The French feminist philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff has taught us something about “the collectivity,” which she discovers in women’s struggle for access to the philosophical, but also about “the unknown” and “the unthought.” It is the unthought which will matter most to what I intend to say today about a fundamental ignorance on which speaker vulnerability is built. On International Women’s Day, it seems appropriate to speak about – or, at least, to evoke – the silencing which has been (...) imposed on women by an oppressive form of ignorance. My question is: how do our resounding voices as women – on 8 March 2016 – avoid what feminist philosophers have distinguished as wilful forms of silencing? Silencing exploits vulnerability; and speaker vulnerability is an exposure either to violence or affection, in its dependence on an audience. My response seeks to undo the silencing of women by transforming an ignorance of vulnerability into a distinctively ethical avowal. To see the significance of this undoing, we will consider how our contemporary global world reduces vulnerability to an openness to violence, ignoring what has been unthought: an openness to affection. A wilful ignorance of vulnerability develops not as a lack of knowledge but its disavowal – on which various forms of oppression are built. An active disavowal of thinking (the unthought) is the other side of a striving for invulnerability; and this striving is encouraged by a social world which remains ignorant of its own wounding, as well as its own potential for ethical relations in vulnerability. Like la mauvaise foi of the French existentialist, invulnerability is a form of self-deception; and those who claim it embrace ignorance of their own and others’ vulnerability too. (shrink)

The extent of a company’s responsibility for the criminal conduct of its employees, as far as such a concept is legally recognised at all, differs between jurisdictions. There has been a shift in r...

In his book Criminally Ignorant: Why the law pretends we know what we don’t,1 Sarch provides a compelling re-conceptualisation and defence of the doctrine of wilful ignorance. Wilful ignorance is a...

In this paper I argue for the relevance of the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer for contemporary feminist scholarship on epistemic injustice and oppression. Specifically, I set out to argue for the Gadamerian notion of hermeneutical openness as an important hermeneutic virtue, and a potential remedy for existing epistemic injustices. In doing so I follow feminist philosophers such as Linda Martín Alcoff and Georgia Warnke that have adopted the insights of Gadamer for the purpose of social and feminist philosophy. Further, this (...) paper is positioned in relation to a recent book chapter by Cynthia Nielsen and David Utsler in which they argue for the complementarity, and intersecting themes and concerns of Gadamer's hermeneutics and Miranda Fricker's work on epistemic injustice. However, Nielsen and Utsler solely focus on Fricker's conception of epistemic injustice and the two forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, that she identifies. In this paper I expand their analysis by considering other forms of epistemic injustice such as wilful hermeneutical ignorance and contributory injustice. Thus, this paper contributes to the budding literature on the relevance of Gadamer's work for the debates pertaining to epistemic injustice and oppression by expanding such analysis to other forms of epistemic injustice, and by further arguing for the strength of Gadamer's work in terms of offering relevant insights for the reduction and remedy of existing epistemic injustices. (shrink)

Activists have challenged the reach of the carceral state into higher education. Whether calling out the exclusion of currently and formerly incarcerated people from higher education or the ways campus police perpetuate the racial and economic biases that plague the US criminal legal system, these voices offer insights that higher education leaders should take seriously. Yet, these challenges are often met with appeals to safety, which purport to override concerns about the harms produced by extension of the criminal legal system (...) into educational contexts. Campus safety debates offer an opportunity to examine the role of wilful ignorance in the perpetuation of systemic injustices on college and university campuses, highlighting tensions between the testimony of those challenging these systems and practices and prevailing narratives around safety. In analysing the operation of wilful ignorance in this context, we will focus on campus policing as a manifestation of carcerality in higher education. We argue that the perpetuation of policing in higher education in the USA reflects wilful White ignorance that represents both an epistemic and moral failing on the part of higher education leaders. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although there is much to commend in Sarch's Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don't, in this piece, I invite Sarch to expand on his analysis by considering how English doctrine diverges from the US doctrine he takes as foundational, and raise some doubts by putting pressure on the theory of culpability that motivates his views on how ignorance supplies culpability. In particular, (a) I question his defence of a motive-insensitive theory of culpability, (b) (...) set out some worries with Sarch's strategy of running theories of inculpation and exculpation together, and (c) suggest that he prematurely rejects motive-based explanations of why a person who is wilfully ignorant of an inculpatory proposition when performing the actus reus of a crime is as culpable as another who does the same thing with the requisite knowledge. (shrink)

Background: After their attempts to have patient safety concerns addressed internally were ignored by wilfully blind managers, nurses from Bundaberg Base Hospital and Macarthur Health Service felt compelled to ‘blow the whistle’. Wilful blindness is the human desire to prefer ignorance to knowledge; the responsibility to be informed is shirked. Objective: To provide an account of instances of wilful blindness identified in two high-profile cases of nurse whistleblowing in Australia. Research design: Critical case study methodology using Fay’s (...) Critical Social Theory to examine, analyse and interpret existing data generated by the Commissions of Inquiry held into Bundaberg Base Hospital and Macarthur Health Service patient safety breaches. All data was publicly available and assessed according to the requirements of unobtrusive research methods and secondary data analysis. Ethical considerations: Data collection for the case studies relied entirely on publicly available documentary sources recounting and detailing past events. Findings: Data from both cases reveal managers demonstrating wilful blindness towards patient safety concerns. Concerns were unaddressed; nurses, instead, experienced retaliatory responses leading to a ‘social crisis’ in the organisation and to whistleblowing. Conclusion: Managers tasked with clinical governance must be aware of mechanisms with the potential to blind them. The human tendency to favour positive news and avoid conflict is powerful. Understanding wilful blindness can assist managers’ awareness of the competing emotions occurring in response to ethical challenges, such as whistleblowing. (shrink)

