RESUMENEl objetivo del presente artículo es indagar las particularidades del problema de uso y función de artefactos técnicos en el marco de Sein und Zeit. En un primer momento se reconstruye el criterio heideggeriano de interpretación de funciones en objetos técnicos por medio de una identificación de dos niveles de «comprensión». En segundo término se discute el problema concerniente al vínculo entre el sustrato material natural y el útil en cuanto a su estatuto ontológico. Por último se muestra cómo, (...) más allá de la prioridad que otorga a la Umsicht como actividad desocultante, Heidegger indica cierto tipo de constricciones en los artefactos (tanto en su diseño como en su comprensibilidad) que limitarían su «flexibilidad interpretativa».PALABRAS CLAVEHEIDEGGER, USO, FUNCIÓN, ARTEFACTO TÉCNICOABSTRACTThis paper intends to investigate some peculiarities of problem of use and function of technical artefacts in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. First it reconstructs Heideggerian criterion for interpreting functions in technical objects by means of an identification of two levels of «understanding». Then it discusses the problem concerning the link between the natural material substratum and the tool in their ontological aspect. Finally this article shows how Heidegger indicates some constrictions in artefacts (related to their design and comprehensibility) which would limit their «interpretative flexibility». KEYWORDSHEIDEGGER, USE, FUNCTION, TECHNICAL ARTEFACT. (shrink)

El presente artículo pone en evidencia una de las dificultades que se encuentran en la recepción de la Humanae vitae y de la Familiaris consortio: la profundidad del sentido de todo acto conyugal, su belleza y su vínculo explicito con el Creador. Esta paradoja provoca en primer lugar la fe de los bautizados en el misterio de Dios, que es amor y vida, y en segundo término la conciencia moral. ¿No sería acaso demasiado hermoso para ser verdad? Sin embargo, (...) la unión de los cónyuges es primero un acto religioso. El principal enunciado doctrinal envuelve la unión de los esposos y su responsabilidad parental. La verdadera “cuna” antropológica de todo ser humano es un acto de amor interpersonal. Este acto particular, rico y complejo, tiene un doble significado: unitivo y procreativo. Estos significados se amalgaman entre ellos, y traducen la unidad de las personas que se donan una a la otra. Es el gran misterio que une a los esposos y a Dios; y es el lugar de una revelación. (shrink)

Fundamento: Los adolescentes constituyen un grupo vulnerable y la maternidad en esta etapa, una problemática de actualidad. Objetivo: exponer particularidades sociodemográficas y de la maternidad en madres adolescentes del municipio de Cumanayagua, en el período septiembre a mayo del año 2014. Método: estudio descriptivo, corte transversal. Se trabajó con el universo conformado por 35 madres adolescentes y sus hijos. Se operó con un formulario de datos sociodemográficos, el análisis de documentos y la entrevista semiestructurada. Los resultados fueron procesados por el (...) paquete estadístico SPSS 15.0 para Windows y se utilizaron tablas de frecuencia y porcientos. Resultados: predominaron madres adolescentes de la etapa tardía con una media de edad 17,89; deserción escolar, más del 50% conviven con los padres con pareja o sin ella; embarazos deseados ; ocurrencia de nacimiento a términos, partos eutócicos, estados buenos de salud física y psicológica percibidos ; percepción de apoyo familiar. Conclusiones: las madres adolescentes de la etapa tardía que se caracterizaron por una maternidad percibida de manera satisfactoria contaron con apoyo familiar, vínculo de pareja, baja percepción de riesgos para su salud física y psicológica. Basis: Teenagers constitute a vulnerable group and motherhood during this period is a topical problem. Objective: Setting out socio-demographic and motherhood characteristics in teenage mothers from Cumanayagua municipality from September to May 2014. Method: Descriptive study, cross section. The population consisted of 35 teenage mothers and their children. A socio-demographic data form, document analysis as well as semi-structured interview were used. The results were processed by the SPSS statistical package for Windows and frequency and percentage tables were used. Results: Late stage teenage mothers with the average ages of 17, 18 and 19 prevailed; school dropouts ; more than 50 % of them live with their parents with or without a partner; planned pregnancies ; occurrence of full-term births ; ectopic childbirths ; good physical health states ; good psychological states ; family support perception. Conclusions: Those late stage teenage mothers who were characterized by motherhood perceived in a satisfactory way, counted on family support, romantic ties, low physical and psychological health risk perception. (shrink)

« Réfléchir aux similarités entre des répertoires très éloignés dans le temps et l’espace permet parfois de repenser à nouveaux frais les oppositions catégorielles qui nous servent à appréhender les genres musicaux. C’est ce qu’avait fait Simha Arom dans un article sur les parentés inattendues entre polyphonies africaines et polyphonies médiévales. En décal(qu)ant ce rapprochement avec la musique techno née à Detroit dans les années 1980-1990, on propose de montrer que l’opposition entre musiques savantes, traditionnelles et populaires, opérante dans le (...) monde occidental depuis le début du xix e siècle, gagne à être enrichie par d’autres grilles d’analyse pour complexifier la cartographie des objets musicaux qui peuplent le monde de la musique aujourd’hui. ». (shrink)

