an international philosophical encounter is an extremely rare thing in the world. Twenty years later, American moral philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre argued that moral discourse today entails the recognition that there are many rationalities, each with its conception of justice, such that one must ask the questions, "Which rationality? Whose justice?" In this paper I take note of these observations with reference to the claim (...) that human rights have universal validity, recognizing that international discussions about this claim are moments in which "the West" presumably experiences a "collocution" with discourses from "the margin". My argument proceeds to conclude that any legitimate discussion of human rights must acknowledge the need for movement from cultural hierarchy to cultural symmetry, thereby conceding that traditions alien to the Western tradition of moral discourse may be superior in rationality, both theoretical and practical, thereby being instructive about the requirements of global justice. (shrink)

The paper is in four parts. The first part offers a brief reminder of the historical context for human rights as women's rights. The second part notes the relative lack of attention in human rights theory to the roles of social meaning and what has been called the ‘social imaginary’. The third part suggests that the social imaginary — understood in terms of the always present backdrop to meaningful social action — may be seen as a fruitful ‘middle ground’ upon (...) which negotiations may take place between human rights and cultural norms. The fourth part examines a case where women's entitlements to basic human rights are compromised by men's claims to cultural or group rights. I conclude by arguing that if human rights are to accommodate women's rights then women must be recognized as legitimate stakeholders in, and valuable contributors to, the necessarily ongoing re-invention and recreation of social meaning and cultural identity. (shrink)

An intuitive conception of objectivity involves an ideal of neutrality—if we’re to engage in objective inquiry, we must try to sideline our prejudices, values, and politics, lest these factors taint inquiry and unduly influence our results. This intuition underlies various “purist” epistemological frameworks, which grant epistemic significance only to “epistemic factors” like evidence or the truth of a belief. Feminist epistemologists typically condemn purist frameworks as inimical to feminist aims. They argue that purist epistemology is divorced from the ineliminably social (...) and value-laden nature of our epistemic practices, and, moreover, that it abstracts away precisely those features that are needed to explain how power shapes knowledge. As they see it, purist frameworks simply lack the conceptual space needed to ask the right kinds of questions. Thus, they go in for “impurist” frameworks, which grant epistemic significance to “non-epistemic” factors, and so shed the confining constraints of purism. I turn the tables on the impurists—where they have connected purist norms with perniciously disengaged epistemology, I connect impurist norms with a creeping anxiety that is diminishing feminist epistemology’s political possibilities. First, I demonstrate that it’s increasingly common for impurist epistemologists to use moral considerations as a means to bypass the evidence, which betrays a lack of faith that the evidence will bear out feminist commitments. Second, I demonstrate that there is needless pessimism about our capacity to understand, as evidenced by the increasingly widespread idea that privileged social positions place robust limits on what people can know about oppression that they don’t personally experience. In both cases, moral and political considerations are invoked to give the illusion of being socially engaged, while in fact they allow people to give up on the difficult project of figuring things out. An extended case study on rape culture illustrates the stakes of doing inquiry that is only superficially socially engaged; I show that the two anxious traps I’ve identified have prevented contemporary feminist theorists from detecting and rooting out racist distortion in their accounts of rape culture because both traps interfere with a genuinely intersectional approach to feminist theorizing. (shrink)

The many constraints of outer space experience challenge the human ability to coexist. Paradoxically, astronauts assert that on the international space station there are no conflicts or, at least, that they are able to manage their differences, behavioral as well as cognitive, in full respect of human rights and the imperatives of cooperative living. The question is: Why? Why in those difficult, a-terrestrial, and therefore almost unnatural conditions do human beings seem to be able to peacefully and collaboratively live together? (...) What is there beyond terrestrial boundary conditions that allows for such a result? And what can we learn from the astronauts’ experience about the effectiveness of human rights on Earth? My proposal is that the a-terrestrial dimension deeply alters the mind/body indexical framework and, in this way, disentangles the human inclination to semiosis from the cognitive and behavioral habits of categorization and territorialization inherent in the experience on Earth. If analyzed through the spectrum of an interdisciplinary approach involving anthropology, semiology, law, and human geography, I think that outer space enterprises can offer many insights into the cognitive and ethical/political hindrances to the effectiveness of human rights and their intercultural uses. Meanwhile the compulsive greed for a possessive territorialization of outer space and celestial bodies is growing by leaps and bounds. It haunts and imbues both astropolitics and space law. The astronauts’ semio-anthropological experience of human rights and cooperative coexistence seems to have been left in orbit. The future requires awareness and action by anthropologists, semioticians, cognitive scientists, geographers and lawyers, working all together in an interdisciplinary effort to move beyond approaching the experiential with a territorial mindset. The hope is that the “dark dream” of human exploitation/colonization of outer space will not turn from a political and legal speculation into a future reality. (shrink)

People implicitly associate positive ideas with their dominant side of space and negative ideas with their non-dominant side. Right-handers tend to associate “good” with “right” and “bad” with “left,” but left-handers associate “bad” with “right” and “good” with “left.” Whereas right-handers' implicit associations align with idioms in language and culture that link “good” with “right,” left-handers' implicit associations go against them. Can cultural conventions modulate the body-specific association between valence and left-right space? Here, (...) we compared people from Spanish and Moroccan cultures, which differ in the strength of taboos against the use of the left hand, and therefore in their preference for the right. Results showed stronger explicit associations between space and valence in Moroccan participants than in Spaniards, but they did not show any increased tendency for right-handed Moroccans to associate “good” with “right” implicitly. Despite differences in cultural conventions between Spaniards and Moroccans, we find no evidence for a cross-cultural difference in the implicit association between space and valence, which appears to depend on patterns of bodily experience. (shrink)

Nearly all psychological research on basic cognitive processes of category formation and reasoning uses sample populations associated with large research institutions in technologically-advanced societies. Lopsided attention to a select participant pool risks biasing interpretation, no matter how large the sample or how statistically reliable the results. The experiments in this article address this limitation. Earlier research with urban-USA children suggests that biological concepts are thoroughly enmeshed with their notions of naive psychology, and strikingly human-centered. Thus, if children are to develop (...) a causally appropriate model of biology, in which humans are seen as simply one animal among many, they must undergo fundamental conceptual change. Such change supposedly occurs between 7 and 10 years of age, when the human-centered view is discarded. The experiments reported here with Yukatek Maya speakers challenge the empirical generality and theoretical importance of these claims. Part 1 shows that young Maya children do not anthropocentrically interpret the biological world. The anthropocentric bias of American children appears to owe to a lack of cultural familiarity with non-human biological kinds, not to initial causal understanding of folkbiology as such. Part 2 shows that by age of 4-5 Yukatek Maya children employ a concept of innate species potential or underlying essence much as urban American children seem to, namely, as an inferential framework for understanding the affiliation of an organism to a biological species, and for projecting known and unknown biological properties to organisms in the face of uncertainty. Together, these experiments indicate that folkpsychology cannot be the initial source of folkbiology. They also underscore the possibility of a species-wide and domain-specific basis for acquiring knowledge about the living world that is constrained and modified but not caused or created by prior non-biological thinking and subsequent cultural experience. (shrink)

Dignity is a human right and a base for human health. This right must be observed in work environments as a moral obligation. This qualitative study aimed to understand nurses’ experiences of violation of their dignity at work and to explore its dimensions. The participants were 15 nurses working in two hospitals in Tehran. The data were collected through 26 unstructured interviews and analyzed using content analysis. The dimensions of violation were ‘irreverence’, including experiences of abuse and violence, (...) humiliation, and being ignored; ‘coercion and violation of autonomy’, consisting of the control of relationships, lack of privacy, rigidness, and imposition; ‘ignoring professional and scientific ability’, indicating impossibilities in applying nurses’ knowledge; and ‘denying the value of nurse/care’, being the theme that verified the dominance of treatment/cure and lack of recognition of care value. Health systems should take the promotion of the nurses’ dignity into account through providing a dignified work environment. (shrink)

In this paper we examine how English and Mandarin speakers think about time, and we test how the patterns of thinking in the two groups relate to patterns in linguistic and cultural experience. In Mandarin, vertical spatial metaphors are used more frequently to talk about time than they are in English; English relies primarily on horizontal terms. We present results from two tasks comparing English and Mandarin speakers’ temporal reasoning. The tasks measure how people spatialize time in three-dimensional space, (...) including the sagittal (front/back), transverse (left/right), and vertical (up/down) axes. Results of Experiment 1 show that people automatically create spatial representations in the course of temporal reasoning, and these implicit spatializations differ in accordance with patterns in language, even in a non-linguistic task. Both groups showed evidence of a left-to-right representation of time, in accordance with writing direction, but only Mandarin speakers showed a vertical top-to-bottom pattern for time (congruent with vertical spatiotemporal metaphors in Mandarin). Results of Experiment 2 confirm and extend these findings, showing that bilinguals’ representations of time depend on both long-term and proximal aspects of language experience. Participants who were more proficient in Mandarin were more likely to arrange time vertically (an effect of previous language experience). Further, bilinguals were more likely to arrange time vertically when they were tested in Mandarin than when they were tested in English (an effect of immediate linguistic context). (shrink)

For some, cultured animal products ought to be celebrated for the potential they offer to replace factory farming. Others argue that, for the same reason, there is a duty to support their production and consumption. This paper argues that the ethical status of cultured animal products ought to be assessed not just in comparison with factory farming, but also in terms of its potential to bring about interspecies justice. The claim is made that the attitudes embodied within cultured animal products (...) show a lack of proper respect for nonhuman animals and are at odds with those required by justice. Although cultured animal products have the potential to greatly reduce harms done to nonhuman animals, this paper argues that their adoption ought to nevertheless be regarded with some regret. Using a Rawlsian framework for assessing transitional steps towards justice, the paper shows that, whilst the adoption of cultured animal products may be permissible, the case for regarding it as a duty is much weaker. For cultured meats to be permissible, it must first be shown that alternatives that respect the value of nonhuman animals as ends-in-themselves do not exist. (shrink)

Dignity is a human right and a base for human health. This right must be observed in work environments as a moral obligation. This qualitative study aimed to understand nurses’ experiences of violation of their dignity at work and to explore its dimensions. The participants were 15 nurses working in two hospitals in Tehran. The data were collected through 26 unstructured interviews and analyzed using content analysis. The dimensions of violation were ‘irreverence’, including experiences of abuse and violence, (...) humiliation, and being ignored; ‘coercion and violation of autonomy’, consisting of the control of relationships, lack of privacy, rigidness, and imposition; ‘ignoring professional and scientific ability’, indicating impossibilities in applying nurses’ knowledge; and ‘denying the value of nurse/care’, being the theme that verified the dominance of treatment/cure and lack of recognition of care value. Health systems should take the promotion of the nurses’ dignity into account through providing a dignified work environment. (shrink)

The author reviews recent books by Alasdair MacIntyre and Garrett Barden that critique the impulse to foundational theory and transhistorical argumentation in moral theory; these arguments are then set in relation to books by Franklin Gamwell and Karl-Otto Apel that seek, in new ways, to defend that impulse. Although far more sympathetic to the latter perspective, the author maintains that all four of these second-order theoretical discussions lack an appropriate understanding of and engagement with the post-Enlightenment tradition of moral theorizing.

