In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dei Filius II:On Divine RevelationSimon Francis Gaine, O.P.With chapter 2 of Dei Filius, the First Vatican Council's Constitution on the Catholic Faith moves on from the confession of faith in God, the Creator of all things, to the fact of God's revelation to us human creatures. The chapter covers first natural revelation through creation and the possibility of our natural knowledge of God, then why we also need a (...) further revelation which is supernatural, the presence of that supernatural revelation in Scripture and Tradition, and finally the canonicity, inspiration, and interpretation of the Bible.1The first sentence of the chapter declares that "holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason."2 This sentence, with its affirmation of the possibility of sure natural knowledge of God without the benefit of supernatural revelation, is perhaps the most well-known of the chapter, the most hotly debated at the council itself, and the most discussed in the secondary literature.3 Hardly any comment is [End Page 839] ever made, however, on how the second chapter begins with the statement that the Church "holds and teaches" what follows. This phrase tenet et docet contrasts neatly with how the first chapter began: "The Holy Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one, true and living God," and so on. While chapter 1's opening sentence spoke of the Church believing and confessing, chapter 2's opening sentence speaks instead of the Church holding and teaching, employing the verb teneo (hold) in contrast to credo (believe).4One can easily recognize a structural parallel between the two phrases: the inner act of holding in chapter 2 corresponds to the inner act of believing in chapter 1, and the external act of teaching in chapter 2 corresponds to the external act of confessing in chapter 1. I shall say something about the Church's holding and teaching, and its overall contrast as a unit with the earlier unit of believing and confessing, before going on to say something about the wider content of the chapter in that light. I do this partly because this symposium is about not only Vatican I's Constitution on the Catholic Faith, but also theology today. Catholic theology today is familiar with a precise distinction between "believing" and "holding," and while it is closely related to the distinction between believing and holding found in Dei Filius, I do not think the two distinctions are quite the same. So, in order to avoid confusion, I shall say something about the distinction familiar in theology in today, and then say something about the distinction at work in Vatican I. [End Page 840]The Profession of Faith in use in the Church since 1989, after quoting the Nicene Creed, continues as follows: "With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down in Tradition, which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, sets forth to be believed as divinely revealed."5 But to this primary profession of what is usually called theological or divine faith, since it is a response to God's revelation, there is then added the following: "I also firmly accept and hold each and every thing definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals."6 A third category, which pertains to non-definitive teaching and to which the appropriate response is "religious obedience of will and intellect," need not detain us here.7The Latin of "I accept and hold" is amplector et retineo, and in the 1989 Profession, it is said in definite contrast to faith and belief as an assent distinct from but related to that of divine faith itself. Though officially translated as "hold"—which might also have rendered teneo—retineo seems to connote guarding and preserving something, holding onto it, rather than merely holding it. The difficulty in interpreting such formulas (including terms such as "profess," "hold," and so on) is indicated by the fact that the previous Profession of... (shrink)

In this volume Professor Sciacca publishes lectures which he gave at Louvain in 1954 in the series ‘Chaire Cardinal Mercier’. A brief introduction sets the scene: in 384 Augustine is a believing, if not a professing, Catholic but he is still burdened with philosophical perplexities left him by Manicheism. At this point Neoplatonic influence is felt; pp. 3-19 analyse its effect. Augustine christianises the Plotinian Intellect identifying it with the Word; but this doctrine does not present the Word made flesh. (...) Augustine had still to learn the humble mystery of the Incarnation; he was in danger of proudly thinking of Christ philosophically rather than theologically, and of becoming a convert to philosophy instead of to a religion. But St. Paul’s words convinced him of the humble reality of the Incarnation. Thus Neoplatonism had to be ignored and played no part in Augustine’s intellectual conversion to the theological truths of Christianity. The Platonists’ contribution was to remove his philosophical difficulties: he can now conceive God as a spirit ; evil, now regarded as something negative, does not need a principle to create it. Plotinus serves as a starting-point, but the Christian doctrine of creation gives his teaching an entirely different direction; Augustine’s doctrine is a Christianized Neoplatonism and not Neoplatonised Christianity. (shrink)

In “Logic and Conversation,” H. P. Grice posits that in conversations, we are “always-already” implying certain things about the subjects of our words while abiding by certain rules to aid in understanding. It is my view, however, that Grice’s so-called “cooperative principle” can be analyzed under the traditional Heideggerian dichotomy of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand wherein language can be viewed as a “mere” tool that sometimes breaks. Ultimately, I contend that the likening of language to a tool allows (...) for a more robust understanding of it and conversational failures, while ontologically recategorizing language as an object of sorts. (shrink)

Some students who possess the same cognitive skill set as their counterparts but who neither speak nor write English fluently have to contend with an unnecessary barrier to academic success. While an administrative top-down approach has been in progress for many years to address this issue, enhancement of student performance begins in the classroom. Thus, we argue that instructors ought to implement a more organic bottom-up approach. If it is possible for instructors to make class content available in other languages, (...) such as Spanish, without thereby compromising something of comparable pedagogical value, then they ought to do so. In fact, we provide here Anselm’s Ontological Argument rendered in Spanish to show how, when translated, it provides native Spanish speakers with greater accessibility to difficult material. Then, we consider the possible beneficial implications of doing so for university students. (shrink)

Paleoneuranatomy is an emerging subfield of paleontological research with great potential for the study of evolution. However, the interpretation of fossilized nervous tissues is a difficult task and presently lacks a rigorous methodology. We critically review here cases of neural tissue preservation reported in Cambrian arthropods, following a set of fundamental paleontological criteria for their recognition. These criteria are based on a variety of taphonomic parameters and account for morphoanatomical complexity. Application of these criteria shows that firm evidence for fossilized (...) nervous tissues is less abundant and detailed than previously reported, and we synthesize here evidence that has stronger support. We argue that the vascular system, and in particular its lacunae, may be central to the understanding of many of the fossilized peri‐intestinal features known across Cambrian arthropods. In conclusion, our results suggest the need for caution in the interpretation of evidence for fossilized neural tissue, which will increase the accuracy of evolutionary scenarios. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/2_JlQepRTb0. (shrink)