Pamela Sue Anderson’s project about vulnerability and the silencing of the female speaker began with her realization of the female philosopher’s position within academia. Exposing the disavowal of the female “knower,” Anderson lays bare the mechanisms of excluding women from intellectual, artistic and religious discourse. Moving beyond the negative configuration of vulnerability associated with an openness to violence, Anderson refigures it as an openness to affection. The denial of thus refigured vulnerability has led to the literal and discursive oppression of (...) women through the “wilful ignorance” of their intellectual, emotional and sexual needs. In this article Filipczak analyses manifestations of this oppression exposed by female writers who illustrate the predicament discussed by Anderson in their fiction. Starting with Anderson’s refiguring of Antigone as a figure of dissent and marginality in her early work, Filipczak discusses Maggie Tulliver from The Mill on the Floss by George Eliot, Morag Gunn from The Diviners by Margaret Laurence and Mary Magdalene from The Secret Gospel of Mary Magdalene by Michèle Roberts. What connects these characters is the fact that they are disavowed as knowers in intellectual, artistic or theological endeavours by male figures of authority who deny vulnerability as an openness to affection, and rely on social collusion with such denial. The analysis also refers to Anna Karenina by Leo Tolstoy and Aritha van Herk’s Places Far From Ellesmere. (shrink)

The paper articulates a new understanding of individual responsibility focused on exercises of agency in reason-giving rather than intentional actions or attitudes towards others. Looking at how agents make sense of their actions, we identify a distinctive but underexplored space for assessing individual responsibility within collective actions. As a case in point, we concentrate on reason-giving for one's own involvement in systemic corruption. We characterize systemic corruption in terms of its public ‘unavowability’ and focus on the redescriptions to which corrupt (...) agents typically resort to vindicate their actions. Through a multidimensional approach to reason-giving, we show that the individual rationalisations these redescriptions point to are necessarily less-than-successful since they keep thedifferent categories of reasons involved in making sense of one’s own conduct misaligned. We argue that this involves a kind of tainted reasoning at the interface between epistemic vice and epistemic disadvantage. We then consider such test cases as self-deception, wilful ignorance, and actions on ‘autopilot’ to show that tainted reasoning is constitutive of systemic corruption, not merely caused by it. On this ground, we expound a new view of responsibility centred on reason-giving as the epistemic core which all responsibility assessments track. To demonstrate the interest of this view, we compare it with existing alternatives revolving around the ideas of accountability and attributability. We conclude by showing how our understanding of responsibility can shed new light on the analysis and normative assessment of an agent’s responsible ignorance. (shrink)

Ideas of love within religion are usually driven by one of two mythologies – either a personal God who commands love or a mystical God of ineffable love – but both are inadequate for motivating love of neighbour. The first tends towards legalism and the second offers no cognitive guidance. The situation is further complicated by there being different understandings of love of neighbour in the various Abrahamic religions, as exemplified in the approaches of two philosophers, Søren Kierkegaard and Emmanuel (...) Levinas. A better approach is therefore to explore actual practices of love in everyday life, and to discover how love might be performed openly and creatively. One such practice is recognition of vulnerability, and this too is often driven by a mythology, in this case one marked by fear, and by a violence either imposed or avoided. One paradigmatic example is the vulnerability felt by speakers, especially women, in front of an audience. A turning from wilful ignorance of vulnerability and a turning to reliance on collective work, modelled on an awareness of mutual vulnerability and openness to the unknown, will help to change our philosophical and social imaginary. The dark myth of vulnerability can be transformed into finding opportunities in vulnerability for openness to affection and so to an enhancement of life. It is only from the perspective of this new imaginary, and from everyday practices of it, that the double love-command – love of God and love of neighbour – will function as any kind of common ground between religions. (shrink)

This article engages the politics of discomfort as a critical but neglected dimension of feminist methodologies and research praxis. Discomfort is explored as a ‘sweaty concept’ that opens space for transformative praxis and the emergence of feminist forms of knowing, being and resisting. I theorise discomfort as an epistemic and interpretive resource and a lively actant in research encounters, fieldwork and analytic and theory-praxis spaces. Building on the work of Clare Hemmings and Sara Ahmed, I trace discomfort as an affective (...) intensity that matters for opening up resistant and anti-colonial feminist research practices and modes of knowledge production. Starting, and staying, with discomfortis theorised as a form of resistance to the reiteration of comfortable and normative truths and ‘wilful ignorances’. Weaving together the work of postqualitative and postcolonial feminist theorists, the sticky praxis of discomfort is conceptualised as involving a number of research strategies, including: engaging with ‘gut feelings’ and embracing interpretive hesitancy. In moving beyond an idealisation of empathy as the central affective principle underlying feminist research praxis, this article explores the epistemic and political salience of discomfort as affective intensity, ‘sweaty concept’ and potentially transformative interpretive resource. (shrink)