Dignity is a human right and a base for human health. This right must be observed in work environments as a moral obligation. This qualitative study aimed to understand nurses’ experiences of violation of their dignity at work and to explore its dimensions. The participants were 15 nurses working in two hospitals in Tehran. The data were collected through 26 unstructured interviews and analyzed using content analysis. The dimensions of violation were ‘irreverence’, including experiences of abuse and violence, (...) humiliation, and being ignored; ‘coercion and violation of autonomy’, consisting of the control of relationships, lack of privacy, rigidness, and imposition; ‘ignoring professional and scientific ability’, indicating impossibilities in applying nurses’ knowledge; and ‘denying the value of nurse/care’, being the theme that verified the dominance of treatment/cure and lack of recognition of care value. Health systems should take the promotion of the nurses’ dignity into account through providing a dignified work environment. (shrink)

This article outlines three conceptions of culture: The normative, the anthropological, and the pragmatist. I advocate a pragmatist conception of culture as practices using the conceptual resources found in John Dewey's pragmatism. I argue that culture is not to be thought of as a distinct, non-natural ontological realm, but is nature as it directs itself intelligently through historically evolved social practices. In Dewey's pragmatism, culture is another name for human experience as a practical process. I further argue that we can (...) only have cultures if we presuppose the reality of certain moral values like truthfulness, justice, and respect for ritual. Finally, I argue that the deepest understanding of culture is a kind of practical rather than cognitive understanding. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Responding to a call by Pierre Sané, Secretary-General of Amnesty International, for a worldwide political movement to overcome the social damage that has been wrought by economic globalization, this paper asks whether such a movement can invoke current conceptions of human rights. In particular, if human rights are Euro-centric, how well would they serve the self-understanding of a movement that is to be global, culturally pluralistic and counterhegemonic to Northern capital? I argue that it is not human rights that are (...) Eurocentric, but only certain conceptions of human rights. Properly understood, human rights are justifiable from within all cultures. Moreover, current conceptions of human rights are not as narrow as they were in 1948, when the Universal Declaration was drafted. Nearly five decades of international dialogue have transformed human rights discourse in ways that are profoundly anti-Eurocentric, and further transformations are already underway. There are resources of moral and political experience, within all cultures, which argue strongly in favor of these transformations. Therefore, a more consistent and more complete knowledge of human rights can emerge cross-culturally if the dialogue is not abused and if the relevant moral and political experience is let into the dialogue from all quarters. (shrink)

BackgroundNorway has extensive and detailed legal requirements and guidelines concerning involvement of next of kin during involuntary hospital treatment of seriously mentally ill patients. However, we have little knowledge about what happens in practice. This study explores NOK’s views and experiences of involvement during involuntary hospitalisation in Norway.MethodsWe performed qualitative interviews-focus groups and individual-with 36 adult NOK to adults and adolescents who had been involuntarily admitted once or several times. The semi-structured interview guide included questions on experiences with and views (...) on involvement during serious mental illness and coercion.ResultsMost of the NOK were heavily involved in the patient’s life and illness. Their conceptions of involvement during mental illness and coercion, included many important aspects adding to the traditional focus on substitute decision-making. The overall impression was, with a few exceptions, that the NOK had experienced lack of involvement or had negative experiences as NOK in their encounters with the health services. Not being seen and acknowledged as important caregivers and co sufferers were experienced as offensive and could add to their feelings of guilt. Lack of involvement had as a consequence that vital patient information which the NOK possessed was not shared with the patient’s therapists.ConclusionsDespite public initiatives to improve the involvement of NOK, the NOK in our study felt neglected, unappreciated and dismissed. The paper discusses possible reasons for the gap between public policies and practice which deserve more attention: 1. A strong and not always correct focus on legal matters. 2. Little emphasis on the role of NOK in professional ethics. 3. The organisation of health services and resource constraints. 4. A conservative culture regarding the role of next of kin in mental health care. Acknowledging these reasons may be helpful to understand deficient involvement of the NOK in voluntary mental health services. (shrink)

Through the personal stories of managers running global business, this book takes an inside look into the dilemmas of managers who are asked to make profits ethically according to the dictates of their company's ethics code. It examines what companies `think" they are doing to help managers in those situations and how those managers are actually affected. Thanks to the boost from the 1991 Sentencing Guidelines which minimizes penalties for companies with ethics codes caught in ethical wrongdoing, more than 85% (...) of US companies and two thirds of all Canadian companies and half of all European companies now have Codes of Ethics. Yet, over and over, we hear of stories of personal dilemmas and conflicts experienced by individual managers navigating those business waters in other cultures. "Eileen Morgan does an excellent job of mapping the course for navigating the previously uncharted global ethical waters. By identifying best practices, she leads the reader on a journey from Surviving, to Understanding to Knowing the ethical issues that frequently confront international business people. This is a must read for anyone who wants to successfully compete in world markets." -Michael J. Litwin, Executive Vice President, Chief Credit Officer, Heller Financial, Inc. "Eileen Morgan has combined the pragmatic concerns of the individual manager with the moral concerns that come from personal-life history, cultural roots, and corporate ethical culture …This book focuses on the constructive task of formulating and using an "ethical map," and is sure to be a tonic to conscientious managers who want to navigate cross-cultural commerce with integrity. It has done a superb job of creating order out of the complexity of cross-cultural moral experience by insisting that the complexity must be honored and appropriated rather than ignored or suppressed." -Dr. Richard Beauchamp, Professor of Ethics, Christopher Newport University "In this groundbreaking book, Eileen Morgan has provided scores of real-life examples and developed a framework for approaching ethical leadership in international business. This is mandatory reading for anyone involved in global management today...This is an important book on an important subject." -Stephen H. Rhinesmith, Ph.D. Author, A Manager's Guide to Globalization "Eileen Morgan provides us with a much needed roadmap for how to walk the path of ethical leadership with practical feet. She reminds us that ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of every day leadership, and that we can all choose to be 'ethical pioneers' in our companies and our communities. Every leader engaged in global business can benefit from the lessons and stories included in this book." -Christi A. Olson, Ph.D. Chair, Telecommunications Management Department, Golden Gate University "Eileen Morgan's thoughtful analysis of 'ethical capital' should be read by anyone who does business in a global environment…Morgan's book presents the issue clearly, comprehensively and compellingly, demonstrating that ethics is an indispensable aspect of individual leadership and organizational credibility. …It provides a clear roadmap for business leaders who need to communicate their commitment to integrity and accountability to their employees, their partners, and their customer, making their 'ethical capital' one of their most valuable assets." -Nell Minnow, Principal, Lens, The Corporate Governance Investors "Eileen Morgan gives excellent insight into ethical practices. She focuses on business but her insights have general application. This book also describes differences in ethical interpretation that can arise between diverse cultures. Ms. Morgan has made an excellent contribution to understanding the benefit of positive ethical practices." -David C. Lincoln, Sponsor, Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics, College of Business, Arizona State University President, Arizona Oxides, LLC · First in-depth look at how managers in global companies actually bridge the gap between their organizations and their daily decisions · Explains the need for internal and external ethical operations¦and how organizations often create confusion rather than clarity with the label of "ethics". (shrink)

In response to a growing perception that America's youth lack the necessary values to grow and develop into adulthood in a socially healthy manner, character education has emerged as a rapidly growing proactive approach that serves to develop good character among young people. The authors examine several of the virtues thought to underlie good character from Character Counts!, a popular character education program, and emphasize the cultural complexities involved when promoting character education in a pluralistic society. 2012 APA, all (...) rights reserved). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Art as a Political Act:Expression of Cultural Identity, Self-Identity, and Gender by Suk Nam Yun and Yong Soon MinHwa Young Choi Caruso (bio)IntroductionA number of artists of color, including Asian American women, are creating art from the basis of their lived experiences. Within minority groups searching for their cultural identity, establishing self-identity is an important process. For various psychological and sociological reasons, artists seem inspired to seek (...) deeper meaning and a broader participation in cultural work.1 Asian American women artists, in particular, are currently making art as a means of exploring self-identity, cultural identity, and gender issues. Korean/Korean American minority women artists are creating art as a reaction to their cultural upbringing, which questions issues of identity, gender, ethnicity, politics, cultural, and socioeconomic status. These contemporary artists are breaking away from traditional cultural expectations and overcoming social barriers as artists, women, and Koreans/Korean Americans. With the growing public awareness of women's consciousness and sense of self as women in Korea and as an ethnic minority in America, these artists are redefining their identity. Despite the traditional patriarchal Confucian hierarchy; lack of social, institutional, and political support; and stereotypic gender, cultural, and socioeconomic status expectations for women, a few have stepped out of their traditional roles as women and have become successful artists in Korea and America.The artworks of these artists are worthy of investigation because they appear to be a culturally, socially, and politically motivated artistic expression of the complex multifaceted Korean/Korean American life experiences as women and as Korean immigrant members of a cultural (ethnic) minority in American society. Therefore, two main research questions can be posed: [End Page 71]• Given that art can be constructed out of layers of different experiences and influences, to what extent do the dimensions of cultural identity, self-identity, and gender interweave and contribute to the function of art as a political act for Korean/Korean American women artists?• How do Korean/Korean American cultural, social, and female experiences influence the artistic expression of Korean/Korean American women artists?In order to answer these questions, I selected case study methodology2 and adapted elements of interpretive biography,3 and narrative approaches as developed by Wallace and Gruber.4 According to Denzin,5 interpretive biography involves the collection and analysis of personal experiences, life documents, stories, accounts, and narratives that describe turning-point moments in individuals' lives. Denzin argues that personal experiences and personal stories are derived from a larger cultural, ideological, and historical context. The intent of the biographical project is to problematize the social, economic, cultural, structural, and historical forces that shape, distort, and otherwise alter lived experiences.By using narrative case study methods, I explore elements of self-identity formation, cultural identity, gender issues, personal thoughts, artistic expression, meaning of artworks, professional achievement, and life circumstances. I examine each participant's life in the Korean and American historical, cultural, social, and political environments. I interpret participants' outer lives (what they do) and inner lives (feelings, thoughts, inner self) to capture their deep, profound life experiences. I examine salient themes of their art expression and how the role of art and artistic activity is a part of political, cultural, social, and feminist activism. I further investigate their professional activities in order to identify the multiple roles that contribute to personal and professional identity formation.For the purpose of this study, I selected the contemporary Korean woman artist Suk Nam Yun and the contemporary Korean American woman artist Yong Soon Min as primary participants. These two women artists, despite many social and cultural barriers, chose to become artists; feminists; and social, cultural, and political activists; in addition to fulfilling traditional Korean family and domestic roles. Yun and Min are regarded as the leading contemporary Korean/Korean American women artists whose artworks deal with issues of cultural, social, feminist, political, and hybrid identity and art as political activism.Lippard acknowledges that visual images play an increasingly important role in society.6 Art that connects everyday experience with social critique and creative expression becomes a vital means of reflecting upon the nature of society and social existence.7 Artworks can function as... (shrink)

Experiments may contribute to understanding the basic processes of cultural evolution. We drew features from previous laboratory research with small groups in which traditions arose during several generations. Groups of four participants chose by consensus between solving anagrams printed on red cards and on blue cards. Payoffs for the choices differed. After 12 min, the participant who had been in the experiment the longest was removed and replaced with a naı¨ve person. These replacements, each of which marked the end (...) of a generation, continued for 10 – 15 generations, at which time the day’s session ended. Time-out duration, which determined whether the group earned more by choosing red or blue, and which was fixed for a day’s session, was varied across three conditions to equal 1, 2, or 3 min. The groups developed choice traditions that tended toward maximizing earnings. The stronger the dependence between choice and earnings, the stronger was the tradition. Once a choice tradition evolved, groups passed it on by instructing newcomers, using some combination of accurate information, mythology, and coercion. Among verbal traditions, frequency of mythology varied directly with strength of the choice tradition. These methods may be applied to a variety of research questions. D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

"The political and academic worlds are fractured by two competing discourses: the universalism of human rights and cultural relativism. This fracture is represented by the deep separation of cultural analysis and theories of international politics. Derek Robbins in a brilliant interrogation of European thinkers from Montesquieu to Pierre Bourdieu seeks to replace cultural relativism with cultural relationism as a step towards reconciling Enlightenment universalism and anthropological insistence on cultural difference. Inter alia he reflects on the (...) tensions between political and social science and takes up the challenge from Raymond Aron to construct a sociology of international relations. A dazzling achievement." - Bryan S. Turner, The Graduate Center, CUNY Through historical studies of some of the work of Montesquieu, Comte, Durkheim, Boas, Morgenthau, Aron and Bourdieu, Derek Robbins examines the changing and competing conceptualisations of the political and the social in the Western European intellectual tradition. He suggests that we are now experiencing a new ‘dissociation of sensibility’ in which political thought and its consequences in action have become divorced from social and cultural experience. Developing further the ideas of Bourdieu which he has presented in books and articles over the last twenty years, Robbins argues that we need to integrate the recognition of cultural difference with the practice of international politics by accepting that the ‘field’ of international political discourse is a social construct which is contingent on encounters between diverse cultures. ‘Everything is relative’ (Comte) and ‘everything is social’ (Bourdieu), not least international politics. (shrink)