My dissertation concerns the nature of linguistic understanding. A standard view about linguistic understanding is that it is a propositional knowledge state. The following is an instance of this view: given a speaker S and an expression alpha that means M, S understand alpha just in case S knows that alpha means M. I refer to this as the epistemic view of linguistic understanding. The epistemic view would appear to be a mere conceptual truth about linguistic (...) class='Hi'>understanding, since it is entailed by the following two claims that themselves seem to be mere conceptual truths: S understands alpha iff S knows what alpha means, and---given that a means M--- S knows what alpha means iff S knows that alpha means M. I argue, however, that this is not a mere conceptual truth. Contrary to the epistemic view, propositional knowledge of the meaning of alpha is not necessary for understanding alpha. I argue that linguistic understanding does not even require belief. My positive proposal is that our understanding of language is typically realized, at least in native speakers, as a perceptual capacity. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that our perceptual experience of language comes to us already semantically interpreted. We perceive a speaker's utterance as having content, and it is by perceiving the speaker's utterances as having the right content that we understand what the speaker says. We count as understanding language in virtue of having this capacity to understand what speakers say when they use language. This notion of perceiving an utterance as having content gets analyzed in terms of Dretske's account of representation in terms of a teleological notion of function: you perceive a speaker's utterance as having content when the utterance produces in you a perceptual state that has a certain function in your psychology. I show how this view about the nature of linguistic understanding provides an attractive account of how identity claims can be semantically informative, as opposed to merely pragmatically informative, an account that avoids the standard difficulties for Fregean views that attempt to account for the informativeness of identity claims in terms of their semantics. (shrink)

The book consists of 6 chapters. Chapter One explains the reason why SLA researchers should study the language learning environment in space: population movements associated with internal and external migration and social mobility such as the circuits of commodity production and distribution create much space, in which language learning environment become diverse and uneven. With the spatial perspective, we can fully understand the interactions between language learners and the world or environments.In Chapter Two, by introducing the brief (...) history of Critical Spatial Theory, the author wants to tell us one of the key ideas in the theory: the social production of space, which views space as the product of the social relations of its era. Based on it, the author adds that the production of languages is an integral aspect of the production of space on a global scale. It can help us to understand how social mobility shapes language learning environments. From this perspective, the local environments in which languages are learned are outcomes of the production of space under the influence of mobility. It reiterates the key view that the global mobilities of physical objects (people, goods and information) produce space.In Chapter Three, the author introduces the mainstream views held by modern linguistics: languages are conceptualized as objects in the space. They hold that the spatiality of language is given by providing correct writing systems and standardized rules for various languages. Influenced by mainstream conception of language from modern linguistics, SLA tends to regard languages as self-contained objects in space. However, this view neglects the relation between language and the learning environments. The author holds that the distribution and circulation of languages and their varieties in geographical space produce the spatiality of language, which clears the ground for an environment or object-as-space view of language in Chapter Four.In Chapter Four, the author develops an alternative "objects-as-space" view and introduces three concepts to illustrate spatiality of language: flat ontology, assemblage and mobilities. The concept of flat ontology helps explain what language is and how it comes into being in the world; From assemblage perspective, the author develops the idea that everything is an object, so are human beings and languages. Language (the non-physical object) interacts with various physical objects, forming the language-bearing assemblage. This assemblage is the form of spatiality of language. The mobilities theory explains how language-bearing assemblages develop or change on a global scale because of social mobility, emphasizing the importance of learning environment in SLA. All in all, the author outlines how language makes its way into physical space in the form of assemblages, or assemblages of assemblages.Chapter Five centers on language learning environment. First, the author explains the relation between language learners and their learning environment from an ecological view: the learner is a part of the language learning environment, and second language learning is a spatial interaction between the learners and the semiotic resources provided by environment. Then, the author discusses language environment from two different perspectives. From an 'individual' perspective, environments are assembled by individuals from the spatial resources available; from an 'areal' view, environments are shaped both by local circumstances and global circulations of language-bearing assemblages. Meanwhile, the author also discusses other language environments like the multilingual city and online resources. What the author hopes to develop in this chapter is an environment perspective that grounds the contexts of language learning in space, which helps the readers think about language learning from a spatial perspective.Chapter Six contains three parts. In the first part, it outlines the work of a number of researchers from sociolinguistics and the contribution they made to the spatial theory. In the second part, the author wants to tell us how the idea of language learning environment emerges from his own research. The last part discusses the four main researching routes (areal studies, studies of individuals learning in settings, studies of the construction of individual learning environment and design-based studies) that might influence SLA research on language learning environments and some research methods. The book is in alignment with several recent "turns" occurring in the field of SLA, such as "social turn" (Block, 2003) and "multilingual turn" (May, 2014), both of which bring to the fore the social aspects involved in language learning. While the first "turn" accentuates the role of social context in shaping and influencing learner cognition, the latter highlights how the physical multilingual world remold language learning experiences, and how the mental multilingual world helps raise learners' language awareness, and facilitates their successful construction of an identity of legitimate multi-language users. The book under review joins up the two "turns" in acknowledging that language learners are persons-in-context with organic interaction with social learning environment (Ushioda, 2021). This view has research and pedagogical implications. From the point of doing research, spatial perspectives, advocated in the book, afford huge research potentials for both language teachers and (instructed) SLA researchers to conduct situated investigations, exploring the complex and dynamic nexus between language learners and their surrounding environment (not restricted to people) that play a part in their learning experience, and thus gaining insightful understanding of how individuals and learning contexts are coupled with each other, how they evolve together, and how they constitute an ecosystem that generates affordances, facilitating or constraining language learning. Pedagogically speaking, the spatial perspectives encourage language teachers to hold an ecological view of language teaching and learning, directing their attention to the individuality of each language learner and their complex, dynamic and multifaceted relationality with other learners and the physical realities, rather than solely focusing on the abstract systems (e.g., the development of cognitive aspect). This holistic view allows language teachers to take measures to address concrete questions emerging in and out of the classrooms, and stimulates them to design and experiment with pedagogical interventions that help to create a favorable environment for language learning. This view also invites language teachers to take learner agency into account (Xu & Long, 2020) and to design pedagogical activities that enable learners to take agentive actions to adapt their environments as they actively create and seek their own language learning opportunities, making the world their own (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). In turn, teachers' agency-enabling activities will ultimately help learners to autonomously access a range of resources in this new affordance-rich era to improve their language skills, and thus become more independent in their pathway to life-long learning.Beside the above benefits, the book is also theoretically and methodologically friendly. In illustrating the role of space in SLA, the author invokes a plethora of theories from such disciplines as sociology, sociolinguistics, psychology, etc. This orientation helps readers to build a transdisciplinary framework to capture the multi-layered nature of SLA, and to acquire a nuanced understanding of how language learning is influenced by multiple scales of environmental factors. Methodologically, the author proposes several specific methods that are especially apt to investigate language learning environment. These methods, together with the theoretical foundation laid by the book, will definitely help researchers and language teaching practitioners to further delve into the complex interplay between context and language learners.Admittedly, the book is not without weaknesses. It spends most of its words on illustrating the importance of physical environment in SLA. Another essential component, the virtual environment is insufficiently referenced and discussed. This lacking is undoubtedly a regret the book leaves with us, especially in these years of pandemic, where language learning in virtual spaces is becoming a norm.All in all, the book is an invaluable contribution to the field of SLA, and is worthy of recommending to language teaching practitioners, researchers, and postgraduates in applied linguistics. (shrink)