In this paper, I look to draw novel connections between critiques of drill and epistemic injustice by addressing the question of whether the critical scrutiny of drill constitutes an epistemic injustice. I argue that these critiques constitute two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. We see testimonial injustice in how courts and police do not give credibility to drill artists’ testimonies about the storylike nature of their songs, and these credibility deficits are based in racist stereotypes about (...) black criminality and believability. We see contributory injustice in how courts and police, through wilful ignorance, see drill music as violent and criminal rather than expressive and fictional – as drill artists do – which thwarts drill artists’ ability to contribute to shared knowledge. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...) Sorensen and Jan Willem Wieland have argued, we seem to be faced with a potentially troubling regress when trying to explain what goes wrong in such situations. I argue that the solution to this so-called Shirker Problem is not to be found in complicated and demanding anti-shirking-principles with universal scope and potentially self-reflexive content. Instead, careful consideration of the necessary motivational make-up of genuine shirkers reveals their ignorance to lack the necessary depth to be exculpatory. Since shirkers by definition react to the possibility of the revelation of morally relevant facts with acts of epistemic self-limitation, they necessarily prove guilty of a form of culpable moral recklessness. Epistemic shirking thus does not pose a worrisome problem for ethical theory. (shrink)

SUMMARYDuring the 1970s, widespread scientific interest in the risks of climate change prompted John A. Eddy, an astrophysicist with the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, CO, to investigate whether sunspots could be used to predict future climate changes. Methodologically, Eddy’s investigations were uniquely historical in nature. By interrogating old manuscripts of solar observations since the early seventeenth century, he identified what appeared to be a correlation between the so-called Maunder Minimum – a virtual cessation of sunspots between 1645 (...) and 1715 – and severely cold temperatures during the Little Ice Age. While he could not identify the physical mechanisms that governed solar-climate relationships, this historical episode fostered his curiosity. Fortuitously, Eddy’s solar-climate research coincided with efforts to use satellites to monitor and record variations in solar energy output, which in context constituted a significant development in managing environmental and technological risk.But using the Maunder Minimum to advance the frontiers of knowledge about solar-terrestrial relationships was not Eddy’s only – or even primary – motivation. In the mid-1840s, German astronomer Heinrich Schwabe discovered what appeared to be a decadal sunspot cycle, the existence of which inspired generations of astrophysicists to more precisely estimate its length as well as determine its underlying causes. Eddy, however, came to believe that the astronomical community failed to consider the implications of subsequent evidence suggesting that Schwabe's solar cycle was not an enduring characteristic of the sun. Instead, he reasoned that evidence offered by nineteenth-century European astronomers Gustav Sporer and Edward Maunder in the 1880s and 1890s had been entirely overlooked. But rather than arguing that their evidence was overlooked in error, Eddy identified what he cast as a conspiracy of wilful ignorance on the part of a staid and conservative astronomical community. By utilizing Eddy's private hand-written notes as they appeared in undergraduate lectures, public speeches and academic talks, as well as his appreciation for the seminal views of sociologist of science Thomas Kuhn, I show that Eddy sought to rectify this injustice by proposing a contrasting vision of science as an interdisciplinary, collaborative and creative process of exploring the ignored areas between scientific disciplines. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is a common contention that education done uncritically and unreflectively may serve to sustain and justify the status quo, in terms of mechanisms of cultural or racial privileging and marginalization. This article explores an argument made from within anti-oppressive education theory and advocated by theorist Kevin Kumashiro, namely that transformative education must entail altering harmful citational practices. I see two shortcomings in relation to this argument: first, its focus on discursive practice entails a prerequisite of high discursive literacy. (...) Second, it may lead to a failure to give credit to people’s intentions, risking a conflation of honest mistakes and wilful ignorance, and depriving us of theoretical nuance. While a well-argued and important call, I argue in this article that both shortcomings lead to the risk of a polarized conversation. Focusing on cultural, ethnic, and racial categorization, and using social studies as an illustration, it is suggested that applying notions from the theoretical concept of epistemic injustice may open up a space for granting nuanced credit to people’s intentions, thereby mitigating the risk of polarization. Rather than viewing attention to outcome and attention to intention as oppositional to one another, it is argued that both theoretical perspectives may benefit from the insights of the other. By applying needed context-specificity and nuance to categorizations of dominance and marginalization in individual discursive exchange, this can be done without granting priority to the experience of dominantly situated knowers. (shrink)

Medicine has always existed in a marketplace, and there have been extensive discussions about the ethical implications of commerce in health care. For the most part, this discussion has focused on health professionals’ interactions with pharmaceutical and other health technology industries, with less attention given to other types of commercial influences, such as corporatized health services and fee-for-service practice. This is a significant lacuna because in many jurisdictions, some or all of healthcare is delivered in the private sector. Using the (...) exemplar of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), this paper asks: what, if any, responsibilities do doctors have to challenge the distorting influence of commerce in healthcare, other than those arising from their own interactions with health technology companies? ART provides a good focus for this question because it is an area of practice that has historically been provided in the private sector. First, we describe a range of concepts that offer helpful heuristics for capturing how and when doctors can reasonably be said to have responsibilities to resist commercial distortion, including: complicity, acquiescence, wilful ignorance, non-wilful ignorance, and duplicity. Second, we present ways that individual doctors can act to stop questionable behaviour on the part of their colleagues, clinics/corporations, and their profession. Third, we note that there are many situations where change cannot be achieved by individuals acting alone, and so we consider the responsibilities of health professionals as collectives as well as the role that professional bodies and regulators should play. (shrink)