This second of a two-part series of articles on applied semiotics and intercultural training provides a qualitative evaluation of the research initiative Tools for Cultural Development. The discussion will firstly centre on several theoretical and methodological challenges inherent to the qualitative research paradigm and then relate these shifting concerns to convergent findings in poststructuralist semiotics, especially with respect to phenomenology and pragmatics. Analysis of four focus group interviews in France and Australia will examine and evaluate the 2007 training experience in (...) light of the culture-specific contexts and stakeholder groups involved. Of particular concern will be the capacity of qualitative evaluative processes to account for the "local meanings" and "voices" within the trainee narratives so as to highlight their perceptions as to the use of semiotics for designing culturally significant practices in education and praxis. (shrink)

To most people outside the relevant laboratories and operating rooms, xenotransplants and artificial organ transplants are bizarre. While the bizarre scares many away and angers others, Lesley A. Sharp approached it and asked, What behooves medical research to take organs out of pigs and primates and design organs out of metal and plastic and use them to replace failing organs in humans? Sharp attended years of conferences, visited countless hospitals and laboratories, and interviewed engineers, scientists, and surgeons to explore the (...) choices and implicit values of decision‐makers in alternative transplantation. The Transplant Imaginary: Mechanical Hearts, Animal Parts, and Moral Thinking in Highly Experimental Science is a rich resource for philosophers who wish to expound on the morality of implanting nonhuman animal and mechanical organs into humans. The author's thorough ethnographic survey of xeno‐ and biomechanical transplant research leads well into two lines of questioning. First, how ethical is the pursuit of alternative transplant? Second, what is essential for transplant researchers to do their jobs ethically? (shrink)

[Under contract with CUP, in preparation] What is a mind? Is it possible for a computer or other machine to have a mind? And how would we know? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these timely questions. Its central idea is that mental states (thoughts, beliefs, desires) are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we should be seen as merely speaking “as if” humans (and perhaps other creatures or even artifacts) had such states, in order to make (...) sense of their behavior. -/- This book is unique in presenting and defending three versions of mental fictionalism in a single volume (prefix-semantical mental fictionalism, pretense mental fictionalism, and affective storyism). The authors are three of the world’s most prominent proponents (respectively) of each variety: T. Parent (Nazarbayev University), Adam Toon (University of Exeter), and Tamás Demeter (Corvinus University of Budapest). The book essentially pits these different varieties of mental fictionalism against each other, allowing the reader to size them up. In the process, fresh perspectives are offered on foundational matters in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics such as embodied cognition, animal cognition, consciousness, and AI. -/- UPDATE: The chapter on prefix-semantical mental fictionalism is available upon request; write to nontology "at" gmail. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 27-29.

_Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...) cases, these judgments are self-fulfilling or self-verifying. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and the author does not wish to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible. The book will be of interest to scholars working on the issue of self-reflection across a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Do you know who you are? If the question seems unclear, it might owe to the notion of ‘knowing-wh’ (knowing-who, knowing-what, knowing-when, etc.). Such knowledge contrasts with ‘knowing-that’, the more familiar topic of epistemologists. But these days, knowing-wh is receiving more attention than ever, and here we will survey three current debates on the nature of knowing-wh. These debates concern, respectively, (1) whether all knowing-wh is reducible to knowing-that (‘generalized intellectualism’), (2) whether all knowing-wh is relativized to a contrast proposition (...) (‘contrastivism about knowing-wh’), and (3) whether the context-sensitivity of knowing-wh is a semantic or purely pragmatic phenomenon (‘contextualism vs. invariantism about knowing-wh’). (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to examine stakeholder identification and prioritization by managers using the power, legitimacy, and urgency framework of Mitchell et al. (Academy of Management Review 22, 853–886; 1997). We use a multi-method, comparative case study of two large-scale sporting event organizing committees, with a particular focus on interviews with managers at three hierarchical levels. We support the positive relationship between number of stakeholder attributes and perceived stakeholder salience. Managers’ hierarchical level and role have direct and moderating (...) effects on stakeholder identification and perceived salience. We also found that most stakeholders were definitive, dominant, or dormant types – the other five types were rare. Power has the most important effect on salience, followed by urgency and legitimacy. Based on our case study, we offer several ways to advance the theory of stakeholder identification and salience. (shrink)

Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how (...) a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts. (shrink)

Here I explore the prospects for fictionalism about the mental, modeled after fictionalism about possible worlds. Mental fictionalism holds that the mental states posited by folk psychology do not exist, yet that some sentences of folk psychological discourse are true. This is accomplished by construing truths of folk psychology as “truths according to the mentalistic fiction.” After formulating the view, I identify five ways that the view appears self-refuting. Moreover, I argue that this cannot be fixed by semantic ascent or (...) by a kind of primitivism. Even so, I also show that the “self-refutation” charges are subtly question-begging. Nevertheless, the reply reveals that a mental fictionalist ought to be a kind of quietist. (shrink)

Entry on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A summary of the literature on whether externalism about thought content precludes non-empirical knowledge of one's own thoughts.

[For a planned Festschrift on William Lycan, edited by Mitch Green and Jan Michel.] Lycan (2022) sums up his (2019) _On Evidence in Philosophy_ as a “dolorous” book. This is primarily because the book claims that the field is infected with non-rational socio-psychological forces (fashion, bias, etc.) and that there is a persistent lack of consensus on philosophical questions. In this paper, I primarily rebut Lycan's second reason for dolorousness. For one, if we attend carefully to his text, his metaphilosophical (...) despair seems to die a death of 1000 qualifications. For another, several of the most important qualifications to such pessimism have been omitted. In attending to these, we shall see that philosophy has much to be proud of. I also offer an explanation for why many optimistic signs for philosophical progress tend to escape our notice. (shrink)