There is a critique of capitalist market economy that consists in claiming not only that capitalist social relations are uncaring and alienating, nor only exploitative of the working class, but that the process of capitalist economy as a whole is a way of living, today globalized, that has gotten out of hand. Its essential nature is unmasked as a senseless circular movement that, besides ruthlessly exploiting natural resources, demeans human being itself and alienates it from the historical alternative of a (...) purportedly authentic mode of human being rooted in collective, solidaric subjectivity. The present article offers an alternative hermeneutic cast for understanding capitalism as the gainful game that can serve as philosophical orientation in fighting for a free and fair social interplay in which the powers and abilities of free individuals are appropriately and reciprocally estimated and esteemed. This requires, first and foremost, seeing through the fetishisms inherent in the valorization of reified value that the mature Marx identified in his critiques of political economy as the essential nature of capitalism. Such critical insight is necessary for orientation also in today’s predicament of the ever more encroaching and ensnaring cyberworld. (shrink)

Baars' contrastive analysis approach offers an essential framework for differentiating conscious processing from the myriad unconscious functions carried out by the mind/brain. In applying this approach it is important to understand that consciousness is not something other than, but something in addition to the unconscious processes that precede and follow the momentary focus of awareness. We have argued elsewhere that neurologically this something is activation via a global attentional matrix which both: 1) controls access to consciousness by competing unconscious (...) processors; and 2) integrates the multimodal representations of those processors which gain momentary access into unified, conscious percepts. (shrink)

We discuss four interconnected issues that we believe have hindered investigations into how language may affect thinking. These have had a tendency to reappear in the debate concerning linguistic relativity over the past decades, despite numerous empirical findings. The first is the claim that it is impossible to disentangle language from thought, making the question concerning “influence” pointless. The second is the argument that it is impossible to disentangle language from culture in general, and from social interaction (...) in particular, so it is impossible to attribute any differences in the thought patterns of the members of different cultures to language per se. The third issue is the objection that methodological and empirical problems defeat all but the most trivial version of the thesis of linguistic influence: that language gives new factual information. The fourth is the assumption that since language can potentially influence thought from “not at all” to “completely,” the possible forms of linguistic influence can be placed on a cline, and competing theories can be seen as debating the actual position on this cline. We analyze these claims and show that the first three do not constitute in-principle objections against the validity of the project of investigating linguistic influence on thought, and that the last one is not the best way to frame the empirical challenges at hand. While we do not argue for any specific theory or mechanism for linguistic influence on thought, our discussion and the reviewed literature show that such influence is clearly possible, and hence in need of further investigations. (shrink)

Tarski’s conceptual analysis of the notion of logical consequence is one of the pinnacles of the process of defining the metamathematical foundations of mathematics in the tradition of his predecessors Euclid, Frege, Russell and Hilbert, and his contemporaries Carnap, Gödel, Gentzen and Turing. However, he also notes that in defining the concept of consequence “efforts were made to adhere to the common usage of the language of every day life.” This paper addresses the issue of what relationship Tarski’s analysis, (...) and Béziau’s further generalization of it in universal logic, have to reasoning in the everyday lives of ordinary people from the cognitive processes of children through to those of specialists in the empirical and deductive sciences. It surveys a selection of relevant research in a range of disciplines providing theoretical and empirical studies of human reasoning, discusses the value of adopting a universal logic perspective, answers the questions posed in the call for this special issue, and suggests some specific research challenges. (shrink)

Most healthcare providers work from ethical principles based on a Western model of practice that may not adhere to the cultural values intrinsic to Indigenous peoples. Breaking bad news is an important topic of ethical concern in health research. While much has been documented on BBN globally, the ethical implications of receiving bad news, from an Indigenous patient perspective in particular, is an area that requires further inquiry. This article discusses the experiences of Māori lung cancer patients and their (...) families, in order to investigate the ethical implications of receiving bad news. Data collection occurred through 23 semistructured interviews and nine focus groups with Māori lung cancer patients and their families in four districts in the Midland Region of New Zealand: Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Lakes and Tairāwhiti. The findings of this study were categorised into two key themes: communication and context. Avenues for best practice include understanding the centrality of the HCP–patient relationship and family ties in the healthcare journey, and providing patients with the full range of viable treatment options including hope, clear advice and guidance when the situation calls for it. Overall, the findings of this study hold implications for providing culturally safe and humanistic cancer care when BBN to Māori and Indigenous patients. (shrink)

Semantic networks were developed in cognitive science and artificial intelligence studies as graphical knowledge representation and inference tools emulating human thought processes. Formal analysis of the representation and inference capabilities of the networks modeled them as subsets of standard first-order logic (FOL), restricted in the operations allowed in order to ensure the tractability that seemed to characterize human reasoning capabilities. The graphical network representations were modeled as providing a visual language for the logic. Sub-sets of FOL targeted on knowledge (...) representation came to be called description logics, and research on these logics has focused on issues of tractability of subsets with differing representation capabilities, and on the implementation of practical inference systems achieving the best possible performance. Semantic network research has kept pace with these developments, providing visual languages for knowledge entry, editing, and presenting the results of inference, that translate unambiguously to the underlying description logics. This paper discusses the design issues for such semantic network formalisms, and illustrates them through detailed examples of significant generic knowledge structures analyzed in the literature, including determinables, contrast sets, genus/differentiae, taxonomies, faceted taxonomies, cluster concepts, family resemblances, graded concepts, frames, definitions, rules, rules with exceptions, essence and state assertions, opposites and contraries, relevance, and so on. Such examples provide important test material for any visual language formalism for logic. (shrink)