Written in 1948 and posthumously published in 1989, this transitional essay is not, as Arlette Elkaim-Sartre suggested in her brief introduction to it, centered on an existential ethics. Rather, it is an attempt to grapple with the question of truth in relation to the ontology of Being and Nothingness. In part, Sartre wrote this work in response to the appearance of the French translation of Heidegger's "The Essence of Truth." Truth is characterized as the "event" in which there is a (...) temporalizing, progressive disclosure of Being. Although Sartre refers to "truth" as the objectivity of the subjective, his emphasis throughout is on a curious form of unargued-for realism. Knowledge of "Being" presupposes freedom and is fundamentally practical. Sartre continually subjects the questions of truth and knowledge to his distinctive form of psychologism. He views non-truth or ignorance as the background and uncovered, unveiled truth as foreground. In fact, this compact essay has more to say about a wilful ignorance or not-knowing than about coming-to-know. There are already indications of the movement towards praxis in Sartre's thought in that he refers to the continuous verification process in human experience, the problem of scarcity, the way economic crises, slavery, and so forth render certain freedoms impossible. Sartre's proclivity to reformulate in different ways central conceptions generates paradoxes, if not contradictions. When he attributes deliberate ignorance to the innocent child, he undermines his idea of a willful choice of "ignorance." Truth and Existence is an interesting transitional piece in Sartre's development, but one that expresses an undefended ontology and slides past epistemic issues. It is an essay that is interesse or "in between" his two most powerful philosophical works.--G. J. Stack State University of New York at Brockport. (shrink)

Is the primary function of an educator to elucidate and convey their own knowledge? French philosopher Jacques Rancière demonstrates that an incidental experiment by Joseph Jacotot presents an alternative paradigm: the ignorant schoolmaster. In his work The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation [Le maître ignorant: cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle], Rancière posits that the ignorant schoolmaster is equally, if not more, capable of instructing students compared to the knowledgeable educator. Rancière examines two educational methodologies: the conventional approach of (...) the knowledgeable educator who explicates and imparts knowledge, and the experimental approach of the ignorant schoolmaster who refrains from explanation and primarily focuses on verifying attentiveness. By providing a brief analysis of these two methodologies, this article aims to demonstrate how Rancière’s work can be utilized to construct a model for articulating the implicit theoretical principles in educational practices. This model is predicated on the following premise: by taking either a successful or a problematic educational practice as an example, one can articulate the theoretical principles inherent within it. The article hopes to facilitate a shift in focus from practices to principles, thereby offering a novel perspective on educational practices and enabling its theoretical explication......... [In Dutch: Bestaat de kernactiviteit van de meester erin om zijn eigen kennis uit te leggen en over te dragen? De Franse filosoof Jacques Rancière laat zien dat een gelegenheidsexperiment van Joseph Jacotot ons een ander voorbeeld aanreikt: de onwetende meester. In zijn boek De onwetende meester: vijf lessen over intellectuele emancipatie (Le maître ignorant: Cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle) stelt hij dat de onwetende meester evengoed of zelfs beter in staat is leerlingen iets te leren dan de wetende meester. Rancière neemt in feite twee onderwijspraktijken als voorbeeld: de traditionele praktijk van de wetende meester die uitleg geeft en kennis overdraagt en de experimentele praktijk van de onwetende meester die geen uitleg geeft maar vooral gericht is op de verificatie van aandacht. In dit artikel wil ik op basis van een korte analyse van deze twee praktijken laten zien hoe we uit Rancière’s boek een model kunnen afleiden voor het articuleren van de theoretische principes die impliciet in onderwijspraktijken werkzaam zijn. Dit model is gestoeld op het volgende uitgangspunt: door een succesvolle of juist problematische onderwijspraktijk als voorbeeld te nemen kunnen we de theoretische principes articuleren die erin werkzaam zijn. Dit schept de mogelijkheid om de focus van de van de praktijken naar de principes te verleggen. Hierdoor wordt de onderwijspraktijk op een nieuwe manier inzichtelijk en kunnen we haar theoretisch expliciteren.]. (shrink)

Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, Wil Waluchow neatly sidesteps the critique of judicial review based on the con- tention that constitutional rights are unacceptably indeterminate by arguing that it is this very indeterminacy that makes a common law method of legal interpretation appropriate. However, his contention that judges are able to ‘discover’ the underlying ‘authentic’ moral views of citizens is insufficiently grounded to meet the objection that common law reasoning utilising such unspecific material will result in (...) controversial decisions that reflect the val- ues and experience of an unrepresentative social and professional elite. He also ignores the important fact that electoral democracy is partly about the protection of vulnerable majorities against powerful minorities. However, Waluchow’s approach could be rendered more acceptable where there is the practical possibility of effective legislative on law style decision-making in the arena of human rights.Resumen:En su libro A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, Wil Waluchow de manera elegante y sutil evita la crítica al judicial review con el argumento de que los derechos constitucionales son irremediablemen te indeterminados y sostiene que precisamente por este aspecto de inde terminación un método basado en el common law es adecuado para la in terpretación de los derechos. Sin embargo, su postura de que los jueces son capaces de “descubrir” las perspectivas morales “auténticas” de los ciudadanos no está bien fundamentada como para hacer frente a la crítica de que el método del common law, al utilizar dicho material poco específico, da como resultado decisiones controvertidas que reflejan los valores y experiencia de una elite profesional y social no representativa. También el argumento de Waluchow ignora que la democracia electoral tiene como objetivo proteger a mayorías vulnerables de poderosas minorías. No obstante lo anterior, la tesis de Waluchow puede ser más viable donde exista la posibilidad práctica de una revisión efectiva de las leyes a través de las decisiones propias del método del common law en el ámbito de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

Moral responsibility theorists and legal theorists both worry about what negligence is, and how it might be a ground of blameworthiness. In this paper I argue that negligence suitably understood, can be an appropriate grounds for mens rea in rape cases. I am interested in cases where someone continues with sex in the mistaken belief that the other person consents. Such a mistaken belief is often unreasonable: a wilfully blind agent, one who deliberately ignores evidence that there is no consent, (...) is clearly not exculpated by his ignorance. However, there may be circumstances in which a man’s mistaken belief in consent is reasonable in the circumstances, then he is not culpable. Thus it is important to be clear about what we mean by a reasonable mistake. Many critics (e.g. Duff, Baron and others) have argued that it is not possible to make a reasonable mistake about consent, that any such mistake must involve culpable carelessness. Consent is so important that we should always double check. Not to do so is reckless, and in that case there is clearly culpability. In this paper I argue that it is possible to make a mistake that is reasonable, at least in one sense. Someone in the grip of sexist ideology might not understand how important consent is, and not through carelessness, but through sexist ideology that they have non-culpably and non-voluntarily absorbed. In that case it is not obvious that the man is culpable. I go on to argue that so far as the law is concerned, there is good reason to hold that even those who have ‘reasonable’ beliefs culpable. Having a reasonable belief in consent may be, but is not always exculpatory. We usually think a reasonable mistake does not count as negligence because a reasonable mistake is not failing to know something that you should have known. I argue that we should understand negligence—not knowing something you should have known—in a moralized sense, so that people who are ignorant through being ideologically blinded can be held to have the mens rea requisite for rape conviction. -/- . (shrink)

This article develops an account of distributive epistemic justice in the production of scientific knowledge. We identify four requirements: (a) science should produce the knowledge citizens need in order to reason about the common good, their individual good and pursuit thereof; (b) science should produce the knowledge those serving the public need to pursue justice effectively; (c) science should be organized in such a way that it does not aid the wilful manufacturing of ignorance; and (d) when making (...) decisions about epistemic risks, scientists should make sure that there aren’t social groups or weighty interests that are neglected. After discussing these requirements, we examine the relationship between discriminatory and distributive epistemic injustice in science and argue that they often compound each other. (shrink)

This article develops the concept of wrongful depathologization, in which a psychiatric disorder is simultaneously stigmatized and trivialized. We use OCD as a case study to argue that cumulatively these two effects generate a profound epistemic injustice to OCD sufferers, and possibly to those with other mental disorders. We show that even seemingly positive stereotypes attached to mental disorders give rise to both testimonial injustice and wilful hermeneutical ignorance. We thus expose an insidious form of epistemic harm that (...) has been overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

Most scholars have focused on The Second Sex and Simone de Beauvoir’s fiction, concentrating on gender issues but ignoring her broader emancipatory vision. Though Beauvoir’s political thinking is not as closely studied as her feminist works, it underpinned her activism and helped her navigate the dilemmas raised by revolutionary thought in the postwar period. In Emancipatory Thinking Elaine Stavro brings together Beauvoir’s philosophy and her political interventions to produce complex ideas on emancipation. Drawing from a range of work, including novels, (...) essays, autobiographical writings, and philosophic texts, Stavro explains that for Beauvoir freedom is a movement that requires both personal and collective transformation. Freedom is not guaranteed by world historical systems, material structures, wilful action, or discursive practices, but requires engaged subjects who are able to take creative risks as well as synchronize with existing forces to work towards collective change. Beauvoir, Stavro asserts, resisted the trend of anti-humanism that has dominated French thinking since the 1960s and also managed to avoid the pitfalls of voluntarism and individualism. In fact, Stavro argues, Beauvoir appreciated the impact of material, socio-economic, institutional forces, without forgoing the capacity to initiate. Applying Beauvoir’s existential insights and understanding of embodied and situated subjectivity to recent debates within gender, literary, sociological, cultural, and political studies, Emancipatory Thinking provides a lens to explore the current political and theoretical landscape. (shrink)