Photo ID 71252867© Stepan Popov| Dreamstime.com Abstract While Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) has been legalized in Canada since 2016, it still excludes eligibility for persons who have mental illness as a sole underlying medical condition. This temporary exclusion was set to expire on March 17th, 2024, but was set 3 years further back by the Government of Canada to March 17th, 2027. This paper presents a critical appraisal of the case of MAiD for individuals with mental illness as the (...) sole underlying medical condition through the analysis of three ethical theories: principlism, deontology, and utilitarianism. Through evidence and discussion, it will be demonstrated that MAiD, in this context, may be ethically justifiable on the grounds of upholding human rights, protecting dignity, and minimizing suffering. Introduction In June of 2016, Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada.[1] Throughout the first six years, a temporary exclusion of eligibility for persons suffering solely from mental illness was extended.[2] The exclusion of mental illness as a sole underlying medical condition was set to expire on March 17, 2024.[3] However, on February 1, 2024, just over a month before the set expiration, the Government of Canada once again extended the exclusion, this time setting it back three years to March 17, 2027. There are currently several countries that allow MAiD for mental illness, including Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.[4] Some countries, like Spain,[5] do not give specific guidance, leaving the matter under discussion by ethicists and courts. In these countries, there are specific (although different) requirements for the process; overall, for mental illness, the illness must be verifiable and not simply related to a perception of satisfaction with the length of life. This extension ignited discussion on whether MAiD for persons who have mental illness as a sole underlying medical condition in Canada is ethically acceptable. As a complex, multi-faceted, and interdisciplinary issue, ethicists assessing MAiD must take into account various moral obligations and considerations. This paper analyses MAiD in this context through the application of three ethical theories: principlism, deontology, and utilitarianism. This paper concludes that, based on the current evidence and knowledge of this developing situation, MAiD for persons with mental illness in Canada may be ethically justified on the grounds of upholding human rights, labour obligations, and dignity. Through the exploration of research and discussions, it will be demonstrated that society at large ought to protect liberty and act towards relieving suffering, thereby supporting the potential eligibility of MAiD for persons who have mental illness. Principlism: The Capacity and Ability to Assess and Decide for One’s Own Life Principlism is the application of four principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. Principlism supports permitting MAiD for mental illness due to the importance of autonomy in decision-making, equitable and just practices for MAiD assessors, and reducing suffering for patients and their family member(s) and/or friend(s). Carter v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court ruling of 2015—which changed Canadian law to allow for MAiD—held that the prohibition of MAiD infringed on Canadians’ right to “life, liberty, and the security of the person.” In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the criminal prohibition of MAiD violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[6] The Court concluded that the criminal law prohibiting MAiD interfered with people’s autonomy and dignity, which are protected by the rights of liberty and security of the person.[7] The ruling emphasized that Canada’s constitution reflects the fundamental importance of individual autonomy in personal decision-making. Research provides evidence that MAiD improves autonomy: A study among psychiatric patients found that 8 of 48 psychiatric patients said the mere option of accessing MAiD was enough to assess their future options for living wholly.[8] These findings complement a study entailing interviews with 30 adults who have mental illness, which emphasized that the ability to access MAiD allows individuals to analyze their quality of life, envision their desired future, and make decisions accordingly.[9] Although not all participants agreed that mental illness as the only underlying medical condition was appropriate for MAiD eligibility, many participants agreed that patient autonomy in decision-making was paramount and should be respected. However, autonomy as an ethical principle does not immediately grant all persons with mental illness the option to access MAiD. There are multiple eligibility criteria for those who wish to receive MAiD, which still must be approved and assessed. Currently, eligibility criteria for MAiD states that individuals must “give informed consent to receive MAiD, meaning that the person has consented to receiving MAiD after they have received all information needed to make this decision.”[10] Consent requires capability or capacity, which is the ability to understand relevant information, appreciate its potential consequences, and make an informed decision for oneself.[11] Like for many other diseases, disabilities, and conditions, patient capability is determined on a case-by-case basis.[12] Given the stigma surrounding those struggling with mental health, this thorough case-by-case examination of an individual patient’s capability and capacity without prejudice or partiality should lead to equitable and fair treatment. Without appropriate testing, those with mental illness could be wrongly stripped of their decision-making power. Arguments against MAiD for those with mental illness have raised concerns about the potential for individuals to harm themselves and others. A survey of MAiD providers demonstrated that physicians believed that the bereavement experience following MAiD is challenging and profoundly distinct and that bereavement support for all members involved should be required.[13] However, while watching one die (of MAiD) may cause harm to their families, friends, and support system at large, it is also important to recognize that watching someone suffer and struggle through their mental health journey also poses significant harm. Qualitative studies in Ontario, Canada, have interviewed family members of persons with mental illness as a sole medical condition, and interviewees shared that witnessing the illness and its impacts on their close one's lives was a very difficult experience.[14] As it relates to MAiD, participants emphasized that those living with mental illness are in the best position to understand their own pain and suffering and, in turn, make their own decisions about relief.[15] In an interview, a MAiD provider stated that MAiD may provide less suffering and more peace, and that, although it “depends on the family,... usually the family is more prepared and at peace.”[16] On the contrary, a person who has mental illness may perceive choosing MAiD as beneficial to their family member(s) and/or friend(s). Among those who died by MAiD in 2021, 35.7 percent reported that they perceived themselves as a burden on their family and friends.[17] While some authors report their concerns regarding such social burden as a potential driving factor for MAiD requests, others report that there are other additional burdens associated with requesting MAiD that may be financial, societal, and personal.[18] As such, the extension of MAiD eligibility to those with mental illness will likely only allow a small number of people to be granted MAiD.[19] Many others will be diverted to appropriate services and treatments. Patients’ decision to choose MAID noted their ability to make choices about their own care, reflecting the value of autonomy.[20] Although it is difficult to determine what is good for families in individual cases, MAiD presents an option that is both beneficent and non-maleficent. Therefore, these arguments satisfy the principles which do not necessarily conflict with MAiD. Deontology: The Duty to Recognize Vulnerability and Relieve Suffering The argument here begins with the fundamental focus of deontology—that moral duty lies in an action rather than in its consequences. Further discussion is required to analyze the impact of MAiD on healthcare workers. The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) Code of Ethics and Professionalism requires physicians to abide by virtues, commitments, and responsibilities in delivering health care and service.[21] The code states that “a compassionate physician recognizes suffering and vulnerability, … and alleviate[s] the patient’s suffering.”[22] In the context of MAiD for persons with mental illness as a sole underlying medical condition, vulnerabilities could be wide in range. Many Canadians are concerned with the interaction between mental health and other social determinants of health, such as the lack of medical, disability, financial, housing, and social support and resources.[23] As a result, another layer to the ethical issue arises: Does permitting MAiD for mental illness treat the symptoms of the issue rather than the root problem itself (social, economic, and systemic inequities)? Some argue against MAiD, stating that the nation should first focus on developing better quality care and service.[24] Others support MAiD as a potential harm reduction approach, given that most of these unjust conditions require a higher level of long-term structural and public policy overhaul.[25] The CMA Code also calls upon physicians to recognize and alleviate patients’ suffering. Some argue that while physicians and medical professionals do work to relieve suffering, they are trained to do so through a primary care-based diagnose-and-treat approach.[26] Studies that have captured Canadian physicians’ experiences providing MAiD report that, although physicians stated that the work was rewarding, it came with many challenges, including strained relationships with coworkers, increased workload, and inadequate compensation.[27] Physicians report that a part of the problem is that MAiD rules are written by lawyers and experts who are removed from its reality in medical practice. As a result, there is a lack of clarity surrounding practice norms and a lack of support for physicians.[28] Thus, while healthcare practitioners have a duty to relieve patients’ suffering, they should feel adequately trained and supported in doing so. If physicians and healthcare professionals recognize vulnerability and relieve suffering, then they should act accordingly, regardless of potential associations or outcomes. Making persons with mental illness eligible for MAiD ensures that treatment to relieve their suffering is available. However, it is imperative that there are sufficient resources and support available to healthcare professionals to ensure that they feel prepared and supported to provide MAiD, should they wish to do so. Utilitarianism: Minimizing Intolerable Suffering and Dying with Dignity Overall, utilitarianism is largely concerned with the greatest happiness principle—to increase the amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. So far, this paper has analyzed individual, family, and practitioner-based ethical considerations. But if MAiD were to be extended to those with mental illness as a singular underlying medical condition, what implications would this have for the world and society at large? There is a global drive toward authorizing organized ending of life, with an increasing number of countries legalizing MAiD.[29] The medical system is generally seen as a safe and appropriate system to carry out MAiD, especially when suicide and self-harm are regarded as “alternatives.” Yet despite these worldwide efforts, many argue through the theory of utilitarianism that the inability to see long-term consequences renders MAiD a premature solution, particularly for those who are unable or unwilling to seek other forms of potentially healing treatment or for those who may undergo MAiD only for a technological innovation or biomedical advancement to later come along as a potential cure.[30] While it is true that MAiD does not prevent these “premature deaths,” it is also true that it does not claim to.[31] MAiD provides an option to alleviate intolerable suffering. Some individuals with severe mental illness do describe their condition as intolerable suffering. MAiD is seen as an option to minimize suffering. It can also be seen as a way to die with dignity and relief.[32] While predicting outcomes is difficult, extending MAiD eligibility for persons experiencing mental illness does not undermine its ability to end suffering. It allows eligible individuals to take charge of their health, their life, and their future. Conclusion Based on the current evidence, allowing MAiD for persons with mental illness as their sole underlying medical condition presents as an ethically justifiable action. The right to self-determination and fair accessibility demonstrates that there is more harm done by prohibiting MAiD for mental illness than allowing it. Such liberty is a right, and in the context of relieving suffering, it is a duty that healthcare workers must uphold, although the ability to opt out of providing MAiD is well established. Thus, to recognize vulnerability and relieve suffering means to provide methods, such as MAiD, for those deeply impacted by mental illness. These justifications stand at both the individual level and for society at large. Nevertheless, it remains imperative to take an upstream approach that addresses the social determinants of health and aims to prevent mental illness and promote long-term, beneficial social change for those suffering, struggling, and vulnerable in our communities. - [1] Jaro Kotalik and David W. Shannon, Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in Canada Key Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 1st ed. 2023., The International Library of Bioethics, 104 (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30002-8. [2] Department of Justice Government of Canada, “Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) Law,” February 21, 2024, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/ad-am/bk-di.html. [3] Health Canada, “Final Report of the Expert Panel on MAiD and Mental Illness,” transparency - other, May 13, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/public-engagement/external-advi sory-bodies/expert-panel-maid-mental-illness/final-report-expert-panel-maid-mental-illness.html. [4] Federal Public Service (FPS) Health Belgium, “Federal Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Euthanasia,” n.d., https://consultativebodies.health.belgium.be/en/advisory-and-consultative-bodies/federal-commission- control-and-evaluation-euthanasia.; Government of Netherlands, “Is Euthanasia Allowed in the Netherlands?,” n.d., https://www.government.nl/topics/euthanasia/is-euthanasia-allowed.; “Information on Requesting Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide,” n.d., https://guichet.public.lu/en/citoyens/sante/fin-vie/euthanasie/euthanasie-assistance-suicide.html. [5] Luis Espericueta, First official report on euthanasia in Spain: A comparison with the Canadian and New Zealand experiences, Medicina Clínica (English Edition), Volume 161, Issue 10, 2023, Pages 445-447, ISSN 2387-0206, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.medcle.2023.06.021. [6] Government of Canada, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” March 15, 2021, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/. [7] Supreme Court of Canada, “Carter v. Canada,” Constitutional Law, 2015, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/14637/index.do.; Kotalik and Shannon, Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in Canada Key Multidisciplinary Perspectives. [8] Karandeep Sonu Gaind, “What Does ‘Irremediability’ in Mental Illness Mean?,” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry. Revue Canadienne de Psychiatrie 65, no. 9 (September 2020): 604–6, https://doi.org/10.1177/0706743720928656; Lieve Thienpont et al., “Euthanasia Requests, Procedures and Outcomes for 100 Belgian Patients Suffering from Psychiatric Disorders: A Retrospective, Descriptive Study,” BMJ Open 5, no. 7 (July 27, 2015): e007454, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2014-007454. [9] Hamer Bastidas-Bilbao et al., “Walking Alongside: Views of Family Members on Medical Assistance in Dying for Mental Illness as the Sole Underlying Medical Condition,” Qualitative Health Research 33 (September 29, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1177/10497323231197365. [10] Government of Canada, “Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) Law.” [11] Commission sur les soins de fin de vie, “Les conditions de l’admissibilité à l’aide médicale à mourir au Québec: la constance dans l’évolution de la loi concernant les soins de fin de vie,” June 9, 2023, https://csfv.gouv.qc.ca/ fileadmin/docs/autres_rapports/csfv_lcsfv_conditions_ amm_2023-06-29.pdf.; Trudo Lemmens, “When Death Becomes Therapy: Canada’s Troubling Normalization of Health Care Provider Ending of Life,” The American Journal of Bioethics 23, no. 11 (November 2, 2023): 79–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2265265. [12] Justine Dembo, Udo Schuklenk, and Jonathan Reggler, “‘For Their Own Good’: A Response to Popular Arguments Against Permitting Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) Where Mental Illness Is the Sole Underlying Condition,” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry. Revue Canadienne De Psychiatrie 63, no. 7 (July 2018): 451–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/0706743718766055. [13] Konia Trouton et al., “Attitudes and Expectations Regarding Bereavement Support for Patients, Family Members, and Friends: Findings from a Survey of MAID Providers,” British Columbia Medical Journal 62, no. 1 (2020). [14] Bastidas-Bilbao et al., “Walking Alongside.” [15] Bastidas-Bilbao et al. [16] Trouton et al., “Attitudes and Expectations Regarding Bereavement Support for Patients, Family Members, and Friends: Findings from a Survey of MAID Providers,” 2020. [17] Ramona Coelho et al., “The Realities of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada,” Palliative & Supportive Care 21, no. 5 (October 2023): 871–78, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1478951523001025; Health Canada, “Third Annual Report on Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada 2021,” report on plans and priorities;transparency - other, July 26, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/health-system-services/annual-report-me dical-assistance-dying-2021.html; Lemmens, “When Death Becomes Therapy.” [18] Coelho et al., “The Realities of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada,” October 2023.; Bastidas-Bilbao et al., “Walking Alongside.” [19] Olivia Stefanovich, “Opposition Parties Call for Indefinite Pause to MAID Expansion for Mental Illness | CBC News,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, January 28, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/special-joint-committee-maid-mental-illness-report-1.7095679; Benjamin Lopez Steven, “Number of Assisted Deaths Jumped More than 30 per Cent in 2022, Report Says | CBC News,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, October 27, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/maid-canada-report-2022-1.7009704. [20] Hamer Bastidas-Bilbao et al., “Searching for Relief from Suffering: A Patient-Oriented Qualitative Study on Medical Assistance in Dying for Mental Illness as the Sole Underlying Medical Condition,” Social Science & Medicine 331 (August 1, 2023): 116075, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2023.116075. [21] Canadian Medical Association, “Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics and Professionalism” (Canada: Canadian Medical Association, December 8, 2018), https://policybase.cma.ca/link/policy13937. [22] Canadian Medical Association. [23] Coelho et al., “The Realities of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada,” October 2023; Stefanovich, “Opposition Parties Call for Indefinite Pause to MAID Expansion for Mental Illness | CBC News.” [24] John Paul Tasker, “Liberal Government Promoting a ‘culture of Death’ with Medical Assistance in Dying Law, Conservative MP Says | CBC News,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, March 6, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/culture-of-death-medical-assistance-in-dying-mental-illness-1.67695 04. [25] Coelho et al., “The Realities of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada,” October 2023; Kayla Wiebe and Amy Mullin, “Choosing Death in Unjust Conditions: Hope, Autonomy and Harm Reduction,” Journal of Medical Ethics, April 26, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2022-108871. [26] Ramona Coelho et al., “The Realities of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada,” Palliative & Supportive Care 21, no. 5 (October 2023): 871–78, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1478951523001025. [27] Konia Trouton et al., “Attitudes and Expectations Regarding Bereavement Support for Patients, Family Members, and Friends: Findings from a Survey of MAID Providers,” British Columbia Medical Journal 62, no. 1 (2020), https://bcmj.org/articles/attitudes-and-expectations-regarding-bereavement-support-patients-family-m embers-and.; William Robert Nielsen, “MAiD in Canada: Ethical Considerations in Medical Assistance in Dying,” Canadian Journal of Bioethics 4, no. 2 (December 9, 2021): 93–98, https://doi.org/10.7202/1084456ar. [28] Coelho et al., “The Realities of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada,” October 2023. [29] Lemmens, “When Death Becomes Therapy.” [30] William Robert Nielsen, “MAiD in Canada: Ethical Considerations in Medical Assistance in Dying,” Canadian Journal of Bioethics 4, no. 2 (December 1, 2021): 93–98, https://doi.org/10.7202/1084456ar. [31] Steven, “Number of Assisted Deaths Jumped More than 30 per Cent in 2022, Report Says | CBC News.” [32] A. Plaisance et al., “Quebec Population Highly Supportive of Extending Medical Aid in Dying to Incapacitated Persons and People Suffering Only from a Mental Illness: Content Analysis of Attitudes and Representations,” Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 21 (April 1, 2022): 100759, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jemep.2022.100759. (shrink)