Two different value orientations with regard to nature are presented. The first orientation corresponds to the naturalistic worldview. It emphasizes the need for protecting the environmental order of things. The second value orientation situates our interests and desires above the imperatives of the nature preservation. Nature is grasped, first of all, as raw material to be more or less radically changed. The distinction of two value systems is relevant for our position not just regarding nature around us, but regarding human (...) nature as well. The current bioethical debates on therapy versus enhancement reflect the opposition of these two sets of values. (shrink)

Language does not fossilize but this does not mean that the language's evolutionary timeline is lost forever. Great apes provide a window back in time on our last prelinguistic ancestor's communication and cognition. Phylogeny and cladistics implicitly conjure Pan (chimpanzees, bonobos) as a superior (often the only) model for language evolution compared with earlier diverging lineages, Gorilla and Pongo (orangutans). Here, in reviewing the literature, it is shown that Pan do not surpass other great apes along genetic, (...) cognitive, ecologic, or vocal traits that are putatively paramount for language onset and evolution. Instead, revived herein is the idea that only by abandoning single‐species models and learning about the variation among great apes, there might be a chance to retrieve lost fragments of the evolutionary timeline of language. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Alzheimer's Disease, Aging, Chance, and RaceAtwood D. Gaines (bio)KeywordsAlzheimer’s disease, chance, mild cognitive impairment, racism, social constructionsThomas Kirkwood's comments are a welcome, articulate detailing of how and why we age with special reference to the brain. As well, his paper indicates clearly that processes reified as pathology and disease, such as Alzheimer's disease (AD), are in fact common and inevitable as the human brain ages. Doubtless, this is the (...) reason that aging is by far the greatest risk factor for the development of AD. A key notion, briefly mentioned by Kirkwood, is that of chance. He points out that, "cells (will be) burdened with protein aggregates and similar materials that will increase with aging. Once again, which cells will experience this fate and which will continue to function healthily is strongly influenced by chance" (Kirkwood 2006, 80–81). This mention of chance is most important for our paper, "Building a Mystery," and for an understanding of science as well. In "Building a Mystery," Peter Whitehouse and I sought to show that the history of AD was not inevitable and demonstrates a variety of chance and singular decisive occurrences of encounters, interpretations, social movements, government initiatives, and technological developments. Such decisive moments do not occur by virtue of some (natural) lawful process that is unfolding, but rather, these are chance events that could have happened in other ways. Indeed, science has been viewed as human attempts to "tame chance" (Hacking 1990). However, it often does so by sleight of hand, misinterpretation, and the biomedical discourse of hope. Increasingly, we are learning that chance is a commonality, not a rarity, in social and biological domains. The biomedical approach assumes the opposite. For example, it seeks to tame the chance appearance of AD in the case of Auguste D, and does so in part by reifying differences that exist, as Kirkwood notes, along a continuum rather than as the discrete entities implied by the labels Alzheimer's disease or mild cognitive impairment (MCI).We thus stand with Kirkwood's bold recognition of chance (see also Kirkwood 2003) in the biological domain and have applied the same idea to the social domain in which we consider the practice of biomedical science. We have elsewhere emphasized consensus statements in the making of AD (Gaines and Whitehouse 1998). In the present article, we add a number of other chance, decisive sociocultural moments to the mix of social processes producing AD and MCI. We have not considered in detail here a host of cultural features in the theory and practice of biomedicine with respect to AD. These include implicit, yet highly [End Page 83] implicative, cultural notions of bilateral kinship employed in genetic research on AD considered elsewhere (Gaines 1998).Bavidge's comments are cogent as well. With respect to the notion of my concept of the local biology of "race" (Gaines 2005), it is germane to point out here that such culturally constructed biologies are relevant to a discussion of AD and other dementias. Such constructions represent culture in science. We used the dramatic example of "race" in US biomedicine because it is experiencing a resurgence as an explanatory tool. For example, recently Haiman et al. (2006) presented research that suggests that "Among cigarette smokers, African Americans and native Hawaiians are more susceptible to lung cancer than whites, Japanese Americans and Latinos." The authors assert, as have many US studies, that their findings show differences relate to the alleged biology of the social groups concerned. Their problem and that of others, is that the groups are social, not biological, and most have mixed ancestry and do not stem from distinct groups. This is particularly true of African Americans and Latinos; both groups are substantially composed of individuals with European, West African, and Native American ancestry in widely varying proportions (Gaines 2005). Thus, they are different only in terms of their classification. Such work regularly overlooks influences, such as environmental racism, discrimination, poverty, and a lack of medical care, as well as other practices. These might include, in a study of smoking, pakalolo smoking (local marijuana) among Hawaiians, who themselves are usually part Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese, and or European... (shrink)

This article provides a theoretical and doctrinal explanation of how the but-for test links gains to the wrong that produced them. Gain-based damages cases focus on the gain resulting from the defendant’s tortious behaviour. In these cases, the contrastive aspect of the but-for test, requiring the factfinder to consider the hypothetical result that would have occurred had the right thing happened instead of the defendant’s wrongdoing, is not confined to the question of reasonability, as it is in negligence cases. Rather, (...) in gain-based damages cases, the factfinder faces the open-ended normative task of determining the hypothetically appropriate scenario that contrasts with the wrongdoing that happened in reality. For this reason, in gain-based damages cases, the normative sensitivity of the but-for test is revealed in full. The article explains how this sensitivity influences the result of the but-for test expressing the amount of gain causally attributed to the defendant’s wrongdoing. (shrink)

‘A property’, according to the author of De Rerum Natura in 1.451–4, ‘is that which can never be sundered and separated without fatal dissolution, as weight is to stone, heat to fire, liquidity to water, touch to all bodies, intangibility to void’, seiungi seque gregari. As elsewhere Lucretius, that most committed practitioner of word-play, makes his verb mirror the very separation which it describes.