Ḥanafī scholars resorted to various methods such as abrogation (naskh), specification (takhṣīṣ), preference, (tarjīh) interpretation (taʾwīl) in order to eliminate the incompatibility between the views of the founding authorities of the madhab (ashāb) and the nass (verses and hadiths). According to the famous narration attributed to Abu’l-Hasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/952), one of the Iraqī Ḥanafī scholars, it is thought that the nass contradicting the views of the madhhab scholars are abrogated, or that other evidence is preferred over them, but it (...) is more appropriate to reconcile and interpret them. However, this approach adopted by the Hanafīs has brought some criticism and accusations that the views of the madhab scholars are prioritized over the nass or that these were ignored in the face of their views. On the other hand, the discourse that the views of the madhab scholars should be preferred in case of incompatibility between the views of theirs and the nass, seems problematic and in need of explanation at first glance. Due to the reason mentioned, these statements, which reveal the general attitude of Ḥanafīs, need to be explained theoretically. In this study, firstly, the Hanafīs’ justifications for adopting this approach are discussed, and then it is seen that this does not mean “the nass is ignored or the views of the jurists are prioritized” as it is claimed. (shrink)

Child soldiers are generally perceived as faultless, passive victims. This ignores that the roles of child soldiers vary, from innocent abductee to wilful perpetrator. This book argues that child soldiers should be judged on their actions and that treating them like a homogenous group prevents them from taking responsibility for their acts.

: The thought of the Qurʾān consists of certain concepts. The concept of “fiṭrah” that expresses the physical and spiritual side of the people, is one of crucial concepts which stands for the conseption of the Qurʾān. Therefore this concept has become the one drawing attention of scholars from the earlies. Usually, the concept of “fiṭrah” is interpreted as the religion of Islam and the initial creation or the human potentiality of acception a religion and whether they can change or (...) not. In this context, it has been established a connection between the “word of khalqullah” in the Surah of Rūm and the same word in the Surah of Nisā. In this study, the essence of “fiṭrah” will be examined and the basic elements of “fiṭrah” will be focused on. Also, whether wisdom, affection, love, and ugliness are among the basic components of fiṭrah or not, will be discussed. In addition, whether there is any connection between the verse of “fiṭrah” and the words of “tabdīl” and “taġyīr” will be investigated. Summary: The Qur’ānic view of human has been set forth with certain concepts. According to our understanding, there is a strong relation between the Qurʾānic definition of human and the terms of tafsīr and ta’wīl. If the Qur’ānic view of human is put forth correctly, then the explanation and interpretation of the Qurʾān will also be more accurate. Therefore, we think that there is an important link between the characteristic of Qurʾānic view of human and the ta’wīl of naṣṣ. For this reason, we have based our study on the term, fiṭrah which explains the nature of human beings and the context of this term in the Qur’ān. In this regard we have tried to take into account in our comments the consistency through the mention of the term of fiṭrah that comes in the 30th verse of the surah al-Rūm with the relation to other verses. Main focus of the study is to see whether the essential aspects of human nature is in correlation with compassion, mental potentiality, power to produce, seeking for truth, wanting to do good and avoiding bad deeds. In the etymological dictionaries of Arabic language and in tafsir books the term of fiṭrah has been explained in various meanings such as “religion of Islam”, “unity of God”, “the first creation of human beings”, “mental capability”, “ability to accept the truth”, “initial agreement”, “pre-eternity of human destiny”, “inborn creed”, “tattoing”, “plucking females hairs” and “to geld animals”. The verse of “la tabdīla li khalqillāh” is explained that there should not be changed things and qualities which are parts of the nature of human being. The verse of "I am going to command humans and they are going to change God's creation" is associated with above mentioned fiṭrah verses. In this context neglecting to worship to Allah and taking means through other idols that are worshiped, sacrificing in the name of idols, replacing religious motives with other motives, denial of creed, making permissible acts impermissible or impermissible acts permissible, females plucking their hair, etc., have been interpreted as changing Allah’s creation. However, we do not think that the interpretation of nature that is mentioned in the verse regarding the replacement of Allah’s creation has no relation with the replacement of Allah’s creation which occurs in Surah al-Nisā. Because changing khalqullāh in al-Nisā is not to change fiṭrah which is accepted same as religion and there is no relation between two issues. The mention of nature along with the concept of religion comes to show the value of Islam is in accordance with human nature. Yet when the Qurʾān is interpreted in the correct manner, a better understanding of the human nature will be seen. The samples and types of i’rāb regarding the link between the terms of fiṭrah and dīn show that there is also a strong relation between religion and human nature. This shows that religion entails all the values and qualities that human nature contains. In the context of the Qurʾān, the term of fiṭrah consists of spiritual qualities, such as reflection, love, desire to find the truth, inclination to good deeds, avoiding bad deeds, creativity and worship rather than physiological qualities such as the desire to eat and drink, need of shelter and sexuality. These are core foundations of human nature which cannot be changed. However, these natural qualities can be lead the opposite direction. This is the reason why there is frequent mention of natures spiritual qualities in the Qurʾān. However, if the Qurʾān and the Sunnah are falsely interpreted, the core qualities of nature will be understood incorrectly which may not be a prototypical that the Qurʾān aims. The Qurʾān frequently makes mention and condemns those that do not use their logic, which comes to show the importance of nature. In order for the other nature qualities to be functional, first the logic must be functional. Likewise, since early ages people try to understand the objects in their environment and start to question them is again natures manifestation. The past and today's philosophical movements, scientific research and as a result the information and findings derived from them is a result of human nature. One of the main components of nature is the belief of the unity of God and acknowledging that the creator is Allah therefore comprehending that He is only worthy of worship. Thus, this belief provides the mental and emotional integrity of person. In times of difficulty, through the natural instinct people show towards the Creator is an act of the reaction shown which is coursed by natural creed properties. It should be said that another important natural human quality is love and affection. As the Qurʾān has expressed that human being is created from "alaq" also comes to the meaning of compassion. It is the human’s natural instinct to incline to those that he has compassion for. Once this inclination is made stronger the compassion turns into love. Desiring good or evil is also part of human nature as these two opponents are in men’s structure. Men being virtuous comes from choosing the good. Another important feature of human nature is desiring those that are aesthetically beautiful and disliking those that are aesthetically ugly. Men does not only desire those that are aesthetically beautiful but rather those that are spiritually attractive such as knowledge, modesty and bravery. It dislikes ignorance, lies and other bad qualities. Qurʾān’s phonetic structure can be counted as a proof to this. One of human’s natural instinct is to create and constantly update information. The word "khalq” is used commonly to bring anything to existence when it was absent totally, therefore this is used for mankind as a metaphor. As a result, it is possible to say that the most important human instinct qualities are reason, the ability of accepting of the unity of God, compassion, human and divine love, creativity, evoking good deeds, avoiding evil, valuing those that are ecstatically nice and avoiding those that are ugly. The different meanings and definitions of fiṭrah in tafsīr books and dictionaries such as dīn, pre-eternity of human destiny, initial agreement, and to geld animals are not the essential aspects of fiṭrah but the manifestations of the basic elements. (shrink)