Does epistemology collapse for lack of resources other than logic, conceptual analysis and descriptions of one’s own apparent experiences, thoughts and beliefs? No, but understanding how and why not requires, Kant noted, a ‘changed method of thinking’. Some of these methodological changes are summarised in §2 in order to identify a philosophical role for thought experiments to help identify logically contingent, though cognitively fundamental capacities and circumstances necessary to human thought, experience and knowledge. As Kant also noted, experiments are only (...) informative in response to posing the right question, indeed: the right kind of question. Accordingly, preparations for these epistemological thought experiments fill half of this chapter. The second half, examines three such thought experiments, variously developed by Kant, Hegel, C. I. Lewis, Austin, Wittgenstein and F. L. Will. (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 78-91. This article consists of three parts. First, I will review the major themes of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude . Since some of my readers will have read this book and others not, I will try to strike a balance between clear summary and fresh critique. Second, I discuss an unpublished book by Meillassoux unfamiliar to all readers of this article, except those scant few that may have gone digging in the microfilm archives of the École normale (...) supérieure. The book in question is Meillassoux’s revised doctoral dissertation L’Inexistence divine (or The Divine Inexistence ), with its seemingly bizarre vision of a God who does not yet exist but might exist in the future. Without literally accepting this view, I will claim that it is philosophically interesting in ways that even a hardened sceptic might be able to appreciate. Third and finally, I will speculate on the possible future of Meillassoux’s speculative materialism itself. And here I mean its future development not by Meillassoux, but by those readers who might be inspired by his book. Plato could never have predicted the emergence of Aristotle’s philosophy, despite the obvious debt of the latter to the former. Nor could Descartes have predicted Spinoza and Leibniz, nor Kant the German Idealists, and neither could Husserl in 1901 have foreseen the later emergence of Heidegger. How are the works of interesting philosophers transformed by later thinkers of comparable importance? While it may seem that there are countless ways to do this, I think there are only two basic ways in which this happens: you can radicalize your predecessors, or you can reverse them. I will close this article with a few words about these two methods, and try to imagine how Meillassoux might be radicalized or reversed by some future admirer. My view is that the more important thinkers are, the easier they are to radicalize or reverse. This helps explain why the great philosophers of the West have so often appeared in clusters, succeeding one another at relatively brief intervals during periods of especial ferment. 1. After Finitude After Finitude is unusually short for such an influential book of philosophy: running to just 178 pages in the original French, and an even more compact 128 pages in the English version, despite the introduction of roughly eight pages of new material for the English edition. Rather than summarizing Meillassoux’s book in the order he intended, I will focus on six points that strike me as the pillars of his debut book. Along the way, I will offer a few criticisms as well. The first pillar of the book is Meillassoux’s own term “correlationism.”1 Although he introduces this term as the name for an enemy, it is striking that Meillassoux remains impressed by correlationism much more than his fellow speculative realists are. This continued appreciation for his great enemy influences the shape of his own ontology. Is there a world outside our thinking of it, or does the world consist entirely in being thought? Traditionally, this dispute between realism and idealism has been dismissed in continental philosophy as a “pseudo-problem,” in a strategy pioneered by Husserl and extended by Heidegger. We cannot be realists, since following Kant we have no direct access to things-in-themselves. But neither are we idealists, since the human being is always already outside itself, aiming at objects in intentional experience, deeply engaged with practical implements, or stationed in some particular world-disclosing mood. The centuries-old dispute between realism and idealism is dissolved by saying that we cannot think either real or ideal in isolation from the other. There is neither human without world nor world without human, but only a primordial correlation or rapport between the two. This is what “correlationism” means: philosophy trapped in a permanent meditation on the human-world correlate, trying to find the best model of the correlate: is it language, intentionality, embodiment, or some other form of correlation between human and world? Among other problems, this generates some friction between philosophy and the literal meaning of science. When cosmologists say that the universe originated 13.5 billion years ago, they do not mean “13.5 billion years ago for us ,” but literally 13.5 billion years ago, well before conscious life existed, and thus at a time when there was no such thing as a correlate. Meillassoux also coins the term “ancestrality” (10) for the reality that predated the correlate, and later expands this term to “dia-chronicity,” (112) to refer to events occurring after the extinction of human beings no less than to those occurring before we existed. Up to this point, Meillassoux’s focus on ancestral entities existing prior to consciousness might seem like a straightforward realist who wants to unmask correlationism as just another form of idealism. Yet Meillassoux also admires the correlationist maneuver, which can obviously be traced back to Kant. Unlike a thinker such as Whitehead, Meillassoux feels no nostalgia for the pre-critical realism that came before Kant: “we cannot but be heirs of Kantianism,” he says (29). What impresses Meillassoux about correlationism is something both simple and familiar. If we attempt to think a tree outside thought, this is itself a thought . Any form of realism which thinks it can simply and directly address the world the way it is fails to escape the correlational circle, since the attempt to think something outside of thought is itself nothing other than a thought, and thereby collapses back into the very human-world correlate that it pretends to escape. For Meillassoux this step, suggested by Kant but first refined by the ensuing figures of German Idealism, marks decisive forward progress in the history of philosophy that must not be abolished. Any attempt to break free from the correlate must first acknowledge its mighty intellectual power. Realist though he may seem, Meillassoux’s works are filled with praise of such figures as Fichte and Hegel, not of so-called “naïve realists.” It is also the case that for Meillassoux, not all correlationisms are the same. The second pillar of his book is a distinction between various positions that I have termed “Meillassoux’s Spectrum,” though of course he is never so immodest as to name it after himself. He distinguishes between at least six different possible positions, and perhaps we could add even subtler variations if we wished. But in its simplest form, Meillassoux’s Spectrum allows for just four basic outlooks on the question of realism vs. anti-realism. Three of these are easy to understand, since we have already been discussing them. At one extreme is so-called “naïve realism,” which holds that a world exists outside the mind, and that we can know this world. Meillassoux rejects this naïve realism as having been overthrown by Kant’s critical philosophy. At the other extreme is subjective idealism, in which nothing exists outside the mind. For to think a dog outside thought immediately turns it into a thought, and therefore there cannot be anything outside; the very notion is meaningless. In between these two is what we have called correlationism. And here comes a crucial moment for Meillassoux, since he distinguishes between the two forms of “weak” and “strong” correlationism, and chooses the strong form as the launching pad for his own philosophy. Weak correlationism is easy to explain, since we all know it from the philosophy of Kant. The things-in-themselves can be thought but not known. They certainly must exist, since there cannot be appearances without something that appears. And we can think about them, which idealism holds to be impossible. They are simply unknowable due to the finitude of human thought. Strong correlationism is the new position introduced by Meillassoux (though he sees it at work in numerous twentieth century thinkers), midway between weak correlationism and subjective idealism. The major difference between the three positions is as follows. Weak correlationism says: “The things-in-themselves exist, but we cannot know them.” The subjective idealist says: “This is a contradiction in terms, since when we think the things-in-themselves, we already turn them into thoughts.” But the strong correlationist says: “Just because ‘things-in-themselves’ is a meaningless notion does not mean that they cannot exist. No one has ever traveled to the world-in-itself and come back to make a report on it. Thus, the fact that we cannot think things-in-themselves without contradiction does not prove that they do not exist anyway. There may be things-in-themselves, we simply are not capable of thinking them without contradiction form within the correlational circle.” This step is crucial for Meillassoux, since strong correlationism is the position he attempts to radicalize into his own new standpoint: speculative materialism. As I see it, this step of the argument fails. Strong correlationism cannot avoid collapsing into subjective idealism, since the statements of the strong correlationist are rendered meaningless from within. All three of the other positions in the Spectrum make perfectly good sense even for those who disagree with them. The naïve realist says that things-in-themselves exist and we can know them; the meaning of this statement is clear. The weak correlationist can say that things-in-themselves exist but lie forever beyond our grasp; this too makes perfect sense, even though the German Idealists try to show a contradiction at work here. We can also understand the claim of the subjective idealist that to think anything outside thought turns it into a thought, and that for this reason we cannot think the unthought. The strong correlationist, alone among the four, speaks nonsense . This person says “I cannot think the unthought without turning it into a thought, and yet the unthought might exist anyway.” But notice that the final phrase “the unthought might exist anyway” is fruitless for this purpose. For we have already heard that to think any unthought turns it into a thought. But now the strong correlationist wants to do two incompatible things simultaneously with this unthought. On the one hand, he neutralizes the unthought by showing that it instantly changes into just another thought. But on the other hand, he wants to appeal to the unthought as a haunting residue that might exist outside thought, thereby undercutting the absolute status of the human-world correlate found in idealism. But this is impossible. If you accept the argument that thinking the unthought turns it into a thought, you cannot also add “but maybe there is something outside that prevents this conversion from being absolutely true,” because this “something outside” is immediately converted into nothing but a thought for us. In short, Meillassoux here seems to be offering a kind of Zen koan: his “strong correlationism” is reminiscent of the gateless gate, or the sound of one hand clapping, or the command to punch Hegel in the jaw when meeting him on the road. We cannot at the same time both destroy the realist challenge of the things-in-themselves in order to undercut realism and reintroduce that very realist sense in order to undercut idealism. In a world where everything is instantly converted into thought, we cannot claim that there might be something extra-mental anyway, because this “might be something” is itself converted into a thought by the same rules that condemned dogs, trees, and houses to the idealist prison. This brings us to the third pillar of Meillassoux’s argument, which is the key to all the rest: the necessity of contingency. His strategy is to transform our supposed ignorance of things-in-themselves into an absolute knowledge that they exist without reason, and that the laws of nature can change at any time for no reason at all. In this way the cautious agnosticism of Kantian philosophies is avoided, but so is the collapse of reality into thought as found in German Idealism. Meillassoux does try to prove the existence of things-in-themselves existing outside thought; he simply holds that they must be proven after passing through the rigors of the correlationist challenge, not just arbitrarily decreed to exist in the manner of naïve realism. As he puts it, “Everything could actually collapse: from trees to stars, from stars to laws, from physical laws to logical laws; and this not by virtue of some superior law whereby everything is destined to perish, but by virtue of the absence of any superior law capable of preserving anything, no matter what, from perishing” (53). If idealism thinks that the human-world correlate is absolute, for Meillassoux it is the facticity of the correlate that is absolute. He tries to show this with a nice brief dialogue between five separate characters (55-59) which is covered in detail in my forthcoming book,2 but which I will simplify here for reasons of time. In this simplified version, we first imagine a dogmatic realist arguing with a dogmatic idealist. The realist says that we can know the truth about the things-in-themselves; the idealist counters that we can only the truth about thought, since all statements about reality must be turned into statements concerning our thoughts about reality. Here the correlationist enters and proclaims that both of these positions are equally dogmatic. For although we have access to nothing but thoughts, we cannot be sure that these thoughts are all that exist; there could be a reality outside thought, there is simply no way to know for sure. And this latter position is the one that Meillassoux attempts to transform from an agnostic, skeptical point into an ontological claim about the contingency of everything. Consider it this way. How does the correlationist defeat the idealist? The idealist holds that the existence of anything outside thought is impossible. The correlationist, by contrast, holds that something might exist outside the human-world correlate. But this “something might” has to be an absolute possibility. It cannot mean that “something outside thought might exist for thought ,” because that is what the idealist already says. No, the correlationist must mean that something might exist outside thought quite independently of thought. In other words, the correlationist says that idealism might be wrong, and this means it is absolutely true that idealism might be wrong. Thus, correlationism is no longer just a skeptical position. It holds that all the possibilities of the world are absolute possibilities. We have absolute knowledge that any of the possibilities about the existence or non-existence of things-in-themselves might be true, and this means that correlationism flips into Meillassoux’s own position: speculative materialism. As Meillassoux sees it, there are only two options here. Option A is to absolutize the human-world correlate, which is what the idealist does: there absolutely cannot be anything outside thought. Option B, by contrast, is to absolutize the facticity of the correlate: its character of simply being given to us, without any inherent necessity. The correlationist cannot have it both ways by saying: “there absolutely might be something outside thought, yet maybe this is absolutely impossible.” In other words, once we escape dogmatism we can only be idealists or speculative materialists, not correlationists. The human-world correlate is merely a fact, not an absolute necessity. But this facticity itself cannot be merely factical: it must be absolute. Here Meillassoux coins the French neologism factualité , which has been suitably translated into the English neologism “factiality.” (7, 122-3) Factialty means that for everything that exists, it is absolutely possible that it might be otherwise, not just that we cannot know whether or not it might be otherwise. Just as Kant transformed philosophy into a meditation on the categories governing human finitude, Meillassoux wishes to turn philosophy into a meditation on the necessary conditions of factiality, which he calls “figures”—a new technical term for him. (80) One such figure is that the law of non-contradiction must be true, and for an unusual reason. Since everything is proven to be contingent, nothing that exists can be contradictory, for whatever is contradictory has no opposite into which it might be transformed, and thus contingency would be impossible.3 Another such figure is that there must be something rather than nothing: for since contingency exists, something must exist in order to be contingent. It is a daring high-wire act, one that sacrifices realism to the correlational circle in order to rebuild it from out of its own ashes. Some might conclude that the lack of reason in things is a byproduct of the ignorance of finite humans, Meillassoux is making precisely the opposite point. For in fact, the doctrine of finitude usually leads directly to belief in a hidden reason. The fact that it lies beyond human comprehension merely increases our belief in this arbitrarily chosen concealed ground. By defending anew the concept of absolute knowledge Meillassoux evacuates the world of everything hidden. The reason for things having no reason is not that the reason is hidden, but that no reason exists. Thus, even while insisting on the necessity of non-contradiction, he rejects the other Leibnizian principle: sufficient reason. Everything simply is what it is, in purely immanent form, without deeply hidden causes. Or as Meillassoux puts it: “There is nothing beneath or beyond the manifest gratuitousness of the given—nothing but the limitless and lawless power of its destruction, emergence, or persistence” (63).The world is a “hyper-chaos”(64). But this is not the same thing as flux. For the chaos of the world is such that stability might occur just as easily as constant, turbulent change. Let’s now digress a bit, and return to the question of ancestrality, which Meillassoux transforms later in the book into “dia-chronicity.” Correlationism holds that all talk of a world outside the correlate is immediately recuperated by the correlate. The phrase “13.5 billion years ago” becomes “13.5 billion years ago for us ,” and the phrase “the universe following the extinction of humans” becomes “the universe following the extinction of humans for humans .” But notice that whether we talk about the world before or after humans, in both cases it is time that is used to challenge the correlate. Meillassoux has no interest in challenges that might be posed by space. For example, what about a vase in a lonely country house that topples to the floor and smashes when no one is there to watch it? Isn’t this also a challenge to correlationism, no less than the Big Bang or the heat death of the universe long after humans have vanished? In an eight-page supplement to the English translation of After Finitude ,4 possibly in response to my own 2007 review of the French original,5 Meillassoux bluntly denies that space is of any relevance to the question. Spatial distance is a merely harmless challenge to the human-world correlate. After all, even though no one is there in the lonely country house to witness the shattering of the vase, we can say that had there been an observer , that observer would have witnessed the toppling and destruction of the vase. For this event still occurs in a world in which the human-world correlate already exists, whereas the diachronicity of events both before and after the existence of humans makes it impossible to say that had there been an observer they would have witnessed the Big Bang occurring in such and such a fashion. However, it seems to me that Meillassoux merely asserts that the temporal simultaneity of our existence with that of the vase in the lonely country house is enough to render it harmless. It is true that the house does not exist prior to the correlate, but nonetheless it exists outside the correlate, and that is enough to make the same challenge. It is difficult to see why the “had there been an observer” maneuver succeeds in the case of a vase in the countryside in April 2011 but fails in the case of the Big Bang. This is not just a matter of nitpicking Meillassoux’s argumentative style: the fact that he bases his argument on time has at least two important consequences for his position. For in the first place, even though Meillassoux insists that the laws of nature are absolutely contingent, this turns out to be true only in a temporal sense. That is to say, it is a paradoxical feature of Meillassoux’s philosophy that he does allow for the existence of laws of nature, and simply believes that they can change at any moment without reason. Within any given moment, laws of nature do exist. He never suggests that different parts of the universe can have different laws at the same time, nor does he have any interest in the laws of part/whole composition that take place within any given instant. Could it be the case that rather than being made of gold atoms, a small chunk of gold could be made of silver atoms, cotton, horses, or that this same small piece of gold could be made of gigantic vaults filled with even more gold? These are not topics that draw Meillassoux’s attention, since he is focused solely on how the laws of nature might change or endure from one moment to the next . Another implication for Meillassoux’s system is that his concept of things-in-themselves turns out to be to be inadequate. For when he proves that things-in-themselves can exist without humans, this turns out to be true only in a temporal sense as well. Namely, things-in-themselves existed ten billion years ago, and they will continue to exist after all humans have succeeded in exterminating themselves. However, being able to exist before our births and after our deaths is just one small part of what it means to be a thing-in-itself. The more important part is that even if a thing is sitting on a table right now, in front of me, even if I stroke it lovingly or press my face up against it directly, I am still dealing only with a phenomenal version of the thing; the thing-in-itself continues to withdraw from all access. Yet no such thing is acknowledged by Meillassoux. For him finitude is a disaster, and absolute knowledge is in fact possible. Meillassoux’s thing-in-itself exists in independence only of the human lifespan , not of human knowledge. The fifth pillar of Meillassoux’s argument is his use of Cantor’s transfinite mathematics to show that even if the laws of nature are contingent, they need not be unstable, and thus we cannot use the apparent stability of nature to disprove his metaphysics of absolute contingency. What Cantor showed is that there are different sizes of infinity, and that all these infinities cannot be totalized in a single infinite number of infinities. Meillassoux sees this as crucial, since it allows him to discredit any “probabilistic” argument against his theory. The probabilistic argument (as defended quite clearly by Jean-René Vernes)6 would say this: given that the laws of nature seem so stable, it it is extremely improbable that there is no hidden reason for their remaining so stable. As Meillassoux sees it, probability is of value only when we can index an accessible total of cases. These can even be infinite: for example, there are an infinite number of points where a rope can break when stretched tight, but this does not stop us from calculating probabilities for various sections of the rope to break. By contrast, there is no way to sum up the number of possible laws of nature. For here there is no way to totalize; we cannot stand outside of nature and calculate the possible number of laws so as to determine the probabilities that any one of them might change. Therefore, although we can speak of probability when dealing with intraworldly events such as elections, horse races, and coin-flips, we cannot use the words “probable” or “improbable” when describing alterations at the level of nature as a whole. Rather than commenting on the validity of this argument and its use of Cantor, let me simply note that it once again creates a dualistic ontology. We already saw that Meillassoux treats time differently from space. In analogous fashion, he now treats the level of world differently from that of intraworldly events. The emergence of worlds is purely contingent and virtual and governed by no probability at all, while events within the world necessarily follow laws (even if these laws can change at any moment without reason), and thus their probabilities can be calculated. It is a strategy deeply reminiscent of Badiou’s (2005) own dualism between the normal “state of the situation” and the rare and intermittent “event.” The sixth and final pillar of Meillassoux’s book can be dealt with briefly, since we have already touched on it elsewhere. It comes at the very beginning of the book, when Meillassoux says that we must revive the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and that the primary qualities are the ones that can be mathematized. He admits that he has not yet published a proof of this idea, though in fact it is already known as one of his primary doctrines. And here we encounter the familiar problem with Meillassoux’s inadequate conception of things-in-themselves. “Primary qualities” refers to those qualities that a thing has independently of its relations with us or anything else. But if the primary qualities can be mathematized, this means that they are not entirely independent of us, since our knowledge can get right to the bottom of them. The mathematized qualities of things are independent of us only in Meillassoux’s sense that they will still have those qualities even when all humans are dead. But to repeat, autonomy from the human lifespan is not the same as autonomy from human access. Here once more Meillassoux is concerned only with independence from the human-world correlate across time, not in any given instant. 