There is a well-known, superficially plausible argument which says that a game is defined by its rules, so that cheaters in that game can't possibly be winners, or even legitimate participants. The article critically examines this argument and provides counterexamples to its underlying assumptions. -/- ================= This article originally appeared in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, VIII, 1981, pp. 41-46. It has since been reprinted in Morgan, William and Meier, Klaus, eds, Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, and Vanderwerken, David and (...) Wertz, Spencer, Sport Inside Out. 40 years later, I don't have an uploadable copy, but I don't understand why, if you have a new anthology that includes it, you can't simply generate an archive copy from it or one of the prior publications. Or, just cite the sources where it appears. (shrink)

In Understanding the Whole Student, the authors contend that good education is, and must be, multicultural in order to gain a deeper perspective on issues under analysis in the classroom through the sharing and negotiating of many different cultural perspectives.

Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...) of S’s action. Joshua Knobe (2003a) presents intriguing data that may be taken to support the second view.1 Knobe’s data show an asymmetry in folk judgements. People are more inclined to judge that S did A intentionally, even when not intended, if A was perceived as causing a harm (e.g. harming the environment). There is an asymmetry because people are not inclined to see S’s action as intentional, when not intended, if A is perceived as causing a benefit (e.g. helping the environment). In this paper we will discuss Knobe’s results in detail. We will raise the question of whether his ordinary language surveys of folk judgments have accessed core concepts of intentional action. We suspect that instead Knobe’s surveys are tapping into pragmatic aspects of intentional language and its role in moral praise and blame. We will suggest alternative surveys that we plan to conduct to get at this difference, and we will attempt to explain the pragmatic usage of intentional language. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) have now entered the realm of medical ethics. In a recent study, Balaset alexamined the performance of GPT-4, a commercially available LLM, assessing its performance in generating responses to diverse medical ethics cases. Their findings reveal that GPT-4 demonstrates an ability to identify and articulate complex medical ethical issues, although its proficiency in encoding the depth of real-world ethical dilemmas remains an avenue for improvement. Investigating the integration of LLMs into medical ethics decision-making appears to (...) be an interesting avenue of research. However, despite the promising trajectory of LLM technology in medicine, it is crucial to exercise caution and refrain from attributing their expertise to medical ethics. Our thesis follows an examination of the nature of expertise and the epistemic limitations that affect LLM technology. As a result, we propose two more fitting applications of LLMs in medical ethics: first, as tools for mining electronic health records or scientific literature, thereby supplementing evidence for resolving medical ethics cases, and second, as educational platforms to foster ethical reflection and critical thinking skills among students and residents. The integration of LLMs in medical ethics, while promising, requires careful consideration of their epistemic limitations. Consequently, a well-considered definition of their role in ethically sensitive decision-making is crucial. (shrink)

The communicative interactions of very young children almost always involve language, gesture and directed gaze. In this study, ninety-six children were asked to determine the location of a hidden toy by understanding a communicative act that contained none of these familiar means. A light-and-sound mechanism placed behind the hiding place and illuminated by a centrally placed switch was used to indicate the location of the toy. After a communicative training session, an experimenter pressed the switch either deliberately or (...) accidentally, and with or without ostension. In no condition did she orient towards the hiding place. When the switch was pressed intentionally, children used the light-and-sound cue to find the toy – and tended to do so even in the absence of ostensive eye contact. When the experimenter pressed the switch accidentally, children searched randomly – demonstrating that they were tracking her communicative intent, and not merely choosing on the basis of salience. The absence of an effect of ostension contradicts research that ostension helps children to interpret the communicative intentions underlying unfamiliar signs. We explain this by concluding that while it may play a role in establishing a communicative interaction, it is not necessary for sustaining one; and that even with a highly novel communicative act – involving none of the means of communication on which children typically rely – three-year-olds can comprehend the communicative intentions behind an intentionally produced act. (shrink)

Scholars will be grateful to the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies for its enterprise in undertaking the publication of a new series of studies and texts. A priori it was clear that much valuable work done in doctorate theses here, as in all other universities, was not generally available; Gilson’s monumental History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages evidently depended on results contained in some of these theses. The present volume is the worthy beginning of a scheme to present (...) these studies in detail to the mediaevalists of the world. Much of the present picture of mediaeval thought was the work of great pioneers at the end of the last century; they took the main figures and great themes and created the outline. To-day the work is less thrilling: it is a matter of the patient study of detail, adjusting and filling in the outline; the joy of great discovery is rare, but the task is vital if a true picture is to result. The texts published here shed light on details from the 12th until the 14th century. (shrink)

Syntax, in its most general sense, is the study of the structure of sentences in natural language. In this course, we will approach syntax from the perspective of generative transformational grammar, as pioneered through the work of Noam Chomsky, and developed over the past four decades. Our goals are three-fold. First, to understand the nature of language as viewed from the structural perspective, and to understand the sort of insight about language this perspective affords. Second, to understand (...) the nature and application of certain empirical methods to theoretical hypotheses within linguistics. And third, to understand certain general principles or laws of language which can be elucidated from the structural perspective by the empirical methods. The material in the course primarily will be drawn from English, but occasional reference will be made to other languages (although no prior knowledge is presupposed). (shrink)

Idiographic understanding has been proposed as a response to concern that criteriological diagnosis cannot capture the nature of human individuality. It can seem that understanding individuals requires, instead, a distinct form of ‘individualised’ judgement and this claim receives endorsement by the inventor of the term ‘idiographic’, Wilhelm Windelband. I argue, however, that none of the options for specifying a model of individualised judgement, to explain what idiographic judgement might be, will work. I suggest, at the end, that narrative, (...) rather than idiographic, understanding is a more promising response to the limitations of criteriological diagnosis. (shrink)

In The Expanse, the major powers do a great deal of talking, but don't have a great deal of understanding. Discussing language can be surprisingly difficult, because the only way to discuss language is with language and that peculiar arrangement can lead to some outright strangeness. Eccentric, reclusive, and hot‐tempered, Ludwig Wittgenstein is a key philosopher in the examination of language and meaning. Wittgenstein's philosophical studies centered around how to express meaning and why conveying meaning (...) so often breaks down. In Wittgenstein's earlier writings he articulates the picture book model of language. Language can be written, spoken, signed, and so forth, but it is convention to refer to any language user as a ‘speaker.’ Wittgenstein argues that language works much like a game, relying on contextual rules and actions to guide and form meaning. The language game model of language also better explains why Belters and the Inners seem doomed to fail to communicate. (shrink)

In Understanding the Whole Student, the authors contend that good education is, and must be, multicultural in order to gain a deeper perspective on issues under analysis in the classroom through the sharing and negotiating of many different cultural perspectives.