Research shows that a high majority of parents receiving prenatal diagnosis of intellectual disability terminate pregnancy. They have reasons for rejecting a child with intellectual disabilities—these reasons are, most commonly, beliefs about quality of life for it or them. Without a negative evaluation of intellectual disability, their choice makes no sense. Disability-based abortion has been critiqued through virtue ethics for being inconsistent with admirable moral character. Parental selectivity conflicts with the virtue of acceptingness and exhibits the vice of wilfulness. In (...) this paper I claim that, beyond failures of moral virtue, disability abortion often involves failures of epistemic virtue on the part of parents. I argue two things: parents believe something false, or at least contested, about life with intellectual disability—and they do so because they are not epistemically conscientious. I first explain why a central motivation for disability abortion—that it prevents harm to the child—is mistaken. I next give a brief account of intellectual virtue and culpable ignorance. I then indicate why many parents fail to be intellectually virtuous when choosing to terminate pregnancy. I focus on elimination of intellectual disability and have little to say about physical and sensory impairments. (shrink)

As a ‘poet of the religious’, Søren Kierkegaard sets before his reader a constellation of spiritual ideals, exquisitely painted with words and images that evoke their luminous beauty. Among these poetic icons are ideals of purity of heart; love of the neighbour; radiant self-transparency; truthfulness to oneself, to another person, or to God. Such ideals are what the ‘restless heart’ desires, and in invoking them Kierkegaard refuses to compromise on their purity – while insisting also that they are impossible to (...) attain. It is the human condition which makes them impossible, and he is willing to describe this in dogmatic terms as original sin – sin being the refusal and loss of God, and thus also the loss of a self that has its ontological ground in its relationship to God – but he is more concerned to explore it in psychological terms. The human condition is for Kierkegaard characterised not merely by ignorance, but by wilful self-deception. (shrink)

One of the most irritating habits of analytic philosophers when they show a passing interest in the work of philosophers from the past is the professed ignorance of textual and philological detail. This used to be worse than it is in current analytical philosophy. Many detailed scholarly readings that roughly can be categorised as belonging to the analytic school of philosophy are published now that show great care for exegesis and philosophical argument in equal measure. But wilful exegetical (...) ignorance of historical philosophical texts is still ubiquitous among philosophers who technically don’t work in the history of philosophy. It’s often seen as a badge of honour to be merely interested in the philosophical argument that can be based on Kant, say, rather than in an exegesis of Kant’s text. This is often also portrayed in terms of the difference between offering Kantian style arguments and engaging in Kant scholarship. Kantianism is not the same as Kant scholarship, it is argued, and the former can be wholly detached from the latter, as if one could indeed judge what is Kantian without having studied Kant. One can of course legitimately pursue Kantian philosophy without at the same time engaging in Kant scholarship, but Kantian philosophy worthy of the name cannot not be informed by solid scholarship. ... (shrink)

Some knowledge — most infamously, the Nazi experiments on human subjects — has been acquired by means which cannot be morally condoned however beneficial the knowledge may be. Yet, given that we now have such knowledge, it seems morally questionable to forbid its use where we know it can benefit us. Although a strong utilitarian case exists for deploying such information and although any pragmatic, humane person would use it where it could improve a situation, residual moral qualms remain which (...) are neither the expression of sentimentality nor squeamishness. Given the evil source of the knowledge, can we avoid the charge that we are tied to the evil, and even respectful of the experimenters, by wilfully benefiting from the work? I explore a few arguments meant to remove the moral qualms and show them all to be wanting. However, because we in fact regularly and routinely benefit in countless ways from many systematic evils of the distant past without qualms, we seem to be inconsistently selective when it concerns certain evils. This inconsistency can be explained, if not justified, by appeal to a principle of decent delay which allows us after a time to ignore the origins of our present benefits and so make moral fadeout acceptable. This principle itself is grounded in our natural and increasing forgetfulness of events as they recede in time, an adaptive mechanism which allows us both to carry on our lives in relative decency and yet to maintain a fitting sensitivity to newer, closer evils which affect more immediately our relations with others and our sense of moral integrity. (shrink)