2. L’Inexistence divine In 1997, the same year in which he turned thirty years old, Meillassoux earned his doctorate at the École normale supériuere with a brazen dissertation entitled L’Inexistence divine ( The Divine Inexistence ). The work was substantially revised in 2003. But even then, with typical fastidiousness, Meillassoux decided that the work was not yet ready for press. It has now been scrapped in favor of some future, multi-volume work bearing the same title. While writing my book on Meillassoux for Edinburgh University Press, I was permitted to translate excerpts from this unpublished work for use as an appendix in my own book; in total, the appendix contains approximately twenty percent of Meillassoux’s 2003 manuscript, the first time any of it will be published in any language. Nonetheless, a portion of the argument was already tested in the article “Spectral Dilemma,” published in English in the journal Collapse (2008: 261-75). There the philosophical motives for the virtual God are already made clear. What troubles us most are early deaths, brutal deaths, deaths of especial injustice– the sorts of deaths in which the brutal twentieth century was so abundant. And here, neither the atheist nor the believer can help us. The atheist can offer nothing but a sad and cynical resignation when reflecting on the victims of these terrible crimes. The believer does little better, being unable to explain how God could have allowed such things to happen, due to the famous intractability of the problem of evil. The solution offered to this dilemma by Meillassoux is bold, and all the more so given that he emerges from such a deeply Leftist, materialist, and unreligious background. His solution is that God does not yet exist, and therefore is not blameworthy for these catastrophes. Given that everything is contingent in Meillassoux’s philosophy, this God and divine justice might never exist, but they can at least exist as an object of hope. Let’s begin by jumping to the end of L’Inexistence divine , where the alternatives are laid out so nicely. There are four basic attitudes that humans can have towards God, Meillassoux says. First, we can believe in God because he exists. This is the classical theist attitude, rejected for the simple reason that it would be amoral and blasphemous to believe in a God who allows children to be eaten by dogs, to use Dostoevsky’s example. Second, we can disbelieve in God because he does not exist: the classical atheist attitude. But this leads to sadness, cynicism, and a sneering contempt for the greatness of human capacity. The third option, rather more complex, is to disbelieve in God because he does exist: in other words, to exist in rebellion against God as the one who must be blamed for the evils of the earth. The examples here might range from Lucifer himself, to the more human figure of Captain Ahab in Melville’s Moby-Dick , to Werner Herzog’s even more recent catchphrase, “Every man for himself, and God against all.” That leaves only the fourth option: believing in God because he does not exist. Meillassoux closes his book by saying that the fourth option has now been tried (namely, in the course of his own book), and that now that all four have been specified, we must choose. The first reaction to this theory of the inexistent God will be laughter. Few readers will ever be literally convinced by it, and probably none will immediately be convinced by it. But if we ask ourselves why we laugh, the answer is because it sounds so improbable that an inexistent God might suddenly emerge and resurrect the dead. It obviously sounds more like a gullible theology than a rigorous piece of philosophical work. Yet two things need to be kept in mind. First, Meillassoux’s theories are hardly more unlikely than those of great philosophers of the past such as Plato, Plotinus, Avicenna, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, or Whitehead. We read the great philosophers not because their systems are plausible in commonsense terms that can be measured by the laws of probability. Instead, we read them precisely because they shatter the existing framework of common sense and open up new window on the universe. Second, and even more importantly, Meillassoux has already rejected probability as a valid measuring stick in philosophy. Or rather, he accepts probability in the intra-worldly realm (where it is linked with potentiality), and rejects it at the level of the world itself (where potentiality is replaced with what he calls virtuality). The virtual God can appear at any moment for no reason at all, just as any other new configuration of laws of nature can appear: in a manner that the laws of probability cannot calculate. Responding to those who might ridicule the idea of a sudden emergence of God and a resurrection of the dead, Meillassoux cites Pascal, who asserts that the resurrection of the dead would be far less incredible than the fact that we were born in the first place. This shifts philosophy onto new ground. Rather than concerning ourselves with what is likely to happen in the world as we know it, we focus instead on the most important things that could happen. For this reason, the expected objection that a virtual God is no more likely to appear than a virtual unicorn or a virtual flying spaghetti monster misses the point. Unicorns and spaghetti monsters could also appear, just like any other non-contradictory thing. But these would just be novel bizarre entities among others, not the heralds of completely new worlds. For Meillassoux, the emergence of matter, life, and thought have been the three truly amazing advents of the world so far, each of them dependent on the advent(s) preceding them. As he sees it, there can be no greater intraworldly entity than the human beings who already exist, since nothing in the world is better than the absolute knowledge of which humans alone are capable. This means that the next great advent must be something that perfects human beings rather than superseding them. And this can only be the world of justice, in which the dead are resurrected and their horrible deaths partially cancelled (Meillassoux never considers the possibility of a God who would literally erase the pre-divine past so that it never happened at all). The only immortality worth having is an immortality of this life, not an existence in some ill-defined afterworld. Human existence, he holds, must always be governed by a “symbol” that gives us the “immanent and comprehensible inscription of values in a world.” And just as cosmic history made the three great contingent leaps of matter, life, and thought, with a leap to justice as the only one still to come, a similar structure occurs within human culture and its symbols, which consist so far of the cosmological, naturalistic, and historical symbols, with a “factial” symbol still to come. We can review each of these symbols briefly. The cosmological symbol refers to the ancient dualism between the terrestrial and celestial spheres. Here below everything is conflict, corruption, and decay; but in the heavens nothing is perishable, all movement is circular, and everything is arranged in mutual harmony. This symbol is ended by modern physics when Galileo discovers such blemishes as sunspots and craters on the moon, and when Newton integrates both celestial and terrestrial movement into a single gravitational law. Next comes the naturalistic or romantic symbol, in which perfection comes not from the sky but from nature itself. The world is filled with pretty flowers (Meillassoux claims that the ancients never discussed the beauty of flowers until Plotinus in the third century) and with living creatures naturally moved by pity, at least until society corrupts them. This symbol collapses in the face of reality as we know it, since pity is no more common than war, corruption, and violence. This brings us to the historical symbol, which only now is passing away. Bad things may happen, but history has an inner logic of its own, such that everything works out in the end. The ultimate form of the historical symbol is the economic symbol, whether in a Marxist or neo-liberal form. Just as the Marxist holds that the inner economic logic of the capitalists will inexorably lead them to self-destruction, the neo-liberal assumes that the sum total of individual selfish actions will lead, in the long run, to the greatest possible good. We worship the economy and let it guide history for us, just as the ancients worshipped celestial bodies and held them to be free from blemish. The final remaining symbol is the factial symbol, which Meillassoux hopes will now emerge. Factiality, we recall, is his term for the absolute contingency of everything that exists. Once we have grasped this absolute contingency, we are free to expect the dramatic advent of the coming fourth World: the world of justice, inaugurated by a virtual God and even mediated by a messianic human figure. There is the added feature, however, that this messiah must abandon all claims to special status once the messianic realm of justice is achieved. The messianic figure will then be no more special than any person on the street, since a reign of human equality will have arisen. Although this focus on human being might seem like a return to standard humanism, Meillassoux holds that human pre-eminence has never truly been maintained. Previously, humans have been treated as special only because they contemplate the Good, because they resemble their omnipotent creator, or because they happen to be the temporary victors in a cruel Darwinian death-match between millions of living species. For Meillassoux, by contrast, humans have value because they know the eternal. But it is not the eternal that is important, since this merely represents the blind, anonymous contingency of each thing. What is important is not knowledge of the eternal , but knowledge of the eternal. We should not admire Prometheus for stealing fire from the gods; Prometheus is simply as bad as all the gods, no matter how much he increased our power. Feuerbach and Marx were wrong to say that God is a projection of the human essence, since for Meillassoux the usual concept of God represents the degradation of the human essence. If the traditional God was allowed to inflict plagues and tsunamis on the human race, the Promethean human of the twentieth century simply assumes the right to inflict death camps and atomic fireballs instead. In this respect, we have simply begun to imitate the degradation of humanity that was formerly invested in an omnipotent and arbitrary God. In response to charges that absolute contingency might lead to political quietism, Meillassoux counters that the World of justice would mean nothing unless we had already hoped for it beforehand. A World of justice that came along at random would merely be an improved third World of thought: indeed, a perfect one. But it would have satisfied no craving, and would therefore have no redemptive power. For this reason, we must actively hope for the fourth World of justice for such a fourth World ever to arise. Not only justice, but beauty is dependent on such hope: for Meillassoux, who is here somewhat dependent on Kant, beauty means an accord between our human symbolization and the actual world, which could never be present in a World of the blessed any more than justice could. And just as a messianic figure is needed to incarnate our hope and then abandon power once the World of justice is realized, it is the figure of the child whose fragile contingency shows us a dignity and a demand for justice beyond all power. 3. Meillassoux Radicalized or Reversed Given the promising reception of Meillassoux’s first book, it would not be groundless to engage in early speculation about what it might take to earn him a place in the history of philosophy. Maybe this will never happen—who knows?—but quite possibly it will: his lucid argumentative methods and sheer philosophical imagination at least make him a good candidate to be read well into the future, especially following further elaboration in print of his mature system. Philosophy is often practiced as thought it were nothing more than the amassing of “knockdown arguments.” But this is no more insightful than saying that good architecture is the amassing of steal beams. It is true that poorly constructed building cannot stand for long, but sound construction is merely the first, indispensable step in building. In fact, I am inclined to say that what really makes a philosopher important is not being right, but being wrong . I mean this in a very specific sense. I once heard the interesting remark about twentieth century culture that “you have to remember that the sixties really happened in the seventies.” That is to say, it was in the 1970’s rather than the more honored 1960’s that civil rights, free love, long hair, and the rock and roll drug culture really took root. With respect to the history of philosophy, we might just as easily say: “you have to remember that Plato really happened in Aristotle,” that “Kant really happened in Hegel” or “Hume really happened in Kant,” or that “Husserl’s phenomenology first achieved its truth in Heidegger.” One becomes an important philosopher not by being right, but by attracting rebellious admirers who tell you that you are wrong , even as their own careers silently orbit around your own. To recruit faithful disciples may be comforting and flattering, but the greatest thinkers have generally had to experience refutation at the hands of their most talented heirs. For this reason, I would propose that we size up the magnitude of living thinkers not by deciding how many times they are right and wrong, but by asking instead: who would take the trouble to refute this author? For this reason I do not ask: “Is Meillassoux right?”, since I do not believe in the virtual God myself, nor am I convinced by any important aspect of Meillassoux’s philosophy. Instead, I ask if there are interesting ways to overturn him. Only by being overturned, by no longer remaining a contemporary, does one become a classic. Let’s begin with a simple model of refutation, which can be refined further at a later date once the basic point is established. One kind of refutation simply consists in saying: “This author is a complete idiot.” The refuter now walks away in celebration, and no link between the present and the future is built; all is reduced to rubble. But this sort of mediocre triumphalism is generally practiced by those who achieve little of their own, and is not especially interesting. Much more interesting is the sort of refutation that does not take its target to be a complete idiot. I would like to suggest that there are just two basic ways in which this can be done: radicalization and reversal . It has not escaped my notice that this is a fairly good match for the Deleuzian distinction between irony and humor. Whereas irony critiques and adopts the opposite principle of what it attacks, humor accepts what it confronts but pushes it into highly exaggerated form. The ironist is like the worker who sows chaos by rebeling and contradicting the boss, while the humorist is like the worker who follows orders to an absurdly literal degree, with equally chaotic results. Let’s start with a few examples. In Aristotle’s treatment of Plato, and Heidegger’s of Husserl, we find reversal. Plato’s eidei are transformed by Aristotle into mere secondary substances, and the individual worldly things despised by Plato become what is primary. For Husserl what is primary is whatever is present to consciousness, while for Heidegger this is precisely what is secondary, since the primary stuff of the world withdraws from any form of presence at all. As for radicalization, it is most easily found in the transformation of Kant by German Idealism: “Kant was right to wall off the things-in-themselves from human access, and simply should have realized that the thought of the Ding an sich is also a thought, and thereby the noumena are just special cases of the phenomena,” with much following from this discovery. It would also be easy to read Spinoza as a radicalizer of Descartes, and Berkeley and Hume as radicalized versions of Locke. Perhaps the distinction is now sufficiently clear. Admiring refutations are not those that say “Professor X is an idiot,” which is merely the flip side of the eager disciple’s fruitless “Professor X got everything right.” Instead, it will be some variant of one of the following two options: “Professor X is important, but got it backwards,” or “Professor X is important, but didn’t push things far enough.” In the history of philosophy these two latter cases have often been painful in purely human terms: Aristotle expresses sadness at refuting Plato, Kant is openly annoyed at Fichte, and Husserl feels betrayed and used by Heidegger. Rude handling from later figures almost seems to be the sine qua non of being a great philosopher. Now, it has already been claimed that Meillassoux is an emerging philosopher of the first importance, and by no less a figure than Alain Badiou: “It would be no exaggeration to say that Quentin Meillassoux has opened up a new path in the history of philosophy…” (Preface, vii). But rather than taking Badiou’s word for it, or rejecting his word, we might experiment by asking how Meillassoux could be radicalized or reversed. Are there interesting ways of doing this that might launch whole new schools of philosophy, unexpected or even condemned by Meillassoux himself? While no one can see the future, the present is poor when it is not riddled with virtual futures. The relation between philosophers and their predecessors and successors is always somewhat complicated, of course. But generally there is one central divergence at stake, which might be taken as the key to all the others. On this basis we could say that new thinkers primarily radicalize or primarily reverse the main ideas of their chief philosophical forerunner. There may be specific historical conditions and perhaps even personality traits connected with these two types, but this question can be left aside for now. More important for us is that radicalizers will generally be followed by reversers, and vice versa. Consider the textbook example of a reversal in the history of philosophy: Kant’s Copernican Revolution, which inverts the so-called dogmatic tradition that addresses the world itself, and makes the world revolve instead around the conditions by which it is known. While it is not completely impossible that Kant’s successors might have re-reversed this principle back into a new and stronger dogmatic realism, conditions were premature for such a move. Anyone doing this too early would likely have been an angry anti-Kantian reactionary rather than an original thinker in command of a genuinely new realist principle. The far more likely outcome is the one that actually happened: Kant’s reversal of his predecessors was viewed as incomplete, or as retaining lamentable bits of the traditional view, which despite his admirable breakthrough he was unable to shake off. This was the view of German Idealism, anyway. In similar fashion, Spinoza could also be viewed as a radicalizer of Descartes, who is equally accused of preserving various Scholastic dogmas in an otherwise radical project of philosophical reversal. The point is this: reversals in the history of thought tend to be followed soon thereafter by radicalizations of those reversals. The same may hold true in reverse: radicalizations might generally be followed by reversals, given that it is not always possible to be more radical than the radicals have already been. Consider the case of Husserl, who radicalizes Brentano’s early vagueness about what lies beyond immanent objectivity, and Twardowski’s assertion that there must be an external object lying outside the intentional content, by collapsing everything into the intentional sphere: there is no difference between the Berlin in my consciousness and the actual Berlin that is home to millions of people. It is difficult to see how one could be even more radical than Husserl’s idealist turn here. And thus the road is paved to Heidegger’s reversal of classical phenomenology, in which the key point is what lies deeper than any presence to consciousness: the Sein whose power and obscurity cannot be made exhaustively present, but only sends itself in historical epochs. In similar fashion we might also read Leibniz as a reverser of Spinoza’s radicalization, retrieving a strong sense of individual substance and a certain validity of what the Scholastics had said. Returning to Meillassoux, we might ask which kind of philosopher he is: a radicalizer or a reverser? At present, Meillassoux looks to me like a radicalizer (though for now his future remains shrouded in mist). He takes the correlationist tradition, which allows us to speak only of the relation between human and world, and tries to raise it into an even more extreme claim about the absolute contingency of everything. But whereas German Idealism did this by trying to collapse the distinction between thought and world entirely into the “thought” side, Meillassoux does it by trying to shift the non-absolute contingency of the thought-world correlate from epistemology to ontology. It is no longer a question of the inability of human knowledge to know what lies outside the correlate, but the inability of reality itself to be rooted in any definite laws. Furthermore, if we look at the various features of Meillassoux’s philosophy identified earlier tonight, all but one are already so radical that there is no obvious way to push them further. The one exception would be his claim that the world as a whole can change for no reason at any moment, coupled with the inconsistent claim that within a given world there are laws of nature that everything must follow. If gravitational attraction between all masses is a current law in our world, then for Meillassoux there can be no exceptions to this law for as long as it remains in force. A toppled vase will fall to the floor every time for sure,unless there is a cosmic change by which the laws of nature as a whole have altered. (This is reminiscent of the late medieval distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God, according to which God has the power to set or change the laws of nature, but not to contravene those laws locally once they are set.) On this point, to radicalize Meillassoux would simply be to say: there are no laws of nature even in the local sense. Everything that happens, even in the world here and now, is purely contingent and not governed by even a trace of law. And while this would be a more consistent development of Meillassoux’s thoughts on contingency, it is difficult to see how it could lead to a new philosophy. Instead, the admiring successors of Meillassoux are more likely to reverse one of his already sufficiently radical points. At least four candidates come to mind: *First, we have seen that Meillassoux thinks correlationism is challenged by a time before or after consciousness, but not by a space lying outside it. Perhaps this could be reversed into saying that spatial exteriority is the really crucial point. The arguments on this point are perhaps the least convincing in After Finitude (and do not even occur in the original French edition), and therefore it might be a candidate for the “blind spot” of which no philosopher is ever free. *Second, Meillassoux uses Cantor to claim that the contingency of laws of nature would not entail that they are unstable. A successor of Meillassoux might claim that it does make them unstable, and celebrate this fact. This person would then have to explain why common sense seems to encounter a relatively stable world despite its truly rampant instability. Whereas Meillassoux’s problem is to show how stability might exist despite contingency, this successor’s problem would be slightly different: to show why actual, full-blown instability might have the appearance of stability. *Third, Meillassoux claims that the primary qualities of things are those that can be mathematized. He might be reversed by a successor who says the opposite: the mathematizable qualities are the secondary ones, and the primary ones are those that elude symbolic formulation. While this is a perfectly valid possible objection to Meillassoux, it is one that is made in advance by some of his predecessors and is still made by some of his peers, making it less interesting for futurology than some of his other points. *Fourth and finally, whereas Meillassoux claims that God does not exist but might exist in the future, a successor might argue even more bizarrely that God has always existed but might vanish in the future. Let’s arbitrarily select the first of these possibilities, and imagine briefly where it might lead, if pursued in the future by admiring detractors. Meillassoux comes from the circle of Badiou, and some of Badiou’s most ardent admirers are found in Latin America. So, let’s imagine that towards mid-century some ingenious reversers of Meillassoux emerge in that portion of the Spanish-speaking world. Just for fun, let’s call them Castro and Chávez. And in order to avoid any confusion with the present-day politicians of those names, we will stipulate that Meillassoux’s great successors are both women. The philosopher Castro (we will suppose she comes from Peru) reverses Meillassoux’s argument that the ancestral or diachronic are what most threaten the human-world correlate. Instead, she claims that the diachronic does not threaten the correlate at all, and that we must instead look at space as what ruins the correlate and demands a strange new realism. What would such a philosophy look like? In order to determine this, we might ask what price Meillassoux pays for doing it the opposite way. As I see it, he pays in two separate ways. One is that laws of nature for him are contingent over time . The laws of nature apply to the universe as a whole at any given moment, and would be changed globally if they are ever changed at all. The second price he pays is that Meillassoux has no mereology , or theory of parts and wholes. Everything for him is on the level of the given, or immanent in experience, with the sole proviso that the laws governing this immanence might change without notice at any given moment. In reversing Meillassoux, Castro makes the following claims in the preface to her stunning debut book of 2045, The Cosmos and its Neighborhoods , rapidly translated from Spanish into all the languages of the world: Despite his brilliant analysis of the contingency of laws of nature over time, Meillassoux gets two important assumptions wrong. First, he allows for only one set of contingent laws to govern nature as a whole. Second, he allows laws to govern only the world that is immanent in experience, and thereby fails to explore the contingency among part-whole relations. In this book I will argue, first, that the laws of nature vary in any given instant between one region of the universe and the next; and second, that the world is made up of layers of parts and wholes that are also contingent with respect to one another. Those are the words of Castro. This may sound like a hopeless free-for-all of chaos, yet the book somehow succeeds in drawing some compelling deductions about how laws must vary from one place or level in the world to the next. Trapped in the limited horizon of 2011, and not yet inspired by the heavily balkanized political and technological situation of 2050 that somehow lends additional credence to Castro’s vision, we can only vaguely grasp what such a philosophy might look like. After this reversal of Meillassoux by Castro, the usual pattern leads us to expect a radicalization by Chávez, a young Argentine student of Castro. How could the already strange theories of Castro be radicalized? Perhaps as follows, in a disturbing new book entitled The Implosion of the Neighborhoods , which argues as follows: Castro was right to shift the Meillassouxian framework of contingency from time to space. However, in this respect she retained a surprisingly traditional opposition between the two. In this book I will show that time and space collapse into one another. This may sound too much like the discredited four-dimensional block universe of twentieth century physics and philosophy. However, the four-dimensional universe is a model biased in favor of space, merely adding an extra dimension to the commonsense spatial continuum while stipulating that the serial passage of time is an illusion. In this book I will argue instead for a one-dimensional space-time modeled after our experience of time, in which there is no simultaneous co-existence at all between different parts of the universe, or ‘neighborhoods’ as my esteemed teacher Castro has called them. Instead, the various portions of the universe link to one another by succession rather than by coexistence. Buenos Aires, New York, and Amsterdam do not exist simultaneously in the same landscape, but one after the other in the mind of some observer, and this observer can only be an observer much larger than any human. Against Meillassoux’s notion of a virtual God that does not exist now but might exist in the future, I will argue for an actual God that surveys the universe in sequence, thereby generating the illusion of spatial diversity and even the illusion of individual minds located within that diversity. Once this divine observer dies, the universe as a whole must perish. Again, these ideas are so bizarre that we of 2011 can barely comprehend them, just as Aristotle would have had a difficult time grasping the theories of Descartes. We could then perhaps imagine a further reversal of this theory, emanating from the intellectually resurgent Philippines of the twenty-second century. The Filipino School might argue that the universe is already dead, given the collapse of its spatial richness into the serial observations of a flimsy and mortal God. The virtual universe does not yet exist, but might exist in fully spatial form in the future, and this would require the death of God and the resulting liberation of God’s succession of images as independent, spatially situated realities. With a bit of sharpening, we might be able to make all of these imaginary thinkers more intuitively clear. Along with the history of philosophy, there might arise a new discipline generating imaginary futures for philosophy. The richness of Meillassoux’s system comes not from the fact that he is plausibly right about so many things, but because his philosophy offers such a treasury of bold statements ripe for being radicalized or reversed. He is a rich target for many still-unborn intellectual heirs, and this is what gives him the chance to be an important figure. NOTES 1. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude . Trans. R Brassier. (London: Continuum, 2008.) Page 5. The word “correlationism” does not appear in his doctoral thesis. As Meillassoux informed me in an email of February 8, 2011, he first coined this term in 2003 or 2004, while editing for publication a lecture he had given at the École normale supérieure on a day devoted to the theme of “Philosophy and Mathematics,” an event including Alain Badiou as one of the participants. 2. Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making . (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming 2011). 3. In an email of December 6, 2010, Meillassoux clarifies that in After Finitude he only deduces the impossibility of a “universal contradiction,” not of a determinate contradiction. In the same email he suggests that he can also prove the latter, though the proof is somewhat lengthier than the one found in After Finitude . 4. After Finitude (18-26), in the passage falling between the two sets of triple asterisks. These pages were sent by Meillassoux to translator Ray Brassier (in French) during the translation process, and do not appear in the original French version of the book. 5. Graham Harman, “Quentin Meillassoux: A New French Philosopher.” Philosophy Today 51.1 (2007): Pages 104-117. The passage where I raise the question of space can be found in the first column of page 107. 6. Vernes is first cited on p. 95 of After Finitude . See Jean-René Vernes, Critique de la raison aléatoire, ou Descartes contra Kant . (Paris: Aubier, 1982).  . (shrink)