Becoming autonomous is a process of coming to realise oneself in shared, socio-historical practices. There can be no self before these practices, but their existence is no guarantee for selfhood either: one can be heteronomous through one's successful participation in various practices if that participation is not a genuine expression of one's own personhood. This means that the sheer capability to participate in the practices in which one finds oneself is not sufficient for personal autonomy. Something else is required (...) before the self is realised in shared, socio-historical practices. How can this be, if as we said, there can be no self before these practices? By what principle do we decide whether a particular expression of selfhood in a socio-historical practice is genuine? If there can only be a self within socio-historical practices, it stands to reason that we can find it only there. If, however, one's participation cannot be considered in advance as a genuine expression of oneself, what we may expect to find is perhaps only a fragment, a hint of autonomy always already entangled in heteronomous elements, or things that would be different if one could have so chosen. To come to an understanding of oneself, then, will require more than just a handle on one's existence in various practices. It will require the capacity to see one's participation in this socio-historically determined practice as a fragment of a whole, a particular instance of something more general which points beyond our present participation in these particular, socio-historically determined practices towards a horizon of possibility that recedes beyond our grasp whenever we try to make definitive sense out of a possibility for agency. (shrink)

Language learning is not primarily driven by a motivation to describe invariant features of the world, but rather by a strong force to be a part of the social group, which by definition is not invariant. It is not sufficient for language to be fit for the speaker's perceptual motor system. It must also be fit for social interactions.

The target article by Locke & Bogin (L&B) focuses on the evolution of language as a communicative tool. They neglect, however, that from infancy onwards humans have the ability to go beyond successful behaviour and to reflect upon language (and other domains of knowledge) as a problem space in its own right. This ability is not found in other species and may well be what makes humans unique.

We introduce a computational theory of situated language understanding in which the meaning of words and utterances depends on the physical environment and the goals and plans of communication partners. According to the theory, concepts that ground linguistic meaning are neither internal nor external to language users, but instead span the objective‐subjective boundary. To model the possible interactions between subject and object, the theory relies on the notion of perceived affordances: structured units of interaction that can be (...) used for prediction at multiple levels of abstraction. Language understanding is treated as a process of filtering perceived affordances. The theory accounts for many aspects of the situated nature of human language use and provides a unified solution to a number of demands on any theory of language understanding including conceptual combination, prototypicality effects, and the generative nature of lexical items.To support the theory, we describe an implemented system that understands verbal commands situated in a virtual gaming environment. The implementation uses probabilistic hierarchical plan recognition to generate perceived affordances. The system has been evaluated on its ability to correctly interpret free‐form spontaneous verbal commands recorded from unrehearsed game play between human players. The system is able to “step into the shoes” of human players and correctly respond to a broad range of verbal commands in which linguistic meaning depends on social and physical context. We quantitatively compare the system's predictions in response to direct player commands with the actions taken by human players and show generalization to unseen data across a range of situations and verbal constructions. (shrink)

We argue that the target article's computational/reductionistic approach to motivation is insufficient to explain the energization of human behavior, because such explanation requires broad consideration of “what people are trying to do.” We illustrate what is gained by retaining (rather than jettisoning) higher-order motivation constructs and show that the authors’ approach assumes, but fails to name, such constructs.

Quality health care relies upon communication in a patient's preferred language. Language access in health care occurs when individuals are: Welcomed by providers regardless of language ability; and Offered quality language services as part of their care. Federal law generally requires access to health care and quality language services for deaf and Limited English Proficient patients in health care settings, but these patients still find it hard to access health care and quality (...) language services.Meanwhile, several states are implementing Medicaid Accountable Care Organization initiatives to reduce health care costs and improve health care quality. Alternative payment methods used in these initiatives can give Accountable Care Organizations more flexibility to design linguistically accessible care, but they can also put ACOs at increased financial risk for the cost of care. If these new payment methods do not account for differences in patient language needs, ACO initiatives could have the unintended consequence of rewarding ACOs who do not reach out to deaf and LEP communities or offer quality language services.We reviewed public documents related to Medicaid ACO initiatives in six states. Some of these documents address language access. More could be done, however, to pay for language access efforts. This article describes Medicaid ACO initiatives and explores how different payment tools could be leveraged to reward ACOs for increased access to care and quality language services. We find that a combination of payment tools might be helpful to encourage both access and quality. (shrink)

Winner of the 2020 European Walter Benjamin Prize, The Revolution is the Emergency Break is a rich compilation of Walter Benjamin's lesser-known writings by renowned social scientist Michael Löwy. Translated into several languages but available in English for the very first time, Löwy brings together the philosophical, literary, theological, and cultural aspects of Benjamin's writings, including his relation to figures such as Gershom Scholem and Franz Rosenzweig, his interpretation of historical materialism, surrealism, anti-fascism and anarchism, his contribution to understanding (...) capitalism as a religion, and his relevance for Latin America and ecology today. The concept of revolution in his writings - not only the political ones, but also those that deal with art, literature or theology, run through the work connecting the various chapters. The Revolution is the Emergency Break also features four new chapters this collection. Written in a clear-eyed, accessible language, The Revolution is the Emergency Break is a must-read for researchers, teachers, and students interested in the works of this influential German intellectual. (shrink)