Domestic abuse is a worldwide public health issue with long‐term health and social consequences. Nurses play a key role in recognizing and responding to domestic abuse. Yet there is considerable evidence that their responses are often inappropriate and unhelpful, such as trivializing or ignoring the abuse. Empirical studies have identified several reasons why nurses' responses are sometimes wanting. These include organizational constraints, e.g. lack of time and privacy; and interpersonal factors such as fear of offending women and lack of confidence. (...) We propose, however, that these factors present only a partial explanation. Drawing on the work of Julia Kristeva, we suggest that alternative understandings may be derived through applying the concept of abjection. Abjection is a psychological defence against any threat (the abject) to the clean and proper self that results in rejection of the abject. Using examples from our own domestic abuse research, we contend that exposure of nurses to the horror of domestic abuse evokes a state of abjection. Domestic abuse (the abject) transgresses established social boundaries of clean and proper. Thus when exposed to patients' and clients' experiences of it, some nurses subconsciously reject domestic abuse as a possibility (abjection). They do this to protect themselves from the horror of the act, but in so doing, render themselves unable to formulate appropriate responses. Rather than understanding the practice of some nurses as wilfully neglectful or ignorant, we argue that through a state of abjection, they are powerless to act. This does not refute existing evidence about nurses' responses to domestic abuse. Rather, as a relatively unknown concept in nursing, abjection provides an additional explanatory layer that accounts for why some nurses respond the way they do. Crucially, it elucidates the need for nurses to be supported emotionally when faced with the transgressive practice of abuse. (shrink)

Illative combinatory logic consists of the theory of combinators or lambda calculus extended by extra constants (and corresponding axioms and rules) intended to capture inference. The paper considers 4 systems of illative combinatory logic that are sound for first-order propositional and predicate calculus. The interpretation from ordinary logic into the illative systems can be done in two ways: following the propositions-as-types paradigm, in which derivations become combinators, or in a more direct way, in which derivations are not translated. Both translations (...) are closely related in a canonical way. In a preceding paper, Barendregt, Bunder and Dekkers, 1993, we proved completeness of the two direct translations. In the present paper we prove completeness of the two indirect translations by showing that the corresponding illative systems are conservative over the two systems for the direct translations. In another version, DBB (1997), we shall give a more direct completeness proof. These papers fulfill the program of Church and Curry to base logic on a consistent system of $\lambda$ -terms or combinators. Hitherto this program had failed because systems of ICL were either too weak (to provide a sound interpretation) or too strong (sometimes even inconsistent). (shrink)

The paper presents a renewed Habermasian view on transnational multi-stakeholder initiatives and assesses the institutional characteristics of the Equator Principles Association from a deliberative democracy perspective. Habermas’ work has been widely adopted in the academic literature on the political responsibilities of corporations, and also in assessing the democratic qualities of MSIs. Commentators, however, have noted that Habermas’ approach relies very much on ‘nation-state democracy’ and may not be applicable to democracy in MSIs—in which nation-states are virtually absent. We argue that (...) Habermas’ detailed conceptualization of the institutionalization of deliberative democracy can be applied to transnational MSIs if these initiatives can be said to have their own ‘dèmoi’ that can be represented in associational decision-making. Therefore, we develop a definition of the dèmos of an MSI based on the notion of collective agency. Subsequently, we explain how Habermas’ approach to democracy can be applied to MSIs and show that it has more to offer than hitherto has been uncovered. Our illustrative analysis of the EPA confirms the criticisms regarding this MSI which have recently been articulated by researchers and practitioners, but also yields new findings and possible avenues for the further development of the EPA: That is, although our assessment suggests that the EPA in its current state is still far from being a democratic MSI, the possibility of a sensible analysis of its democratic character indicates that transnational MSIs can, in principle, help to fill governance gaps in a democratic way. (shrink)

Artikelen over intersubjectiviteit in ethiek, spiritualiteit en filosofie.

On the basis of ethnographic and historical material this article makes a comparative analysis of the relationship between public events, ceremonies and academic rituals, institutional identity, and processes of transition and power at two universities, one in Mexico and the other in South Africa. The public events examined here play a major role in imagining and bringing about political shifts within universities as well as between universities and external actors. It shows how decisive local histories and constituencies are in mediating (...) and transfiguring identity projects initiated from above. (shrink)

On the basis of ethnographic and historical material this article makes a comparative analysis of the relationship between public events, ceremonies and academic rituals, institutional identity, and processes of transition and power at two universities, one in Mexico and the other in South Africa. The public events examined here play a major role in imagining and bringing about political shifts within universities as well as between universities and external actors. It shows how decisive local histories and constituencies are in mediating (...) and transfiguring identity projects initiated from above. (shrink)

So cial re search is no lon ger fo cused on the “ob ject” of re al ity, but on and from an af fec tive space relationality in which the “ob jects” form part of the sig nif i cance and sym bol iza tion re la - tions of the sub jects that act inter-sub jec tively. In view of this co-existencial t..