We should react to deaf parents who choose to have a deaf child with compassion not condemnationThere has been a great deal of discussion during the past few years of the potential biotechnology offers to us to choose to have only perfect babies, and of the implications that might have, for instance for the disabled. What few people foresaw is that these same technologies could be deliberately used to ensure that children would be born with disabilities. That this is a (...) real possibility, and not merely the thought experiment of a philosopher, is brought home to us by the decision of an American lesbian couple to select a deaf sperm donor in order to maximise the chances that their children, Jehanne and Gauvin, would be deaf like them.1 Their choice has sparked controversy, not only among medical ethicists, but in the opinion pages of newspapers across the world. Ought parents be permitted to make such choices?If the parents of Jehanne and Gauvin have done anything wrong, it must consist in violating their child’s right to an open future—limiting its future potential for choice.2 But what does it mean to respect this right?From the moment a child is born, her parents are making choices for her, which will powerfully shape her future. They will decide what kind of education she will have, what religious experiences, from among what group she can select friends. Thereby, they profoundly mould the person she will be and the life she will have.When this activity is carried out within certain, ill-defined, limits, it is in no way objectionable. It is not merely a …. (shrink)

The practical problem of how to conduct oneself as a Christian and a Philosopher or Bioethicist in public debate an when asked to be engaged in government committees is difficult. One solution that has had some support has been to approach the issues on the grounds of our natural law tradition but understood anthropocentrically – the ultimate end is not communion with God by integral human development. This is often called New Natural Law (NNL). This separation of Philosophy and Theology (...) has had its critics and most notably the current Poe and his immediate predecessor. In their own writing addressed to people of goodwill, they took a different approach that was essentially Christocentric and involving s close partnership between Philosohy and Theology. In my own experience over thirty years of public involvement in Bioethics, I have discovered that the NNL approach has two overwhelming problems. What is offered to the secular dialogue, as an anthropocentric natural law, often sounds false to secular others because we propose something guided by our beliefs, but failing to acknowledge that contribution. However something that I have discovered latterly in that approach is in fact false by our own standards. By the strictures we impose on our contribution we in fact ignore the New Law instituted by Christ, the law of love. The New Natural Law (NNL) Project has proved to be a failure where it has been tried, and, I know realize, was doomed from the outset, because in being anthropocentric it was essentially lacking and the answers that it gave to problems were often unsatisfactory because lacking love and the particular demand of needing to be capable of being oriented towards God, the God of love. The NNL approach tended to produce a casuistry that was too liberal and too lacking in understanding of the essential role that affectivity plays in our lives, created as we are in the imago dei, in the image and likeness of the God of love. Such a morality demands much more than anthropocentricism can demand. In recognizing these difficulties I propose instead a more pragmatic approach that reflects a partnership between Philosophy and Theology as espoused by the Second Vatican Council, and by Pope’s Benedict XVI and Pope John Paul II, and which engages the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Servais Pinckaers. An approach that I have tried with some success in chairing government committees. (shrink)