Philosophers disagree, with some rare exceptions. One of those exceptions is the broadest-brush account of what language is. Language is a system of signs used for the communication of --well, and here the agreement begins to break down--thoughts, ideas, messages, propositions or propositional contents, intentions, and a host of technical terms offer themselves to chink the cracks. A list of philosophers subscribing would be impossible to complete. Locke, Carnap, Augustine, Hobbes, Fodor, Katz, Chomsky, Derrida, --well, and on and (...) on. Easier would be to list those who dissent. Heraclitus, Wittgenstein, maybe J.L. Austin, Frank Ebersole, and NOT on and on. The first chapter lays out the view that language is a system of signs in sympathetic terms. The second provides a selection of what are usually called “ordinary language” arguments against the view--reminders about how the view requires us to think in terms which are not consistent with how we think about language and signs when we are not doing philosophy. Those arguments have been unpersuasive among philosophers, and Chapter Three begins the work of investigating separate pieces of the view in detail. Chapter Three takes up an argument for the view which is familiar among philosophers, using Jerry Fodor’s formulation: we cannot be thinking in a public, natural language, because animals and preverbal infants think with no such language. I show this argument is not an argument at all but is rather an expression of the view in question. Chapter Four takes up the argument that the relations between particular words and their meanings is arbitrary or conventional rather than natural or necessary, otherwise there would be only one language among mankind. I argue that the alternatives (conventional vs. natural or necessary) are both generated by taking the division between words and their meanings to be the division between signs and signified--in other words, the question is a result of adopting the view of language as signs. Attempts to argue for the legitimacy of the question without taking the view for granted only serve to call it into question more. In Chapter Five I investigate whether we talk in order to communicate something which is otherwise hidden and invisible. We are tempted to think that you and I talk because I cannot read your mind or you mine. Though Wittgenstein has a famous set of comments on the notion of a private language, it remains a strong temptation to think that language gives public form to something (thoughts, ideas, intentions, feelings, content, meaning) which without language would be unknowable to all but the person whose something it is. Examples help point to the incoherence of this view and show that even if it were not incoherent, remedying the invisibility of those internal whatnots would still leave us with a need for language. Chapter Six takes up a hoary question about boundaries of effability--the possibility that there are limits to what can be said which are more restrictive than what can be thought or felt. The account of language as signs provides one easy way to make sense of this idea, but investigation into examples shows the problem is not one that makes sense unless we just grant that account. Chapter Seven investigates how to make sense of the notion that there are things which are in language and other things which are not. I spell out how the view of language as signs gives us a way to think this, and then show how one reaction to finding problems with the notion resonates with Wittgenstein’s early work and with some work of Jacques Derrida, who bite similar bullets and agree that everything is language, that the limits of language are the limits of our world. I then subject that reaction to critical investigation using examples, which reveals their reaction as a rear-guard attempt to save the view of language as signs. Chapter Eight uses examples as guides toward alternative views of language, feeling our way toward what language might be if it is not a system of signs. Finally, the appendix takes up what I take to be the serious arguments against the methods I use in this work, the first two articulated by John Searle (“the assertion fallacy”) and H. P. Grice (“conversational implicature”), and another the generally unspoken belief that philosophical work is like scientific work. (shrink)

By focusing on three different yet correlated disciplines in China in which the Sebeok’s Chinese connection has been found, this article elaborates on his personal contact with the Chinese semiotic community and extant constructive academic responses from Chinese semioticians. It provides a detailed description of the reasons for the uniqueness of Sebeok’s Chinese connection and proceeds to demonstrate the three major Chinese figures that used to know Sebeok and the interactions between them. Against the common belief that influence of Sebeok (...) the semiotician, rather than Sebeok the convener, is quite minimal in China, I have proven that he did have a direct impact upon the Chinese semiotic literati, which is evident not only in the form of the work exclusively on Sebeok the person but also in the form of the writings in recognition of both his contributions to semiotics as a global cause and his status as the mid-wife of contemporary semiotics. As a projection into the future, I put forward a vision in which Sebeok’s work and achievements should be duly appreciated in their full extent by the new Eastern stronghold of semiotics. (shrink)

It is a natural thought that understanding language consists in possessing knowledge—to understand a word is to know what it means. It is also natural to suppose that this knowledge is propositional knowledge—to know what a word means is to know that it means such-and-such. Thus it is prima facie plausible to suppose that understanding a bit of language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of its meaning. I refer to this as the epistemic view of (...) class='Hi'>understanding language. The theoretical appeal of this view for the philosophy of language is that it provides for an attractive account of the project of the theory of meaning. If understanding language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of the meanings of expressions, then a meaning theory amounts to a theory of what speakers know in virtue of understanding language. In this paper I argue that, despite its intuitive and theoretical appeal, the epistemic view is false. Propositional knowledge is not necessary for understanding language, not even tacit knowledge. Unlike knowledge, I argue, linguistic understanding does not fail in Gettier cases, does not require epistemic warrant and does not even require belief. The intuitions about knowledge that have been central to epistemology do not seem to hold for linguistic understanding. So unless epistemologists have been radically mistaken about what knowledge requires, knowledge is unnecessary for understanding language. (shrink)

When a business has competitors that break a burdensome law, is it morally required to obey this law, or may it break the law to avoid an unfair competitive disadvantage? Though this ethical question is pervasive in the business world, many non-skeptical theories of the obligation to obey the law cannot give it a clear answer. A broadly Kantian account, by contrast, can explain why businesspeople ought to obey laws of a certain type even under competitive pressure, namely laws (...) that play a direct role in defining rights to use physical or financial resources free from substantial interference. Businesspeople must obey these laws even at the cost of allowing their businesses to fail and even when the acts proscribed are mala prohibita. This argument for obeying the law in competitive contexts has limited scope. Considerations of fairness or self-preservation may justify violating laws of other types under competitive pressure. (shrink)

David Lewis argues that believing something is self‐ascribing a property rather than holding true a proposition. But what is self‐ascription? Is it some new mysterious primitive? Is Lewis saying that every belief you have is about you? Several recent authors have suggested that, in the light of these questions, Lewis's theory should be rejected, despite its enormous influence. But this neglects the fact that Lewis makes two relevant proposals about belief: one about belief de se , another about belief de (...) re . It is the second that prompts these questions but the first that is central to his theory. (shrink)

This article contains the results of a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of natural language understanding (NLU), as a methodological problem. The combination of structural-ontological and informational-psychological approaches provided an opportunity to describe the subject matter field of NLU, as a composite function of the mind, which systemically combines the verbal and discursive structural layers. In particular, the idea of NLU is presented, on the one hand, as the relation between the discourse of a specific speech message and (...) the meta-discourse of a language, in turn, activated by the need-motivational factors. On the other hand, it is conceptualized as a process with a specific structure of information metabolism, the study of which implies the necessity to differentiate the affective (emotional) and need-motivational influences on the NLU, as well as to take into account their interaction. At the same time, the hypothesis about the influence of needs on NLU under the scenario similar to the pattern of Yerkes-Dodson is argued. And the theoretical conclusion that emotions fulfill the function of the operator of the structural features of the information metabolism of NLU is substantiated. Thus, depending on the modality of emotions in the process of NLU, it was proposed to distinguish two scenarios for the implementation of information metabolism - reduction and synthetic. The argument in favor of the conclusion about the productive and constitutive role of emotions in the process of NLU is also given. (shrink)

A fundamental question facing the cognitive sciences is why it is so difficult for us to look at the world in new ways. Experts, in particular, appear to have extreme difficulty in questioning the foundations for their belief. This I argue is because we can only view our world through mental paradigms. Such paradigms, our mindsets, have evolved so that we can respond automatically to things of importance but, by having mindsets, we are intrinsically prejudiced. I suggest that infantile autism (...) provides valuable insight into what a mind would be like if it were not to have paradigms. Because we are constrained to look at the world through our mindsets, the only way to see more is to acquire more mindsets. But, to actually be original, it is also necessary to subvert conventional wisdom and this would appear to be culturally dependent. Accordingly, understanding creativity necessitates examining the collective perspectives of diverse disciplines, encompassing abnormal minds as well as the historical transformations of different cultures. (shrink)

In this timely and important work, eminent political theorist John Dunn argues that democracy is not synonymous with good government. The author explores the labyrinthine reality behind the basic concept of democracy, demonstrating how the political system that people in the West generally view as straightforward and obvious is, in fact, deeply unclear and, in many cases, dysfunctional. Consisting of four thought-provoking lectures, Dunn’s book sketches the path by which democracy became the only form of government with moral legitimacy, analyzes (...) the contradictions and pitfalls of modern American democracy, and challenges the academic world to take responsibility for giving the world a more coherent understanding of this widely misrepresented political institution. Suggesting that the supposedly ideal marriage of liberal economics with liberal democracy can neither ensure its continuance nor even address the problems of contemporary life, this courageous analysis attempts to show how we came to be so gripped by democracy’s spell and why we must now learn to break it. (shrink)

We argue for the existence of a state constitutional legal right to language. Our purpose here is to develop a legal framework for protecting the civil rights of the deaf child, with the ultimate goal of calling for legislation that requires all levels of government to fund programs for deaf children and their families to learn a fully accessible language: a sign language. While our discussion regards the United States, the argument we make is based on human (...) rights and the nature of law itself, and can likely be adapted to any country.We begin with an introduction to the biological facts surrounding language acquisition and how these facts impact the deaf child, where lack of language has devastating effects on individuals and negative effects on society in general. (shrink)

It is well known that the self-energy of the gauge bosons is quadratically divergent in the Standard Model when a simple cutoff is imposed. We demonstrate phenomenologically that the quadratic divergences in fact unify. The unification occurs at a surprisingly low scale, $\Lambda _\mathrm {u}\approx 4\times 10^7$ GeV. Suppose now that there is a spontaneously broken rotational symmetry between the space-time coordinates and gauge theoretical phases. The symmetry-breaking pattern is such that the gauge bosons arise as the massless Goldstone (...) bosons, whereas the dilatonic mode acts as the massive (Higgs) boson, whose vacuum expectation value determines the gauge couplings. In this case, the quadratic divergences or the tadpoles of the gauge boson self-energy should indeed unify because these divergences need to be cancelled by a universal dilatonic contribution, assuming dynamical symmetry breaking. If there is dynamical symmetry breaking, we are in principle able to calculate the value of the gauge couplings as well as the scale hierarchy $\Lambda _\mathrm {cut}/\Lambda _\mathrm {u}$ . We perform this calculation by adopting a naive quartic symmetry-breaking potential which unfortunately violates local gauge invariance. Using tadpole-cancellation and dilatonic self-energy conditions, the value of $\Lambda _\mathrm {cut}$ is then found to be approximately $4\times 10^{18}$ GeV in the Feynman gauge and $5\times 10^{15}$ GeV in the Landau gauge. The cancellation of an anomaly in the dilaton self-energy requires that the number of fermionic generations equals three. The symmetry-breaking needs to be driven by some other mass-generating mechanism such as electroweak symmetry breaking. Our estimation for $\Lambda _\mathrm {u}$ is of the correct order if $\Lambda _\mathrm {cut}\approx 5\times 10^{15}$ GeV. (shrink)

This paper argues that a language can exist and flourish in a community even if none of of the members of the community has any communication intentions; and that reference to the notion of communication intention can therefore be dispensed with in the core account of the nature oflinguistic meaning. Certainly one cannot elucidate the notion of linguistic meaning without reference to psychological notions; the communication-intention theorists are right about this. They are, however, wrong about which psychological notions are (...) needed. It is not possession of the ability to mean something that is crucial—the possession and exercise of communication intentions. What is crucial is rather the possession of certain semantic psychological attitudes. To possess such semantic psychological attitudes is to be disposed to take certain publicly observable phenomena—such as sights and sounds—as meaning something. The paper argues that it is possible to describe circumstances in which one can in so doing be said to understand their meaning. (shrink)

Studies on bilingual word processing have demonstrated that the two languages in a mental lexicon can be parallelly activated. However, it is under discussion whether the activated, non-target language gets involved in the target language. The present study aimed to investigate the role of the first language translation in the second language word processing. The tasks of semantic relatedness judgment and lexical decision were both adopted, to explore the relation of the possible L1 involvement and the (...) task demand. Besides, bilinguals with relatively higher and lower L2 proficiency were recruited, to clarify the potential influence of L2 proficiency. Results showed that the manipulation of L1 translation exerted an influence on bilinguals’ task performances, indicating that L1 translation was involved, but did not just serve as a by-product when bilinguals were processing L2 words. And about the influence of L2 proficiency, the higher proficiency bilinguals performed better than the lower proficiency ones when the L1 translations could be taken advantage of, indicating a better access to L1 translation in L2 word processing, as bilinguals’ L2 proficiency increased. As for the task demands, the L1 translation was partially involved in Experiment 1 while a full involvement was observed in Experiment 2, suggesting a differed depth of L1 translation involvement, if the task demands allowed. The present study supplemented the previous ones due to its participants and tasks ; besides, it provided an interesting view into interpreting the “task schema” of the BIA+ model. (shrink)

Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has multiple important virtues and is more (...) informative than alternatives. More speculatively, it may help to illuminate two important emerging questions in AI ethics: 1. Can agency contribute to the moral status of non-human beings, and how? 2. When and why might AI systems exhibit power-seeking behaviour and does this pose an existential risk to humanity? (shrink)