This article discusses the role of representative strategies in twentieth-century Russian culture. Just as Russia interacted with Europe in the Marquis de Custine’s time via discourse and representation, in the twentieth century Russia re-entered European consciousness by simulating ‘socialism’. In the post-Soviet era, the nation aspired to be admitted to the ‘European house’ by simulating a ‘market economy’, ‘democracy’, and ‘postmodernism’. But in reality Russia remains the same country as before, torn between the reality of its own helplessness and poverty, (...) and the messianic myth of its own greatness. Post-Soviet culture is a product of Stalinist culture. ‘Russian postmodernism’ was created less by artists, writers, poets, and film makers, than by theorists and critics. At the beginning of the 1990s, a need to describe contemporary Russian culture emerged. In this way, ‘Russian postmodernism’ arose from the desire to ‘sell’ projects in the West—from the simple obligation to describe socialist experience in concrete, transferable terms that Westerners could grasp. The nostalgia experienced by the post-Soviet era creates its own simulated postmodernism , in which the matrices of the construction and functioning of culture cease to be connected with specifically Russian (Soviet) history, and instead reproduce Western models almost exactly. We are facing yet another attempt at radical cultural modernization. If the first attempt (revolutionary culture) was the most original and fruitful, and the second (Stalinist culture, Socialist Realism) was less productive but still original, then the third, post-Soviet, attempt (rich in individuality, but lacking in original ideas or style) is for the moment the least productive and original. If we exclude sots-art (conceptualism) from ‘Russian postmodernism’, there would be nothing left. Clearly, an original cultural model in post-Soviet Russia will not take shape until original strategies for processing the country’s cultural past are developed. In their turn, these strategies can only result from a radical transformation of post-Soviet identity into a new, genuinely Russian one. (shrink)

A perspective on unifying culture and psychology is presented. Following a brief discussion of universalist perspectives , the current lack of unification is considered. Some necessary presuppositions are proposed for a unifying perspective, which are then pursued through the concepts and texts of the philosopher John Searle, particularly his concept of Background. Culture may be seen as a pattern of Background. How Background cultural patterns arise constitutes the major question challenging any unifying perspective. An example of how the question (...) can be addressed is proposed, by an articulation of the four levels of causation, phylogenesis, ethnogenesis, ontogenesis, and microgenesis . Finally, an empirical study of cross-cultural differences understood within this unifying perspective is described. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The article aims to shed light on teaching the Arabic language in non¬-Arab countries, especially since the Arabic language it is the main gateway to learning the Qur’an and its sciences, the current reading also aspires of the Arabic language and the reality if its teaching methods to non Arabic speakers, and the obstacles the prevent the educational process from being achieved. The article also shows the role of reading in teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers, reading is on (...) one of transferring knowledge, and reading enriches perceptions and expands knowledge and information, The current reading aspires to know the different types of reading, as each has characteristics that differ from the others, Therefore, knowing the types of reading and methods of teaching them contributes to the status of teaching Arabic as a foreign language, and constitutes a means to understand and communicate it correctly and soundly.The work was divided into axes. In the first axis, the research will reveal the status of the Arabic language, whether for its speakers or for non-native speakers，It gained this status from being the language of the Qur’an, In addition to the fact that it contributes to the throne of languages by speaking them and using them to understand religious, economic, cultural and commercial matters.The second axis will focus on the meaning of teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers, and teaching it by transmitting it to them by helping another individual to communicate with it and learn it as a second language.Then, the reality of Arabic language teaching curricula and the problems they face were discussed. Especially with the presence of a large number of these curricula, with their different plan, method, and time duration, the teacher here finds himself faced with confusion in choosing the appropriate curriculum for the group - non-Arabic speakers - he is entrusted with teaching, and which suits their abilities and intellectual inclinations.The article also shows that there are good curricula that have been highly successful in delivering and transferring the academic content to the learner. This is due to its respect for a set of pedagogical rules and controls and the hierarchy of the curriculum. The clearer the curriculum is and built on specific foundations and elements, the more effective and profitable it is.There is no doubt that it is not possible to download and teach any educational curriculum without a teacher who has several scientific methods and skills. That is, he must have a set of skills and be armed with a variety of methods in teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers. Something that contributes to the success of the educational process.A good professor is one who diversifies his methods while teaching non-Arabic speaking students. Therefore, the article aims to pay attention to the teacher and train him according to certain basics, including the cultural basis of the country in which he will study, and the cognitive and professional basis. The research also recommended the need to hold training courses and workshops to train teachers of the Arabic language to non-native speakers.The research has confirmed that reading has an important and fundamental role in teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers, and that this skill contributes to providing the learner with a large linguistic resource, as well as benefiting from the depths of Arabic books, and also helps in improving the level of pronunciation and communication with a good master of the Arabic language.The article also explains that teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers suffers from several obstacles and obstacles that prevent achieving the goal of the educational learning process, including reading weakness among learners, especially at the level of pronunciation, in addition to inversion, substitution, and lack of distinction between similar sounds in pronunciation.The current reading shows that despite these problems and obstacles; However, the experiences related to teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers are moving in the right direction.The article relied on the descriptive and analytical approach. To describe and analyze the phenomenon of teaching the Arabic language to non-native speakers, with the need to point out that the proposed reading is not final and does not claim to have the final say or possess the “truth”, as long as it is one among other possible readings. (shrink)

Since the inception of the psychology of personality, psychologists have been trying to account for regularities in behavior. The preferred construct has been the personality trait as an inner disposition that directs conduct and which is common to all people. Although found lacking during the 1970s, the search for sources of direction from within has been resurrected in the form of the five-factor theory. According to this approach there are five underling structural factors common to all people and independent (...) of cultural influences—an asocial, ahistorical, biologically based conception. Examination of the theory finds it to be dealing with traits of temperament rather than personality and judges it insufficient on that basis. Rather than conceiving of personality as fixed and universal, it is argued that personality is an adaptation worked out in the cultural and historical context of the individual life. It is further contended that a reconsideration of the personality theory of Gordon Allport will provide a better basis for understanding personality and personality traits specifically. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Purpose: Despite various comparative studies in the field of cultural heritage protection in the world, there is still a significant lack of comparative research on policies related to the legal system of countries' governance. The purpose of this study is to address the comparative policies in Iran and Italy, with a particular focus on the results of the executive experiences of two different types of policies in the cities of Oroumieh (North-West of Iran) and Turin (in North-West of Italy). (...) Design/methodology/approach: Utilising the comparative, analytical, bibliographic and descriptive historical research methodology, which is based on the study of the local, national and international comprehensive review of regulations and policy-making of cultural heritage preservation policies in Iran and Italy. In this research, the related documents in three languages (Persian, Italian and English) have been examined to compare profoundly and comprehensively the policies and regulations adopted in these two countries to be able to analyze the national and transnational regulations and local policies in the cultural heritage sector. Findings: In addition to many cultural similarities and numerous commonalities, especially in the multiplicity of urban cultural heritage in historical centers, the results suggest that the legislation structure in Iran is much more centralized than in Italy. Also, the findings suggest that Italy focuses on aligning its previously centralized national legislative system in line with contemporary European heritage and preservation policies. Originality/value: The paper outlines how to use historical and cultural similarities through comparative study to benefit the experiences of two historical countries in urban heritage conservation and policy-making part despite their differences. (shrink)

Tоday there is a strong tendency to incorporate the bioethical principle of social justice in healthcare in cross-cultural communication. Considering cultural differences makes it possible to ensure that the human right to medical care and wellbeing is fully respected. Several types of most vulnerable populations were identified – immigrants and social minorities. When seeking medical care they face a number of problems such as culture and language barriers, lower socio-economic status, lack of literacy, which impede effective communication (...) and care provision. The most promising ways of coping with the problem are developing cultural competence and practicing a patient-centered approach. New curricula aiming at raising cultural awareness have been elaborated for practical use in medical schools. (shrink)

This research seeks an answer to the question of why spirituality is needed in social service. Providing spiritual support resources to the client in overcoming the problems that people face, coping with these problems, making sense of them, and reaching spiritual peace is called spiritually sensitive social service. It can be said that the history of social work is equivalent to the history of humanity. Therefore, especially in the West, the problems experienced in the modernization process, or the dominant paradigm (...) of the period (science-church conflict, rationalization and positivist approach to knowledge) brought a social service discipline and intervention, which was far from spirituality. It can be said that, in the last quarter of the 20th century, the lack of this approach was felt in the West and the studies on this field are accumulating today. In Turkey, there is an obvious gap in this literature. The problem of the present study is why there is a need for spiritually sensitive social service. The gap in the literature on this subject in Turkey indicates the importance of the study. The present study is of a descriptive method based on literature review. Social service is a career that aims to increase the functionality of individuals, families, groups, and societies at micro, mezzo, and macro levels and to strengthen them in overcoming their problems. Therefore, social service helps individuals to overcome problems arising from the individual issues and external factors and to meet resources with opportunities. It is obvious that it is difficult for a social service approach, which is distant from spiritual values, to find satisfactory answers to some of the questions and problems faced by individuals. It is clear that the understanding and practices of social service sensitive to spirituality will play an important role in helping clients overcome problems, make sense of them, and strengthen the individual. This study addresses the necessity of spiritually sensitive social service in four items: First, modern societies are under more threat and fear in comparison with the ones in the past. Therefore, they experience more anxiety, stress, and distrust. While the developments in technology and science offer great opportunities and conveniences to people, they have also manifested some problems that have not been experienced until today. Social service sensitive to spirituality will contribute to the separation of individuals, groups, and communities from the climate of fear they have experienced by activating their current cultural structure and world of belief. Second, modern lifestyle and individualization have isolated people by weakening people's social support systems. Modern lifestyle makes people to experience loneliness. The individualistic and self-centered lifestyle has alienated the individual from social ties and created a perception that one does not need anyone else. Social service that is sensitive to spirituality will increase the quality of life and joy of the individual by eliminating one’s loneliness and will help one to look to the future with hope and to overcome one’s loneliness. Third, human beings want to make sense of the events and problems they encounter. It would not be wrong to call the modern age "the age of the crisis of meaning". Today's people are experiencing serious crises in terms of making sense of the problems they face. Especially when faced with existential life-threatening factors such as severe illnesses, disability, and death, spirituality has a great impact on overcoming these problems and making sense of life. The efforts of individuals to rebuild the meaning they have lost can only be possible with the provision of social services sensitive to spirituality. Fourth, since the modern social service understanding is human-centered, holistic, and rights-based, the idea that people should be evaluated holistically highlights the necessity of spiritually sensitive social service. Experiencing a dizzying, diverse and, rapid change, today's people live in a complex network of relationships. The inaccuracy of the one-dimensional evaluation of human behavior is better understood today. The individual differences of the clients and their approaches to the problems make it necessary to evaluate the applications for these with a holistic and encompassing perspective. Therefore, the holistic evaluation of human also reveals the necessity of evaluating the spiritual social service within the framework of the rights arising from being human, not as a treat offered to individuals. (shrink)

International human rights treaties and declarations lay out the interconnection of civil and political rights with economic, social, and cultural rights. However, it was not until 1993 at the 2nd UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna that governments agreed that all of women’s rights are an integral part of human rights. Promoting women’s economic, social, and cultural rights is a critical human rights advocacy issue. Poverty leaves women more exposed to violence and less able to escape it, (...) and severely restricts women’s ability to organize and fight for change. The article describes work by AI and other NGOs on violence against women and its connection with women's poverty and lack of education, healthcare, housing, and access to land in Africa. Besides the burgeoning of African women’s organizations calling for protection of all women’s human rights, a second hopeful development has been approval in July 2003 of an historic Protocol on the Rights of women in Africa. (shrink)

An organizational culture can be defined as "Organizational Humanizing Culture" if it presents the following features: (1) recognition of the person in his or her dignity, rights, uniqueness, sociability and capacity for personal growth, (2) respect for persons and their human rights, (3) care and service for persons around one, and (4) management towards the common good versus particular interests. Current findings and generalized experience suggest that an organizational culture with these features tends to bring about trust and associability, which (...) are basic elements for social capital (a sort of asset embedded in the relationships of individuals, communities, networks or societies). (shrink)